

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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

JANUARY.

	PAGE
THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN PARIS. A. G. B. - - - - -	1-8
INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST. Frank C. Porter - -	10-29
HELLENISM AND HEBRAISM. John E. McFadyen - - - - -	30-47
THE NEW SCIENCE IN RELATION TO THEISM. George T. Knight - -	48-65
CRITICAL NOTE: <i>The Problem of the Poem of Job</i> . Dr. Eduard König - -	66-77
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE - - - - -	78-223
BOOKS RECEIVED - - - - -	224

APRIL.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. George A. Coe - - - - -	225-239
WHAT IS A MIRACLE? William Dewar - - - - -	240-255
THE LEGAL CODE OF BABYLONIA. A. H. Sayce - - - - -	256-266
A POINT OF VIEW FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION. Samuel H. Bishop - -	267-285
A NEW THEORY AS TO THE USE OF THE DIVINE NAMES IN THE PENTATEUCH. Henry A. Redpath - - - - -	286-301
CRITICAL NOTE: <i>The Place of God in Human Evolution</i> . C. S. Patton - -	302-305
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE - - - - -	306-431
BOOKS RECEIVED - - - - -	432

JULY.

A PLEA FOR THE HIGHER STUDY OF THEOLOGY. Charles Augustus Briggs	433-451
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. William H. Walker - - - - -	452-469
THE LOGIC OF EVOLUTION. Samuel Zane Batten - - - - -	470-486
PERSIAN DUALISM. Henry Goodwin Smith - - - - -	487-501
FAITH AND MYSTICISM. Eugene W. Lyman - - - - -	502-535
CRITICAL NOTES: <i>The Madrid Manuscript of Laodiceans</i> . Edgar Johnson	
Goodspeed - - - - -	536-539
<i>The Martyrdom of John the Apostle</i> . F. P. Badham - - - - -	539-554
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE - - - - -	555-624

OCTOBER.

	PAGE
THE RELIGIOUS FORECAST IN ENGLAND. A. Taylor Innes - - -	625-635
ART, RELIGION, AND THE EMOTIONS. Rudolph M. Binder - - -	636-657
THE ORAL SOURCES OF THE PATRIARCHAL NARRATIVES. Lewis Bayles	
Paton - - - - -	658-682
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE DIVINITY SCHOOL.	
Benjamin Wisner Bacon - - - - -	683-698
HODGSON'S "METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE" AS THE FOUNDATION OF	
THEOLOGY. James Ten Broeke - - - - -	699-727
CRITICAL NOTE: <i>Jews and Anti-Semites in Ancient Alexandria.</i> Ernst von	
Dobschütz - - - - -	728-755
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE - - - - -	756-823

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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Number 1

THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN PARIS.

(JULY-AUGUST, 1903.)

By A. G. B.,¹

Paris, France.

THE religious situation in Paris, and in France generally, is now more disturbed than it has been for twenty-five years, and as it is much affected by political questions, it is not easy to discover the truth, and to discern which is right among the conflicting parties. We will try nevertheless to draw a sketch of it, as impartial and accurate as possible.

The Roman Catholics cry that they are persecuted, deprived of their goods and their rights; that their clergymen are treated as rebels and their monks and nuns as outlaws. The Radical Socialists, on the other hand, complain of the presumption of the Roman Catholic priests and of their encroachments in secular matters, and are resolved to champion the supremacy of the civil power over the clergy. Such was the background of the Association Act of 1901 (*Loi Waldeck-Rousseau*), which, although granting more liberty for secular associations, greatly restrained the religious, and especially the monastic, congregations. The present struggle is but an episode of the conflict between the clerical and civil powers which has lasted for centuries. It will be enough, for our purpose, to point out the latest and most efficient causes of the anti-clerical movement.

¹ At the request of the author his name is withheld. [THE EDITORS.]

The strongest is the unquestionable tendency of most of the monastic orders to fight against our political organization. The orders, through their preachers and teachers, instruct the people that subordination of the clergy to the civil power, civil marriage, divorce, and liberty of non-Catholic worship are contrary to the constitution of the Roman Catholic church, as founded on a divine law, and, therefore, that these institutions may be tolerated as lesser evils, but cannot be recognized as permanent, and consequently ought to be fought by all means. On the other hand, an increasing group of the Socialist party, the so-called *Libertaires*, supported by the great majority of the Freemasons and by many scientific men, are openly hostile to every religion, which they denounce as standing in the way of social and scientific progress. At last, the open or secret participation of some congregations and of many bishops in several recent political matters—for instance, in the Dreyfus case and in the parliamentary elections of April, 1902—roused in the whole Republican party an outpouring of indignation and a resolution to render a repetition of the interference impossible.

Such was the situation on June 7, 1902, when Senator Combes took the reins of government from the tired hands of Waldeck-Rousseau. The declaration of the premier, in his opening address before the Chamber of Deputies, did not leave the least doubt concerning the catastrophe which was impending over the Catholic party:

A part of the clergy would confuse the cause of the Roman Catholic church with the cause of the religious congregations. Contrary to the spirit of the law, these clergymen have come down into the field of battle of the parliamentary elections. Such misconduct is intolerable. We will examine with you if the means of action which the government possesses are sufficient to prevent the recurrence of such an abuse. The Association Act has entered upon its period of judicial application. The cabinet will see that none of its clauses are checked.

And these words were not idle threats. During the past year the cabinet of Émile Combes, supported by the majority of both houses, has suppressed the greater part of the preaching and teaching congregations, closed seven or eight hundred of their houses, repealed the Falloux Act on secondary education (March,

1850), kept back the salary of several bishops and vicars who had made protests against these measures, broken off the negotiations with the Holy See about the nomination to vacant bishoprics, and declared that, if the clerical power would not submit, it would not shrink from the repeal of the Concordat.

Let us now consider each of the parties separately.

1. *The anti-religious party.*—One cannot say that the entire government party is openly hostile to religion, but since up to now it has yielded in almost every case to the anti-religious movement and voted the aforesaid measures, we end with the same result. The cause is championed by the newspapers *La Raison*, *L'Action*, *La petite République*, etc., by the majority of the Freemasons, and by a good half of the members of the League for Human Rights. The leaders are François de Pressensé, deputy from Lyons; Lintilhac, deputy from the Cantal; G. A. Hubbard, deputy from Paris; Charbonnel and Guineaudau, formerly Roman Catholic priests. They aim at the destruction of every religion as favoring ignorance and superstition, and would build the temple of reason and science on the ruins of the churches. To this end, one of them, F. de Pressensé, has prepared an elaborate bill on the separation of church and state, which throws much light on the secret purpose of the party. This bill, consisting of 103 articles, disestablishes the four religious societies recognized by the state—Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and Jewish, and, far from granting them full civil freedom, it deprives them of eighteen common rights at least. So that the application of such a bill, if voted and changed into an act, would be the ruin of all religious denominations.

Moreover, the love of symbols and of mysterious rites is so strong among our nation that, in order to destroy radically the Christian worship, they have invented ceremonies, which would replace the sacraments and feasts. Among the freethinkers there is a kind of initiation of children corresponding to baptism or first communion; two years ago, at the Trocadéro, a Feast of Reason, as a substitute for Whitsunday, was celebrated with great solemnity.

Their favorite topic is the radical reform of public education.

They are not satisfied with the exclusion of the Roman Catholic clergy from the primary and secondary schools; now they wish to make the moral education of all children fully agnostic. Here is the declaration of war against religious education made by Mr. Dantresme, general secretary of the Prefecture of Bouches du Rhône, in his address as chairman of the meeting for distribution of prizes at the Lycée of Marseilles (July 31):

It is necessary to draw all superstitious prejudices out of the mind of the younger generations. We want a system of education cleared from that Christian humility which lowers man by the besetting thought of sin, and renders him a quaking and credulous slave. The future will be ruled, not by faith, but by science, which makes the conscience free. So much the better, if the evolution of the human mind proceeds without religion.

And here is a specimen of their tolerance. Some weeks ago *La Raison* and *L'Action* raised a strong protest against the customary procession of the Fête-Dieu (June 11), and succeeded in getting from several prefects the prohibition of it, under the pretense that it would obstruct the streets. And just now (August 2), with the permission of the government and the protection of all the force of the police, they have organized a kind of atheistic procession, passing before Étienne Dolet's statue in Paris. Could there be a more striking example of intolerance and partiality? In fact, the leaders of this anti-religious party do not deserve the title of freethinkers, since they do not admit freedom of thought for their adversaries. They are no less fanatical than the most exclusive Ultramontanes.

2. *The Ultramontane Catholic party.*—If, now, we consider the other great struggling party, the Roman Catholic—or, more exactly, Ultramontanes—we are, at first sight, struck by the similarity of their spirit and their actions to those of the anti-clerical party. After they have been defeated in the last electoral struggle, they are crying aloud, "Liberty—liberty of association, liberty of conscience!" and are protesting against persecution. But if one turns to the editors of their leading papers—Drumont, of *La libre Parole*; Cassagnac, of *L'Autorité*; and Desmoulins, of *Le Gaulois*—and observes their attitude, or that of *Les Croix*,* toward the Anti-Semitic movement in Algeria

* *Les Croix*, the official organ of the Roman Catholic bishops in Paris and in the departments.

or the Dreyfus case at Paris, it will then be impossible to take in earnest their advocacy of religious liberty. In fact, they advocate the confessional unity of France, the subordination of all secular institutions to the church, and the subjection of all other denominations to the control of the Roman Catholic authority. In 1877-78, under the so-called "Cabinet de l'ordre moral," when the Roman Catholics had a majority in Parliament, they did their utmost to put the nation under the yoke of the bishops and to get the support of public authority for the worst practices of the Roman Catholic faith, namely, the worship of the sacred heart of Jesus and the control by the bishops of all grades of public education. This fresh instance shows what use the Ultramontanes would make of their power, should they resume the reins of government.

From this character of the party one can realize to what state of mind they have been reduced by the enforcement of the Waldeck-Rousseau act and of the last acts of Parliament, the latter increasing even to injustice the clauses of the former. They are incensed by the abolition of most of the preaching and teaching orders; by the closure of a hundred chapels, the walls of which are still resounding with the eloquent voices of Fathers Didon, Coubé, or Ollivier; and by the suppression of so many schools and colleges where their children were taught their religion and their political principles. All these measures, voted by Parliament without serious preliminary discussion, or ordered by the minister of the interior, in many doubtful cases, without appealing to the courts of justice, have wounded the sense of right and even of legality, and have excited feelings of rancor and revenge, which at the first opportunity may burst out in bloody reprisal.

However, the long agony of Pope Leo XIII., by diverting the attention of the Roman Catholic party, has brought a kind of truce in this religious war. Although a great many of the Ultramontane and royalist groups could not forgive him for advising the Catholics of France to rally to the republican government, the mass of their people showed the most sincere and respectful sympathy for the august sufferer and joined in the solemn prayer

ordered by Cardinal Richard to be said before the holy sacrament, in every church and chapel of Paris.

This sympathy extended to the non-Catholic societies. It is noticeable that even a lodge of English Freemasons openly expressed its desire for the healing of Leo XIII., or, if that could not be, for a painless death. The editor of the Protestant monthly, *La Revue chrétienne*, said in his number of August:

We render full justice to the eminent qualities of that great pope, to the dignity of his life, to his conciliating spirit. However, the most serious mistake of his government was to allot to human politics, to diplomatic combinations, too large a space.

It was stated by the College of Cardinals, after the death of Leo XIII., that the letters of condolence sent by the schismatic or heretic sovereigns and the presidents of republics were more expressive and sympathetic than the addresses sent by the heads of Roman Catholic nations, as Austria, Spain, and Italy. The Ultramontane party openly expressed its wishes for the election of an uncompromising, strongly conservative pope; and, strange to say, this wish was supported by the ultra-radical party in France, which hoped that the increasing struggle might end in the rupture of the Concordat. Both these extreme parties have been disappointed, and from all we know about Sarto's personal character, we may infer that Pius X. will continue Leo XIII.'s conciliatory policy toward the French government.

3. *The Liberal party.*—Between the Ultramontane Catholics and the anti-religious Freethinkers there is a middle party which, in my opinion, deserves the title of Liberal Republican, since it champions the maintenance of the great principles of the French Revolution: liberty of worship and equality of all citizens before the law. This party, represented by the newspapers *Les Débats*, *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Siècle*, and by the *Revue des deux Mondes*, consists of men of every denomination: Roman Catholics, like Georges Picot, Ribot, and Anatole Leroy Beaulieu; Protestants, like Gabriel Monod and A. Lods; agnostics, like De Lanessan and Waldeck-Rousseau; and even Jews, like Henry Michel and Théodore Reinach. All these men, although decidedly anti-clerical, have protested against the anti-monastic acts voted by

the present Parliament, or at least against the arbitrary and rough power used by Senator Combes to enforce them.

M. Georges Picot, the eminent author of the *Histoire des États généraux en France* and general Secretary of our Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, has eloquently shown in the number of the *Revue des deux Mondes* for July 15, under the title "Les Garanties de nos Libertés," how perilous for the liberty of every citizen is the abuse of Art. 10 of the Code of Criminal Examination, made by the prefects and police officers, on the order of the Minister of the Interior, for the application of the congregation acts. Let us quote a few lines from this paper:

We are right in declaring that never did public authority act more roughly than during the last year; that the last bills have been suggested and enforced by a sectarian spirit; that, owing to pettifoggery, the parliamentary proceedings, instead of protecting free discussion, have been used to crush it; that Parliament, converted into a court of justice, has denied the right of employing advocates to those who have been condemned in advance by the majority; that the laws, voted with a culpable thoughtlessness, contain tricks; that the government, after securing from both houses of Parliament violent laws, went beyond their plain intent in executing them, and thus broke them. Wherefore public authority, the task of which should be to foster peace, fails of its mission and brings disturbance and war into the streets.

Altogether, with Georges Picot, Gabriel Monod, the learned editor of the *Revue historique*, who so gallantly fought for justice in the Dreyfus case; René Goblet, an ex-premier and former leader of the Radical party; Cornély in *Le Siècle*, and, with less vigor, Georges Clémenceau, the present editor of *L'Aurore*, have protested against these excesses. They clearly understand that the civil power has nothing to gain from the proceedings of the majority; they reflect that a majority which abuses its power is condemned to become sooner or later an oppressed minority; and they claim for their adversaries the rights which they demanded for themselves, though only yesterday those rights were denied to them by their adversaries.

Among this gallant, but as yet too small, troop of Liberals, we are proud to say, the Protestants hold a prominent place. Their attitude in the present conflict shows that French Protestantism, on the whole, is a party of free inquiry, of toleration,

and of liberty. They condemn the vexations inflicted upon the Roman Catholics for the same reason that they condemn the persecutions which they had to suffer in former days. They do not deem that religious politics should be a perpetual crimination and recrimination, and have resolved with all true Liberals to promote religious peace.³

As for the Parisian Jews, the great majority of the so-called neo-Israelites are unbelievers, and interested only in business or art; but a minority, of which the Reinachs, Alphandéry, and Henry Michel are the prominent men, stand for the spirit of the prophets and for full liberty of conscience. On this matter there is no doubt that the liberal Jews are supported by the bulk of the orthodox or talmudic Jews, represented by the Rothschilds.

Such is, in its great features, the religious situation in Paris at the end of the parliamentary session. Let us now sum it up in a few lines. The repression of the encroachments of the Roman Catholic clergy was unavoidable, because of the excessive increase of their wealth and their participation in political matters; but, as often happens in such reactions, it has not seldom been too rough and hasty. The problem of the monastic congregations ought to have been solved slowly, as has been the question of the schools, which has lasted for seventeen years and is not yet settled. In acting so roughly and without observing the ordinary proceedings of Parliament, the Combes cabinet has brought on an excitement which is perilous, not only for the country, but also for itself. If, at the reopening of Parliament in the middle of October, the cabinet should commit one mistake more, it might not be supported by the majority and would fall.⁴ Then it would rest upon the new majority, after having broken every link with the ultra-socialist and anti-religious groups, to resume the noble tradition of the liberal republicans, to find an equitable way of reconciling religious liberty with law, and to settle the question of the separation of church and state.

³See *Le Temps*, July 13, 1903.

⁴In fact, the situation has not materially changed, November, 1903. A. G. B.

INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

By FRANK C. PORTER,
Yale University.

IT is characteristic of our age to approach all such subjects as the doctrine of the divinity of Christ in the historical way. We do not assume that the origin of a belief settles the question of its truth and value, but we feel sure that a correct knowledge of its origin is an essential help in determining its truth and value and interpreting its meaning. In this essay an attempt is made to suggest in a summary way some of the problems of the historian with reference to the beginnings of this faith, and some inferences that may be drawn from the history as to our own standpoint.

I. The first question that we naturally ask is: What did Jesus think and say about himself? The return from dogma to history, which characterizes our age, finds its chief task and its special justification in the return from the Christ of dogma to the Jesus of history. We begin, then, with the gospels in our inquiry, but we shall not end there; and in the gospels we begin with the question of the Messiah, but here also we cannot end where we begin. It is quite natural that in this return to history, which is our inevitable impulse and our conscious pride, we should push back of the apostolic age itself and strive to get into the immediate presence of the Master; and that we should at first include Paul and John in our judgment of doubt or disfavor upon all theological dogmas about the person and work of Christ as departures from the simplicity of the truth and the reality of the life as they were in him. But what has thus far been the result of this eager effort of many minds by all means to get back to the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth? It has not been altogether reassuring. We are here concerned with these results as they bear on the self-consciousness of Jesus, that is, primarily, on the question of his messiahship. Messiahship is not divinity, and yet, if a basis is to be found in the teaching

of Jesus for the later faith in his divine nature, this is the point which it is natural to examine first. But what most impresses and disturbs us at this point is to find how little agreement has been reached, and how opinions seem now to be multiplying and moving farther than ever apart.

A fact which explains in part the various opinions that find support on this matter is that the gospels present two different aspects of the teachings of Jesus which cannot easily be harmonized. According to one, his chief message was the fatherhood of God and the sonship of man; the love of God to man, and the love of man to God and to man; the religious faith and ethical ideal which he set forth, both positively in plain words and in parables, and negatively in criticism and condemnation of the conceptions of God and of the law which the Pharisees taught in words and life. According to the other aspect, his message was the speedy coming of the kingdom of God, that is, of God as King and Judge, and his own calling to the supreme place of glory and power in God's kingdom, which he would share with his faithful followers. According to the first aspect, Jesus appears as a teacher of spiritual insight and moral authority, concerned with the present, revealing the wrong ideals and practices of his time, and pointing out the one way of true life toward God and man. He is the calm, sane seer, who dwells on the heights, who speaks for all times that which is eternally true. According to the second aspect, Jesus appears as the prophet of a threatening catastrophe. He is absorbed in his urgent message that God's coming is at hand. He is a man of vision and ecstasy, who speaks under stress of deep emotion and with a fiery inspiration. His gospel is an eschatology, an announcement of last things, and his words are meant, not for all times, but for last times. To some, as to Wellhausen, Jesus appears almost wholly in the former light; to others, as to the younger Weiss, almost wholly in the latter. The two conceptions seem quite irreconcilable, and it is perplexing to find them maintained by competent historians, and to find that a case can be made out for each on the basis of the synoptic gospels, and that the approach toward agreement as to the synoptic problem

does not appear to bring with it an answer even to a question of such radical significance as this.

As a result in part of such differences in the total impression of the teaching of Jesus, and in part of different judgments as to the course of tradition that lies behind our gospels and their sources, various views are put forth as to the thought of Jesus about messiahship, and many questions are now open in the court of critical investigation. Was Jesus conscious of the Messiah-calling in childhood, or, as most affirm, at baptism, because of the vision and the divine voice, or at some later point in his ministry, because of his inner sense of a unique sonship, or because of the necessity he found himself under of criticising not only Pharisaism but Mosaism, and because no prophet, no one less than Messiah, could be authorized to put a new law in place of the old? Did Peter's confession call forth this certainty in him, or the people's acclamations as he entered Jerusalem, or the high-priest's solemn question? Or was the Messiah-idea absent from the whole ministry of Jesus, being the earliest form of apostolic faith in the risen Lord? Did the voice of baptism, if this was the messianic call, relate to the servant in Isaiah, chap. 42, in whom God was well pleased, or to the king in Psalm 2, whom God had that day begotten? The two ideals are far apart, and tradition wavers as to the original form. Did Jesus choose messiahship as the form of his ministry gladly and confidently, or under a compulsion due to the conditions and expectations of his time, so that a tragic element entered into his choice, as into its outcome? Does messiahship belong in the region of the sober, rational life, or in that of vision and ecstasy? Did Jesus conceive of his messiahship after the ruling type of a national king, either in a literal or in a spiritual sense; or after that very different type which we meet in the Book of Enoch, developed out of Daniel's figure of the one like a son of man—a type transcendent and heavenly in character, cosmic rather than national in range? Could Jesus have used the phrase "Son of man" as a messianic title? Was the messianic consciousness of Jesus the consciousness of being already the Messiah, so that he must have spiritualized that conception and given it the character of a divinely sent teacher,

physician, deliverer; or was it the consciousness of being the one chosen by God and destined for messiahship in the coming kingdom, so that he may have accepted it in a more literal sense? What is the meaning of the idea expressed in Acts and by Paul that Jesus became Messiah through his death and resurrection? Does it mean that the disciples did not know him as such till then, that the messiahship was really a product of the resurrection faith, or that Jesus himself only looked forward to a future messiahship, or that the disciples, through Jewish prejudices, had missed the spiritual sense of his earthly messiahship?

I do not mean to imply that all these questions are equally open, and all the alternatives equally probable. But every view thus suggested has its advocate among historians of good capacity and standing, and at some points the tendency now is toward the answer that we should not choose. I do not mean that historical resources are exhausted and that the place of messiahship in the mind of Jesus can never be determined with greater certainty and a larger agreement than are now attained. Yet it must be evident that religious needs cannot wait for the settling of such complex historical problems and must not be supposed to be dependent on them; and also that the historian himself must look elsewhere for that basis of relative certainty that he requires.

Evidently the study of the Messiah-consciousness of Jesus does not promise to lead us far toward an understanding of his inmost self. The study rather tends to turn us from itself to the things more clearly said and more unquestionably authentic in order to solve the problem of his witness to himself. We begin with the Messiah-consciousness, but we do not come to an end there. We begin to suspect that Jesus did not say so much about himself as we had supposed. And then we see that it was not in what he said about himself, but in what he said about God and about man, in his life with God and in his love for man, that he himself is most fully revealed. The study of his self-consciousness involves us in the most complicated and confusing problems. The study of his consciousness of God, his view of God's nature and demands, and of man's duty and

destiny, brings us into a region of light, and makes us aware of the heavenly glory of him from whom the light comes. He does not seem to be conscious of himself. His consciousness is wholly absorbed in God and in his fellow-man; and it would almost seem as if the study of his self-consciousness necessarily put us at an unfortunate point of view and made it impossible for us to see him as he was. It is when we listen to his words about God and man that we realize that the truth he is uttering is the truth of God; that his words are the words of God; that he is speaking in entire unconsciousness, in forgetfulness of self, with an authority that does not belong to man. We know that the sonship to which he calls us belongs primarily and perfectly to him, that the divine love which he declares as a gospel and commands as a law is present in life and truth in him. He taught of God, did God's work, and thus brought God's salvation near by word and deed. What men must think of God he made known, and what character and life that thought demands; but he seems to have left it to them to decide what they would think of him.

Some things, however, do result from the study of his self-testimony, which are of the nature of warning and direction as to our thought of the divinity of Christ. One thing is that we are to look nowhere but to the mind of the man Jesus if we would understand the distinctive nature and moral quality of the divine spirit that was in him. His character is the primary and essential factor in the interpretation of his divinity.

Again, his teaching should warn us against conceiving of his divinity in such a way as to exclude the imitation of him. This would be to repeat toward Jesus the error in the attitude of the Jewish mind toward God which he was most concerned to correct. He created or restored the ideal of God-likeness, setting before men as the supreme duty and the highest joy the imitation of the Father, teaching that reverent worship does not exclude imitation, but that these two belong together, obedience and aspiration, the child-like trust and the Father-like love. He must therefore necessarily, and did actually, repel any worship of himself that made the imitation of his mind and ways unessential or impossible, any conception of his sonship that

made more difficult instead of more natural the belief in the divine sonship of men.

Again, it could not be the will of Jesus that we should think of his divinity in a way that denies the Fatherhood of God, but only in a way that confirms it. It has been said that a high Christology has often produced or accompanied a weak sense of God. Men have thought of God as remote and inaccessible, and of Christ as near. They have thought of God as austere, unfavorable, coldly just, and of Christ as loving and forgiving. But Jesus taught the nearness of God, and that it is he, not some other, who clothes the lily and feeds the birds of the air. He taught the love of God, that he is good to evil and good alike, that his patient, suffering love draws sinners back to him, and that his chief joy is in their return. Whatever love Jesus felt toward men and whatever ministry he performed was in imitation of God and was justified by an appeal to the nature and example of God. It was surely far from his thought that he was to stand between men and God, spanning the distance that severed them and overcoming the disposition in God that kept them estranged. Therefore his divinity could not mean that he is a second God, doing what God cannot or will not do for men. Such a conception would be utterly abhorrent in his eyes. His divinity must lie in his oneness with God, not in his separateness, and come to effect in our oneness with God through him. Paul should have made the error I refer to impossible. In his view Christ brought men near to God by revealing God and executing his will of love to men. Christ was not in the world reconciling God to men, but God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. Christ does not commend his love to us over against the justice and displeasure of God, but God commends his own love to us in that when we were yet sinners Christ died for us.

II. This brings us to a second main question: What did his first disciples come to think of him? We cannot avoid this question or make it secondary, if we would come through history to some understanding of what the divinity of Christ should mean. We begin with the gospels, and our study of them is not without result. But we must carry our question also over into

the documents of the apostolic age. What meets us here? We find ourselves in the atmosphere of the worship of Jesus. The religion of the Father has become the religion of the Son. The New Testament writers give us various forms of expression of the common faith in the divinity of Christ, various theories that state and interpret the common worship of him, in other words, various Christologies.

Two things impress us in this wonderful, new, religious creation which the New Testament records. One is the boldness with which every important religious conception is applied to Christ and interpreted by him; and the other is that this devotion to Christ does not mean at all an anxious dwelling upon the earthly life of Jesus, but is almost wholly directed upward and forward to the living Christ and the coming one. Let us look somewhat more closely at these two wonders of New Testament Christology.

1. Religion has to do with overcoming the separation which men know exists between themselves and God, and as this separation is conceived in different ways, so the means by which it is to be overcome are variously imagined. There were at the time of the beginning of Christianity many sorts of mediating agents or processes by which this one religious task was to be performed, by which God and man were brought into harmony and oneness. Now, according to Christian experience, Christ is the one who unites God and man, who removes the estrangement, who breaks down the barrier, in whom God approaches man, and in whom man draws near to God. Hence Christian faith put Christ above all other agents and ascribed to him the names or the functions of those mediating, revealing, redeeming powers or persons in which religious faith had formerly trusted.

The Messiah was the deliverer for whom the Jewish people had hoped; hence the first confession of Christian faith was, Jesus is Messiah; and whatever heightening of the figure of Messiah had been attempted by Judaism, of its own impulse or under foreign influence, whatever identification of him with the heavenly, typical man and the coming judge of men and angels, all this Christians would eagerly appropriate to Jesus, knowing that no office was too high for him.

Angels had been mediators between God and man, and especially for Israel the angel Michael had been a heavenly helper, an intercessor before God on Israel's behalf, a minister to Israel of God's saving gifts. Now, Christ is above all angels, and to him are assigned the loftiest angelic qualities of nature and function. The help of no other angelic being is needed, and the malice of none is to be feared.

The Spirit of God had been the medium of the divine activity in men, the impartor of divine energies, the purifier of man's nature. Now, even the divine Spirit is conceived of as the Spirit of Christ. This is probably the most significant feature in Paul's Christology—this, rather than the idea of pre-existence. The exalted Christ is the life-giving Spirit that dwells in man and makes him a new creature. The Christian life is due to the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ. It is a life in Christ, the life of Christ in us. The Lord is the Spirit, and our transformation into the image of Christ is from the Lord, the Spirit.

In the Old Testament, Jehovah is the God of Israel's salvation. From Egypt onward he is Israel's God, the God of the nation's trust and hope. As Jehovah, God drew near to Israel, and Israel had access to God. Christian faith rose even to this height and identified Christ with the revealing and redeeming God of Israel. The Greek rendering of Jehovah was "Lord," and in declaring Jesus to be Lord, Paul quite certainly means that he is now to Christian faith what Jehovah was to Israel's faith, God as self-revealing, self-communicating, the God who is near and who comes to save. Christ was not Lord from the beginning, but he was, Paul tells us, exalted to that place and given that name that is above every name because of his self-denial, because in his former state in the likeness of God he had not done what, according to current belief, certain other angel beings had done—sought to seize upon the throne of God—but had rather become a servant and been obedient unto death. The lordship of Christ was the result of his earthly life and death freely undertaken for men's salvation. Now, he is the Christian's Lord-Jehovah, and is destined to be worshiped by the whole creation of God. No wonder that the decisive Christian confes-

sion as Paul formulates it is no longer, "Jesus is Messiah," but "Jesus is Lord." No wonder that it seemed to him that no one could make that confession except by the Spirit of God.

But this does not end the process by which all that men valued in their past religious faith was confidently ascribed to Christ and given his name and character. The conception of the Wisdom of God had done noble service in expressing the self-communicating relation of God to the world and to man. By wisdom God made the world. She was his first creation and his helper as he laid the foundations of the earth. By his wisdom God had entered from age to age into holy souls, and made men friends of God and prophets. Now, to Christian faith Christ is the divine wisdom, the agent of God in creation, and the inspirer of a knowledge of God and of divine mysteries in the minds of men. The fulness of the divine wisdom was in him and is by him imparted.

Somewhat related to this was the Logos conception, whose birth and growth was on Greek, not on Hebrew, soil. The *reason* of God, which is the soul of the world, and the *word* of God, which is the creative power by which all is made and all made known—this supreme mediating conception of the Hellenists was also interpreted by Christian faith as one more name and aspect of Christ. Here, as in every case, the identification meant a change. Christian faith did not simply claim all for Christ, but it knew how to assimilate all to Christ. So that while in this marvelous process the figure of Jesus, the Messiah, was lifted up into the heavens and transfigured, on the other hand, all these thoughts and images of men's religious strivings and ideals were in good measure themselves elevated and spiritualized by the all-subduing might of the Spirit of Christ. The Logos of John's gospel and even of the Apologists is very different from the Logos of Philo, and how much greater than his!

With the conception of the Law, finally, Christ was put chiefly in contrast. Yet even here the element of fulfilment was by no means wanting.

This is one characteristic of the process of thought about Jesus that meets us in the New Testament—the boldness with

which the important religious conceptions of the past were identified with Christ and interpreted by him and he by them.

2. The second characteristic fact is that all this was done without anxious and literal dependence on the Jesus of history. The interest of the apostolic age in Christ was supreme. Its interest in the historical Jesus, his deeds and words, was slight. It was not Jesus to whom all these divine names were ascribed; it was the risen and ascended Christ. His followers did not look backward to find and keep him, and linger among memories of the past. They looked upward, and they looked within. The living Christ was over them, their Lord; the Spirit of Christ was in them, the inspiring power of their new life. We may well wonder at this, and we might easily regret at first that they had not more anxiety to collect and preserve their memories of Jesus and give to the future a far fuller and more exact picture of him just as he was. But we well know, when we stop to think, that we are here in the presence of the very secret of the Christian religion, the very heart of its powerful life. What these men, and even Paul himself, had, they received ultimately from the Jesus of history. In his soul lies hidden the divine mystery of our faith. But having searched gropingly and without sure result through the gospel traditions for that mystery we may well find—and rejoice in this—that we are nearer grasping it in the letters of Paul. The greatness of Jesus, his secret, his divinity, let us say, is most nearly disclosed in the power that he had to produce in men a living faith that was not bound to his earthly presence, that was not contained in the words he uttered and the life he lived, though it had its first expression there, that did not depend on accurate recollections of all that he had said. It did, indeed, produce—this power of life that went forth from him—a supreme devotion and lasting loyalty to him. He himself, and no other, was, as we have seen, the sufficient, all-inclusive, all-interpreting and all-fulfilling revelation, communication, redemption from God. He was the one way to God, and yet his way was to set men upon their own way and divinely further them in it. The freedom of the apostolic age is the wonder of it, its worship of Christ and its freedom from bondage even to him.

He was apprehended as one who ruled and yet who set free. The law of his rule was a law of liberty. He was the Lord, but he was also the Spirit. He set men free. That was his way; that was their experience. He set them free even from himself as a literal example, as a binding law. Perhaps if he had written a book, he could not have liberated men from subjection to its letter. His religion might then have been a new legalism, and men might not have dared to move forward, to do new things and greater than his, to think new thoughts as the Spirit led them into the truth. Perhaps if the gospels were more perfect as historical sources and we could now accomplish our desire and perfectly recover the Jesus of history, we might lose the essence of Christianity as a living, ever-moving, free Spirit. So it may be that such disappointment as history has for us in our effort to get back to Jesus is for our good. If we could literally get back to him, could we also spiritually move forward in him? Certainly we could do so only in some such way as the first Christians did, by some measure of disregard for what was past, by the possession of the Spirit of Christ as an indwelling, divine power.

How, then, ought we to judge the Christology of the first age, two of the impressive characteristics of which we have had in view? Must we not say that it is the spirit, not the letter, of it that demands our assent? In the region of letter and form there is much that we cannot make our own. The Messiah is not to us, as he was to the Jews, a figure that expresses our living hope and stirs our deepest feeling. Hence the confession that Jesus is Messiah cannot be for us the best expression of the faith that in Jesus our hope of salvation is, or is destined to be, realized. Angels play no significant rôle in our view of history or of nature. The declaration that Jesus is above all the angel host, and that the interceding and mediating ministry of angels is fully performed by him, does not adequately express our highest thought of his office. The Logos is not our ruling philosophical term. We do not find the best explanation of the universe and of God's relation to it in this doctrine. Hence the identification of Christ with the Logos is not to us what it would have been to Philo—the incarnation in this person of our highest

truth, the domination of our world by his spirit. But it is not only the specific forms of these first Christologies that we can not adopt with literalness and put upon our minds as fetters. We must recognize also a certain danger in all this movement, splendid and for good as it was as a whole. It has been truly said that the Logos Christology is not higher but lower than the simple Christology of common Christianity which it rivaled and displaced; for, according to this, men are to see in Jesus, not God himself, but a second divine essence, God himself being remote and inaccessible. To see God in Christ, and to come to God through Christ, and to receive with faith in Christ, the inworking of the divine Spirit, the Spirit of God, the Father—this expresses in terms of experience a higher than the Logos Christology, a higher conception of the divinity of Christ than can be set in formulas.

No, it is not the letter, but the spirit, of the performance of the apostolic age that we should imitate. And what was its spirit? It was the offering of their best thought to Christ. It was the subjection of their entire being to him. It was a victorious conquest of self and sin in his name. If we can do something like this; if we can in some real way make Christ central in our world and in our life as they did in theirs; if we can conquer the present world of knowledge and effort in the name of Christ and by his Spirit, as they conquered their world; then we shall be doing what they did. But if we can only repeat their formulas and bind ourselves to dogmas put together out of their phrases, we shall be doing what they did not; we shall fall short of their greatness, because we miss the liberty with which Christ had set them free.

III. The final question is thus reached, how we can most surely and easily gain for ourselves this living and liberating Spirit of Christ, and especially whether we can gain it best from the Jesus of history or from the Christ of apostolic faith, from the synoptic gospels or from Paul and John. Let us agree that it is Christ the Spirit that we are seeking to grasp; that the question of the divinity of Christ, if it is to have any reality for us, must become a question of experience, not of theory; that it is only

the experience of Christ as divine that gives us the right to affirm his divinity. Which of the two ways, then, will most directly and certainly lead us to the experience of Christ as a living, divine power, the divine Spirit within us? From the earliest times to the latest this question has been differently answered by different men, so that we may fairly infer that some, in fact, find one way easier and some the other. This difference now divides the ranks of liberal theologians, and the question is one of vital concern, how deep-going a difference it is, and whether we must make a definite choice for ourselves.

In the New Testament itself we find evidence of differences of judgment as to the place and significance of the earthly life of Jesus in relation to the vision and possession of God in him and through him. There are here in particular two great types of Christian faith, Paul's and John's, which differ at this point. Paul's: Jesus through his death and resurrection has become Lord over us and life-giving Spirit in us, as present experience testifies; John's: the divine Logos became flesh in Jesus, whose life was a complete disclosure of God, as past experience proves. One finds divinity in the effects produced in men by the Spirit of Christ after his death; the other finds divinity in the earthly life of Jesus spiritually discerned. The two types are not necessarily contradictory, though they may become so. In fact, to Paul and John alike the gospel on the one side is bound up indissolubly with a historical person, and on the other side has received from him and receives with him a living principle of growth and free development. Furthermore, we can see the special value of the point of view of each in his place. Paul contributed mightily to the accomplishment of that first essential transition from following an earthly master to believing in a heavenly one and living in him. The thing first needed was the disengagement of Christian faith from what was past and sensible, the translation of it into the region of the eternal. Paul's thought and work alike reached out beyond the limitations of the earthly life of Jesus; and in this he showed far deeper appreciation of the Spirit of Christ and greater loyalty to it than did those who bound themselves more literally to the

habit and words of the Master. But the time came when the danger was no longer that men would hold too closely to the earthly life of Jesus, but rather that they would lose hold of this altogether, and with it would lose the distinctive quality of the new religion. The time came when Paul's way was either too easy or too hard for men; too easy for those who took it to mean that everything that the Christian might think or do was inspired by the Spirit of Christ, and who went on to think and do most un-Christian things in Christ's name; too hard for those who took it to involve a real and clear vision of Christ and a life of actual personal communion with him such as only a few could attain. In such a time the fourth gospel was written to bring Christian faith back to the actuality of the earthly life of Jesus; not, indeed, to rob it of the richness and largeness it had gained through Paul, but to prove that all that Christ had come to be to Christian faith he already really was as a man upon earth, if one would but look below the surface of his life. It was essential, if Christianity was to remain Christian, that it should return to the actual Jesus, and put its feet again upon the solid ground of history. The dangerous heresy then was the denial that Jesus Christ had come in the flesh, and the needed testimony was to the reality of things heard, seen with the eyes, and handled concerning the Word of Life. The aim of this writer was not to prove that the man Jesus was divine, against those who declared him to be only a man, but to prove that the divine Christ was truly and fully man, against those who affirmed that his humanity was not real. If we approach the fourth gospel from the reading of the other three, it seems to us that the figure of Jesus is being blended with ideal conceptions, the Logos, light, life, truth, and is in process of being stripped of historical actuality; but if we approach the book from the region of growing Gnosticism, we see that we are being brought back from speculations to realities, and that in effect abstract conceptions are being tested by the living personality of Jesus, and transformed into his likeness.

Now, without pressing a very imperfect analogy, it may perhaps be said that somewhat as the Johannine followed the

Pauline theology, the Ritschlian movement followed and balanced the speculative tendencies of the earlier liberalism. The original contrast of the two schools has not held itself unchanged, but there are at present some liberal theologians, especially of the Ritschlian direction, who urge a return to the historical Jesus as the sufficient and only revelation of God, the ground of faith, and the source of the Christian experience, while other liberals, especially of a more philosophical tendency, affirm that the living Spirit of Christ is the essential element and power of Christianity; that in Paul and the apostolic age we have not a departure from the simple and final gospel of Jesus in a speculative direction, but the emancipation of the Christ-spirit from the trammels of history and the beginning of its normal, free development; and that our present task is not to return to the Jesus of history, but to undertake for our age such a new adjustment and application of the Spirit of Christ as Paul accomplished for his age.

In raising the question which of these two tendencies of modern theology is the truer, we shall do well to approach them in the light of our earlier discussion. From this it resulted that when we seek for a true and living apprehension of Christ, or experience of his divinity, in the gospels, we shall find what we seek, not in the messianic claim or consciousness of Jesus, but in his gospel of the fatherhood of God and the sonship and brotherhood of man; and that when we seek for it in the other books of the New Testament, we shall find it, not in the forms of their Christological beliefs, but in the one experience which sought expression in these various forms, the experience of a new life in Christ, the Spirit. When this has been said, many of the arguments which each side urges against the other's position lose their force.

There are three arguments that are chiefly urged against the more historical by the more philosophical school, and in these the differences between the two tendencies come clearly into view.

1. The Jesus of history cannot be recovered with such certainty that he can be made the source and authority and con-

tents of our religious faith. We can go back from John to the synoptists, but not with certainty from these to their sources; still less from the sources to the traditions out of which they came; and least of all from these traditions to the facts. To this the answer is given: It is true that we cannot recover the details of the deeds and words of Jesus, but this is not what we are seeking for. It is rather the total impression of the person of Jesus, the ruling traits of his character, the fundamental principles of his teaching, his motives and aims, his faiths and ideals; in a word, his spirit; and this Spirit of Jesus can be well known by a study of the gospels, and better known the more critical the study.

2. But, it is said in reply, among the things that historical criticism makes probable about the teachings of Jesus not all are such as reason and conscience can assent to as of permanent validity. On the contrary, some ideas which are most certainly authentic are least capable of being accepted as authoritative. The reference is, of course, especially to the eschatological and apocalyptic region of thought and fancy. The kingdom of God, according to the ruling critical view, was an eschatological conception. The Messiah was one who is coming with the clouds according to Daniel's vision. These eschatological ideas and expectations, proved untrue by events and entirely out of place in the world as we know it, belonged to Jesus because he was a Jew of a certain age; and to him they were not secondary ideas, or merely the form of spiritual truths, but were of primary concern and literal value. We cannot erect the teaching of Jesus into the place of a final and absolute revelation, not only, because we cannot fully recover it, but because not all that we can recover can we approve.

To this two replies are possible. Admitting the eschatological element in the religion of Jesus, it may be urged that it does not constitute the essential contents of his teaching. This is to be found rather in the fatherhood of God and the law of love. The eschatological conceptions of Jesus were, even if not consciously, yet practically in value and in effect, the form of which the other was the substance. The eschatology furnished an

urgent motive, it kindled the fires of men's nature and quickened their higher powers; but the thing itself, the faith and the conduct to which this emotion gave impulse and conquering force was the love of God and the answering and mutual love of men, trust in God and in God's cause for now and forever, and a devotion to it which meant the conquest of self and the world. In this direction, not the other, authority and finality are to be found.

The other reply still further suppresses the eschatological features in the teaching of Jesus, not by interpretation, but by criticism. The eschatological element in the gospels, some declare, is unauthentic, being the first translation of the message and person of Jesus into the language and world-view of current Judaism. This view has been urged, not only by Martineau, who had so strong a bias in its favor, but by so sober and sane a historian as Wellhausen.

3. Over against this it is maintained that there is in any case a permanent objection to the attempt to bind the present to the past. The effort to return to the Jesus of history as the sum and substance of Christianity is an effort to put a past law upon religious thought restraining it, whereas it is the peculiar glory of Christianity, among the religions of the world, that it is a vital force, a principle of development, that it liberates and stimulates thought and will, and does not impose limitations and restraints. Even if it were possible to recover the actual teaching of Jesus, and even if this teaching were found to be altogether of the eternal and absolute quality, with no marks of its age upon it, yet the fact of its being accepted from the past as an external rule and final law would work disastrously, arresting the growth that is essential to health, and limiting that freedom which belongs to the highest life of the spirit. To this the reply is made that it is, of course, possible so to conceive of the finality of Jesus that faith in him shall be a fettering, not a liberating experience; but a literal imitation of his conduct and a literal and legal application of his words is not at all what we mean when we urge a return to the gospels and the earthly life of Jesus. What we seek and find in him is not an outward law for

deed and dogma to which we obediently submit; it is a living person who not only commands but inspires us; it is a personal influence which we invoke to uplift and save us. It is our belief that personality is the only effective force in the sphere of morals and religion, and the supreme person is therefore the supreme and ultimate fact, the only saving and transforming power. Jesus left no code of law, no creed, no dogma. He put no value on an external following of him. Both the limitations of our knowledge of his words and deeds and the nature of that which we do know forbid us from making our return to him a return from liberty to law, from spirit to letter.

Such, in brief, is the conflict between two great tendencies within the ranks of modern liberal theology. Must we now take sides in this great debate, this modern form of an ancient difference among Christian thinkers? May we not fairly say, at least, that the difference is not so deep-going as it seems? It appears to me that, rather than two forms of the Christian religion, we have here two ways, adapted to two types of mind, in which the same thing is attempted, namely, the apprehension of Christ as a reality of present experience. The one who searches in the gospels for the historical Jesus and would make him the foundation of faith, the final revelation of God, really gives this significance, not to what is historically uncertain, nor to what belongs to a past and for us impossible view of the world, but to something historically secure, and unconditioned by time and circumstance—to the personal, inner life, the character, or mind, or spirit of Jesus. It is the eternal that the student of the earthly life of Jesus is searching for, and we surely have no good reason to deny that, in spite of all difficulties, the eager and sympathetic and careful reader of the gospels may come through them into the presence of the Spirit of Christ. On the other hand, the one who looks into the apostolic age and into Christian history for the essence and principle of Christianity does not accept past formulas regarding the person and work of Christ as final and binding upon him. He is not looking for a theology, and identifying Christianity with it. He also is looking for the Spirit of Christ; but it seems to him easier to get

through form to reality at the point in history where the earthly life of Jesus has ended, and through death he has become a spiritual power and possession in the lives of his followers. We can best know Christ as spirit, such a one says, by contemplating his work in the spirit. Just that which we want to effect for ourselves, the change from what is past and outward to what is eternal and spiritual, the first believers in the risen Christ achieved. Their experience is typical and of the classic quality. By sinking ourselves in their writings we can enter into the inner reality and truth of their experience in such a way that in us, too, Christ may become an inner, spiritual power. But this end of such a search, the eternal being and spiritual reality of Christ, is precisely what the student of the earthly life of Jesus sets before him; and the question between the two schools resolves itself into this: Can the eternal, divine Spirit of Christ be best found and most surely and purely possessed by investigating and contemplating the man Jesus, of whom the gospels contain memories and impressions; or by observing how, especially in the first age, and there in original and normative fashion, the personality of the historical man of Nazareth became an inspiring, purifying, transforming power in the lives of his followers; and then how, age after age, the Spirit of Christ has proved itself to be the divine spirit of righteousness, holiness, and truth in the lives of men? In other words, shall we regard the earthly life of Jesus as the preliminary stage of a revelation and communication of God which was fully effected only after the end of his earthly life, in the minds of the first believers, and from then till now has been a living, moving, self-evidencing force in human history; or shall we regard the earthly life of Jesus as the pure and full embodiment in man of the divine Spirit, never again so perfectly realized, so that we need always to turn back to that, rather than to look within or about us, for its perfect presence and convincing demonstration?

Different as these two opinions are, and warmly as they are contending for the mastery in the modern mind, I still think we may say that they are only different forms of one faith; not that one is true and the other false, but that one to one mind and the

other to another mind is the truer expression of one reality, the more natural path to one experience. Both hold that the Spirit of Christ is the spirit of God. They agree that in his earthly life the man Jesus was possessed by the spirit of God, lived by it, walked in it. They agree that after his death the power to live by the divine Spirit came to men by faith in his resurrection and lordship, and was experienced as the power to live in him, or to be lived in by him, who is the power of the divine life.

The two ways should not be put into antagonism with each other, and need not be here in America, where the controversy between Ritschlian and liberal schools has not divided modern theology into warring camps. The two ways will, it is true, appeal differently to different minds. There will be some to whom the critical difficulties of the study of the gospels will seem the greater obstacle, and others who are more repelled by the remoteness of the problems of the apostolic age and the strangeness of its views of the world. To some the person and to some the ideal seems the chief reality and force in religion; that is, to some it seems that the great person creates the ideal and makes it effectual; to others, that the ideal inspires the person and is only mirrored and illustrated in him.

Each should follow the way that he finds will lead him nearest to the presence of the Lord. The average man should follow both ways. He should dwell with the man, Jesus of Nazareth, and learn to know God in the man. But he should go back to Paul as well as to Jesus, to the Spirit of Christ in Paul, as well as to the Spirit of Christ in the gospels. The Spirit of Christ was in Paul and others of the early age in its fresh power, and they worked out under a mighty inspiration, before which we stand in awe, the momentous transition by which the Jesus of history was lifted up, away from the earthly realm, into the spiritual and eternal, and was found to be no longer a man of a certain time and race, a certain limited range of activity, a certain view of the world which could not remain unchanged, but a spiritual being, a divine power, working ever new wonders in human life. The call to return to Christ, which we recognize as in a peculiar sense our own, is not the call to undo their work.

John's return to Christ was not in its inner meaning a departure from Paul, nor should ours be. Christianity cannot thrive—one is tempted to say, cannot in the end continue—if it cease to be what it was at the beginning, a religion of the spirit; that is, a present possession and experience of the inner life, a sure and joyful freedom of soul, a motive and principle of individual and social progress. But, on the other hand, the spirit of Christianity must always test itself anew by the mind of Jesus from which it sprang, and must never lose its vital, harmonious relation to him. .

HELLENISM AND HEBRAISM.

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To sum up the spirit and temper of two great peoples like the Greeks and the Hebrews within the compass of a brief paper will seem possible only to one who has not rightly measured the task. The Greeks were too versatile and the Hebrews too profound to lend themselves to such summary treatment. We can hope to do no more than point out one or two of the more salient features that distinguish the Hellenic from the Hebraic type of thought. Of course, between these peoples, as perhaps between all peoples, there exist more points of contact than of conflict. The New Testament was written in Greek by Hebrews; that is a point of vast significance. It means that there is no fundamental antagonism between these two types, widely as they differ. No doubt to one who has trained his taste on the models of classical style, the style of the New Testament will often seem lame and barbarous. Yet the fact that there exists a living and demonstrable continuity between the language of Plato and that of Paul—the fact that the great watchwords of the New Testament, such as *πίστις* and *δικαιοσύνη*, are to be found everywhere in classical literature, and have been developed by a perfectly natural and historical process into the rich connotation which they bear in the pages of the gospels and the epistles—is enough to suggest that the genius of the Greek and Hebrew peoples was, though vastly different, yet not fundamentally distinct. But we are at present more concerned with their differences than with their similarity. And to ascertain where precisely the difference lay, it may be well to begin at the outside; for the form in which a people expresses itself will always be in some more or less faithful correspondence with its inner thought.

Now, of form, in the classical sense of the word, Hebrew has little or none. The ceaseless repetition of the particle *Waw* in the Old Testament and of *δέ* in the New; the co-ordination

of thoughts of different value which the Greek would have expressed by some subtle subordination; the existence of practically only two tenses which have to do duty, not only for themselves and sundry other tenses, but for moods as well—all these things point to a certain syntactical helplessness, which is only the grammatical side of the Hebrew indifference to form. Perhaps the critic who spoke of the quotation in the epistle of Paul to the Ephesians (5:14) as a "broken fragment of shapeless barbaric verse,"

ἔγειρε, ὁ καθέδων,
καὶ ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν,
καὶ ἐπιφαίσει σοι ὁ χριστός,

forgot that we are not the best judges of the impression that such a verse produced on the ears of a Greek Christian; yet few would deny that it is, at any rate, a long step from that to the elegance of Pindar.

This disregard of form—a disregard which, in the light of the second commandment, we are almost entitled to pronounce religious—is also strikingly seen in the ease with which a Hebrew historian sets side by side two different and often palpably contradictory accounts of the same event, and also in the occasional disregard of inherent congruity with which two conflicting versions are fused together. At bottom, this is an artistic defect; and where the Hebrew mind is weak, the Greek is strong. Aristotle, in the *Poetics*,¹ lays down the law that, in a tragedy, nothing is more important than the arrangement of the incident; it is the *ψυχὴ τῆς τραγῳδίας*, more important even than the correct delineation of character. Reverse this, and you have approximately the Hebrew conception of the relation of character to incident. No doubt, even in Hebrew literature, the arrangement of the incident is often highly artistic: nothing could be more dramatic than the stories of Joseph and Esther. But, in the main, to the Hebrew it is character that is the be-all and end-all. Hebrew genius is subjective, spontaneous; it does not discuss, examine, compare, criticise. This disqualified the Hebrew from the successful pursuit of philosophy. He has hardly any par-

¹vi, 9.

ticle to correspond to the Greek *ἄρα* or *οὖν*; when he says "therefore," לְכֵן, he is usually not concluding an argument, but denouncing a judgment. The Greek keeps himself well in hand; the Hebrew lets himself go. Greek may be simple as well as Hebrew; but the one is the simplicity of art, the other of nature. Hebrew may, indeed, often give us the artlessness which is higher than art; but it is not conscious art. The Hebrew cared much less for the form than for the content. His thoughts were inspirations of the most high God; as for the words, "be not anxious beforehand what ye shall speak; but *whatsoever shall be given you* in that hour, that speak ye, for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit."

It is partly perhaps this consciousness of God that gives to Hebrew literature its spontaneity in comparison with Greek. "Men spoke from God, *being borne on by the Holy Spirit*." How wide is the gulf between this and the conscious effort put forth by the typical Greek—by Demosthenes, for example, who is said to have acquired his style by copying out the history of Thucydides eight times; or by Plato, after whose death a tablet is said to have been found containing the opening words of the *Republic*, κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραῖα, written out in all the possible permutations! To Plato, the most serious and beautiful-souled of the Greeks, style still counts for much; besides being one of the great original thinkers of the world, he is also a conscious literary artist. But the Hebrew world which set the hope of its redemption in the suffering servant, whose vision was marred, and who had no beauty that men should desire him, is a world in which grace of form or of language, though very far from absent, is not the object of the same conscious effort, for the realities of the inner life and thought are all-absorbing. The second commandment gives expression to one of the deepest instincts of the Hebrew nature at its best: "Thou shalt not make unto thee the likeness of any form." The true Hebrew, like his God, looks upon the heart; the Greek is as much concerned to impress the ear and the eye as the soul. This does not mean, of course, that the Greek cared supremely for style, and very little for content; for no one can throw his thought into a truly

artistic mold till he has completely mastered it; but it means that the Greek always retains the power of standing outside the matter with which he is dealing, of looking round upon it with a critical eye, and refusing to be mastered by it.

The note, then, of Hebrew will be reality, with enthusiasm at least for moral interests. It is characteristic that the word **דָּן** is relatively more frequent in Hebrew than the corresponding words in other literatures, and it occurs often in quaint combinations, as does its equivalent *δύωω* in the New Testament. The impetuous **צֶדֶק צֶדֶק תִּרְדֵּי**,^a which, whether we regard its use of the verb, its repetition of the noun, or its fierce insistence on character, is one of the most characteristic things in the Old Testament, offered a stumbling-block to the Greek translator, whose tame equivalent is *δικαίως τὸ δίκαιον δυνάξῃ*. The note of Hellenism, on the other hand, is balance, symmetry, an impartial distribution of sympathy, not only on the moral side of life, but in every sphere of human activity, the moral hardly even predominating. To him more truly than to most could the lines of Terence be applied: "Humani nihil a me alienum puto." In his history, his poetry, and his philosophy he preserves an even balance of sympathy; he cannot even look virtue straight in the face, but has to define it as the mean between two vices. This is perhaps only another way of saying that he contemplates the world from a predominantly æsthetic, rather than from an ethical or religious, standpoint. Naturally this statement is true only with great and serious restrictions. Much of Greek tragic poetry could fairly be called religious, even in a narrow sense of that word; and the work of Herodotus is the Greek attempt to justify the ways of God to men by showing on a gigantic scale how pride is followed by the vengeance of heaven. But though large and important tracts of Greek literature sometimes assume a semi-religious form, it is still true that the Greek diffuses his sympathy, with something like even-handed impartiality and with no special regard for moral considerations, over all the parties that file before him. He does not see them in the light of God, and so is under no obligation

^a Deut. 16 : 20.

to take sides. He is attracted by the humanity that is in them both—in the one not less than in the other.

It is startling to find how far the great Greek writers carry their impartiality—an impartiality which we might mistake for indifference, did we not remember that it is conditioned by the power of wide and generous sympathy. It is in a Trojan home that Homer has given us the purest picture of domestic love and conjugal happiness. Herodotus, too, does ample justice to the nobler qualities of the Persians. It is no part of Greek literary policy to vilify opponents; and we need not resort to the subtle assumption that the glorification of the enemy is intended to enhance the greatness of the victory over them. Rather does it seem due to what Julia Wedgwood has called the "spirit which insists on hearing the other side." No writer possesses this dramatic impartiality in so high a degree as Thucydides. To those who can read between the lines it is quite clear that the Spartan Brasidas is his hero, and the same spirit of fairness is everywhere. It was no congenial story of triumph that he had to tell, no brilliant tale like that of Herodotus—of how the might of Persia had dashed itself to pieces against the bravery of Greece. But he told it with matchless impartiality—the story of the ruin of the cause of the city he must have loved—how one bright day her splendid fleet set sail, amid the shouts of the people gathered on the shore; how drink-offerings were poured out to the gods, and their blessing invoked; and how those high hopes were slowly crushed by the tidings of disaster upon disaster; how at length the Athenian cause was shattered, her men suffering sorrows too great for tears, and few out of many returned home. There is no rancor here against the Athenians who had banished him, nor yet against the Syracusans who had crushed his countrymen; it is simply a calm recital of historical fact, colored neither by moral nor by party considerations. Syracuse came as much within the sweep of his historical vision as Athens, and therefore demanded and received the same historical justice.

There is a passage in the biography of Thucydides by Marcellinus which sheds a curious light upon this Greek, or at any rate Thucydidean, genius for impartiality. He tells us that Thu-

cydides spent large sums of money on the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, so that he might have accurate information of all that was done and said during the war. "This he might have learned," says Marcellinus, "from the Athenians alone, but it was his object to write a truthful narrative of the events, and it was natural that the Athenians should misrepresent the reports to their own advantage, often saying '*We* conquered,' when they had done nothing of the kind."³ Thucydides tells us himself that he scrutinized the accounts of speeches or events as closely as possible, and that he experienced great difficulty in the investigation as there were often conflicting accounts of the same incidents due to the partiality or the bad memories of his informants.⁴ To this stern impartiality he makes no exception even in favor of himself. He refers to his own banishment in a tone of the most complete disinterestedness, merely to account for the special opportunities which his position gave him of following the chances of the war. "It was my lot," he says, "to live in exile for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis. I thus became conversant with both parties—indeed, as an exile, I saw most of the Peloponnesians—and was enabled to study the events more at my leisure."⁵ Here is impartiality at its zenith. No Hebrew could have written that; he would have imparted more personal feeling to it. The passion of the Hebrew historian for his people and his God beats behind the plainest narratives. There is never wanting something of that feeling which inspired the prayer of Moses: "If thou wilt not forgive the sin of this people, blot me, I pray thee, out of thy book which thou hast written;" or of St. Paul: "I could wish that myself were anathema from Christ for my brethren's sake." Almost all the work of the Hebrew historian was inspired either by a love for his people, or by a desire to illustrate the moral order, or rather the divine discipline and love in history. His work is instinct with religious enthusiasm; it glows with a pas-

³ σκοπὸς γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων συγγράψαι, εἰκὸς δὲ ἦν Ἀθηναίους πρὸς τὸ χρῆσιμον ἀπαγγέλλοντας τὸ ἐαντῶν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ λέγειν πολλάκις ὡς ἡμεῖς ἐνίκησαμεν, οὐ πικθήσαντες.

⁴ i, 22, 3.

⁵ v, 26, 5.

sion, distorted—Thucydides might have said—on the one side, in the interests of nationality, on the other, in the interests of righteousness.

Enough has been said to show that there was a wide difference of temper and character between the Greeks and the Hebrews. To show how deep this difference really lay, we shall dwell for a little on what we may call points of contact and conflict between Hebraism and Hellenism; and we shall find that, numerous as the former seem to be, they only serve to strengthen our conviction of the deep, though not radical, difference between the two peoples. Numerous passages could be culled from every period of Greek literature, in which we seem to hear the echo of the Old Testament or the prophecy of the New. We find Themistocles giving thanks to heaven for the Greek triumph over the Persians, in language which reminds us forcibly of Joshua's farewell address to Israel: "For it is not we who have wrought this deliverance, but the gods and heroes, who were jealous that one man should reign over Asia and Europe, and he unholy and wicked."⁶ The aged knight Phoenix, in Homer, urges the value of prayer in words that recall the goodness of the Father who hears in secret and gives men the victory over sin. "Even the very gods can bend. . . . Prayers are daughters of the great Zeus, halting and wrinkled and of eyes askance, that have their task withal to go in the steps of Sin. For Sin is strong and fleet of foot, wherefore she far out-runneeth all prayers, and goeth before them over all the earth, making men fall, and Prayers follow behind to heal the harm."⁷ Striking, too, is the couplet in the Anthology:

He who enters the fragrant temple must be holy.
And holiness is purity of mind.⁸

There is something almost distinctively Christian in the line of Menander: "True life is living not for self alone." Plato, the most profound of all the Greek seers, must have looked upon life with Christian eyes when, in the *Symposium* (203) he wrote:

⁶ HERODOTUS, viii, 109, 4.

⁷ *Iliad*, ix, 496.

⁸ ἀγρὸν χρὴ τοῦτο θυώδους ἐντὸς ἰόντα
ἔμμεναι· ἀγρὲν δ' ἔστι φρονεῖν δαία.

"Love is always poor, and is far from being fair and tender as the many suppose, but is lean, ill-favored, shoeless and houseless, a poor, penniless wanderer, sleeping at doorways, or on waysides with the sky above him."

But there is no single Greek book which seems to present both the points of contact and of conflict so strikingly as the *Ethics* of Aristotle; and we shall conclude our summary of the former by calling attention to three passages—though the number could be greatly increased—which come astonishingly near to the spirit of the New Testament and even to its phraseology. "A man is not proved to be just," he tells us, "by doing a just thing; he must do it in the spirit of a just man." Again: "It is a strongly marked feature of the liberal man to go to excess in giving, so as to leave too little for himself; for disregard of self is part of his character"⁹—a tolerably close approximation to the saying: "It is more blessed to give than to receive." But the correspondence reaches perhaps its highest point in Aristotle's description of the good as that which is peculiarly a man's own and can scarce be taken away from him.¹⁰ Who that reads this can help thinking of the peace of God, which the world can neither give nor take away?

But great and often surprising as is the resemblance between the Hebraic and the Hellenic spirit, it only serves to throw into sharper relief the deep-seated difference. To balance the passages quoted, many more could be adduced which could have come from no Hebrew pen—passages in which the great and guiding thoughts of Hebraism are characteristically absent. "Happiness," says Aristotle, "plainly requires external goods;" and "the happy man is one who exercises his faculties in accordance with perfect excellence, being duly furnished with external goods for a full term of years, who shall continue to live so, and shall die as he lived."¹¹ We cannot help wondering what he would have thought of Him who had not where to lay His head, and who yet lived in the blessed and abiding fellowship of the Father. Again, it is a far cry from the dictum that "virtue depends upon ourselves and vice likewise"¹² to the confession that

⁹ iv, 1, 18.¹⁰ i, 5, 4.¹¹ i, 10, 15.¹² iii, 5, 2.

our sufficiency is of God. Again, in Aristotle's discussion of temperance there is no trace of the thought that this is a duty to God as well as to ourselves, our bodies being temples of the living God. Plato, in the *Phædo*, works out the thought expressed in the proverb *σῶμα σῆμα*, that the body is a prison; Paul, too, cries in a moment of transport: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" But Plato's desire to escape from the body was inspired by the thought of the evil of matter; Paul's, by the thought of the exceeding sinfulness of sin. The typical Greek has no sense of the struggle with sin, and no sympathy with the cry, "Oh wretched man that I am!" He has no conception of the world or the individual as needing redemption, and so feels no obligation to exercise a redemptive activity in the sphere of human sin or suffering. The Greek ideal, as Aristotle reminds us,¹³ is *θεωρία*, not action, but contemplation. "If we were to go through the whole list of virtues," he says, "we should find that all action is petty and unworthy of the gods: their life then must consist in contemplation."¹⁴ Contrast this with: "My Father worketh hitherto and I work."

On the whole, the Greek tends to emphasize the value of principle; the Hebrew, of personality—neither, of course, to the exclusion of the other. Plato refers all things in the world of being and of thought to "the unhypothetical first principle," that is, "the good." But though, in his glowing pages, this is not the cold and lifeless abstraction which most first principles are, it is a long way from the living simplicity and power of the Hebrew Jehovah. The same tendency—natural, of course, in a philosophical discussion—to emphasize the importance of principles, comes out in the great phrase of the *Ethics* that good actions are to be done *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*—for the sake of that which is *καλόν*, noble. And yet both Plato and Aristotle feel the need of supplementing principle, at least for most men, by an appeal to personality: Plato, when he tells us in a tone, half of hope, half of despair, that the world will never be right till philosophers are kings; and Aristotle, who practically concedes the necessity of reasoning in a circle on moral questions, when

¹³ *Nicomachean Ethics*, x, 7, 1.

¹⁴ x, 8, 7.

he says, "that is truly valuable and pleasant which is so to the earnest man, the *σπουδαῖος*."¹⁵ Such words force us to feel that the Greek heart, in its desire to solve the world-riddle, yearned no less than the Hebrew for "one like unto the Son of man."

When the Greek forgets himself and instead of keeping rigidly to his discussion of principle, draws the picture of his ideal man, we feel how much better adapted the Hebrew world was than the Greek to teach humanity the harder lessons and the nobler ideals of religion. The high-minded or great-souled man of Aristotle, who may fairly be taken as the Greek ideal, is one who claims much and deserves much; one who will not run into petty dangers, but will be ready to incur a great danger, feeling that life is not a thing worth keeping at all costs; one who will be more willing to confer favors than to ask them; one who will not do many things, but great things, and notable, one who speaks the whole truth, hates gossip, and despises flattery; one who will not run along swinging his arms any more than he would commit an act of injustice; one whose gait is slow, whose voice is deep, and whose speech is measured: why should he excite himself when nothing is of very much importance to him?¹⁶ It is only fair to remember that if the high-minded man claims much, it is because he deserves much: high-mindedness is impossible without the union of all the virtues. Still we cannot help feeling, with a tragic intensity of which Aristotle did not dream, that his high-minded man "seems to look down upon everything," and to exhibit in his character a certain superciliousness which is the very antipodes, not only of the Christian, but even of the finer Hebrew type of humility. For the Hebrew consciousness was always overshadowed by the presence of God, and this produced—not indeed always, but very often—a temper of self-dissatisfaction which we rarely find among the Greeks. The ideal man of the fifteenth psalm has several points in common with his Greek brother; but the opening question of the psalm carries us into a different world of religious feeling, by contemplating human character in the light of God.

Jehovah, who shall sojourn in thy tent?
Who shall dwell in thy holy hill?

¹⁵x, 6, 5.

¹⁶*Nicomachean Ethics*, iv, 3.

The conception of God made all the difference. It was this that made the Hebrew feel that when he had done his best he was still an unprofitable servant.

This will be a convenient place to say a word about Greek religion. It has been said that Greek religion is a religion of this world. Like most epigrammatic utterances, this is only half a truth. It is true, indeed, that though the death of Ædipus is invested with solemn glory, there is no hint of a blessedness that will be his in the next world; but, on the other hand, Antigone consoles herself with a hope, that is almost a certainty, that she will find in the other world the love she has missed in this. In the main, however, it is true that Greek religion concerns itself chiefly with this world. It seeks its compensations here, and is disappointed when it does not find them. The few words in which Thucydides sums up the character and fate of the unfortunate Nicias sound like the expression of perplexity and disappointment. "Of all the Greeks of my time," says the historian, "he least deserved so miserable an end, for he lived in the performance of all that was accounted virtue."¹⁷

The popular Greek conception of deity is singularly vacillating; it hardly seems to know whether God is one or many, moral or immoral. Tales the most noble and the most base jostle each other on the pages of the poets. But, in spite of this confusion—a confusion which tends to vanish with the progress of Greek thought—there are elements in Greek theology making for monotheism and morality from the very first. Even in the Homeric times, which rejoiced in a multitude of gods, there is one who is Father. This is the beginning of that feeling which finally learned to designate the deity in terms of the most rarefied metaphysical unity as τὸ ὅν. The tragic poets stand midway between the popular polytheism of their contemporaries and the philosophical monotheism of Plato, with more leaning to the latter than the former. A chorus in the *Agamemnon*¹⁸ begins an appeal to Zeus with a peculiarly un-Hebraic hesitation:

Zeus, whosoe'er he be,
If this be the name he loves;

¹⁷ vii, 86, 5.

¹⁸ 160 f.

and it is said that "some (τις) Apollo or Pan or Zeus will send a late-avenging fury."⁹⁹ The monotheistic instinct was also to some extent satisfied by the Greek conception of *Μοῖρα*, or Fate, as a power which lay behind both gods and men.

On the metaphysical side of Greek theology there are hints, and more than hints, of monotheism. What is to be said of the ethical side? What was the character of the god or gods? Human feelings are ascribed to the gods by Greek and Hebrew alike, with this difference, that the anthropopathy, as it has been called, of the Hebrews—that is, the ascription of fear or wrath, scorn or repentance—is hardly ever repulsive, while that of the Greek is often shocking even to a not over-refined moral sense, though this is true mainly of the earlier poetical and popular conceptions. Homer and Hesiod, for example, are fiercely attacked by the poet-philosopher Xenophanes for having "ascribed to the gods all that is blame and shame among men—theft, adultery, and mutual deceit." Pindar, too, has not scrupled to alter stories discreditable to the gods to suit the high purposes of his own pure verse. For the highest, and therefore not the average, conception we must turn to Plato, who, in a trenchant protest against popular ideas, vigorously maintains that we must conceive of God as the author of good only, and not of evil also; and also as wholly unchangeable, and so incapable of the metamorphoses which figure so prominently in poetry. But more may be learned of the typical Greek mind from the historians and the poets than from Plato. They tell us that the gods love the good and hate the bad, especially the proud, and, curiously enough, not only the proud, but the successful, at any rate the too successful. This divine jealousy of human success is one of the familiar marks of Greek theology. Both the ethical and the anthropopathic views of deity are combined in the passage of Herodotus already quoted, where the gods are said to be jealous that one man should rule over both Asia and Europe, and he, too, unholy and wicked. The gods were bound to hate Xerxes because he was wicked: they were no less bound to hate him—so thought the Greek—because

⁹⁹ *Agamemnon*, 55-59.

he was powerful. Prosperity seems to have been the only crime of Polycrates. The gods are jealous of men who stand head and shoulders above their fellows, in somewhat the same way as Hebrew tradition ascribes to Jehovah jealousy of the builders of the tower of Babel. "Deity is always jealous," says Herodotus in another passage, "and delights in confusion."²⁰ The whole history of Herodotus is a brilliant and impressive sermon on the text, "The gods love to bring down high things." The Persian disasters were the divine vengeance on ὕβρις. This thought brings us back to the principle with which we started—the Greek love of balance—and shows us that the gods were conceived to be governed by the same passion for symmetry that ought to determine human action. He who had been guilty of ὕβρις, he who was too prosperous or too rich, must be punished by the Greek god of proportion.

With this thought let us pass to the consideration of the Hebrew and the Greek view of suffering. It is well known how the Hebrew writers solved, or rather approached the solution of the suffering of the good man; how the man who did what was right was divinely rewarded with material prosperity, while misfortune was the divine curse on sin; how the sufferings of the exile taught men the inadequacy of the older solution; how an unknown prophet softened the bitterness of the sorrow by learning that the servant of Jehovah may be wounded to heal transgressions that were not his own; how the great writer of the book of Job found comfort in a larger thought of God; how at length the problem received its living solution in the cross of Christ. No such powerful comprehension of the place and meaning of suffering in human life has been given by the Greeks. They have taught us much, but it was not their mission to teach us that. Still, Greek literature does answer this problem in a way of its own, and there can be no better point for starting the discussion than the famous passage in the *Poetics*, in which Aristotle lays down the conditions of a successful tragedy: "We must not have good men," he tells us, "changing from prosperity to adversity—this would not be pitiful or terrible, but

²⁰ i, 32, 2: τὸ θεῖον . . . φθονερόν τε καὶ παραχῶδες.

shocking—nor bad men changing from adversity to prosperity, nor very wicked men from prosperity to adversity, for this evokes sympathy, but one neither pre-eminent for virtue or justice, nor falling into adversity through vice or wickedness, but falling δι' ἀμαρτίαν τινά, being a person of great repute and prosperity."²² That is to say, where there is suffering, there must be some ἀμαρτία—not sin, but flaw—to account for it. But this only restates the problem without solving it, for the difficulty remains that the punishment is often in such pathetic disproportion to the crime, if crime it can be called. True, when we scan a tragic character closely, there is always some ἀμαρτία; in Œdipus there was rashness, temper, impetuosity; in Antigone—well, it is more difficult to condemn her, for if she has broken the law of the state and should suffer, she has kept the higher law of the family and should be saved. Still, from the Greek point of view, it could be urged that she showed a boldness both of deed and word which was not seemly in a woman. Here, at least, is a ἀμαρτία which would satisfy the Greek view of character, though surely it hardly merits such a tragic penalty; and so the riddle remains. But here and there the light breaks through. The mystery of suffering can in part be explained; it may be due, for example, to ancestral guilt. This is the idea so magnificently worked out in the *Oresteia* of Æschylus, and in this conception two ideas meet which partly reconcile us to innocent suffering. The one is that the guilt of ancestors is in some sense our own, as we are bound to them by a common life and spirit; the other is that the tragedy ultimately comes about through the exercise of free will on the part of the sufferer.

Further, suffering teaches: there are few thoughts commoner in Greek literature than this, which was stereotyped in the phrase παθήματα μαθήματα. It may help to sweeten and purify character, as it did with Œdipus, whose old age is invested with a grace which his middle life knew not; or it may establish a higher law, as the death of Antigone wrought a victory for the family which her obedience to the state could never have done. Often, too, there is some kind of compensation to the sufferer, some-

²² xiii, 2, 3.

times in this world, sometimes in that which is to come. To the old, blind, and broken-hearted king comes the honor of burial in the sacred grove of the Eumenides; and "the passing of the man was not with lamentation, or in sickness and suffering, but, above mortal's, wonderful."²² Antigone, too, finds comfort in the thought of the future. "When I come there—such is the hope I cherish—I shall find love with my father, love with thee, my mother, and love with thee, true brother."²³ And, besides the possible compensations of this world or the next, the sufferer always retains a consciousness of his own integrity of which no misfortune can rob him. "True worth," says Aristotle, "shines out in the calm endurance of many great misfortunes;" and yet his hero, as we have seen, is not a sufferer. For the adequate recognition of the beauty of sorrow we must go to that most Christian of all the Greek thinkers, Plato, whose rapt words seem to fall from the lips of one who had gazed prophetically upon the cross of Christ. For Plato tells of one who had done all "that he could for his people, and had received from them nothing but scorn; so, in the storm of dust and sleet, he seeks the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and goodwill, with bright hopes."²⁴ With a still deeper glance into the mysteries of God, he sees one who is the best of men, going on his way in his nobleness and simplicity, yet thought to be the worst of men; he sees him scourged, racked, bound, subjected to every kind of evil, and in the end crucified.²⁵ Here Greek thought becomes Christian. As there was one Jew, in the person of the great prophet of the exile, to whom the cross would not have been a stumbling-block, so there was at least one Greek, in the person of Plato, to whom it would not have been foolishness.

The consideration of the suffering of the innocent leads us by an easy transition to the Greek thought of the sadness of all human life. So keen was the Greek sense of beauty, and so numerous its sources of satisfaction, so versatile was the genius

²² *Œdipus Coloneus*, 1663 ff.

²⁴ *Republic*, vi, 496.

²³ *Antigone*, 897 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, ii, 361.

of the people and so triumphant in its versatility, that one would have expected them to be possessed by the feeling which thrilled the poet of a later day: "Joy was it in that day to be alive." Yet, this is very far from being the predominant note of Greek literature. The consciousness of the presence of God and of fellowship with him gave to the Hebrew, even when humbled by a sense of sin, and overpowered by the thought that he was but a stranger and sojourner upon the earth, a sense of peace which not only reconciled him to his lot in the world, but touched his sorrow with gladness, gave him a certain delight in life, and sometimes, though not always, a fearlessness at the contemplation of death, to which the Greek, for the most part, remained a stranger. This note of sadness is struck as early as Homer. "There is nothing more piteous," says Zeus to the weeping horses of Achilles, "than a man among all things that breathe and creep upon the earth,"²⁶ and gently or loudly this dirge is heard from the beginning to the end. Solon told Cræsus of two young men of Argos, strong, and victors in the public games, who had drawn their mother in a car six whole miles to the festival of Hera. The proud mother prayed that Hera would grant her sons the greatest blessing men could receive; and they fell softly asleep in the temple, and never woke again.²⁷ Verily, all of us who live are no more than phantoms, fleeting shades, the shadow of a dream—that is the burden of tragic poetry. No wise man will crave length of years; for "the long years," sings the chorus in the *Œdipus Coloneus*,²⁸ "lay up full many things nearer unto grief than joy; but, as for their delights, their place shall know them no more, when the doom of Hades is suddenly revealed, without marriage song, or lyre, or dance—even Death at the last." The whole passage strikingly recalls Qoheleth, that least biblical of all biblical books; and the chorus goes on in a strain that not only rises again and again from the Greek heart in every period of its life, but that often expresses itself in almost the same words: "Not to be born is, past all prizing, best; but when a man hath seen the light, this is next best by far, that with all speed he should go to the land whence he hath come."²⁹

²⁶ *Iliad*, xviii, 443-47.²⁷ HERODOTUS, i, 31.²⁸ 1215 ff.²⁹ 1225 f.

But it is perhaps in the later poets of the *Anthology*, who had seen the decay of all that was most distinctively Greek, and were peculiarly impressed by the frailty of all human things, that the melancholy of life is most persistently reiterated. Rufinus sends a bunch of flowers to a girl with the words :

Garland thyself with these, and cease thy pride :
Thou like the garland, too, dost flower and fall.³⁰

How can life but be sad, when we have only "chance as pilot" of our way?³¹ So "all is laughter, and all is dust, and all is naught."³² "Weeping was I born," mourns one, "and weeping I die; 'mid plenteous weeping did I pass my life." There is deep pathos as well as humor in the lines :

Here lie I, Dionysius of Tarsus, aged sixty years;
I never wed; I wish my sire had never.³³

Very touching too is this epitaph on a baby :

"Me, a babe, that was but tasting life, fate snatched away, whether for good or ill I know not. Oh greedy death! Why didst thou cruelly snatch me in my babyhood? wherefore thy haste? are we not all thine in the end?"³⁴

Now, it would be rash to assert that the pathos of life finds no expression in Hebrew Literature. Sadness there must be in any true transcript of life; and most of all where men deeply feel, as the Hebrews did, the sin or transiency of the world. It was voiced now and then by psalmists who felt that they were strangers on the earth, and that man flourisheth as the flower of the field. "What is your life?" asks a Christian writer. "For ye are a vapor that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." But how does it come that Greece is so sad? How is it that those laughter-loving children of the purple mountains and the sunlit sea, who spent their days amid the

³⁰ ταῦτα στεφάμενη λήξον μέγ' αὖ λανχος ἔοθ' αὖ
ἀνθεὶς καὶ λήγεις καὶ σὺ καὶ ὁ στέφανος.

³¹ τὴν δὲ τύχην βιότῳ κυβερνήτειραν ἔχοντες.

³² πάντα γέλως καὶ πάντα κόπῳς καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδέν.

³³ ἐξηκοντούτης Διονύσιος ἐνθάδε κείμε·
Ταρσεύς, μὴ γήμας· αἶθε δὲ μήδ' ὁ πατήρ.

³⁴ ἄρτι με γενόμενον ζωῆς βρέφος ἤρπασε δαίμων
οὐκ οἶδ' ἔτ' ἀγαθῶν αἰτίως ἔτε κακῶν·
ἀπλήρωτ' ἄϊδα, τί με νήπιον ἤρπασας ἐχθρῶς;
τί σπεύδεις; οὐ σοὶ πάντες ὀφειλόμεθα;

inspiration of blue skies and valleys of bewitching beauty, who at festive seasons listened to the most rhythmic and melodious word-music and looked upon the fairest sculptured forms that ever came from the heart of man—how is it that this people of all peoples should have felt so overpoweringly that life was but laughter and vanity? This feeling of the tragedy of life which comes with such a shock of surprise upon those who have been only impressed by the bright and vivacious genius of Greece and by the beauty and splendor of her creations, was due, partly to that artistic balance of mind which impelled her to face both sides of a great question, and to see life in the shadow of death; partly also it was due to her history and experience, and partly no doubt to the absence of any penetrating consciousness of God. She had seen, as early as Homer, in the fall of the autumn leaf, a prophecy of the fate of every human life. She had seen the decline and fall of at least one great empire. During the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars—that is, through all the period of her real greatness in literature, politics, and enterprise—there can have been few families which had not lost a member in battle. Small wonder that, with such an experience, Greece should have felt the pathos of life. But most of all, no doubt, was this feeling due to the fact that the typical Greek whose ideal was self-sufficiency, had no sense of fellowship with God. He did not walk through this world before God or with Him, and so knew nothing of the joy of this communion, or of its power to banish fear and sorrow. At the very bottom, it is the consciousness of God that made life so different for the Hebrew and the Greek. It is this consciousness that is responsible for most of the serious divergences between the temper and aspirations of those two great peoples. It was this that inspired the Hebrew with his passion for morality and religion. It was this that made him a worshiper, while the Greek remained an artist and a critic. It was this that lightened the mystery of suffering, lifted much of life's sadness, and helped the Hebrew to overcome the world. The Greek might have said: "We have heard of thee with the hearing of the ear," but no one could have said with such passion or truth as the Hebrew: "Mine eye hath seen thee."

THE NEW SCIENCE IN RELATION TO THEISM.

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UNTIL recent years the prevailing theory of scientific materialism regarded matter and its physical forces (summed up in the word "motion") as a complete explanation of the universe. Mind, they said, is not a substance, but a function of matter. Thought is produced by the nervous system, organized as brain, somewhat as bile is secreted by the liver or as the motion of our arm is caused by the contraction of a muscle.

In support of this theory several courses of argument were brought forward. First, the forces at work in the human frame are found to obey the same laws with those in outer nature. Likewise the origin of them is traced to purely material facts, namely the food, drink, and air, whatever we take into our body. Moreover, these forces make use of familiar mechanical contrivances. Just as in a factory the burning coal under the boiler furnishes heat which through the agency of the engine becomes the driving power of a series of machines, so food and drink and air in man furnish all the power that carries on the various functions of the several organs of our body. This power operates the stomach to prepare more fuel, and the lungs as a bellows to get oxygen to burn it, and the heart as a force pump to carry supplies to every part and bring back the blood loaded with refuse which it has picked up in its course, and finally operates certain filters to strain off the waste. This process is being repeated so long as we live. On the whole, man is correctly described as a mechanical contrivance uniting many ingenious devices.

Still again, the forces in us are now weighed and measured with the exact scales of science. We have a definite quantity in store, not the same in all, but differing with each one. We draw off something from this amount and make it less by every movement of the body and every mental act. The scientist can tell

you how much blood is used up in ordinary thought and feeling, and how much more is required for anxious thought and for great pain or sorrow. He can describe to you what goes on when we have thoughts and feelings. Thus he says: "At the ends of the nerves are certain very delicate escapements so fine that a vision in the eye, or a sound or feeling or thought, may operate them. The vision does not furnish the acting power; it simply finds it in store and turns the stop cock to let it out through one nerve or another." Thus: "When a coward sees his enemy, the sight opens the end of every nerve leading to a most wonderful and complicated device for running, and the whole energy of the man crowds out through those nerves until his strength is exhausted." This is literally true, it is no figure of speech; and the device is purely mechanical, there is no magic about it. To be sure, our running-machine has no wheels and shafts and belts, but it has various other material devices more like an electrical apparatus. Or again: "There is a lack of water in the system, and some nerves are peculiarly affected thereby—we commonly call the peculiarity thirst—but, in fact, these nerves operate certain processes, by which power is let into certain other nerves, which move certain muscles, by which we are walked off to the town pump and get a drink."

These are samples of human actions scientifically explained or described. According to the older materialism, they are fair samples, and no other kinds of action are found in man.

Other fields of inquiry are said to yield the same general result. The revelations of the microscope furnish a full description of the origin of living bodies, and at the same time disclose the source and growth of their organic functions. The scientist has seen practically the whole process. He knows that every living body has arisen from a single cell, of which he can give you a lengthy description. Especially he can tell what the cell does, how it absorbs other material in its neighborhood and, instead of swelling up and bursting, it divides and forms two cells, and they, working individually and together, form other cells. At length these little bodies, form a joint-stock company and divide the labors of the firm. One, for instance, keeps the business of

multiplying cells, that the firm may become still larger. Another devotes itself to getting food, and, joining with others (as committee on supplies), forms a stomach. Others, making similar combinations, develop the several organs of the body, each of its kind. By increasing and correlating these committees the body is completed in form and function and grows to its maturity. The process, I repeat, is exactly known; it is seen to be purely mechanical, merely the moving of matter from one place to another. Matter and motion are the whole body; they are its only constituents; they fully explain it.

They also explain all that occurs in it; the mind is not overlooked. While the body is being developed from the single cell through countless stages of increasing complexity into the completed human organism, a soul is being developed in corresponding stages. At first the mental part is merely the simple motions of the cell and its particles. These activities may be called the cell-soul. When the cell combines with another, and again with many, their several motions are of course compounded according to mathematical or mechanical laws. Thus with each multiplication and combination of cells the cell-souls are mingled and elaborated in corresponding complexity and refinement, until at length the human brain and its soul have come forth together.

Now, just as the rude motions of the cell are the functions of the matter of the cell, so the finer and more complex activities are the functions of the matter to which they belong, grade for grade. Of course, the lower organizations cannot do the work of the higher, but with each elaboration matter has a finer and higher function. To be more definite, a number of atoms of carbon in certain conditions will arrange themselves as a crystal of diamond. But let this stone be ground to dust, and the same particles in connection with protoplasm will form living cells and become, say, a tree and its fruit. Then, if a bird eat the fruit, the same matter will enter into its more advanced structure and will manifest a new set of attributes or exert a new set of powers such as the bird has. And, finally, if a man eat the bird, still another advance is made. Thus the same identical particles manifest under different circumstances all these differ-

ent powers. The same few atoms of carbon will shine in the crystal, and grow in the tree, and fly and sing in the bird, and think in the man. There is no occasion to suppose a separate thinking substance (called the soul) in man, any more than there is for a separate walking substance (a walking-soul) or a digesting-soul, or a separate singing-soul, or in the tree a growing-soul, or in the mineral a crystallizing-soul and a shining-soul. All suggestions of this kind are equally gratuitous and vain, and are emphatically rejected.

For these reasons and the like, it has been held that thought is merely a mechanical product of nerve action; there is no psychosis without neurosis; mind is a function of matter.

When this theory was further applied, it was not found to be quite satisfactory. Long ago those philosophically inclined had viewed with suspicion our notions of matter. They had inquired what it is in itself. Some of them had discovered that we know nothing of it except that it has power to produce certain effects on our senses. It is, indeed, only a mode of force. We did not need to say all things are explained by matter and force, but by force only—or, since force is a mode of motion, by motion only.

Some inquired again, and more exactly still: What do we know about matter and motion and force? and perceived that what we know is merely our knowledge of them; we know only our thoughts; things are just what we think them to be, no more no less. And we can never get outside the mind to see if there be anything but thoughts after all; that is to say, matter is only a certain manner or mode of our thoughts. Matter is a function of mind, and not mind a function of matter.

This turned the tables on the materialist; but for the common man it was a difficult and rather dazing line of thought, in which he could have little confidence. And for the ordinary scientist, accustomed to the vivid realities of his senses rather than to abstract thought, it could not be much more satisfactory. The chief scientists, however, were able to see that materialism was totally overthrown. Matter and motion could not possibly explain the world. "Mechanicalism cannot even explain mat-

ter," said Karl Pearson. All parties agreed that at least the old-fashioned confidence in materialism was not justified. For instance, Professor Ferrier had said :

Matter is already in the field, is an acknowledged fact by all parties ; and mind considered as an independent reality is not so unmistakably in the field. Now, since, by a well-known law, entities must not be multiplied without necessity, we are not entitled to postulate a new cause (mind) so long as it is possible to account for phenomena by a cause already in existence.

This reasoning was adopted by many, but when Berkeley's and Kant's acute analysis of our notions of matter had been recalled and enforced by later writers, the judgment of Professor Ferrier was for the more thoughtful quite reversed. No longer can we postulate matter as the one sure thing to build on, for mind antedates it and has the right of way among theories. As I said, however, this thought was for some people difficult. Things of another order were more significant to them, if not to all ; as when someone described a Bethoven string quartet as "a scraping of horses' tails on cats' bowels"—a description which, however exact in science, leaves some facts unaccounted for.

Several portions of scientific theory did not well sustain examination. There was Spencer's brilliant generalization by which he defined life. Attractive as it was in its newness and boldness, and having a certain compelling power by virtue of its authority and the number of facts which it gathered in itself, yet it gradually failed to command assent. Spencer had said : "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."¹ But someone remarked that according to this definition the locomotive engine is alive, for its "internal relations are adjusted to its external relations." This seemed to reduce the definition to an absurdity. Yet some thought not, and accepted the idea with its implications. Professor Büchner did not hesitate in his most celebrated book to say : "The steam engine is in a certain sense endowed with life."²

Nor can this idea be regarded as merely scholastic and far-

¹ *First Principles* (edition of 1896), p. 87.

² *Force and Matter*, p. 136.

fetched. The "untaught child of nature" was found to have a similar view.

A Matabele scout once ventured over toward a railroad which had been laid near his country, and saw a train starting from the station. He fled to his people and reported he had seen a huge animal belonging to the white man. "It has only one eye," he said; "its breathing can be heard for miles; it can pull many wagons; but before it begins to work it screams with a terrible voice."

In spite of these authorities, however, many have had a more or less conscious feeling that something is lacking in a notion of life when an engine can be called "alive."

There was also a popular suspicion, to say the least, that some of the elements of human experience cannot be derived from matter-forces, and therefore cannot be explained by materialism. In varying phrase, this came to be an opinion or conviction among thoughtful scientists and philosophers. Herbert Spencer³ himself, though he believed he had "proved inductively and deductively the correlation and translation of physical and mental forces," yet added: "How the metamorphosis takes place, how a force existing as motion, heat, or light can become a mode of consciousness, it is impossible to fathom."

A similar conclusion was reached in the study of the origins of life from the cell. Professor Weismann, a thoroughgoing materialist (as words are used), was yet candid enough to recognize the defects of his own system of thought. He wrote substantially as follows: Every reproductive cell is faithful to its kind, and contains in itself the power to reproduce every important peculiarity of the parent body from which it came. Now, that this cell of only microscopic size should contain from the first as many molecules as there are varieties of structure in the mature organism which it will produce, and besides some special arrangement for faithfully preserving each of those characteristics by which man is distinguished from the brute, and those by which one race of man is different from another, and those finer peculiarities by which one family of man is different from other families for some generations back, and at last those still

³ *First Principles* (edition of Appleton, 1900), pp. 221-31.

finer by which the individual is different from all other individuals—that a single microscopic cell should contain something physical corresponding to all these items, each one with power to perpetuate its kind, is so unthinkable

that we are compelled to suspend all known physical and physiological conceptions, and must make the entirely gratuitous assumption of an affinity . . . whose origin and means of control remain perfectly unintelligible. . . . An unknown controlling force must be added . . . in order to marshal the molecules which enter the reproductive cell in such a manner

that they may do their several tasks.⁴ Here is a definite declaration that materialism is a failure, and that some extra affinity or unknown force must be supposed to be at work in things living.

It was evident that a more searching study must be made of the whole subject of the relation of the mind and body. Already Descartes and others had compared matter-things and mind-things, and had shown that they are wholly different. Matter and mind have no real resemblance whatsoever. Matter has color, weight, shape, size, and so on. But mind has none of these. Not one thing that you can say of matter (essentially) can be said of mind, with the same meaning. They are so utterly opposite, unlike, and unrelated that we cannot connect them in thought; we cannot imagine their having to do with each other. Spencer declared this relation to be absolutely inscrutable. Huxley and others said it is an inextricable puzzle. Du Bois-Reymond said consciousness cannot be explained by its material conditions. Tyndall in an oft-quoted essay said :

The formation of crystal, plant, and animal is purely mechanical . . . but associated with mechanism are phenomena no less certain than those of physics, but between which and mechanism we can discern no necessary connection. The relation of physics and consciousness is invariable, and from a given state of brain the corresponding thought may be inferred—inferred because associated—what relation exists between them we do not know. The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently the rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to

⁴ *Essays on Heredity*, etc. (Oxford, 1891), Vol. I, p. 77.

pass by a process of reasoning from one to the other. They occur together, we know not why.⁵

In the words of Spencer, again:

That a unit of feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring them into juxtaposition. No effort enables us to assimilate them.⁶

The agnostic conclusion which these men express was confirmed and made more pointed by another course of thought. It was observed that our idea of cause and effect involves the transfer of energy, or of matter-motion, from the thing called cause to the thing called effect. Now, when thought occurs there is a transfer, but it is from one cell or nerve to another, which other is therefore the effect. There is no transfer of matter-motion into thought: thought is not an effect of matter or its activities, but merely an accompaniment of the effect.

Scientists are fully persuaded that the circle of matter-forces in the order of cause and effect is unbroken: no thought ever enters into that circle as a link between any two parts. The impossibility of such entrance was expressed by Professor Clifford. "Imagine," he says, "a train of cars joined together, not by links of iron, but by bonds of friendship between the engineer and the conductor." No, matter-things and mind-things do not mix. Matter-things within the human body are connected causally, as everywhere else, and all our activities are "fully accounted for in physical science." But that in connection with some of these activities, namely those in certain parts of the brain, there should be thoughts and feelings is entirely unaccounted for; it seems to be something miraculous, "like the appearance of the Djinn when Aladdin rubbed his lamp," says Huxley. Tyndall said:

I do not think that he [the materialist] is entitled to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions explain everything. In reality they explain nothing. The utmost that he can affirm is the association of two classes of phenomena of whose real bond of union he is in absolute ignorance. The problem of the connection of body and soul is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in prehistoric ages.

Karl Vogt's (or Cabanis's) celebrated phrase by which thought

⁵ *Fragments of Science*, pp. 119-21.

⁶ *Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 158.

is compared with organic secretions and physical activities cannot now be defended. Höffding remarks that some continue to speak (carelessly) of thought as a function of nerves. But, he says, *function* is here misapplied; its real meaning connotes a material product, but thought is not material.⁷ Likewise Professor James condemns the notion of the earlier materialism:

We know of nothing connected with liver and kidney activity which can be in the remotest degree compared with the stream of thought that accompanies the brain's material secretions.⁸

Wundt is not less clear and confident. In *Human and Animal Psychology*⁹ he says:

Cerebral processes give us no shadow of indication as to how our mental life comes into being. For the two series of phenomena are not comparable. We can conceive how one motion may be transformed into another, perhaps also how one sensation or feeling is transformed into a second. But no system of cosmic mechanics can make plain to us how a motion can pass over into a sensation or a feeling.

On another page he suggests that "we have made too much of the idea of causality," as if we must be content to find some things uncaused. Clifford thought he found traces of chance in the order of nature. Professor Royce declares:

There is something more fundamental than Causality, namely, Being, Meaning, Idea. Causality is a distinctly lower grade of fact and is a portion of or subdivision of Meaning.¹⁰

Perhaps Joseph Le Conte presents this thought most clearly in Royce's *Conception of God*:

Suppose I could remove the brain-cap of one of you, and expose the brain in active work. . . . Suppose I could see everything that goes on there, what should I see? Only decompositions and recompositions, molecular agitations and vibrations; in a word, *physical* phenomena, and nothing else. . . . But you, the subject of this experiment, what do you perceive? You see nothing of this which I see, but an entirely different set of phenomena, namely consciousness, thought, emotion, will, *psychical* phenomena, a self, a person. From the *outside* we see only physical, from the *inside* only psychical phenomena. Now take external nature, the cosmos, instead of the brain. The

⁷ *Outlines of Psychology* (Macmillan, 1893), pp. 60, 61, etc.

⁸ *Psychology* (smaller edition; Henry Holt & Co., 1892), p. 133.

⁹ Macmillan's edition, 1894, pp. 6, 427.

¹⁰ *World and Individual*, Vol. I, p. 443.

observer from the outside, the ordinary "scientist," sees and *can* see only physical phenomena. But this may not be the case on the other side."

Many others, including Dr. Paulsen especially, have shown that no just conception of nature can overlook the "meaning" of it, and that the meaning is something not in the order of cause and effect, as physical science knows them. This mental element, this "real value" of things, is to be excluded from our notions of *cause* and *physics*, and therefore from *function*, as it must be understood in this connection.

In short, science now forbids us to say that matter is the cause of mind or of anything in mind. Exact science denies that thought is a function of matter.

The preceding statements are mostly negative and barren, but they imply a positive value, which scientists have not overlooked. When Weismann felt himself obliged to "assume an unknown controlling force" in the production of living forms, he had given more than a bare suggestion that the force is immaterial, for he described it as entirely unlike the known material forces in both origin and method of action, yet as also able to arrange and adapt material things to the definite service of life and mind. It is fair, however, to add that Weismann intended his words to be agnostic—whatever value you and I may see in them.

A more positive conviction was reached by the philosophers who had turned the tables on the materialists and found that mind rather than matter is at the bottom of all things. Spencer, while fully recognizing the difficulties of the question, declared that, if we were compelled to choose between the physical origin of all things and the mental origin, we must choose the latter.¹² Still later, the same author in a private letter "saw no escape from the conclusion that when life first arose on earth, a new force came into play."¹³ Practically all the philosophers from Plato to Paulsen, Deussen, and Royce have agreed that the source of all things is either mind or some mind-like thing, such

¹²Original edition, p. 43.

¹³*Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 160, 161.

¹³PROFESSOR JAPP, before British Association for Advance of Science, September, 1898. See *Independent*, December 1, 1898, p. 1564.

as will, impulse, effort, or idea. Among broad-minded scientists and critics there is a tendency to the same thought. Huxley said that, as a matter of fact, we know more about mind than we do about body. The immaterial world is a firmer reality than the material. Professor Clifford went so far as to say that the world is made of mind-stuff. Professor Karl Pearson suggests that after analyzing the scientific concept of matter, the only thing that we can find that at all resembles it is mind.¹⁴

Thus the vivid sense of the real unlikeness of mind and matter, and the reaction from gross materialism, have resulted in the total overthrow of the theory that the soul is derived from purely material beginnings, from mere motion in matter. Science has, therefore, been obliged to substitute another theory, namely, that the soul is derived from some *mind-germ*—an eternal something-else-than-matter, which is always present with matter, though in various stages of development. Here is one form of the idea of the “associated thought,” the “view from the inside,” the “meaning” of which the wise have spoken.

The evidences of this mind-germ are both deductive and inductive. An example of the first is the *a priori* necessity of supposing a peculiar and distinctive source, in order to explain the growth of mind. The inductive evidences are summed up in the mind-like actions which are observed in matter, even in its lowest estate. Essentially, this is no new theory, but can be found in ancient times; and in later centuries it has had advocates such as Gassendi and Lamarck. Perhaps its largest expression is given by Paulsen, who quotes a great array of authorities. Some additional expressions may exhibit its variations of form. Thomas A. Edison was recently quoted as saying that

No one can study chemistry and see the wonderful way in which certain elements combine with the nicety of the most delicate machine, and not come to the inevitable conclusion that there is a master intelligence controlling them.

Some go farther and declare that not only are the movements of matter *directed* by intelligence, but that they *are* the movements of mind. Haeckel himself applies the language of mind to the

¹⁴ *Ethic of Free Thought*, 2d ed., p. 22; cf. p. 32.

fundamental activities of matter, as, for instance, when he identifies chemical affinity and repulsion with love and hate. So, indeed, Du Bois-Reymond, and all his kind, have identified matter-activities with mind-activities, when they declare there are no new forces in life and mind or thought, but merely the same old forces with which we are familiar in matter and mechanics at large.

John Fiske said :

The law of evolution . . . means that the universe as a whole is thrilling in every fiber with life — not indeed life in its usual restricted sense, but life in a general sense. The distinction, once deemed absolute, between the living and the not living, is converted into a relative distinction. Life as manifested in the organism is only a specialized form of the Universal Life.

In the words of Professor James :

If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness must have been present at the very origin of things. Accordingly the more clear-sighted evolutionary philosophers are beginning to posit it there.

It is to the thought in which these several statements agree that I would call attention. These authorities mean to say that all matter has in it (or in some connection with it) life and intelligence, or mind. The import of this scientific conclusion is the chief topic of the present essay. By this conclusion we are required to think of life as having almost infinite variety of form and grade, and mind as likewise graded and differing with every device through which it is manifested, and having an endless series of means of expression. With the help of science we will be more definite, and for brevity may confine attention mostly to mind, as for our purpose sufficiently inclusive of life. A portion of its significance may be seen by taking another look at the approaches by which scientists have reached their position. From the study of the signs of mind in man they have moved to the study of animals next below man; and have been unable to find any dividing line between them. If one has mind, the other has, although it is of a somewhat different kind. Then they have studied the next lower animals, and have found again no dividing line. And so on to the bottom. At no point is there a possibility of saying: Above this there is mind and

below this no mind. In fact, there is mind all the way down and all the way up, from the single protozoic cell to the complex human brain. A multitude of facts point to this conception. Professor Cope finds that the cells which in the human brain do the thinking are the same kind as the protozoic cells from which all life has arisen or by whose work we are what we are. If they think in man and in animals near his grade, why not in all grades, unto the simplest? Indeed, careful observation of these indicates as much. Single cells in their original uncompounded state appear to have the sense of touch, light, and color, and some other indefinite, perhaps universal, sense. In their spontaneous activities are signs of will, and in the selection or choice of needed material from the blood is a fine intelligence and discrimination—but more of this later.

The scientist, however, has not done with us yet. His theory is more wonderful still. He says our thought cannot stop with cells. If cell-activity is intelligent, then the work of the so-called dead matter in forming the original cell was intelligent; if one activity is intelligent, then the others also. In short, all matter is alive and thinks.

"What," says someone, "this dull, rigid, deadest thing, stones and dirt, alive!" The scientist replies: "Who told you that matter is rigid?" In fact, the hardness and deadness of matter are popular superstitions. Science teaches that all the attributes of matter are modes of motion. And this very hardness is produced by an especially rapid variety of motion. As a top when it spins more rapidly stands up more stiffly, becomes more rigid, so the atoms and molecules which have unthinkably high rates of motion are firmest in their place. If there were really no activity in matter, it would then be dead, but it would then lack all the attributes of firmness and solidity which it now has.

The general course of reasoning at this point is effectively presented by Karl Pearson. He says, in substance: The action of cells in gathering other matter and forming more cells like them is called life. But the action of atoms in collecting other atoms and forming molecules, and of molecules in forming a mass, is just as truly life as the other. And if from your neigh-

bor's intelligent actions you infer that he thinks and is conscious, you must, if consistent, infer that atoms think and are conscious. The world is completely rational. Primarily it is to us a succession of sensations, but when we analyze them we find more than sensations and barren succession ; we find a logical sequence. Only the idiot or the madman fails to find order. Tell me, says the great scientist, the nature of matter, and, merely by developing the definition, I will show how the world was made. Tell me the laws of motion, and I will rationally deduce the physical universe. I will shut myself up in my closet and write out certain formulæ in mathematical terms, and draw on paper a chart representing my thoughts. Then I will go forth, and behold, every object of nature fits the formulæ I wrote out of mind and follows the curve I drew with my pencil. The greatest result of human experience, the greatest triumph of the human mind, is the discovery that the laws of the physical universe follow logical processes. The intellect—the human mind—is the keynote to the physical universe.

Very often the scientists have seen and intended the implication of mind ; but have said the mind is dull and stupid, mind at the minimum, a mere germinal intelligence. I would suggest, however, that Professor Pearson's words describe no such thing. They speak of the universal mind, they imply mind at its maximum, a supreme intelligence. Let us see : *If the activities of the cell and atom are intelligent, or are substantially identical with mind-activities, or are indications of mind, then they are indications of a mind which is comparable with the character of the activities in evidence.* On the one hand we must consider the fineness of the work done in the microscopic cell, and that done with the atom, beyond any possibility of the microscope, and perhaps we should add the latest supposed subdivision of atoms into several hundred parts. The refinement, sensitiveness, and delicacy of the faculty that can invent and handle these things is so far beyond our coarse and bungling minds as to be out of all comparison.

Consider next the variety of the work done. Stuart Mill used to say that the variety of nature is infinite. And another has said : If there is any one thing the mind of nature seems to

like more than another, it is variety. Of all the leaves of the forest there are no duplicates. The mind of nature shows no sign of bondage or the limitations of habit such as small dull minds have, but it elastically fits every occasion, and adapts its activity to every changing circumstance.

Think of the surety and precision of the operations in question! A little mind is weak, whimsical, vacillating, unreliable. But science tells us that everything in nature is orderly, accurate, infallible—so much so that we have been accustomed to think of the activities of nature as not mind at all, but mechanical necessity. If, now, they are mind at all, they are a great, strong, perfect mind.

Think also of the *unthinkable* swiftness of some of these activities! We have a proverb: "Quick as thought." The speed of human thought has been measured, and is reported as about one hundred feet per second. Let this or our ordinary human movements be compared with light at 186,000 miles per second, or with gravity at 186,000,000,000 miles per second—"and nobody knows how much faster." If slow movement indicates dullness, stupidity, and germinal intelligence, what shall be said of the human mind in comparison with that of nature?

Finally, we must reckon with the greatness of the work done, the universal range, of which Mr. Pearson writes, some notion of which we gather with effort from the revelations of astronomy. These also are in evidence, and are as unthinkably great as the first are small.

On the other hand, there are in nature some things which, in our view at least, are dull and slow. Their existence is not for a moment overlooked; and if they were all the facts to be reckoned with, they might signify a germ-mind—and for all I know there are such minds doing such work. But there are the other facts which we have been considering above; no germinal intelligence is adequate to them. To be more definite: A single cell goes to work to make a hen. Science says that in doing so it shows mind or intelligence. Very well. The mind that can make a hen out of a cell is no fool of a mind; it is altogether superior to the hen-mind, or the human mind. And the mind

that can do this, and all the rest that must be taken into account, is an unthinkably great mind.

In short, the evidence indicates a mind or intelligence of practically infinite fineness, variety, or adaptability, precision, quickness, and power—in effect, the Infinite Mind of Christian theology.

Another, and very different, line of thought has contributed to the same general result. Many scientists, aware that matter, as commonly known, furnishes no unity or finality as an explanation of the world, have sought and found an underlying substance and cause of all things. They call it “ether,” and describe it as essentially different from matter, to the extent of being contrasted in nearly all its attributes. Their words at once suggest its identity with mind, especially when the list of positive properties is considered. Ether is described as without atoms, structure, friction, heat, weight, or other power to affect (directly) our senses, and also as filling all space, of unthinkably quick activities, of infinite energy, indestructible, the source of all that is. Some other attributes are mentioned or supposed to exist, but they need not be included here.

Let me call attention to what has been said in naming these attributes. To “fill all space” is to be omnipresent, to “have infinite energy” is to be omnipotent, to be “indestructible and the source of all” is to be the eternal Creator; and the other properties named are simply familiar attributes of God as conceived by the Christians, expressed in unfamiliar and unhandy terms. The elaboration of the theory is even more suggestive. Hear the cosmology of this mode of thought: Ether is the eternal first cause, which for reasons within itself has created all things and governs them in accordance with the laws of its own nature. Ether is the “mind-stuff” of which the world is made. This one great activity has set up within itself certain lesser and local activities, which live and move and have their being in ether, and which cannot escape from its all-enfolding and pervading power, though they take wings of the morning or make their bed in the grave. Their derived activities are in some degree independent and have spontaneous energies like their

parent, and are ever pushing onward, taking on peculiarities of impulse or action-habit according to their varied experiences. Some have become so far developed and so peculiar as to be personal individuals, with rights and duties and dignities of their own. These are called men. So we might go on to describe the world, in large part—translating the well-known Christian doctrine into the rather strange idiom of science.

It can hardly be claimed that the scientist has at last by searching found out God, although Haeckel himself suggested that the "cosmic ether is God;" but it must be regarded as significant that intelligent materialists, starting from their standpoint and proceeding by their methods, have reached a position so very near to theism.

Neither one of the two chief courses of thought which have now been considered gives us the whole idea of the Christian God, though perhaps each gives an essential from which the whole might be inferred, if we were disposed to urge them to the utmost. The total value of the theories may appear in their union. To some extent they are supplementary. Thus, while the ether theory contains no immediate suggestion of a world-pervading intelligence, this element is the chief outcome of the other theory. Only one main element is absent from both of them: the *moral character* of Deity is not brought forward. Yet it is there, if we look beneath the surface; for infinite power and intelligence must know and appreciate moral facts, that is to say, must have moral character.

SUMMARY.

Science joins philosophy in requiring us to give up the old doctrine that matter is the source of all things, and mind is a function of matter. They require us to place chief reliance on mind-things as more firmly real, and to interpret matter-activity as essentially identical with mind, or at least as controlled by mind. But if these activities indicate mind at all, they indicate a mind of practically infinite fineness and greatness. The scientist, in admitting mind into original matter-activities, has in effect abandoned materialism and gone over to theism, with all his bag-

gage and with some very effective weapons of offense and defense. Or, rather, he has become the prophet of modern times, and is promulgating that which makes for religion and theology. In his own words: "Science, so far from having in the popular sense materialized the world, has idealized it, and has for the first time rendered it possible for us to regard it as something intelligible." Professor Wundt says:

The ideal goal of all science is the coherent theory of the universe, and it is the duty of philosophy to recognize the continuance of mentality in the widest sense beyond experience as given in any science, yet as to the suggestion and completion of every science.

Now has it come to pass that science is doing the work which was foretold for it when Tyndall said:

To yield the religious sentiment reasonable satisfaction is the problem of problems of this present hour.

Or, in the words of Pearson, again:

Not to convert the world into a dead mechanism, but to give to humanity in the future a religion worthy its intellect, seems to me the mission which modern science has before it.

CRITICAL NOTES.

THE PROBLEM OF THE POEM OF JOB.

THE recent publication of a commentary on the book of Job by Friedrich Delitzsch¹ has given renewed interest to the old question of the problem which that poem presents and of its solution. The main portions of the book of Job, chaps. 3-31 (except chap. 28 on wisdom) and 38:1-42:6 (with the exception of a few interpolations), have been stigmatized by Professor Delitzsch as "pessimism's song of songs" (pp. 15, 91). An examination of this theory is now all the more necessary since in the meantime there has appeared a pamphlet which goes even farther than Delitzsch. This pamphlet bears the title "The Genuine Job,"² and defends the thesis that everything outside of chaps. 3-31 is to be struck out as spurious, and that Job himself proposes the absolute injustice of God, or rather atheism, as the solution of the problem of human suffering. In view of these theories it can hardly be superfluous to ask anew the question: What is the real problem of the book of Job and what is its true solution?

Fortunately, we can begin in this case with a fixed point, for it cannot be disputed that the book of Job deals with the question how the suffering of pious—and therefore comparatively good—men is to be explained. The uncertainty and diversity of opinion begin only when it is to be determined *how* this question is *answered* in the book of Job.

Naturally, two portions of the book lie outside of this dispute. There is no doubt that the prologue looks upon the suffering of the pious man as a testing of his character. And, further, this also is certain, that the poet makes the three friends defend the view that the suffering of men is a punishment for their sins; for that position is always the last word in the speeches of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. So, for instance, the last named, Zophar, calls upon Job, as a sinner under God's punishment, to humble himself before God (11:13) and cast iniquity out of his house (vs. 14). And though it be true that the

¹ *Das Buch Hiob, neu übersetzt und kurz erklärt.* VON FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902.

² *Der echte Hiob.* VON EUGEN MÜLLER. Hannover: Rechtsmeyer, 1902.

sinfulness of man is the result of his bondage to earth (4 : 19), yet this sinfulness is not guiltless. Therefore all experiences of misfortune in the course of God's government of the world are to be considered as punishments, made necessary through human sinfulness. There are none who suffer innocently.

But what explanation of human suffering has the poet put into the mouth of his chief character? In regard to this, as indicated above, opinions differ widely, especially at present.

The view of Delitzsch has found its most striking expression in his characterization of the poem of Job, on account of the utterances of its hero, as "pessimism's song of songs." This theory he attempts to establish in this way: The poet reasons that if a man truly pious in life and character is afflicted by God with a loathsome disease, can he any longer believe in a righteous God? "If a scourge slay suddenly" (9 : 23 *a*), is it not plain that "God mocks at the calamity of the innocent" among its victims (9 : 23 *b*), that the difference between the innocent and the godless is of no account at all to him—hence he cannot be a righteous God? If a righteous people is ruthlessly devastated through war by a stronger power, and God, in spite of all prayers, remains indifferent (24 : 12), is it still possible to believe in a righteous God, even though punishment certainly overtake the evil-doer at last? Such meditations lead our poet in his whole view of life into the gloomiest pessimism, for the only answer to which he constantly returns is that God is and will remain an angry God, who denies justice to man and will not regard even his prayer.

As the theory of E. Müller concerning Job's explanation of human suffering agrees in the main with that of Delitzsch (see above, p. 66), so also does his method of establishing it. Both can therefore be treated at the same time. What is original with Müller will be noticed as we pass along.

Is now the argument which Delitzsch has advanced for his theory of Job's view conclusive? It could be so accepted only in case it gave a perfectly true picture of all those instances in the book of Job upon which the characteristics of its point of view depend. But such a picture cannot be derived from the passages cited by Delitzsch.

The utterances of Job cited by him are not the only ones which the poet has placed in the mouth of his hero, nor are they the decisive ones.

It seems to me that the two questions—first, whether the poet desired to describe his hero as a fixed and unchangeable being, and,

second, in which utterances he would have us find his hero's ripest judgment—have not been sufficiently distinguished. This paper aims to be a contribution to their answer.

Even with regard to the *form* of his attack upon God, the poet does not delineate his chief character as an abstract and fixed quantity. Even in his formal point of view he lets him develop as a living personality. The acuteness of pain naturally abates with the lapse of time in all human beings; the same we see in Job. The intensity of his anguish is allowed to diminish gradually. For so violent a complaint as "Let the day perish, wherein I was born," etc. (3:3), sounds at no later time. Even if 31:37*b* were to be translated, with Müller, "As a prince (in the act of giving audience to one of his subjects) would I come before him," the tone of this expression would be defiant toward God rather than so painfully convulsive as in 3:3 ff. But more probably the meaning of 31:37*b* is, "Like a chief, or mighty man of valor, would I oppose myself to him" (*cf.* 2 Chron. 32:21*a*), since the verb *qēr(r)ēb*, is said to be allied to *qrāb*, "encounter" or "battle." The pronoun "him" then stands for the opponent-at-law, under which figure the real accusers of Job could be designated by this individualizing singular. The opponent-at-law is the last-mentioned person (vs. 35*b*). The more remotely mentioned "Almighty One" is the "one who hears," whom Job desires to be present as daysman or arbitrator between the two parties. Not only is this fact overlooked if the pronoun "him" in vs. 37*b* is made to refer to God, as the latest exegetes would have it, but besides the two following considerations are also against it. Job did not need to tell God, the Omniscient One (13:9), the number of his days (vs. 37*a*); and it would be very unnatural if Job should have declared it as his intention that after the appearance of God he would wear the *divine* writ of accusation as a trophy.

Nor is the hero of the poem the lifeless personification of a philosophical idea, for his utterances are set in the natural sequence of his physical and psychical states, which can be proved in a twofold way.

To begin with, we know the exceedingly violent expressions in Job's first monologue (3:3–26), which he commences with a curse on the day of his birth. But what sort of feelings does the poet let him express in 6:26? He makes him say: "Ye undertake to reprove *words*, and yet the words of one in despair are for the wind only." This means that Eliphaz, who, in chap. 4, had spoken in the name of the friends, had without reason made a mere spasm of pain that found

vent for itself in that monologue (3:3-26), the point of his attack. For was it not known only too well that convulsions of despair are much more a physiological than psychological phenomenon? Such outbursts of despair he should have recognized as emotional manifestations, as rebounds of psychical currents upon the nervous apparatus, and as reactions which take place in it involuntarily. The poet, accordingly, gave it as his hero's explanation of the bitter complaints in the monologue, 3:3-26, that it was only a temporary and external turning away from God. And repeatedly does he thus allow Job to succumb to momentary onslaughts of physical pain and to reproach God. But these utterances allow no final conclusion in regard to Job's relation to God. They are to be taken in the light of 6:26, "the words of one in despair are for the wind." Therefore they do not sustain the theory that Job's relation to God in his inner consciousness had become severed.

As, on the other hand, the paroxysms in the monologue (3:3-26) and elsewhere (6:26; 9:34; 16:7) are to be traced to physiological causes, so, on the other hand, much of the violent language which Job allows himself toward his opponents has a psychological origin. Contradiction from opponents naturally carries a man into extreme assertions. And does not the poet mean to have Job's utterances understood in that light? Is not the form in which Job gives expression to his woes in 6:8 f. derived really from a sense of utter helplessness and forsakenness (vss. 11 ff.)? Are not such words as these which the poet puts into his mouth to be so regarded: "What is my strength that I could endure" (vs. 11a)? "Is my strength the strength of stones" (vs. 12a)? "Is it not that I have no help in me" (how then can I endure) (vs. 13a)? "To him that is ready to faint, insult is offered even by his friend and he (the friend) forsakes (*i. e.*, denies) the fear of the Almighty" (vs. 14ab).

So, then, neither the expressions which Job gives forth under the pressure of physical pain, nor those others which, psychologically explained, are elicited from him by the human desire to maintain himself against opposition, are to be considered decisive.

Rather are we to listen to the words which the hero utters in calm self-introspection and meditation upon the relation of man to God. And are no such words of the hero to be found in the poem of Job? Let us cite the following series of passages:

According to Delitzsch, the speeches of Job characterize God as an angry God. But is this "anger" of God (9:5b, 13a; 14:13b; 19:11)

either the arbitrary eruption of natural powers or the caprice of a tyrannical despot? This is by no means to be presupposed as a matter of course; nor are the speeches of Job altogether lacking in indications which indirectly disprove such a presupposition. We read: "They (the previously mentioned evil-doers) are led on to the day (*eis hēmeran*) of wrath" (21:30b). Therewith, indeed, the assertion is made that evil-doers are not always punished upon the spot, yet it is admitted that they have to fear a day of the wrath of God. This is borne out also by what follows the text, where it is not affirmed that evil-doers never receive punishment, but only this is complained of, viz., that their sins are not *immediately* visited upon them. The Septuagint translator found the same statement in 21:30b, inasmuch as he translates: *eis hēmeran orgēs autou ἀπαχθήσονται*. And Delitzsch himself, contrary to other modern exegetes, leaves that statement uncorrected, for he translates: "To the day of the outpouring of wrath are they led forward." And who could, with Budde, for instance,³ in 21:30b find the meaning "that in the day of the flood the evil-doer rises to the surface"?

But in the speeches of the chief character we may observe a still more important development of his way of looking at things. While in the first monologue (3:3-26) God is put in the place of the accused, in the succeeding speeches of Job he gradually takes on the character of a deciding power. From the place of the accused he is allowed to move over again to the judgment seat.

The battle in which the poet depicts his hero as repulsing the recompense theory of his friends is not the only one he is fighting. At the same time (*a*) he is made to fight a battle within himself. He is brought before us as agonizing to come to a decision between two opposing possibilities, viz., that God by his treatment of men is actuated only by intelligence and power, or else that his justice is twofold, by reason of which, on the one hand, he sends punishment upon all sinners and hypocrites (13:16), but, on the other, does not forget man whom he has created and most carefully fashioned (10:8 ff.). This is, as it were, the dawn of a new hope of justice arising in Job. Again (*b*) the poet makes man's hope of eternity (13:15) to do battle in his hero with those elements which on the ground of the natural experience of mankind are commonly alleged against it.

Let us now consider in detail how the poet allows these two possibilities to unfold themselves in his hero. He makes him give expres-

³ *Handcommentar zu Hiob*, 1896.

sion to the sentiment that God justly punishes others. He lets him warn his opponents: "He will surely punish you, if ye do secretly show partiality" (13:10). A similar admonition is, "Be ye afraid of the sword" (19:29)—words which undoubtedly were meant to be applied to divine retribution also. Indirectly the same thought is expressed, when Job says: "Their (the evil-doers') prosperity is not in their hands" (21:16). True, the evil-doer frequently for a long time goes without punishment, but it is only a delay, not an escape from the penalty, for "the evil man is reserved to the day of calamity" (21:30a). Therefore it is not surprising that Job does not want the fate of the evil-doer to come upon his friend, but exclaims, "Let mine enemy be as the wicked" (27:7); or, "Is not calamity to the unrighteous" (31:3)? "When God calls him to account, what shall he answer" (vs. 14b)? Thus, at first half-unconsciously and almost involuntarily, but afterward ever more and more clearly, does the poet portray his hero as insisting that the righteousness of God is manifest at least in the case of the wicked.

Indirectly also the righteousness of God comes more and more to recognition in the following manner. Job emphasizes that he is not an evil-doer in the sense of his opponents, yet he means to insist only upon a relative innocence. Here also we have step by step a gradually increasing distinctness of confession. At first the poet lets him speak of his sins only in a very conditional sense: "I have sinned" = "If I have sinned" (7:20a). Then with reference to this he puts a self-negating rhetorical question into his mouth: "How could man be just as compared with God" (9:2b)? Next he lets him speak positively, at least in regard to sins of youth: "Thou makest me to inherit (the retribution for) the iniquities of my youth" (13:26b). And at last he has him confess the general sinfulness of all men, for he lets him risk the impotent wish: "O were it possible to bring a pure descendant from the impure" (14:4)! Consequently he can expect only such treatment from God as is due to one who is only relatively righteous. And this, as a matter of fact, is all that he expects, as will be seen from what follows.

There are instances in which Job, not only for the wicked (as in the second series of passages quoted above), but also for himself, hopes in the righteousness of God. This development in the hero comes about in this way:

After the poet has brought him to realize, in the first round of disputation, that he is altogether misunderstood by men, he lets him flee to

God with the consciousness of relative innocence. Under the agony of pain, and the desire to maintain his cause, he had been led to call God unjust, but he had not yet heard explicitly from God himself why this suffering had been allowed to come upon him. The poet could therefore, so to speak, let Job appeal from the God of the present to the God of the future. This is significantly expressed in his prayer: "Give now a pledge, be surety for me with thyself" (17:3*a*).

This appeal we hear for the first time in the words: "O earth, cover not thou my blood, and let my cry have no resting-place" (16:18)! Job here wishes that, as Abel's blood was effective in calling forth divine punishment (Gen. 4:10), so his cry for justice, or at least for light, may not die away upon the earth unheard. Job was bold enough to challenge the grave and the silence of death. His ethico-religious consciousness, in spite of his momentary distress, gave him the confidence which is expressed in 16:19: "Even now, behold my witness is in heaven." Since his complaints and accusations had been forced from him by the contentions of his opponents, he does not feel himself separated from God: either objectively or subjectively. Therefore these words press for utterance upon his lips: "My friends (even) scoff at me" (16:20*a*); "mine eye sobs (*i. e.*, looks tearfully) unto God" (vs. 20*b*); "that he maintain the right of a man with God" (vs. 21*a*). However, Delitzsch translates vs. 20*a* thus: "My character is my advocate," but then the antithesis which in vs. 20 directs Job's tearful look toward God would be lost. Besides, Job's character would be transferred to heaven (vs. 19) as though it were a person.⁴

We have a similar appeal from God hiding⁵ to God revealing himself in the well-known words: "But as for me, I have come to a consciousness of this: My redeemer liveth, and as the one who is last will he come forth upon the dust" (19:25). Still, Delitzsch thinks, the *G'd'el* of vs. 25*a* is an earthly redeemer, and he finds Job expressing this thought in vs. 25 f. that "at the same time with the appearance of this earthly redeemer he will see God himself (as the God proven just) with his eyes." But the idea of an earthly liberator from misunderstanding and perversion of justice (this is the meaning of the word *G'd'el* in Jer. 50:34; Ps. 119:154; Prov. 23:11) is not at all compatible with the words, "and as the one who is last will he come forth upon

⁴ The other recent exegete of the book of Job, Eugen Müller, who proposes as his thesis that in Job, chaps. 3-31, the essential injustice of God, or atheism, is proclaimed, has altogether left out of consideration Job 16:19 f. (p. 9).

⁵ Isa. 45:15, "Thou art an *El mistattër*."

the dust" (vs. 25b). For these words most probably characterize God as the one who will prevent injustice in Job's case, as he is to tread under foot all that is enmity against God, and will come off as the great victor. Delitzsch, however, translates, "and will stand at last by the (side of him who is) dust." But what could such an earthly redeemer have accomplished? He would not have been omniscient, and therefore could have given no final information either concerning Job's suffering or the presence of evil in the world. How then could he do what Delitzsch ascribes to him, viz., that "after Job's death he would secure recognition of his innocence before God and men"? And, besides, how unnatural would the expression be, if the words, "I know that my redeemer liveth, and as the one who is last, he will stand," etc., were meant to refer to a kinsman of Job who was to avenge him! Why did not this kinsman appear before, at the same time as the three friends? He was, perhaps, gone on a journey?⁶

A similar appeal to God as the supernatural deliverer of man crops out in the following sentences: "Doth not he (*i. e.*, God) see my ways and number all my steps" (31:4)? This question contains the incipient thought that the final decision in regard to the reason of Job's suffering rests with God. This develops into the wish: "Let him weigh me in just balances" (vs. 6a). The final solution, therefore, which is expected from God, may nevertheless be just. This is the necessary presupposition for the fact that Job, according to 31:35-37, desires to bring his case before God.

God, then, is not always characterized by the hero of the poem as actuated only by (arbitrary) anger.

And did the poet depict him as *beginning with optimism and ending with pessimism*? This Delitzsch infers from 17:2 ff. But does the passage really mean to imply that?

In all probability this passage means: "Truly mockeries (= mock-

⁶It is easily seen that what Delitzsch has added to the above citation about seeing God who after all is found to be just, carries with it for his new theory the germs of its own refutation. Eugen Müller translates 19:25 thus: "Nevertheless I know that my avenger liveth; after my death he shall justify my dust." But how can this translation be brought into harmony with the context? And what can the justification of Job's dust mean? These questions Müller has not answered. Instead he adds that vs. 26 and 27 have either become corrupted, or must be entire interpolations (p. 9). And why "must be"? "The real belief in immortality was not imported from Babylon and Persia until after the Exile." But this is the question, and in the solution of this question the book of Job has also a word to say. If this book is to be ruled out on the supposition of corruption and interpolation because it speaks of immortality, that is nothing else than to suppress part of the religio-historical material.

ing-birds) sit with me, and their opposition shall delight mine eye forever" (17:2). Delitzsch translates here: "Upon my oath, in self-deceptions was I ensnared, and on their multitude continued mine eye." But the meaning "*self-deceptions*" cannot be made out for *hathûlim* nor for *mahathallôth* (Isa. 30:10), nor could this meaning be brought into harmony with the context. The preceding verse has reference to Job's impending death. To make self-deceptions its cause would be unnatural. But, on the other hand, *hathûlim* in the sense of "mockeries" is more natural. They would be a nail in the coffin of Job indirectly mentioned just before. So, too, Budde rightly finds that in 17:2a "mockers" are meant. That the opponents are referred to is shown also by the pronouns "their" (*eorum*) and "them" (*eos*) in vss. 2 and 4ab.

Of course, Delitzsch expunges 17:3, 4. But Job refers to his opponents no less in the words, "I shall not find a wise man among you" (vs. 10b), which he allows to stand. But he argues that this with vs. 11a marks the poet's return from the optimistic to his pessimistic view. Delitzsch translates: "In the lapse of time my ways of thinking have passed away." But the poet did not mean to have *yamay* understood in the sense of "during my days," for then the "passing of his ways of thinking" would have extended over Job's whole lifetime. But in reality this change from an optimistic to a pessimistic point of view could only have taken place during the period of his suffering. Accordingly, *yamay* must here be understood in the sense of "my days," provided the phrase was originally intended to be read in this way. For it is possible that the consonants *yodh* and *mem* belonged originally to the preceding *chakham*, and therefore that vs. 10b had the plural form *chakhamim*. This would give the form *ja'abîrû* for vs. 11, and the poet meant to say: "They would put to flight my ideas, and root up (*we natt'qû*) the possessions (= the fundamental tenets) of my heart (= my think-shop)." And how do his opponents propose to do this? The next sentence tells us: "The night would they stamp as day" (vs. 12a), which means, they would make out that there is nothing unusual in Job's misfortune, and it is at any rate a well-deserved fate. Thus would they dispense miserable comfort, as was said in 16:2b. They intended sophistically to change concepts, an operation so drastically set forth in Isa. 5:20.

But even if the traditional text of 17:11a is original, still the delineation takes a new turn with the words: "My days are fled, my thoughts (so he adds ironically), the possessions of my heart, are

uprooted: for the night (my sufferings) they would stamp as day," etc. With this reproach Job aims in all probability at his opponents. He is unconscious that he himself previously had thus changed concepts, and that he did so could not be taken for granted without good evidence. But, so far, the very opposite is found in his utterances.

The trend of the speeches put into the mouth of Job indicates, as shown above, not a development from optimism to pessimism, but rather a development in the opposite direction. For have we not seen that the intensity of the paroxysms of pain diminishes more and more, and that alongside of them there are heard other and softer melodies? The poet, then, in reality meant to give us in his hero the portrait of a man who, from original stumbling at the course of the world and doubts as to the righteousness of God, has fought himself through to a cautious conclusion regarding the relation existing between God and the world.

Consequently we cannot consent to Delitzsch's view, even in regard to the sentiments of Job found in chaps. 3-31, that they are "pessimism's song of songs."

According to Müller, the *genuine Job* closes with chap. 31. He must think, then, that the poet, whose "genius" and "clear mind," which he so loudly extols (pp. 8 f.) contented himself with a torso. For it would be no more than that, if in 31:35a he challenged God to an answer and had told us nothing about a divine manifestation. Besides, the author of Job, chaps. 3-31, this herald of atheism, is to have lived before the fifteenth century. In Müller's opinion he wrote before "the Hebrews entered Canaan, who immigrated there in the fifteenth century according to the Tel-el-Amarna tablets" (p. 8). At that time there will have lived among the Hebrews, to whom Müller assigns Job, a preacher of atheism! No, indeed, in earlier times there may have been among the Hebrews, and in all probability also among the other Semites, changes of gods, but no denial of them. Müller, however, tries to prove the opposite from Ps. 14, which begins with the well-known words: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God." But he should not have adduced this psalm. Or does he mean to vouch for the Davidic origin of the whole of the seventy-three psalms ascribed to that king? If not, then neither could he put Ps. 14 into David's time (p. 10), for its closing words contain a reference to the time of Israel's captivity.

But still much less can the poem of Job be called "pessimism's song of songs," if with Delitzsch it extends, not only through chaps.

3-31 (except chap. 28), but also through 38:1—42:6 (with minor exceptions). In that case also the speeches of God (38:1 ff.) would fall under this stigma. With reference to these Delitzsch holds the view that in thus coming to a close this "song of songs of pessimism" arrives only outwardly and in appearance at a reconciliation (p. 92). But not so. In the speeches which in 38:1 ff. are put into the mouth of God we have the real culmination of the original poem of Job. These, therefore, must contain that solution of the problem which its author considers the right one.

And what is this solution? It is this: Observation of the many mysteries in the origin of the world and in its constitution must lead us to the conclusion that a super-human intelligence is throned above the universe. We must therefore have sufficient confidence in this intelligence that for the accomplishment of a rational end it has also mingled evil with the constitution of things. Yet what this rational end in each individual case may be may remain a secret for us.

This solution of the problem of the presence of evil in the world is, as a matter of fact, perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to state expressly what can be read between the lines, in order to make it clear that this solution is the final one. But should we wish to do so, it would be something like this:

The sum total of what appears benevolent to human reason, even at first sight, outweighs the sum total of that which we generally regard otherwise. According to human judgment also, there are more useful than harmful plants, more well-developed forms of life than degenerates in the animal world, more erect men than hunchbacks, more well persons than sick, etc. But if that transcendent intelligence who in the magnificent structure of the universe has erected his statue of honor has therein also used a few doses of evil, we can regard this in no other light than that of rational necessity. The man who feels that he could not in any way look upon the misfortune that befalls him under the aspect of punishment, let him at least believe that it is intended as a means for his purification. But should someone suppose that then misfortunes would merely be means of education also in case of the wicked, let him consider, in the first place, that he cannot know how much agony they have to endure in their inner being; and next, he should not forget the great principle:⁷ "To whomsoever

⁷ Luke 12:48, *ὅτι ἕδωκεν πολλὸν κ.τ.λ.* Cf. already *δυνατοὶ δυνατὸς ἐτασθήσονται* (Wisd. 6:7), and also "they who sinned under the dispensation of the law, shall be judged by the law" (Rom. 2:12).

much is given, of him shall much be required." And lastly, in reference to the disparity in the possession of earthly goods, it is to be borne in mind that, since God allowed men to come into existence as beings with the power of free self-determination, he thereby allowed a form of development, for the separate stages of which he cannot be held responsible, since this difference in earthly goods could not be removed without destroying man's freedom.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

CHANNING AND THE RELIGION OF NEW ENGLAND.

MR. CHADWICK, in this life of Channing,¹ has published a work to which evidently he has given many years of careful study. The reader should observe from the beginning that it is not the formal biography of Channing, and he ought to be glad that it is not. It has quite enough of "he was born such a day; he went to this school; he lived at that house; and he is buried in such a tomb"—the sort of superficial detail in which the scientific biographies delight—quite enough of this, and, let us be grateful, not too much of it. The book is really the history of the development of religion in New England for more than a century past. It ought to be read with the recollection that this is so, and I think that a fair-minded reader will acknowledge that Mr. Chadwick has not overstated the place which Dr. Channing occupies in the evolution of the form or system of Christianity in the period which the book covers.

People who read books know by this time that the biography of a preacher, or indeed of any literary man, hardly ever gives in the concrete many entertaining external events. The chances are badly against us, if we are looking for what might be called the pictorial or even the dramatic experiences, such as give interest, say, to the life of Lord Roberts, or to the life of Washington, or to the life of Robinson Crusoe. Take the external events of Channing's life as a good enough instance. He went from Newport to Harvard College; he went to Richmond as tutor in a family; he came home from Richmond and was settled as working minister in a Boston parish; his health declined, and he had to work with a colleague; he lived in Newport half the year and in Boston half the year; and he died. These facts are not specially valuable for a picturesque biography, nor would it add much to the interest of the book if four or five pages were given to a discussion whether the house he lived in were No. 49 or No. 36, or whether the entry of his baptism were correct or no. But, on the other hand, it is easy enough to see that if in the years between his birth and death his

¹ *William Ellery Channing: Minister of Religion.* By JOHN W. CHADWICK. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. 463 pages.

life was an important part in an evolution of opinion which has diametrically changed the religious life of New England, the interest of the reader changes from his curiosity about an individual to his wish to follow the stages of a moral revolution.

In fact, the New England into which Channing was born had been moved to the very heart by the throes and struggles of the American Revolution. It had already been new born and transformed. The decorous forms of its pulpits had not been abandoned, but the men and women of the time had no heart or courage for digging up the fossils of an old theology or threshing out its wheat from its straw. How to govern themselves, how to get rid of the shreds of the government which they had shaken off—these were the questions which occupied them; and one has only to attempt the dreary task of reading the sermons and so-called religious pamphlets of that day to see that men's hearts were not in the discussions of the old subjects, though they would have fired their very souls the century before.

Contrasted with the indifference of that period, we have in the middle of the nineteenth century, not only New England, but the whole country alive to every idealistic discussion, eager to work out the problems of the relations of God with man. We have the beginning of unfettered discussion by men who are afraid of nothing and enter joyously upon the duty, which is a pleasure, of unraveling the threads even to the beginning.

There are American historians of no little distinction who seem to have shrunk before the questions which ask how the Puritan of 1620, Calvinistic in his theology, more than Jewish in his bibliolatry, and hieratical in his politics, developed into the free and easy New Englander of 1850, who was, according to Dr. Holmes, undevout even in the way in which he swung his rattan, and to whom the books of Leviticus and Numbers were simply archæological curiosities. It is curious that no one of the historians of the United States or of New England or of Massachusetts has chosen to discuss or to answer such questions. You might suppose that the absolute change of religious habit was like the fashionable change of a woman's bonnet or the color of its strings. But certainly the change was one worth study, and that study has been given to it, so far as the period between Whitefield and our own time is concerned, only in Mr. Chadwick's book.

If you were to have Congregational churches, you could not help variety of opinion. Even the Presbyterian hierarchy could expel a freethinker, on the one side, or could welcome one who raked over burn-

ing cinders, on the other; but the churches of Plymouth Colony were purely independent; and the churches of the Bay saved themselves from absolute independence only by inventing the word "congregational." So long as clerical caste held the supremacy, which was perhaps for fifty years after the settlement, it made but little difference whether the constitution were Congregational or Presbyterian. But after that half-century without any uniform confession—and these churches had none—and with no compulsory power to whip any recusant church back into harness, that happened in New England which will happen under any such conditions, that the laity repudiates the follies of the priesthood and states its own religion for itself, or very likely refuses to make any formal statement whatever. This has happened, for instance, in Switzerland. It was easy enough under such conditions for hard and fast Calvinism to give way and for the milder Arminian system to come in—a system which wholly rejected the idea of elect castes in the matter of salvation, and insisted that salvation was free for anybody who would accept it.

Simply as matter of history it followed that when Whitefield, in his triumphal progress through New England, compelled people to take sides, yes or no, as to Calvinistic doctrine, all those churches of which the majority were Arminian in theological doctrine refused to adopt any dogmatic creed. It was only those churches where the majority held to Calvinistic formulas which chose to reduce those formulas to writing, in the hope of giving them permanency.

What is called the Unitarianism of New England was in its origin the Arminianism of New England. When in the beginning of the last century the Calvinistic writers called them Unitarian, they accepted the name as frankly as the Methodists accepted the name "Methodist," though probably in both cases it had been intended as a term of offense. In truth, however, the Unitarianism of New England was not derived from the Unitarianism of England. It is worth making this remark because all discussion relating to the religion of New England is worthless which turns very seriously on questions regarding the character or personality of Jesus Christ. From the time of Jonathan Mayhew to this time the divergence of opinion among the Unitarian people and their ministers as to the place of Jesus Christ in the world's history has varied all the way between extremes of opinion. On the other hand, the Unitarian church has been and is absolutely at one in insisting upon the "real presence" of the living God, and in the consequent right of each individual to maintain his own personal relations with a God who is really at hand.

Mr. Chadwick's history and interpretation of this profound idealism will contain much which is new to some closet students. He has sometimes extracted from quite unexpected quarters testimony as to what closet students would call the latitudinarianism of New England in the eighteenth century. As early as 1743 the clergy "were not dumb dogs." Chauncy's "Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England," is acknowledged to have been the most effective criticism made on Whitefield and his friends. It claimed for a diligent use of the ordinary means of grace a more efficient operation than that of revivalism with its "spasms of sense and sensibility."

Mr. Chadwick quotes Dr. Andrew Peabody as saying in 1780:

There was only one Calvinist preacher in Boston, Samuel Cooper, the minister of Brattle Street, with a liberal congregation, while Eckley of the Old South was liberal with an orthodox congregation. Such mixtures were not uncommon, and generally the people in the pews were more radical than the ministers in the pulpits, an interesting comment on the charge of timid reticence which was brought against the ministers a little later, and which has persisted till our time.

Mr. Chadwick does not recall, as he might have done, the epigram of the time which says of Samuel Cooper:

At Brattle Street
You oft will meet
With silver-tongued Sam.
He gently glides
Between both sides,
And so avoids the jam.

The truth is that the educated laymen were in advance of the ministry in these affairs. And it would be safe to say that the Congregational clergy of New England in the eighteenth century resembled rather curiously the clergy of the establishment of England at the same time. That is to say, they were a respectable set of magistrates for affairs of conscience and morals. They were a peerage for life. Once minister of Old Town or New Town, you could not be put out, and a sort of mechanical discharge of a sacred duty followed, such as is apt to follow wherever there is an establishment. Establishment! Yes! that which is established.

It was the curse of the ministerial profession then that in the separation of theology from life the ministers really did not know men as well as laymen did. The directors of divinity schools now should

*Is not that good—"spasms of sense and sensibility"? This is one of Mr. Chadwick's bright epigrams.

remember this, for here is the great danger of their institutions and the peril of the men who study in them. Take this very matter of a free salvation. "I know salvation's free. It's free for you and me;" as old Methodists sang. If that is true, you can trust your state to universal suffrage. If every man has a right to communion with God and the joys of heaven, why, you can order every man in Massachusetts to carry a musket to fight against Burgoyne; and when the time comes, you do. All the same, that man will expect to vote when the time comes, and we cannot help ourselves. We give him the suffrage. But, of course, we do not give him the suffrage, and we dare not bid him take his musket to fight, if the chances are seven out of eight that he is a child of Satan and incapable of good. No community is so mad as to give its weapons into the hands of those who are born devils. Or, to state the same thing in fewer words, if you throw off the divine right of priests—and the rule works the other way—if you grant men freedom in their political opinions, freedom in the matters of this world, you must grant them freedom in their religious opinions which relate to both worlds.

Indeed, the downfall of Calvinism in America may be more directly traced to the upward progress of opinion and practice in political affairs than to the skilful dialectics of men of ecclesiastical training.

Dr. Wendte tells an excellent story of a "leader of industry" who had grown up in a mining camp. This man said to him that he didn't know much about religion, but that one of the boys had left in his cabin a book by a man named Waldo Emerson. "I read the book, and I found that this Emerson had said just what I had been thinking ever since I was a man."

That excellent story illustrates very well what happened, first to a handful of people in a Boston meeting-house, then in a larger circle of Arminian churches in New England, and, to a certain extent, afterward throughout the United States, when Channing began to say in the pulpit just what the hearers had always thought, but perhaps had not dared to say.

The certain crisis came, when in the year 1819 some people in Baltimore, most of them of New England training, established what they called the First Independent Christian Church in that city. They invited Channing to preach the sermon at the ordination of its minister, Rev. Jared Sparks. Channing's reputation was well established, and I have always supposed that the audience was largely flavored by the presence of Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, and possibly even

Episcopalian and Catholic clergymen, but perhaps this was not so. Whether it were or were not, the sermon was printed and the result was the same. Almost with the innocence of a child Channing arrayed on the right and left the favorite idols of the Calvinistic worship, painted them, not in an extravagant way, but with simple colors, and then moved serenely down between these rows of idols, slapping each of them in the face, not exactly with contempt, but with indifference. The sermon seemed to say: "this is what men pretend to believe, but what nobody of sense really cares for." Now, it is observed that men hate to be called fools as they hate nothing else. You can prove that a man's reputation for truth is a little damaged; you can prove that he has been rather a tyrant in his house; you can prove that in a bargain he has not considered the other fellow; but when you tell him that he is a fool, he is not pleased. And I am disposed to think that the gentlemen who had trained themselves to a sort of functional habit of repeating the Calvinistic dogmas resented the New Englander's contempt for it as they would not have resented merely a demonstration of its infidelity. What is called the arrogance of New England, or of Boston, was charged upon the assertion which in a certain sense was new.

I like to repeat what the late Dr. Richard Storrs said to me, very earnestly once, that if in the tens and twenties of the nineteenth century the Congregational churches of New England had had anything to do together, what he called the great schism in their body would never have taken place. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was born in 1810. He thought if it had been well at work at that time, all the Congregational churches would have co-operated with each other, and they would have left Calvinism to take care of itself.

But it is hardly worth while now to refer to such passages of a century ago. Calvinism has gone to its own place now. There are a few who do it reverence in a Pickwickian fashion, but practically the fatherhood of God is sought everywhere, and the children of God are awaking to their privileges and to their duties.

I hope the reader will not feel that, instead of calling his attention to Mr. Chadwick's admirable book, I have been only gossiping about details in the history to which that book is devoted. Really even a careful abstract of the book would not take its place for an intelligent student of the history of life in America. It must be carefully read from beginning to end.

I do not like to pass by without referring to what one might call the generosity of the book, as the writer tries to recall to our memories entirely independent lines of thought and work which have led up to the broader theological statements of today. Thus there are a few pages very well devoted to Rich, Murray, Ballou, and the rest, who have built up the Universalist communion in America, the communion whose central doctrine is now to be heard enforced in almost all pulpits. Perhaps he might have gone farther in showing how the Universalist churches of America are the legitimate children of the Calvinistic church, precisely as the Unitarian church of America is the legitimate child of Arminianism.

"Murray was a Calvinist in his major and minor premises, but drawing a different conclusion from that of Edwards and Hopkins. Only the elect were saved, but everybody was elect; 'as in Adam all died, so in Christ shall all be made alive.'" In 1903 no distinction but that of history can be found between the Unitarian and the Universalist churches. To the popular mind of nine-tenths of the country they are undoubtedly the same. Both names begin with U, and that for the "general reader" is enough. To the few people who care anything about history this genealogical reference is interesting.

Channing himself, as Mr. Chadwick shows all along, was surprised to find that he was thought to be the minister of a new religion. He never laid down any hard and fast statement of theology. His own speculative views underwent as distinct an evolution as did those of other people of his time; and I suppose that the feature of this book which will most impress those who knew nothing about him or American Unitarianism will be its frank acknowledgment that Channing's statements, even on points of much importance, were changing all the time, between that early moment when he was horror-struck as he heard the rhetoric of Hopkins and the very last year of his life.

Henry Ward Beecher once pointed out to me a long row of pamphlet boxes in which my own sermons were buried, and asked me what I had there. I said timidly that they were my old sermons. Beecher said, almost with scorn: "Why do you keep your sermons?" I was startled, but I had to reply, and I said: "Why, I think a man wants to know what he used to think." "I do not see that," said Beecher; "what I want is to know what I think now."

This epigram of his suits exactly with Channing's turn of mind. The modern generation entertains itself with comparing sermon No. 67, of April 1, 1809, against sermon No. 1,999, December 25, 1841.

But really such comparison is but the merest play of Chinese puzzles and has not the value of the tactics of a game of backgammon.

Let us hope for many such books. Hero-worship is a very good thing, but hero-worship is not everything. Is it perhaps the greatest thing of all to speak for one's time—to be enough ahead of it to lead men where they falter or are afraid, not to be so far from it that they cannot hear one sound or other appeal? We despise Erasmus because, while he knew so much, he did so little. We are grateful to Luther because he did so much when he knew so little.

"Who dares think one thing and another tell
My heart detests him as the gates of hell."

Channing is one of those people who dare say what they think. He, like other people, gives clothes to the skeleton, giving weapons to the soldiers.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

MORE than two years have passed since Professor G. A. Smith in his volume of Yale Lectures declared the war between criticism and the traditional views of Scripture ended and the fixing of the indemnity as the only thing left. Which side was to prescribe and which was to pay "the indemnity"? Professor Smith did not leave indefinite. Not long afterward, however, came another herald claiming to speak on the subject of this war, Dr. John Smith, of Edinburgh, claiming that the contest was far from over, and that when it is ended, not the traditional side, but the critical, would be the one to pay the indemnity. Whether one or the other of the Drs. Smith be right in his declarations, there is a great host of Christian students and thinkers who are interested in the contest. And they cannot believe with the enthusiastic professor that the only thing left is the fixing of the indemnity, although they are not, on the other hand, as confident as Dr. John Smith is that the critical movement is on the verge of a collapse. They are interested in the answer to two questions: first, What is the present state of opinion among critics? and second, If criticism should be vindicated and the verdict become absolutely unanimous in its favor, what would ensue to the faith of the Christian? Would he be called upon to give up his Bible? And on the principle that "the Bible, the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants," would he give up his religion? Or, is there a *modus vivendi* between faith in the inspiration and authority of

Scripture and an absolutely untrammelled criticism leading into any historical conclusions that might appear logical and legitimate? The first of these questions is a question of fact, and Dr. J. Estlin Carpenter undertakes to answer it in a series of eight lectures.¹ The second is a hypothetical question to the average Christian thinker; but Professor McFadyen answers it from the point of view of one who has ceased to look at it as a possibility in the future, has confronted it and grappled with it with a vigorous hand.²

But, though differing in their specific aims, these two works naturally overlap at many points. Professor Carpenter could not have accomplished his expository and historical task without pointing out at various and frequent intervals the bearings of nineteenth-century criticism on the faith of the church. In addition to these hints interspersed through the first seven lectures, the author devotes the whole of his eighth lecture to the subject of the Bible and the church. On the other hand, Professor McFadyen could not have fulfilled his mission as a harmonist of Old Testament criticism and the Christian church without weaving into his work a large amount of history and exposition of the critical methods and results. It will scarcely be necessary to add more than one word further on the difference of the breadth of the field of these two works. Whereas Professor Carpenter surveys the whole history of biblical criticism, Professor McFadyen limits himself to the Old Testament altogether. As the principles involved, however, are the same in both the Testaments, and as no result reached in the Old Testament can long remain without its counterpart in the New, this difference is secondary and may be left out of the account in speaking at least of the harmony of criticism and faith.

The expository part of these works we shall not undertake to report in full. It will be sufficient to say that they agree in taking the current theory of the development of the Old Testament associated with the names of Graf, Wellhausen, and Kuenen as established beyond question.³ Are they correct in this assumption? If by "establish" be meant that this theory is accepted by an overwhelming majority

¹ *The Bible in the Nineteenth Century*. Eight Lectures. By J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, M.A. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. xvi+512 pages.

² *Old Testament Criticism and the Christian Church*. By JOHN EDGAR MCFADYEN, M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903. xxii+376 pages.

³ Professor McFadyen gives a brief but wonderfully full statement of the theory in an appendix, pp. 365 ff.

(amounting to a practical unanimity) of the scholars and teachers who claim the field as their specialty, our answer must be in the affirmative. As the editor of the *Sunday School Times* points out:⁴

The fact now exists, to the shame of conservative biblical scholars—namely, that they are placing before the public no great works which at all compare in elaborateness and painstaking with those issued by their opponents. If it be said that this unanimity of scholars is no guarantee of the theory in question, no sane man ought to question the statement. The world has been unanimous in the acceptance of error too often in the past to make the mere unanimous acceptance of any theory a guarantee of its truth. Nevertheless, the practical unanimity of scholars on this subject is bound to give the theory the value of a working hypothesis, and the question must be inevitably asked: "Will it work?" and, "How will it work?" If it be said that the unanimity referred to is reached, not by the independent examination of the data by each man separately, but on the authority of a few "experts," and that thus it becomes a "new tradition" as against the old tradition, the answer is that there is a vital difference between the two traditions. Whereas the origin of one is lost in gray antiquity, the other has been formed within view of a watchful and keenly interested world. It is the difference between a reasoned tradition and an unreasoned one; and the intelligent student will know how to choose, if all that is to be said against any theory is that it is a "new tradition."

The net result, therefore, of a searching examination into the status of Old Testament criticism in the opening years of the twentieth century is the revelation of the strength of the Kuenen-Wellhausen theory. Conservative Christians who have been filled with alarm as they have viewed the steady and rapid progress of the critical views within the last quarter of a century, have been comforted from time to time with the cry: "A reaction is about to set in." Unfortunately, in every case the hopes raised by this cry have been doomed to disappointment. The leaders from whom great things were expected toward initiating a reactionary movement, not excepting Professors Sayce and Hommel—to say nothing of the ridiculous fiasco of Professor Margoliouth's *Lines of Defense of Biblical Revelation*—have proved broken reeds for the conservative to lean upon.

We are far from saying that the current theory is unalterably fixed. Too many changes have taken place within few years, since the second quarter of the nineteenth century, to make such a statement a safe one.

⁴January 31, 1903.

What the two works before us indicate is rather the necessity of inquiring whether, in case the Wellhausen hypothesis is found to have a century or longer before it, the faith of Christians would be damaged or materially affected. The question is a double one. It resolves itself first into the query, Does criticism prove fatal to Christian faith? and secondly, If not, in what respects does it lead to modifications of the faith?

The first of these questions is answered by both Professor Carpenter and Professor McFadyen with a decisive negative. Says Professor Carpenter:

The true value of the Bible has been enhanced [by criticism]. We have ceased to ask of it what it cannot give us; we cherish all the more what it can. . . . We cannot imagine either our history or our religion without the Bible. (Pp. 453, 454.)

In other words, we are and must remain believers in the religion of the Bible as we find it by historical study. Professor McFadyen is more explicit and emphatic. Criticism and faith are compatible because they coexist in the persons of the devout evangelical and aggressively evangelistic critics of the type of Professor George Adam Smith. It was useless for Lardner to attempt to prove that no steamboat could cross the Atlantic Ocean when the treatise containing his attempted proof was brought across the Atlantic by a steamboat. In the face of testimonies which he can cite from such men as Professor George Adam Smith, Dr. Batten, Professors Karl Budde, Kautzsch, Meiphold, and Loisy, he will not believe that criticism even tends toward cooling missionary zeal (p. 120). Some losses in spiritual power and insight he recognizes, but these are temporary and transitional. They are counterbalanced by larger gains of a permanent character:

The historical method eliminates the possibility of arbitrary, or at least unreasonable, interpretation. . . . It has rescued for us not a few books of the Bible. . . . It has given very great impetus to the study of the Bible. Never has so much strenuous and enthusiastic study been devoted to it before. . . . It presents us with a reasonable, probable, and even thrilling view of the development of Israel's history and religion. . . . It has relieved the double strain of moral and intellectual difficulty. . . . [Under its rule] the discrepancies, etc., which have perplexed many and given occasion to the adversary to blaspheme, may be turned to real apologetic account. . . . Many an extravagance in belief and conduct would never have been heard of had the Bible been interpreted by the historical method. . . . Finally it furnishes the simplest and strongest defense against the attacks of scepticism. (Pp. 122-31.)

It is not certain that Professor McFadyen can persuade every one of his readers that the positions above cited are well taken. But the fact that he takes them, and that he is ready to spend his most earnest effort and his most facile pen in the defense of them, is significant. Nor is he alone on his platform. Professor Gunkel is quite as ready to testify to the reinforcement of his faith by the historical criticism. Accepting the early accounts of Genesis as mythical or legendary, he nevertheless believes in their inspiration. He compares these accounts with their Babylonian parallels and exclaims in enthusiastic strains:

How immeasurably superior is the Hebrew story to the Babylonian! Shall we not then be glad that we have found in this Babylonian parallel a criterion to estimate the height of Israel's thought concerning God, which is powerful enough thus to purify and transform what is strangest and most repulsive.⁵

To the layman, even though he may not follow these men in the adoption of the new views, such testimonies cannot help bringing reassurance. If the temptation come to him to say that the critic who will not give up his faith must hold that faith at the expense of logical consistency, he will resist that temptation with the deeper thought that the critic would be guilty of a more serious logical inconsistency if he were to deny either the reality of the facts which he has discovered as a historical student or give up the faith which his heart accepts on equally strong grounds.

But if faith is not destroyed and is even reinforced by criticism, is it unaffected? Here, too, our leaders agree in their answer. Faith is modified. But they differ by the diameter of the circle as to the extent and kind of the modification it undergoes. According to Professor Carpenter, the nineteenth century with its study of the Bible has left Christianity a non-miraculous religion. Professor Carpenter is a student of comparative religion. He finds nothing in Christianity which does not reappear in some form or other in heathen religions. Inspired Scriptures, miracles in connection with its founders or great men, the virgin-birth of its founder, doctrines of incarnation, and in fact all that impresses one as characteristic of the Christian faith is duplicated in the other great religions of the world. Christianity accordingly must take what Kuenen assigned to it—a place as “one of the great religions of the world neither more nor less.” Jesus Christ is a teacher, the greatest of all, but still nothing more than a teacher descended of purely human ancestry and occupying a place in history like all the other great men of history. The position rep-

⁵ Quoted by MCFADYEN, pp. 297, 298.

resented by Dr. R. W. Dale, "that the idea of the living Christ is the life-blood of evangelical Christianity; that in all ages it has been the source of the church's energy and happiness," Professor Carpenter sets aside without unseemly polemical vehemence, but firmly and positively.

But Professor Carpenter does not claim these conclusions as the necessary and inevitable results of the critical movement. On the contrary, he concedes that others may deduce other conclusions from the same data:

Different investigators will naturally attach different values to the same evidence; different questions will be approached from varying points of view; not all students will have the same preconceptions respecting the significance of the letter of Scripture, the value of tradition, or the function of the church. (P. 452).

The facts with which criticism has to deal are so many and diverse that men of different temperament and education will necessarily generalize differing theories from them.

We may go one step farther and assert that the conclusions of Professor Carpenter will never and can never be accepted as the legitimate results of criticism, because the spiritual nature of man will assert its rights. If criticism and the spiritual nature be pitted against each other, as they seem to be in Professor Carpenter's system, we do not hesitate to say that the spiritual nature will prove victorious. We do not say that its victory will result in its own pure and permanent life. Facts cannot be ignored and never will be. The true scientific scholar will respect facts and begin with them in the construction of his religious system. But facts apart from their meaning are dead and useless. And in the reading of facts faith will claim its prerogative of seeing their spiritual side. Professor Carpenter, and those whose conception of religion is his, will deny the reality of what the spiritual sense reports that it sees in the facts. But those who claim the spiritual sense will in their turn refuse to have their vision limited only to those aspects of fact which Professor Carpenter sees. The gulf at this point seems to us impassable. Voltaire could not see the beauties of Shakespeare. But the admirers of Shakespeare have not accepted Voltaire as their true interpreter of the poet.

Criticism, then, as such is not responsible for Professor Carpenter's views. This conclusion is fully corroborated as we turn to Professor McFadyen's estimate of the results of criticism in the realm of faith. First of all we are assured by this exponent of the critical views that

inspiration—the inspiration of the Bible—constituting it a unique and authoritative rule of faith and life, not only remains, but is even supported and strengthened by the new views:

Inspiration may be difficult to define, but the fact is impossible to ignore, whether we regard the express testimony of the prophets that they received their words from God, or the indirect testimony of the earlier part of Scripture to the presence of a spirit which effectually differentiates Hebrew literature from others to which it is akin (p. 302).

Predictive prophecy likewise remains, and the supernatural element conceived of as the power underlying the whole movement of thought in Israel. If we bear in mind the fact that Professor McFadyen's specific design did not involve the discussion of the supernatural from the point of view of the New Testament, we shall realize all the more thoroughly the significance of his claim that criticism leaves the supernatural in Christianity unaffected (chap. ix). Finally, the supremacy of Christ and his final and unimpeachable authority in the spiritual sphere are vigorously maintained by Professor McFadyen, and that not merely as things untouched by Old Testament criticism, but as set in a clearer light and given greater practical efficiency.

Perhaps the most useful chapter of Professor McFadyen's enticing, we might almost say brilliant, volume is that entitled "A Great Gulf Fixed?" It is needless to say that the question is asked with reference to the views respectively known as the traditional and critical. Recognizing the irreconcilable differences of these views on matters of a literary and historical nature, are these differences such that the adherents of the two standpoints cannot join hands together in the religious and spiritual sphere? The author answers with an emphatic negative. Does he support his answer adequately? In our judgment he does. The points of agreement between believers in the supernatural origin, unique character, and redemptive power of the gospel in the critical camp and the traditional decidedly overbalance and put out of sight the points of difference between them. The former are essential and vital; the latter are formal and outward. Professor McFadyen has not only made this clear, but has helped to bridge over the chasm, so far as there was one; and for this service he deserves the cordial recognition and sincere thanks of the scholars both of the traditional and the critical types, so far as they love the Word of God and submit to the authority of Jesus Christ.

A. C. ZENOS.

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EASTERN CHRISTENDOM.

THAT there is a growing interest in oriental Christianity is evident from the number and quality of books bearing on the subject, now appearing from the press, and also from the fact that eastern scholars are beginning to apply scientific methods to the problems of ecclesiastical history. From the fifth to the eighth century Christendom was gradually sundered into two great branches, which finally ceased to feel, or indeed to have, any vital relations with each other. During these centuries the eastern church was likewise breaking up into a half-dozen fragments. Theological controversy, racial antipathy, and the spread of Islam destroyed the sense of unity, and oriental Christendom lay bruised and bleeding from every pore. The orthodox imperial church alone retained any great vitality. Its chief service was the conversion of Russia and the preservation of the Greek language and literature. But the crusades dealt it a cruel blow, and the Ottoman Turk completed its overthrow. Since the capture of Constantinople in 1453 oriental Christianity has had a retrograde existence, if we except Russia. The Nestorian church, it is true, for several centuries zealously spread the faith in central Asia and sustained a vigorous patriarchate on the Tigris. But the curse of Islam finally pervaded its life and blighted its future.

The present disintegrate condition of oriental Christendom can be explained and understood only by tracing the history of each branch of the eastern church from the days of controversy and schism until now. And the reintegration of oriental Christianity and of Christendom as a whole will come only from a sympathetic study and appreciation of the struggles and trials and sufferings of each separate branch. History is the great teacher and reconciler. And sympathetic history is beginning to be written. Kyriakos's *Geschichte der orientalischen Kirchen*,¹ though strongly suspicious of the motives of the Roman papacy, and plainly partial to the Orthodox church, preserves in general a balanced judgment and portrays the history of the various branches of the Eastern church after the fall of Constantinople in a sympathetic manner. His German translator, Dr. Erwin Rausch, has done western students a great service by the publication of the work now before us.² The book is mainly an interpretation of the work of

¹ A review of this work will be found in Vol. VII, pp. 556 ff. of this JOURNAL.

² *Kirche und Kirchen im Lichte griechischer Forschung*. Von LIC. DR. ERWIN RAUSCH. Leipzig: Deichert, 1903. viii + 127 pages.

the Athens church historian. Our author sketches briefly the efforts of Greek historians since the fall of Constantinople, and then describes the sources of the "*Ἐκκλησιαστικὴ Ἱστορία*" of Kyriakos whom he calls "der Hauptvertreter der modernen griechischen Kirchenhistorik." One of the most interesting chapters of the work before us treats of the "development of orthodox ecclesiastical doctrine" (pp. 29 ff.) The section opens with an exposition of the influence of "*παράδοσις*," which Kyriakos defines "*εἶναι πᾶν, ὃ τι πάντοτε, πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πάντων ἐπισταύθη*." This faith is the ever-living consciousness of the church. It unfolds as time goes on, and becomes more fully understood and more accurately defined, yet the substance remains unchanged. "Die Lehre unserer Kirche," says Kyriakos, "ist nicht in allen ihrer Einzelheiten durch die alten Väter und die ökumenischen Synoden begrenzt, wie dies in der römischen Kirche durch das tridentinische Konzil und die päpstlichen Dekrete der Fall ist; deswegen genießt die theologische Wissenschaft bei uns mehr Freiheit als in der päpstlichen Kirche." Our author next describes the influence of philosophy upon the Christian faith, as that is understood by Kyriakos, who declares: "*ὁ χριστιανισμὸς συνεπλήρωσε τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἐλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν*." Neoplatonism, the Aristotelian philosophy, the mystic theology, and modern philosophical movements are specifically treated. Dr. Rausch then passes to an exposition of the relation of the Anatolian church to the Romish church, as conceived by Kyriakos. "The arrogance of the papacy" is declared to be the real cause of the final schism in the church. "Photios war der Mann der die anatolische Kirche von der Tyrannei des Papstes rettete. Ohne ihn war diese verloren, die *παράδοσις* und der Latinismus angenommen." Islam and the Anatolian Church, and Protestantism and the Greek church, complete the treatment.

Dr. Karl Beth³ deals particularly with the Greek, Armenian, and Coptic churches. The author aims to give us a picture of the present condition of these churches, their outer relations, their varying conceptions of Christianity, and the prevailing types of piety found among them. Part I treats of the organization and administrative life of the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem; and describes the constitution of the Orthodox autonomous churches of Hellas, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Servia, and of the remaining Danubian provinces. It also deals with the smaller Orthodox churches—

³ *Die orientalische Christenheit der Mittelemerländer*. Von LIC. DR. KARL BETH. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1902. xvi + 427 pages.

Armenian, Coptic, and Abyssinian—and with those oriental churches which have from time to time been brought under the sway of Rome.

The second part of this valuable work deals with the religious life of the oriental churches, describing first the inter-confessional relations of the various branches of oriental Christendom, and of these churches with Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. The cultus of the Greek Orthodox churches is treated under four heads: "Church Buildings," "Church Year," "Liturgy," and "Sacraments." Although the sketch is brief, it reveals the fact that Dr. Beth is thoroughly familiar with the details of the cultus of the Greek church, and knows how to portray them in a fresh and interesting way. The chapter on "Dogma and Piety" gives proof of patient investigation and a thorough mastery of the theme. Taken altogether, the work of Dr. Beth calls for the highest commendation and will prove of great service to students of oriental Christendom.

An excellent German translation, by Konrad Grass, of the introductory portions of the two standard Russian works on dogmatics,⁴ has recently appeared from the press. The first part consists of Makari's *Geschichte der rechtgläubig-dogmatischen Gottesgelehrtheit*, the second of Silwestr's *Geschichte der dogmatischen Wissenschaft*. The little volume will prove of great interest and value to western students of Russian systematic theology. The two works chosen by Grass for translation divide the Russian theological student world into two camps. While they differ somewhat in point of view and method of treatment, the historical portions in the main follow similar lines and reach similar results. A valuable part of this small volume consists of the alphabetical register of works on Russian systematic theology. The catalogue is large, and the reader will no doubt be surprised at the scope and thoroughness with which many questions of theology have been treated by Russian writers. There is also added to the volume before us an alphabetical register of the present Russian theological reviews and current periodicals.

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THE RELIGION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

HISTORIANS tell us that great movements in the field of thought develop in silence for years, and then come to the surface at about the same time here and there. In like manner it has often proved that

⁴*Geschichte der Dogmatik in russischer Darstellung*. Von KONRAD GRASS. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1902. xiv + 179 pages.

inventions or discoveries in technical lines or in natural science have, it may be in slightly different forms, been proclaimed at the same time by various persons. Harnack's *Das Wesen des Christentums* was the first book in a new movement in the effort to clear up doubts and difficulties in reference to the foundations of Christianity. A large part of the books that followed Harnack's in time were directly drawn forth by his book, and sold well because they caught his wave of popularity. Now a book has appeared that touches the foundations, it is true, but in a different way from that of Harnack and as a result of long researches. Bernhard Weiss, the professor at Berlin, who has done fifty years of theological work in the universities, and who has published during that period many a book about the New Testament, held his introductory lecture in the University of Königsberg, on July 27, 1852. In that lecture he discussed the relations of exegesis to biblical theology. It was his opinion that the detailed work upon the single writings of the New Testament should finally be concentrated, boiled down, and digested, so that the manifold colors should unite in one ray of truth and light.

During the long years of lecturing and of teaching Weiss has repeatedly done a certain work of this kind for students and theologians. Now, however, he has taken it up again in a form which addresses itself, not merely to the circles of theology, but as well to every educated man.¹ This book is dedicated to his old friend Dr. Dryander, the upper court preacher at Berlin. It contains, after the introduction, three parts. The introduction itself begins with defining the essence of Christianity and passes then to treat of the nature or essence of revelation, of holy Scripture, and of religion and theology. The first of the three main divisions places before us the presuppositions of the salvation offered to us; namely, the essence of God, the essence of the world and of humanity, sin and its consequences, the divine government, and the preparation for salvation. The second division turns to the salvation offered in Christ, dealing with the Son of God and Son of man, the life-work of Jesus, the saving importance of the death of Jesus, the ascended Christ and the Spirit, and the word and sacraments. The third division presents the realization of salvation, discussing election and calling, saving faith and the position of the saved (their rank and degree), new birth and sanctification, preservation and perfection, the church and the kingdom of God, and finally the end of the world.

¹ *Die Religion des Neuen Testaments.* Von BERNHARD WEISS. Stuttgart und Berlin: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1903. xii + 321 pages. M. 6; bound, M. 7.50.

The author is determined to let the Scriptures speak for themselves, and he therefore gives everywhere what almost might be called a cento of Scripture paraphrase. Happily the passages referred to are named in the text in a parenthesis; thus everyone can refer and read for himself, like the Bereans. As we take the book in hand, the question presents itself whether biblical theology advances or not, whether in the fifty years that Bernhard Weiss has been pondering over the New Testament there has really been no new thing learned, whether this is precisely the book he would have written at that first moment. The answer is decidedly that there has been an advance, and that this book is on many points different from what it would have been a half a century ago. The misfortune is that many of the readers of the book will only look for a confirmation of what they once learned. If they find a sentence in Weiss that does not agree with their own old views, that sentence will be at once rejected by them or explained away. On that plan it would not be strange if biblical theology should not advance.

In one respect such readers will find a comfort in one observation. It is the custom of late years to say that the Revelation cannot be the work of the apostle John, or that if it be, then the gospel cannot be, and that one epistle or another must be attributed to a different writer from the one named. Here Weiss is conservative. He quotes the Apocalypse as well as the gospel and the epistles as from John. He refers to 2 Peter as readily as to 1 Peter or as to Romans. And, as far as single passages are concerned, he uses the end of the last chapter of Matthew like the rest of that gospel. The end of Mark and the story of the adulterous woman are of course passed over. The moment for the completion of the canon is (p. 37) the last quarter of the second century. It is interesting in this connection to see how Paul's treatment of the Old Testament, his use of the original or of the Greek translation, and his free handling of it are applied by Weiss (pp. 34-36) to the whole question of the canon, or of inspiration, as showing that the precise wording of Scripture is not to be regarded as of divine origin. In reference to Old Testament prophecy we are told (p. 21) that the office of the prophets was the interpretation of God's revelation for the people, and not a supernatural communication of new truths. On p. 29 Weiss agrees with Lessing, that the most striking miracle could not confirm the truth of a doctrine, and concludes that a revelation shows itself to be divine in meeting our deepest religious needs and in making us ready and fit to do God's will. In leaving this part of the discussion it is only necessary to point to pp. 54, 55, with their

presentation of the exegesis of dogmaticians, of rationalists, and of philological historians. Much as the author commends the philological and historical treatment of the New Testament, he insists upon it that no one can duly understand it who does not accept it as testimony to the revelation of salvation in Christ.

If the New Testament is the message about Jesus, then the view taken of his person and work must be the heart of it all. The excitement of late years in reference to the question of the supernatural conception and birth does not affect the author. He says (p. 143) that the miracle of the incarnation is as little to be understood when we assume that the flesh and blood in which the Son of God appeared was supernaturally begotten, as if we assume that it was begotten according to the course of nature. As to the life of Jesus we learn (p. 145): "Nowhere do the gospels show in him a higher knowledge, surpassing the bounds of his time and of his nation;" Jesus regards Psalm 110, a late one, as written by David, and Deuteronomy as written by Moses, and the book of Jonah as real history. And further, Weiss holds that the miracles done by him are not signs of divine might, but are common as well to the prophets and apostles (p. 146), and even in John are described as the work of the Father, thus thoroughly putting aside the dogmatical efforts (p. 147) to make comprehensible the union of two natures in the man Jesus. The peculiarity of his life on earth lies (p. 148) in his complete knowledge of God and his full union with God, so that he is the most perfect revelation of the Father and knows exactly what God's will is, and (p. 150) in his freedom from sin.

Jesus, who had no divine omniscience (p. 160), did not at the opening of his work on earth anticipate a violent death, but reached a knowledge of it as the opposition to him increased. His death was, however, not the punishment of the innocent for the guilty (p. 166), even though he calls it a redemption, and as little is it the condition (p. 175) upon which God forgives sin and foregoes punishing. His death, viewed by believers as the means of reconciliation and as the price of redemption, makes it possible for God (pp. 176, 177) to let the punishment fall away and to exercise his gracious forgiveness.

If the discussions of late have turned largely upon the above-mentioned question of the miraculous birth, they have as well directed themselves to the question of the resurrection. It will here be enough to press the one point (pp. 184, 185) that, according to Weiss, Jesus and the whole New Testament understand by resurrection not a return to earthly life, according to the pharisaic hope, but an awakening to

heavenly life. Weiss says: "It is accordingly incontestable, that the still ruling view, according to which the resurrection of Jesus was only a resurrection to earthly life, such as even in the Old Testament tradition had taken place in the case of various dead persons, and in the New Testament had been effected by Jesus himself several times—that this view irrecoverably does away with the totally unique signification which the whole New Testament attributes to the resurrection of Christ." Weiss insists upon it, accordingly, that the appearances of Jesus to the disciples must be placed upon a level with the appearance to Paul, just as Paul himself places them.

It is then a necessary consequence of this, when we read (p. 186) that "the conception of a special miracle in which Jesus in his earthly body ascended into heaven is contrary to Scripture." From the moment of the resurrection on, Jesus was in his heavenly body (p. 187): "His resurrection is his ascension in Jesus' words as well as in the whole apostolic preaching." Even if the expression "God-Man" does not occur in the New Testament, Weiss thinks that it fits the ascended Jesus, but he deprecates the carrying back of this term into the earthly life of the Son of man.

In the presentation of the view of the New Testament touching the Spirit, Weiss finds it hard to understand how people continue to refer to the Spirit in the New Testament as a person, and shows (pp. 197, 198) how in even the most frequently quoted passages there is no possibility of the personal conception.

Baptism is taken by Weiss, as by others, to have originally been immersion. He begins his discussion of it with the words: "The rite of immersion" (p. 204). He further (p. 211) considers it beyond doubt that in the New Testament period only adults were baptized. Proceeding from these two points, he then explains the passage to sprinkling and to infant baptism.

When the Lord's Supper comes to be spoken of, Weiss insists upon it (pp. 208, 209) that Jesus does not compare his body with the bread or his blood with the wine. Jesus intends to show the disciples that his death, which he then saw to be approaching, was not to be viewed by them as a gloomy fate, but as a means for the divine gift of salvation. Bread is broken to be distributed to the participants in the feast; his body is to be broken in death that they may personally partake of his salvation.

That is enough to show the mass of interesting material contained in this volume. The reader will think of many another point: elec-

tion, reward, second coming. One of the great virtues of this book is its concentration of New Testament theology into one short view. Christianity passes rapidly before the reader's eyes in one clear picture. It is, of course, necessary that the proof-texts should be named, yet it would be a good thing, if it were only possible in a business way, if the text could be given as one clear essay in another edition, an edition for cursory reading. This book should be translated into English, but by a good translator, not by a beginner. Perhaps in the translation the proof-texts could be given in an appendix, page for page, but the essay itself should then contain no numbers or signs. The texts for the page in order would be clear enough.

Schleiermacher said that practical theology was the crown of theology. He was right. Bernhard Weiss has written for years theological books of all kinds, and especially commentaries, and in his short commentary to the whole New Testament with his own Greek text he has given a handbook for theological students. But now he should crown it all with a popular commentary, accompanying the German text, and that not too short a commentary. The church itself should have a share in his ripe work.

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THE BOOKS OF KINGS.

IT was a complaint of the elder Delitzsch, twenty-five years ago, that modern Old Testament criticism criticised too much, and constructed too little. This has often been re-echoed since. But, of course, construction has from the first been its logical aim. Whether this work was delayed too long can be fairly determined only in view of the obstacles to be cleared away, and with some appreciation of the difficulties which the fresh constructions involve. Now, at all events, the work is going on quickly. The literature of Old Testament study, particularly in English, has been transformed within twenty years—almost within ten.

The books of Kings were not among the first to receive systematic attention, although the surprising light from the monuments led to many discussions of certain parts. Old Testament history was rewritten, and Old Testament histories published, from the modern point of view, before a complete treatment of the historical documents of the royal period was in the hands of students. Until the appearance of Ben-

zinger's *Könige* in 1899, and Kittel's in 1900, there was no commentary on Kings in any language which a modern teacher could commend to his pupils with real satisfaction. Burney's¹ is the first of such books in English.

I must at once qualify this remark by saying that it is not precisely a commentary, as the term is generally understood. The textual and the grammatical predominate, as the title suggests. There is more remark upon the structure and composition of the book than the title really demands, though none too much for the student's good. Of historical discussion there is very little. The scope and manner of Mr. Burney's work are, in a word, modeled upon Professor Driver's *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, with some modifications in detail.

He shows the training of a sound school. The thorough philological knowledge, dispassionate observation, accuracy, intellectual caution, sobriety and calmness of judgment, which give Professor Driver his commanding influence in the Old Testament study of Great Britain at the present time, work their work through his books, but also through the pupils whom he trains. Such younger men as C. F. Burney, G. A. Cooke, A. E. Cowley, G. B. Gray, J. F. Stenning—to name no others—have learned the solid worth of his method, and use it, to the advantage of scholarship, in various individual combinations. "To his teaching and example," Mr. Burney modestly says in his preface, "is due most of what may be of value in this book." This does not mean borrowing, or imitation, but inwrought habits of treatment. The result is an excellent book for students. A careful use of it will promote knowledge of these important historical writings, and aid, in turn, in the sound training of those who are to be busied with the Bible. It is of course highly technical, and an adequate review of it must share this character.

"Notes on the Text" puts textual questions at once to the fore. Here we have no startling novelties, but, as the main feature, a careful registration of such current proposals for textual change on the basis of the versions, as Mr. Burney, with independent judgment, accepts. He heartily acknowledges and frequently specifies the work of Thenius, Wellhausen, Klostermann, Kamphausen, Hooykaas, Benzinger, Kittel,

¹ *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Kings*. With an Introduction and Appendix. By REV. C. F. BURNEY, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Hebrew of S. John Baptist's College, Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903; New York: Henry Frowde. xlviii + 384 pages.

1903

and—especially, of course, on the building enterprises of Solomon—Stade. There is also discriminating inquiry into the real significance of the readings cited from the versions, and occasionally an entirely new suggestion.

Among the less familiar changes are the following:

1 Kings 1:26b, **בְּקֶה** for **עֲבֹדָה**, with Luc., Klost., and Hooykaas; vs. 28, the omission of the first **לְפָנַי הַמֶּלֶךְ**, with the same; 2:5, **וַיִּשְׁמָם** for **וַיִּקְסָם**, with Luc., Vet. Lat., Klost., Hooykaas, and Kittel; vs. 29, the long insertion of LXX, Luc., after **וַיִּשְׁלַח שְׁלֹמֹה**, with Böttcher, Klost., and Kittel; 5:14, the insertion of **וַיִּקָּח מִנְחָה** before **מֵאֵת**, with Luc., Pesh., Klost., and Hooykaas; 8:12, 13, the preference of the Greek to the Hebrew form of Solomon's dedicatory lines, with Wellh.; 11:23–25, the reading of LXX, Luc., with Klost., Benzinger, Kittel, and Oort; 13:34, **לְחֻשָּׁאֵת לְבֵית יִרְבֵּעַם**, with LXX, Luc., Pesh., Thenius, Kamph., Klost., Benz., and Kittel—we must surely follow these authorities also in reading **הַדָּבָר** for **בִּדְבָר**;—18:5, **וְלֹא תִפְרֹת מִמֶּנּוּ בַהֲמָה**, with Luc. and Wellh.; 19:2, the insertion of **אִם** **אֶתְּהָ אֱלֹדֵיו וְאִנִּי אֲחִיבֵל**, with LXX, Luc., and Thenius (but the idiom is questionable, and the heaping up of asseverative phrases hardly probable, cf. Benz.); 2 Kings 4:35, omission of **יְיָ וַיִּזְוֹרֵר**, with LXX, regarding **וַיִּזְוֹרֵר** as dittography for **וַיִּגְדֹּר**, with Grätz; 10:32, **לְקִצּוֹת** for **לְקֹדֶץ**, with Vulg. and Klost.; and many more. In addition to deciding on such previous suggestions, Mr. Burney offers some of his own, such as these: 1 Kings 7:47, 46, 48, the order of LXX, Luc., and the text (mainly) of Luc. (here Benz. agrees in part); 8:33, the insertion of **וְנִפְלֵה** before **לְפָנַי אוֹיֵב**, with Luc. (where, however, the parallelism of Yahweh with the enemy seems doubtful); 9:24, substantially the reading of LXX, Luc. (in vs. 9), the establishing of the daughter of Pharaoh being then (apparently) understood as co-ordinate with the building of Millo, and not as *conditioning* this building, or standing in any specific relation to it; 10:26, a reconstruction, incorporating part of 5:6, on the basis of LXX, Luc., and 2 Chron. 9:25; 12:31, the insertion of **וַיִּרְבְּעָם**, with Luc.; 19:5, **שָׁם** for **אֶחָד** **רָתֵם**, partly after LXX, Luc. (Benz. and Kittel avoid the difficulty otherwise); 2 Kings 9:25, **כִּי זָכַר** **מִפְּנֵי-אֲשֶׁר**, with LXX, Luc., Pesh., and Vulg.; 17:2, **וְרָק לֹא וְגו'** for **וְרָק לֹא וְגו'**, with Luc. (but here surely the more difficult text is the original).

An excellent feature of these discussions, pedagogically, is the painstaking effort to reduce the variant readings of the versions to their common original.* Of course, a fundamental weakness of the whole procedure lies in the uncertainty of the text of the versions themselves.

* E. g., on pp. 9, 132 ff., 141, 157, 161, 168, 177, 224.

For this Mr. Burney is not responsible, nor for using such materials as he has. The text of the Old Testament has been greatly improved by the judicious use of the versions even in their imperfect form, and a fuller apparatus in the present book would probably be bewildering, rather than helpful, to the student. Some sense of the limitations under which the versions must be used will be gathered from the introductory remarks on "Characteristics of the Chief Ancient Versions"—although we are referred to Professor Driver's *Samuel* for quite fundamental matters. It would, however, be most desirable to make students familiar with the necessity of pushing the classification of MSS. much farther, and defining families more sharply, that their weight may be justly appreciated, before we can feel that there is really solid ground beneath our feet when we use the versions for a systematic reconstruction of the Old Testament text. It is at present convenient to operate, in large measure, with such imposing symbols as "LXX," "Luc.," and the rest. But the value of these symbols varies greatly. For example, where "Luc." is adduced as the sole witness for a proposed reading, the actual MS. authority is far from being a fixed quantity, as a brief study of Holmes and Parsons will show. Moreover, other groups are waiting to be discovered and classified. We are a long way yet from the original LXX. We should at least begin to prepare our students for the science of diplomatics, in relation to the text of the versions. Some hints as to the relative value of the versions, alone and in their various combinations, would also be welcome to this end, and, in general, some statement of the laws of corruption and emendation. As it is, Mr. Burney leaves these to be derived mainly from the specific cases, from the living teacher, or from other sources.

As all Old Testament critics must, Mr. Burney makes occasional (not excessive) use of conjectural emendation:

Thus (with Klost.) **הַבְּלֹן** is proposed for **הַבְּעֹלֹת**, 1 Kings 4:16; **עַל-כִּלְהֶפְצָבִים** is inserted after **אֶחָד** in the same verse (with Klost., and, guardedly, Benz.); as a possibility, **אֶת-הַשָּׂרֵכֶת** is inserted after **וַיַּעֲבֹר**, 6:21 (with Thenius); vss. 29, 30 are excluded from the original text (with Benz. and Kit.); in 7:8, while the omission of **יַעֲשֶׂה** (LXX) is not opposed (so Benz. "vielleicht"), a corruption of it from **עָשָׂה** after a (conjectured) **וַיִּבְרָא** is offered as an ingenious alternative; in proposing **פְּנִיתֶיהָ**, vs. 30, for **וַאֲרֵבְעָה פַעֲמָתָיו**, Burney goes with Kamph., Benz., and Kit.; 9:25, he agrees with Benz. in thinking **אֶת-אֲשֵׁר** a plausible substitute for **אֲתֹר אֲשֵׁר**; he follows Kamph., 10:15, in reading **מִאֲשֵׁר בָּא מִסָּחָר** for **מִאֲנָשִׁי**

וּמִסְחָר וְהַתָּרִים—but has וְהַתָּרִים developed from בָּא ? Kit.'s suggestion, מִמָּאֲשֶׁר בָּא מִן־הַעֲרִים וּמִסְחָר, is worth considering; 11:19^b, וַיִּתְּנֵהּ, is read, with Winckler and Benz.; 12:30, he inserts (with a hint from Luc.) אֶל־בֵּית־אֵל וְלִפְנֵי הָאֹהֶל, before עָדֶיךָ, *i. e.*, "the people used to go before the one to Bethel, and before the other unto Dan" (Benz. in part), where it would have strengthened his case if he had cited 1 Chron. 21:30 in support of the meaning given to לִפְנֵי (see Driver, *New Heb. Lex.*, 817^a), especially since Kamph., Benz., and Kit. allow only "march in front of;" 18:19, he appears to agree with Wellh., Stade, Kamph., Benz., and Kit. in regarding מֵאוֹת אַרְבַּע הָאֲשֶׁרָה וְנִבְרָא as a gloss; 22:48, 49, he (like Klost., Benz., Kit.) goes with Stade in reading וַיִּנְצֵב הַמֶּלֶךְ יְהוֹשָׁפָט וַיִּנְצֵב; 2 Kings 3:15, הָיָה is explained (with Klost.) by supposing the omission of the end of Elisha's speech; vs. 25, he inserts (before עַד) וַיִּנְיֶדוּ אֶת־מוֹאָב, after Luc. and Klost., and then changes אֶת־בְּנֵיהֶם to בְּנֵיהֶם, "and they harried Moab until her sons were left in Kirhahreseth," but even so we miss a restrictive term—"only in K."—and the proposal is hardly final; 6:15, he agrees with Klost., Kamph., Benz., and Kit. (in the main) in reading מִמְּחֶרֶת for מִשְׁרָת, and בִּבְקָר for לָקוּם (*cf.* Luc.); he has a fresh and attractive reading for the troublesome verse, 7:13; 9:14^b, he inclines (rightly) to follow Grätz in reading וַיִּדְוֶה for וַיִּדְוֶה.

It cannot be made a serious criticism that Mr. Burney sometimes cites the moderns who agree with him, and sometimes does not, for it is not given to us to be complete and consistent in such matters; but the fact may be noted, to prevent misunderstanding. Nowhere does he follow slavishly:

In some instances he maintains the Masoretic text, against the Verss. and other critics, as 1 Kings 3:4; 2 Kings 6:5 *al.*; in 1 Kings 1:6 he does not quite remove the difficulty of עָצָב (but 2 Sam. 13:21, LXX add., should be compared, with most moderns), and עָצָר (LXX ἀπεκάλυσεν), which he rejects, might mean "check," "he did not check him" (after one deed, and prevent his going on to another); 1 Kings 10:1, he hardly maintains the integrity of the text; לָשִׁם occurs elsewhere always with a *vb. actionis*; and that Solomon's fame was a result of Yahweh's fame is improbable; whether some such insertion as that of Klost. *al.*, or the simple omission of לָשִׁם as a gloss (Böttcher, Thenius), is to be preferred is not easy to say.

Other features of the book claim briefer attention. Grammatical notes are scattered through it, many of them very useful for students:

Not all of them command full assent. The difficult imperfect in 1 Kings 3:4 is hardly to be explained as a frequentative. In that case the אֵלֶּה would

have to be understood of each occurrence, and the meaning would be that Solomon repeatedly offered one thousand burnt-offerings at Gibeon. They were hardly such common affairs. It seems better to take יַעֲלֶה of continuance, giving the setting of the following incident. It will then denote the duration of the period of extraordinary worship, within which fell the night of Solomon's vision, vs. 5. Similarly, אָדַבֵּר, 1 Kings 21:6, "I was speaking to Naboth, and (in the course of conversation) I said," (rather than Mr. Burney's "I begin to speak"); even יִנְהַג; 2 Kings 9:20, Mr. Burney understands of Jehu's habit, demanding הֲוֵא נִהַג for a (single) present event. But this is surely an excessive purism, as the examples in Ges.-Kau., §§ 107 f., König, *Syntax*, § 160b, plainly show. In fact, the Hebrew could say "is driving madly" or "drives madly," as the English can, of an event before one's eyes, and this rendering adds greatly to the vividness of the passage. In vs. 5 I cannot think that מָדָה in the object-clause is an outgrowth of the indefinite sense of מָדָה (rare, by the way, in Hebrew). In 5:20 the explanation of צִוְּהוּ וַיִּכְרְתוּ is so phrased as to leave room for the meaning that "Command and let them hew," "Command that they hew," and "Command, in order that they may hew," are equivalent, and easily interchangeable. Most grammars treat this delicate point inadequately. It seems best (and so I understand König, *Syntax*, § 361gß) to suppose that the copulative idea passes immediately into the idea of the object, without the intervention of the idea of purpose. On vs. 28, explaining the accusative of manner, often puzzling to beginners, a reference would have been desirable, not only to Davidson, § 70, but also to the enlightening passage Da., § 71, R 1, where the possibility is recognized that such a word modifying a *subject* may be regarded as in apposition with it; on the other hand, in 6:7 we hardly have a "loose apposition" (the references do not show like examples), but rather an accusative of specification; cf. Da., § 71. בֵּית (בְּמוֹת), 12:31, is explained as a collective; may not בֵּית בְּמוֹת be rather a compound noun, of which only the second member is pluralized (like בֵּית אֲבוֹת, so Kit.)? On 20:8 Mr. Burney revives the view of Ewald that לֹא with the imperfect, after אֵל with jussive, softens the energetic negative, and "secures an even flow to the sentence." The point is an obscure one, and authorities disagree, but it seems to me more probable that we have here a climax, in the passage from the politer אֵל of deprecation to the more categorical לֹא of prohibition.

Explanations are sought for many difficult words: such as שִׁקְפִים, 1 Kings 6:4 (also 7:4, cf. vs. 5); שְׁלֵי־יָמִים, 9:22; בְּלִיעַל, 21:10; עָפַל, 2 Kings 5:24; and others; of peculiar interpretations may be noticed שִׁים, 1 Kings 20:12, as reflexive (at best doubtful, and needing at least some defense); יִנְחֹשׁ, vs. 33, as "began to divine" (where "were taking the omens" has perhaps more in its favor; cf. 21:6; 2 Kings 3:4, above); עָפַל,

2 Kings 5:24, as "citadel," rather than "hill;" it would be easy to multiply illustrations.

In several respects, as remarked at the beginning, Mr. Burney's book over-runs—to the advantage of the student—the limits suggested by the title, and yet without being so full on these points as to become a comprehensive handbook. Thus, while we have no account of the title, and no statement of the relation with the books of Samuel, the questions of structure and composition are by no means neglected. A section of the introduction is devoted to this subject, and significant points are specially discussed, in the body of the work, as they arise. It is to be regretted that for the important subject of the sources, and the editor's treatment of them, the student is merely referred to Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, where Mr. Burney has handled these topics in an article. Given these sources, modern critics are substantially agreed—and Mr. Burney with them—that the books of Kings have taken their present Hebrew form under a threefold redaction, the first two controlled by the Deuteronomic and the third by the Priestly Code, R^{D_1} being pre-exilic (about 600 B. C.), R^{D_2} exilic, and R^P (far less important) post-exilic and provincial, not appearing in the LXX. The main question is as to the agency of R^{D_1} and R^{D_2} , respectively. Some connect, or identify, R^D with the editor of the general history from early times, of which the books of Kings form a later section. Mr. Burney does not touch upon this, and indeed it would have taken him too far. All hold that R^{D_1} supplied the original framework, and that R^{D_2} added the appendix (say, from the end of 2 Kings, chap. 23), and worked in various other passages (*e. g.*, 2 Kings 17:19, 20) which presuppose the exile of Judah. But Mr. Burney ascribes the chronological statements, including the synchronisms, to R^{D_1} , while Benz. and Kit. assign the synchronisms to R^{D_2} , for reasons which have weight, but which Mr. Burney does not discuss. He merely gives a tabular scheme of the synchronisms, to show the differences between MT, LXX, and Luc. We find in the introduction a full list of the Deuteronomic marks of the redaction, and these are illustrated elsewhere, *e. g.*, on 1 Kings 11:1–13. He appears to favor Winckler's analysis of 11:14–25, with its double narrative, which Benz. adopts outright, but Kit. rejects. He treats with fulness and care 11:26–43; 12:1–24, and notes the superiority of the LXX version, while he differs from Benz. in judging LXX 12:24*d–f* as inferior to MT 11:19*b* ff. He presents the "Narratives of the Northern Kingdom" (beginning with 1 Kings, chap. 17) with a special and discriminating introduction, and through-

out there are many remarks and brief discussions which keep the student's interest alive, and quicken his perception for the structural marks of the composition. I cannot refrain from calling especial attention to the strong and, in part, quite fresh argument for diversity of authorship of 1 Kings, chaps. 20 and 22, on the one hand, and 21, on the other, and unity of the authorship of 1 Kings, chap. 21, and 2 Kings 9:1—10:27.

The point of view of a student of history, as well as of language and literary monuments, is taken from time to time. One misses a summary statement of the value of Kings as history, and here, of course, the lack of a treatment of the sources, and of the chronology from the historical side, is felt. Historical notes are relatively full in connection with the fall of the northern kingdom, and with Hezekiah's reign, and the appendix reproduces—as a work of supererogation, one would almost think—the Mesha' and Siloam inscriptions, together with (transliterated) extracts from Shalmaneser II. and Sennacherib. Besides these, we have two plates (pp. 91, 92), illustrating the *מכילת* of 1 Kings 7:27 ff., from the bronze stands of Larnaka and Enkomi. There are also many incidental remarks on topography, the identification of place-names, deities, and the like.

This review may be brought to a close by the consideration of one or two details of historical interest. It is not quite clear whether Mr. Burney regards 1 Kings 11:26–43 as originally belonging to the narrative of Solomon's reign. In any case, the position that the history of the division is from a Judæan hand (Wellh., Stade) seems untenable; all blame is ascribed to Rehoboam, and the right of Israel to a free choice of king (after David and Solomon) is assumed. Both these facts point strongly to an Israelitish origin (so Benz., Kit.). The northern Muşri is adopted to explain 2 Kings 7:6, and (less confidently, *cf.* König) 1 Kings 10:28; but Winckler's extravagances regarding an Arabian Muşri are absent. That at least three sources are to be distinguished in 2 Kings 18:13, 17–20:19 appears certain. Among the difficult problems furnished by these passages the most familiar relates to the "fourteenth year of Hezekiah," 18:13. Mr. Burney, like Benz. and Kit., resigns this date without a pang! To me it seems so probable that a date of such signal importance would be preserved, and 714 for Hezekiah's accession makes Ahaz's dates so much easier, that I would sooner yield many other things, *e. g.*, the originality of 20:6, and by all means the synchronism of the sixth year of Hezekiah with the ninth of Hoshea (vs. 10). Rather than abandon

it I would even accept whatever difficulty there is in supposing the accession of Sennacherib (705 B. C.), the sickness of Hezekiah, his incipient revolt (which certainly needed physical vigor to promise success), and the embassy from Merodach Baladan to have been all connected in time.

Even the most serious review of a work so abounding in details must pass over by far the greater part of it. I hope enough may have been given to indicate the grounds for the opinion that, viewed as a whole, although Mr. Burney's book is not quite a complete commentary, it offers very much to the student, and especially the English and American student, which up to the present has never been so accessible to him, and sets before him an example of patient, deliberate, well-informed, and candid inquiry. It cannot fail to stimulate and to instruct those who work with it, and to pave the way for a more intelligent and thoroughgoing appreciation of this central historical document of the Old Testament. One may differ from Mr. Burney here and there, but he has made himself indispensable for students of the books of Kings.

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MARTINEAU, THE MAN AND THE THINKER.

PROBABLY no men in the English-speaking world were better fitted to tell us about Professor Martineau than the authors of this work, occupying as they do, after long years of most intimate relationship with their hero, the academic positions which he himself had held. As a biography in two volumes of a man whose career extended over nearly a century, little is left to be desired, and yet we could wish for a work with more of the literary finish which the great subject of the sketch always used in his writings.

Book I details with clearness and accuracy the leading facts of the busy life, while Book II, by Professor Upton, treats of the "Philosophy" of Martineau. The sources used included the "Biographical Memoranda" written by Martineau in 1877, and "severe selections from

The Life and Letters of James Martineau, LL.D., S.T.D., etc. By JAMES DRUMMOND, M.A., LL.D., HON. LIT.D., Principal of Manchester College, Oxford; and a Survey of His Philosophical Work by C. B. UPTON, B.A., B.Sc., Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College, Oxford. Two vols. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1902. vii + 972 pages.

the mass of letters at command," so that a large part of the narrative is autobiographical. Little attempt is made to criticise, the aim is rather to present as objectively as possible the subject of the sketch. The treatment of some of the events of his life is surprisingly meager, until we compare the space at hand with the long and rapid succession of things in the life which seem worthy of record. The correspondence chosen for publication is very illuminative, as Dr. Martineau's letters covered apparently the entire field of his thought.

In 1805 James Martineau began his life in Norwich, a city distinguished for its literature and music, and died in 1900. The stock was French Huguenot. The traditional calling was surgery. Entrance into Britain was made in 1685 by the ancestors. The father was a plain business man, of whom the daughter Harriet wrote: "the most unselfish of men, who never spoke of his own feelings and always considered others." The mother was a woman of "rare capacity, nobleness, and wisdom." The training of the family of which James was a member was severely Puritan. James was, as a child, delicate, grave, and thoughtful, and confessed that his childhood was not happy. Theologically the household was Unitarian.

His education began in the Norwich public schools. His impressions gained here were such that he was never afterward a friend of the public-school system. After this he was the private pupil of Mr. Madge, the Unitarian pastor in Norwich, and in 1819-21 was under Dr. Lant Carpenter, in Bristol. In this formative period of life these years were of vast importance to young Martineau. Dr. Carpenter's one characteristic was profound moral feeling and a reverence for duty and right. He taught prominently the two lines of connection between God and the world, the causal and the moral, which occupied so large a place later in Martineau's *Weltanschauung*.

Inheriting an aptitude for scientific work, young Martineau was apprenticed to a machinist at Derby for three years, but was not satisfied. The death of a beloved cousin turned him toward the ministry. Seeking a theological training, he turned to Manchester New College, a resort of the Unitarians, the national universities being closed to dissenters. Rev. Charles Wellbeloved, Rev. John Kenrick, and William Turner were among his most influential teachers. Five years—"a vestibule of well-directed years" with "few outward changes"—were spent here.

After school days were over, Martineau held a position as teacher for three years in Dr. Carpenter's school in Bristol, where he listened

to Robert Hall's preaching and found in him the "contagious elevation of a powerful mind" who "influenced men not by addressing them, but by thinking aloud before them." "These years" said Martineau, in a letter at ninety years of age, "were years of most rapid growth." In 1828 he began the pastorate in Dublin as assistant to Dr. Philips in a Presbyterian church which had embraced Unitarianism. The ordination which soon followed his arrival in Dublin called for an address which is of importance in estimating the man at twenty-three years of age. He regards Jesus Christ as "mediator between God and man, who was appointed to produce by his life, and more peculiarly by his death, an unprecedented change in the spiritual condition of mankind, and to open a new and living way of salvation;" as the "chosen representative of the Most High, in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily;" and "not to honor him as we honor the Father is to violate our allegiance to him as the Great Captain of our salvation."

The years in Dublin were busy years with tutoring and pastoral work. In 1831 he resigned rather than accept the grant of state funds. The following year he was called to Paradise Street Chapel in Liverpool, as co-pastor with Rev. John Grundy. In the next sixteen years Martineau's thinking changed very rapidly, largely under Dr. Channing's influence. This was an intensely active period of his life, with magazine writing, lecturing, preaching. Dissatisfaction with the older form of Unitarianism which was based upon necessity and the association philosophy arose in the early part of this ministry.

In 1836 appeared Martineau's first systematic treatise, *The Rationale of Religious Inquiry*. It sought to show that the last appeal in all researches into religious truth must be to the judgment of the human mind . . . and against these judgments Scripture cannot have any authority, for upon its authority they themselves decide.

The "Liverpool controversy" was an event of vast importance in the world of religious thought as well as in the biography of James Martineau. Thirteen clergymen of the Church of England were ranged against three Unitarian ministers — James Martineau, J. H. Thom, and Henry Giles. There was no public debate from the same platform, but each party lectured to all who came to hear. The positions taken by the Martineau party are now largely common views among all classes of believers. The following quotation well expresses them:

We believe no less than you in an infallible revelation (though, had we the misfortune to doubt it, we might be in the sight of God neither better nor

worse than yourselves); you in a revelation of an unintelligible creed to the understanding; we in a revelation of moral perfection and the spirit of duty to the heart; you in the revelation of the metaphysics of Deity; we in the revelation of the character and providence of the Infinite Father; you in a redemption which saves the few and leaves with hell the triumph after all; we in a redemption which shall restore to all at length the image and immortality of God; we *do* reserve, as you suggest, a *sort of inspiration* for the founder of Christianity. A sort as much higher than your cold, dogmatical, scientific inspiration as the intuitions of conscience are higher than the predications of logic, and the free spirit of God than the petty precision of men.

Martineau delivered five lectures. In these he accepts miracles, but regards them as "awakening facts," not proof of any doctrine. He regards Christ as "a being so unimaginable, except by the great inventor of beauty and architect of nature herself, that I embrace him at once as having all the reality of man and the divinest inspiration of God." These lectures proved to be a serious contribution to the subject under discussion rather than mere passing controversial pamphlets. The tone on the Unitarian side was courteous and kind; less so on the other side.

When in 1840 Manchester New College, at the time the unique representative of free teaching and free learning in England, was removed to Manchester, Dr. Martineau was elected professor of mental and moral philosophy.

The direction of change in Martineau's thought in these years may be seen by comparing the *Rationale* as it appeared in 1836 and in the second edition in 1845. In the former he said that, should the attempts of the German Rationalists to reduce the facts of the evangelical history to common events be successful, the gospel falls. "Nor is there any intelligible sense in which one who thinks that the preternatural may be thus banished from the birth and infancy of our faith can continue to take the name of Christian." In the second edition he treats the difference of opinion respecting the supernatural origin of Christianity as "not very serious." In an appreciative criticism of Dr. Thomas Arnold, he says: "In his view of Christianity there is nothing to which, with very slight modification of language, we should not readily assent." He looked with strongest repugnance on the attempt to render Christianity independent of the individuality of Christ, and could

find no rest in any view of Revelation short of that which pervades the fourth gospel, and which is everywhere implicated in the folds of the Logos doctrine;

that it is *an appearance, to beings who have something of a divine spirit within them, of a yet diviner without them, leading them to the divinest of all that embraces them both.*

As to the forensic scheme of vicarious atonement, Martineau was particularly hostile :

To accept the offer of such a doctrine would be unworthy a noble heart, for he who would not rather be damned than to escape through the sufferings of innocence and sanctity is so far from the qualifications of a saint that he has not even the magnanimity of Milton's Fiend.

Martineau's view of moral perfection in Christ came out in his contest with Professor Newman, his associate in Manchester New College. Martineau rests his Christianity on the moral perfection of Christ; but moral perfection consists in entire fidelity to a trust and no hyper-physical nature or endowment is an indispensable condition of a sinless life. As to the fundamental idea of Christendom, it is "the ascent, through conscience, into communion with God."

Martineau's feelings about the Unitarian movement at various times are very significant. At no time did he seem very hopeful or enthusiastic. He always opposed the separate organization of the Unitarian church. He was willing to accept the name "Unitarian" as descriptive of a certain type of theology, and as applicable to individuals who held that theology, but he believed it was improperly applied to a church in which there had been and might still be a progressive change of theological conviction.

From 1853, the time of the removal of Manchester New College to London, to 1857, Martineau went twice a week to the college from Liverpool to lecture. In 1857 he resigned Hope Street and removed to London upon his election to a full professorship. This was the close of his active ministry and his entrance, at the age of fifty-two, upon more exclusively scholastic pursuits.

From 1857 to 1869 Rev. J. J. Tayler, whom Martineau called the English Schleiermacher, and James Martineau were intimately associated in the work of giving instruction. In February, 1859, Martineau accepted the office of ministering to Portland Street Chapel, which after two years was left to his sole charge. Here he ministered until 1872. This was his last work in the pulpit, and a word as to his idea of the ministry should be said. His aim was always to separate, yet combine the prophetic and teaching functions of the Christian ministry. "The hours set apart for public worship should be absolutely surrendered, as seems to me, to devout thought and utterance and

the consecration of human life by divine affections, and as a rule I could never, without feeling myself guilty of an abuse, treat the pulpit as a lecturer's platform for didactic exposition, critical discussion, or philosophical speculation." Christianity is, in his mind, a divine dispensation for bringing men into conscious union with the Holiest of All; with the Father through the Son. A church is an institution embodying and applying the distinctly Christian requisites to this end—the dying away to sin and self and the rising into strength, goodness, and love by filial surrender to the perfect will.

In all the realm of practical or theoretical theology there was scarcely an author or system or a view which Dr. Martineau did not, at some time, bring to the test of his keen, critical judgment. Few of his opinions are more interesting than his estimate of the prayer-book.

The prayer-book model of worship is the product of a religion radically different from the nonconformist. The basis and regulative idea of the church service are supplied from a *sacerdotal* religion. . . . Accordingly the service opens with deprecation and penitence . . . and not till the priest has in virtue of this pronounced his absolution, can God be asked to "open our lips that we may show forth his praise." The nonconformist order, the *natural human* order, is where the pious affections follow one another as they kindle and deepen in the course of meditation and prayer. By this rule the penitential part of devotion lies *far on* in the interior recesses of worship. How can it indeed be expected that a whole congregation should in an instant swing itself into an attitude of mind, of which the language of the prodigal son, in the very crisis of his agony, should be the appropriate expression? . . . Of communion between the divine and human spirit there is no trace. It is the worm in the dust before the Almighty.

On the decease of Dr. Tayler, Professor Martineau, in his sixty-fifth year, was made principal of Manchester College. He was in his best and growing years in intellect, and Mrs. Tennyson wrote of him at that time, "Dr. Martineau came. He struck us as having a wonderful and subtle mind; he is mournful and tender looking—a noble gentleman." It was about this time when the first recognition of academic rank came to him. Americans had long been among his warmest admirers, and in 1872 Harvard bestowed upon Martineau its LL.D. Men were just beginning to see that the "mischievous heretic was after all the ablest living defender of a spiritual conception of the universe." Three years later Leyden honored Martineau with S.T.D. In 1884 came D.D. from Edinburgh University; and at the last the prophet, when bent with eighty-three years, was recognized by Oxford, *honoris causa*, with D.C.L.

Dr. Martineau had left the pulpit in 1872, partially retired from college work in 1874; now, ten years after, all college duties were resigned, and from 1885 to 1900 was spent in studious retirement. Much of the time now was spent in literary work which he had always longed to see accomplished. The results of a life of study were gathered into *A Study of Religion* (1888), *The Seat of Authority in Religion* (1890), four volumes of *Essays* (1891), and *Types of Ethical Theory* (third edition, 1891). The address on his eighty-third birthday, prepared by Professor Knight, and bearing the signatures of six hundred and fifty leaders from the most opposite quarters of the literary, scientific, political, and religious world, is probably unique in the annals of scholarship. One paragraph reads thus :

You have taught your generation that both in politics and in religion there are truths above party, independent of contemporary opinion, which cannot be overthrown, for their foundations are in the heart of man. You have shown that there may be an inward unity transcending the divisions of the Christian world, and that the charity and sympathy of Christians are not to be limited to those who bear the name of Christ ; you have sought to harmonize the laws of the spiritual with those of the natural world, and to give to each their due place in human life. You have preached a Christianity of the spirit and not of the letter, which is inseparable from morality; you have spoken of a hope beyond this world; you have given rest to the minds of many.

Tennyson, Browning, Jowett, M. Müller, J. R. Lowell, Lecky, J. R. Seeley, Edwin Arnold, F. W. Newman, E. Renan, Stopford Brooke, and Sir John Lubbock were among the eminent names which were appended to the address.

We could wish for a fuller treatment of the philosophical work of Martineau than is given in the last half of Vol. II, but the great number of letters and the incidents of life bearing directly upon every question of his deeper thinking enable the reader to glean the essentials of his system. It is the inner history of Martineau that is interesting ; his development is easy to trace, and we wish that the author had given it to us with greater clearness and sympathy.

During the earlier life of Martineau what philosophical interest existed in Britain was divided between the Hartleyan empirical schools and the Scottish school of common-sense. The former controlled in Manchester New College in the York period. Martineau was an ardent advocate of the necessarian theory of the will and a quasi-mechanical theory of the universe, until his attempt to make it clear to pupils, when he became aware of its incompatibility with moral and

religious sentiment. In the first eight years of his Liverpool ministry the works of Victor Cousin, Maine de Biran, and Sir William Hamilton aided in a process which proved to be his philosophical conversion. When Dr. Channing heard the news, he wrote to Martineau: "Nothing for a long time has given me so much pleasure. I have felt that this doctrine with its natural connection was a millstone around the neck of Unitarianism in England." Martineau says of himself: "I breathed more freely. It was an escape from the logical cage into the open air."

Martineau's constructive philosophy begins with the interpretation of the experience of the sense of effort and the feeling of resistance of the outside world. The former reveals immediately the existence of self as an active principle; and the latter, of the not-self as a corresponding active principle resisting the self; and as we are conscious of effort as the result of will, we necessarily assume that what opposes us is also a self-conscious will. The self knows itself to be a cause, and thus derives the idea of causation. There arises here also the antithesis of the "here" and the "not-here," or "there," giving us the idea of space—the idea of cause thus coming before the idea of space. But both time and space have objective validity and possess in his philosophy the same real character which they do in the spontaneous judgments of mankind.

His theory of knowledge, which is found in Book I of *A Study of Religion*, is in the main Kantian. Our knowledge has two sources—the senses which give us insight into the order of phenomena, and the intuitions of the mind which acquaint us with the metaphysical causes or noumena to whose activity phenomena are due. Kant was wrong, he thinks, in holding, with Hume, that causality was ascertained by study of the relation between spatial phenomena. Our trustworthy intuitions inform us of our personal causality, and this gives us the idea of causality in general. They also assure us of our moral freedom, and no inferences drawn from phenomenal sequences can avail to overrule these ultimate pronouncements of our rational moral nature. Thus Martineau seeks in his epistemology to vindicate the true causality and moral freedom of the human will. He then goes on to extend this idea of causal volition until it covers and explains the nature and activity of the eternal cause and ground of the universe. Unlike Kant, who regarded the space-idea as only a subjective form, Dr. Martineau maintains that the very circumstance that we cannot think space away is a valid reason for believing that it exists objectively, though he did not regard this belief as absolutely essential to his philosophy of

religion. In short, the Martineau theory of knowledge is the common-sense theory, learned in the school of Hamilton, which amounts to the dictum that our faculties are to be trusted.

It is in the development and use of the metaphysical idea of cause that the crux of Martineau's entire system lies. Having in his epistemology rescued it from the uncertainty and skepticism of the phenomenologists, it is here he seeks to find a satisfactory answer to the fundamental questions of the philosophy of religion. A thorough investigation of the conception of causal relation in philosophy convinces Martineau that only the antecedents that possess a dynamical character can really satisfy the idea of causation. The "feeling of operative will" or the "sense of effort" which we are conscious of putting forth compels us to believe that will exerts power, and wherever we see material objects move, since the mind asks for a non-phenomenal cause for every phenomenon, and as we know of only one noumenal cause, namely will, we must regard these movements as the result of exerted will. Will, therefore, equals causality. All will is cause and all cause is will, and all energy is at bottom will. The first cause is will, and there are no unconscious "second causes." The sole causes in the universe are God and rational beings endowed by him with causality.

A more able defense of a philosophical position has seldom been made in the nineteenth century than is made of this theory. Ripe scholarship, all the acumen of a mind trained in three-quarters of a century of accurate scholastic work, and a literary style which fascinates the reader, have made the presentation one which will be read, whether one accepts the writer's conclusion or not. As to the validity of the system, psychologists and philosophers do not agree as to this "sense of effort." The biographer, Professor Upton, defends the theory as Martineau uses it, quoting Professors James and Baldwin, as also Professor Zeller, W. B. Carpenter, and others. James can with greater propriety be quoted on the other side.* Münsterberg, both in the *Willenshandlung* (1888), and in the *Psychologie* (1900), and Sigwart in *Kleine Schriften*, Vol. II, p. 131, and Külpe in his *Psychology* (sec. 77), all regard the "feeling of effort" as an illusion. What we get is not the sense of power being exerted, but the pain or weariness resulting from the muscular exertion carried to the brain by the afferent nerves, but with which the efferent nerves have nothing to do. Any idea, as James has shown, tends to realize itself in action without any direct conscious volition, if not inhibited by some other idea, and the existence of an act

*See his *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 449.

of will essentially different in nature from the spontaneous rushing into action of an idea is questioned by not a few psychologists. If Martineau's psychological analysis is not correct, then the superstructure of his system must seek some other foundation. His theory of the freedom of the will—viz., that man, as proved by the fact of deliberate conscious choice, is endowed by God with a given amount of power to use as he will, and is constituted a cause of phenomena through the self-individuation of the First Cause—must appear very questionable; and the theism, which is substantiated by the application and development of the metaphysical idea of cause as the manifestation of will, by the study of nature through which the Godhead is shown to be intelligent, and by an investigation of the moral consciousness where he is shown to be moral, loses its show of finality.

Yet this last part of Martineau's work has been called the greatest product of his genius. Through the "dualism of perception," as he terms it, we get knowledge of ourselves and of a lower-than-ourselves, or the external world; and through the "dualism of conscience" we are introduced to a metaphysical reality higher than ourselves, viz., that which exerts its authority over us and tells us "this is better than that." Thus a causal power is revealed to us in the world of matter, and a moral law is revealed in our consciousness. That these two causalities emanate from one metaphysical center is shown by many marks, but especially by the fact that the physical universe co-operates with the moral law in enforcing discipline and administering retribution. Nature's apparent cruelty and disregard of pain, and the facts of death and evil, are ably discussed, and all that contemporary science can contribute to the subject is brought to bear, making one of the best apologetics for the system of things as they are that the English language contains. His defense of immortality is the last part of *Study of Religion*, and is as strong a case as has been made out by philosophical methods.

There is little space to mention his ethics. It is intuitional. He calls it "ideo-psychological," indicating that ethics has a special territory of its own in man's inner life, and is not dependent on the sensational, intellectual or the æsthetic divisions of psychological phenomena. Hetero-psychological ethics interprets ethics as the outcome of man's sensational experience, as do the systems of Hobbes, Mill, and Bain; or as explicable from the intellectual intuition of the mind, as those of Cudworth, Clark, and Price; or as a rising out of the intuitive perception of the beautiful, as those of Shaftesbury and

Hutcheson. The unpsychological systems are either metaphysical or physical. Spinoza and Aristotle represent the former, Comte the latter.

The ideo-psychological theory begins with the "broad fact stated in its unanalyzed form, of which ethics has to find the interpretation, that instinctively, as men, we have an irresistible tendency to *approve and disapprove*, to pass judgment of right and wrong." We pass moral judgment only on persons and only upon the motives leading to the action. "Every action is right which in the presence of a lower principle follows a higher, and every action is wrong which in the presence of a higher principle follows a lower." Ethics is to find out the relative rank of the springs of action by observing the phenomena of conscience. There are four classes of motive principles of our nature — propensities, passions, affections, sentiments. These are then set in the order of their moral worth by a most acute analytical study. This order is admitted by Professor Upton to be the relative rank which these springs of action assume in the spontaneous judgments of mankind under the present conditions of civilization; but both Professor Upton's stricture, viz., that an ethical classification of desires as abstracted from their object is not practicable, and Professor Sedgwick's, viz., that in any moral conflict the comparison ultimately decisive is "between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action," are valid objections to the system; and the reader, though carried along by Dr. Martineau's power as a writer and as an advocate, yet comes from the book with the feeling that no solution of the ethical problem which is so luminous and easy can be a finality. The same can be said of his philosophy of religion. Its very completeness arouses suspicion. Both the ethics and the philosophy are like the man, and are the products of a more than usually strong moral sense; a clean-cut logical mind, and a strong will. The man is worth knowing, and his books are worthy of careful study by those who have time only for the best thinkers.

ORLO J. PRICE.

FREEPORT, ILL.

THE MINISTER FOR THE TIMES.

THE author of this volume¹ is an active clergyman in the great manufacturing district of England which has the city of Manchester

¹ *Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology*, with an Appendix on the Influence of Scientific Training on the Reception of Religious Truth. By VEN. JAMES M. WILSON, D.D., Vicar of Rochdale, and Archdeacon of Manchester; Lecturer on Pastoral Theology in the University of Cambridge in 1903. London: Macmillan, 1903.

for its center. His treatment of his subject is largely affected by this fact. Perhaps unconsciously to himself, the young men whom he addresses are in his mind not only candidates for the Christian ministry, but specially for a ministry in the midst of the artisan rather than the agricultural population of England. Archdeacon Wilson belongs, it would seem, to that branch of the English church which still bears the impress of Arnold of Rugby, and men of his thinking. His desire is to show his loyalty to the national church by strengthening her "as a great spiritual and educating force" in the entire community. He glories in his church because of her generous latitude of view in theology. With the most successful bishop who has yet faced the masses of men and women in the great Lancashire towns—Bishop Fraser—the archdeacon would be willing to admit that "the difference of opinion which she allows to her children is the glory of our national church."

In keeping with this spirit, these lectures do not confine themselves to the ordinary lines of pastoral theology. They aim to furnish to the young clergy "some guidance with regard to the kind of difficulties of belief that they would be likely to meet with in the course of an ordinary ministry, and the wisest mode of dealing with them." Accordingly, the lecturer deals in successive addresses with pastoral theology in its bearing on national progress and welfare, on philosophy and science, and on the Bible. He also treats at length of the attitude of the pastor toward the church and toward his congregation, and, in the essay which is appended to the lectures, with the general subject of "Science and Theology." We may say at once that Archdeacon Wilson's book is most stimulating and suggestive. It is pre-eminently the work of a man of the times, fully alive to the demands of the age in which he lives, and most sympathetic with the intellectual and spiritual conditions of those to whom he speaks. All this is evident from the first lecture, in which Dr. Wilson treats of the essential qualifications of the pastor. What is needed, as he argues, is a working theology in which facts are held to be of greater importance than explanations. The minister as the years go on finds himself selecting the truths which tell for most among his people, and laying the strongest emphasis upon them. This is illustrated by the teaching of the present day on the subject of everlasting punishment. This dogma, if not repudiated, is no longer put in the front, because it does not make for righteousness. The pastor must assume the objective reality of God. The "loveliness of personal goodness without the

conviction of a divine Person " may lie back of the source of theology, but it is too ideal and unsubstantial to battle with moral degradation, indifference, and materialism. A profound sense of sin both national and personal is essential if the pastor's work is to be deep and serious. These hard facts can be met and conquered only by a definite faith in a present and sympathizing Christ.

These considerations lead the author to his second subject, which is " Pastoral Theology in its Bearing on National Progress and Welfare." The lecturer aims at showing that the pastor must gain increased power of attack, rather than rest content with present lines of defence (p. 4). " One of the indispensable functions of the church, and therefore of our ministry, should be to inspire men with a thought of God and man which shall be utterly inconsistent with acquiescence in any demoralizing condition of life." The difficulties in the pastor's way, when he attempts to better the condition of those about him, are many. Drunkenness, poverty, the opposition of those whom he aims to reform, and the indifference of those who are better off, are among the chief of these. The organizations that are now considered indispensable to a church which is in the midst of teeming thousands are all commended but above all there must be strenuous resistance of the selfish individualism which has given birth to socialism, as one extreme inevitably produces another. The popular English theology is degenerate and evanescent ; it has " come to think God so remote as to be unintelligible ;" it has settled down to a belief that God has left his world to educate itself and so it views with equanimity, or at all events with indifference, the terrible conditions under which the life of thousands in the city slums is passed. Against this *laissez-faire* theology the teaching of Jesus protests, and the hope of England lies in accepting it and applying it to daily life. Believe this, and the conflict, as Carlyle said, is henceforth between faith and unfaith, and " every political question," in the words of Mazzini, " is a religious question."

In dealing with " The Pastor's Attitude to Philosophy and Science " Dr. Wilson shows admirable tact and judgment. He is not one of those who would press into pastoral theology a complete course of training in the current controversies of the hour, and in all the sciences. Omniscience has always been a foible of the ecclesiastical mind, and it is not necessary that our spiritual instructors should encourage it. Before the preacher speaks, the lecturer counsels that he should know his subject. Our age is confessedly in a transitional state, and what we need to do is to separate the essential from the

non-essential (although traditional) elements of the Christian faith. The basis of our belief has changed. Without abandoning the historical arguments on which we have been wont to rest, it may be that we shall henceforth rely still more "on an aggregate experience of a sonship to God, which through the historic Christ of the gospels, shall have become part of the inheritance and one of the axioms of the world." We are not all philosophers, but we can all prize knowledge, keep our mind open, and believe in God and in the spiritual kingdom, of which we form part. The lecturer quotes with approval the words: "Reason uncorrected by instinct is at least as dangerous as instinct uncorrected by reason." The use of the imagination in religion is evident enough. "Religion is the highest poetry of life: it admits to the region of reality."

The general interest in scientific questions makes it well that the pastor should be interested in science also. He is happy in living at a time when the church no longer demands a belief in a creation of six literal days, although the story of creation still "stimulates the religious awe of man in presence of the supernatural." That the account of the Fall is not regarded as strictly historical does not affect the fact that "it remains a divinely appointed parable or apologue setting forth important truths on subjects which, as matter of history, lie outside our present ken." The miraculous element cannot be eliminated from the gospels, but alike in the Old and New Testaments an element of legend has mixed with the narratives, although it might be wiser to speak of that element as parable rather than legend. That Christ should possess miraculous powers was inevitable, since he was divine. As to the miraculous birth of our Lord and his physical resurrection, there can be no question that the final word has not yet been said, but equally true is it that the Christ who was born into our world has changed the whole conception of our life, "and uplifted the whole of human nature from the bottom." It is likely that this is the lecture which will least satisfy the spirit of the times. Its wise concessions will seem to be surrendering too much or else too little. Yet it is evident that the position assumed is the safest for one who has to deal with the minds of a congregation of intelligent but not deeply read people.

In his concluding lectures (IV-VI) Archdeacon Wilson treads on ground which is more peculiarly Anglican than that which we have hitherto traversed. He discusses the pastor's attitude toward the Bible, the church, and the congregation. With characteristic frankness he grants that the minister of the established church, by virtue of his

ordination vows, is not entirely master of his own thought. He is not entirely free to think and say what he pleases. Yet the writer holds that, since life involves variety, in order to do justice to the divine ideal he must put some limit to his obedience to his church. The New Testament is antedated by the Christian church, and is its product, not its charter. There seems to be here a confusion of terms. The church scarcely originated the New Testament. That came book by book through individuals. And, as the archdeacon fully recognizes, it is from the Bible that new awakenings of the divine life in men have come in every age. No doubt he is correct in the main in his contention that the English church, in contrast with the Church of Rome, never demanded of its members faith in the infallible accuracy of the Bible. This is all the more matter for congratulation since inerrancy does not really affect the divine teaching of the Bible. It is right to recognize that the early ideas of morality and of God were defective, and our author quotes with approval Rev. Aubrey Moore's words: "We can no longer say, 'It is in the Bible, approved and allowed by God: therefore it is right!'" What, then, is the ultimate ground of authority? Not, as Rome claims, the Church, but rather the collective spiritual insight of good men. We may be disposed to question whether Dr. Wilson's view differs so radically in this matter from that of Rome, which declares that a dogma becomes matter of faith only after it has been approved by a long succession of good men. But, be that as it may, the real contention of the lecturer is in line with the current view of our times. The collective insight it is which tests historical and dogmatic utterances. For this reason we must be patient, and learn to suspend our judgment, to be open-minded, and to wait, on many points, for new light. Authority is now transferred from the text of the Bible, and this carries in it elements of danger to the impatient minister who, failing the old ground of assurance, will be apt to pin his faith on some party or society; and also to the patient, plodding minister who is too much occupied with his office to examine for himself, and will be tempted to curtail his message under a smoldering fear of insecure foundations for his cherished beliefs. The archdeacon pleads for more Bible in the pulpit. A widespread intelligence has provided other means of education than the church and the pulpit. So the Bible, while unique and honored, is less read than formerly. The preacher's duty is to appeal to the personal experience of his hearers to bear out the words of Scripture, and thus restore it to its true place. Some readers of this lecture may be disposed to think that

the archdeacon treads on doubtful ground in his argument, and that at all events it needs fuller treatment at his hands if it is to be treated at all.

Less interest will probably be felt in what Dr. Wilson says as to the pastor's attitude toward the church than in some of his other lectures. Yet nothing can be more admirable than much of the advice that he gives to the young clergy in this matter. He recognizes that to the layman the clerical attitude, as it is popularly conceived, is alien and unattractive. This is peculiarly true in the great manufacturing heart of England, in which Archdeacon Wilson lives. A sturdy, outspoken, and independent class of men and women, beholden to no church for charity, but equal to caring for themselves, has very little of the spirit of reverence for "Mother Church." A large proportion of the people have no interest in any ecclesiastical organization, and of those who have at least half are non-conformists. The archdeacon deprecates all professionalism; he counsels co-operation with outsiders, and very properly insists that it is lack of sympathy which alienates the people from the clergy. He urges that the minister should study and interest himself in the varieties of feeling and emotion of the people around him, that he should respect those who belong to other communions than his own, and, not arguing with them, win their good-will by a spirit of friendliness. But he does not relinquish the claim that "churchmen, neutrals, thoughtful outsiders, and the dissenters of the parish" are all included in "the Church." We are not surprised that this assumption, warranted though it be by English law, and mildly as it is put here, has already been resented by the sturdy independence of Lancashire.

With the concluding lecture, on "The Pastor's Attitude toward his Congregation," we need not concern ourselves other than to say that its spirit is excellent. The author is hopeful in his tone, and with good reason. Who has so enviable a lot as the minister? His relations with his people are personal, kindly, and happy; his work is varied; he has the consciousness that he is not superfluous, and if he is "kindly, sincerely religious, unaffected, his people do more than welcome him; they love and respect him for his own sake and for what he represents." Of all the chapters in his book this one seems to us the fullest of sane and wise counsel, the surest of its ground, and likely to be the most useful to the ordinary clergyman.

In the concluding forty pages of his book Archdeacon Wilson discusses science and theology, in an essay on "The Influence of Scientific Training on the Reception of Religious Truth." Although only

indirectly related to the subjects with which he has been dealing in his lectures, such a discussion is quite germane to them. His ground is what we have sufficiently indicated by our review of the main body of the book. The most valuable section, to our thinking, is that in which the archdeacon deals with the permanent effects of scientific training on educated minds. He holds that primitive conceptions of God are no longer tenable; that the standard of religious knowledge has been raised by scientific research and the mind freed of material incumbrances; thus our sense of mystery has been deepened, while religion now occupies a more important sphere than ever before. Scientific training, however, cannot touch the springs of conduct; and our affections, our will, our conscience, and our religious faculty must still remain supreme. This entire essay might well have been published separately, appealing as it does to a class larger than that to which the lectures themselves are addressed. It is the work of an enlightened and acute observer, who speaks not from the professor's desk, but from his position as emphatically a man among man.

We commend Archdeacon Wilson's volume as the latest and frankest and most hopeful study of the relations, not of the minister alone or chiefly, but of religion itself to the world to which it brings its message.

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RECENT CRITICISM OF THE GOSPELS.

THE criticism of the gospels has been passing of late through a somewhat negative stage. Professor Schmiedel's articles on "Gospels" and "Resurrection and Ascension Narratives," "John, Son of Zebedee" and "Simon Peter," in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* need not perhaps be included in this statement. Schmiedel regards the gospels as containing history, and attempts to ascertain by the usual critical processes their substantial historical contents. Many of their narratives, no doubt, it is now impossible to accept as they stand. Of conflicting accounts of the same event, such as the resurrection, some must be given up. The words of Christ passed through such processes of accretion and change that a choice must often be made among those transmitted to us. Still, to Schmiedel the synoptic gospels present an account of Jesus, the Messiah, which in its main outlines we can accept. In the recent works of Brandt¹ and Wrede,² on the other hand,

¹ *Die evangelische Geschichte und der Ursprung des Christenthums*, 1893.

² *Das Messiasgeheimniss in den Evangelien*, 1901.

attempts are made to show that the evangelical narratives are quite wrong in the account they give of the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, and in representing that he claimed to be the Messiah of the Jews. According to Brandt, Mark's story of the trial by the Sanhedrin is the basis of the others in the New Testament, but it was made up by that writer. It is not based on any original evidence, and parts of it are so inconsistent with Jewish law and procedure that they must be deemed impossible. According to Wrede, Jesus never claimed to be the Messiah. After he died his disciples regarded him as the Messiah, so that it was felt necessary that the accounts of his life should represent him in that light. But it was well known that he had never made the claim; and how was this to be got over? It was got over by the statement, many times repeated in the gospels, that he forbade any allusion to his messiahship; and that as long as he lived it was treated as a secret, a mystery. These prohibitions, accordingly, are not historical. They were never uttered; they were never called for.

Either of these conclusions involves a disarrangement of the whole framework of the life of Christ as hitherto conceived. If the reports we have of the trial by the Sanhedrin are entirely untrustworthy, and if we do not know the charge on which Jesus was condemned by his countrymen, then one of the main pillars of our knowledge of his life crumbles before us. If he did not claim to be Messiah, his life has to be written over again; its outward development cannot have been such as we think; and the views he took of his position and destiny must be stated in quite a new way. Professor N. Schmidt, for example, who writes the articles on "Son of God" and "Son of Man" in the last volume of the *Encyclopedia Biblica*, accepts the conclusions both of Brandt and of Wrede. To these he adds, as a result of his own Aramaic study, that the phrase "Son of Man," if Jesus did use the Aramaic word for it, could not denote the Messiah, as it does in the Greek gospels. Jesus probably never called himself by that phrase at all; the belief that he did so was based on a misconception of some of his words. The impression made on the reader of these articles is, it is not too much to say, that if they can be upheld, the study of the life and sayings of Jesus has to begin afresh, and that in the meantime no "Life of Jesus" or "Teaching of Jesus" is at all within the compass of scholarship. No doubt, the truth of these matters will have to be accepted by the learned and by the world; and, no doubt, it will be far better for us than anything that now stands in its place; but that truth is not yet found; how it will turn out no one as yet can say.

The book³ considered in this article traverses the main conclusions both of Brandt and Wrede, though at the same time it makes considerable concessions to their arguments. It consists of an attempt to define the nature and to estimate the historic value of the gospel according to Mark, now generally acknowledged, and it may be said proved, to be the earliest of those in the New Testament. The work is dedicated to the writer's father on the occasion of his jubilee as an academic teacher, on May 20, 1902. The readers of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY will remember the tribute paid to this veteran theologian by Dr. Gregory in the opening number of the JOURNAL, and are aware how much he has done in the way of laborious research and systematic statement for the open-eyed understanding of the New Testament, and especially of the synoptic gospels. He is specially great as a commentator, and his book on the gospel of Mark is perhaps the most important he has produced. It was written to illustrate a theory of the two sources of Mark, one peculiar to him, the other common to him with Matthew and Luke—a theory which has been adopted by few scholars. As a piece of careful and loving analysis of the text, however, both in its detail and its composition, that book is of great and enduring value. The son here presents the same theory somewhat elaborated and brought in various ways up to date. He assumes in his title and throughout his book that Mark's gospel is the earliest of our four, and that it was used by Matthew and Luke. But he does not consider, as some do, that that view explains all the phenomena of the synoptic problem. He sees that there are passages where Matthew and Luke, while following Mark's order, do not follow his words, but give words which are evidently more primitive than those now read in Mark. It is this phenomenon that supports Hilgenfeld's view of the priority of Matthew to Mark. And on this phenomenon also has been based the conclusion, which has often been brought forward, that the Mark we read now is not the Mark whom Matthew and Luke followed, but a changed and edited Mark. Matthew and Luke had before them an *Urmarkus*, an original Mark, whom we know only thus constructively from them. Our Mark is the work of an editor. Along with this, the Weiss theory maintains that Mark was from the first acquainted with the Logia, or collection of Oracles (*Spruchsammlung*), which formed the second source of Matthew and Luke. This second source has thus

³ *Das älteste Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zum Verständniss des Markus-Evangeliums und der ältesten evangelischen Ueberlieferung.* Von JOHANNES WEISS. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. xii + 414 pages.

to play two parts : it is not only the second source of the later evangelists, but enters into their first source also. But Mark, though acquainted with this source, made the very scantiest use of it. The younger Weiss remonstrates against the adjective "complicated" as applied by many to this theory. Yet complicated it surely is. We shall see about this later.

In the first part of the book, however, which is also the most satisfactory part of it, the author's theory of the sources disturbs the reader but little. Here he sets forth his view of the literary and religious character of the second gospel. He assumes, as we said, that Mark's gospel preceded those of Matthew and Luke, so that he was the first to draw up a connected account of the life of Jesus. He also assumes provisionally in his preface—though in his last chapter he shows weighty reasons for regarding this assumption with caution—that the Mark who did this was the John Mark of Acts, chap. 12, who belonged to Jerusalem, was intimately connected with Christianity at a very early stage, was associated successively with Paul and with Peter, and acted, according to the tradition reported by Papias, as the latter apostle's interpreter. Why did this person write a life of Christ? What was there in his circumstances to make him think of doing this? What purpose did he principally expect to serve by doing it? According to the maxim generally accepted in all study of literature, that a work is to be understood by studying the period of its author and his position in that period, it is here concluded that Mark wrote his gospel because those possessed of original information as to the life of Christ were dying out, because a written account of that life was a desideratum in the work of a Christian mission at the time, and also because of the exceptional knowledge he possessed of the traditions on the subject, and the interest he took in them. His work accordingly is a "beginning of the gospel" as then preached, and was drawn up for the purposes of the mission. It is to be understood and interpreted as a didactic work, and the doctrine it is designed to further is that of the Pauline mission. This is clear from many of its features. It has no supernatural birth, as Paul knows of none, but the person it speaks of is, as in Paul, Jesus Messiah, Son of God. The metaphysical doctrine of Paul as to the person of Christ is not explicitly taught, but is taken for granted. Jesus is a being of more than human power and knowledge, the demons know him for what he is, the gentile centurion does him homage. The Pauline doctrine of the rejection of the Jews is explicitly set forth, both in the explanation of Jesus' reason for teaching in parables (chap. 4), which corresponds so

closely to the argument of Rom., chaps. 9-11, and in other passages where Jesus is said to have turned away from his own countrymen and betaken himself to gentile territory. The disciples know the mystery of the kingdom and the Messiah, but it is hidden from the Jewish people. But if the disciples understand so far, their understanding is yet limited. Often and often we find them represented as failing to grasp what was put before them by Jesus. Especially did they fail to understand the doctrine of the cross, though very plainly stated to them. Jesus told them again and again of his approaching death; and in the feeding he clearly points to the Lord's Supper in which to Pauline Christians his death was shown forth; yet on every such occasion Mark tells us that the disciples did not understand him. In this the experience of Paul is reflected, who found that to the Jews the doctrine of the cross was a stumbling-block, and that even to the older apostles the death of Christ was a riddle and superfluous. No wonder that in a gospel written in such a spirit there is no allusion to the primacy of Peter. But Weiss suggests that when Mark wrote the older apostles had atoned by their martyrdom for the want of apprehension they had shown in their Master's lifetime; the division of the Pauline period was removed, and they had come to enjoy the veneration of the whole church.

It thus appears that the earliest gospel is a didactic work written in the interests of the Pauline mission. The argument is not stated by Dr. Weiss at all extravagantly, as it was, *e. g.*, by Holsten, and it may be fully agreed to. On the other side, however, it is maintained that Mark was fond of the stories he had to tell for their own sake. This leads us to his association with Peter. Belonging originally to Jerusalem, he had been concerned, as the Muratorian canon suggests, in some of the proceedings in which the church was so deeply interested. From Peter he had heard of others of them, and this was by no means the whole of his equipment for his task; he was also acquainted with other sources of the tradition. He was well placed for the work he took in hand of making the traditions of the East serve the ends of the missions of the West. His character as a writer Dr. Weiss does not estimate very highly. He was a transmitter of existing materials, we are told, not an original writer, nor in fact a historian in the higher sense at all. He has little literary skill; he has no chronological scheme in which to frame the events he records; his geographical data are anything but clear; he gives no time dates, and the chronology which may be traced in his book is no more than the subject itself unavoidably dictated. He has no plot, no development; the tragedy of the life of Christ is

not worked up to, but is present from the first; the disciples at once believe, when they are called, in his messiahship, which is not unfolded gradually; the plot to put him to death is given us in the third chapter. After all that has been said of Mark's order, which was followed by Matthew and Luke, who have little genuine historical order of their own, the assertions sound strange that Mark is destitute of real insight into the development of the story he records. Other recent writers, such as Wrede, have said the same thing, but the matter surely admits of argument. In this connection it is wonderful how much skill Dr. Weiss imparts to Mark in the way of conveying the lessons he wishes to enforce without stating them; they are suggested only by the way in which he arranges his materials. No injunction is put into the mouth of Jesus regarding baptism or the Lord's Supper or the gentile mission; yet they are all provided for. If Jesus goes away from the Jews to Perea or to Tyre and Sidon, this is to indicate that the Jews are given up by him; he turns to the gentiles. His own baptism is typical of that of the Christian in the church; the story of the feeding points to the Supper in which Christ is still as he was then, the kind house-father. The questions agitating the church at 65 A. D. are all attended to; the sabbath, the distinction of clean and unclean, fasting, divorce—all are to be found here, considered and settled by the highest authority. Nothing is said of circumcision; that question was disposed of before Mark wrote, and required no mention. Dr. Weiss does not specify the question of the forgiveness of sins (Mark 2: 1-12) as one on which the church might need the assurance of a word of Christ; yet to many the practice of absolution without any sacrifice or formal rite may not have appeared quite as a matter of course. Of the conflicts generally we read (p. 93) that "their significance is to be seen not only in the discussion they represent with Judaism; they also serve to characterize and to defend the new religion, which this gospel was written to explain and to recommend." All the Evangelist gives, we are told, was of immediate importance in his own day. Not that Mark is to be regarded as a framer of myths or setter forth of symbols; what he records *are* facts. But he puts a meaning into them for the church of his day; they become in his hands, not symbols indeed—a symbol is an unreal thing—but types of what is taking place in the experience of the Church and of individual Christians. A relative amount of validity is thus allowed to the mythical theory of the formation of the gospel traditions, as surely must be done in any view of the matter where completeness is aimed at. The whole of the first part of Dr. Weiss's book, in which there are

many interesting features that we cannot notice in this brief summary, is a very able and good piece of work. It is so closely parallel with my own account of Mark in my book *The Earliest Gospel* (1901), which the author does not mention, that I shrink from praising it. It is written with the command of all the facts of New Testament scholarship which we look for in a German theologian, and must contribute much to the true understanding of the genesis of the gospels.

In the second part of his book, "The Evangelist and Early Tradition," Dr. Weiss deals in detail with the question of the sources, going through the gospel section by section, and seeking to determine in each case what source was used by the evangelist, how he used it, and how far his original use of it has been allowed to stand. Here it must be said, our faith in the author is put to a severer test than in the first chapter of his book. These discussions as to sources, of which so much of German work on the New Testament is made up, what are we to think of them? Is it necessary that we should be satisfied that a particular story came to Mark through Peter, or that he got it from the collection of oracles which Matthew and Luke also used, or that it came from a third source about which we know less than about either of these? Is it necessary that we should know whether the words we now read in Mark are the very words read in him by Matthew and Luke when composing their gospels, or whether Mark was altered by some hand unknown after Matthew and Luke made use of him so as to yield the text the church has read in him? Is it possible to know these things? Need we hope that some day we shall know, say in the story of the baptism and the temptation, or in the story of Jesus' visit to Nazareth, which words stood in each of the pre-gospel sources, and exactly what Mark wrote, and what was added to Mark by his editor? Yes, we must answer, these inquiries are necessary. The credibility of the gospels depends to a large extent on what we know about the transmission of the traditions entering into them. Mark is not an independent witness of the facts of the gospel; we have to ask where he got the information he records. If he got it from Peter, and if it is possible to identify the parts of it which came from Peter, then the information is to that extent good and early. If he got some of it from a written work which the other evangelists used too, then Mark is not a better authority for that part of it than Matthew and Luke were; possibly not so good. If Mark's text proves to have been touched up after the other gospels were written, so as to bring him into agreement

with them in matters of fact and of expression, then we have to use him with great caution. Every scholar, then, who feels called to deal with this matter thoroughly has to do what Dr. Weiss here does—to try to specify section by section what belongs to each source, how far the source is reliable in each case or is affected by influences known to have operated on it, and in which of the gospels the source seems to be preserved most purely. Wernle in his very able book *Die synoptische Frage* (1889) dispenses himself and those who follow him from a great part of this labor. With him there are in the main two sources only, Mark and the oracles; the passages in which Matthew and Luke, while following Mark's order, give a better version of a story, are so few that they may be neglected altogether. Not many of those, however, who have gone seriously into the question have been able to satisfy themselves so easily; and Dr. Weiss will have the sympathy of most scholars when he contends that in many passages Mark's narrative is farther from the source than that of Matthew or Luke, and that this has to be accounted for. His dissection of the gospel into its sources is carried out, accordingly, in a very thorough manner; we are told where Mark got each story, almost each verse, and where exactly he was touched up after Matthew and Luke used him. When, however, he has gone through all this labor, our author tells us frankly that what he proposes is to be regarded as no more than tentative; opinions may differ, he says, as to the extent of each of the sources and of their employment. What we have before us, accordingly, is to be regarded as a set of proposals for the definition of the sources of Mark and of their application in his work.

The Peter source comes first. Dr. Weiss holds, and it is not difficult to agree with him, that we ought, if we accept the Papias tradition about Mark's use of Peter's discourses, to try to identify in his gospel the pieces which he may have procured in this way. Of these he himself specifies a good number. The following is the list of them:

1. Jesus' appearance in Galilee; call of the four fishermen.
2. The Sabbath in Capernaum.
3. The paralytic.
4. The crowds and the blasphemy of the Spirit.
5. Jesus' true relatives.
6. Preaching at the seaside; crossing; the storm; Gerasa; Jairus's daughter.
7. Rejection at Nazareth.
8. The first feeding; crossing; Jesus walking on the sea; landing at Genesaret; the demand of a sign.

9. Northern journey; Peter's confession; transfiguration; the epileptic boy; second prediction of the passion.

10. Question of precedence; Peter's question as to reward; the ambitious sons of Zebedee.

11. Entry into Jerusalem; question of tribute.

12. Cleansing of the temple; question of Jesus' authority.

13. The son of David; words on the temple.

14. Betrayal; Gethsemane; Peter's denial; trial before Pilate; crucifixion.

The reasons both for inclusion in and exclusion from this catalogue are set forth at large in the detailed dissection, with much of which I find myself in hearty agreement, while there are portions which I cannot accept. The Peter pieces accepted by Dr. Weiss are narratives which are possible, likely, and primitive. Peter, it is held, did not report the second feeding, as there was but one. Mark doubled it from another source, for subtle didactic reasons of his own. The story of the demoniac of Capernaum tells nothing that could not take place, nor does the story of Jesus in the storm, nor that of the walking on the sea nor that of Jairus's daughter. On the other hand, Peter did not report the details of the feeding, because it is not made clear, as he would, have made it, how the portions were transmitted to the guests; he could not report the story of Bartimæus, an impossible story, nor the curious case of the deaf and dumb man at the end of chap. 7, nor that of the blind man at Bethsaida, which describe in so peculiar a way Jesus' method of cure. He could not report what is said of the eclipse at the crucifixion, nor the incident of the veil of the temple; these are symbols, not facts. In deference apparently to the criticism of Brandt, Peter is not made to vouch for the course of the trial before the Sanhedrin, though the narrative of the proceedings in the early morning and the trial before Pilate are due to him. And to the contention of Wrede that Jesus did not proclaim himself Messiah it is conceded that the first prediction of the passion (8:31) ought not to stand where it does, as it interrupts the Peter narrative, which went straight from the confession of Peter to the declaration that some standing there should see the kingdom come, and to the transfiguration, which is the confirmation from above of what the disciples have found out below. In the Peter pieces the same view of the person of Jesus is found as in the speeches in the early part of Acts; he is a man endowed with power by God, etc.

The value of the reminiscences of Peter preserved by Mark is not that they give us a complete or chronological picture of the life of Jesus; it lies in

the characteristic glimpses they afford of the nature of Jesus and his manner of living. They show us, not an everyday, matter-of-fact life, not a calm enlightened sage, but a person holding the supernatural views of his day, driven by powerful religious impulses, full of enthusiasm and of a sovereign consciousness of power. We see Jesus inspired by the highest idea of his age, which yet was a very inadequate expression for his inner experience, and therefore involved him in his tragical fate (p. 363).

Dr. Weiss allows that some of the Peter pieces may be identified with more confidence than others; he has an open mind as to the extent of this source. He considers that Mark possessed this source in writing; because some of the groups of the narratives in it have so clear and closely articulated sequence. This does not appear convincing; there is no reason why Peter should not have been accustomed to give a pretty long story, or why it should not by repeated telling have acquired a definite form which his interpreter could reproduce from memory.

The presbyter quoted by Papias makes it appear as if Mark had no other source of information for his work than the discourses of Peter which he heard. No one now doubts that he had other sources, some of which at least were written; the apocalypse of chap. 13 is one of these, and the sets of conflicts, both those of chaps. 2 and 3, and those of chaps. 11 and 12, may be another. That he may have collected many loose traditions, some written, some unwritten, appears most probable; but we need not expect to be able to say where he found all his materials. One collection of stories and sayings there is which the correspondences of Matthew and Luke enable us to identify and to some extent to describe; *i. e.*, the so-called Logia, or Oracles. This is the second source of Matthew and Luke, their use of which makes their gospels so much richer than Mark's, and the contents of which at the same time they use in such different ways. This particular collection, Weiss maintains, as his father did, that Mark knew, and used. This is a difficult hypothesis. The baptism and the temptation, for example, are held by Weiss to have stood in the Oracles in the longer form of Matthew and Luke, with the speeches, and Mark is held to have considered that his readers knew all about these things already and to have given the narratives in an abbreviated form. The parables about the divided kingdom and the divided house are said to have been borrowed by Mark from the Oracles; in which case he is seen to have omitted the verse about Jewish exorcisms and that about the exorcisms of Jesus proving the advent of the kingdom. Other instances show similarly that if Mark

used the "Oracles," he did not take them very seriously, and had no scruple about altering the point of the sayings he found in them, as in 4:21-25, and using them for purposes quite different from those which they served in the setting where he found them. How much more likely that he derived them from a different strain of tradition, in which they offered themselves more readily to the use he made of them? Weiss, however, does not insist so strongly as we might expect on this part of his theory. He points out texts in which he thinks Mark used the Oracles, but when he comes to some of Mark's various sources he expresses himself guardedly, allowing the possibility that the sayings Mark might have got from the Oracles may have been in the Peter tradition too, and concluding with the cautious statement that "Mark drew his words of Christ from a written collection which he knew to be used and valued in the church." This does not identify Mark's source of the sayings with that of Matthew and Luke; and Weiss ends this discussion with the statement that he applies his source-hypothesis with varying degrees of confidence to the pieces he thinks Mark got from the Oracles. To some of the stories outside of the Peter tradition he attributes a high degree of authority, as to the set of conflicts. He recognizes, however, a number of traditions of a second class; these are more or less legendary, viz.: the story of the death of John the Baptist, the cursing of the fig tree, the prodigies at the death of Jesus, the empty tomb, the man with the withered hand, Bartimæus, and the cures of the deaf and dumb man and of the blind man of Bethsaida. The discussion of the sources ends with the remark that for a person who had lived at Jerusalem at the time of the crucifixion Mark shows himself very poorly informed as to the circumstances of the trial and the passion. He places the crucifixion on the wrong day, for Weiss prefers the Johannine tradition on this point, and thinks that this circumstance does not strengthen the belief that John Mark was the writer. A curious speculation with which the book concludes as to another John and another Mary who lived in the same house, and the possibility of their having been confused with John Mark and the Mary with whom he lived, deepens that scepticism. But here Dr. Weiss declares himself not yet committed to the conclusions he thus adumbrates.

We conclude our very inadequate account of this most interesting book with a few words on the part played in it by Mark's supposed redactor (*Bearbeiter*). That person is never set clearly before us in this book, nor are his aims and methods explained; we only see him from

time to time at his work of altering in all manner of ways that *Urmakus* whom Matthew and Luke had faithfully followed. When Mark contains more than these followers of his, in a connection where they are undoubtedly following him, it is the redactor who has added fresh matter to the original. This is to be seen in the story of the Gerasene demoniac, in that of Jairus's daughter, in that of the epileptic boy, and in many another passage. It must have been the redactor who made John the Baptist say that the Mighty one coming after him would baptize with the Holy Spirit, pointing to church baptism. Matthew and Luke say "with the Holy Spirit and with fire," and the Original Mark must have written "with fire." Here the change attributed to the redactor does not seem beyond the compass of a copyist. Are the stories of the cure of the deaf and dumb man and the blind man at Bethsaida more naïve and more savoring of popular medicine than is Mark's wont? Matthew and Luke have them not: the redactor put them into Mark. Even Mark's coloring touches, which give the gospel to so large an extent its tone and manner—"had compassion on him," "looked round about them in anger," "grieved at the hardness of their hearts," etc.—are by the redactor; Matthew and Luke do not give them! The Original Mark theory, it is seen, gets rid of the difficulties of the synoptic problem by stripping the second gospel of its distinctive character and reducing it to such a colorless document as may underlie both Matthew and Luke. There are other ways of dealing with the difficulties. The earlier text undoubtedly presented here and there by the later gospels points to the fact that Mark did not simply copy his source, but dressed it to his own liking, and that the older state of the source was here and there not forgotten by writers who came afterward. Matthew and Luke in their turn did not accept Mark word for word, but omitted what belonged to his peculiar style, what appeared to them too simple and crude, or what conflicted with another tradition they had taken from elsewhere. There may remain some passages where the differences cannot be accounted for in any of these ways; but surely it is better to confess that we cannot explain everything than to set up a "redactor" for the sole purpose of getting all the difficulties put on his shoulders to carry away.

I would say of Weiss's book that it is valuable, not on account of its source theories, but rather in spite of them. That Mark used the same book of Oracles as that of Matthew and Luke is a view which is not likely to prevail, nor is the redactor a figure likely to impress the world more strongly than he has done in the past. His character and views

are not definite enough, nor the necessity of his existence sufficiently plain. But as a piece of exegesis the book is an admirable one.

In what position does the criticism of the gospels now stand? What new results appear to be coming to general acceptance, and in what directions does it seem likely that new light will shine on this great problem? In what remains of this article we take Weiss's book as a text on which to base some answers to these questions which concern the world so deeply.

1. It is increasingly clear that the gospels are to be understood from the point of view of the age which produced them. We have to ask the apostolic age to tell us in what ways such books were wanted, and in what spirit various writers sought to meet the requirements of their age. To regard the evangelists as saints, hardly of this world, all telling the same story, only with some small human differences, such as that Mark wrote specially for gentiles, Matthew for Jewish Christians—this is scarcely the right way to get close to them. Each has to be studied separately to make out what he felt and meant; his personal situation in the apostolic church has to be made out; we have to ask what sources he used, what traditions he was acquainted with, and how he set to work to deal with his materials and to construct out of them the great work which bears his name. Mark is the most important of them all in this respect, because he came first and was the first to make use of the tradition living in the church in the way in which the others also followed him. By studying his position and his individual genius as an author, we come to know more clearly than from the others what the church said and thought about Jesus before the gospels came to be written, and are able to determine to some extent the way in which the tradition grew up and the gospel facts were dealt with in the first age. To explain a gospel from the circumstances of the apostolic age is by no means to lose confidence in its historical character. That the evangelist worked as writers of narratives do still, that he arranged his material to suit his own purpose, combined one thing with another which till then lay apart from it, altered, heightened, curtailed or amplified—this is not to say that he is to be regarded as a writer of fiction and that no credit attaches to his statements. He did not make his bricks without straw; he collected what lay to his hand, as every writer must; he wove it into a telling story, as every good writer does. The facts were there, and he dealt with them. His narrative, accordingly, is not to be treated as if it consisted of minutes,

taken down on the spot, of each occurrence, nor as a photographic reproduction, faithful in each detail to the original fact. When this is recognized, we no longer require to harmonize one evangelist with another; we rather rejoice in their varieties as showing us what an interest was taken in the matter in these early days, and in what a variety of lights the incidents were regarded. That the incidents did occur we do not doubt, although the representation of them which has reached us is made up of many elements.

2. It is due partly to the great development in our days of anthropological studies that many of the incidents in the gospels which used to be regarded as simply miraculous are now ceasing to appear in that light. The cures of demoniacs are spoken of even in recent commentaries as miracles; but they are nothing of the kind. Such things happen still, as we hear from India and from the reports of missionaries in China, especially in remote and backward districts and among dispirited populations. At this point I may be excused for referring to my own *Earliest Gospel*, in which the exorcisms of Jesus are treated from this point of view; and I am delighted to find that Weiss in his book takes the same line. Of other incidents which with him I have treated as not miraculous, but possible, I may mention the cure of Peter's mother-in-law, the cure of the paralytic and of the man with the withered hand, the raising of Jairus's daughter, the feeding of the multitudes, and the walking on the sea. I refer to the same category the cure of the deaf and the dumb man in the seventh chapter of Mark, and of the blind man at Bethsaida (Mark, chap. 8); both of which Weiss considers to be no part of the original Mark, but to be due to the redactor. I do not see why these stories should not be part of the earliest tradition. That Jesus appears in them to make use of certain simple applications of popular medicine is reason enough perhaps why Matthew and Luke should have discarded them, but is not enough reason for our doing so. If he practiced the art of healing, as he undoubtedly did, he is not likely to have scorned methods of healing current in his day in which there was nothing superstitious or degrading and which might often prove effectual. I differ from Weiss, again, when he declares that Mark describes the whole curative agency of Jesus in the words (1:39), "and casting out demons." The second gospel appears to me to draw a very clear distinction between the work of exorcism and that of healing disease, and to regard the former as a task Jesus felt to be obligatory upon him, while the latter was one he often shrank from. Why was the former imposed on the disciples, and not the latter (3:14)?

3. That the second gospel exhibits no historical development—a conclusion of Wrede which Weiss adopts—is perhaps not quite true to the facts of the case. No doubt the doctrinal interest did prevail over the historical, in Mark as well as in John; Jesus is announced from the outset as the Son of God, and works which we can see to have been possible are to the evangelist such as no other could have done, and proofs of divinity. With his sources it is otherwise. Peter's reminiscences were correct representations of the position and of the mind of Jesus at various points in his career; there was therefore to the discerning eye some of the inner history of Jesus to be gathered from them. With others of the traditions it must have been the same. And can it be maintained that Mark, who had these various traditions to work on, obliterated the evidence they afforded of a development in the experience of Jesus, or even was blind to it? Surely it cannot; surely we must allow that the dogmatic interest in Mark did not quench the historical, that he cared for the stories he had to tell for their own sake, and so told and arranged them that they not only served the ends of the Christian mission, but were a true record, not only of the details, but of the connection of the Lord's life. No doubt the doctrinal motive acts very confusingly; Jesus forecasts his death in the second chapter, and refers to himself as Messiah; his enemies plot for his destruction from the outset. But the true sequence is still there and can be recognized. Jesus comes forward as a teacher conscious of divine aid, speaking of a swiftly approaching divine event, yet relying on the methods of persuasion, making no personal claim, directing attention to the kingdom, not to himself. This patient and self-denying activity, described by him under the figures of a fisherman, a sower, a physician, is broken in upon by the reputation he swiftly gains as an exorcist and a healer; people demand that he should do cures for them, and he cannot always refuse; great crowds flock about him. His chief aim at this time is to form a community of persons who believe his doctrine and accept him as their leader in looking forward to the great changes which are coming. In this he has much success, and moments are recorded when he enjoyed full sympathy with many who resorted to him, and was the head of a body which might look forward to great fortunes. Then the rôle of Messiah is suggested to his mind. Till now he has refused any homage tending to place him in a separate position from other men, and has sedulously abstained from any methods but those of the teacher and friend of men. Titles offered to him by the demoniacs he has sternly refused.

He would still refuse any special rôle or position, but he is aware that he is charged with a special message to men, and he comes to be convinced that a special position must also be his, and that, however little he desires it, the messiahship is appointed for him by God. That he should not wish this discovery at once trumpeted to the world is no more than natural; he is quite aware how different a Messiah he must prove from that one who occupies the mind of his fellow-countrymen. His fortune too as Messiah he well sees must be quite different from that of the Son of David his people expect; they will not accept him till God intervenes with a strong hand from heaven. To those who accept him he can bring all that any messiah ever could have brought; but most will not recognize him; he will bring, not peace, but a sword; no cause for him to hurry on such a conflict or bring upon himself too soon the death which he sees too clearly is to be a part of his messianic career. But he does at length make the claim, and suffers its almost inevitable penalty.

This development is naturally suggested by the Peter pieces as Weiss enumerates them; and we cannot suppose that Mark was blind to it, though in weaving in his other sources, and pleading as he thought necessary for his doctrine of Christ, he certainly confused it; one in his position could scarcely be quite consistent.

4. That Jesus did claim to be Messiah is written on the whole of the gospels, and cannot be denied without doing them the greatest violence. The inscription on the cross, allowed by Brandt to be historical, implies that the Jews accused him to Pilate of claiming a headship of his people which the sovereign power ought not to tolerate; and the charge could scarcely be a pure invention, devoid of any basis in the acts and words of Jesus himself. To assert that it was not Jesus himself, but his followers, who asserted his messiahship is to credit them with an inventiveness and intellectual audacity which is entirely unlikely. The claim was surrounded with every possible difficulty, as the Acts and the gospels themselves amply prove. If Jesus was merely a sage who excited by his attractive teaching the jealousy of the rabbis and the attention of the rulers, but who never went himself beyond that rôle, it is hard to imagine how such men as his disciples were could set up the assertion, so absurd and impossible to all Jewish thinking, that he had been all the time a great deal more. That act of faith must surely be ascribed to a much greater mind than theirs. The denial of the messianic claim of Jesus thus deprives his death of its natural explanation as a historical fact, and makes the early Chris-

tian creed that Jesus was Messiah a statement with which Jesus himself did not agree and which is in every aspect inexplicable. The injunctions placed in the mouth of Jesus not to speak of his being Messiah are, when we consider the circumstances, quite natural. The messiahship was a perilous rôle, the announcement of it must have altered at once the tenor of his life and involved him in conflicts which, though he was prepared to enter on them when God gave him a signal, he could not desire to hasten. That the demoniacs addressed him as Messiah is not at all psychologically impossible. It was natural that his messiahship, like the kingdom he preached, should be in the meantime veiled and a mystery, to be alluded to in figure and parable and enigmatic title, but not to be declared in so many words, till the time came.

There can be no doubt that the discussion now going on as to the historical value of various parts of the gospel narrative will lead in time to an increase of light. Other grave questions are at present in dispute besides those noticed in this paper. Whether the fourth gospel contains a tradition of some facts of the life of Christ which is independent of that of the synoptists, and which may even be preferred to it, is a question by no means settled. Weiss holds to the views of his father, that at various points John is right and the synoptists wrong, or at least defective. The debate on the "Son of man" has had a long and varied history, and is not yet decided. From it we may hope that a clear understanding of the relation Jesus took up to the messiahship will one day be obtained. There is abundance of work to be done in this field by devoted and truth-seeking students. That it is work of the greatest importance for the world no one can question.

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IMMORTALITY.

THE question discussed by these books¹ is that of "the future life." If a man die, shall he live again? Does the individual human personality perish through and after that catastrophe of the body which we call dying?

¹ *The Other Room*. By LYMAN ABBOTT. New York: The Outlook Co., 1903. 120 pages.

Human Destiny in the Light of Revelation. By JOHN F. WEIR. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. xix + 186 pages.

A quite new interest has become attached to the question. For many Christian centuries it occupied attention little or not at all, because it was thought of as settled, closed, not lying within the field of examination. It was assumed that "man" was an order of beings set off sharply from all other creatures, chiefly by the endowment of each member of the race with an "immortal soul." Of course, if it were true that an immortal soul were part of the original equipment of every child of "man," the questions concerning a future life could only be such as: What kind of life will the soul live? Where will it live? What will its capacities and functions be? and such like.

Until lately the common thought within Christendom ran somewhat like this: Each human being is composed of a soul and a body. The soul is intrinsically immortal. The body is essentially perishable. The two coexist, much as a long-lived tenant occupies a poor and flimsily built house. Sooner or later, but certainly, the building falls into decay or is broken up by a catastrophe. When this occurs the tenant moves away. Where it flits to or how it maintains itself, while thus houseless, was never very clearly thought out or even imagined. The general notion in religious circles was, and for that matter is, that at the moment of death the soul and body separate; that the body slowly disintegrates; that the soul goes temporarily to a place of its own, where it endures in a sort of partial self-consciousness for a long but indefinite period; that at the end of a certain time each body which has ever served as the home of a human soul will be reconstituted, of the same matter, with member, joint, and limb restored; that each soul will be reunited to its own body; that then comes judgment, reward, and unchangeable doom.

Two postulates underlay all this way of thinking — postulates which have been taken for axioms. The first was: "The human soul is by its constitution immortal." The second was: "All human souls are alike in structure and possess the same quality of immortality." Both these postulates are now challenged. Indeed, it would be nearer the truth to say that they are both rejected as at least unprovable by the science of today. The soul is not by nature immortal, and all souls are not alike in this regard. It would take too long to tell the steps by which the thought of today has reached this conclusion. It has, moreover, reached it reluctantly, but it has reached it. The new sciences of biology and anthropology have claimed a right to speak upon this subject, which had theretofore been regarded as the peculiar possession of theology. Dr. Lyman Abbott is a theologian—at least he was

once. Forty years ago he would have written upon this theme, no doubt with the same charm and graciousness of spirit, but he would have derived his data from very different sources, and he would have used very different arguments from those which he employs today. Then he would have gone to the metaphysicians and the Bible. Now he goes to psychology and the analogies of nature. The essential belief which he holds upon the subject may be seen from a single paragraph :

If we are to pluck truth from the tree of life, we must have a right to it. If we would have a rational hope in life hereafter, we must have the immortal life here.

This is the substance of the whole matter. When Professor Weir's arguments are analyzed, they yield the same conclusion. Immortality is not a natural endowment, it is an achievement. This is also the original Christian teaching. But it is not the belief of the Christian world of today, and it has not been for thirteen hundred years. It was the message of the apostles who preached the "gospel of the resurrection." They spoke to a world of men in which the individual had no expectation of continuing in conscious identity after his death. When the ambassadors of the risen Christ brought the news that a man who had died was not only still living, but that he had uncovered the secret by which other men could do the same, they were listened to at first with incredulity and voted to be madmen. But when they brought such proof of their facts as convinced, they were hailed as the deliverers of the world and their story was instinctively characterized as the "Good News." It was good news, but it was news at all because it was new. They said to men everywhere: "Your life need not end with the breaking up of the body, if you really wish it otherwise. There is a way of escape. The way is not easy. It is a strait and narrow one. Comparatively few will find it. No one will find it unless he tries, tries ardently and persistently." St. Paul himself after years of preaching was by no means sure that he had compassed it. He did not count himself to have attained, but he was determined to go on in the endeavor, in confidence that he might by any means attain unto the resurrection of the dead. The zeal and enthusiasm of the early Christians can be accounted for and understood only when we remember that they believed themselves to be engaged in what was literally a life-and-death affair, not physical or even moral life, but to die, like the beasts, or to live, like Christ. This accounts at once for their zeal as missionaries and for their light-hearted martyrdom. It

was vastly different from the motif which has obtained since the Christian world fell back again into pagan Platonism and grew to believe that every human child is sure of immortality in any case, and that the only question is whether or not his endless life will be a blissful or a miserable one. The "orthodoxy" of today cannot make much out of the sober words of Athanasius:

Man is according to nature mortal, as a being who has been made out of things perishable. But on account of his likeness unto God he can by piety ward off and escape from his natural mortality and remain indestructible if he retain his knowledge of God, or can lose his incorruptibility if he lose his life in God.

Immortality is an achievement, not a natural endowment. This both Dr. Abbott and Professor Weir allow. But they both appear to shrink from the consequences of their belief. Dr. Abbott in gracious and winning terms sets about to reassure the affections of timid souls. In a very large measure he succeeds, partly because of the contagiousness of his fine spirit, and partly because the affections do not scrutinize logic. He assures them that they are needlessly terrified; that God and nature do all things gently and tenderly; that the "other life" is not some departure into an eternal exile in some far-away sphere, which frightens by its strangeness; that the other life, if it be at all, is already begun, and, the subject is living it now; that in God's spacious house are many rooms, and that death for him who is immortal is only like passing from one room of a friendly home into another. No doubt all he says is true; at least we may well believe it to be true; but it seems in some elusive way to avoid the whole tragic side of living and dying. It will not satisfy, will not console, and will probably exasperate the earnest man who stands face to face with the momentous question: "Can I live after death, and, if so, how?"

The issue at stake is really the most tragic which can possibly confront a conscious creature. The earnest man wants it settled, not tenderly pushed aside out of sight by pleasing reflections. Shall I live or not? If I pass finally out of conscious being, will it be through what must be for me the crowning tragedy, the dissolution of my body? Or may I pass on into still another doubtful stage in which death is still a possibility? Shall I in it attain to a fixed and stable existence? Or shall I there be liable to succumb, after possibly long, painful, and fruitless struggle, to the "second death"? The author of *The Other Room*, we venture to think, does not realize that the consolation, to be valuable to a man in this mind, must be quite different in kind from that addressed to one who accepts the belief in inherent immortality and

only seeks for future happiness. The way of life and the way of happiness are quite different. The means to secure a living are one thing; the means of securing pleasure and escaping pain are another. The author avows his belief in a contingent immortality, and then proceeds to speak as though his hearers were immortal of necessity. His arguments are gracious, cogent, uplifting. The question is: Are they relevant?

Professor Weir sets before himself a different task, and if he fails to achieve it, it is only because it is an impossible one. His aim, as he states it, is "to ascertain the destiny of man by the exclusive light of revelation." By revelation he means the Protestant Bible. He separates this authority sharply from all other means of attaining knowledge. "Science supplies no data whatever upon which a conclusion may rest concerning that which transcends the boundaries of earthly life; revelation alone supplies the key." The first half of his book is devoted to the exploitation of this thesis. Of this we can only say that the attempted delimitation of science and revelation is fatal to them both. Revelation is scientific; and science is revelation. To reach the truth upon this sober question one must use every hint, analogy, fact, and feeling which the natural universe can supply, and must fuse the result with the experiences and guesses of holy men recorded in Scripture. Professor Weir's deliberate separation of the two kinds of knowledge and the two kinds of psychological action does, as it seems to us, destroy the cogency of an argument which is learned and orderly, and which shows quite uncommon insight into some of the conditions of the question.

The truth of the matter would appear to be that the Christian world is not ready as yet to inquire seriously about the way of life. It is still controlled by the assumption that life immortal is in any case an essential quality of human personality. It has long been busying itself about the matter of future happiness and misery. It will not seriously take up the previous question, "What must I do to inherit eternal life?" until the mischievous assumption that eternal life passes by inheritance ceases to stand in the way. When that time comes—and it is coming swiftly—then all religious questions and activities will take on an earnest and real quality which will correspond to the tragic situation in the universe of beings who realize that they carry in their constitutions the possibilities of continuing in living or of perishing, swiftly or lingeringly, as the case may be.

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MORE LITERATURE ON BABYLON AND THE BIBLE.

THE *Babel und Bibel* controversy has absorbed almost the chief attention of Old Testament and Semitic scholars in Germany for the past eighteen months. Hundreds of thousands of copies of brochures, some of them running into several editions, from more than a score of writers have been sown broadcast among biblical readers and students in that land. Added impetus was given to the already warm discussions by the deliverance of a second lecture by Professor Delitzsch January 12, 1903, before the German Orient-Society and in the presence of his majesty, Emperor William. This presentation took a theological turn and thereby aroused the sharpest kind of criticism. Even the emperor felt it incumbent on himself to publish his opinion of questions discussed in the lecture. Now, the first lecture of Professor Delitzsch, already noticed in this JOURNAL (April, 1903, pp. 384-85), and the second just referred to, and "Notes" covering one-third as much more space have been put in English dress as Vol. I. of the "Crown Theological Library," by Mr. C. H. W. Johns, of Cambridge University. The editor also writes a preface of a conciliatory character, in which he accords to Delitzsch the high praise justly due him for his valuable service in the field of Assyriology. The "Notes" of this volume are largely rebuttals of arguments set forth by opponents, and further explanations of items gently referred to in the body of one or other of the lectures. The second lecture is a severe arraignment of the time-old orthodox view of the Old Testament, and the practical reduction of it to the same level as that of other oriental literature, both in origin and value. It is illustrated by a few good half-tones of the monuments. Mr. Johns's translation is well made. But the book is not complete. It has no table of contents, no list of illustrations, and no indices of any kind at all—serious defects in these times of progress.

A Chicago house also puts out a one-volume translation of these lectures.* The work is well done, but is embellished, as was the translation of the first lecture (this JOURNAL, p. 385), by too many poor

* *Babel and Bible*. Two Lectures Delivered before the Members of the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft in the Presence of the German Emperor. By FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH. Edited by C. H. W. JOHNS, M.A. London and New York: Putnam, 1903. 226 pages. \$1.50.

* *Babel and Bible*. Two Lectures on the Significance of Assyriological Research for Religion, Embodying the Most Important Criticisms and the Author's Replies. By FRIEDRICH DELITZSCH. Translated by T. J. MCCORMACK and W. H. CARRUTH. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1903. 167 pages. \$0.75, net.

woodcuts that are not in the original text. This volume, however, contains one document not found in Johns's translation, viz., the manifesto of Emperor William wherein he locates himself theologically as touching Delitzsch's radical utterances. We find no list of illustrations and no indices in this production. Either of these translations, just noted, will give English and American readers a good idea of the basis for the contentions that have resulted in the flood of *Babel und Bibel* literature that has poured from German presses since January, 1902.

Eduard König³ has put another of his contributions to this question in the form of correspondence. E writes K about the large statements and claims of Winckler's brochure, *Die babylonische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen zur unsrigen*. E is skeptical over Winckler's claims for the importance of Babylonian influence in modern civilization. He finds traces of the elements of other ancient civilizations among modern peoples. K at first stands by some of Winckler's statements, but later gradually leaves him and his claims, until at the end of the correspondence the two writers so far agree that they deny the claims of the pamphlet regarding the relation of Babylonian culture to world-history. They also decide that Winckler's statement that the discoveries in Babylonia now change our comprehension of world-history from the ground up is false. The net results of the correspondence are an impeachment of the radical claims of Winckler's brochure.

Pastor Hübener,⁴ of Kolberg, enlists in the company of defenders of the Bible. He speaks tenderly of Franz Delitzsch the father, and with grief of the son, Friedrich, in view of his late utterances which minimize the revealed character of the Old Testament. Of Delitzsch's ability as an Assyriologist he speaks in the most laudatory terms. But in the province of religion and theology Hübener says he shows himself to be an idiot (p. 8). He scouts the idea set forth by Delitzsch that the inscriptions of the early traditions resembling Gen., chaps. 1-9, are more trustworthy than, and are besides the sources of, the biblical records (p. 9). "Every religion," says he, "which is thought out by man himself is false, and cannot be other than false." Hence the falsity of Delitzsch's position when he speaks of the expansion of religion through the thought of man. Again he charges Delitzsch

³ *Babyloniens Kultur und die Weltgeschichte*. Ein Briefwechsel veröffentlicht von EDUARD KÖNIG. Gr. Lichterfelde-Berlin: Runge, n. d. 42 pages. M. o. 70.

⁴ *Das zertrümmerte Babel, das unfehlbare Gotteswort, und die ewige Gottesstadt*. Ein Vortrag von W. HÜBENER, Pastor zu Kolberg. Zwickau i. S.: Der Schriftenverein der Ev. Luth., 1902.

with being an atheist, because he does not believe in a God who can perform miracles and can speak to man (p. 14). His view of an infallible Scripture is vigorously set forth in the second division of his lecture. The third part is the eternal city of God, that is, the church of God, in contrast with all the heathen cities that have fallen. Babylon has long ago fallen, and only its ruins testify to its greatness of the long ago. But the Word of God and the city of God remain forever. The pamphlet shows that the author is deeply evangelical in belief and spirit, and is ready at all hazards to defend the Bible against every damaging attack.

Another pastor has come to the rescue of the Bible against the assertions of *Babel und Bibel*.⁵ After a general introduction he takes up and reviews several of Delitzsch's positions, following the order laid down in Genesis. At the conclusion of his rather prejudiced discussion of the creation stories, he states that he does not hesitate to assert that he finds in Genesis the clear sources, the pure original, of those traditions (p. 19). His treatment of the paradise question is concluded by a quotation from Dillmann, in which the great exegete states that he could not see what the likeness of the Babylonian word *édinu* had to do with the Hebrew paradise. His study of the flood legends is also closed by a quotation from the same authority, to the effect that the Hebrew and Babylonian traditions are due to a common inheritance of hither-Asiatic peoples, and not that the one was derived from the other. The table of nations (Gen., chap. 10) is corroborated by the investigations in cuneiform literature. In other words the author stands rigidly by such positions as those taken by Dillmann and Robertson. His division devoted to Bel and El contains nothing new, and concludes by a declaration of the superiority in every way of the El of the Old Testament over the Bel of Babylonia. The outcome of the writer's investigations is expressed in this final sentence: "Verbum Dei maneat in æternum."

The wand of peace is stretched forth by Giesebrecht⁶ over the contentions concerning *Babel und Bibel*. His pamphlet came into printed-being after Delitzsch's second lecture. In his preface, his first fault with the discussions on Delitzsch's side of the question is that evolu-

⁵ *Bibel und Babel, El und Bel*. Eine Replik auf Friedrich Delitzsch's *Babel und Bibel*. Von W. KNIESCHKE, Pfarrer in Sieversdorf. Westend-Berlin: Faber, 1902. 64 pages.

⁶ *Friede für Babel und Bibel*. Von FR. GIESEBRECHT. First, and unchanged second edition. Königsberg: Thomas & Oppermann, 1903. 62 pages.

tion is given so large a place in the history of Israelitish culture and religion. He charges Alfred Jeremias, who, in the main, supports Delitzsch, with not understanding the position of the Old Testament scholars whom he encounters. He maintains that Babylonian culture is by no means the medium by which one can explain the work of Moses. "The real kernel of Moses's religion, at least," for Giesebrecht, "is found in revelation, while its form possesses resemblances to Arabian material" (p. 15). At the very outset of his discussion proper Giesebrecht reveals his attitude to Delitzsch's position in the second lecture. He states that by that effort he had undone everything, and that, in place of a recognition of a potent significance of the Old Testament from the point of view of a history of religion, he practically set it aside for Babylonian beliefs. How severely he has damaged the truth cannot yet be stated.

In order to establish peace between the *Babel und Bibel* controversialists this writer proposes concessions on both sides. Assyriologists must produce proofs of the statements they make. They must also respect the religious peculiarities of the Old Testament. Non-Assyriologists, on the other hand, must be ready to recognize the good, whatever be its source; and if an Old Testament narrative is vivified and made plainer through some Babylonian discoveries, they should be ready to learn from the Babylonians. In reviewing with some care the points discussed in *Babel und Bibel* Giesebrecht shows an open-mindedness and consideration which are conspicuously absent from some of the reviewers. In his conclusion he frankly admits that there are very many technical, scientific, and historical allusions to Babylon in the Old Testament. There are also some legal, ethical, and religious phenomena at the very apex of Babylonian thought and life that fall little below the heights of Old Testament thought. But the central idea of the Old Testament, the religious, cannot be predicated of Babylonian literature. If Delitzsch had presented a cross-section of the Babylonian religion, instead of merely the extreme points of its religio-moral apprehension, his lecture would have appeared entirely different. While Giesebrecht grants much to the claims of Delitzsch, he stands by the revealed character of the Old Testament and the far-and-away superiority of its God and religion.

Most of the writers on *Babel und Bibel* are comparative strangers to Assyriology. This Catholic priest,⁷ however, is a striking exception. He

⁷ *Zur Babel und Bibelfrage*. Von P. KEIL. Erweiterter Neudruck aus *Pastor bonnus*. Trier: Paulinus, 1903. 78 pages. M. 1.

wrestles with the problems in a detailed yet masterly manner. He analyzes the questions at issue, and arrays them in two lines of research: (1) dogmatic issues, such as El, Jahweh, angel, sabbath, and the beyond, or future; (2) the more historical issue, such as creation, fall, early patriarchs (*Urväter*), and the deluge. For the first class of issues he finds (1) justness in Delitzsch's claims for *El*; (2) nothing but theory in his hypotheses for Jahweh; (3) considerable doubt as to the basis for the claims regarding the origin and character of cherubim, seraphim, and guardian angels; (4) that Dillmann in 1882 expressed his view of the case when he said: "Delitzsch's attempt has greatly miscarried;" (5) that the Babylonian and Israelitish idea of the future had many things in common. For the second class of issues he finds (1) that the theory of the dependence of the Hebrew account on the Babylonian is not more noteworthy than the agreement in the succession of the acts of creation; (2) that the dependence of the Hebrew record of the fall on the Babylonian is entirely out of the question; (3) that tables descriptive of the early patriarchs are not dependent, either one on the other, but both preserve material collated from parallel streams of tradition; (4) that the Hebrew account of the deluge is the simpler, the more straightforward, and consequently could not have been copied from the Babylonian, but rather the two accounts may be traced back to a common origin.

Budde's contribution⁸ to the contest between *Babel und Bibel* appears in a second edition, with a new "Vorwort." He briefly reviews Delitzsch's second lecture. He affirms that the lecturer now appears as a reformer. He now sets aside the Old Testament and promotes "Babel" at its expense. He agrees with Delitzsch in setting aside verbal inspiration, and maintains that God revealed himself, not in words, but in deeds; not in messages, but in transactions. We, however, cannot set a limit to God's methods of revealing himself; if we could, he could scarcely be our God. Delitzsch has gone too far, has touched matters vital to the church, which must be answered at no distant day.

From Breslau also comes a message on the same theme.⁹ The Assyriologist is everywhere in the Old Testament blindly finding the influence of Babylonian culture; in other words, the cultus of Israel is

⁸ *Das Alte Testament, und die Ausgrabungen.* Von KARL BUDDE. Zweite Auflage. Giessen: Ricker, 1903. xii + 40 pages.

⁹ *Babel und die biblische Urgeschichte.* Von MAX LÖHR. Mit 5 Abbildungen. Breslau: Aderholz, 1903. 28 pages.

a mere transcript of that of Babylonia. As circumcision and human sacrifice many of the elements of Israel's cultus were borrowed from other than Babylonian sources. At the outset he finds in Gen., chaps. 1-11, only these three things that were demonstrably influenced by Babylonia: (1) the creation account (1:1-2:3); (2) the patriarchal list (chap. 5); (3) the deluge report (6:5-9:19). But on the patriarchal list he finds traces of a contact with Phœnician tradition, and thinks that it is a work of theological speculation, a learned literary product, and not popular in character. It was probably drawn from some old Babylonian source. The same may be said regarding the deluge account. Of the creation legend, the really only striking resemblance between the two accounts is the fact that the production of man was the last act of creation. In conclusion, since Babylonian influence in the Old Testament is undeniable, it must be said that Israel took over from Babylon only external material, such as the patriarchal list, the deluge history, or a cosmological idea, such as chaos in the creation account. But the religious spirit of all these records is totally different from that in the original Babylonian. And this difference has its significance for every student of the Old Testament.

Pfarrer Heyn¹⁰⁰ begins his treatment of the *Babel und Bibel* controversy by putting on the left hand those who find no essential difference between Jewish and Babylonian religion, who look upon Babylonia as the venerable mother and school-mistress of the Bible. On the right he places those who are determined advocates of its originality. "In which camp shall we take our stand?" Minute consideration of the questions of the creation, the fall, the early patriarchs, the deluge, the sabbath, and the devil and angels, leads the author to conclude in his first lecture that the younger, the Old Testament view, is in considerable measure dependent on the older, the Babylonian. The second lecture deals with the value of both religions in relation to their depth and clearness of a knowledge of God, to their ideas of the seriousness and hopes of life. Without any prejudice toward all the influence of Babylonia upon the Bible, it still remains that the lasting crown of glory of the Old Testament is that it has given monotheism to mankind. In the religious field, as one example, the Babylonian psalms do not approach the Bible either in their moral earnestness or in their trust in God. In the field of moral action the comparison between the Old Testament and Babylonia is decidedly unfavorable

¹⁰⁰ *Zum Streit um Babel und Bibel*. Zwei Vorträge. Von J. HEYN, Pfarrer in Greifswald. Greifswald: Bamberg, 1903. 55 pages.

toward the latter. Finally, as surely as the Bible is dependent on Babylonia, so surely does it outrank the latter in its spirit and morality.

Emperor William's letter to define his position relative to Delitzsch's second lecture receives especial attention at the hand of Professor Harnack.¹¹ The Emperor's letter is intended to check the thought that Delitzsch's lectures have thrown overboard the Old Testament. More than that, it is to set right the popular notion that the Emperor sympathized with Delitzsch in his views of Christ and the New Testament. By this letter he directs attention to the fact that Delitzsch's authority as an Assyriologist does not cover his theological teaching as well, and in this Harnack fully agrees with him. The Emperor's letter does not curb freedom in chosen specialized lines, but leaves theological questions to the science of theology. "In the evangelical church the ultimate and most important questions are always open to discussion, and every generation must obtain the answers to them afresh for itself" (p. 11). The Emperor's concluding sentence is indorsed by every evangelical Christian: "Never was religion a product of knowledge, but rather the pouring out of a man's heart and being through his intercourse with God." Harnack's comment on this is especially noteworthy: "Theology indorses this sentence; it is well aware that it creates nothing of itself, but tries reverently to ponder something which has been given." Revelation is only through persons. "There are no revelations through things" (p. 13). The Emperor's letter stands by the Christ of the New Testament. Harnack says: "Every estimate of Christ which effaces the distinction between him and other masters the Christian community must reject" (p. 15). The warm-heartedness of the Emperor and of his commentator, and their zeal for the gospel as revealed in Christ, lead one to forget the contention which led to these noble and far-reaching statements.

Hilprecht¹² has put into this one lecture a good condensed popular account of the ruins of the old Bêl temple of Nippur. It is incidentally a contribution to the *Babel und Bibel* controversy, but mainly a record of discoveries at Nippur illustrated by a half-hundred good half-tones. These with a map and plans, help the reader to understand

¹¹ *Professor Harnack's Letter to the "Preussische Jahrbücher,"* on the German Emperor's Criticism of Professor Delitzsch's Lectures on "Babel und Bibel." Translated into English by THOMAS BAILEY SAUNDERS. London: Williams & Norgate, 1903. 18 pages.

¹² *Die Ausgrabungen der Universität zu Pennsylvania im Bêl Tempel zu Nippur.* Ein Vortrag. Von H. V. HILPRECHT. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 76 pages. M. 2.

fully the wonderful revelations of the past made in the mounds of Nippur. To those who have read Hilprechts's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the Nineteenth Century* there is little new in this brochure. At the close of his discussion of discoveries in Babylonia he presents his well-known theory of the Sumerian origin of Babylonian civilization, saying, however, that at about 4000 B. C. the Semitic invaders were in possession of that land (p. 62); and that from the beginning of their supremacy the old Sumerian art and science gradually degenerated (p. 71). In the last few pages he gives some of the assertions of Delitzsch a hard blow. He specifies particularly (1) his setting aside the revelatory character of the Old Testament, and (2) his finding in a 2300 B. C. document, with several possible interpretations, ground for the origin of the monotheism of Israel in Babylonia. Hilprecht after his fourteen years of archaeological study finds only degeneration in the peoples and civilization of Babylonia continuously from 4000 B. C., while in Israel there are the revelation and the words of the great prophets, who pointed to the fall and disappearance of the great ones of that day.

One of the colleagues of the writer of *Babel und Bibel* has made bold to utter himself on the current controversy of Germany. Gunkel¹³ has written a sane, up-to-date, evangelical and clear statement of his position. He avers that Delitzsch in all his lectures has said almost nothing that has not been well known in the circle of investigators. His rather unguarded and bold assertions in his first lecture called for numerous replies. His second lecture struck off on a theological line, and put in question the revealed character of the Old Testament, and of Israel's religion. Gunkel asks this question: "What influence had the Babylonian world on Israel, and particularly on Israel's religion?" There were, of course, some pervading Babylonian elements, to be determined only on examination. In the deluge record Gunkel maintains that the biblical was not copied from, nor prepared with the help of, the Babylonian account. Israel's tradition was rather transmitted to them in oral form. Delitzsch's unproved assertion that the Babylonian is the older and purer form is chargeable with much of the confusion on the subject. The two records are two different worlds, not to be put in the same class. Likewise the creation story, while somewhat dependent on the Babylonian, far surpasses in originality that which it has taken over to itself. Delitzsch's seal-cylinder of the fall is

¹³ *Israel und Babylonien: Der Einfluss Babylonien auf die israelitische Religion.* Von HERMANN GUNKEL. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. 48 pages. M. 1.20.

pronounced as yet of uncertain value. Among other things, Gunkel denies Delitzsch's conclusions on the origin of the sabbath, and calls his monotheistic proposals mere speculation. Delitzsch's denial of a revelation of God in Israel is accompanied with arguments two centuries old and already cast aside by progressive thinkers. On the modern theory of revelation, Israel was the people of revelation. Delitzsch is called a rationalist of the old stamp (p. 39), who is unfamiliar with the theological thought of this day. Gunkel thinks this unhappy and expensive contest might have been largely averted if Delitzsch had conferred with his colleagues on several points in which he was not at home. Inconsistencies and untenable theories might thus have been eliminated, and a vast deal of money, time, and patience saved. Still, it may not have been in vain for the fatherland.

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IS GOD UNIVERSAL FATHER?

THE author of this work¹ explains in the preface that "the book embodies the substance of a series of lectures delivered at the Bermondsey Settlement to a small class of theological students during the last three years;" and that "it has been prepared by snatches in the short intervals of leisure left by almost unceasing public engagements." This may account for the repetition of the same thought in connection with his separate treatment of a large number of passages of Scripture, when it might have been possible, by a more thorough analysis, to group them together, thus saving space, if not adding to the clearness and force of his general argument. Neither has he followed what is generally thought to be the logical order in his discussion of this most important doctrine. Instead of beginning with a historical review of the evolution of thought on the fatherhood of God as preparing the way for his own discussion, he reserves his historical sketch until he has elaborated his own argument. The reason for this may be because there has been no regular development of thought on this very precious doctrine, but its prominence as conceived by Mr. Lidgett is of quite recent date.

Still, whatever may be the reader's criticism of minor points, he will undoubtedly recognize this as the most elaborate treatment of this

¹ *The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life.* By J. SCOTT LIDGETT, M.A. New York: Imported by Scribner.

subject which has been coming more and more to the front in recent years. While very many may not be prepared to accept the author's chief position, they will acknowledge the ability of his discussion and his intention to be fair and judicial.

The book is written in support of what is called the "universal fatherhood of God." It is not open to many of the objections which lie against much that has been written in support of this belief. It grants that God is called Father in three special senses: in the ideal sense he is Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; in a very special sense he is Father of all believers; he is also called Father because he is the author of all things. But apart from and in addition to these senses in which the term "Father" is applied to him, he is the universal Father because fatherhood is of the very essence of his being. Neither does the author allow any sentimental inference from the designation "Father," which he believes belongs to God in this universal sense, to make him blind to the facts of sin and righteousness, and the teachings of the Bible in reference to God's attitude toward the wicked. He thinks they are all consistent with God being the universal Father in a deeper sense than that of the ultimate author of their being.

In his introductory chapter the author states some of the reasons why the doctrine of the fatherhood of God has not sooner been more generally recognized and does not even now receive the assent of all. These he elaborates more fully in succeeding chapters. One is that people are compelled to see the restricted senses in which God is called Father, and fail to discriminate this use from that of his universal fatherhood. Then the Old Testament reveals God's sovereignty rather than his fatherhood, and Old Testament ideas have ever had an immense influence in shaping the thought of the church; various theological conceptions have also tended to shape the interpretation of the New Testament away from this doctrine. The very depth of the experience of the fatherhood of God by the most pious has made it hard for them to believe this fatherhood was toward all. Finally, the one-sided, sentimental view of God's fatherhood has made it objectionable to the more strenuous natures who conceive it, thus interpreted, to be out of harmony with the facts of life and the needs of the soul.

The author believes that "the revelation of the fatherhood of God came to mankind through our Lord Jesus Christ," in whose filial consciousness it is first revealed, as it "expresses his prevailing sense of kinship and fellowship with, but of subordination to, the Father" and "manifests a relationship original and peculiar to himself," which "is

the foundation of his saving office for mankind." This is thought to be the teaching of the synoptic gospels. John's gospel adds to this the descriptive term "only begotten," and traces back the relationship to a pre-incarnate existence, showing also its bearing upon our Lord's offices as Creator of the universe and Savior of men. The sonship of believers is not original, as in case of our Lord, but derivative through him. Their knowledge of the fatherhood of God is conditioned upon their answering sense of sonship. "Leave out the necessity of being 'begotten of God' in order to sonship, and the result is unevangelical and unethical." Thus far all is clear.

But when he comes to discuss the question of the universal fatherhood, especially when this aspect of the divine nature is made supreme and all-inclusive, the consensus of thought fails and divergences appear. It is here that the author feels he has come to what is all-important, and exerts his full strength.

He argues for the universal fatherhood from the designation "the Father" as applied to God. While admitting that God may be called, in most cases, "the Father" in his relation to the Son, he thinks there are exceptions to this use, and believes, in any case, that all men may be so included in Christ as to make God the Father of mankind in being his Father. The baptismal formula he considers one of these exceptions. We cannot do better than quote from his discussion of this passage, Matt. 28:19, in illustration of the author's mode of argument.

Baptism is *into* the name; that is, it brings men into fellowship with the divine person, and into experience of what is revealed in his name. . . . And the name, with all that is included in it, is antecedent to our baptism into it. It remains the same whether we experience it or not. . . . And this seems to involve that "the name of the Father" is the revelation of the supreme and perfect fatherhood in God, which is manifested toward the Son and waits to disclose itself to us, till we come into true relationship with it.

Now, the whole force of this argument depends upon the question whether the name "the Father" is used here to describe a relation existing between God and the candidate for baptism before he believes. Now we are sure that, were the name "the Father" given to God because of his relations to Christ and believers, the use of it in the Great Commission would have been most appropriate, especially when we remember that the function of baptism is not to introduce into a new relation, but to signify that the candidate has already entered into this relationship—is already a son of God. The whole discussion of

the use of the name "the Father" in connection with John 4:23, 24; Matt. 6:6; John, 14:6; Eph. 2:18; 5:18-20; Jas. 3:9; 1 Pet. 1:17, etc., is not conclusive. Let the name "Father" once be given to God, even though because of his relationship to the Son and to believers, he might then be spoken of as "the Father," even when these relationships were not specifically had in thought. It becomes a more general designation.

But the author proceeds to discuss passages which seem to him directly to teach the universal fatherhood of God. These are of three classes: those that teach it explicitly or implicitly, those that imply it in their teaching about salvation, and those that imply it in their teaching about human nature. Of the first class the Sermon on the Mount is thought to be, although it is admitted that "throughout the whole sermon there is no distinct mention of the universal fatherhood of God." We quote from his argument:

The whole sermon is addressed to our Lord's disciples. The question is: in what relationship are they conceived as standing to the rest of mankind? By the answer to that question the whole discussion must be decided. Are the privileges of the kingdom of heaven extended to the disciples, and its laws and its spirit incumbent upon them, because they are *exceptions* to the rest of mankind, or because they are *types*; representatives of what all men are ideally or potentially, of what, therefore, all men should become really? The distinction, therefore, between the disciples and the rest of mankind is between those who have entered into the consummated life of true and perfect spiritual relationships, which are open to all men, and those who, for one reason or another, have not. But this representative character can only subsist on condition of the universal fatherhood of God and the potential sonship of all men.

That is to say, because God is willing to become the real Father of all who will become sons, he must already stand in the relation of fatherhood to all, even before they become sons. It is anything but clear that this is a legitimate conclusion. Neither is it evident that the disciples can be representative of what is open to all men "on condition of the universal fatherhood of God." They might have the same representative character in this respect, in relation to privileges which had to do with God's kingship over men. To the passages treated under this head—Luke 15:11 ff.; Acts 17:28, 29; 1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 3:14, 15; Heb. 12:9—we cannot refer more than to say that some of them seem to point to God's fatherhood in the sense of his being the author of all things. It is thought that Luke 15:11 ff., the Parable

of the Prodigal Son, is explicit in its teaching of the universal fatherhood. It certainly is the strongest passage in its favor.

The teaching of one class of passages which are thought to indicate that the nature of salvation shows that it rests on the universal Fatherhood of God is thus summarized: "The characteristic feature about all these passages is that 'the Father' is apprehended and approached as such, he does not become such." It is but a repetition of his argument under God's designation as "the Father." The teaching of the other class is that salvation is "the entrance into the life of sonship." This is "the end which God set himself to realize through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus." The motive must be that of "perfect fatherhood and fatherliness fulfilling itself in redemptive grace."

In support of his contention that the universal fatherhood of God is implied in the essentially filial constitution of human nature, he urges the narrative of the temptation of our Lord, wherein it is shown that "the law of life for the Son of God and for man is one and the same," proving that the constitution of human nature is "inherently filial." "And how could this filial constitution represent the original and universal truth of manhood—as is revealed in the consummating man who is brother of all men—were not human nature created by and for the all-perfect and universal Father in heaven?" The author also argues from the title "Son of man" that our Lord was "the typical and representative man." "His divine sonship was the realization of the implicit possibilities of mankind." Because of this "our Lord assumed rather than proclaimed the universality of the fatherhood of God." He also thinks this "is a part of the apostolic teaching as a whole."

In his chapter on the "Validity and Content of the Fatherhood of God" the author explains more fully how he conceives it arises that God is the universal Father and how he can be the Father of those who are not actually sons. His chapter on "The Place of the Doctrine of the Fatherhood of God in the Theology of the New Testament," so far as it has to do with the question of its universality, is but an expansion of what he has already presented. His argument, as a whole, will be seen to be fourfold, although his positions are not all separate and distinct from each other.

1. God is called "the Father." This was his name before men became sons. Therefore fatherhood is of his essential being and he is Father in the most universal sense, prior to all human relations of sonship and independent of them. But, we repeat, even though the name

"the Father" had been given him because of his special relation to the Son and to believers, or even because he is the author of all things, once given, it would be used when speaking of him in all his relations, whether of fatherhood or not. Is it not safer to argue that the name "the Father" was given him to express the fatherly relations which are clearly stated to exist between him and Christ and his people, when a natural explanation can be found for the expression on this ground, than to assume it is given to express a universal relation, when there is no clear teaching otherwise to support this view?

2. The second argument is, substantially, that God is willing to be the Father of all—that the great object of his redemptive work is to bring all who will into sonship to himself. Therefore, fatherhood is essentially in God, and is the ultimate ground of creation as well as redemption. But the author recognizes the distinction between fatherliness and fatherhood. God's love and desire that men should become sons is fatherliness, but is it not a misuse of language to say that God is actually the Father of those he desires to become sons? Does not the statement that he desires them to become sons admit that they are not yet sons? And is God the Father of those who are not his children in any legitimate sense of the name? Are not fatherhood and sonship correlative, so that neither can subsist without the other? The author sees this difficulty and often uses expressions like "in salvation, men become conscious of their sonship," although elsewhere he states the Scripture teaching to be that men become sons, rather than come to realize a sonship already existing.

3. His third argument—that there is potential sonship in all men, a constitution which enables them to become sons and consequently filial, and that this can only be explained as God is the universal Father—is liable to the objection just stated in the preceding one. Does the power given men to become sons make God their Father before they become his children, while they are living in estrangement to him?

4. His fourth argument, that all men are in Christ in such a sense that God's fatherhood in relation to him includes them all, seems to have the most direct teaching of the New Testament against it. For, only those who believe upon him and become like him through regeneration are said to be in him and to share in his standing before God.

For these and other reasons we are not convinced by the author's reasoning. There is a clearly stated principle governing the use of the terms "father" and "son" in the New Testament. The relationship expressed by these words is determined by moral likeness. Our

Lord in John 8:39 lays down the principle. According to his views, those who are like Abraham and act like him alone are his children in the spiritual sense in which these terms are used in reference to God and men. Those who are like the devil and act like him are his children (John 8:44). Those who are disobedient are the children of disobedience (Eph. 2:2-4): Those who are born of God by partaking of the divine nature, and are led by the Spirit of God, are God's sons. Men shall be children of God if they act like him (Matt. 5:44, 45). According to this criterion, our Lord divides all men into great classes in the parable of the Tares (Matt. 13:38, 39), and John (1 John 3:10) distinguishes between the children of God and the children of the devil by their relation to righteousness. In view of this clear and explicit teaching which runs through the New Testament, are we justified in interpreting into these precious terms a meaning which would make the devil a child of God in a sense other than as his creature? In the sense of Creator, or Author of being, all men are said to be the offspring of God (Acts 17:29, and perhaps Heb. 12:9 and other passages).

But our author means vastly more by the universal fatherhood than this. He thinks: "the fatherhood of God represents, above all, a spiritual and moral relationship," although "that spiritual and moral relationship rests upon a natural basis as its necessary condition; and that natural basis springs from, has its essence in, and is shaped by the fatherly love which gives it being." We are still unconvinced that it would be either wise or scriptural to extend the meaning of "Father" and "son" beyond what is described above, and make it so that a man might be "morally and spiritually both a child of God and of the devil at the same time." There is no question as to the love of God for all. It is only a question whether the New Testament writers and our Lord do not restrict the use of "Father" and "son" to a closer and dearer relationship than can exist between him and those who are "enmity against God."

While we venture these words of criticism of the arguments supporting the fundamental position of the book, we recognize the moderation of the author in guarding against inferences from his view which would prevent belief in the divine abhorrence of sin, and God's judicial and punitive righteousness, and would lead by a straight road to universalism. Not only are the sterner aspects of God's moral government in harmony with the fatherhood of God, but this doctrine, according to the author, affords the only true explanation of all the teachings of

the Bible and all divine and human relations. And it is this fact—that “it is more fully adequate than any other conception to set forth the complete truth of God’s character, to explain the secret of man’s nature, and to set forth the relations between both”—which is the surest proof of the doctrine. Most fundamental of all, “fatherhood is the determining relationship within the Godhead.” It is the explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity itself. Christ’s eternal sonship “is the type, the ground, and the means of man’s,” and the Holy Spirit is the “divine Agent by whom our spiritual life in the Father and the Son is realized.” “The doctrine of the fatherhood” also “lays the foundation of the divine authority” and explains God’s sovereignty. This doctrine also must then explain the methods of the divine rule. It is a regnant fatherhood, rather than the Ritschlian idea of the “kingdom of God,” which is the key to interpret Christianity. This explains his revelation in and to man, and his lawgiving completed in judgment. It also is the assurance of the permanence of the individual and explains his relations to society.

Having considered the fatherhood of God as a doctrine, the author proceeds to explain “God’s actual dealings with the world as they have been wrought out in giving effect to his fatherhood.” He treats of these in three chapters. The first has to do with the “Spiritual Constitution of the World,” as all things have been created and constituted in relation to himself and his purposes, and is an exposition of Col. 1:16, 17. The whole argument depends upon the doctrine of the eternal sonship of our Lord. The author very strenuously contests the position of Dr. Simon in his *Reconciliation by Incarnation* that “the Logos was designated the ‘Son of God’ as incarnate.” Many will doubt whether “the Logos” or “the Son” was a name given to express the eternal and inner relation of the persons of the Godhead to each other, and will think, therefore, the author’s position, as well as Dr. Simon’s, is questionable and his argument inconclusive, when it makes the doctrine of the eternal sonship all-conditioning. May we not make a clear distinction between love and fatherhood and sonship, and avoid committing ourselves to all the author’s conclusions?

The chapter on the “Redemption of Mankind” is to show the relation of fatherhood to redemption. The first position is that “Christ is so related to God and also to mankind that what he does God does, and equally that what he does man does;” and therefore, in the second place, the atonement is “a personal dealing with the Father by the Son on behalf of mankind.” This atonement “demanded and

offered within the limits of the fatherly and filial relationship must be determined as to its object, methods, and meaning by the fatherly end," which is "the restoration to filial fellowship of those who have fallen from it." It will thus be seen that the author holds to substitutionary satisfaction. He believes that "the very greatness of the love" of the Father "will be the measure of the strictness with which that love demands recognition of, and conformity to, the only conditions which make its satisfaction possible." When men are untrue to the filial relation, there must be expiation which "involves submission to the penalty and suffering from it." The view of atonement demanded by the universal fatherhood of God is thought to include all that is of value in all past and present theories, and to be all-comprehensive.

In our review we have been at such pains to explain the author's view of the New Testament teaching on this precious subject that we have made only incidental reference to his outline of the teaching of the Old Testament bearing upon God's relation to men, and his review of the question of the fatherhood of God in church history, which comprises nearly half of the book. We have space for but brief further reference to this part of his treatment, which is very full and, so far as we can judge, generally discriminating and able. He does not think the divine fatherhood is taught in the Old Testament. It is his kingship which is there insisted on. Even in Isaiah and the Psalms, where the highest revelation of the Old Testament and the most intimate fellowship are recorded, there is only a preparation for the higher teaching of the New.

The author thinks that at the outset of church history "the doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God is clearly taught by the greatest and most representative fathers of the church," though, for reasons which he proceeds to give, "it was not wrought out in any clear and consistent account of his dealings with mankind." But where he comes to deal with the specific writings of these fathers, he qualifies this statement very materially. The quotations from Clement, Barnabas, Ignatius, the epistle of Diognetus, Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, and Tatian are anything but explicit in their teaching on the universal fatherhood, except in the sense of his authorship of all things and care for them and love for men. It is in the writings of Irenæus he thinks the profounder teachings on this subject are found. But, after an examination of the most conclusive passages, he admits that "Irenæus laid the main stress upon creatorship, and upon what might be called the natural and universal relationships springing out of a creation motivated by love."

He thinks the nature of the controversies Irenæus was engaged in "threw into the background those spiritual and moral qualities of fatherhood which are manifested in the personal and intimate communion with sons."

The great church teachers of Alexandria gave prominence to knowledge under the platonic influence, especially Clement, and Origen's conception of fatherhood is toward the Son. In the Arian controversy this tendency to limit God's fatherhood to his relation to the Son is most pronounced in Athanasius. In the West it was Augustine who shaped the thought which was to prevail for ages. And with him the fatherhood of God had passed virtually out of sight, to be replaced by that of his sovereignty. This conception continued through the scholastic period and, for the most part, through mediæval times. Even the Reformation, bringing in the personal experience of forgiveness, while giving prominence to the fatherhood and fatherliness of God, did not immediately bring a complete view forward. Calvinism still insisted on sovereignty, and the Reformers generally went back to Augustine, and even regarded forgiveness as an act of sovereignty. Luther had no doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God. But he did set forth anew the fatherliness of God as revealed in Christ. The Socinian doctrine "is based upon the sovereignty of God, understood as the unfettered exercise of supreme will, unhindered even by its own previous decisions. "The exclusively governmental views of Arminianism expressly shut out the fatherhood of God from view."

It was in Methodism that the return to the doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God began. This testified to "the universality of the love of God, and of his will to save men through Christ." But the early Methodists did not go farther than this. But chief among the personal influences which have restored the doctrine of the universal fatherhood to its pre-eminence he mentions Maurice, Kingsley, Erskine of Linlathen, and McLeod Campbell. But influences more far reaching than the personal have been at work in the nineteenth century to this end. The human element in Christ's person and work, the breaking away from the Old Testament conception as but a stage of progress toward the revelation of the New, the recognition of the inner relations of fatherhood and sonship in the Trinity as governing creation and redemption, the explanation of the ways of God to men from the starting point of creation rather than the fall, the conception of the more intimate relation of God to all things, a new conception of true manhood in Christ, a conviction that there can be no opposition

between the human and divine, and the more humane and sympathetic tone of thought have all tended to the recognition of God as the universal Father. This new impulse has had its dangers. A sentimentalism in all the concerns of life has invaded theology, and has introduced elements of moral weakness by obscuring God's sovereignty and the righteous ends which he seeks and demands in the life of men.

The whole book gives the feeling that the author writes from the deepest conviction, and is profoundly impressed by the far-reaching and fundamental importance of the doctrine he supports and elaborates. He makes no attempt at rhetorical effect, and if he uses arguments which, in some cases, seem defective, it is because he is unaware of the fact. The treatise may well be studied as a very important contribution to the discussion of a most vital subject.

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THE SYRIAC VERSION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

In all the discussions which have been raised about the comparative value of the various texts of the Greek New Testament, and especially of the Greek gospels, the value of the Peshitto version has taken a prominent place. Some of the opposers of what Mr. Gwilliam¹ tells us we must call the *Traditional Text*, and not the *Textus Receptus*, went so far as to describe it as the "sheet-anchor" of the defenders of that text. This moves Mr. Gwilliam to wrath as a wrong description of the position taken up. He would only place it among a number of other witnesses and would say that, if that witness were withdrawn from testifying to his case, he has others as good, and "primary witnesses" in the MSS. which are still better. But none the less, the appearance of Mr. Burkitt's treatise on S. Ephraim's quotations from the gospels, published in the Cambridge "Texts and Studies" late in 1901, has led him to discuss the views set forth in that work and to consider what effect Mr. Burkitt's theory would have upon his own general position. We are inclined to think that, though he holds himself in suspense on this matter, and formulates certain objections which do not seem to amount to much, Mr. Gwilliam really inclines toward the acceptance of Mr. Burkitt's theory.

¹*Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica*. Vol. V, Part III: "Place of the Peshitto Version in the Apparatus Criticus of the Greek New Testament." By G. H. GWILLIAM. Oxford: Clarendon Press

The whole question in fact turns upon the date of the Peshitto version. It was long held that S. Ephraim, when he quoted the gospels, quoted the Peshitto version. But this is certainly a mistake, if we sift out the genuine works of S. Ephraim from others which have been attributed to him. If this be done, Mr. Burkitt assures us that there is really nothing to suggest the actual use of this version. Further, we have direct evidence that this version was later than S. Ephraim. It is ascribed to one Rabbula, appointed bishop of Edessa 411 A. D. Of him it is said by his biographer that "he translated by the wisdom of God that was in him the New Testament from Greek into Syriac, because of its variations, exactly as it was."* With this direct statement before us, it is scarcely possible to date this version any earlier. Rabbula probably based his version upon the *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe*, commonly known as the Curetonian version from its discoverer. Whether S. Ephraim used this version or the Syriac Diatessaron is not clear. Mr. Burkitt thinks it was the latter.

But we are traveling away from Mr. Gwilliam's essay. One point against the attribution to Rabbula is that not more is made of it, and that such an event is unnoticed except in this one passage. But other notable events in the history of the Bible and its versions have not met even with such notice as this. Where can we find any account of the fixing of the canon of the Old Testament in the Jewish Church? What record is there of the introduction of the vocalization of the Hebrew text? The date of Rabbula stands somewhere, perhaps midway, between these two important events; why should we expect great attention to be turned toward it, especially if the version was only of the nature of a revision of a pre-existent version? We cannot grant to Mr. Gwilliam his second point, as stated in his synopsis—the disappearance of the pre-Peshitto text. Most people would say that it has not disappeared. His third objection is the universal or almost universal acceptance of the Peshitto version in the fifth century. But this is surely not difficult to account for, if Rabbula's was a commanding personality, not only in his own diocese, but in the whole Syrian church, and this seems to have been the case. The following is the description given of him in Smith's *Dictionary of Christian Biography* (Vol. IV, p. 532a): "His episcopate was a powerful one, characterized by great activity and zeal, which was not always exhibited in a gentle

*OVERBECK, p. 172; see BURKITT, p. 57. It is curious that VENABLES in his article on Rabbula in SMITH'S *Dictionary of Christian Biography* does not mention this work of translation, though he refers to Overbeck.

or conciliatory manner. His temper was fiery, and Ivas does not scruple to call him the tyrant of his city, who lorded it over all, and violently persecuted those who opposed his imperious will." He "became the leading prelate of the oriental church," and is described as "the common master of Syria, Armenia, Persia, nay of the whole world."

We therefore consider that Mr. Burkitt has practically made out his case for the date and source of the Peshitto. It still remains for us to remember, as Mr. Gwilliam reminds us, that the version represents a Greek text which is not identical with any now extant. This he shows at considerable length. Whether Rabbula, considering the age in which he lived, would have any great powers of discrimination as to the critical value of any copies of the gospels set before him may well be doubted. The value of that text can be settled only by a minute examination of the Peshitto, and, when that has been made, we suspect that scholars will still continue to hold different opinions, according to their preconceived notions of what the purest text of the gospels was like. Mr. Gwilliam's essay will have its place in that discussion, and will well repay examination.

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THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

SINCE Gibbon wrote his famous fifteenth chapter, every historian of pre-Constantine Christianity has felt constrained to give some attention to the causes of the early progress of that religion. Most writers, if more orthodox than Gibbon, have been quite as superficial. Many valuable monographs and brief studies have indeed been written, and a great mass of fact has gradually accumulated, but there was needed learning and industry and insight like Harnack's to organize this knowledge and make it available. None of that accomplished scholar's books so displays his best qualities at their best as this history of early Christian missions.¹

There is nothing especially original or striking in the author's formal treatment of his material; he gives us the familiar German division of his subject into four general sections, or "books." The first of these is introductory, and includes a discussion of what is called by many writers "the preparation for the gospel"—taking up such

¹ *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten.* Von ADOLPH HARNACK. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902. xii+561 pages.

topics as the spread and decline of Judaism, and the external and internal conditions that favored a universal extension of the Christian religion. This is followed by chapters on Jesus Christ and world-wide missions according to the gospels, and the progress from Jewish to heathen missions. The effectiveness of Harnack's treatment of the gospel teaching regarding missions is greatly affected by his critical theories, in consequence of which he is compelled to regard Matt. 28:19 f. as an interpolation, representing rather the ideas of the second century than the original Christian tradition. Missions were therefore a legitimate development of the teaching of Jesus, but did not rest on any specific command of his. This is a totally inadequate explanation of the missionary activities of the apostolic and sub-apostolic period. The New Testament must be wholly rewritten, and not merely the Great Commission be expunged, to remove the primitive tradition that the apostles believed themselves commanded by their Lord to disciple all the nations unto him. With this exception, the treatment of these introductory questions is adequate, even masterly.

The second book discusses missionary preaching, to which phrase the author assigns sufficient scope of meaning to include, not only the preaching of the gospel, in the ordinary sense, but the practical activities of Christians, and even polemics against heathenism. Omitting the consideration of other themes of this "book," we may remark that the chapter on "The Religion of a Book and Fulfilled History," while it shows the place held by the Old Testament among Christians, gives a very unsatisfactory account of the composition of the New Testament writings and their gradual reception as of equal authority with the Old Testament. Of course, it might be replied to this criticism that for the adequate treatment of the subject a separate volume would be required, but we have a right to expect here, since the author elects to discuss the subject, a clear and reasonably adequate outline, and this we do not get. Those who might resent Harnack's summary of this "book," under the title of "The Full Embodiment of Christianity as a Syncretistic Religion," should remember that it is the historical Christianity at the end of the third century of which he speaks, when it had absorbed much from Greek philosophy and the heathen religions, and was already transformed into something quite different from the religion founded by Jesus and preached by his apostles. So considered, the chapter is open to criticism only as containing the tacit suggestion that all this is a legitimate development of primitive Christianity — and that suggestion Harnack may not really intend.

The third "book" considers several matters of great moment, the missions and missionary methods of the first three centuries. There is first a thorough examination of the various titles of Christian missionaries—apostles, prophets, teachers—and the functions appertaining to each, concluded by an excursus in which a complete account is given of all recorded missionary journeys, drawn from the Fathers of the period. This is followed by a chapter on missionary methods, one of the most suggestive discussions in the volume, and the more valuable as dealing with a subject on which there is little available literature. Preaching was *the* missionary method, according to Harnack. The one God, Jesus Christ, the Son and Lord, the coming judgment and the resurrection, were the burden of the preaching. It was the gospel of the Savior and salvation, of love and helpfulness, that was proclaimed. The new religion was described and certified as spirit and power, as power of a new moral life, and as power of self-control. News was brought of the revelation of God, to which mankind must submit in faith.

The conclusion to be drawn from all the examples accessible is that it is not possible to exaggerate the effect of coherent preaching in relation to missions. A convulsing, heart-stirring individuality has in all times been a stronger lever than a long sermon. The Acts of the Apostles reports to us many conversions at once, as if by storm, and that is not unhistorical. Paul is converted, without a missionary, by a vision. The eunuch is brought to faith in Jesus by Isa., chap. 53—to how many has this chapter been a bridge! Thekla was won through the word of a virgin and prayer. The lives of Christians were also a most powerful missionary influence. Paul often speaks of this, and in 1 Pet. 3 : 1 we read that the unbelievers would be won without the word by the behavior of their wives. The moral life of Christians spoke with special impressiveness to Justin. Christian brotherhood, a thing unknown to the heathen, had also a powerful effect, and as practically shown in charity was a missionary force of the first order.

At his reception into the Christian community the candidate was baptized. The ceremony of being buried by baptism and rising again (*Untertauchens und Wiederauftauchens*) gave the guaranty that now the old has been washed away and is gone and he has become a new man. The utterance of the name of Jesus, or of the three names, during the act placed the baptized in the inmost fellowship with them, lifted him up to them. Sacramental speculations had already begun : immersion was death ; immersion in the name of Christ a death with him, a being

submerged in his death; the water is the symbol of his blood. Paul had already so taught, but he declined the speculations attempted at Corinth, to bring the baptized into mysterious relations with the baptizer (1 Cor. 1:13 f.). This last conclusion of Harnack rests on an exegesis that is more ingenious than convincing.

"Christians are made, not born," says Tertullian, and not till after the middle of the second century was this rule changed; then the natural extension of Christianity from parents to children took its place. From that time begins also the practice of infant baptism—at least we can safely assign it to no earlier date. But whether adult or infant baptism, it came to be regarded as a mystery, with natural-supernatural results of a powerful kind. That it blotted out all preceding sins, without reference to the greater or less susceptibility of the baptized, so that from the baptismal bath the man emerged entirely pure and entirely holy, was the general belief. This teaching easily lent itself to ridicule by the heathen opponents of Christianity, who by no means missed their opportunity. Of the ceremonies that were introduced in consequence of this sacramental doctrine, as well as of the catechetical system, Harnack also gives an account. The catechumenate, indeed, deserves even more attention than he has given it, for in the third century it was certainly the chief missionary agency of the church; and it might also have been made more clear that the later decline of this system was due to the rapid increase of infant baptism, which finally left no place for instruction of adult converts. This last consideration, of course, does not strictly come within the limits that the author has assigned himself, but he often disregards chronological limits for the sake of clearness, and might advantageously have done so in this case.

The third chapter is devoted to an exhaustive discussion of the names of the Christian believers, beginning with the "disciples" of the gospels and ending with the established name of "brethren" for esoteric purposes, and "Christians" as their public designation. Harnack differs from many German critics in accepting as historical Luke's statement (Acts 11:26) that the appellation "Christians" originated at Antioch, and shows that the name could only have been given by the heathen—a conclusion also supported by the Latin form of the name. Luke's probable birth in Antioch makes the accuracy of this statement less open to question, according to Harnack. This chapter also includes a history of the word *ἐκκλησία*, as describing Christians collectively, and the epithet *καθολική*, which from the time

of Ignatius was generally added, and the various ideas that this epithet came to connote.

Chap. iv, on "The Formation of Churches in its Significance for Missions," is one of the most important in the volume. While Christian preaching had as its object the winning of souls and bringing them one by one to God, "that the number of the elect might be fulfilled," yet from the beginning it was effective in the formation of a society and had as its end the union of Christian believers. First was the union of the disciples of Jesus, but these disciples knew and conceived themselves as the true Israel and as the church of God. They brought over the form and strict clannishness of the Jewish church, spiritualized and energized it, and came into possession of a strong and exclusive organization. But this organization, which included all Christians on earth, was at first purely ideal, and as such could hardly have survived had not the local organization been associated with it. This the Christians borrowed from the Jewish synagogue. With this bond of brotherhood and the synagogue as their foundation the Christian churches developed their local organization with double strength, greater than the Jewish communities had attained. Each community was distinct in itself, and a whole, a facsimile of the entire church of God. Such a religio-social community, without any politico-national base, was altogether unheard of and new among Greeks and Romans. A rudimentary form is perhaps to be found in the schools of philosophy and their common life, which was also religious. But here we have a community that binds together the associated believers of a city in the closest fellowship, a lifelong membership, and not only provides for the members a single or repeated consecration, but brings them together daily, gives them spiritual blessings and imposes obligations day by day, assembles them daily, at first, then weekly, separates them from others, associates them in a union for worship and mutual support, in an order for the leading of a peculiar life, and teaches them to regard themselves as the church of God. Much has been written of late years to show how largely the Christian *ἐκκλησία* borrowed from pre-existing organizations, Jewish and heathen, and how little that can be pronounced original there was in it. This statement by Harnack of its absolutely unique character is a refreshing contrast to much recent literature on the subject.

What follows is equally good. The convert coming into such a fellowship was taught from the beginning the ideal of a community upbuilding—the church a body with many members, that each mem-

ber is subordinate to the whole, one member suffers and rejoices with the others ; that Jesus Christ does not call men as individuals, each for himself, but is building up for himself a community in which the individual finds his place. The Christian religion, as interpreted by Paul, combines the most exalted individualism with the most complete collectivism. Brotherly love is the lever, and this brotherly love has besides received the richest heritage—the heritage of the strongly united Jewish church. Thence came the wonderfully practical conception : to place the universal church (as an ideal community) and the local church in such a relation that what is true of one can also be said of the other, namely, the church of Corinth, Ephesus, etc., is the church of God. Altogether apart from the content of these creations, says Harnack, every statesman and politician must most highly admire the solution that is here found of one of the most difficult problems of every great organization: to preserve unimpaired the independence of the local community, and to bind it with a strong and unifying general polity, covering the whole empire, that will little by little become a universal condition. This is high praise of this fundamental Christian conception, but who will say that it is undeserved? What a hold, says Harnack, must such a creation have had upon the individual. What an attraction it must have exerted so soon as he comprehended its scope. In fact, we may safely say that the mere existence and continuous activity of the local churches more than anything else produced the extension of Christianity.

In Book IV we come to the very heart of the subject, and more than a third of the entire volume is devoted to a detailed study of the progress of the Christian religion in the Roman empire, prior to the council of Nicæa. This study begins with a chapter of general testimonies to the extent and power of the Christian faith, culled from Christian and pagan writers alike, most of them sufficiently familiar to all students of the early Fathers. These are carefully examined in turn, and the worth of each witness is candidly estimated. Next comes a chapter on what is called "The Intensive Progress," in which the quality of the converts to Christianity during this period is carefully scrutinized. While it doubtless continued to be true, as in the apostolic age, that relatively not many mighty after the flesh were called, still there were always some from the higher walks of life who became Christians—in the aggregate a large number. Inquiry is made into the number of converts (1) among the nobles, the wealthy, the official class, (2) in the imperial court, (3) in the army, (4) among the women.

Readers of Ramsay, Orr, and other recent writers on this subject, will find little that is new in this chapter, but it is certainly the most complete assemblage of facts to be found anywhere.

It is when we reach the third chapter, on "The Progress of Christianity to the Year 325," that we find the most valuable part of this work. This is an original contribution to our knowledge of this period of the highest value, and such as possibly no other living scholar could have made. Harnack has ransacked the literature and gleaned from it every pertinent statement, every hint even, that could be made to throw light on his problem. Those who have made a special study of the ante-Nicene Fathers will be most amazed at the quantity of fresh information he has brought together. He surveys the provinces of the empire in turn, gives a brief history of the spread of Christianity in each, and then compiles an exhaustive list of the places in which Christian churches are known to have existed, with references to the authorities whence the facts are drawn. In addition to the specific statements, he gives also the vague, general indications of Christian progress in which patristic literature abounds. It is not too much to say that, in comparison with what he has done, all previous investigators of this subject have but scratched the surface. To give any intelligible account of this portion of the volume would require far more space than is here available.

What value, asks Harnack, has the material thus accumulated for statistics regarding Christianity? It is certain that we can give no absolute numbers, and even estimates are of little value; especially are estimates in the lump worthless. Gibbon supposes the number of Christians in the time of Decius to have been a twentieth of the population; Friedländer thinks this number enough for the time of Constantine; La Bastie and Burckhardt estimate for the time of Constantine one-twelfth; Chastel, one-tenth for the East, one-fifteenth for the West, and one-twelfth for the middle section; Matter thinks one-fifth, Ständlin, one-half. It is certain that the number of Christians, even in the East, was less than half the population. But in several provinces it is extremely probable that Christians were almost half the population. In some cities they were in the majority—even a large majority. Many of the references to Christians during this period speak of their influence rather than their numbers, but it is possible for a small number to be very influential. Christianity was a religion of the cities—the larger the city, the greater the number of Christians—but in many provinces we learn also that it had penetrated deep into the country,

and in the villages were many Christians. From the best data available Harnack estimates the number of bishops in the East as from eight to nine hundred, and for the West from six to seven hundred. Many of these, of course, had small churches under their charge, but many presided over churches having numerous congregations and containing thousands of members. It is agreed on all hands that the number of Christians had come to surpass that of the Jews in the empire, and hence it cannot be placed under three to four millions. That is the nearest to definite figures that Harnack permits himself to come.

A careful review of the facts established concerning the various provinces of the Empire shows that they fall into four categories: (1) Those in which Christianity had obtained the ascendancy, had won half the population, and become the most general religion. These were: the entire region known today as Asia Minor, the part of Thracia opposite Bithynia, Armenia, and the city of Edessa. (2) Provinces in which Christianity had influenced a considerable fraction of the population, had attained a wide influence, and was a successful rival of other religions. In this list belong Antioch and Cœle Syria, Cyprus, Alexandria (including Egypt and the Thebaid), Rome, lower Italy and parts of central Italy, proconsular Africa and Numidia, Spain, Achaia, Thessalia, Macedonia, and the southern coast of Gaul. (3) Provinces in which Christianity had made some progress. These include Palestine, Phœnicia, Arabia, parts of Mesopotamia, the interior districts of Achaia, Macedonia, Thessalia, Epirus, Dardania, Dalmatia, Mœsia and Pannonia, northern Italy, Mauritania, and Tripolitania. (4) Provinces and districts in which there were few or no Christians. These were: the cities of old Philistia, the northern and northwestern coasts of the Black Sea, western upper Italy (Piedmont), middle and northern Gaul, Belgium, Germany, and Rhætia. For all these last-named provinces Harnack thinks an estimate of 10,000 Christians sufficiently liberal. The great difference between the eastern and western provinces is striking, but easily enough explained: a Greek Christianity had existed from the times of the apostles, a Latin Christianity only from the days of Marcus Aurelius; Asia Minor was the headquarters of the former at the beginning of the fourth century and had been thoroughly Christianized.

This description of the general aim and scope of this work and summary of its chief conclusions, given so far as possible in the author's own words, will give some hint of its great merits. It is confidently commended to all students of the early church as a treatise, acquaint-

tance with which will from this time on be indispensable. Its breadth and accuracy of scholarship have already been mentioned, but this we long ago learned to expect from Harnack. Another merit is more unexpected: the style is very different from that of most German theological books—different from the author's *History of Dogma*. That cannot be recommended as easy summer reading, even in its English version; but in this volume the sentences are short, clear, uninvolved, and scarcely one must be read a second time to get its meaning. Though for the most part he holds to a plain and matter-of-fact style, at times the subject inspires the author to real eloquence. Both for its form and its content, this must rank as one of Harnack's best works. It is to be hoped that a good English translation will soon place it at the service of the many who cannot now avail themselves of its great value.

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THE RELIGIONS OF ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS.

TWO BOOKS¹ have recently appeared, both masterpieces in their way, concerned with one of the most important subjects that can occupy the attention of thinking men at the present time. We live on the eve of a new Reformation. As the study of Greek paved the way for those changes of thought which went to form the Reformation and remade Europe, so now the study of the languages and literature of ancient Egypt and Babylonia is likely to revolutionize our views of the Bible. Nor can a man set aside the Bible any longer as outside the area of living thought. With the new view it must resume for a long time to come its preponderating influence as the most interesting book in the world. A fresh impulse has been given to its study that will bring it back into intellectual circles that had grown indifferent. Nor is it the Bible and theology alone that are affected. The classical culture, with its deep influence on modern life, must reckon with new material for origins. Studies that had become dry as dust by the reiterated overworking of the same limited material will be revived by

¹ *The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*. [The Gifford Lectures.] By A. H. SAYCE. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribner, 1902. vi + 509 pages.

Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament. Von EBERHARD SCHRADER. Third edition. II. Hälfte, 1. und 2. Lieferungen, re-edited by H. ZIMMERN. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1902. 345-680 pages.

the fresh evidences of an age-long background of experience and thought.

For a while, no doubt, we shall be overdosed with Babylonizing theories of everything, but we shall gain much real knowledge, and in the new setting old truths will sparkle more brilliantly. There is, perhaps, too much tendency in these books to see parallels to old knowledge. Men in similar circumstances do arrive at much the same thoughts and devices. Even the ancient American civilizations furnish striking similarities to Egyptian or Babylonian humanities. But here we have two nationalities between whom the Hebrew folk grew up. Both came into contact with Greek civilization. Where similarities can be shown to exist we shall have difficulty in denying transference.

What is absolutely necessary now for anyone who would set his knowledge of history or religion in a vital relation to the soul of humanity, and thereby give it value for modern life, must add a knowledge of what lay behind. The duration of man's written record of himself has been given an extension backward that makes us take fresh views of nearly all our old knowledge. Antiquity has become twice as old. The first half is nearly unknown, but knowledge pours in upon us faster than we can assimilate. The great thing now is to assimilate all we can. It is premature to say what it will teach us. Books like these are priceless for the theologian, philosopher, and historian.

We may not expect of them the finished judgments that were possible when the whole material was already long known and when every word had been indexed, counted, weighed. There is hardly a day but some student adds more to the knowledge of the subject. The ink is hardly dry before the last new book is out of date in some detail. We may not, however, wait for finality. It cannot come for years. There are things that touch us at all points in a very sensitive part of our life. We must master them at once, and be ready to master more as soon as they are available.

Professor Sayce once before took the subject of Babylonian religion in hand, for his Hibbert Lectures. It was easy to find fault with them, as it will be with this book, because the subject is one on which everyone has some fresh light to bring, and it is theological. But that fault-finding is not with the writer so much as with his subject. It is essential to find all the fault possible, in order that the rest may be recognized at its true worth. This is a most important book, but it is very irritating from the point of view of a student. The writer seems always to regard facts with great suspicion and only deductions with

anything like confidence. One follows him, a little annoyed at the caution with which monumentally attested facts are stated, wondering what can be the possible alternative view or reading; then comes a plump statement, apparently too certain to the author to need any evidence, and one is comforted. This must be a thing too well known for its proof to be rehearsed; all one wishes for is a reference to some work where the proof was once, long ago no doubt, given. But this is something one can quote, and looking back one can see that it renders probable much of what went before. Only, one would have been helped if it had come first. After much research, and weary looking up of previous utterances of the same writer, the student will find that this definite statement was after all not a proved theory, but meant to be a conclusion from the rather shadowy facts rehearsed before it. In fact, the author seems to have for his canon: "The things that are seen are uncertain, things that are not seen are certain."

Thus (pp. 351 f.) the reasons for thinking that kings were regarded as gods in Babylonia are set out in a way that leaves much to be desired. We may ask whether being adopted by Marduk, at the ceremony of "taking the hands of Bêl," was exactly the same as deification, and whether there are instances of a Babylonian king being called a Bêl, and, if so, whether it meant "Lord" or "lord." Sargon and Naram-Sin were "explicitly deified," we are told, but what is that? Was it only the use of a determinative of divinity before the name? The reference given only proves that. One would have liked a list of the "Semitic successors of Sargon" who assumed the "title of god," but this has, probably, one thinks, been worked out by someone. It is only singular that they so often dropped it; one looks in vain through Radau's *Early Babylonian History* for it, except in the case of certain dynasties. Of course, one knows of Hammurabi, but were the other kings of the First Dynasty deified? One feels the reserve with which the facts are treated. Now comes the blow: "But a change came with the conquest of Babylonia by Kassite hordes from the mountains of Elam; the foreign kings ceased to be divine and the title of god is given to them no more." But the contracts of the Kassite period tell a different story. At any rate, Kudur-Bêl, Šagarakti-šuriaš, and Bitiliašu II. bear the determinative of divinity before their names. Can we, then, maintain the theory that this apotheosis of the monarch was specifically Semitic? What we are really justified in saying is that Babylonian kings were treated to some extent with divine honors, and then we may set out in full the evidence of this. But we are still very much in

the dark as to what this meant. Professor Sayce's view of its meaning is to be welcomed as helping us to understand something possible.

Herein consists the importance of the book. It is full of views. These views are most stimulating. Most men cannot get on with their work without some view of what the facts they are collecting mean. Such views may often have to be abandoned when fresh facts are found to be inconsistent with them. But it would be a real gain now to a student if he could get a compendium of ascertained facts; and, if the compiler must give views, it would be a comfort to have them printed in different type, or otherwise distinguished from facts. We do not wish to quarrel with any of the views in this book. But it is misleading to use the same affirmative statement of them as of facts. If the reader will bear in mind that what reads as a result of knowledge is usually only a statement of the author's conviction, he may find this book very valuable. The author is undoubtedly deeply versed in his subject, and no man has better right to lay down the law. How often he has been right, when most disputed, is a matter of history. He would perhaps have provoked less disagreement, if he had been less positive. But discussion is not wasted on such a subject.

The difficulty of handling the subject is greatly increased by the popular style in which Professor Sayce's book is cast. The part dealing with the religion of Egypt may be sound, but where one can check the rest doubt is the lasting impression. There are many passages which shock one rather severely, but render a reply difficult, because no ground for opinion is given that can be attacked. It is, of course, impossible that a full proof with technical details should be set out, and, lacking this, no reply can be attempted. But one feels bound to enter a protest against such statements being taken as the result of rigorous proof. Thus we are told that *Enlil* belongs to the realm beneath the earth, "ruler of the spirits, whose abode was beneath the earth, or in the air by which we are surrounded" (p. 262). He is rather god of the earth, on which men live, without excluding that portion of the air in which men move. The proof of his subterranean power is not indicated. It seems to be deduced thus: *En-lil* is "lord of *lil*," "*lil* is ghost," "ghost is spirit of buried men," therefore *En-lil* is lord of things below the earth. Each step, if we have guessed the course of argument correctly, is open to question. If we grant that *En* is "lord" by itself, that does not prove *En-lil* means "lord of *lil*." There are plenty of compounds of *En* where it does not mean "lord" at all, but is a possibly phonetic part of the name. What proof is there that *En-lil* has any connection with either *En* or *lil*? Granting that to be likely, as likely as any other explanation of a name whose derivation may be quite different, *lil* is not proved a "ghost." To do that we must be shut up to the "spirit of a dead man." We can admit *lil* denotes a "spirit,"

but why not simply a "demon"? We are not bound to admit that "demons are really "ghosts." But granting "ghosts," do the buried have "ghosts," or only the unburied? If only the latter, the subterranean idea is gone. Each objection here raised may be argued at length, and the argument may go against the objector, but if one be maintained, where is the proof of the whole? This argument appears to be the only ground for saying that Nippur denotes "the darker side" of the early religious thought. A careful comparison of what Zimmern says under *Bil* and *lil* makes us wonder what the "darker side" means. Sayce (on p. 281) seems to give up the ghost idea, even its connection with man at all. The statement is still adhered to that the home of the *lil* was beneath the earth, but everything supported by reference to sources shows it to be a "demon" only. The difficulty of the derivation, "lord of the ghost world," for En-*lil* is actually pointed out in the note on p. 282. Dialectical forms are said to be *Mul-lil* and *U-lil*. How do we know En-*lil* was so pronounced, not Ellil, and why should not all three names then be Semitic? If so, where is *lil*, "the ghost," gone? What the ordinary man wants now is a statement by some competent person of why all these readings are concluded. If En-*lil* is only a guess at a pronunciation of the two signs, read sometimes En and *lil* when separate, when read together, what conclusions about "ghosts" and "darker sides" can be proved? Is *Mul* "a lord"? or *U* either?

Those who do not admit the existence of the Sumerians as a separate people will rejoice over the evident difficulty there is in separating the traces of their religion from the Semitic. The distinctions attempted between the religious ideas are often too fine to be perceived, and oftener seem to be nothing more than a separation between two ways of regarding the same words. Give a god a name and it will suggest many things to say about him, even a whole theology, if you are ingenious enough. If you find that the things said are not all logically consistent, it is easy to refer one set to Sumerian, another to Semitic. Really, that seems to be all there is in many of Sayce's distinctions. But it is not always proved that anybody ever said these things till now. It is too often what Sayce thinks they mean; we are not sure the ancients said so. Thus animism is ascribed to both Sumerian and Semitic apparently. But that any such idea was entertained by either seems to depend on giving a special sense to one or two words or signs. That one value of *zi* is *napištu*, and another *nišu*, seems the only ground for saying that there were spirits of the gods as well as of men. There seems no reason for reading *napištu*, rather than *nišu*, wherever used of God or man. There is no reason why *nišu* should mean "spirit," unless that it is represented by *zi*, which also means *napištu*. But *nišu* is often replaced by *mu*, which is read *šumu*, "name," or other words for "name." The name is interchangeable with the person, the *napištu* is the person. We need not use "spirit" at all; "name" or "person" will do for *zi* everywhere. If something was said of the *zi* which could be said of a "spirit," and not of the

living person, we should have surer ground. But you can swear by the "name" of a god, or the "name" of heaven, just as well as by the "spirit" of the same. In fact, it would need very rigorous proof to show that men swore by the "spirit" of a thing, rather than by its "name." Moreover, that *nišu* is a synonym of *lū*, "verily," seems altogether to exclude "spirit." In the star SIB-ZI-AN-NA we may admit that separately SIB = "shepherd," ZI = "life," and AN-NA = "heaven;" but that together they mean "shepherd of the spirit of heaven" is doubtful. We know that ZI-AN-NA was also part of a "palm tree," called *asitu*, very likely "topmost tip;" why could not the star be "shepherd of the zenith"? The mere fact that we have the ZI of many things does not prove any animism. What we want is a "spirit," expressed by some unequivocal sign or name, of stocks or stones, things at least which have not "life."

As a rule, where we can compare Sayce with Zimmern, the latter is a valuable corrective and a safer guide. There are many larger questions which cannot be discussed here, and Sayce is often suggestive where Zimmern is silent. Very interesting are the traces of human sacrifice. If one takes the view that such must once have existed, the traces are evident, but they all seem to be indecisive otherwise. Sayce, p. 467, still clings to his view that in K. 5139, etc., *urišu* must mean a "child." It does also mean a "kid," as it occurs in lists of "goats;" it may mean also a "lamb." Further, the text itself lower down (C. T. XVII, pl. 10, ll. 73, 74) speaks of "a white *urišu*;" a white "kid" would be valued, as they are generally black in the East, a white "child" is very unlikely. Zimmern's rendering, p. 577, is much to be preferred. As so often, Sayce's desire to analyze ideograms into Sumerian compounds and so concoct a meaning from their elements leads him into an odd error. "The offspring who raises his head among men" results from breaking up *nigsagilū*, a synonym of *pūhu*, into *nig*, "who," *sag*, "head," *ilu*, "raising." It really means "an exchange," and the line reads "the kid the exchange for the man." There are many such strange results scattered up and down the book. But, on the whole, it is full of interest, though also of traps for the unwary. The fault we find is that, owing to the writer's strong convictions and his popular style, they give us no warning. Unless, then, both Zimmern and Sayce agree, it is well not to rely on the latter, unless, of course, one can track the source and verify the translation. The excellent indexes to both books and the existence of Delitzsch's *Handwörterbuch* and Muss-Arnolt's *Concise Dictionary* is a great help.

The subject of these religions is one of the deepest importance. For we are increasingly aware of most suggestive parallels with the religion of the biblical books. It may not be too much to say that

those biblical teachings which have made the deepest impression on western thought are precisely those which seem to be common to Babylonia and Israel. Professor Zimmern makes it his duty, in dealing with the cuneiform inscriptions in their relation to the Old Testament, to point out as widely as possible the parallels between Babylonian ideas and the Bible. It is not sufficient in his view to collect illustrations of history and geography, or references to Babylonian gods, from the Bible. He compares, what is far more convincing, the close parallelism in thought. Nor does he except the New Testament. Even the gospel history is shown to contain many things which are startlingly like the things said of gods and heroes in Assyria and Babylonia. The history of religious ideas in the Bible can no longer be limited to the old range. We have already begun to learn to trace back doctrines to Jewish apocalypses. We have now to learn what ideas, and even expressions, meant in Babylonia, centuries before they appear in the Bible.

For those who study the history of doctrine, Professor Zimmern's book must long be the text-book. If they know enough Assyriology to trace his facts back into their original setting, so much the better. But they may quote his facts without reserve. They are all marshaled with extreme care and scrupulous accuracy. His fairness appears in the way he quotes whatever he has noticed that bears against the view he takes. If the evidence does not seem sufficient to him, he abstains from formulating a conclusion. But he often indicates the direction in which the evidence points. It is hardly necessary to say that many of his conclusions may have to be revised as new evidence comes to light. But nowhere does he irritate us by a view for which nothing cogent is produced. Of course, his book is very hard reading. It is meant to be studied rather than read. Every page needs careful thought and is meant to be compared with the oft-quoted originals. Some may find the multitude of references appalling, and perhaps the temptation to run down everything to its last refuge is too often yielded to; but this is a joy to the serious student and is better than glossing over weak places.

In such a mass of splendid work it is difficult to select the most valuable items. But one may perhaps instance the treatment of the name Jahwe as a model. After examining the numerous cases where *Iaû* or *Iaûu* occurs in proper names and can be accepted as the divine name without doubt, he considers cases where it has been suspected in other names under such forms as 'Iba, *Hiba*, *Ja*, or *Aia*. But he rightly doubts the occurrence in the time of the First Dynasty of Babylon. Such a name as *Iaum-ilu*, or *Iahve-ilu*,

granting the correctness of the reading, cannot prove the knowledge of the divine name Iahve or Iaû. For while, if Iaum, or Iahve, was a divine name, these would be exactly like Šamaš-ilu, Sin-ilu, Nabû-ilu, and similar names of the period, it could also be like Iabnik-ilu, Iadiḥ-ilu, Iazi-ilu, Iahbar-ilu, Iakub-ilu, Iakbari-ilu, Iamanu-ilu, Iambi-ilu, Iamlik-ilu, Ia'si-ilu, Iapi-ilu, Iakar-ilu, Iarsi-ilu, Iašbi-ilu, Iarbi-ilu, Iašup-ilu, Iati-ilu, where the first element is an adjective or verb. That such adjectives, or verbs, played an important part in the nomenclature of the period is shown by such names as Iabadu, Iabi-ḫatnû, Iabuzatu, Iabišu, Iabušu, Iaduru, Iadaḥ-telum, Iadi-usatu, Iadiru, Iaḫusalum, Iaḫziru, Iaḫilatu, Iakannu, Iakubu, Iakulatu, Iakitu, Iamadau, Iamara', Iamat-Šamaš, Iamrum-zikum, Iasi-bitu, Iaviu, Iapsu, Iašaru, Iašuhatu, Iašupu, Iataru, Iatratu, where the verbs which form their third person singular in *ia-* are continually found again in other names with the Babylonian form in *i-* alone. We need, in fact, to find some name like Iahve-rabi, where the second member of the name is a verb. Till then we have no assurance that Iaum, or Iahve, is a divine name found at this period. The name Ḫali-Iaum depends on reading the sign PI as *Ia*, but is supported by Ḫaliaum, whose father was Ia-PI-um, or Iave-um. It is not a very cogent example, as a verb *ḫalû* might make its participle *ḫaliu*, which could be taken as a name; compare the feminine Ḫaliatu. Of course, a definite example may soon be produced. We must await it.

Professor Zimmern takes the divinities of Babylonia in order and gives probably the clearest account yet given of them. More may be found in Jastrow's *History of the Religions of Babylonia and Assyria*. But here the chief points are noted with an eye to biblical narratives. After each god has been described from native sources a section follows setting out whatever biblical references can be suggested. Here is the point of the book. Not only occurrences of the god's name, in actual references to him, or in proper names, but parallels to the doctrines taught about him are collected and arranged. Thus Marduk, who, as the city god of Babylon, has more said about him than any other, is compared with Christ as the Messiah. The result is startling.

The books are complementary. Each helps the other. They are more important to get and read than almost anything to be had for the same money. They are too full for it to be possible to give a résumé of their contents. But no teacher of religion can afford to be ignorant of the facts they deal with and must form his opinions of them, if he need not accept those of the authors. These facts will form the stock in trade of the writers of a whole literature before long.

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SOME RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.

A LARGE number of useful books on the Old Testament have appeared since the review of this literature in the April, 1903, number of the JOURNAL. Those which, by their subject or method, have been thought deserving of more detailed treatment—such as Burney's *Notes on the Books of Kings*, or Smith's *Old Testament History*, to name two among the number—will receive special discussion elsewhere in this JOURNAL. Those here noted are in some cases equally useful and worthy of a longer review than the limited space permits.

Beardslee's *Outlines*¹ "are the outgrowth of fifteen years of study and teaching." With these words the author begins the preface to a book that might have well belonged to a previous century. He has practically no use for the progressive results of Old Testament investigation. In discussing the authorship of the Pentateuch, he states in meager form the current new view, and then enters his rebuttal, which consists of the worn-out and threadbare arguments of a century ago. "We conclude then that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch" (p. 31). The treatment of each several book is marked, too, by an immovable conservatism, that sees practically no good in the progressive scholarly thought-movements of this day. Such a book may be useful in the hands of a competent instructor, but its influence on the Bible-studying public is counter to progress or improvement in the right direction. Whatever may be said against the results of some of the so-called higher criticism of our times, we cannot with impunity take such a stand, and maintain it, in the middle of the stream of progress.

Class-room text-books are time-savers both for instructor and student. Sampey's *Syllabus*² was prepared expressly for his classes in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. It gives more than ten pages of titles of the best and newest books in English on the Old Testament. Each Old Testament book is then clearly and briefly analyzed. Where there is room for different views of authorship, as of the Pentateuch, and of Isaiah, Sampey states in brief the chief positions, and refers for further treatment to his own lectures to be delivered in the class-room. The work is well arranged and with the added zest of the human voice, particularly of the author, in lectures, can be made very useful to students of the English Bible.

¹*Outlines of an Introduction to the Old Testament.* By JOHN WALTER BEARDSLEE. Chicago: Revell, 1903. 215 pages.

²*Syllabus for Old Testament Study.* By JOHN R. SAMPEY. Louisville, Ky.: Dearing, 1903. 106 pages.

Diettrich's work³ is a study in the history of Old Testament interpretation. He publishes for the first time the Syriac text, together with a translation, of a part of the Nestorian bishop Išō'dādh's commentary on the entire Old Testament. By way of introduction Diettrich gives the few facts known concerning Išō'dādh, describes the MSS. used as the basis of his text, indicates the large extent to which Išō'dādh quotes his predecessors—particularly the famous Theodore of Mopsuestia—shows that through Išō'dādh's work the interpretation of Theodore was carried over into the Monophysite church, and discusses the relation of Išō'dādh to the grammatico-historical method of Theodore, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the allegorical methods of the Monophysites. An interesting result of the investigation is the conclusion that the prevailing view of the exclusive use of the Peshitto in the Nestorian church is incorrect, since Išō'dādh furnishes a large number of variations from the Peshitto, which presuppose a knowledge of the Septuagint, either in the original or in a Syriac translation. The work is of interest from several points of view, and is in every way worthy of the valuable series of *Beihefte* to which it belongs.

A history of Israel, in one volume of moderate size, clear in style and up to the level of modern scholarship, while devout and sympathetic in tone, is a desideratum. The volume by Foakes-Jackson⁴ meets some of these demands; it is simple in style and warmly appreciative of the men and motives of Israel; its scholarship is reasonably good. But a strange sort of compromising and mediating tone pervades it. The biblical stories are retold in detail, though uncertainty as to their historical value is suggested. Vagueness of view and indefiniteness of opinion on vital points of history are not infrequent. The writer seems to have no first-hand acquaintance with recent German scholarship. The only German book-title mentioned is misspelled. Indeed, the impression is given that an industrious study of the work of other English scholars rather than original investigation has produced this book.

In a brief essay⁵ Winckler seeks to show how the religion of

³*Išō'dādh's Stellung in der Auslegungsgeschichte des Alten Testaments an seinen Commentaren zu Hosea, Joel, Jona, Sacharja 9-14 und einigen angehängten Psalmen.* Veranschaulicht von G. DIETRICH. [= "Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft," VI.] Giessen: Ricker, 1902. lxx + 163 pages.

⁴*The Biblical History of the Hebrews.* By F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON. Cambridge: Heffer; London: Arnold, 1903. xxx + 414 pages.

⁵*Abraham als Babylonier; Joseph als Aegypter.* Der weltgeschichtliche Hintergrund der biblischen Vätergeschichten auf Grund der Keilinschriften dargestellt. Von HUGO WINCKLER. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 38 pages.

Israel came into being historically. Taking his stand on the principle that all leaders of thought and life must have their *raison d'être* in their environment, he proceeds to account for Abraham and Joseph after this fashion. Abraham represents the old Babylonian religion which maintained itself in Palestine from 2300 B. C. on in opposition to the new Babylonian religion of the first dynasty of Babylon. Joseph, on the other hand, represents the reformation of Egyptian religion in the direction of monotheism forced through by Amenhotep IV. These are interesting generalizations or historic applications of general conditions, but are too loosely anchored to concrete facts for the historian to make use of them. They are as extreme applications of the present conception of the ancient oriental world as a vital organic unity, permeated by one culture and one religious system, as were the earlier and ignorant assumptions that the ancient oriental nations had nothing at all to do with each other. Winckler entirely overlooks the possibility of Abraham as a bedouin preserving his genuine old Semitic type of religion in the midst of the mixed and movable population of Palestine.

Blake is already well known through his series of five volumes, entitled *How to Read the Prophets*. In the present volume⁶ the same dominant purpose is manifest. The book is not for the critic, but for the scholarly reader who wishes to have presented in compact form the net results of critical study. The plan of presentation is simple and comprehensive. The Jahvistic narrative of Joseph and Moses is presented first; the passages are arranged in chronological sequence, and paraphrased into modern English, without note or comment. This occupies fifty-six pages; ninety-seven pages are then devoted to the treatment of this matter in a broadly historico-expository manner. Part II deals in the same way with the Elohist narrative; the paraphrased passages occupying forty-two pages, and the expository treatment sixty-seven pages. A chronological table is appended. Of especial value to the ordinary reader is the list of words and phrases that are peculiar to each narrative. Wherever these occur in the paraphrases they are put in italics, thus calling the reader's attention to them. The aim of the author has been to give the most widely accepted position in matters where difference of opinion exists. The matter is presented as a compact manual with the exclusion of other and divergent views. The historico-expository treatment is of real value to the timid student who may have been led to look askance upon critical scholarship, as it will

⁶*Joseph and Moses, the Founders of Israel*. By BUCHANAN BLAKE. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1902. 266 pages.

show him that favorite narratives have lost no whit of their freshness, force, or instructiveness by reason of the scholarly analysis that has displaced the older treatment.

A *Kaisergeburtstagsrede* must entail upon German professors severe searchings of heart in securing a subject which can be conveniently approached from the point of view of a royal birthday. Budde has succeeded admirably in his choice. He studies the estimate put upon the monarchy⁷ in different periods of Israel's history. Beginning with the twofold attitude of the sources in 1 Samuel, he discusses the origin of the theocratic view found in 1 Sam., chaps. 7, 8, in an enlightening way. Then he follows the thread through Ezekiel and the post-exilic literature. The seventh chapter of 2 Samuel is interestingly expounded; the beginning of the doctrine of the messianic king is found there. Budde concludes that in the main the Old Testament approves the monarchy. The paper is quite readable and informing.

Rothstein's study⁸ of the genealogy of Jehoiachin and his descendants is a most ingenious piece of conjectural criticism. The frequent admonitions to the reader that the positions taken are possible or probable only, suggest sometimes the suspicion that the author is consciously perpetrating a *tour de force*, and does not wish to be taken too seriously. Yet a joke of this sort would be impossible on Teutonic soil, and therefore we must consider the essay in all soberness. There are three sections and an appendix. In the first section the dates and occasions of the births of the six (not seven) sons of Jehoiachin are proposed. Two were born before he was straitly confined, the rest after he was released. Shenazzar is another name for Pedaiah and is identical with Sheshbazzar. In the second section reasons are given for regarding Zerubbabel as the son of Pedaiah, not of Shealtiel. Somebody has been tinkering with the text of Haggai and Zechariah to give the wrong impression on this point. Zerubbabel was born either just before the returning exiles left Babylon or just after they arrived in Jerusalem. His father Pedaiah led the returning exiles and laid the foundation of the temple. He then, somehow, mysteriously disappeared and the temple building stopped. And so on through the third section on the descendants of Zerubbabel, concerning which

⁷*Die Schätzung des Königtums im Alten Testament.* Von KARL BUDDE. Marburg: Elwert, 1903. 33 pages.

⁸*Die Genealogie des Königs Jojachin und seiner Nachkommen (1 Chron. 3:17-24) in geschichtlicher Beleuchtung.* Von J. W. ROTHSTEIN. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1902. 162 pages.

space forbids comment. The appendix presents "a witness, hitherto overlooked, to the messianic conception of the servant of Jahwe." This is the book of Isaiah as a whole, which Rothstein regards as put together from old prophecies by a single editor who by additions and changes made practically one work with a single message. This message was the expectation of a messiah from the house of David. It is interesting to find a critic tracing out the elements of unity in the whole book of Isaiah after the various "Isaiahs" who have contributed to it have been exploited so thoroughly. We seem to advance in circles and about once in so often get back to the point from which we started. Let us hope that each time it is a little higher up, if on the same perpendicular.

Winckler's revised edition of his *Keilinschriftliches Textbuch*⁹ supplies at a very reasonable price what is still a desideratum in English—a German translation of the important passages or documents of the Babylonio-Assyrian literature that bear upon the Old Testament. This new edition contains as additional material some Tel el-Amarna letters, an improved translation of the creation tablets, and other less apparent but valuable corrections, additions, and modifications of the historical inscriptions that bring all up to the present level of scientific research. The book is very complete; a most helpful and convenient handbook.

The relations of Israel to Egypt are sufficiently important to bring Budge's work¹⁰ within the circle of this series of notices. For the student of Egyptian history the want of order and intelligible interpretation of the materials so abundantly provided will prove a formidable obstacle to its profitable employment. To the Old Testament student, however, the discussions of particular points and episodes will be often illuminating. Among such helpful discussions is that on the Exodus from Egypt in Vol. V, and that found in the introduction to Vol. VI, where Winckler's theory of the North Arabian Mutsri is vigorously assailed and courteous warning is given Cheyne regarding his too easy acceptance of hypotheses from Germany. These handy volumes, with their clear type and useful engravings, are models of book-making.

⁹*Keilinschriftliches Textbuch zum Alten Testament*. Zusammengestellt von HUGO WINCKLER. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. iv + 230 pages.

¹⁰*A History of Egypt*, from the End of the Neolithic Period to the Death of Cleopatra VII. By E. A. WALLIS BUDGE. 8 vols. New York: Frowde.

Count Schack's studies on the grammar of the pyramid texts have reached a second series." The texts commonly called the "pyramid texts" are the oldest examples of the Egyptian language which have survived to us. Philologically, their study is exceedingly important and interesting, and is as yet only in its infancy. The verb has been carefully investigated by Sethe after the preliminary studies of Erman, and Count Schack is now undertaking certain researches with reference to particular points in the grammar of the archaic language. While not of the far-reaching importance of the broad generalizations which we have been able to base upon Sethe's work, Count Schack's work is nevertheless a distinct and valuable contribution to the detailed investigation of the language of these texts which must now be undertaken in order to determine the nature of the oldest Egyptian preserved to us. It therefore deserves our recognition, and those who are interested in the earliest history of human speech, especially in the Semitic field, will find important data in Count Schack's contribution.

Steuernagel's Hebrew Grammar¹² is a worthy member of the excellent series to which it belongs. There is no lack of elementary grammars, but the number of good books characterized by sound pedagogical and philological principles is always small, and any addition to their ranks is sure of a cordial welcome. Besides the grammar proper, this book includes exercises for translation, Hebrew German and German-Hebrew vocabularies, and a selected bibliography. It is well adapted to introduce German students to the principles of the Hebrew language and to prepare the way for the use of the more exhaustive and technical discussions of grammatical problems.

Strack has placed the Hebrew text of Ecclesiasticus¹³ within the reach of all students. The facsimiles published by the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge constitute the basis of the text here given. Numerous footnotes furnish the variants in the codices, the readings of the Greek and Syriac translations, the various emendations sug-

¹² *Aegyptologische Studien*. Fünftes Heft, "Zur Grammatik der Pyramidtexte": II, "Die formbildenden Elemente der altaegyptischen Grammatik." Von H. SCHACK-SCHACKENBURG. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902.

¹³ *Hebräische Grammatik mit Paradigmen, Litteratur, Uebungstücken und Wörterverzeichnis*. Von CARL STEURNAGEL. [= "Porta Linguarum Orientalium," Pars I.] Berlin: Reuther & Reichard; New York: Lemcke & Buechner, 1903. xii+148+120* pages.

¹³ *Die Sprüche Jesus', des Sohnes Sirachs*. Der jüngst gefundene hebräische Text mit Anmerkungen und Wörterbuch. Herausgegeben von HERMANN L. STRACK. Leipzig: Deichert, 1903. vi+74 pages.

gested, and the parallel passages in the Old Testament. The text is unpointed save for a few verses found already pointed in the manuscripts. The vocabulary includes all the non-biblical words, and also words which occur but rarely in biblical Hebrew or are here used in a new sense. The whole work is characterized by Strack's well-known thoroughness and accuracy, and is to be commended as a textbook exactly adapted to the needs of classes taking up the study of this important text.

The first edition of Gunkel's commentary on Genesis¹⁴ appeared at the end of 1900. In less than two years a second edition was called for. In so short a time, as the author himself says, we should hardly expect or wish great changes, yet alterations have been made in thirty-nine passages, not to mention various references, footnotes, etc., added. These changes add both strength and polish to the book. The chief matter worth mentioning is that the author feels less inclined than formerly to explain the legends as a dressing-up of tribal relations and occurrences. It seems to him now that the ethnographic and ætiological ideas are subsequent additions to the legends, and the legends themselves remain finally inexplicable.

Hummelauer has written the commentary on Joshua¹⁵ in the series edited by Cornely, Knabenbauer, and himself. It is voluminous and learned. Both ancient and modern scholars are abundantly cited. The author rejects the findings of the modern critical school and works along the old lines. As illustrative of the fulness of the treatment we notice that fifteen pages are given to the problem of the sun standing still. All commentators on Joshua must reckon with this volume.

Baumann's monograph on Amos¹⁶ is another attempt to improve upon the present arrangement of the text and to restore it to its original poetic form. According to Baumann, the prophecy of Amos contains five addresses; four of these have three main divisions each, and the last division in each address, with one exception, has four subsections. This symmetrical arrangement, however, involves a radical subversion of the present order of the text which fails to justify

¹⁴ *Genesis übersetzt und erklärt*. Von HERMANN GUNKEL. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1902. xcii + 439 pages. M. 9.80.

¹⁵ *Cursus Scripturae Sacrae: Commentarius in Librum Josue*, auctore FR. DE HUMMELAUER. Parisiis: Lethielleux, 1903. 528 pages.

¹⁶ *Der Aufbau der Amosreden*. Von EBERHARD BAUMANN. [= "Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft," VII.] Giessen: Ricker, 1903. viii + 69 pages.

itself. For example, the second address is composed of 3:1-8 + 4:1-3 + 8:4-14. Furthermore, many omissions and transpositions of words and phrases seem to have no warrant beyond the necessities of the poetical arrangement. This arrangement has much in common with the previous arrangements by Harper, Löhr, and others, though in many important matters Baumann goes his own way. The large amount of agreement among the various workers upon the poetical form of Amos is a significant and encouraging fact for students of Hebrew poetry.

Jeremiah the prophet lived in tumultuous times. Robson¹⁷ attempts to weave his life and story into a narrative of small compass. To do this he is severely put to it, for the material is abundant and the events of those days were soul-stirring and vitally important. His scheme embraces a three-fold division of the prophet's life and utterances. The first period covers his early life down to the capture of Jehohaz (608). He locates in this area of time chaps. 1-6 and 11-13. The margins also carry references to other portions of this book, and to other books that aid in the understanding of the topic under treatment. The second period covers the time of the reign of King Jehoiakim, (608-598). To this period he assigns, and in this order, chaps. 7:1-28; 26; 14; 15; 16; 17:1-18; 18; 19; 20; 7:29-8:3; 25; 46-51; 35; 36. There is large room for difference of opinion in the succession of chapters indicated above. If chaps. 46-51 should come near chap. 25, why not insert them, as does the Septuagint, in the middle of that chapter? The third period covers the remainder of the prophet's career. Its chapter assignments are: 24; 27; 28; 23:9-40; 29; 21; 23:1-8; 34; 37:1-10; 37:11-38:28; 30-33; 39:1-43:6; 52; 43:6-44. The effort at condensation of the material in these many chapters is so thorough that it often becomes little more than mere bones of a narrative. On the whole, Jeremiah's portrait is well made.

Happily the latest attempt, of course the only successful one, to interpret Daniel's prophecies¹⁸ is brief and well printed, the interpolated interpretations being in red ink. The most interesting thing we have found in it is that after the predicted period of years is found to be too long by five, God is called in, and it is declared that in mercy he saw fit to reduce the time foretold by this number of years. This

¹⁷*Jeremiah the Prophet.* By JOHN ROBSON. [=Bible Class Primers.] Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribner; no date. 115 pages.

¹⁸*The Only Key to Daniel's Prophecies.* By W. S. AUCHINCLOSS. New York: Van Nostrand, 1903. 173 pages.

is a new and, we should think, a very useful principle to have at hand in the numerical interpretation of predictive prophecy. Sayce contributes an introduction chiefly remarkable for its brevity and unimportance.

The purpose of Meinhold's study¹⁹ is to trace the origin, meaning, and history of the idea of the remnant in Israel. The result in brief is (1) that Elijah had no thought of anything but northern Israel as a whole; (2) that Amos did not at first look forward to a total destruction of northern Israel, but was forced to this conclusion later, perhaps after his return to Judah; and that for him Judah was to be the remnant; (3) that Hosea at first saw nothing but total destruction at the hand of Yahweh, but later, with the appearance of the Assyrians, he hoped for a deliverance of the nation after chastisement, not being able to conceive of Yahweh as permitting to the Assyrians and their gods so great a triumph as the complete destruction of Yahweh's people. Hosea, however, always deals with the nation as a whole, never distinguishing between Israel *κατὰ σάρκα* and Israel *κατὰ πνεῦμα*; (4) that Isaiah also in his younger days threatened complete destruction, but later, about 734 B. C. exempted those who accepted his teachings, Israel *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, from this fate; and still later, in connection with Sennacherib's invasion, taught that Yahweh would deliver only the faithful gathered together in Jerusalem, the sacred city. After the wonderful deliverance, however, when Isaiah realized that no real change had been wrought in the hearts of the people by this experience, he was compelled to abandon all hope for the future and once more announce total destruction. This is a careful and thorough piece of investigation, and no student of the prophets can afford to disregard it. The very nature of the materials studied is, of course, such as to preclude the possibility of unanimous assent to the conclusions reached; too many passages of uncertain meaning and still more uncertain date are necessarily involved. But the study is stimulating and illuminating, and challenges serious consideration.

The essay published in 1899 by W. Möller which assailed with acuteness and force the modern critical theory of the Old Testament on its literary side has been followed by another²⁰ which attacks the same

¹⁹ *Studien zur israelitischen Religionsgeschichte*. Band I, "Der heilige Rest;" Teil I, "Elias, Amos, Hosea, Jesaja." Von JOHANNES MEINHOLD. Bonn: Weber. 1903. viii + 159 pages.

²⁰ *Die Entwicklung der alttestamentlichen Gottesidee in vorexilischer Zeit*. Historisch-kritische Bedenken gegen moderne Auffassungen. Von WILHELM MÖLLER. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. 183 pages.

theory from the point of view of its conception of the development of Israel's idea of God through the successive stages of polydemonism, henotheism, and ethical monotheism. The detailed discussion of the several biblical passages cited by the critics is clearly done, and shows how it is possible by such attack to shake any position which rests on cumulative evidence. The entire treatise reveals, and doubtless it was the author's intention to reveal, that the critics and their assailant occupy points of view so diverse that controversy on particular points is beside the mark. What the author's fundamental attitude toward all so-called modern methods of studying the Bible is, he thus states: "The entire modern Old Testament science is on the wrong road as long as it does not take the Bible *as it is* and seek to explain it as such to the people." God's word has saved men in the past in the form in which we now have it, which is the way God wrote it down—thus Möller closes his argument and settles the question. This disclosure indicates not only that the historical point of view is quite hidden from him, but that he has failed to observe that the world moves—two limitations somewhat diminishing the value of his work.

Hunnius has rightly called attention to the need of employing the results of critical analysis in synthetic studies of history and theology. His dissertation²¹ is an attempt to get a pre-deuteronomic doctrine of God. He starts with the Sinaitic covenant episode, which, in common with many modern scholars, he interprets as the acceptance of Israel as his people by the storm-god on Mount Sinai whose name was Jahwe. From the secondary nature of this union he derives the arbitrary elements in the attitude of Jahwe toward Israel, and makes some very suggestive remarks as to the later ethical separation between Jahwe and his people having its origin here. Turning to the patriarchal and primitive stories, Hunnius finds quite another god, one who is kindly, devoted to his people, good-natured, and forgiving. This is the Semitic clan god which has survived and is merged into Jahwe. Likewise totemistic and animistic gods or spirits, even a heaven god, have been taken up into this all-embracing Jahwe. Thus he is a deity who has absorbed many other divine beings, a kind of composite photograph. Much learning and ingenuity are displayed in this exposition, but the result is quite unsatisfactory. How these various powers were thus united in Jahwe is not very clearly set forth. In other words, we should like to know who took this composite photograph.

²¹ *Natur und Character Jahwes nach den vordeuteronomischen Quellen der Bücher Genesis-Könige*. Inaugural Dissertation. Von CARL HUNNIUS. Strassburg: Heitz, 1902. 61 pages.

Erft groups three studies under a general title: ²² (1) an investigation into the origin of the deuteronomic law, with its Yahwistic and Elohist predecessors; (2) a comparative study of the laws of the Elohist and those of Babylon, especially the code of Hammurabi; (3) a metrical arrangement of the transliterated contents of each of the Hebrew codes under consideration, with an accompanying translation. This latter section of the work is of especial interest, since it is an application of the metrical principles of Sievers to the materials in question. The analysis of the contents of the legal codes is keen, and the hypotheses concerning the times and occasions of their respective origins are ingenious and suggestive, even if the verdict upon them must be "not proven." This investigation is an outcome of the author's former study of the times of Jeremiah,²³ and will be of interest to all students of the growth of Israelitish law.

Canon Cheyne's *Critica Biblica*²⁴ is "a collection of entirely new notes on Textual Difficulties of the Hebrew Bible." The Jerahmeel theory is here given full sway. The results would astonish us were we not prepared for something of the sort by the later volumes of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. Jerahmeel, Ishmael, and other north Arabian names are discovered lurking in the most unexpected places throughout the whole Old Testament. Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon seem to be forced into the background by these little north Arabian kingdoms. We are told that the Syro-Ephraimitish war "was really a Jerahmeelite invasion;" that the familiar names Immanuel and Maher-shalal-hash-baz are corruptions of "Jerahmeel-will-be-deserted;" that it is "perfectly certain" that Jerahmeel must be substituted for Babylon in Isa., chap. 13; that Isa., chaps. 24-27, have a Jerahmeelite background; that the name Jeremiah is a corruption of "the Jerahmeelite;" that Ezekiel's three righteous men were Enoch, Jerahmeel, and Arāb; that Joel's locusts were north Arabians; that Jonah's mission was to Asshur, a north Arabian province; and that the story of his flight is an insertion; that Malachi is corrupted from Jerahmeel; and so on *ad infinitum*. All these surprising results are secured by textual changes made in accordance with the preconceived Jerahmeelite theory. However, for

²²*Die Sicherstellung des Monotheismus durch die Gesetzgebung in dem vorexilischen Juda*. Von W. ERFT. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. 120 pages.

²³See this JOURNAL, Vol. VII, pp. 379 f.

²⁴*Critica Biblica*; or, Critical Notes on the Text of the Old Testament Writings. By T. K. CHEYNE. Part I, "Isaiah and Jeremiah;" Part II, "Ezekiel and Minor Prophets;" Part III, "First and Second Samuel." London: Black, 1903. 312 pages

the full setting forth and defense of this theory we must await the publication of Cheyne's "condensed sketch of the history of Israel now ready for press in a comprehensive historical work." Cheyne charges present-day scholarship with a lack of originality and an excess of caution, and pleads for new methods in Old Testament study. A new method, however, must have something more than the originality of its results to commend it to scientific scholarship. The mere multiplication of improbabilities, no matter how long continued, never constitutes evidence. Thus far the results of the Jerahmeelite theory seem to point to a method in the highest degree arbitrary and subjective. The work of Cheyne has, indeed, called attention to the fact that north Arabia and the other territory adjacent to Israel, must have played a larger part in Israel's history than we have heretofore accredited to them; and for this service let us be thankful.

Any addition to the extensive literature dealing with the creation story needs to come with exceptional merits in order to find acceptance. Zapletal's work²⁵ will not be found wanting. The subject is treated under the following heads: (1) the justification for treating Gen., 1:1—2:3 as a separate unit; (2) the explanatory notes on the text of the passage; (3) the cosmogonies of neighboring peoples; (4) the various explanations of the biblical account; (5) the most natural explanation; (6) the literary-historical phase of the question. The explanatory comments on the story are illuminating and evince accurate scholarship and interpretative insight. The treatment of the non-Israelitish cosmogonies is the least satisfactory section of the work, yielding practically nothing to the student of these subjects. The criticism of the various interpretations of the story is fair and thorough, and the view presented rightly emphasizes the vast gulf yawning between the Hebrew story and all other cosmogonies. The story of P may not rightly be termed a myth; though using mythological materials, it has so transformed them as to rob them of their most characteristically mythical elements. The result is a didactic narrative dominated by a purely monotheistic spirit and purpose. It is a relief to read a work on this subject free from the polemics of the Babel-Bibel controversy.

The phenomenal success of the French excavations at Susa gave us the stele of Hammurabi. Very soon after its publication at the hands

²⁵*Der Schöpfungsbericht der Genesis (1:1—2:3), mit Berücksichtigung der neuesten Entdeckungen und Forschungen.* Erklärt von VINC. ZAPLETAL. Freiburg: Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1902. 104 pages.

of Scheil, Winckler²⁶ issued in *Der alte Orient*, a German translation of the document. This is presumably made from the original text as reproduced in the French edition, but no accompanying statement makes that claim. The speed with which it followed Scheil's edition gave little opportunity or time for Winckler to improve on his predecessor. In fact, an examination of some of the doubtful passages of Scheil reveals no improvement in Winckler. He has added, however, some notes that are helpful in the understanding of certain legal provisions; also some topographical material, particularly in notes on the translation of the prologue to the laws proper. The translation was issued so precipitately that it is not presented in modern proper legal form, such as would seem to be required, but in straightforward literary German of today. It will serve, however, to present this marvelous codification of ancient law to the German public until a more detailed and technical translation, such as that announced by Kohler and Peiser, appears. There is no index, no table of contents; in fact, every mark of hasty preparation.

Jeremias²⁷ is among the first to present a comparative study of Hammurabi and Moses. After a brief introduction, he classifies the Hammurabi laws for convenience in examination. Those relating to marriage and inheritance receive first consideration. Then follow property rights, penal justice, and the method of executing the law. In his comparison of the code of Hammurabi with that of the "book of the covenant," he uses twenty-four passages. The likenesses are overwhelmingly in favor of some intimate relations either between ancient Israel and the Babylonians, or between the sources from which their laws were gathered. In comparing the ethical character of the provisions of Hammurabi with those of the Pentateuch, Jeremias finds in the latter a more humane, just, and exalted idea of right. The code of Hammurabi, though it mentions numerous gods, temple furniture, and temple women, does not contain one single religious idea. The fundamental religious idea of the *Tora*, duty to God, and fear of God is lacking in the laws of Hammurabi. Shamash is credited with having given the laws to Hammurabi, while the spiritual, the God-fearing, aspect of the laws of Moses were due to a revelation. At this point new problems face us, that must be worked out with great care

²⁶ *Die Gesetze Hammurabis, Königs von Babylon um 2250 v. Chr.* Das älteste Gesetzbuch der Welt. [= *Der alte Orient*, 4. Jahrgang, Heft 4.] Uebersetzt von HUGO WINCKLER. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902. 42 pages.

²⁷ *Moses und Hammurabi.* Von JOHANNES JEREMIAS. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 47 pages.

and patience. Did Moses have anything to do with the codification of the laws of the Pentateuch? Certain it is that the law did not originate without Moses. Von Ranke's assertion now comes to the front: "Moses is the most exalted personality of the oldest history."

Shaw-Caldecott's paper²⁸ was published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* last April. It is merely the first part, or an advanced copy of the first part of a *Biblical Archaeology* to be issued by the author. This part is purely technical, dealing with the measurements found on the Senkereh cuneiform tablet and the statue of Gudea. To use this tablet the author was obliged to reconstruct parts of it. This he has done, and claims as his permanent results: "(1) that the breadth of the hand-palm (conventionalized) was the fundamental of all length-measures; (2) that there were three ell-lengths in simultaneous use, each probably in a different department of trade, like our own Troy and avoirdupois weights; (3) that the relation of these ells to one another was the relation of 3, 4, and 5; those having been the number of palms of which they respectively consisted" (p. 19). The question of the validity of his arguments must remain unanswered until we have before us his process in detail. There is room enough in several places to make a slip. Therefore we await with interest the issuance of his complete work.

Pick²⁹ seems to have chosen a field of labor that promises to yield rich returns. The pamphlet under review contains the introduction to the work itself, which is promised within a short time. It is reasonable to suppose that the Babylonian Jews living for centuries in the midst of the remains of the Babylonian people and civilization would incorporate into their language and customs much of the language and ideas of their Babylonian predecessors whose language and civilization, highly developed as they were, must have persisted long after the loss of their political supremacy. Hence Pick has instituted a careful search of the Babylonian Talmud for evidences of the influence of Babylon upon talmudic thought and speech, and seems to have found an abundance of material. The introduction confines itself chiefly to a consideration of the facts bearing upon the debt owed by the Jews to the Babylonian civilization—a debt by no means insignificant. The body of the work, however, promises to be

²⁸ *The Linear Measures of Babylonia about B. C. 2500.* By W. SHAW-CALDECOTT. With an Appendix on "The Biblical Cubit: A New Suggestion." Hertford, 1903. 45 pages.

²⁹ *Assyrisches und Talmudisches: Kulturgeschichtliche und lexikalische Notizen.* Von HERMANN PICK. Berlin: Calvary, 1903. 33 pages.

lexicographical. It is probable that the results will be of more value to students of the Talmud than to Assyriologists.

Wiernikowski's pamphlet³⁰ is not intended to aid the present critical study of Job, but to supply the place of a Midrasch. The author points out that there is reason to believe that such a Midrasch once existed and was lost. He has undertaken to collect scattered references and comments from various rabbinical sources, and to present them in such manner as to indicate, as far as it may be understood, the general tendency of the earlier rabbins in their treatment of the book. Some effort has been made before in that direction, but those compilations adhered rigidly to the order of verses, regardless of the different schools of Jewish thought. Wiernikowski has classified the material under three schools, the Tannaite, the Palestinian, and the Babylonian. The order of matter treated under these schools is practically the same, viz.: Job as a man, exegetical matters, biblical narratives, sayings and proverbs, the study of its teaching, and its philosophy of religion. Indices add to the value of the collection.

No teacher of the Old Testament made a larger place for himself during the last century than did Ewald, the centenary of whose birth fell on November 16, 1903. His wide learning and spiritual intensity attracted students to him from all quarters, and his published writings wielded a compelling influence upon all investigators. Hence the appearance of a life of Ewald by T. Witton Davies³¹ is timely and welcome. This biography is well written, and furnishes not only the necessary facts concerning Ewald's career of manifold activities, but also a sympathetic, yet impartial, view of the character and disposition of the man. Appendix I contains, with other matter, several letters that passed between Ewald and other scholars; these are of especial interest as showing the respect and esteem generally felt toward Ewald. Appendix II gives an extended list of Ewald's writings. Davies has certainly given us the most complete and satisfactory biography of Ewald to be found in English.

Conder's attitude and characteristics as critic and philologist are too well known to the scholarly world to need any description. His

³⁰ *Das Buch Hiob: nach der Auffassung der rabbinischen Litteratur in den ersten fünf nachchristlichen Jahrhunderten. Erster Teil.* Von ISAAC WIERNIKOWSKI. Breslau: Fleischmann, 1902. 92 pages.

³¹ *Heinrich Ewald, Orientalist and Theologian, 1803-1903: A Centenary Appreciation.* By T. WITTON DAVIES. London: Fisher Unwin, 1903. viii + 146 pages.

purpose in the present volume³² is to prove that the ancient Hebrew records were written in the cuneiform script. The most interesting portion of the book is that devoted to showing how the same group of cuneiform characters, read in different ways, would explain the fact that the same person or place seems in some cases in the Old Testament to bear different names; thus Nebuchadrezzar = Nebuchadnezzar; the last ideogram being readable either as precativ or positiv; Mahalath = Bashemath, if one small wedge be overlooked; Jethro = Reuel, upon the same condition; Michal = Merab; Joram = Hadoram; and many others. It must be said however that his cases do not furnish any proof that the ancient Hebrew records were written in cuneiform. The last hundred pages of the book are devoted to alleged discrepancies. Conder here follows the simple method of forcing upon the monumental texts doubtful readings or interpretations, that the Old Testament records may still have a chance to be correct. It never seems to occur to him, as a simple principle of historical criticism, that if we should accept his questionable propositions, we should not demonstrate the correctness of the challenged statements; rather we should merely throw open the entire question for further light. And it does not require the doubtful treatment of the records which Conder has introduced to prepare us for further light.

This³³ is the second series of studies in the use of the Bible by the early writers of English. The former instalment, which was published in 1898, contained the biblical passages in the *Laws* of King Alfred, Bede's *History*, and Aelfrick's *Homilies*. The present studies include reviews of Bishop Waerferth's version of Gregory's *Dialogues*, Blickling's *Homilies*, Wolfston's *Homilies*, *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, King Alfred's version of Augustine's *Soliloquies*, and a number of other works and fragments of early English literature. The method is that of quoting in order the passages from the different books of the Bible, presenting at the same time the original Latin in footnotes. In the appendices are found parallel passages from the *Old English Gospel*, the Cambridge *Fragment of Genesis*, and a *Glossary of the Durham Ritual*. There are also indices of biblical passages and principal words.

The problem of how to teach the modern views of the Old Testa-

³² *The First Bible*. By C. R. CONDER. Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1902. 242 pages.

³³ *Biblical Quotations in Old English Prose Writers*. By ALBERT S. COOK. New York: Scribner, 1903. 396 pages.

ment to children is briefly discussed in a brochure by X. Kœnig.³⁴ He is practically in sympathy with the critical positions of such writers as Westphal, and believes the time at hand when they should be carefully, cautiously, yet simply taught even to children. He thinks we should begin our history of Israel, not at the reign of David and Solomon, but with Moses, the founder of their life as a nation. From that point he gives a sketch of the picture which should be presented to those who take up the study for the first time. In order to provide a scheme for work he divides the whole of the Old Testament into three great periods: (1) "The Origins," down through Joseph; (2) "The Epic Period," from the sojourn in Egypt down through Saul; (3) "The History Period," from David down into the New Testament. This material is broken into fifty sections, of unequal length, and embraces also a study of the prophets. The scheme is comprehensive, but we fear quite beyond any class of persons who have not had considerable experience, both in reading and study of the Old Testament. It would appropriately engage the best efforts of laymen of somewhat advanced training in Bible study.

A second edition, in revised and enlarged form, of Houtin's striking book³⁵ on the Roman Catholic attitude in France toward the Bible, should make it known more widely among biblical scholars. One curious element of the enlargement in size consists of forty pages of reprinted reviews of the book itself in its first edition. In this case these opinions are valuable, since they come mostly from Roman Catholic sources.

Miss Meade has undertaken in this series of narratives³⁶ to tell the biblical stories in such simple and personal form that they will engage the attention and arouse the imagination of the child. The scope of the volume is practically that of the Old Testament, so far as the leading characters of that portion of the Bible are concerned. More strictly the story closes with Elijah, though Esther and Daniel are added. In each of the narratives the first person is used. The speaker is the leading character—now Eve, now Abraham, now Moses, etc. The narratives are illustrated with some fifty excellently designed drawings.

³⁴ *De la sincérité dans l'enseignement de l'histoire sainte de l'Ancien Testament aux enfants.* Par X. KŒNIG. Paris: Fischbacher, 1903. 68 pages.

³⁵ *La Question biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIX^e siècle.* Par ALBERT HOUTIN. 2^e édit. Paris: Picard, 1902. 378 pages.

³⁶ *Stories from the Old, Old Bible.* By L. T. MEADE. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. 409 pages.

Weidner's²⁷ versatility touches every branch of theological science. These studies in Exodus continue the method laid down in his Genesis. It consists of an analysis of the book arranged in eight studies, with a ninth devoted to a general review, examination, and quiz. The studies analyze a portion of the narrative, and then add remarks pertinent to the exposition of a point or points under any given heading of the analysis. The well-known conservatism of the author stands squarely in the forefront, Rawlinson being the most frequently quoted authority. We have no doubt that the author can use these outlines with greater vigor in a class-room than anyone who should attempt to follow his scheme.

The first inspiration to the work of Dalman²⁸ was received from his desire to find in the mouths of the people songs which would furnish instructive parallels for the interpretation of Canticles. Had his work been confined to this investigation, the results would have been meager. There are, indeed, love-songs, describing the physical charms of the beloved, which remind us of similar descriptions in the Song of Songs, but these furnish the interpreter with a small part of the parallelism needed. Dalman spent fifteen months in Syria and Palestine, from March, 1899, to June, 1900. The chief places chosen by him for his investigations were in Jerusalem, Madeba, Eş-Şalt, El-Hösn in 'Ajlûn, Merj 'Ayûn in Sidon, and in Aleppo, where he spent more than six months, not to mention other places visited. These are all excellent centers for such work, though Damascus, the most oriental city in Syria, the home of the purest Arabic, with its environs, might well have been included, and Nebk and ẖaryatên in the Syrian desert would perhaps have furnished more range. At ẖaryatên the poems of Nimr of the Adwan in praise of his wife, a most charming Arab lady, whom he loved devotedly, are still handed down. Dalman describes eighteen kinds of Arabic poetry. All the poems are given in Arabic, but with a transcription in Latin letters, and there is an accompanying translation into German. In this latter work he has secured the aid of someone familiar with the poem in the locality where he heard it. On account of the various dialects of Arabic this is a necessary precaution. He has produced a work in accordance with scientific prin-

²⁷*Studies in the Book: Old Testament.* First Series, "Exodus." By REVERE FRANKLIN WEIDNER. Chicago: Revell, 1903. 59 pages.

²⁸*Palästinischer Diwan als Beitrag zur Volkskunde Palästinas.* Gesammelt und mit Uebersetzung und Melodien herausgegeben. Von GUSTAV H. DALMAN. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901. xxxviii + 370 pages.

ciples, suited to give him great reputation, for such a collection of songs from the mouths of the people does not exist in print; yet a mere translation of Arab poetry is not adapted to convey the thought or music of the oriental to the occidental. Though the table of contents seems promising, the *Diwan* is not at all adapted to be an independent work on "manners and customs," nor can it be considered a substitute for one. Indeed, it should rather be a second volume as a supplement to a thorough discussion of the manners and customs of the people by the author. It cannot be understood without previous knowledge of the people, or without a mastery of the literature of the subject. As an academic performance it is worthy of all praise, but not as the best that the author should contribute in this department. It is doubtless true that Dalman in his new position as the head of the German archæological school in Jerusalem may be expected to make important contributions to the literature of the subject.

GEORGE S. GOODSPEED.

IRA MAURICE PRICE.

HERBERT L. WILLETT.

JOHN M. P. SMITH.

RECENT LITERATURE IN CHURCH HISTORY.

THE books to be noticed in this collective review treat a great variety of subjects. In the list there are some works of superior merit, and nearly all were well worth the making. Large books designed for popular use may be scholarly in character, and small books on themes of remote interest may represent the most painstaking and laborious research. To both kinds the attention of the reader will be called in this article. The literature lays emphasis on no special division or branch of church history, unless Methodism is an exception. The evangelical revival of the eighteenth century and the progress of the Wesleyan movement have more prominence than any other single topic. The occasion of this is, of course, the bi-centenary of Wesley's birth.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL.

In Archæology the *Dictionnaire*¹ just issued from the French press is worthy of mention. There is a large place waiting for a good ency-

¹*Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*. Publié par LE R. P. DOM FERNAND CABROL, Bénédictin de Solesmes, Prieur de Farnborough (Angleterre), avec le concours d'un grand nombre de collaborateurs. Fascicule I. Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1903. 287 pages. Fr. 5.

lopedia of Christian antiquities in which Roman Catholic views shall be represented. If the Roman Catholic is often too credulous, the Protestant is sometimes too skeptical, and needs to be corrected from the representatives of tradition. Judging by the initial "fascicule" now before me, this *Dictionnaire* will prove a valuable contribution to the subject from the Roman Catholic point of view. It is learned and critical and full. The contributors to it number forty. Perhaps a disproportionate space is allotted to liturgical questions, but these will interest Roman Catholics and high Anglicans, though the Protestant world at large will care little for them. Among the most notable articles in this "fascicule" is the one on "Abercius," occupying eleven pages, and giving a complete apparatus for the study of the famous inscription; the one on "Abgar," occupying five pages, in which the legendary character of the story is maintained; and the one on "Accusations contre les Chrétiens," occupying twelve pages, and to be completed in the next number perhaps with as many more. The illustrations are numerous, and some of them are excellent. It is to be regretted that others are coarse and cheap. The bibliographies are ample, and show a good acquaintance with the most recent literature, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant. If this *Dictionnaire* does not entirely supersede Kraus and Smith and Cheetham, it will at least add much to them, and in many places will bring us the fruits of more careful research.

The trustees of the British Museum* have rendered a valuable service to those students of Christian archæology who cannot visit their collections. Their little book is full of interest and instruction. The first half of it is devoted to an introduction, in which the chief features of Christian archæology are set forth with admirable brevity and completeness. The second half contains descriptions of the objects associated with early Christianity which are preserved in the museum. There are more than a hundred illustrations, the majority of them photographs, and all of them remarkable for distinctness of definition.

The skeleton of Lazarus,³ the friend of Christ, has been shown both at Autun, France, and at Andlau, Alsace. Rev. Joseph Rietsch enters

**British Museum: A Guide to the Early Christian and Byzantine Antiquities.* With fifteen Plates and eighty-four Illustrations. Printed by order of the Trustees. xii + 116 pages. 1s.

³*Die nachevangelischen Geschehnisse der bethanischen Geschwister und die Lazarus-reliquien zu Andlau.* Von JOS. RIETSCH, Vikar an St. Stephan in Mülhausen i. E. Strassburg: Le Roux, 1902. 59 pages. M. 0.90.

the lists against the French relics, and in favor of the German. It is easier for him to break down the defenses of the former than to erect good defenses for the latter. He succeeds however, in discovering an early oriental tradition that Lazarus became bishop of Citium in Cyprus. He renders it probable that the genuine relics of Lazarus were carried to Constantinople. He shows further that Mary, the sister of Lazarus, is not identified with Mary Magdalene in eastern tradition as she is in western. For the historian the chief interest of the pamphlet will consist in the possibility which it offers of tracing the career of Lazarus after his return from the grave. The materials brought together by Rietsch for this purpose are worthy of respect, and constitute a real contribution to our knowledge of the subject.

GENERAL CHURCH HISTORY.

In general church history no new works of importance have appeared. The small volume by Horsch⁴ sketches the origin and growth of Christianity to the present time. The author is ruled by the idea that the true history of the church is found in the life and practice of believers rather than in the papal hierarchy and state establishments. All improvements on the great work of Dr. Moeller⁵ will be welcomed by students of church history. Dr. Schubert's corrections are considerable, and appear everywhere to have been admirably done. The preceding parts of the beautiful work by Baum and Geyer⁶ have already been noticed in this JOURNAL. This last part is fully equal in excellence to the preceding parts, and the book as a whole is much to be desired. It contains a good index.

The recent works on special phases of general church history are of only ordinary interest. Among them we may notice that of Mrs. Bell⁷ who starts out with the purpose of "sifting the true from the legendary," and giving us the results of recent studies in the lives of the

⁴*A Short History of Christianity.* By JOHN HORSCH. Cleveland, O.: Published by the Author. 312 pages. \$1, net.

⁵*Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte.* Von DR. WILHELM MOELLER. Erster Band, "Die alte Kirche," zweite und dritte Abteilungen. Zweite Auflage neubearbeitet von DR. HANS VON SCHUBERT. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1902. 69 pages. M. 4.

⁶*Kirchengeschichte für das evangelische Haus.* Von FRIEDERICH BAUM UND DR. CHRISTIAN GEYER. Dritte Auflage, fünfte (Schluss-) Lieferung. München: Beck, 1902. M. 2.20.

⁷*Lives and Legends of the Evangelists, Apostles, and Other Early Saints.* By MRS. ARTHUR BELL. London: Bell; New York: Macmillan, 1901. x+284 pages. \$4.50, net.

saints. This carries her into various fields of criticism. Fortunately, she does not devote much of her space to them, for she is not at home in them. We may glance at a few of her critical opinions:

A very typical example of what the new criticism has achieved is the solution of the mystery of the non-intervention of heaven in cases where a saint was condemned to be beheaded. Why, after some steadfast believer has been rescued from fire and water, and preserved unharmed through protracted tortures of the most horrible description, no effort should have been made to arrest the sword when it was raised to destroy him, has long puzzled the student of Christian legend.

The explanation, as determined by "the new criticism," is that the makers of the legends recognized the legal right of the officer to kill with the sword or the ax, the emblems of the civil power, but not by any other means, since other instruments were not emblems of the civil power. We are equally disposed to believe when she assures us, as sober history, that the emissaries of Herod pursued Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, "into the very holy of holies, and there put him to death." On quite as good authority she affirms that "there is every reason to believe that St. Joseph was a master builder, his work often taking him away from home;" that there is no proof that Matthew wrote the gospel attributed to him; and that only a portion of the Acts is from Luke. But when we turn from these adventures in the fields of criticism, we find much for which to be grateful. Mrs. Bell is thoroughly acquainted with the painting of the Roman Catholic church. Her knowledge of it is not limited to a few of the great painters and a few of their greatest paintings. It extends to the more obscure artists, almost every one of whom has left us something worthy of admiration. Her appreciation is genuine and personal, and not gathered from books. She is familiar with the entire range of Christian symbolism. She has unstudied skill in communicating her thought. On the whole, her work is worthy to stand beside those of Mrs. Jameson and Mrs. Clement. It has the advantage of an acquaintance with the most recent literature on the subject. The publisher has done much for the book, giving it photographic illustrations of a high order, and luxurious paper and binding.

The small volume by Thümmel^a is a part of the more comprehensive study of excommunication. The Romish church inflicts punishments upon the living and the dead. But the Evangelical church

^a*Die Versagung der kirchlichen Bestattungsfeier, ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Bedeutung.* Von W. THÜMMEL. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902. viii + 196 pages. M. 2.80.

recognizes no church punishments—they are unworthy of a church. The work is divided into two parts. The first is historical, beginning with the denial or lessening of the ceremony among the Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews; the Christians during the first five centuries; the ecclesiastics from the sixth to the seventeenth century. Then follow sections on the Reformation; orthodoxy, and the illumination; and the nineteenth century. The second part treats of the present import of the ceremony in its various phases. The work is one of much value to those seeking a knowledge of the subject in a small compass.

The history of baptism,⁹ so far as it has yet been written, considers only two classes of subjects, namely, adults and infants. But in the lapse from the baptism of believers to infant baptism there was an intermediate stage of child baptism, distinct from both the others. In the first century the typical candidate was an adult; in the tenth century the typical candidate was an infant; but in the fifth or sixth century the typical candidate was a young child, not an infant. This middle stage of the process has yet to be studied by historians. Diettrich presents us with a contribution to the subject, though he does not recognize it as such. He calls it "the oldest ritual of infant baptism known in Christendom." But it is plainly not adapted to infants, but to young children who have emerged from infancy. Diettrich is cast into great perplexity by his lack of acquaintance with this intermediate stage of the process. No less than four times does he find himself compelled to add footnotes to the text pointing out features which are inapplicable to infants, and referring them to adults. But obviously they have neither adults nor infants in view; they regard the candidate as a young child. In addition to these four, we have marked five passages of the same class. A liturgy for infant baptism containing nine passages which cannot possibly be applied to the baptism of infants would be a strange thing. In this liturgy we have passed down below the stage of the child instructed in the catechumen school. The candidate is younger, for the catechumen schools have fallen into decay or extinction. Hence the ceremonies of exorcism, of the renunciation of the devil, and of the confession of faith are omitted, and, at certain places, the child is held in the arms of an older person as a symbolical act. We see the Nestorian church approaching infant baptism, but not yet fully adopting it. With the exception of this

⁹*Die nestorianische Taufiturgie ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter Verwertung der neusten handschriftlichen Funde historisch-kritisch erforscht.* Von LIC. DR. G. DIETRICH. Giessen: Ricker, 1903. xxxi + 103 pages. M. 4.

misinterpretation, the work of Diettrich is admirably done, and fills a place in the history of baptism which was almost empty.

Dr. Barry traces the history of the papacy²⁰ from the first bishop of Rome to the overthrow of Boniface VIII. at the opening of the fourteenth century. He writes sympathetically, being a Roman priest, but is chiefly concerned with the facts, and so is at liberty to point out without reserve the strong and weak points on all sides. The result is a very admirable and judicial survey of the papal monarchy from its beginning to its overthrow as a temporal world-power. The style is always limpid and often felicitous. His grasp of the entire situation is comprehensive. The reader may therefore count on a pleasant and instructive journey with him over thirteen centuries of history. There are numerous illustrations which add much to the interest and value of the book. Among these are Anagni and the papal palace and broken bridge of Avignon. Dr. Barry is very sure that the mediæval papacy served a great and necessary purpose as the guardian at once of faith, learning, law, and civilization. . . . Its benefits far outnumber its abuses, and the glory is not dim which hangs round its memory when we call to mind that it consecrated the beginnings of a peaceful, Christian Europe and watched beside the springs of art, science, industry, order and freedom. (P. 428.)

Along with many other large movements and long-standing institutions it came to an end in the second half of the thirteenth century.

THE REFORMATION PERIOD.

Mr. Workman's²¹ books constitute a series of improvements. This last volume is the best of them all. It is based entirely on original investigation. Each paragraph is the author's independent judgment. He was running perilously close to Bishop Creighton, but in each case he reached his own conclusions before consulting the bishop. So the entire volume bears the impress of originality. Hus is tardily coming to a just recognition. While Wiclif was undoubtedly his master, Hus has a value and importance of his own. He had his own forerunners, and grew up in the atmosphere of his own nationality and his own times. It is safe to assume that if he had never heard of Wiclif, he would nevertheless have made a great stir. This is clearly seen from the true historical setting which Mr. Workman has given him. We

²⁰ *The Papal Monarchy*. By WILLIAM BARRY, D.D. New York: Putnam, 1902. xxii + 435 pages. \$1.50.

²¹ *The Dawn of the Reformation*. By HERBERT B. WORKMAN. Vol. II: "The Age of Hus." London: Kelley, 1902. xvi + 374 pages. 3s. 6d.

have one hundred and fourteen pages dealing with the Great Schism, the Council of Pisa, and the forerunners of Hus, before the central figure is introduced. The bibliographies are very full, giving both original and secondary sources. Eighteen brief but valuable appendices enhance the value of the work. The volume is bright and attractive, and is an advance upon its predecessors. We hope that the author will give us another volume on the influence of the Mystics, as he half promises in his preface.

Some brief periods of time are so full of momentous influences that we never cease to study them in the hope of understanding them better. Such a period is that of the Leipsic disputation between Eck on the one side, and Carlstadt and Luther on the other. Seitz¹² has found three new manuscript sources from which to construct the history. They contribute something to our knowledge of it, though not much. They give us a more correct Latin text of the speeches. They give us more exact dates at certain points. They give us some names of attendants not before published. This work of Seitz will take its place as the standard for all future references to the debate and all future quotations from the utterances of the champions on either side.

The value of a work on the evangelical church codes of the sixteenth century¹³ depends on its completeness and its accuracy. The volume leaves nothing to be desired in either of these respects. Its completeness is seen in the fact that the legislation is sometimes repeated for the different districts to which it was applied by Luther, though an effort has been made to avoid a too tedious reiteration of the same things. Its painstaking accuracy is equally apparent. Each code is accompanied by a historical introduction admirable for fulness and perspicuity. The old spelling has been modified, though not entirely modernized, so that one can read these earliest laws of the Lutheran church with ease. Latin types have been substituted for the German throughout. The paper is luxurious, and the press-work a model of distinctness and beauty. This first volume is more important for the general reader than any of the others, for it shows us Luther

¹²*Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation (1519): Aus bisher unbenutzten Quellen.* Herausgegeben von LIC. THEOL. OTTO SEITZ. Berlin: Schwetschke & Sohn, 1903. iv + 247 pages. M. 3.

¹³*Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts.* Herausgegeben von DR. JUR. EMIL SEHLING, Universitäts-Professor in Erlangen. Erste Abtheilung: "Sachsen und Thüringen, nebst angrenzenden Gebieten;" Erste Hälfte: "Die Ordnungen Luthers; Die ernestinischen und albertinischen Gebiete." Leipzig: Reissland, 1902. xxiii + 746 pages. M. 36.

driven to the disagreeable task of legislating for a vast church left without precise regulations, and accomplishing it with rare tact and wisdom. Had he possessed as much skill in selecting men to carry out these regulations as in framing them, he would have been known as one of the great organizers and rulers of history. As curious and interesting as any other features of this legislation are the scraps of theology which he intersperses through it. The work is a monument of careful editing and clear exposition.

*The Reformation in Goslar*¹⁴ is the seventh number in a series entitled "Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens." Goslar came over to the Protestants in 1528 after the heroic age of the Reformation, and hence the narrative presents relatively few dramatic incidents and characters. For readers in general its interest may be somewhat diminished by the exact reproduction of many documents of the sixteenth century with their orthography unchanged. This feature, however, renders it valuable to the investigator, for whom it was prepared, and to whom it is strongly recommended.

*Johann von Leiden*¹⁵ is the first number of a series entitled "Bilder aus der religiösen und sozialen Unruhen in Münster während des 16. Jahrhunderts." The author writes with full command of the sources and with considerable literary skill, and constructs a historic picture at once accurate and fascinating. He begins by exonerating the anabaptists as a body from all sympathy with the polygamy of John of Leyden, and protests against the inference that their views contained any tendency to vice. He has something new to tell us about the chief actor in the tragedy of Münster, and presents him to us as a sort of Miltonic Satan. John of Leyden is usually regarded as an ignorant fanatic, and nothing more. But here he rises to the proportions of a bad hero, sensual, self-seeking, but of consummate ability. We see him defending Münster for a year and four months against the repeated assaults of overwhelming numbers brought from all parts of the empire. This he does with a force that could never have exceeded sixteen hundred men. He is overcome at last only by treachery. If the other volumes of the series shall prove as fair and as

¹⁴ *Die Geschichte der Reformation in Goslar; nach dem Berichte der Akten im städtischen Archive dargestellt.* Von PROFESSOR DR. HÖLSCHER. Hannover und Leipzig: Hahn, 1902. 195 pages. M. 3.60.

¹⁵ *Johann von Leiden. Seine Persönlichkeit und seine Stellung im münsterschen Reiche.* Von DR. HEINRICH DETMER. Münster (Westf.): Coppenrath, 1903. 71 pages. M. 1.25.

interesting as this, it will give us valuable guidance through one of the small but curious by-paths of church history.

Pietism¹⁶ has played an important part in the history of the Lutheran church. We have before us a brief treatise which reviews the whole subject, taking in the movement of Spener from about 1680 to 1703, and the contest with separatistic Pietism from 1703 to 1705, and the growth of tolerance from 1715 on. It could hardly have been possible that Pietism would not result in separatism, for the same causes operating according to the same laws are found here as in all cases where divisions take place. The author finds that the difference between orthodoxy and Pietism is not so much dogmatic and ethical as practical and ecclesiastical. The service of Pietism was to push back the over estimation of pure doctrine by toning up the religious life through a return to the Scriptures as a source; to put new emphasis on personal Christian life as over against faith in ecclesiastical institutions; to give proper recognition to the lay element; in short Pietism may be briefly defined as the emancipation of personal piety from the power of the church.

Dr. Kolde writes an important chapter in the history of toleration.¹⁷ Notwithstanding the terrible instruction of the Thirty Years' War, Bavaria refused to permit Protestant citizenship and Protestant worship until the opening of the nineteenth century. In order to maintain her position as the champion of Catholicism in Germany, she banished her best people and sacrificed her industries and reduced herself to poverty. Two influences induced her to adopt a saner policy, neither of them of a very lofty nature. One was her perception of her industrial and intellectual decadence; the other, the spread of rationalism among her rulers, making them indifferent to all the religious confessions. The change came in 1803. It led to the immigration of Protestants, to the revival of business, and to renewed intellectual vigor. The state is still Catholic; the Protestants in it are not numerous; but it has joined in the general advance of the German empire, though it does not occupy the leading position which its great population and its abundant natural resources should give it.

¹⁶ *Die Anfänge des Pietismus und Separatismus in Württemberg.* Von CHR. KOLB. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. iii + 218 pages. M. 2.

¹⁷ *Das bayerische Religionsedikt vom 10. Januar, 1803, und die Anfänge der protestantischen Landeskirche in Bayern.* Ein Gedenkblatt. Von DR. THEODOR KOLDE. Erlangen: Junge, 1903. 44 pages. M. 0.90.

ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY.

In an earlier number of this JOURNAL we have already expressed our high appreciation of *A History of the English Church*, edited by Stephens and Hunt, and to be completed in seven volumes. Four of the volumes, bringing the history down to the death of Mary, are now before the public, and they amply fulfil the promise of the editors to base their work on "a careful study of original authorities and the best ancient and modern writers," and to make it their principal concern to tell the truth without partisan prepossession and bias. Editor Hunt prepared the first volume,¹⁸ extending from Gregory to William the Conqueror. Of it we have already said that if the volumes which follow equal it in learning and candor, the work as a whole will be the best history of the English church yet written. The second volume¹⁹ in the series, prepared by Editor Stephens, extending from William to Edward I., is equally worthy of commendation. It deals with such kings as the Conqueror, William Rufus, and Henry I. and II., and with such great ecclesiastics as Lanfranc, Anselm, Becket, and Langton. The third volume²⁰ in the series, dealing with the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was intrusted to Canon Capes. He has abundant knowledge directly from the documents, has this knowledge under complete control, is fair-minded and sympathetic, and is so nearly unerring in his conclusions that one hesitates long before differing from him on any important matter. His period is one of stirring events, including such subjects as Chaucer, Wiclif, Langland, the Great Plague, the uprising of the peasants, the Lollards. We are naturally much interested in the state of education in this period, and so we have a most interesting chapter on schools and universities. Nearly all the phases of church life receive careful attention, and with the fullest knowledge of these various subjects, Canon Capes has given us a very complete picture of these two centuries with all the parts organically related. A very good test of a churchman's fairness in treating this period is to be seen in his manner of dealing with Wiclif and the Lollards. Our author here is eminently judicial. He evi-

¹⁸*The English Church from its Foundation to the Norman Conquest (597-1066)*. By REV. WILLIAM HUNT, M.A. London and New York: Macmillan. xix + 444 pages. \$2, net.

¹⁹*The English Church from the Norman Conquest to the Close of the Thirteenth Century*. By the Dean of Winchester. London and New York: Macmillan. xiii + 351 pages. \$2, net.

²⁰*The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*. By W. W. CAPES, M.A. London and New York: Macmillan. \$2, net.

dently seeks neither to overstate nor understate the case. The result is that he sees all the points and gives us a statement with which we believe that few historians with our present status of Wiclif knowledge will be likely to take issue. In the *History of the English Church* the last volume²¹ to appear, the fourth in the series, is on the Reformation period. It is from the pen of James Gairdner. In point of learning no man is better qualified for the task. The man who can follow Professor Brewer and calendar the papers of the reign of Henry VIII. knows the history from the inside and knows it down to the finest points. But this piece of work makes it plain that the historian needs something more than erudition. Dr. Gairdner has gathered the facts and he has marshaled them in orderly sequence, but he has not written a history. After the meaning of these facts, their immense significance and importance, their bearing on human interests and destiny, he has not been concerned to inquire. He is dealing with the most thrilling period in English history, and he deals with it in so cold, hard, dry, unsympathetic a way as almost to anger the reader. He seems to have the intellect to chronicle events, but not the soul to understand, appreciate, and write history. In England a great movement was in progress, great intellectual and moral forces were in operation which were to shape and determine the destiny of the nation, and powerfully to affect the civilization of the modern world, and yet in reading these pages no one would suspect what was really going on, so blind is the author to the meaning of it all and so little does he touch the quivering life of those eventful times. The volume has its place in the series, and men will consult it to verify or correct their information about small matters, but no one will ever read it to find out what the English people were really doing in the reigns of Henry, Edward, and Mary.

To demonstrate the effect of the doctrine of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ on certain lives, and to mark how those lives ministered to the formation of English national character, is the object of the Bampton Lectures for 1903.²² The author is manifestly a ripe historical scholar. One feels that there has been throughout careful weighing and separation of matter of fact from matter of legend and myth.

²¹ *The English Church in the Sixteenth Century from the Accession of Henry VIII. to the Death of Mary.* By JAMES GAIRDNER, ESQ., C.B., LL.D. London and New York: Macmillan. vii + 430 pages. \$2, net.

²² *The Influence of Christianity upon National Character as Illustrated by the Lives and Legends of the English Saints.* ("Bampton Lectures" of 1903.) By WILLIAM HOLDEN HUTTON, B.D. New York: Dutton & Co., 1903. 385 pages. \$4, net.

A vast literature has been searched and analyzed, and from it has been culled this book, which might fairly be called a science (in outline) of English hagiology. Mr. Hutton has, in large part, made intelligible and invested with interest what has hitherto seemed too much like a mass of monotonous miracle and fable—fair field for the man whose interest lay in bones and stones, not in men and affairs. The saints herein reviewed are all of the pre-Reformation period. For the epoch of the Reformation “not unfitly,” Mr. Hutton somehow or other thinks, “closed for us in England the canon of the saints.” And he adds:

It is not that the society in which these lives were cherished can no longer bring forth fruit in perfection: but not unwisely or unnaturally the technical expression of it, the formal recognition won in past times, has ceased to be given.

One exception is to be noted, however—King Charles, saint and martyr. This king, “who even might” forget or deny “his word,” kept faith with the church, and was dubbed saint and martyr, and officially revered as such for two centuries. That is to say, he was saint and martyr, not in virtue of the possession of common honesty, but in virtue of the fact that he was defender of the church, and therefore defender of the faith, and therefore champion of the Christ. Straightway one is constrained to ask: What, then, is a saint? The book is a splendid attempt to answer this vexed question:

The saint is one who claims to live a life—of faith—of which Christ is the Leader and the Finisher; to act in a society—the church—of which Christ is the only and immortal Head.

The faith determines and defines the saint, death in the name of the faith the martyr! Throughout the book Mr. Hutton has most admirably and searchingly applied the test “by their fruits ye shall know them.” Faith and works make the saint, not works and faith. In support of this idea, in addition to the illustrations he abundantly adduces from the lives of the saints, he cites with great aptness the intent of the author of the epistle to the Hebrews (chap. 11). It is the definition of the historian rather than the idealist.

The English ideas of catholicity and the Roman do not exactly coincide, and hence not yet can the two churches coalesce. The Roman view of the situation and terms of reunion are disclosed in a volume of essays by Father Carson.²³ The titles of these essays will sufficiently show that it is not intended to “reunite” in the sense in which that word is commonly understood among church reunionists: “The Evo-

²³*Reunion Essays*. By REV. W. R. CARSON (Roman Catholic Priest). New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

lution of Catholicism;" "A Moderate View of Papal Infallibility;" "The Social Aspect of Confession;" "The Kenosis of Christ;" "The Kenosis of the Church;" "The Maternity of God;" "The Personal Factor in Religious Belief;" "Anglician Concessions on the Invocation of Saints;" "The Rationale of Saint Worship;" and an "Appendix on the Non-Infallible Dogmatic Force of the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* of Pope Leo XIII. Condemning the Validity of the Holy Orders of the Church of England." In a fine old academic way Father Carson pleads throughout that the characteristic Roman—not Catholic, but Roman—dogmas of the later councils and infallible pontiffs are really not so absolute, or unreasonable, or unscriptural after all. Whatever appeal to us the book may possess comes by way of the first essay, "The Evolution of Catholicism." Its argument is familiar:

By the law of metabolism every particle of our bodily frame disappears in cycles of seven—some say even fewer—years; but this does not prevent the persistence of the same person in unaltered reality as the subject of manifold experience. . . . It is the same with the church of Christ, its constitution and its doctrine. . . . The church of Leo XIII. is the same church as that of St. Peter in the sense in which the I of today am the same as the I of thirty years ago; but the two are not identical; there is an increasing movement and process of formation.

This appeal to the continuity of life gives a color of plausibility to the whole book. For continuity of life and effort is a divine attribute. The church, as representative of this, is divine. The Roman Catholic church does represent continuity of Christian life and effort. The authentic lives of the saints attest this. The Luthèran, and English, and Scotch churches represent continuity of Christian life and effort. Seceders from these churches represent continuity of Christian life and effort. The mistake has been that those who split off have supposed, not always, but far too often, that the evidence of the divine has forsaken those historic churches and come to reside only in them. And those churches were confident the while that they still retained possession of it. What is catholicity—not Roman Catholicism, but catholicity? The question is raised by such books as these *Reunion Essays*. The possession of the loving-service spirit is presupposed. Is it also the possession of a certain richness or abundance of expression of that spirit? Can a single institution enfold all forms of that expression? Can a single institution focus all its forms of expression? Catholicity assuredly implies a wholeness, inclusiveness, comprehensiveness of some sort, whether doctrinal or geographical. How far can a church be

eclectic and yet catholic? Father Carson settles these difficulties very easily. He rightly divines that in catholicity lies the hope of reunion. But catholicity and Roman Catholicism are synonymous terms according to him, and reunion cometh by way of acceptance, among other things, of the doctrines of papal infallibility, the invocation of saints (spoken of by the twenty-second of the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England as "a fond thing, vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God"), and by such highly speculative doctrines as the kenosis of Christ and the kenosis of the church.

DENOMINATIONAL HISTORY.

The celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of John Wesley's birth called from the English and American press numerous volumes in appreciation of Methodism and its founder. Many of these are ephemeral, but some are of permanent value. No one doubts the undying worth of *Wesley's Journal*. Herein as nowhere else one learns, not only what manner of man Wesley was, but the character of the times in which he lived. It has been said that no man can understand the real history of the English people during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries who has not read most carefully the *Journals* by Fox and Wesley, and Newman's *Apologia*. Of *Wesley's Journal* it has also been said that between the two Octobers in which its first and last entries were made, fifty-five years between, "there lies the most amazing record of human exertion ever penned or endured." The recent bi-centenary celebration moved publishers in England and America to issue editions of this immortal diary. The reader who wishes the complete work must purchase the standard four-volume edition. The Watkinson²⁴ popular edition condensed is in two volumes, printing about one-half the *Journal*. The pages are in double columns, and at the top are running titles and the month and year. This device, together with a copious index, gives a ready reference to the contents. The edition by Hughes²⁵ is in a single volume and contains about one-fourth the original material. In addition to an "Introductory Essay" by the editor, it prints the celebrated "Appreciation"

²⁴ *The Journal of John Wesley*. Popular edition condensed. Introduction by REV. W. L. WATKINSON. In two volumes. London: Kelly, 1903. xii + 463 + 485 pages. 3s. 6d. each.

²⁵ *The Heart of John Wesley's Journal*. With an Introduction by HUGH PRICE HUGHES, M. A., and an Appreciation of the Journal by AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, K. C., edited by PERCY LIVINGSTONE PARKER. New York, Toronto, Chicago: Revell

by Augustine Birrell, K. C. The cheapest edition²⁶ in one volume of 424 pages, is published by Kelly of London. It has used the pruning knife most in the second half of the *Journal*, thus retaining all that is most thrilling in the story of early Methodism. "A Methodist Preacher" who withholds his name gives us a life of *John Wesley, the Methodist*,²⁷ written in popular style, and following for the most part the chronological order. It will command a large sale because it brims over with eulogy, is spirited in recital, is gotten up handsomely, and contains a hundred portraits, views, and facsimiles. Withrow's *Makers of Methodism*²⁸ sketches the lives of Susanna Wesley and her sons, John and Charles, Whitefield, the Countess of Huntingdon, Fletcher, Coke, Asbury, and other English and American leaders in the great revival. The design is to illustrate the spirit of the movement by the study of a few of the noteworthy actors in it. A little book by Fitzgerald, *The Roots of Methodism*²⁹ is exactly what its title imports. It deals only with those great outstanding facts which every intelligent student of the movement ought to know, and it does this in a lucid and interesting way. Another work, entitled *Wesley and His Preachers*,³⁰ conveys a mass of valuable information of a sort no one would look for from the title. It runs through more than three hundred pages of chatty, rambling gossip about the characteristic features of the eighteenth century—traveling and travelers, singular phases of town and village life, the common people and the upper classes, prisons and prisoners, superstitious notions and beliefs in which Wesley himself largely shared. It is a book from which one can get countless useful hints and side glimpses of the social, moral, material, ecclesiastical condition of things amid which Wesley lived and wrought—the cost of living, imprisonment for debt, drinking customs, the dirty habits, evil practices, brutal temper, and mob violence of the common people, the poverty and degradation of the working classes, highway robbery, wrecking and smuggling, criminals dangling on gibbets by the roadside. These pages

²⁶*John Wesley's Journal*. Abridged edition. London: Kelly, 1903. 433 pages. 2s.

²⁷*John Wesley the Methodist*. By a Methodist Preacher. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye, 1903. 319 pages. \$1.25, net.

²⁸*Makers of Methodism*. By W. H. WITHROW, D.D. London: Kelly, 1903. 256 pages. 2s. 6d.

²⁹*The Roots of Methodism*. By W. B. FITZGERALD. London: Kelly, 1903. 217 pages. 2s.

³⁰*Wesley and His Preachers: Their Conquest of Britain*. By G. HOLDEN PIKE. London: Fisher Unwin; Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1903. 910 pages. \$1.75, net.

reveal a state of morals well-nigh incredible, and it was out of these lowest depths of profligacy and vice that the Wesleyan revival lifted the English people. The Methodists of Canada may well rejoice in the thirty-third Fernley Lecture, in which Dr. Sutherland³¹ presents the salient features in the development of Wesleyanism from small beginnings into that "compact and thoroughly organized church" which now numbers nearly one-fifth the whole population of the Dominion. It is a story of surpassing interest, and it is told with a clearness and felicity and force of statement which compel the reader's attention and acquiescence. In many lands the history of Methodism has repeated itself. In its essential features it is everywhere the same. In Canada as elsewhere it is a great religious movement, having its start in the rectory of Epworth and in the Holy Club at Oxford, and in its progress always intense and aggressive, eager for conquest, and confident of victory. To Methodist readers the chapters in Dr. Sutherland's survey which deal with the relations of their Canadian church with the British conference, the development of their missions, and the unification of their denomination will be deemed of special historical significance. The non-Methodist reader will be more taken with the romance and pathos of the pioneer days and with the heroic struggle for civil and religious liberty. That, too, is a history which has repeated itself wherever the English established church has borne sway. We are familiar enough with its ecclesiastical intolerance and tyranny in our own colonies, in Virginia, in Maryland, in the Carolinas, and in the mother-country itself; but quite as disgraceful was the outrageous treatment of nonconformists in Canada, and quite as resolute and triumphant was the contest in Canada for equality before the law. If in America in the Revolutionary period the Methodists were too closely allied with the English establishment to render signal service to the cause of freedom, they are to be awarded the highest meed of praise at a later period for their valiant struggle on Canadian soil for the rights of free-born citizens to worship God in keeping with their own convictions of conscience. When the Methodists once broke free from the trammels in which their founders confined them, they were among the foremost in demanding both civil and religious emancipation from Old World tyranny. The twelfth volume of Hauck-Herzog's *Realencyclopädie* closed with an article of fifty-seven pages by Professor Loofs on "Methodism;" the thirteenth volume begins with an article of twenty-

³¹ *Methodism in Canada: Its Work and its Story*. By ALEXANDER SUTHERLAND, D.D. London: Kelly, 1903. 350 pages. 4s. 6d.

five pages on "Methodism in America"³² by an able young theologian of the German Methodist church. The article by Professor Loofs is the first accurate and impartial treatment of Methodism ever published by a German theologian. While German theologians scan the history of the continental churches with a microscope, they seem to be almost blind to the rich church life of England and America. The free religious life of America especially could serve them as a laboratory and experiment station in church formation. Methodism is to be congratulated that in Professor Nuelson, of Berea, O., it has a scholar with full American information and also with full use of German, to place its history in America before the German theological world. The article is especially rich in its bibliography.

Though the contrast between Methodism and Presbyterianism in doctrine and polity is marked enough, yet in devotion to Christ, zeal for missions, love for education, and liking for organization, the two communions are animated by the same spirit. Dr. Thompson,³³ secretary of the Presbyterian Home Mission Board, is especially qualified to trace the history of his denomination in this country. He is more concerned with the missionary life and work of the church than with its ecclesiastical form and dogmatic thought. Presbyterian order and Calvinistic theology have their nearer origin in John Calvin, but in their essential principles they date back to Christ himself. The history proceeds on this assumption. The same may be said of another work,³⁴ covering the same ground, prepared by three Presbyterian professors of church history, each of whom tells the story through one of the three periods into which the whole is broken. We find ourselves quite in sympathy with the noble achievements which these two volumes record, but we are persuaded the wholesome impression would not have been lessened, and the truth of history would have been better conserved, had the writers frankly acknowledged some of the shortcomings of the church whose valor and virtue they have set themselves to extol. For example, from these pages no one would suspect that the Presbyterians were ever guilty of intolerance from the days of John Calvin to the

³² *Methodismus in Amerika*. Separatabdruck aus der Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Von Professor J. L. NUESLEN, D.D.

³³ *The Presbyterians*. ("The Story of the Churches.") By C. L. THOMPSON, D.D. New York: Baker & Taylor, 1903. 312 pages. \$1, net.

³⁴ *A Short History of American Presbyterianism*. By Drs. A. T. MCGILL, S. M. HOPKINS, AND S. J. WILSON. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1903. 207 pages.

present hour. The impression is conveyed that they were always staunch defenders of religious liberty, and that through untold sufferings they bequeathed to us this priceless boon. Would it not have been better openly to confess that through the greater part of their history they simply wanted liberty for themselves and had no idea of granting it to others? It is true enough that they suffered at the hands of persecutors, but it is equally true that "new Presbyter was but old Priest writ large." In the matter of intolerance and ecclesiastical despotism unfortunately Presbyterians must be classed with Episcopalians and Romanists, their only merit being that they learned the true meaning of religious liberty a little sooner than the others. When finally here in America they came to see that toleration is not the "last and strongest hold of Satan," and that the freedom of others is as sacred as their own, then they became and have ever since remained "thoroughly loyal to the cause of liberty and the rights of mankind."

In the uniform set of denominational histories being published by Baker & Taylor the account of the Presbyterian church by Dr. Thompson is confined to this country, but Dr. Vedder in treating of *The Baptists*²⁸ devotes more than half his pages to their history in England, giving somewhat special heed to their historical antecedents. He has a penchant, not for panegyric, but for truth-telling, and hence the plain facts come out even though theories cherished in certain quarters are upset thereby. When history is being written the partisan and advocate have lost their vocation. If there is no historic proof of an apostolic succession of Baptist churches; if descent from the anabaptists is precluded by the vagaries, errors, and crotchets which were inseparably mixed with anabaptistry; if the history of the Baptists properly so called really begins with the Separatist movement in England near the opening of the seventeenth century; if in the earlier times the school of Arminius claimed as many disciples as the school of Calvin, and extreme Arminianism and high Calvinism split the Baptist host into warring factions and implacable foes; if at first Baptists were not immersionists, practicing affusion until 1641; if at the bar of history "open" communion can show as many marks of age as "close;" if feet-washing, anointing the sick, worshiping without song, and preaching without pay are ancient Baptist customs; if mid-week prayer-meetings, Sunday schools, young people's and missionary societies, colleges and seminaries, and all the modern ecclesiastical machinery constitute no part whatever of

²⁸*The Baptists*. ("The Story of the Churches.") By HENRY C. VEDDER, D.D. New York: Baker & Taylor, 1903. 245 pages. \$1, net.

the original Baptist heritage—then it is evident that in their history Baptists have passed through all sorts of changes, and that in present-day contentions over disputed points in polity and doctrine the appeal to precedent and to antiquity is of slightest value. In Dr. Vedder's narrative we mark the vicissitudes and changes through which the denomination has passed, its achievements and progress, its periods of stagnation, of decline, of growth, and, here in America, its hard struggle with Campbellism, Masonry, Millerism, and slavery, and, in more recent times, its onward and upward move in missionary and educational undertakings. A history that gives the facts as they are is of immeasurably more interest and value than a mere laudation, and *The Baptists* is such a history. In marked contrast is an English publication, entitled, *What Baptists Stand For*.³⁶ It is hard to conjecture why it was written and how it found a publisher. Its nine chapters are on threadbare themes, in the rambling discussion of which neither freshness of thought nor vigor of statement is displayed.

In passing from Methodist, Presbyterian, and Baptist history to the life and times of the Catholic queen, St. Clotilda,³⁷ we are transported into another world. We witness the scenes and we breathe the spirit of the early Middle Age. Dean Milman in his *Latin Christianity* maintains that in its immediate and remote consequences the conversion of Clovis was the most important event in mediæval history. It meant the founding of the Merovingian dynasty, the overthrow of Arianism, and the establishment of the Catholic faith. This conversion, fraught with such momentous consequences, is to be attributed directly to Queen Clotilda. In writing her life l'abbé Poulin has brought under review the entire history in the midst of which she moved. Interspersed with the biography are extended notices of the Franks and the Romans, the Arians and the Catholics, the peoples whose dominions Clovis subjugated and the sanguinary careers of the sons who succeeded him. The chief source of information is, of course, the *Ecclesiastical History of the Franks*, by Gregory of Tours. The writer has not only reproduced the material thus furnished, but—which is peculiarly interesting and significant—he has himself exhibited the point of view and the very spirit of Gregory. Often the mental and moral temper of the story-teller is more instructive and

³⁶*What Baptists Stand For; and Gleanings in the Field of Baptist History.* By REV. ALFRED PHILLIPS. London: Stockwell, 1903. 120 pages. 1s. 6d., net.

³⁷*Sainte Clotilde.* Par L'ABBÉ C. POULIN. Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse. xxx + 375 pages.

entertaining than the story itself. The life of Clotilda has a certain value, but the value of the religious self-revelation of her biographer is even greater. Here is a man in whose mind Christianity and the papal hierarchy are indissolubly bound together, are indeed identical. By her devotion to the Catholic faith and the mother-church God will direct and determine the history and destiny of France. By their failure to recognize this primordial verity the most illustrious French historians have vitiated their work, and the pages of Guizot, Michelet, Martin, and Thierry are filled with contradictions, incoherencies, false colors, and strange errors which a simple country priest, devoutly Catholic, can easily enough point out. God in the papal church and the papal church in France is the light in which the history must be read, the key with which its mysteries must be unlocked, the scales in which its actors and their deeds must be weighed. Barbarians, Romans, Arians, Catholics, Clovis, Clotilda, Remegius, Geneviève and all the rest can be speedily and justly blessed or cursed by noting their attitude toward holy church; and this human judgment God himself confirms by the gift of miracles. He does not hesitate to display his miraculous power on all sorts of occasions and in all sorts of unexpected ways. Miracles abound, and without wincing the good abbot accepts them all. He credulously weaves them into his narrative, however trivial, absurd, puerile, grotesque, or ridiculous. One stops to wonder what kind of a religion and what kind of a God Clovis and Clotilda and the saints of the fifth century created for themselves, and to wonder still more that a man in the twentieth century can yield himself joyously to such superstition and folly. It must not be thought that l'abbé Poulin is alone in this, for his life of Clotilda has the *imprimatur* of the archbishop of Paris and a highly eulogistic *approbation* by the archbishop of Chambéry.

In this JOURNAL, April, 1903, we reviewed Thwaites's life of Marquette. The life of this illustrious Jesuit missionary and explorer by Hedges³ is in no respect equal to that by Thwaites, except that it gives the full particulars of the discovery of the burial place of Marquette. The author himself declares that his real object is, not to write a full biography, but "to set forth what facts we have on hand concerning the discovery of Marquette's grave, and to prove that the

³*Father Marquette. His Place of Burial at St. Ignace, Michigan.* By REV. SAMUEL HEDGES, A.M. New York: Christian Press Association, 1903. 164 pages. \$1, net.

modest marble shaft in Marquette Park, St. Ignace, Michigan, really marks the final resting-place of the great missionary."

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RECENT LITERATURE IN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

ONE hundred years have passed since the birth of Horace Bushnell. It is natural that the century mark should have suggested the publication of a new volume¹ from his pen. The book contains an unfinished paper on "Inspiration by the Holy Spirit;" eleven sermons, complete or nearly so; twenty-eight selections from sermons, some of which are long extracts, while others contain only a few paragraphs; and about one hundred pages at the end devoted to "Miscellanies and Bibliography." The volume is not without value, for the freshness and vigor of Bushnell's style and thought are here. But, unless one is intending to buy all his works, it will be wise to select volumes long well known in preference to this. The sermons, for example, while of a high order, do not reach the level of that remarkable collection which ought to be in every preacher's library, *Sermons for the New Life*. Ministers who are seeking for good examples of the discussion of current events from the pulpit will find in this new volume sermons relating to the financial crisis of 1857, to the water supply of the city of Hartford, and to the disaster at Bull Run in 1861, that show how one pulpit did this thing (occasionally) and maintained its high standards.

Admirers of James Martineau will welcome this new volume of sermons and addresses² selected from manuscripts left by him at his death. It contains six sermons relating to national duties, sixteen upon more distinctly religious themes, and twenty-three addresses delivered upon various occasions; such as communion, christening, marriage, funerals, theological class graduations, and installations. The charm of his other writings is present—and the lack too. Take, for example, the sermon entitled "Faith in Christ for His Own Sake."

¹ *The Spirit in Man: Sermons and Selections*. By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Scribner, 1903. xi + 473 pages. \$1.25, net.

² *National Duties, and Other Sermons and Addresses*. By JAMES MARTINEAU. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co. viii + 461 pages. 6s., net.

Admirable as what it contains is, what it lacks disappoints. The glow of evangelical preaching is quite absent; the sermon, in effect, is a depreciation of miracles rather than an appreciation of Christ. These sermons, without exception, were first preached by Dr. Martineau in his early ministry, while pastor in Liverpool; and afterward delivered, in their present revised form, to his congregations in Little Portland Street Chapel, London. How complete the revision may have been it is, of course, impossible to know; but they furnish an interesting example of the way early sermons may serve a later use, even after a lapse of a third of a century. It recalls the remark of John Hall, made to the students of Yale Divinity School, that many of the sermons preached during his first pastorate in Ireland he "repeated in New York with apparent attention and profit on the part of the people."

Mr. Torrey's evangelistic tours in the Orient were followed with prayerful interest by many in this country, and accounts of the success which attended meetings of this character in far-off lands were received with thankfulness. Seventeen of the sermons delivered during these tours have been selected and published in an attractive volume.³ They are upon the great themes usually selected for such occasions, and are simple, direct, earnest presentations, illustrated and enforced by incidents drawn largely from the preacher's own experience. It is inevitable that the reader, especially one who has never heard Mr. Torrey, should miss much of the impression produced upon the hearer, and be tempted to ask why some of these sermons were so effective when spoken.

The class of Christian workers known in England as "lay preachers" is comparatively small in this country; but we have many ordained preachers whose work deserves all the appreciation that Rev. F. B. Meyer gives, in the preface of his little book,⁴ to the lay preachers of his own land, and who, like them, have been denied the special training of the schools. There is no reason, therefore, why Mr. Meyer's book may not be useful in America as well as on the other side. It cannot take the place at all of larger works on homiletics, and does not seek to, but one whose limited time and training prevent the use of these will find here many things well said that are worth knowing, and that will be no less useful because not said for the first time.

Six lectures delivered by Bishop Hall of Vermont, on the Bishop

³ *Revival Addresses*. By R. A. TORREY. Chicago: Revell, 1903. 271 pages. \$1, net.

⁴ *Hints for Lay Preachers*. By F. B. MEYER. Chicago: Revell, 1903. 128 pages.

Paddock foundation, before the students of the General Theological Seminary in New York city, make up one⁵ of the volumes before us. These lectures are: (1) "The Use of the Holy Scriptures in Public Worship Inherited by the Christian from the Jewish Church;" (2) "The Use of the Holy Scriptures in the Eucharistic Service;" (3) "The Gradual Development of the Daily Service;" (4) "The Use of the Psalter;" (5) "The Reading of the Old Testament;" (6) "Some Practical Suggestions." The lecturer keeps to the work before him, and addresses himself to the students and clergy of his own church. Yet the lectures are of value to others, in that they present the spirit and purpose of some of the features of the worship of the Episcopal church, and thus enable one who is not a churchman better to understand and appreciate them. Some subjects of common interest, however, are discussed in a helpful way; and anyone who is, or expects to be, a leader in the public worship of a congregation will find it worth his while to read this book. The following quotation, taken from the last lecture, is, considering its source, especially refreshing; and it is to be hoped that the clergy, and ministers generally, will lay it to heart:

If we read intelligibly, we must also seek to read intelligently—to give, that is so far as we can, the proper and intended meaning to the words we pronounce. The sense of Scripture is Scripture; and it is this which we are to bring home to the people. Whatever theory of verbal inspiration any may entertain, it will hardly be contended that the mere words apart from the thought which they express have a sacramental efficacy for the hearer. Deliberately and on principle to refrain from reading with emphasis, so as to avoid putting one's own interpretation on the sacred writings, is a curious mode of showing reverence to Him who is both the Word and the Wisdom of God; and the latter (if one may so say) before the former—the Thought of God more fundamentally than the Utterance of that Thought.

Many men of earnest spirit have sought to bring about the unity of the Christian church. A study of the *Kinship of God and Man*, completed in this the third volume entitled "The American Church,"⁶ is an effort to contribute to this end. The author, who is the rector of St. Stephen's, Milledgeville, Ga., believes (and some of his reviewers seem to agree with him) that he has made discoveries that cannot fail

⁵ *The Use of the Holy Scripture in the Public Worship of the Church.* By RIGHT REVEREND A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. 203 pages. \$1.40, net.

⁶ *Kinship of God and Man.* By REV. J. J. LANIER, in three volumes. Volume III, "The American Church." New York: T. Whitaker, 1903. 184 pages. \$1, net.

to hasten the consummation so devoutly wished. Mr. Lanier certainly realizes the evil of division; that he appreciates the obstacles to unity is not so evident.

A new volume in the series of "Handbooks for the Clergy,"⁷ gives a thoughtful and temperate discussion of authority in the church. Beginning with authority in the state, the author goes on to consider authority in education and the relation of authority to reason, and discusses finally authority in the church. He traces the gradual development of this in the New Testament with some minuteness. The basis of authority in the state, in education, and in the church he regards as fundamentally the same, namely, the social nature of man; the difference in the sphere and extent of this authority being due to a difference of purpose. The remaining chapters are devoted to the consideration of authority as related to polity, to creed, and to practices. To one who already agrees with the author about the constitution of the church the volume will prove suggestive and informing; but to one who questions the scriptural basis, or the desirability of the hierarchical form of church polity, it will be unsatisfactory. This, however, should not be urged as a criticism upon the book, for the design of the series is not polemical, and the volume seems admirably adapted to the purpose for which it was written.

The next book⁸ on our list contains many suggestions that will be helpful to the earnest Sunday-school teacher whose previous training is sufficient to enable him to make use of them; but it is a question whether the average teacher will find here much that will be of service. The author seeks to impress the importance of the adaptation of instruction to the scholar, and show how this may be done. It would seem, however, that he has not altogether succeeded in doing this himself, unless he is addressing a rather small class, or unless the attainment of the average Sunday-school teacher is higher in England than it is in America.

Scotland is rich in famous sons; and she keeps their memory green, not only by full biographies, but by series of small volumes that circulate among the people. Such is the "Famous Scots" series, the latest

⁷*Authority in the Church.* By THOMAS B. STRONG. New York: Longmans' Green & Co., 1903. 173 pages. \$0.90, net.

⁸*Primer on Teaching.* By JOHN ADAMS, M.A., B.Sc. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. 129 pages. \$0.20, net.

⁹*Principal Cairns.* By JOHN CAIRNS. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. 157 pages. \$0.75, net.

issue⁹ of which is before us. The subject of this sketch is Principal Cairns; and the writing is done with both affection and skill. The bracing air of the north country is in the pages that tell of the struggles of the shepherd boy through poverty up to the university, where, by his industry and natural gifts, he justified his mother's sacrifices and hopes, and prepared himself for the large service he was to render his church and the world. Such books as this will keep the fires burning in the breasts of Scottish mothers and lads, and insure a succession in the line of worthies.

*The Life and Letters of Charles Butler*¹⁰ is a fine specimen of book-making. The printer's art is at its best, and the story of a useful life is simply and well told by Professor Stoddard. In educational and religious circles Mr. Butler will be long remembered because of his connection with the New York University and the Union Theological Seminary. He entered the council of the University soon after the institution was founded, and until his death gave it his unwavering support. He was a leader in the establishing of the Seminary, was a member of its board of trustees for sixty-two years, in the last twenty-seven of which he acted as chairman; and was from the beginning one of its most generous patrons.

The Crises of the Christ,¹¹ which in some ways is the most important book on our list, has been reserved for the last. "The aim of this book," says the publisher's note, "is not to add one more to the already long list of lives of Christ, but to indicate how our Lord accomplished the work for which he came." The author's scheme is as follows: Preliminary, "The Call for Christ;" this is discussed under three heads: (1) "Man Distanced from God by Sin;" (2) "Man Ignorant of God through Sin;" (3) "Man Unlike God in Sin." Then follows the discussion of the seven crises in the earthly life of Christ: I, "The Birth;" II, "The Baptism;" III, "The Temptation;" IV, "The Transfiguration;" V, "The Crucifixion;" VI, "The Resurrection;" VII, "The Ascension." Finally, "The Resultant: The Answer of Christ to the Call of Men;" and this is discussed under three heads paralleling the three of the preliminary: (1) "Man Restored to God by Christ;" (2) "Man Knowing God through Christ;" (3) "Man Like God in Christ." Without giving the subdivisions employed in the dis-

¹⁰ *The Life and Letters of Charles Butler*. By FRANCIS HOVEY STODDARD. New York: Scribner, 1903. 357 pages.

¹¹ *The Crises of the Christ*. By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. Chicago: Revell 1903. 477 pages. \$2, net.

cussion of the seven crises, this is sufficient to show that the plan of the book is ingenious and striking; and the first criticism, perhaps, that will occur to some when reading the volume is that too much is made of the scheme. It is dominant rather than subordinate; it not only determines the selection of material, but at times the material itself seems to be molded to fit it. This, of course, is always the danger when a writer has hit upon a striking and ingenious plan. It is the same danger that threatens the scientist who has a pet hypothesis: his inductive work becomes unreliable. There are parts of Dr. Morgan's book that seem admirable to the writer of this notice. The thought is strong, the style attractive, the insight keen, and, best of all, the feeling deeply spiritual and uplifting. For example, the portrayal of the character of God in contrast with sinful man, as given in the third division of the preliminary section, is impressive and suggestive. This is true of portions of the discussion of "The Incarnation," and of other passages as well. But in some places where one might hope for the best, it is not found. There are times when the greatness of the subject under consideration seems almost to paralyze the writer's powers; and yet he lingers. Indeed, the discussion is often unduly prolonged. Then some of his interpretations do not win our confidence; deep significance is discovered where a simpler meaning would be, at least, more natural; and pure assumption is given undue prominence and weight. Thus one who has found himself in agreement with the main positions of Mr. Morgan, and has enjoyed portions of his elaborate study, may be obliged to confess to disappointment when he has finished the reading. Somehow the task undertaken and the method employed are not suited to each other. The task needed an exegete and a theologian; this book is the work of a rhetorician and a preacher. And now that we think of it, it is what might have been expected from the title.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

HOLDEN, H. W. *Justification by Faith and Sacred Trusts in Harmony and Correlation*. London: Skeffington & Son. Pp. xiv + 160. 3s. 6d.

HARNACK, ADOLF. *Augustins Konfessionen: Ein Vortrag*. Dritte Auflage. Giessen: Ricker, 1903. Pp. 32. M. 0.60.

In Harnack's best vein is this enthusiastic appreciation of the great bishop of Hippo.

KNIEBE, DR. R. *Der Schriftenstreit über die Reformation des Kurfürsten Johann Sigismund von Brandenburg seit 1613*. Halle: Niemeyer, 1902. Pp. 161. M. 4.

How came the house of Brandenburg, once strongly Lutheran, to accept Calvinism? The question, not very important in itself, has acquired some interest from the rise of the house of Brandenburg to the imperial dignity. It is answered by Dr. Kniebe in a thorough review of the literature to which the change gave rise.

DOUGLASS, R. G. *Spiritual Evolution, or Regeneration*. Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1903. Pp. 350. \$1.20, net.

HARNACK, ADOLF. *Das Mönchthum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*. Sechste Auflage. Giessen: Ricker, 1903. Pp. 63. M. 1.20.

Another edition of this well-known work shows that the demand for it continues.

VON KUGELN, CONSTANTIN. *Die Gefangenschaftsbrieife des Johann Hus. Nach dem Originaldruck vom Jahr 1536*. Zum Wittenberger Universitäts-Jubiläum neu herausgegeben. Leipzig: Wöpke, 1902. Pp. 30. M. 1.50.

This is a very valuable addition to the sources of the history of the forerunners of the Reformation.

VOYSEY, CHARLES. *Religion for All Mankind*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. 223. 2s. 6d., net.

HOLZAPFEL, P. HERIBERT. *St. Dominicus und der Rosenkranz*. München: Lentner, 1903. Pp. 47. M. 0.60.

This pamphlet is No. 12 of the publications of the church history seminar at Munich. The author shows that Dominic had no connection with the rosary; that the rosary as a national exercise was only of gradual growth; and that it was not until long after Dominic's death that he was brought into connection with the rosary.

LUTHER, MARTIN. *Christian Liberty*. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. Pp. 56. \$0.10.

CARO, ISIDOR. *Die Beziehungen Heinrichs VI. zur römischen Kurie während der Jahre 1190 bis 1197*. Berlin: Fromhalz, 1902. Pp. 64. M. 1.50.

An excellent piece of work.

STEINBERG, AUGUSTA. *Studien zur Geschichte der Juden in der Schweiz während des Mittelalters*. Zürich: Schulthess & Co., 1902. Pp. 159. M. 3.

This pamphlet of 159 pages is the first attempt since the eighteenth century to reconstruct the history of the Jews in Switzerland. It is a carefully wrought out and admirable piece of work.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

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EVERY profound stirring of the ethical or religious spirit on a large scale has two sides—an idea and an aspiration, a conception of ultimate reality and an effort toward ultimate good. The spontaneity, extent, and earnestness of the agitation for religious education justify us in regarding it as a “movement” of this profound kind. It undoubtedly has an idea-side, a philosophy, as the implicit counterpart of its practical purpose. What this philosophy is we may hope to discover by noting the position which the movement occupies among the educational and philosophical currents of the time.

EDUCATION AND THE TELEOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD.

The general educational philosophy of our time is characterized by two tendencies: (*a*) It gives ever-increasing recognition to natural law. This appears most prominently in the shifting of the point of view from the content of instruction to the child—his physical and mental structure, his spontaneous impulses, the stages of his growth, and the relation of his development to the evolution of the species. We have learned to regard education

as a conscious carrying forward of a natural process.¹ (b) On the other hand, the *end* of education is defined in terms of social ethics. Education consists of acts performed by society for social ends. As far as the individual is concerned, it issues, not merely in intellectual power or worldly advantage, but rather in character.

Each of these conceptions has a positive affinity for a particular world-view. To regard education as the conscious carrying forward of a natural process is to include man's will—the will to educate—in the concept of nature. For the underlying thought is that of continuity between the biological processes that shape species in general and the school that shapes the human mind. If education is thus a part of the general cosmic process, it follows that here nature takes conscious charge and control of herself. Further, since education exists for the ethical ends of society, we may infer that here, at least, nature is not only intelligent, but also benevolent.

One may, of course, deny the assumed continuity between evolution and education, or the benevolent character of education; but in so doing one would put oneself outside the prevailing currents of educational thought. Looking backward, we behold the race emerging from animality under the general laws of organic evolution; we see human society forming itself on the basis of natural instinct; and in education we cannot help seeing these same natural factors raised to a higher power. Thus, consciously or unconsciously, we admit teleology to a place beside law. With a little assistance from the theory of knowledge, it might be shown, further, that the purposed evolution that occurs through us cannot be regarded as merely sporadic or without significance for the cosmos as a whole. It is the part of the cosmic process that we know best. Here, where we *are* nature, we cannot help assuming that we have our clearest glimpse into the reality of things.²

¹ "Education is conscious or voluntary evolution."—THOMAS DAVIDSON, *History of Education* (New York, 1901), p. 1; cf. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, *The Meaning of Education* (New York, 1898), Lecture I.

² The only writer, as far as I know, who has attempted a systematic analysis of the metaphysical implications of education is PROFESSOR H. H. HORNE, who discovers here the three ideas of traditional metaphysics—*God, freedom, and immortality*. See *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XII, p. 168.

A teleological view of the world is thus the theoretical counterpart of education as a practical activity. The eyes of education are lifted up toward spiritual heights whence its strength comes. The philosophy of education in general, and of religious education in particular, is all one. Both conceptions have reference to ultimate reality and ultimate good, and whatever truth controls one will control the other also. The religious-education movement is, indeed, simply one phase of the general advance in education. It manifests a quickened consciousness of the ethical end, and also of natural law as controlling the process. Religion as fact of consciousness has a place no longer outside but inside our notion of mind and its laws. Mind, in turn, is correlated with body, and so at last we connect religion with the entire evolution of life. In a real sense, the religious life of each of us is continuous with nature as a whole. Hence religious education is to be thought of as included in the "conscious evolution" which constitutes education in general. What distinguishes the religious variety from any other is simply the fact that it explicitly recognizes the teleology that is implicit in the notion of education, and therefore undertakes to assist the child to identify his will with the universal Over-Will. We have now to note how this very general point of view is related to some of the current conceptions of technical philosophy.

THE INTEREST OF EDUCATION IN METAPHYSICAL IDEALISM.

Asking, then, not what philosophy is true, but what philosophical currents of our time move parallel with the general educational advance, we note, first of all, that the demand for religious education arises coincidently with the decline of dogmatic agnosticism and with the growth of certain types of idealistic metaphysics. Agnosticism has declined partly because a thorough application of its own critical method has revealed an ontological element in cognition; partly because of the newer directions taken by psychological study. Modern psychology connects the fact of cognition with the general ongoing of nature, especially the preservation of life and the evolution of social forms. There results a tendency to regard cognition no

longer as a subjective imaging of nature, but rather as participation in the process of reality itself. This tendency is reinforced by the general recognition of the fundamental place of the will in all mentality. We no longer set ideas and realities apart from each other, and then ask how we can be sure that ideas are true copies of things. We regard the thinking of an idea as itself a will-act, and so as a part or phase of our total reaction upon reality. Reality is therefore regarded as not only knowable, but also actually known in all knowledge whatever.³

This newer phase of the theory of knowledge issues, of course, in an idealistic ontology. A non-mental universe is scarcely thinkable. In one way or another, mind—whether reason or will, conscious or unconscious, personal or impersonal—is ultimate reality. Perhaps the most influential type of idealism at the present time is that which tends to regard the cosmic mind as personal. Idealism of the Hegelian type has been swerved in this direction largely through the fuller recognition of will as fundamental.⁴ The "personal idealism" that results therefrom views reality as consisting of a society of persons having their being in and through one supreme person. The relation between this metaphysics and the new social ethics is direct and obvious.

Its relation to the educational movement is not far to seek. The modern school reform is essentially an effort practically to fuse together nature, culture, and society. The undertaking is reasonable, provided that these three are genuinely continuous; *i. e.*, if the individual realizes his individuality only in society, and is in himself also an index of the world that has brought

³Two recent statements of this point of view may be referred to: "There is no independent object outside of thought, and there is no 'thought in itself,' standing apart and in abstraction from the contents of experience and entering into only occasional and external relations to this content. We do not first have a mind and then become conscious of our relations to objects, but *to have a mind* is just to stand in those self-conscious relations to the objective realities. . . . We are, of course, using the term 'thought' in its broad sense, as inclusive of the volitional and emotional aspects of the life of a rational being."—J. E. CREIGHTON, "The Standpoint of Experience," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XII, No. 6, pp. 593-610; *cf.* F. C. S. SCHILLER, in *Mind*, Vol. XLVII, pp. 341-54.

⁴Perhaps the most prominent very recent example of this general tendency is JOSIAH ROYCE, *The World and the Individual*, 2 Vols. (New York, 1900, 1901).

him forth. If reality is a society having the ground of its unity in a universal person, then, indeed, education and evolution are one process, and the social end of education is one with the cosmic laws involved.⁵

EDUCATION AND THE IMMANENCE OF GOD.

The philosophy of nature that moves within the realm of this idealistic ontology is largely summed up in the theological concept of the immanence of God. This means, among other things, that material things are forms of divine activity; that the laws of nature are simply the orderly methods of a rational will in complete control of itself; that evolution does not suffer any break when man, a self-conscious and moral being, appears; that the correlation of mind and brain is just the phenomenal aspect of the real correlation of our mind with the universal mind in which we live and move and have our being; that the development, physiological and mental, that man receives through nature and independently of his planning is yet a part of an educational plan, and that, in our work as educators, God is working through our reason and will to carry forward this same plan.

Both "worldly" and "other-worldly" views are transcended by this conception. Narrowly "practical" notions of education may be widespread among the people, though they rarely become articulated into a theory. When this does happen, the

⁵There are indications in many directions that educational thought is becoming conscious of the need of co-ordinating itself with a general world-view. A few typical quotations may be suggestive: "No education can reach its highest development until those having it in charge . . . regard it from that standpoint of ultimate human good, and make the training of the child, in the truest sense, a religious act."—J. P. MUNROE, *The Educational Ideal* (Boston, 1896), p. 218. "In essence all education is religious. For what is religion but the consistent recognition that life has to be lived in the spirit of the whole, that we are not fragments, that the world is not a collection of fragments, but that our lives and the life of the world form a real whole?"—J. S. MACKENZIE, "The Bearings of Philosophy on Education," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. VIII, p. 438. "Education . . . is to develop the individual into a capacity for living in conscious unity with the sustaining power of the universe."—ARNOLD TOMPKINS, *The Philosophy of Teaching* (Boston, 1895), p. 274. "Education is man's conscious co-operation with the Infinite Being in promoting the development of life."—BISHOP J. L. SPALDING, *Means and Ends of Education*, 3d ed. (Chicago, 1901), p. 72.

theory turns out to be some form of materialism or agnosticism combined with hedonistic ethics of limited horizon. Yet everything that "practical" education can properly signify is provided for, on a higher plane, by the view that has been suggested. Nerve and sinew, physical forces and physical things, industry, commerce, politics — all these are included within the divine system of human education. We merely obey the divine decrees written in our members when we train hand, eye, and judgment to do the everyday tasks of life. Indeed it adds to the significance of all these things to see in them a divine presence and the means of a divine destiny. The danger of "practical" education is simply that of mistaking means for ends.

"Other-worldliness," on the other hand, failing to recognize God in his world, robbed itself of the very means provided for our training into godliness. The pit from which education has been digged is well illustrated in Comenius, who, though himself one of the founders of the natural method, declared that this life "is not (properly speaking) a life at all, but only the prelude to a real and everlasting existence. . . . Our only business on earth should be to prepare for the next world." Accordingly, he recommended that boys be taught "by the example of infants, boys, youths, and old men who are daily snatched away by death."⁶ In the seventeenth century the nothingness of this life seemed to make education, as preparation for life hereafter, most important. In practice, however, the more distant the end in view, the more is education belittled. It is most exalted when it is seen to carry an exalted end within itself.

Education, then is not mere means either for this life or for that which is to come; it is not mere preparation for life (though it is that), but rather life itself.⁷ Its method is not imposed upon the child, but derived from the laws of the child's self-realization. This is a truism in modern education, and the deeper aspect of it is the conviction that ultimate reality and

⁶JOHN AMOS COMENIUS, *The Great Didactic*, translated by M. W. KEATINGE (London, 1896), pp. 184, 373.

⁷"I believe . . . that the process and the goal of education are one and the same thing."—JOHN DEWEY, *My Educational Creed* (New York: E. L. Kellogg & Co., 1897), p. 13.

ultimate good are not separate from our world, but realized therein ; that the eternal is in the temporal, so that we may have eternal life abiding in us.

The distinction between religious and secular education therefore lapses. The only real education is that which carries into life whatever meaning there is in the world that brings us into being. The problem of religious education is not how to add a feature to our school system, but to determine what education really is, and then to secure — not a kind of education, but — education.⁸

If this principle cuts to the quick the whole notion of secular education, it also penetrates to the joints and marrow of traditional theories of religious training. For while it declares, as against secularism, that natural law expresses a spiritual reality, it also declares unto religious believers that spiritual life is lived in natural forms and under natural law. The opposition between education and grace, growth and conversion, is thus removed.⁹ Education is not a device of men ; it is a divine operation in men. The inner spring of the movement, in both pupil and teacher, is the living God, who worketh even until now, while we also work. Of the effect of true education, not less than of sudden conversion, it may be said : "By grace are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves ; it is the gift of God."

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

Between modern psychology and the movement for religious education there are several points of contact. First, the "faculty psychology" has been so completely superseded that any

⁸The American educational system includes three institutions — the family, the church and the school. Though the functions of these three are not interchangeable, the three must constitute a unit by being pervaded by a common feeling of the meaning of life. Otherwise we have no educational system at all. Though the state school may not teach dogma, its attitude, tone, and point of view should be religious. A school cannot, in fact, be neutral. To develop in the child a purely secular consciousness is to set up standards that compete with religion. Most of our state schools are probably pervaded by the spirit of religion, but many, apparently, are not.

⁹The difference between "growth cases" and "conversion cases" is not in their content, but in the rapidity of a process. See E. D. STARBUCK, *The Psychology of Religion* (New York, 1899).

separation between religious and other consciousness, religious development and other development, is in principle impossible to present thought. In the next place, the extension of the field of psychology to the child-mind and to religion is beginning to furnish insight into the specific laws of religious development. The most significant general point of view thus secured is that the growth of self-consciousness is at the same time growth of the social consciousness, and that this ego-social consciousness has an ideal side, at once an ideal "self" and an ideal "other."²⁰ Here religion has its root. Of more specific results the most fruitful are found in the psychology of adolescent religious phenomena, which is already helping to improve all methods of religious work with youth. This particular movement is so well known that a mere reference to it satisfies our present purpose. A word of caution, however, may be in order. Education is not applied psychology; it is, especially, not applied fragments of psychology. The psychology of religion is not a set of stencils with which to mark packages of humanity preparatory to railroading them to their spiritual destination. Education is the communication of life; and so into the making of education, as into the making of life, goes the whole of history, of philosophy, and of faith.

A third point of contact between psychology and religious education is the clearer insight that recent years have brought with respect to the impulsive and instinctive factor in mental life. Of old the accepted definition of man was "a rational animal." Technically expressed, this is intellectualism, or the theory that cognition is the fundamental quality of mind. In general, this was the point of view of scholasticism. Through Thomas Aquinas it triumphed over the voluntarism of Duns Scotus, and it continued to dominate until Kant gave the primacy to the practical reason. The result was that intellectual training had a disproportionate place. The old-fashioned school, assuming that instruction is the essential part of education, cultivated almost exclusively the memory and the logical reason. Reli-

²⁰J. M. BALDWIN, *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development* (New York, 1897).

religious education consisted in teaching the catechism or the Bible. But because an essential function of mental life was here ignored, the practical outcome was that both the catechism and the Bible tended to become empty forms.

Modern psychology regards the will (impulse, desire, and instinct included) as at least equally basic with intellect. Some writers go to the extreme of regarding intellect as a mere form or expression of will. Now, though we may suspect that mere will and mere intellect are mere abstractions, there can be no doubt that the voluntaristic tendency in psychology has enriched education. It has confirmed the principle of free self-expression upon which the educational reformers have laid so much stress. It has compelled us to attend to the whole circle of the child's spontaneous interests. We can no longer think of education as mere instruction. It consists, rather, in nourishing a self and bringing it to harmonious expression. We cannot impart education; we can only provide the means of self-training. The provision of expressive activities in Sunday schools, the formation of self-governing clubs, the organization of practical service for young people, and similar innovations, are not merely improvements in "method;" they indicate a reversal of the point of view. Intellectualism is being abandoned.

Since education is thus the self-training of the will, it is ethical in process as well as in purpose. The assumption used to be made that education, being a matter of intellect, is ethically neutral, so that an educated thief (this was the stock example) is a worse thief because of his education. Today we are ready to say that a man with an untrained, unsocial will is not quite an educated man. In view of the universality of the religious impulse, the time may yet come when an irreligious man will likewise be regarded as undeveloped. In any case, religious education is ceasing to be identified with dogmatic instruction. It is taking into itself the training of the religious impulse, which manifests itself in feeling and act quite as much as in belief.

The adoption of the evolutionary point of view into psychology creates a fourth point of contact with religious education.

We now realize that the spiritual unfolding of a child is not merely a growth from less to greater, but also a retraversing of the path (shortened, no doubt) from animality to spirituality. As a result, our standard of judgment with respect to the young has to be derived from young life itself in its various stages. The standards of maturity may no longer be used to justify the repressive training of other days. This change in point of view is most marked in its bearing upon the practical aspects of the dogma of depravity. In its complete and unrelieved form, this dogma leads to repression as the only method of training, whereas modern education aims at self-expression. Unless the child has native or germinal goodness, moral and religious education are simply out of the question. Yet it is perfectly evident that the native impulses of the child need readjustment. Some of them must be subordinated or overcome. Good character is an achievement that follows a struggle of a divided self after unity. The evolutionary point of view helps us to do justice to these facts. We are ceasing to think of human life in merely static terms. To the rigid "either—or," the "being and non-being," of good and evil, righteousness and sin, innocence and guilt, has been added the alternative of "becoming." Every child that develops normally is moving out of animality toward spirituality, out of egoism toward social self-realization, out of the life of sense into the life of the spirit. Every child is naturally depraved in the sense that there is always something in oneself to overcome; yet every child is naturally good because the impulse to overcome is also natural.

THE ETHICAL REVIVAL AND THE MOVEMENT FOR RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION.

On its practical side the movement for religious education is a part of the general awakening of the social-ethical sense that has been going on for more than a score of years. But in point of theory the affinity is not so close. The distinctive feature of the newer ethics is its effort to express all ethical conceptions whatsoever in terms of human society. In its more radical form it asserts that society originated under the law of natural selec-

tion; that conscience is entirely accounted for by the pressure of the social will upon the individual; that the only ethical good is social health, progress, etc.; and that the only sanctions of morality are social rewards and penalties. The school, according to this, is simply an instrument for furthering the merely temporal process of social evolution.

What is the relation of all this to religion? According to some writers, religion is simply a naturally evolved means for the self-restraint of the individual in the interest of society.¹² One author holds that, having done its work, it will disappear.¹² These are, of course, extreme views, yet they represent a tendency. Ethics independent of religion is in fashion, and hence education in morals has for this generation a kind of practical self-evidence that religious education hardly possesses. This is the fact even among religious persons. The dependence of moral education upon religion is aggressively asserted chiefly by the Catholic church. The obvious element of truth in this view is that, as the personality is one, so is education; so that religious and other education belong together. Now, religion simply refuses to be a mere means to a temporal process like social evolution. It refuses to be co-ordinate with morals. It insists upon being a higher and inclusive principle; and if it cannot be that, it will be nothing at all. That Protestants are awakening to this truth after neglecting it arouses just pride among the Catholics, who have proclaimed it without ceasing.¹³

Nevertheless, the question as to "dependence" is a complex one, and the different parts of it are often confused. The question may mean either, (a) Has the moral life of the race grown

¹² H. R. MARSHALL, *Instinct and Reason* (New York, 1898); cf. BENJAMIN KIDD, *Social Evolution* (New York, 1895).

¹³ M. J. GUYAU, *The Non-Religion of the Future* (New York, 1897).

¹⁴ While Protestants are awakening to this, which may be called the major premise of religious education, Catholics are awakening to what may be regarded as the minor premise, namely, the natural laws that underlie correct method. See, for example, a pamphlet, *Religious Education and its Failures*, by RIGHT REV. JAMES BELLORD (The Ave Maria, Notre Dame, Ind.). Another sign of the times is the recent establishment of the first Catholic magazine of education, the *Review of Catholic Pedagogy*, Chicago (now the *Catholic Review of Reviews*).

up under natural laws and forces? or (b), Does the moral order in human life rationally imply a universal moral order, or God? or (c), Is the content of duty known only by deduction from religion? or (d), Can the highest character be produced by social motives in the absence of religion?

The type of idealism already referred to, which is ethical through and through, answers both the first and the second of these questions in the affirmative, for it conceives the universal ideal as being realized through law, not in spite of it. As our impulses and emotions are included in the law of our development, dogmatic instruction is not the universal and necessary basis of good character. On the other hand, the highest character must depend upon some realization—at least emotional appreciation—of the world-currents that flow through our being. Enthusiasm for humanity is little more than a fad or a reaction from the *ennui* of egoism, unless it is suffused with some realization that in social service one participates in the spiritual movement of the universe, and thus experiences the eternal in the temporal, God in us. Certainly morals are not a mere corollary of religious belief, yet moral education can complete itself only in religion.⁴⁴

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

The philosophy of religion in its present form might almost be regarded as a philosophy of religious education. First, under the influence of Schleiermacher, it has adopted the psychological method of approach to both its historical and its metaphysical problem. The religions of the world are seen to be expressions of a constitutional fact of the human mind. The "tribe destitute of religion," which figured in the anthropology of the recent past, has disappeared, and the history of religion begins its story

⁴⁴ The ethical-society movement, organized to promulgate ethics independent of religion, quickly discovered that ethics must be raised to religion in order to be complete ethics. Mr. Salter, for instance, says that the moral life consists in making ourselves "the hands by which the eternal purpose realizes itself."—Address on "Ethical Religion," by W. M. SALTER, in *Ethics and Religion* (London, 1900), pp. 74-91; cf. address by W. L. SHELDON, on "What Does it Mean to be Religious?" in *Ethical Addresses*, First Series (Philadelphia, 1895); also W. R. W. SULLIVAN, *Morality as a Religion* (London, 1898).

with the religious impulse as a datum.¹⁵ As a consequence, not only must complete education include religion, but in the actual history of religion we behold an educational process on the largest scale.

In the next place, the philosophy of religion discovers in the developing self-consciousness of man both a logical basis for belief in God and a growing content for the God-idea. That is, God progressively reveals himself through all the normal functions that reveal man to himself. Anthropomorphism, in this higher sense, is both inevitable and reasonable. It is the sole way in which the God-idea (or, for that matter, the idea of nature) obtains articulate content. In the individual and in the race the fact is the same. When conscience awakens, it moralizes the gods as well as men. In proportion as the social instinct discovers itself, it socializes religion as well as morals. Any enlargement of the intellectual, ethical, or æsthetic horizon enlarges in the same direction our ideas of the divine.

Religion can be truly present, then, in all stages of growth, and religious education begins with the infant's first crude efforts at self-realization. This is education not merely *for* religion, but also *in* religion. New light is thus thrown upon Bushnell's famous dictum that "the child is to grow up a Christian, and never know himself as being otherwise." This is possible, not because a young child can attain to the inner side of mature Christian character, even in miniature, but because in any genuine development the highest is germinally present in the lowest. The free self-expression of the native religious impulse at any stage is a revelation of God; it is a stage in the growth of the plant whose flower and fruit appear in Jesus the Christ.

One special feature of the dominant type of philosophy of religion, which is represented by the Cairds and Royce, has a peculiar interest for religious education. The cognitive function, it is said, is universally performed under a tacit assumption of a supreme mind to which the particular mind is related. It follows that reflective or self-conscious performance of the cognitive

¹⁵See, for example, MORRIS JASTROW, *The Study of Religion* (New York, 1901), pp. 195 f., 293, *et passim*.

function, which intellectual culture aims at, must bring the mind nearer and nearer to a fully explicit realization of the divine presence. Thus the traditional antithesis between intellectual and spiritual culture disappears, and from a new point of view the unity of education may be reasserted.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIANITY.

Divine revelation through the human self implies that human personality is the great objective as well as subjective force in education. The child finds himself only through society, and this is a foundation principle of all education, whether secular or religious. It is not the text-book or the laboratory that educates, but the contact of the child with persons. All such contact, whether in the school or out of it, contributes to the formation of character. The sense of the divine grows in the child through contact with other persons who show forth the ideal qualities of divinity. There is, to be sure, a native religious or idealizing impulse; else there had been no progress in the religious consciousness of the race. But the essence of education lies in the fact that native impulses are not left to find for themselves the painful path by which the race has toiled upward out of savagery. Education shortens the process through appropriate contact of the young with the products of past development. What civilizes the child's native impulses is intercourse with the concrete civilization that surrounds him. Just so, religious training must come through concrete religion. No "methods," no catechizing, no written revelation, can do the work in the absence of a living revelation of God in human lives. The foundation of method is the sharing of life between the older and the younger.

Now, the philosophy of Christianity is just the philosophy of this divine self-revelation through human personality brought into relation to the historic Christ. We are able, in some measure, to understand him, because our self-consciousness, like his, bears witness to the God in whom we live and move and have our being. But he is at once the supreme man and the supreme manifestation of God, because what is dim and partial in us becomes clear and complete in him. For the same reason, he is

the supreme educator. Being the actuality of that which is only potential in us, he reveals us to ourselves and becomes an inner dynamic for the realization of our true self. He saves us by the sharing of life that is the essential fact in education. He is therefore both Teacher and Savior; but these two are one. Upon any theory of the divine self-giving for the world, the atonement becomes a dynamic in the human life by a method that is essentially educative. Whether one gradually assimilate the life of Christ as one grows in experience, or be suddenly converted from an already dominant lower self, the inner fact is the same. What moves us in either case is God manifested in a human person who shares our life.

Thus we reach our final and highest conception of religious education, namely, that it is God's self-communication through Christ and through Christly men and women. "The glory which thou hast given me I have given unto them, that they may be one, even as we are one; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected into one; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovedst them, even as thou lovedst me."

WHAT IS A MIRACLE?

By WILLIAM DEWAR,
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THE problem of the supernatural continues to be the pressing theological problem of our day. It goes deeper than most of the other problems before us, and their solution to a very large extent depends for validity on its solution. But the problem is a baffling one, and, it must be admitted, keeps at arm's length the great majority of investigators.

One great difficulty has always been the lack of a clear definition of the supernatural. There have been many definitions constructed; but the arguments that proceed under the one definition often cannot proceed under the others. They frequently represent such entirely different points of view that discussion becomes idle or impossible. And yet, during the last two centuries, there has been a marked progress in this definition of the supernatural. The result is that today we are in a much better position than ever before to debate the well-worn theme.

The purpose of this article is simply to attempt a definition. The discussion of the reality of the supernatural, whether from a scientific or philosophical point of view, cannot proceed without such a definition or agreement, and, plainly, many a difficulty and a debate would have had no existence, if there had been a more critical use of terms. Perhaps the most valuable contribution to the solution of the problem in our day of confusion would be a thoroughly workable conception of the supernatural.

In attempting such a definition, we cannot, of course, begin at the beginning of knowledge. Accordingly the following assumptions will be made throughout the article: (1) We will assume the truth of Christian theism. God is a spirit, immanent in all things, transcending all things, the Creator, Ruler, and Redeemer of the universe. (2) The doctrine of evolution will be accepted as universally valid, and therefore as the mode of creation in all orders of finite being. Nothing finite will be removed from its

domain. Accordingly, (3) the reign of law will be regarded as absolute. No exception will be allowed, however ignorant we may be of many of the laws of the universe. These three assumptions we will take as commonplaces, with which all our other theological ideas must be in congruity.

Now, how shall we obtain the sought-for definition of the supernatural? Three methods offer themselves; viz., etymology, induction, and speculation. We will adopt them in this order.

1. The first method will not detain us long. Etymology can help us little to an understanding of the problem, though its contribution is valuable.

The older word "miraculous" simply means the marvelous or wonderful. This idea is the first that enters into our conception of the supernatural. Many would like to limit the meaning of the latter to this simplest of all its elements. But such a limitation is impossible until the other definitions are disproved.

The later term "supernatural" is more helpful in its significance, though it is as ambiguous as the older term is vague. It is a relative term, and describes something by contrast with the "natural." But what is the "natural"? Many meanings have been attached to it from the earlier use of it to describe all reality, to the latter use of it to denote only the physical order of being. The restriction of its use to denote the physical order is, however, modern; and when the term "supernatural" came into use, the term "natural" certainly covered both the physical and the moral orders. The Christian revelation was called supernatural in distinction from both these orders, which constituted the "nature" of an older day. Here, then, is a difficulty. We commonly use the term "natural" as the equivalent of the physical or mechanical; whereas the term "supernatural" preserves an older usage. But, once stated, the difficulty should never lead to confusion.

There is another ambiguity in the historical usage of the word, which sometimes confuses. It is found in the force of the prefix. What does it mean to be "above" or "beyond" nature? The supernatural transcends the natural, but in what sense? There have been two interpretations of its meaning: (1) The supernatural is transcendent in the sense that truth transcends

true words or justice transcends just acts; or, better still, as God transcends the universe in which he is also immanent. In other words, the supernatural does not denote a part of experience distinct from the physical and the moral orders, but the reality manifested in and constituting the mechanical and moral orders, though not perfectly revealed in their progressive phenomena. A large and influential school of thinkers would interpret the supernatural in this philosophical sense of the transcendent.¹

(2) But there is another understanding of this transcendence of the supernatural, which has the distinction of being the most widely accepted usage of the term. The supernatural is a part of our experience, which transcends both the physical and moral orders, in the sense that it does not conform to their laws, but subordinates these orders to higher ends. The transcendence of the supernatural describes a relation between two parts of experience, not the relation of experience as a whole to the ultimate principle of reality. The supernatural is the miraculous, a series of experienced facts, inexplicable by the laws of nature and morality. This has been by far the most widely accepted usage of the term, and must in fairness be adopted until disproved.

This brief etymological inquiry, therefore, gives only a negative result. We learn the predominant usage of the term to be a description of alleged facts as transcending physical and moral orders of being, and inexplicable by their laws and forces. What the supernatural positively is remains yet to be seen.

II. We come now to our second method of definition, viz., by induction from the facts alleged to be supernatural. The belief in the supernatural has been practically universal throughout human history; and the facts are numberless which are thus designated. We can observe, compare, and analyze these facts, like any other facts of experience, after an approved scientific manner.

We must, however, limit ourselves to a select number; and the miracles of the New Testament are obviously the most typical and credible. Let us accept them as the facts to be defined.

¹ This is also the prevalent conception of the supernatural in much of our literature. The "Natural Supernaturalism" of Carlyle is typical.

In the New Testament we find two distinct series of facts referred to as supernatural; viz., a series of physical events, *e.g.*, making water wine, healing the sick, multiplying loaves and fishes, raising the dead; and a series of moral events, *e.g.*, regeneration, sanctification, prophecy. Whatever the supernatural may be, it apparently transcends both the natural and moral orders of being; and we have these two distinct classes of miracles. There is suggestion in this distinction and unity of the two classes.

There is plainly little room for an inductive study of these miraculous events, since they are far distant in time, and we learn of them only through the report of others whose psychological characters are more or less unfamiliar to us. But if we are looking at distant events through others' eyes, we can at least bring their observations to the test of universal experience.

Let us look first at the physical miracles; and, as a fair example, we will take Jesus' healing of the leper (Mark 1:40-45), a miracle circumstantially recorded by all the synoptists. What do we find in it that is common to them all? The facts can be very easily stated. (1) A sudden physical change, apparently instantaneous—viz., cleansing from leprosy. (2) The change is without any physical cause. From the story, we must understand the leprous condition to remain unchanged up to the moment of healing; and no physical remedy was used. (3) The change follows the volition of Jesus, who by word and touch declared his purpose to heal. "I will, be thou clean." (4) On other occasions Jesus ascribes this power to work miracles to God, given to him by God in answer to prayer (Matt. 12:28; John 11:41, 42; Matt. 28:18). (5) The healing is a work of mercy, done in compassion. A review of the miracles recorded in the New Testament would probably discover these features common to them all.

Let us now look at the moral miracles referred to in the New Testament. There is, unfortunately, more difficulty in determining the facts involved, inasmuch as a moral change is a much more complicated affair than a physical one, and less open to observation than it. But we have the great advantage of the

full religious experience of historical Christianity to aid us; and the difficulty should not baffle us. Let us take Paul's conversion as our example. We will neglect the physical miracles connected with it, and seek the features which it has in common with all other sudden conversions. What are these? (1) A radical change of character, viz., in disposition and purpose of life. (2) The change is antagonistic to previous conduct, and cannot be the moral expression of it. (3) It follows the surrender of a man's life to God in a penitent faith. (4) This faith is a reliance upon God instead of upon oneself for salvation. (5) This salvation is self-realization through self-abnegation. These features will probably be found true of all Christian conversions.

Now, the parallelism between the physical and the moral miracles is obvious; and the features common to them may be easily gathered. Let us arrange them thus: (1) On the assumption of theism, a miracle is a divine act, as truly as any change in providence. (2) It is an act of grace, redemptive in its character. The redemptive character of all miracles, physical and moral, is finely illustrated by Jesus' words in healing one sick of the palsy (Mark 2: 10, 11). (3) Its operation transcends the laws of nature and morality, *i. e.*, does not conform to them. (4) It does not involve the suspension or violation of these laws, but only their subordination to the purpose of grace. (5) It is conditioned by the religious faith of the man who acts as the agent or is the subject of the change.

These are the observations which the Christian church has repeatedly passed upon the miracles reported in the New Testament; and they are acceptable to all who are willing to accept the reports for the sake of definition. They tell us two important things, viz., what the supernatural is, and what its transcendence means. The supernatural is a divine work of grace, for the redemption of the world from evil and the realization of its eternal destiny. This is its positive meaning. Again, its transcendence of natural and moral laws means, not simply that it does not conform to them, but also that grace wields dominion over them, and subordinates them to its redemptive purpose. The laws of

nature and morality are unceasingly operative, but they are subject to the saving purposes of the Eternal Love. These are the important results reached by the method of induction; and by this method, on the report of others, we cannot perhaps easily go farther. The interpretation of these results has now become the important matter; and for that we must adopt the method of speculation.

III. The resort to speculation for the sake of a definition is forced upon us by the startling character of our results by induction. They do not seem to fit into any of our theories of the universe. Hence we are compelled to speculate as to their meaning. Speculation is the attempt to see the particular in the light of the universal, or judge of a part by its relation to the whole. All speculation involves some theory of the universe; and the speculative definition of the supernatural will vary with the theory of the universe accepted. Is there, then, any theory of the universe that gives the supernatural an intelligible place in it?

In a brief review of the leading historical definitions, we must necessarily limit ourselves to the most typical ones—those which reflect the great movements of modern philosophy. We may say, therefore, that there have been three great stages in the progress of modern definitions; and we will seek our definition by following the historical order.

1. The first stage may be called the *dogmatic*. It is the type of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The natural and moral orders constitute the whole universe of God's creation, a work which was complete in the beginning. The miraculous is a divine interposition or intervention for the redemption of the world from the evil which has entered it by man's free will. Each miracle is an overruling of the course of nature or morality, in the violence of love; and since it does not conform to the laws of nature and morality, it must be due to God's direct volition or immediate agency. Let us try to analyze this familiar conception. (1) We have the deistic conception of creation. (2) The miraculous is therefore an intervention or interposition in the finished order of creation. (3) The transcendence of the

spiritual must be due to the direct volition of God, in distinction from his activity through the medium of second causes.

The difficulties of such a conception of the supernatural are apparent. First of all, it makes God use his omnipotence in an arbitrary way, even though in love, that he may save the universe of his creation. It makes the miracles appear as isolated, scattered events, external additions rather than constituent elements of the world, subject to no law but the impulse of love. Then, further, how can God act upon any created object except through its conditions, since there is no such object except so far as it is constituted by these conditions? If God cannot act upon any created object except through its conditions, his action is as completely conditioned in a miracle as in any act of providence. In the miracle's transcendence of natural and moral law, therefore, there must be either an arbitrary suspension or violation of the laws of nature and morality,* or there are other unknown natural and moral laws which are observed in this sovereignty of grace. On the dogmatic theory of the universe, we are shut up to one or other of these alternatives. But if we assume the absolute reign of law, we must reject the first and accept the second, or deny the reality of miracles altogether.

2. We accordingly reach what may be called the *skeptical* stage in the progress of definition. It is the type which has been largely developed in the latter part of the nineteenth century; and its view of the supernatural increasingly prevails.

The dogmatic view, resting upon its theological theory of revelation, held fast by the transcendence of the supernatural over all nature and morality, but could not explain the apparent arbitrariness of a miracle, except by referring it to the immediate agency of God or his direct volition, *i. e.*, action without the medium of second causes. The scientific temper of the nineteenth century, however, could not overlook the numberless conditions of every creature in the universe, without which there can be no such creature. It insisted, therefore, that if miracles be real, there is no breach of law. God's activity in a miracle

* So Hume, etc. Cf. Professor Tyndall's interpretation: "A miracle is strictly defined as an invasion of the law of the conservation of energy," etc.

is not unconditional, and, being conditioned, it is like all other divine activity, subject to law. Accordingly, if the miraculous event does not conform to the known laws of nature or morality, it is yet in strict conformity with other unknown laws of these two domains. And the transcendence of the supernatural is not a transcendence over all nature and morality, but a transcendence within each of these domains, one law being higher than another. Grace, accordingly, becomes a kind of special providence, the sovereign direction of the processes of nature and morality in the redemption of the world from evil and the realization of human destiny.

If we make an analysis of this conception of the supernatural, for the sake of comparison with the other, we reach this result: (1) There is here again the limitation of creation to the orders of nature and morality. (2) A miracle is a divine act in conformity with some unknown law of one or other of these two domains.³ (3) The transcendence of the supernatural is therefore, within, not beyond, these orders of creation.⁴

It will be observed that the divine works of grace are miracles to us only because of our ignorance. With the advance of knowledge, the events so designated will be no longer so designated; and the term "supernatural" will become, as to many it already has, a relic of our superstition. All experience is reducible to two orders of being, natural and moral; and any idea of a third realm, transcending these two, is a mere dream.

This must surely, however, be too easy a solution of a definition. The insistence upon law is welcome. We must believe that the reign of law is absolute, and that there is no part of our experience without law. There can be nothing arbitrary about grace, and we must suppose law where none is known. But this skeptical definition may be as dogmatic as the one it opposes. The one

³Some will recall the discussion by BADEN POWELL in the once famous *Essays and Reviews*.

⁴The definition of a miracle given by ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE in the interest of Spiritualism belongs to this skeptical type, since the spiritual is only a peculiar activity of the moral intelligences; viz., "any act or event necessarily implying the existence and agency of superhuman intelligences" (*Miracles and Modern Spiritualism*, p. 5).

may be ignoring truth as much as the other. For what does the sovereignty of grace mean? It is not simply the sovereignty of God over the orders of creation, for that is as true of providence as of redemption; but it is the transcendence of the religious life in its spiritual development over the natural and moral orders of being. We can escape this conclusion only by objecting to the evidence for the alleged facts.⁵

3. We are therefore forced onward to what may be called the *critical* stage of our definition. Since there is no place for the supernatural in any of our popular theories of the universe, it may be that our theories of the universe are inadequate. Dogmatic theology asserted its place beyond the natural and moral orders, but could give no explanation of its position there. A skeptical theology has found a place for it within these orders of being, but forces it into its place by robbing it of its distinction. The one insists on the transcendence, the other insists on the orderliness of the supernatural; and both facts must certainly enter into our definition. A reversion to the problem of the universe must be our criticism of the dogmatism of each position; and such a reversion discovers a theory of the universe which apparently allows a satisfactory definition of the supernatural.

The error of the old dogmatic theology was twofold: (1) the conception of God's relation to the universe as a purely transcendent one; (2) the mechanical conception of creation as complete in the beginning, and therefore limited to the natural and

⁵The great intellectual obstacle to belief in the miraculous has been the conception of a miracle as an arbitrary interpolation in the order of creation. It has been supposed that we must choose between miracles and the reign of law. But if such be the alternative, miracles must go, for they would be irrational events in a rational world, which is a contradiction. It seems strange that the possibility of miracles being strictly in accordance with law, without losing their distinctive character, should have had such a hard fight for recognition. BUSHNELL, among others, has done yeoman service in emphasizing this truth. "To let go of such a faith, or lose it, is to plunge at once into superstition. If any Christian, the most devout, believes in a miracle, or a providence that is done outside of all system and law, he is so far on the way to polytheism. The unity of God always perishes, when the unity of order and law is lost." (*Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 262.) The nearest approach to a breach of law in the world is sin — *drovula* — a violation of law; but if it is rebellion against the higher law, it is subject to the lower laws of life. There is no escape from law.

moral orders. The dogmatism of such a theory of the universe is very apparent, and has long ago received its correction. God is a Spirit, immanent in all things as truly as he is transcendent above all things. The universe is the self-revelation of God, in the evolution of the finite up through all its forms to the highest order of being. Creation is, therefore, a continuous process, ever going forward, never finished, without beginning or end. In this evolution of the universe we are able to discover the three typical orders of being—natural, moral, and spiritual. Since God is a Spirit, the spiritual is the goal of creation or highest type of being; and it transcends the moral, as truly as the moral transcends the physical. This spiritual theory of the universe is, briefly, the solution of the supernatural offered to us by criticism.⁶ The supernatural is the spiritual, and it therefore transcends both the natural and the moral orders. There is nothing arbitrary about it, for law reigns in the spiritual realm as absolutely as in the lower spheres of the world's development. It is not a scattered series of isolated events, but an order of life, apparently springing out of the lower orders of life, but rising above them and embracing them in its higher unity. It is the kingdom of God upon the earth.

We are not at present concerned with the defense of this spiritual theory of the universe. We are simply tracing the progress in theological definition of the supernatural; and we have found the highest or most intelligible conception of it in this spiritual theory of the universe. For consider how it interprets the two important results reached by induction, viz., the transcendence of the supernatural over all nature and morality, and the redemption of both nature and morality through its grace.

1. The transcendence of the spiritual over the natural and the moral is the fundamental matter. In the spiritual theory of the universe there are the three orders of being—natural, moral,

⁶The lack of a sharp distinction between the moral and the spiritual seems to the writer the chief defect in most of the recent definitions of the supernatural. So Bushnell. See also PROFESSOR J. H. BERNARD'S article in HASTINGS'S *Dictionary of the Bible*, Vol. III, where the distinction is, of course, recognized, but no fundamental meaning given to it.

and spiritual. The transcendence of the moral over the natural is a familiar truth, and furnishes the conception of the supernatural of many able writers (*e. g.*, Bushnell). But the transcendence of the spiritual over the moral, and therefore also over the natural, is, according to this theory, an equally demonstrable truth. It is the familiar distinction of morality and religion in their highest developments. Morality is the life of self-consciousness and self-realization. Religion is the life of divine consciousness and service. In morality man seeks a moral ideal that is unattainable in its perfection by the slow, successive steps of human volition. The infinite is beyond the reach of the finite; and the moral life is a constant defeat, though we may rise as often as we fall. In religion, on the other hand, the infinite perfection of life is identified with the God in whom we live and move and have our being. But God is not simply our ideal and the object of our contemplation. God is immanent in all life, as he is transcendent; and by our faith in him, the eternal life of God enters into our own life, lifting us up into the realm of his own spirituality. But this means that the infinite perfection of life is no longer simply a moral ideal; it is a spirit or principle which enters and energizes the life that has faith in God. The infinite ideal has already become a reality, not as our moral perfection, but as a spiritual energy; and the rigid laws of moral progression have been transcended by the grace of God who inhabiteth eternity, yet dwelleth also with him that is of a humble and contrite heart.⁷

The transcendence of the spiritual over the moral is clear, and as the moral transcends the natural, the spiritual must also transcend the natural. But the transcendence of the spiritual over the natural is a different thing from the transcendence of the moral over the natural. It must be different, because the spiritual also transcends the moral. And so a physical miracle is a very different phenomenon from any moral action. It is a spiritual event, in which both the natural and moral orders are transcended. This will be clearer from an illustration. When

⁷See the late PRINCIPAL CAIRD'S fine volume, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. But the classic statement is Paul's epistle to the Romans.

Jesus fed the multitude with five barley loaves and two 'small fishes, so that twelve baskets of the fragments were left over, what happened? If there had been time and money, the disciples could have multiplied the loaves and fishes to the same extent by the ordinary means, *i. e.*, by a series of moral actions. But Jesus accomplished the matter without the use of any physical means. Such a feat was beyond the power of human will, and beyond the power of Jesus' will, as he often confessed. It was accomplished by faith in God, who worketh all things in all; and God's will, though it be as completely conditioned as man's will, is not limited in its freedom by the organic conditions of the human will. A physical miracle is, therefore, a work of divine grace, transcending both the natural and the moral orders, and by its sovereignty bringing them into the unity of the spiritual.

The same may also be said of moral miracles. Take, for example, the sudden conversion of Jerry Macaulay in New York city, and numberless others. His regeneration is manifested in a radical change of life, *viz.*, a new disposition and purpose of heart. What is the secret of it? Not the power of a man's own will, but contrite faith in the living God. In the surrender of one's life to God, the Spirit of God apparently renews the organic conditions of desire, as well as gives a new direction to the will—a process of renewal that is only begun in regeneration and is continued in sanctification. But the striking thing is that there is a new disposition as well as a new purpose of life.⁸ In regeneration, the grace of God transcends the organic order as well as the moral order, and by its sovereignty brings inclination and duty into harmony under the unity of the spiritual.

The transcendence of the spiritual over the natural and the moral is therefore not simply the transcendence of one law over another, but the transcendence of the highest order, in which the lower orders find their unity and fulfilment.

⁸Modern psychology confirms historical theology in its claim that in regeneration the result is not simply a new act of will but a new disposition, since volition in every case supposes desire, and desire supposes sensuous impulse. The new disposition and the new purpose go together.

2. And this fact leads us to consider the second important result of our inductive study, viz., the redemptive character of the supernatural. It is a divine work of grace, in the redemption of the world from evil and realization of its eternal destiny. There are the two aspects of it, the annulment of evil and the realization of good, giving to good and evil their spiritual meanings. But these are simply two aspects of the one spiritual process, or evolution of the kingdom of God on earth.

The existence of evil in the universe offers a tremendous problem; but we need only say that apparently it is inevitable in the evolution of the finite. There is physical evil, or the bondage of the moral, and therefore of the spiritual, to the material. There is moral evil, or the self-assertion of the moral intelligence in opposition to the spiritual. In each case, evil is the frustration of the higher by the lower, or the bondage of the higher to the lower.

The evolution of the spiritual is possible only by the overcoming of both evils; and that means the evolutionary progress cannot be along a straight line. There must be a continual reversion to the more elementary conditions for the sake of rebuilding the more complicated structures of life. And this mode of overcoming evil is the probable explanation of the miraculous, in distinction from the supernatural. The supernatural, as we have seen, means only the transcendence of the spiritual over the natural and moral in the sense already explained. There is nowhere any breach of law; only spiritual law transcends natural and moral law, because the spiritual is the higher unity in which they are embraced and come to their own. But in a miracle there is an apparent breach of law, unless we suppose the presence of law where none is known; and this is what the spiritual theory compels us to do. For, granting the truth of the record, what happened when Jesus at Cana made the water into wine? We can only suppose that in the divine laboratory of the universe the divine will resolved the water into the most elementary condition of matter and recomposed it into the new complexity called wine. The possibility of such a process receives light every day from the late discoveries and hypotheses

of science.⁹ What chemistry offers us in its list of elements and their combinations is, after all, only an introduction to the study of the intricate processes continually going on in the divine laboratory of the universe. A similar process we may suppose to have taken place in the healing of diseased tissue. A similar process possibly takes place in the renewal of the sensuous elements of volition in regeneration. And, as a final example, a similar process may possibly explain the resurrection of the dead. But whatever may be the hidden process, this reversion to more elementary conditions for the sake of rebuilding the more complicated structure of life reveals the possibility that each miracle conforms to unknown laws, natural and moral, the discovery of which would remove all mystery from a miracle and show it to be simply a reversion to the simple for the sake of rebuilding the complex. This critical definition of a miracle, therefore, really combines the dogmatic and the skeptical in a higher view, since the transcendence of the supernatural over all nature and morality becomes reconciled with the presence of unknown second causes.¹⁰

If our interpretation of the spiritual theory of the universe be correct, the place of the miraculous in the universe is fixed and definite. It is the manifestation of the supernatural in the annulment of evil. If there were no evil in the world, there would be no miracle, though the supernatural would appear unchangeably

⁹The reference is especially to the discovery of radium and the renewed speculation about the ultimate constitution of matter.

¹⁰ According to the above definition the old idea of a miracle as an event without the explanatory antecedents, and therefore due to the immediate agency of God, passes away. The real distinction of a miracle is the reversion to simpler conditions for the sake of reconstruction. If there were no evil, such a reversion would not be necessary, evolution of life being an unbroken progress. A miracle, therefore, involves not only the higher law of the spiritual, but other laws of nature and morality governing the more elementary conditions of these realms. By hypothesis, it is a reversion to more elementary laws for the sake of reconstruction.

If we still use the word "immediate" to describe the divine activity in a miracle, in distinction from the divine activity in providence, we must not use the word to denote the absence of certain conditions, but rather the presence of the totality of conditions in the self-activity of spirit. It contrasts the absoluteness of the infinite with the relativity of the finite. STRAUSS's words are at least interesting: "God acts upon the world as a whole, immediately; but on each part, only by means of his action on every other part" (*Life of Jesus*, Vol. I, p. 72, as quoted by Bushnell).

in its sovereignty over nature and morality. And the less evil there is in life, the less of the miraculous there will be in the evolution of the spiritual. Accordingly, in the human development of Jesus' life, where there was physical evil, but no moral evil, there was less of the miraculous than in the life of the redeemed, though, being completely spiritual, it was completely supernatural. There was in his life the crowning miracle of the resurrection, but that is an annulment of physical evil, and promised to all believers. There was no moral miracle in his life,¹⁰ because there was no sin to be taken away, as in the case of the redeemed. It follows also that in the redemption of sinful humanity, the less sin there is in any life, the less of the miraculous there will be, so that in the development of many Christian lives regeneration will be marked by no sudden change, and may be imperceptible to our dull vision.

The place of the miraculous in the universe is so fixed and definite because the place of the supernatural is so fixed and definite. It is but one mode of the manifestation of the supernatural in the spiritual evolution of the universe. And the place of the supernatural in the universe is fixed and definite beyond all disputation, if the universe be spiritual. If God is Spirit, and creation be the evolution of spirit, the sovereignty of the spiritual over the material and the moral, with the involved annulment of evil, is the surest thing in history. In the New Testament terms, it is the kingdom of God on earth, which the Christ came to set up. It is the final stage in the cosmic evolution, and the perfect revelation of the divine reality; and, instead of being the dream of superstition, it is the most real thing in the experience of men.

This correlation of the unity of the universe with its spirituality is the clear doctrine of Christ throughout his teaching. The universe is one because it is spiritual. It is a perfect unity, in which all forms of being are harmoniously and structurally

¹⁰ These words will appear strange to many who constantly declare Jesus' sinless life to be the great moral miracle of history; but the explanation is found in the distinction, drawn above, between the miraculous and the supernatural. We are referring, also, to his own personal development and neglecting his spiritual place in the world as Redeemer.

embraced; and its evolution is an orderly progression from the lowest to the highest. There is no division or chasm or conflict between the orders of being, except the obstruction to the progress of evolution created by sin; and sin is overcome by divine grace in the spiritual redemption of the world. In the evolution of the spiritual there is no more a breach of the principle of continuity than in the evolution of self-conscious intelligence. Miracles are simply the signs of the new order, bursting into view, appearing regularly in the cosmic development. Instead of a disturbance of the unity of the cosmos, the unity of the cosmos now truly appears. For the universe is one because it is spiritual. God is One, because he is Spirit.

In conclusion, let it be remembered that we have been seeking only a definition of the supernatural, the most intelligible one that can be found. The reality of the supernatural is another problem. The problem of its reality demands the utmost scientific and philosophical criticism. There must be scientific criticism of all the available evidence, both on the historical and the psychological lines. There must be searching philosophical criticism of the theory of the universe, both in its conception of God and the evolution of the finite. But a definition is surely one condition of successful criticism. Without it there have been volumes of discussion, as inconclusive as aimless.

THE LEGAL CODE OF BABYLONIA.

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NOT so many years have passed since the discovery of the Tel el-Amarna tablets startled the archæological world by proving that the Mosaic age was one of high literary activity, and that all parts of the civilized world of the time were bound together by the ties of literary intercourse. Since then we have been taught that in ages till lately considered prehistoric Egypt was enjoying a culture equal to any that she possessed in later days, and that from the earliest epoch of the united monarchy a careful chronological register was kept, enabling the native historian to fix with precision the dates of its kings and dynasties. Next came the discoveries of Dr. A. J. Evans in Crete, revealing the existence of an early and marvelously modern civilization in the islands and lands which afterward became Greek, and re-establishing the credit of traditions which the historian had thrown contemptuously aside. Then once more it was the turn of Assyriology to throw light on the distant past, and to show that the culture of the Tel el-Amarna age was but the last flicker of a literary civilization which had already reached its acme in the age of Abraham. And more than this; so numerous are the records and monuments of it that have survived to us that we now know more about the lives and thoughts, the literary works and social habits, of the Babylonians of that age than we do about those of the contemporaries of Pisistratus.

The latest of these monuments to be found is nothing less than the legal code of ancient Babylonia. It was compiled by order of Khammu-rabi or Ammu-rapi—the Amraphel of the fourteenth chapter of Genesis—after his overthrow of the Elamite power in the thirty-third year of his reign, and the restoration of Babylonian independence and empire. A copy of it was discovered by M. de Morgan in the ruins of Susa at the beginning of 1902, and is now set up in the Louvre. It is

engraved in beautifully cut cuneiform characters on a tall monolith of polished black marble, and at the top is a bas-relief representing the king receiving the laws from the mouth of the sun-god.

The codification of Babylonian law undertaken by Khammu-rabi resembled that which was carried through by Napoleon I. in France. It bears witness to the antiquity of Babylonian civilization and the height to which it had attained in the second millennium B. C. The code remained the standard of Babylonian law for many centuries, though modifications and additions were necessarily introduced into it from time to time. It was obeyed, not in Babylonia and Assyria only, but wherever the empire of Babylonia extended and the influence of Babylonian culture was felt. Canaan was an integral part of that empire; indeed, the only title given to Khammu-rabi on a monument raised by one of his Syrian subjects is that of "King of the land of the Amorites;" and the code of Khammu-rabi must consequently have been quite as much in force in Canaan as in Babylonia itself.

The code is not arranged on any systematic principle. Groups of laws relating to different departments of public and private life are thrown together without any closer connection than that of juxtaposition. The greater number of them are in the form of decisions pronounced by the royal judges in the cases that had been brought before them, Babylonian law being, like English law, "judge-made" and founded on precedents. Hence, as might have been expected, laws belonging to different periods of social advancement exist in it side by side. Trial by ordeal makes its appearance by the side of an elaborate system of fines; and while, as a general rule, the state forbids the individual to take the law into his own hands and insists on its right to determine punishment, there are cases in which the application of the primitive *lex talionis* is still allowed.

In studying the code, there is one fact which has especially struck me. We have long known that there is a good deal in the Pentateuch which looks back to Babylonia. The earlier chapters of Genesis have a Babylonian background, like certain features of the Israelitish ritual; and since Babylonian culture

and law were dominant in Canaan down to the age of its conquest by the Israelites, as we have learned from the Tel el-Amarna tablets, any legislation which arose on the soil of Canaan would necessarily have come under the influence of the Babylonian code. It was, therefore, a great surprise to me to find that a comparison of the Babylonian and Israelitish codes revealed, not similarity, but contrast; not evidences of a common origin, but the reverse. Put briefly, the code of Khammu-rabi is addressed to a great trading and agricultural community in an advanced stage of civilization, and living under a settled and organized monarchy; while that of Moses is intended for a small and compact body of confederated tribes which are still in a comparatively backward condition of culture, and not yet organized into a state.

Throughout, in fact, the Babylonian code presupposes the state whose laws the individual is bound to obey, and to which all his private wrongs and injuries must be referred. The Israelitish code, on the other hand, is built on the tribal principle of blood-revenge; the legislator even provides cities of refuge in which the manslayer may receive sanctuary and protection from legal punishment. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed," is laid down at the very beginning of the Pentateuch. In the code of Khammu-rabi, on the contrary, the right of blood-revenge is allowed in only two instances—once when a brigand is caught red-handed, and again when a man is found robbing a house which has been set on fire. In no other case is it permitted. The state, in short, has superseded the tribe or family, public law has taken the place of revenge.

This is the first fact which forces itself upon the attention of the student. Then, secondly, Babylonian law differed from Israelitish law in its greater severity in cases of theft and robbery. Theft is punished with death almost as mercilessly as in the England of two generations ago. Here again the reason is to be found in a difference of social and civil organization. Babylonia was a highly civilized monarchy, the subjects of which had been engaged in trade for unnumbered centuries; the respect for property was correspondingly great, and to rob a man's house

was as serious a crime as to kill the man himself. Either act was equally an offense against the state, and the state accordingly punished it with equal severity. In the Israel of the Mosaic age—though not, be it observed, in the Israel of the kings—it was otherwise. The camp of confederated tribes had not yet become a state, much less a monarchy; war rather than trade or agriculture was their occupation, and while therefore every individual life was of importance to the whole community, the individual's private property was of comparatively little account. The comparative humanity of the Mosaic law in regard to theft and robbery has the same origin as the prominence allowed in it to the right of private revenge. Both alike belong to a less developed condition of society, to an organization which is not yet that of the city and the state.

A third point of contrast between the two codes confronts us in the laws relating to inheritance. The Babylonian father was able to make a will and leave a "favorite son" "an estate, garden, or house" over and above the share in the property to which he was entitled after his father's death. Of this there is no sign or trace in the Mosaic law. The individual rights of property were not yet recognized in Israel as they were in Babylonia, and implied settlement in a country and the existence of a state. Testamentary devolution presupposes not only an advanced stage of civilization, but advanced ideas as to the tenure of property as well. In a tribal community such as that for which Moses is said to have legislated the will was necessarily unknown.

The little that is said in the Mosaic code about the woman's rights of inheritance has a similar origin. The code of Khammu-rabi contains minute directions about the wife's share in the property left by her husband at his death. The dowry she brought with her at marriage reverted to her, the property settled upon her by her husband was secured to her, and along with the children she had a right to the usufruct of the rest of the estate. If the widow married again, she lost the property settled upon her by her first husband; and if her children by the first husband were still under age, she and the second husband were required to support and educate them. Indeed, in the

latter case permission to marry at all had to be given by a judicial court.

All these laws and regulations are significantly absent from the Mosaic code. Even the dowry brought by the wife is unknown to it; the Israelitish women enjoyed no such independent position as the women of Babylonia, and, except in a case like that of the daughters of Zelophehad, were not able to hold property. Under the Mosaic law they were still in the same position as the women of an Arab tribe—little better than the “helpmeets” and adjuncts of the man.

The fact is brought into greater relief by a notice in the books of Joshua and Judges which indicates that the provisions of the Babylonian code were observed in Canaan down to the moment of its invasion by the Israelitish tribes. We are told that when Caleb gave his daughter Achsah in marriage to Othniel, after the capture of Kirjath-sepher, “she moved him to ask of her father a field.” Caleb, however, was a Kenizzite of Edom and not a pure-blooded Israelite, so that this solitary example of a dowry brought by the bride to her husband stands outside the limits of the Mosaic law and is in striking contrast to its general tenor. The difference between the codes of Babylonia and Israel is the difference between a community which has long been organized into a state, and one which has not yet emerged from a semi-nomad condition.

Such, then, are the chief points of contrast between the code of Khammu-rabi and that of the Hebrew legislator. The right of the individual to avenge himself, the estimation and legal status of property, the laws of inheritance, and the position of the woman are regarded under absolutely different lights by the two. And the contrast is rendered the more striking by a very remarkable fact. Laws and provisions in the Babylonian code, which are unknown to the Mosaic code, are nevertheless referred to and implied in the history of the patriarchs as described in the book of Genesis. Customs and usages are mentioned which, as is well known, have no foothold in the law of Israel; but which, we now discover, are in accordance with the code of Khammu-rabi. Thus it is enacted by the Babylonian legislator

that the wife could present her husband with a concubine, and if she had had no children the husband was permitted to take a second and inferior wife. The enactment explains the action of Sarah in regard to Hagar, and of Rachel in regard to Bilhah: "Sarai, Abram's wife," we are told, "took Hagar, her maid, the Egyptian, after Abram had dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, and gave her to her husband Abram to be his wife." But this is not all. One of the laws of Khammu-rabi expressly lays down that "if a man has married a wife and she has given a concubine to her husband by whom he has had a child, should the concubine afterwards have a dispute with her mistress because she has borne children, her mistress cannot sell her; she can only lay a task upon her and make her live with the other slaves." This law applies exactly to the case of Hagar, and enables us to understand why Hagar was not sold, and why even her expulsion from the camp was "very grievous in Abraham's sight." It not only deprived Ishmael of the rights of inheritance which he possessed under the Babylonian law, but was illegal as well.

Abram's adoption of Eliezer of Damascus is another example of the application of Babylonian, as opposed to Israelitish, law. By the Babylonian code the childless man was able to adopt an heir to whom he gave his name and left his property. By the act of adoption the heir became a free man, if he had previously been a slave, and acquired full rights of inheritance. Adoption, indeed, played a considerable part in the family life of Babylonia, and so familiar did it become to the Babylonian mind that the king himself was regarded as the adopted son of Bel, and could not claim his heritage or be recognized as legitimate sovereign until the act of adoption had been formally carried out.

The account of Isaac's marriage with Rebekah, again, takes us to the code and customs of Babylonia instead of those of Israel. The bride receives a dowry from the father of the bridegroom, while other presents are made to her mother. So, too, the account of the purchase of the cave of Machpelah is in exact accordance with the forms of Babylonian law. Even the

technical terms of a Babylonian contract are adhered to. What the Israelitish law and custom was, on the other hand, we know from the book of Ruth (4:7-9); it was utterly different from the Babylonian, from which, indeed, it differed in principle as well as in form. The commercial law of Babylonia was not recognized in the Mosaic code.

Even the infliction of death by burning with which Judah threatened his daughter-in-law Tamar, on the supposition that she was a widow, finds an explanation in Khammu-rabi's legislation, where the same punishment is enacted against a nun who has been unfaithful to her vows of virginity or widowhood. It is, however, needless to go farther. It is now sufficiently clear that, while between the codes of Babylonia and Israel a great gulf existed, it is the code of Babylonia which is presupposed in the story of the patriarchs.

This striking conformity of pre-Mosaic, as opposed to Mosaic law with the regulations of the code of Khammu-rabi leads, as it seems to me, to an obvious conclusion. The details of the patriarchal story can be no fiction of an age which was familiar with other usages and a different system of law, and had forgotten that the law of Babylonia was enforced in Canaan at the very time to which the narratives are assumed to belong. Like the proper names which are characteristic of this period and of no later one, the law that is presupposed in the book of Genesis is the law of the pre-Mosaic age. It is the law of the Babylonian empire of Khammu-rabi, and not the law of the Pentateuch.

There is yet a further conclusion to be drawn from a comparison of the Babylonian and Israelitish codes. The law of Moses is not founded on that of Khammu-rabi, though the latter must have been in force in Canaan down to the time when it was invaded by the Israelites and its older inhabitants intermingled with the newcomers. On the contrary, while the code of Khammu-rabi has as its background a highly organized state, behind the code of Moses lies an earlier stage of society in which the Arab law of blood-revenge is still dominant, and the wandering tribe has not yet become a settled community. The

fact has a direct and important bearing on recent theories as to the composition and date of the Pentateuch. As Dr. Johannes Jeremias remarks, it deals a finishing blow to the assertion that a codification of law was inconceivable before the age of Solomon, and that the prophets must precede the law. Had such a hypothesis been right, the background of the Mosaic law would have been, not the tribe, but the state, and the principles of Babylonian law—which, it must be remembered, was also the law of the land in which the Israelites settled—would have been embodied in it. The theory that no codification of law was possible so early as the Mosaic age must share the fate of the theory that the Mosaic age was not a literary one.

The newly discovered code explains the form assumed by the code of Israel. Groups of laws are thrown together in both without regard to any general principles; and the several laws are introduced in both by the same formula. The Babylonian code tells us what this formula meant. The individual laws are, in fact, the decisions pronounced by the royal judges in the suits brought before them. Babylonian law was "judge-made." The laws of Israel must, therefore, have the same origin. And such, according to the Pentateuch, was the case. We are there told that before the legislation at Sinai and Kadesh, judges were appointed in accordance with the usage of Midian—and so of a part of the world that had been affected by Babylonian influence—and that "they judged the people at all seasons: the hard causes they brought unto Moses, but every small matter they judged themselves." A more remarkable instance of agreement between a statement of ancient history and the revelations of modern archæology could not be found.

Doubtless similarities may be discovered between the codes of Babylonia and Israel by the side of the general and marked contrast that exists between them. Indeed, it could not be otherwise. In both cases the legislators were Semites, and the bulk of the population of the Babylonian empire was in the time of Khammu-rabi as much Semitic as the Israelites themselves. The fundamental ideas of justice and the punishment of crime from which they both started would naturally have been the

same. Moreover, the ritual law of Israel, as we now know, bore in many respects a close resemblance to that of Babylonia, upon which it may have been partly modeled. Unfortunately, the ritual code of Babylonia has not yet been discovered, although from certain allusions in the first two enactments of the civil code of Khammu-rabi it would seem to have been already in existence when the latter was compiled, and until it is found no scientific examination of the ritual laws of the Pentateuch is possible. All we can say is that the connection between the ritual codes of the two peoples appears to have been considerably greater than that between their civil codes.

Perhaps one of the most striking similarities is in the legislation on enslavement for debt. According to the Babylonian code, the slave in such a case regained his freedom at the end of three years. In Israel the term of servitude was seven years, for which there was a ritual reason. But on the civil side the enactments were practically the same.

Both codes, again, took notice of death from the goring of an ox; in the Pentateuch the owner of the ox is not held responsible for the act, but the ox itself is to be put to death. The code of Khammu-rabi advances a step farther and spares the offending animal. It has passed beyond the stage at which the animal was regarded as endowed with reason, and so placed on a footing of equality with man. Where, however, the owner could be proved to have been negligent, or otherwise responsible for the action of the ox, the Babylonian law fined him half a mana of silver; the Mosaic law, on the other hand, exacted the death penalty in accordance with the general principle of blood-revenge, though blood-money might be paid instead. If a slave had been gored to death and not a free man, the fine in Babylonia was the third of a mana; in Israel it was half a mana, and the ox was symbolically put to death. With the exaction of the penalty of death in the Mosaic code, where the principle of blood-revenge was involved, we may contrast the penalty for theft, which was either compensation or slavery; in the code of Khammu-rabi, on the other hand, the alternatives were death or a severe fine. Babylonian law considered the security of property a matter of greater moment than avenging the individual.

There is one humane provision about which the codes of Khammu-rabi and Moses are in unison. To the Israelite the lawgiver said: "If thou at all take thy neighbor's raiment to pledge, thou shalt deliver it to him by that the sun goes down: for that is his raiment only, it is his raiment for his skin." For the Babylonian the law was: "If a man takes (his neighbor's) ox in payment of a debt, he shall be fined the third of a mana of silver." Moses was addressing a body of wandering tribesmen, to whom, as to the Arab of today, the cloaks in which they slept at night were of primary importance; the law of Khammu-rabi was intended for a settled population, a large part of whom were agriculturalists, and thus dependent on their plowing oxen for their means of support.

But the distance in the social outlook which divides the earlier from the chronologically later code shows itself most clearly in the Babylonian legislation on the subject of surgical operations. The surgeon and the veterinary are distinguished from one another, and the legal consequences of a surgical operation are entered into in detail:

If a surgeon performs a serious operation on a man with a bronze lancet, for tumor or for disease of the eye, and the patient recovers, the operator shall receive 10 shekels of silver [about \$7.50].

If the operation has been performed on a poor man, he shall receive 5 shekels of silver.

If the operation has been performed on a slave, the slave's master shall pay 2 shekels of silver.

If, on the other hand, the operation is unsuccessful, and the patient dies or loses his sight, the operator is condemned to have his hands cut off; or, in the case of a slave, to provide another of equal value.

If a surgeon has healed a man's broken limb, or has cured a disease of the intestines, the patient shall pay the surgeon 5 shekels of silver.

If the patient is a poor man he shall pay 3 shekels of silver.

If he is a slave, the slave's master shall pay 2 shekels of silver.

With these enactments it is instructive to compare the prescription of the Mosaic law:

If men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: if he rise again and walk abroad

upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed.

The society to which the Mosaic legislation was addressed knew nothing of surgeons, much less of veterinaries; they were known in Canaan, indeed, in the Tel el-Amarna age, as we learn from a cuneiform tablet; but we do not hear of them in Israel before the age of the kings.

I have left to the last what is, after all, the greatest of the contrasts between the codes of Babylonia and Israel. This is in the spirit which actuates them. The law of Babylonia is a purely civil one, in the eyes of which crime is what it is in the codes of modern Christendom—an offense against the state and nothing more. The state, accordingly, punishes it with merciless but impartial justice, and to the state alone belongs the definition of crime as well as its punishment. Though at the head of the monument on which the laws of Khammu-rabi are inscribed he is represented as receiving them from the inspiration of the sun-god, this is a mere form, a mere concession to Semitic modes of thought. Throughout the code itself there is no indication that its basis and sanction are otherwise than human. What a contrast to the law of Israel! Here crime is sin against God, and deserves punishment because it is so. The national God takes the place of the state and the Babylonian king, and the sanction of the code he communicates to his chosen people is necessarily divine. On the forefront of it stands the declaration that he is their God, and that they shall have "no other gods before" him. The laws they are called upon to obey, accordingly, flow from him, and are built on the immutable foundations of a law of righteousness.

A POINT OF VIEW FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION.

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ONE of the signs of the times from which we derive assurance of progress toward unity of knowledge is the growing feeling, in the minds of scientists and scholars, of the unity of the sciences; in other words, the renewed belief in philosophy as the central interpretative principle of all sciences. Whether or not we agree with those, such as Paulsen, Wundt, and others, who conceive that the Greek thought of philosophy, as the sum total of all scientific knowledge, must be accepted as the determining concept of philosophy, we must certainly recognize the interrelation and dependence of the sciences, and the necessity of a study of that interrelation and dependence; which study must, in a true sense, be philosophy. Every science and every discipline must make a part of its work the setting forth of the principles by which it relates itself to other sciences and disciplines. And it is not simply the moral or theoretical duty of a science or discipline to show, as soon as it attains a consciousness of itself, its poles of relativity to others, but it is a practical necessity to its own development. Each science needs the others as auxiliary sciences; isolated from them it cannot solve its own problems. Every branch of natural science, for example, presupposes the rest: biology presupposes chemistry and physics; physics presupposes chemistry. So all the natural sciences are necessary one to the others.

It is a part of the philosophic temper in modern thought that religion, which is assuredly one of the most interesting facts of life, has come to be studied both scientifically and philosophically; that is, both as to individual fact and as to the relationship of facts. It is, however, a curious characteristic of modern study of religion that students find it difficult to determine whether the concept according to which religion shall be studied is predominantly scientific or philosophical, and whether it shall

be considered chiefly as fact or as a sort of principle of relativity between facts. One school speaks of the "science of religion;" and that school studies religious phenomena, rites, and customs, like sacrifice and prayer, and other religious observances. Another school speaks of the "philosophy of religion," and studies the intellectual and moral relations of those fact- and thought-phenomena which are embraced under the term "religion." But in whichever way we study religion, we meet in that study, as in all others, with a fact or a law which becomes necessarily the object of such study; and that fact or law is something which we find between us and the real object of our study—an intermediary thing which is not the ultimate object, but which is studied as the object. The physicist who is studying matter, for example, is not studying matter, but human thought about matter. The thing which makes a desk a desk, or a plant a plant, or a rock a rock, is not direct knowledge of the essential and ultimate desk, or plant, or rock, but the consensus of human observers and thinkers about those objects that they are such. It is a simple and trite observation that we do not know the ultimate and essential nature of wood, plants, and stones; but it becomes important to keep in mind, when we are meditating upon what really is our knowledge of wood, plants, and stones, all that we really know when we are studying and thinking of those objects. There lie between the human mind and what Kant calls the "noumena" phenomena; that is, sensations—the terms in which the things themselves are registered upon the mind. Consequently there must be a peculiar and direct relation of all sciences, including religion, to psychology and epistemology, or to the facts and laws of the human mind and the method of its knowledge; for, however definitely objective a particular science or discipline be to us, there lie between it and the mind these intermediary objects, which are the direct objects of our investigation and thought, covering the real objects, and into which for knowledge the real objects translate or symbolize themselves; and those intermediary objects are, partly at least, the effects of our mental operations, and are, partly at least, of the same nature as the mind. The object of study, whether of material science, or of human

history, or of philosophy, is thought—is the reaction of the mind upon impressions. The nature of the source of those impressions—what it is that makes them, what the noumena are—we do not know and cannot guess. The student of the things of the mind and of the spirit is on the same ground, and is dealing with the same object-matter as that with which the student of the material world is dealing. Hence, epistemology, or the method and law of knowledge, becomes of primary and essential importance in all study and thought. Every real scientific investigator must be something of a psychologist and philosopher. The day is forever past when the competent scientist can be merely a fact specialist. He is bound to think of that intermediary object which lies between him and his real object, and is bound also to think of the method according to which he approaches, or is approached by, the object of his investigation and study. He must be a man of visual perspective and philosophic insight. The great scientists, whose names are illustrious in their own special subjects, have in these modern days essayed comments—and these comments are almost uniformly large-sighted and valuable—on the psychological and philosophical implications and relations of every particular science.

But, to return to our caption, what we mean by “A Point of View for the Study of Religion” is the epistemological point of view. That is to say, we are to consider carefully our real object, thought, and the method of our knowledge of that object. We may ignore—we *must* ignore—as do the scientists, the absolute nature of the *Ding an sich*. We are not to attempt to get at the absolute and ultimate nature of the noumenon in religion. Our point of departure for an investigation of the subject of religion is from those facts or objects which are produced in the human heart and mind by certain stimuli, of the nature of whose sources we are ignorant. It has been the mistake of theology that it has made the attempt, which has been made by some students of material science, to get at the metaphysics of the thing by means of an analysis and a test-tube; that is to say, it has discussed the nature and being of God, and has landed itself in a series of dogmas about God. The scientific

study of religion makes no such attempt, but concerns itself with those religious phenomena of action and thought which are universal both in time and place, and which are the effects of our mental reaction upon the *Ding an sich* of religion.

The scientific and philosophic study of religion is, to speak roughly, about thirty years old, coming in with the reaction against a speculative philosophy and a speculative theology which were the bases of the older study of religion, even that of Locke and Hume; for, though Locke and Hume followed Bacon in the work of laying foundations for a scientific study of the world of human thought and human history, they did not advance to the thought of a real scientific study of religion. The publication of Professor Max Müller's lectures before the Royal Institution of London was one of the first literary evidences that the foundations of a science of religion were being laid. Indeed, that distinguished scholar, whatever may have been his etymological and philological errors, must be honored by all students of religion. He began his work before the data were in; but he should at least have the credit of making a hole in the subject, through which the data might come in. However, the speculative conception of religion was not so thoroughly destroyed by the reaction against speculative philosophy in general as were the other great speculative conceptions of thought. Even after the rise of the scientific method, scientific philosophy spoke in its highest and proudest strain in the person of Hegel. Hegel constructs the whole of reality out of concepts. The concepts were for him, as for Plato, the ultimate realities of truths; and, accordingly, for him all reality was conceived out of philosophy. But this supremacy of speculative philosophy was not of long duration. And in Germany, Hegel's home, came the speediest and severest reaction—a reaction in which Hegelianism, the most speculative philosophy, was almost demolished. The little that was left fled to England, reappearing there in the teachings of Green and of the neo-Hegelian school. It is mainly, however, the ethical, the religious, and the political elements of Hegelianism that reappear in Green and in his school. English philosophy is religious and practical; and Green, though he was

himself by nature a speculative philosopher, as were also the Cambridge Platonists, was influenced by his environment to think mainly along the ethical, religious, and political lines of the speculative philosophy. Moreover, *a priori* conceptions, from the nature of the case, obtain with much more force in ethics and in religion, and even in politics, than in natural science. The doctrine of innate ideas, as formulated by Descartes and Malebranche, and developed by Spinoza in one direction and by Leibniz in another, suffered great loss, as respects its philological and scientific significance, from the attacks of Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. It has suffered even greater loss from the attacks of modern psychology. But, as respects its religious significance, it is still the basis upon which a school of students of religion build a philosophy of the subject. Even Kant, whose purpose it was, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to show the emptiness of *a priori* principles of real objective truth, founds his moral argument, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, upon logical inferences. It is difficult clearly to differentiate them from the innate ideas of Descartes or of Leibniz. The speculative, or *a priori*, philosophy is most vital and strongest today in the ethical and religious thought of men. It finds in that thought a natural home; and it gives premises to religious faith, and a confidence in those premises which seem like knowledge. And religious faith has not failed to appreciate the advantage it could derive from a speculative philosophy, or been loth to make use of it; indeed, the history of religious thought almost inclines one to the opinion that faith of her own accord has demanded certain great *a priori* philosophical conceptions as necessary to her life. The philosophical presuppositions of the great oriental religions make up a large part of the content of those religions. The teachings of Philo, Moses Maimonides, and Moses Mendelssohn are evidences of the necessary philosophical relationships of Hebrew religion; and that the structure of Christian theology has been built largely out of philosophical material, one needs only to read the fourth gospel, Justin Martyr, Albertus Magnus, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, and Calvin, to see. To be sure, there has often been opposition, and even hostility, between the domi-

nant systems of religion, or of theology, and philosophy. Socrates was condemned and executed as a contemner of the gods. Bruno and Galileo, Descartes and Spinoza, Hobbes and Locke, Leibniz and Wolff, Kant and Fichte, were all treated by the reigning system of religious tradition as foes; but, as Paulsen says, the cause of this hostility is to be found, not in the essential disparateness of religion and philosophy, "but in their close affinity. The battle is only between hostile brothers or sisters."

The situation as respects our discipline is then, in brief, something like this: There are two great schools of religious investigation, each of which has grown about a regulative conception of the method of study of religion. One of these schools investigates religion according to what I may call an *a priori* or a conceptual method, starting either with the postulate of direct immediate consciousness of God, of self, and of the world, as do Hegel and the Hegelians; or with the postulate of certain spiritual intuitions given in the nature of the mind or by the revelation from God, as have done most of the writers on philosophy and on the philosophy of religion, from Plato to Martineau. The other school investigates religion according to what I may call an experimental or historical, or more recently an anthropological, method; that is, it studies inductively customs, rites, ceremonies, languages, and comes at last, by induction and comparison of these external religious phenomena among both primitive peoples and those most highly civilized, to a systematized summary of the phenomena, which it calls the science of religion. This school does not pretend either to have so completed the induction as to make the discipline a science in the strict sense of the word—for it recognizes that it cannot get at all the data necessary—or to have gotten at the essence of religion. By religion, says Tiele, "We mean . . . the aggregate of all those phenomena which are invariably termed religious, in contradistinction to ethical, æsthetical, theological, and others. I mean those manifestations of the human mind in words, in duties, customs, and institutions which justify a man's belief in the superhuman, and serve to bring him into relation with it."¹ Tiele's seeming exclusion of the belief of which

¹ *Elements of the Science of Religion*, p. 4.

those phenomena are manifestations from his tentative definition of religion should be noted here. He seems to think that this belief, as well as the reality of its foundation or source, belongs to metaphysic, and that it is not a matter of concern to the science of religion. "The object of our science," he says, "is . . . religion based on belief in the superhuman."^a We may grant that the question of the reality of the foundation or source of this belief is a problem of metaphysic; yet I think we must say that the science of religion ought to include the belief itself as one of the initial phenomena to be taken into account.

But in order to a clear reason for the point of view for which I am pleading, may I dwell a little longer upon the present situation of our discipline and upon the history leading to that situation? There is just now among the anthropologists themselves much dissatisfaction with the rigidly inductive and historical study of religious customs, rites, ceremonies, etc.; which dissatisfaction has a number of causes, one of which is that the belief by which only rituals and ceremonies may be understood is not included in such study; and another of which is that the exclusive study of cult, ritual and ceremony has resulted, not in one great interpretative result or set of results concerning the discipline as a whole, but in many varying and sometimes mutually exclusive and contradictory results. The various theories of the physical origins of religion, such as animism, ghost- and ancestor-worship, are evidences of the lack of consensus as to results. Books like Fraser's *Golden Bough*, and the mythological theory of primitive religion in general, have no severer critics than the anthropologists. In a conversation which the writer once had with Tylor and Waitz both of them remarked that the mere anthropological study of religion has become unproductive of much valuable knowledge as to the real essence of religion. Again, to quote Tiele, who was one of the most widely learned students of religion in Europe—alas for the science of religion now deceased! After pleading for the denominative "science" and for the scientific method in the study of religion, and after declaring himself to be primarily a historian in method and feeling, he says:

^a *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Yet I believe that the science of religion requires a broader foundation than history, in the ordinary sense of the word, and historical research must precede and pave the way for our science; but it does not belong to it. If I have minutely described all the religions in existence, their doctrines, methods, customs, the observance they inculcate, and the organization of their adherents, besides tracing the different religions, their origin, bloom, and decay, I have merely collected the materials with which the science of religion works. And indispensable as this is, it is not enough. I therefore think that we need not hesitate openly to proclaim the philosophical character of our science, and to apply to it the method adapted to all philosophical branches of science, namely the deductive. Not the one-sided empirical method which culminates in positivism and only ascertains and classifies facts, but is powerless to extend them. Nor the one-sided historical method which yields exclusively historical results. Not again the genetic, speculative method, a mixture of history and philosophy, which lacks all unity. Still less, I must hasten to add, the warped speculative method, which has no foothold on earth, but floats on the clouds. . . . I think that we should neglect nothing, but welcome everything that may give light. In the doctrine, whatever be its form, mythological and poetical, or dogmatic and philosophical, I recognize the fountain head of each religion. The chief thing of all religion is doubtless its spirit, yet it is the doctrine that affords us most light. Cult, ritual, and ceremonies teach me nothing when I contemplate them, unless I have some explanation of their meaning.

And Professor Hopkins, in his *Religions of India*, says of the ritual of sacrifice:

Even a résumé of one comparatively short ceremony would be so long and tedious that the explication of the intricate formalities would scarcely be a sufficient reward. With Hillebrandt's patient analysis of the new- and full-moon sacrifice, of which a sketch is given by von Schroeder in his *Literature and Culture*, the curious reader will be able to satisfy himself that a minute description of these ceremonies would do little to further his knowledge of the religion, when once he grasps the fact that the sacrifice is but show.

These quotations, and others that might be cited, indicate a profound dissatisfaction, in the inductive or historical school itself, with a merely anthropological method of studying religion, and a certain lack of unity as to any method or concept according to which religion is to be studied. Nor is the philosophical school at unity with itself. There is the orthodox, or traditional, wing of the school which holds to the doctrine of original intuitions *plus* supernatural or miraculous revelation; there are Hegel and the Hegelians, such as Green, the Cairds,

and Pflieger; and there are others, like Martineau, who make intuitions the manner and the content of revelation. The position of the traditional wing of the school is so well known as not to need any specification; though it is somewhat difficult to locate it in the history of philosophy, and to describe it philosophically or psychologically. In the persons of Augustine, Anselm, Descartes, and others it formulated a philosophic doctrine of innate ideas by which the existence of God is immediately and necessarily postulated; but it does not consider those ideas the sufficient content of religious knowledge. It supplements the knowledge given innately by a miraculous revelation from God, not, however, attempting any theory of the method of human apprehension of that revelation, except the philosophical thesis of faith; that is, the thesis of a spirit or heart faculty of apprehension, of which the reason has no knowledge. In the persons of Hobbes and Locke it denies the doctrine of innate ideas, and makes religious knowledge wholly a matter of revelation. Hobbes says there are three ways of knowing God: first, through the tacit dictates of righteousness (righteousness being the social conscience, the harmony of society, not an innate idea of right); secondly, through immediate revelation in supernatural voice, or vision, or dream; thirdly, through a prophet. According to Hobbes, we have no idea of God, because the finite cannot conceive the infinite. Both Hobbes and Locke were religiously and theologically committed to the idea that the object-matter, the thing known, of religion is given by revelation. Hobbes held to the Erastian principle that this revelation is the basis of civil order, the supreme authority authenticated by miracle and by supernatural prophecy, vision, or dream, and constituting the essence of civil government; while Locke, by reason of his doctrine of the limitation of knowledge, and by reason of his conviction that the ethical completeness of men necessitates religion, was compelled to assume an object miraculously given to faith. Locke starts, then, from an *a priori* faith which it is the business of religion to justify. The idea of God is not innate, and is not given in sense-experience, but is given in faith, and is verified or cor-

roborated by the application of reason to faith. Reason is for Locke the comparing and relating of ideas given in sense-perception, or, in the religious sphere, in faith. As Fraser says, reason is, in the philosophy of Locke, merely "discursive intelligence." For Locke and Hobbes all that comes from the outer world, whether of things or of spirit, must be apprehended by the senses. Nevertheless, they must both be classed among the *a priori* philosophers of religion—in so far as they are philosophers of religion at all—because both postulate elements or powers in the mind by which a transcendental revelation is conceived and judged.

Hence Hume was perfectly consistent in rejecting, as in fact *a priori*, those elements in the philosophy of Hobbes and Locke upon which they built theology. If religious thought was to flow on beyond Hume, it must have been, not by the force of his reasoning, but by the force of the reasoning of men, who found in the human mind a power of apprehension of objects, whether or not given to the senses, yet not delimited and determined by the nature of sense-phenomena. To find the real stream of religious thinking, we must follow in the line of Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and Green, who, while differing widely in many respects, have this one characteristic that they all construe religion according to the principles of a philosophical idealism, not identifying religion and philosophy, but making the principle or method of knowledge the same in both. And the point of interest to us, in tracing the thought of the philosophers about religion, is that the point of connection of their religious and their philosophic thought is their theory of knowledge. When Kant finds that he cannot get by his theory of knowledge to the *Ding an sich* of the world, he passes easily over to an application of that theory to the search for the moral and religious *Ding an sich*. He seems himself to have thought that he was successful in that search, and that from that great *ought* which he found in his mind he could get easily to God, and could verify easily to knowledge divine revelation and command, by recognizing his duty as such divine revelation and command. We see now how unsuccessful Kant was in giving us any sure principle of knowl-

edge of God; because it was really only an arbitrary act of will by which he transformed this idea of oughtness, which in the *Critique of Pure Reason* he has told us is only an idea of a subject, the reality of which we have no means of knowing. As Caird says :

Only a Reality which can recognize that the consciousness of the moral law is not a "mere Idea" of the subject—an Idea that merely ought to be realized—but rather that it is one form of the consciousness of that religious principle which is always realizing itself in us and without us, and to which therefore we give the name God, can avoid the alternative of a Rationalism which denies all contact between the subject and an objective reality, and a Mysticism which asserts such contact as an absolutely intelligible fact.³

It is just exactly that idealism to which Hegel unequivocally commits himself. Kant could not but in some measure adhere in a critical philosophy to the empirical skepticism of the eighteenth century, which he criticises, and between which and the older idealism he is trying to mediate; and though he makes the way for German idealistic philosophy, his own idealism is formal and critical rather than substantial. Hegel, on the other hand, breaks absolutely with empiricism, and it is that break that makes Hegel really the father, not only of modern philosophic idealism, but also of the modern philosophy of religion. Yet Hegel does not reach his doctrine of universal idealism in the way that Kant must have done, if he had gone on to substantial idealism, *i. e.*, by the arbitrary predication of absolute reality to the ideas of the subject, but as Plato did in his doctrine of ideas. Hegel makes an assumption, but not the assumption that Kant makes. Hegel goes farther back, to one mighty assumption, about the cause of the ideas. The dualism of man and the world must be thought as embraced in a Unity, a Universal. We can and must think of them together, and that very thinking of them together is a Universum in thought. This Universum, this Absolute, with which we think when we include all the phenomena of sense and all the phenomena of our minds in one, is the Reality of which they are parts, and is revealed in them as parts. But this Universum is thought; therefore thought is the reality; and the subject's idea of Universum or Absolute is the registration, so to speak, of the Abso-

³ *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, p. 620.

lute in one of its parts, viz., the subject: it is the revelation of the Absolute to itself. The idea does not make the Absolute, but the Absolute is and makes the idea. Yet this Universal thought, this Absolute, is, according to Hegel, not simply the sum of the world and of man. So Hegel guards himself from the pantheism of Spinoza. The Absolute is more, and in a sense, other than the world; it is more and in a sense other than the ideas. The world and the ideas of man are the Absolute revealing itself to itself in two ways. We see, then, what Hegel's theory of knowledge in religion must be. Religion is for him philosophy known in mind and realized in feeling, or it is the activity of the whole life of man. Of course, he must make the assumption that the Absolute is spirit, or God; and, having made it, his theory of knowledge in religion becomes identical with his theory of knowledge in philosophy. God registers himself as Idea in man. Religion is God operating in man; and the knowledge of religion is both immediate—*i. e.*, the knowledge of self-consciousness—and mediate—*i. e.*, the knowledge given in the categories of understanding and reason. It is this mediate knowledge of religion, by the way, that gives us the content and determines worship. Hegel is very careful to distinguish between immediate and mediate knowledge, immediate knowledge of God being the result of God's existence in human consciousness, the thinking by man of God, which thinking is an activity of God himself; and mediate knowledge being the result of reflection upon the truth given in immediate knowledge, and upon its relations and determination.

I must hasten to a brief statement of the positions of two of the most recent writers on the philosophy of religion from the *a priori* point of view—Martineau, who speaks the traditions of Spinoza, Herder, and Schleiermacher rather than of Hegel; and Edward Caird, who speaks, to some extent at least, the traditions of Hegel and Green. These two men seem to me to be particularly important, because, though they continue the traditions of philosophy in the study of religion, they are both thoroughly acquainted with the modern scientific method as used in the study, and also with modern psychology and the effects upon that

psychology of biological evolution; yet, curiously enough, does neither one of them criticise thoroughly and profoundly his own theory of knowledge, or the metaphysical assumptions upon which he bases his constructive theory of religion, in the light of the absolutely necessary implications in psychology, and so in all psychical products—of which religion is one—and of our modern knowledge of biological evolution. Martineau begins his whole study of the subject with the assertion,⁴ quoting Kant,⁵ that metaphysics has discovered “that for all phenomena of experience we are obliged to supply in thought a transcendental object, as their ground,” and with the assumption of two fundamental intuitions as the source of religion, viz., intuition of causality and intuition of right. He does, indeed, devote a number of pages to a discussion of a theory of knowledge, reviewing the theories of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Mill, and Spencer, but rather for the purpose of maintaining his thesis of the religious intuitions than to get down to that real root of the matter which must be laid bare before a scientific theory of knowledge can be formulated. For example, he uses Kant’s doctrine of space and time as *a priori* conceptions (*Vorstellungen*), or forms of sense-perception. Martineau, by the way, follows Trendelenburg in making space and time objectively as well as transcendently real, as a means of getting his own *a priori* intuitions of causality.⁶ And as he proceeds in his review of the doctrine of knowledge from Kant to Spencer, one cannot see that he frees himself from the old metaphysical doctrine that the theory of knowledge is a matter entirely of the existence or non-existence of an external world; whereas it is really not, or need not be now, necessarily connected with the doctrine of such existence or non-existence. Of course, one’s theory of knowledge would be profoundly affected by his denial of an external world; but psychology does not deny it, indeed does not particularly concern itself with that doctrine; and an epistemology which is in accord with psychology ought not to concern itself with that doctrine. Psychology studies mental phenomena as phenomena, and epistemology

⁴ *Study of Religion*, Preface, p. viii.

⁵ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Vol. II, p. 422.

⁶ *Study of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 61 ff.

studies that one of the mental phenomena which is called knowledge, and which, when first considered, appears as the reaction of mind upon the stimulus of the senses. That appearance is the starting-point of the strict study of epistemology. The nature of that which lies behind the appearance is a matter of metaphysics. Martineau's theory of knowledge bases itself upon the doctrine of the objective reality of the external world, which world is known by us because its structural principles, substance, and causality are *a priori* intuitions of the mind. His theory of religious knowledge is the same, except that he adds another intuition, that of right, which gives us cognizance of spirits and of God. That cognizance is synonymous with revelation. Intuition in religion and revelation are then really one; or, rather, intuition is the mode of revelation. Martineau really dispenses with all the sense-element, making ethical intuitions the whole and sufficient basis of religion.

Professor Edward Caird, although called a Hegelian, and really continuing the great Hegelian conception of the knowledge of the infinite as a consciousness of the unity in which the world and man are embraced, starts out, in his theory of knowledge, directly from a comparison and combination of the theories of Professor Max Müller and Mr. Spencer. Professor Müller refers to Spinoza's famous dictum "*Omnis determinatio est negatio*," and makes our consciousness of the infinite a negation of the finite—a sort of consciousness of the beyond which outlines our field of knowledge of self and the world. Spencer returns rather to the Spinozistic principle that the consciousness of the infinite is the presupposition of the consciousness of the finite, the *prius* of all positive knowledge, when he considers the infinite as both unknown and unknowable; it simply is. Professor Caird's criticism of Max Müller's view is that it is bare negation, yielding only a bigger finite, which is limited or determined by the first finite; and of Mr. Spencer's view his criticism is that it destroys knowledge, even of the finite, in that it makes unknowable the ultimate reality which conditions the reality of the finite. It opposes irreconcilably our thought of things to the reality of those things; yet, according to Caird, both of these views contain truth. There is a consciousness of the infinite

which is negation of the finite, and a consciousness also of the finite as presupposing and as conditioned by the infinite. That is, both consciousnesses are one, the differentiation for us being the result of differing mental processes, synthesis and analysis. Yet Caird does not, as Hegel did not, mean to make God simply the sum of self and not-self, but a higher unity, in which they both get their true meaning.⁷ Caird is an evolutionist, and Hegel was not. For Hegel the consciousness of God was first given as an *a priori* principle in the human mind. For Caird, though it is in a true sense an *a priori* principle—*i. e.*, not continentally given as the result of sense-perception—it comes at the end of a systematic or organic process of education. God is organically the primal unity of self and not-self; therefore, as man's knowledge evolves it goes back to the consciousness of that primal unity, or God, as fundamental to its ideas of self and not-self. Evolution of knowledge seems to be for Professor Caird a matter of time. In the order of time we are conscious, first of particulars, then of the universal, which in nature is first. As Aristotle said, "what is first in nature comes last in genesis." But the consciousness of God is not a sum of added knowledges; it is generally inborn, only not at first realized. And here Caird, by his use of the principle of knowledge, is able to fill a gap in Hegel's doctrine. Hegel jumps to the content of the idea of God; Caird gets it as the result of the evolution of knowledge. The filling up of the content of the ideas of self and the world fills up also the content of the idea of God. We approach true knowledge of God as we gain deeper, fuller knowledge of ourselves and of the world, the intensive content of the idea of God growing as the content of the ideas of self and of the world grows.

If I have presented correctly the development of thought about the object, and the method, of knowledge in religion, it has become plain that the present situation is highly unsatisfactory; that we have come, in fact, to a stopping-place; and also that we need to look for some new conception according to which the study of religion may proceed. This review has been

⁷ *The Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 105 ff.

for the purpose of emphasizing the importance of a method which Professor Brinton calls the psychologic method, and which, he says,⁸ is well known to students of our discipline. I should like to call it the epistemologic view; for to my mind epistemology is a discipline sufficiently dignified and inclusive to yield us a method for the study of religion. Professor Tiele gives the conception when he says: "The chief thing in all religion is doubtless its spirit, yet it is the doctrine that affords us most light."⁹ May I go farther, and say that the best and most nearly adequate expressions of the spirit of religion are its ritual and its doctrine, and that the ritual and the doctrine afford nearly all the light we can get? The first question to be asked in the study of religion is: What are we directly studying? How do we get hold of the subject? The word "religion" means nothing to us at first; it is only a name. The question is: What does the name connote? It is, it seems to me, the fault of the anthropological school that it has never satisfactorily answered the question. To go back to the criticism of Professor Tiele which I made above, it has studied customs and ceremonies and institutions, but it has neglected the faith to which these customs and ceremonies and institutions testify. We agree most heartily with Tiele that such facts as customs, rites and ceremonies, which anthropology exhibits to us, must be studied in so far as they express or throw light upon faith and convictions; and also that the history of religions must furnish us material. We must study religion as it was in order to understand it as it is. But if the doctrine of evolution be true, the nature of a germ must be more easily and better understood in the evolved product than in the simple germ. Hence Caird is so far right in that he argues for a study of the highest types of religion in order to the studying of its nature and reality. The merely anthropological method has loaded the subject with unexplained and unrelated facts, with an enormous compilation of customs, rites, and ceremonies, and has not used that which alone can serve as a principle of classification and explanation—their liturgical and doctrinal signification. It has not begun at the proper point and with the

⁸ *Religions of Primitive People*, p. 6. ⁹ *Elements of the Science of Religion*, p. 22.

proper material, viz., the beliefs and thoughts underlying religious actions. If we were studying only the religion of a primitive people, then we should have nothing else to study but customs, rites, and ceremonies; but we know that religion has evolved into thought-expression, and therefore to continue a compilation of customs is only to clutter the subject and to lead ourselves astray by refusing to use what the evolutionary process has put into our hands.

But, on the other hand, we may not now begin within any *a priori* hypothesis. I have tried to show that there is no consensus among the authorities of the *a priori* school, and that, from the nature of the case, there can be no consensus. The root of the whole *a priori* assumption, whatever be its form, has been cut by modern psychology and biology. As Professor Sabatier says:²⁰ "Psychology has long since dispelled the scientific illusion of idealism." Modern psychology allows us to attribute to what we call the mind certain powers, certain modes of arrangement of the presentations of experience, according to which these presentations are co-ordinated and translated into thought; but it does not allow us to ascribe eternally necessary transcendental content to the modes of the mind's reacting upon experience. Call these modes categories, or principles of the understanding, or what you will; they are but simple forms without experience, shells without kernels. Experience is necessary to give them content. As Professor Sabatier says again:²¹ "Pure idealism, so far from furnishing a solid theory of knowledge, ends in skepticism, *i. e.*, in the negation of knowledge." I am well aware that Professor James, in the last chapter of his *Psychology*, argues for a certain transcendental element in knowledge, for ideas which, as he phrases it, come in "at the back door of the mind." But those ideas even need experience to set them at work and to give them a real calculable content. Furthermore, biology has a voice in this matter. How can the mind have as part of its structure universally and absolutely necessary ideas, immediate intuitions of infinite truth, if the doctrine of biology be true that the mind itself, and of course then its content, be

²⁰ *Outlines of Philosophy of Religion*, p. 280.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

the product of an evolutionary process which, we have good reason for believing, is by no means exhausted, and therefore well included in the limits of the finite?

It does not seem necessary to argue further that we have no right to assume for the mind such ideas and intuitions upon which it may build a religion.

I think, then, we can easily see the necessity of a psychologic and epistemologic method for the study of religion. Professor Brinton says¹² that the psychologic method is the crown and completion of the quest; and Professor Granger says that "all mythology and all history of beliefs must finally turn to psychology for their satisfactory elucidation."¹³ For if all study is a matter of presentation and conception, and so a matter of psychology, religion is surely a matter of psychology. That is to say, the laws of mental phenomena must explain religion as one of those phenomena. To quote again, Professor Brinton says¹⁴ that what seems to him the most startling discovery of recent times is the discovery that the human mind works apparently as a machine; give it the same materials and it will infallibly grind out the same product. But, startling as it is, we must accept it. The fact is well established that the origin of ideas is due to impressions on the nerves of sense: the same or similar impressions will always give the same or similar results. The laws of the environment are the laws of the psychic life. Technically, Professor Ward may not be right when he speaks of the mind as "presentation continuum,"¹⁵ a stream of mental phenomena. But we must be prepared in the study of religion to count on such a possibility and to treat religion as we must treat all other ideas. We must study it, not as a set of physical actions on the one side, or of assumed *a priori* ideas on the other, but as a series of mental phenomena, which are the results of sense stimulus and psychic reaction upon that stimulus; we must ascertain, from a study of history and language, the ideas of which rites and customs are the expression. The canon of criticism in religion

¹² *Study of Primitive Religion*, p. 6.

¹³ *Worship of the Romans*, p. vii.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. vi.

¹⁵ The article "Psychology" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

is given in epistemology, in the theory of knowledge. The question is: What are the ideas and how did we get them? We must not be afraid even of the belief that knowledge in religion comes through sense-experience. It is only an *a priori* dogma, after all, that God cannot be known in such experience. The greatest religious geniuses claimed sense-experience of the divine. Paul grounds, if we may trust the account in Acts, all that is most truly spiritual in him on his Damascus experience. And in later times men have done the same. Augustine, Luther, and hundreds of lesser men have founded their religious lives on some initial experience known in terms of sense. Perhaps such sense-experience may be possible only to morbid physical and nervous constitutions. Professor James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, intimates that Paul was probably an epileptic; but, as Professor James truly says, we judge things, not by their beginnings, but by their fruits. Surely, the virtues of the lives of such men as Sakya Muni, Zoroaster, Paul, Augustine, Luther, constitute the very efflorescence and summit of moral and religious thinking and attainment; and, whatever be the origin, we may accept the dictum of him who had the profoundest experience of God, and is consequently the greatest of religious teachers: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

A NEW THEORY AS TO THE USE OF THE DIVINE NAMES IN THE PENTATEUCH.

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THE theory which is the prevailing one, it must be confessed, about the sources of the Pentateuch has been gradually evolved from the investigations taken in hand by Astruc, in the middle of the eighteenth century, who was the first to draw attention to the use of the divine names in the Pentateuch. It is from that starting-point that all the later theories have been elaborated, which, if we may venture to say so, have become so intricate in their multiplication of sources that it becomes a bewildering matter to follow them; and we could well imagine that, if only some simpler theory could be produced with any amount of substantial evidence on its side, it would be gladly welcomed even by some of those who at present support the current view. At any rate, the time has come, we venture to think, when some of the writings on the other side (*i. e.*, opposed to the present theories)—*e. g.*, that by Wilhelm Möller, *Are the Critics Right?*—ought not to be passed by in silence by the advocates of the prevailing theories.

I will take one of the latest works on a part of the Pentateuch, Professor G. B. Gray's *Numbers*, simply as an illustration of what I mean as to the complex theories which are now in vogue. According to him, the documentary sources of that book are, in alphabetical order, D, E, H, J, JE, P, subdivided into P^s, P^a, and P^x—eight in all. Of these, J is of the ninth century B. C.; E of the eighth century; P^s was written about 500 B. C.; and so on. Can anything more complicated be imagined? Has anyone ever been able to produce the smallest fragment even of these separate works? Can a single book be produced in any language constructed exactly after this fashion?

But, further, these theories are not free from many difficulties, their upholders themselves being witnesses. There are difficul-

ties in some cases in distinguishing between JE and P, still greater difficulties in distinguishing between J and E, and some passages that can only with difficulty be fitted into the theory at all, so that, it may be, we must add to our list a seventh-century amplification of J or E. Further still, if these theories are right, there are misplaced passages in JE. Still further, we have (1) fragments anterior to J and E; (2) part of Balaam's prophecy was a later insertion than the rest; (3) P is the work of many hands and many generations; P^g is the work of a single writer, P^a and P^x of an indefinite number of hands. Then note the following statement:

It is seldom possible to refer passages with any certainty to P.^a It is impossible to determine with any confidence how much, if any, of the matter defined as P^x formed an original part of P^g. (Pp. xxxv, xxxvi.)

What P preserves is also some of it earlier than P^g. Notwithstanding all this, Professor Gray thinks he can outline the probable contents of P^g. This craving after definite sources leads to such statements as the following:

In view of the difficulty of separating with confidence any elements from JE which may be embodied in this passage [above, p. 132], it cannot be safely used as evidence that the term of forty years for the wanderings in the wilderness was found in that source, still less for its presence in either of the two ultimate sources. But [and note this] it is clear on other grounds that "the forty years" formed part of early Hebrew tradition: see Amos 2:10; 5:25.

Again:

In both P and D the Forty Years' Wandering is a period of punishment; on the other hand, passages in the early prophets seem to imply that the period was regarded as one of special divine favor (Amos 2:9 f.; 5:25 f.; Hos. 2:16 (14)).

Again note how the writer goes on:

The two points of view are not necessarily irreconcilable; but, under the circumstances [*i. e.*, simply of the obligation to accept the theory promulgated!!], it cannot be safely concluded that the primitive character of the wanderings was a primitive element in this story. (P. 161.)

I wish it to be distinctly understood that I have taken Professor Gray's book only as a specimen to illustrate what seem/ to me to be the complications and difficulties of prevailing theo-

ries. It is a book full of most important matter, and, in particular, his illustrations from other religions are extremely valuable.

Considering, then, all these difficulties, it has for a long time past seemed to me that, if only a reasonable account could be given of the use of the divine names Yahweh and Elohim, a fresh point of departure might be made in the study of the Pentateuch. If such a theory could be established, all other points which have been evolved from them, in many cases only by a system of subjective criticism, would then be reopened for discussion with a much greater chance of obtaining substantial results. My present subject, of course, touches only a small part of a much larger one.

Let me now briefly indicate what facts we have to go upon, starting with our present Hebrew Bible—the Authorized Version of the Jewish church of today.

As it stands at the present time, it is a composite production in its text and in its contents. The text consists of (*a*) consonants, and (*b*) vowels and accents. Besides these, there is a certain number of critical notes in the margin. These elements combined form what is called the Massoretic text. Between the fifth and the eighth century A. D. this edition of the Hebrew Scriptures—to all intents and purposes what we have now—had its origin. Such a statement as this shows how little we know about the Hebrew text. No Hebrew Bible in existence, so far as is known, is earlier than the ninth century, whereas we have Greek Bibles of the fourth or fifth century, and parts of the LXX translation itself (and in particular that of the Pentateuch) go back to the middle of the third century B. C.

Somewhere, then, between the fifth and the eighth century A. D. was the beginning of the written vocalization of the consonantal text; even now the synagogue rolls have no points. No doubt this vocalization was based upon the traditional reading of the text, but it is very often artificial, and certainly inconsistent in places.

Behind the date of the vocalization of the Hebrew text we have with us only the consonantal text, no doubt read with tolerable consistency, as to its vocalization, throughout the Jewish

church. How far back are we to carry this consonantal Bible complete in all its parts? Here again nothing definite can be stated. The nearest answer we can give is, somewhere between 200 B. C. and 100 A. D., the latter limit being most probably too late, owing to the witness of the New Testament, which has references to its threefold division, as well as to the books of Daniel and Chronicles. It is quite natural to suppose that the scribes and Pharisees would be the leaders in the work of settling the canon, as the Sadducees concerned themselves mainly with only the Torah or law.

For our present purpose we can pass by the extremely interesting discussion of the composition of the canon of the Old Testament and of the books that were looked upon with suspicion before the settlement of the canon.

With that settlement all other earlier Hebrew texts of the Scriptures seem to have gradually perished, or to have been compulsorily destroyed wherever Jewish ecclesiastical authority prevailed. The doctrine, pharisaic no doubt in origin, that not one jot or one tittle of the law was to be altered, was extended to the whole Scriptures, and in later times was so pressed that practical uniformity was created in the text of all copies.

But that this did not prevail before, and that there were various editions of the same book is obvious. At the present time it is hotly contended whether the book of Ezra or the first book of Esdras more nearly represents the original form of the Hebrew text. But, putting that on one side, we have two different recensions of the last chapters of Exodus, and the different arrangement of the prophecies of Jeremiah, as well as the varying versions of Daniel, to prove this. The LXX, the New Testament, and the newly discovered fragments of papyrus containing the Ten Commandments alike bear witness to a variation even in the order of the decalogue, while the LXX over and over again testifies to readings other than those of the Massoretic text. There is evidence also from the varying texts of the Greek version that it was modified by different scribes to suit different Hebrew texts.

But, though this be so, neither versions nor Hebrew text bear

any witness to the existence—and, in the case of the Pentateuch, the evidence goes back to the third century B. C.—of separate narratives such as are demanded by modern critics. The only exception that might be alleged to this general statement is perhaps the state of the Greek text of 1 Kingdoms (1 Samuel) in the passages concerning the conflict of David and Goliath, but this does not affect the subject of my present paper.

We have reached, then, the following point, that at the middle of the third century B. C. the Pentateuch existed, in the main, in its present form, though, whether by displacement in their manuscript or from some other cause, the LXX translators varied the order of some of the later chapters of Exodus. At the same time, there existed, as must necessarily be the case in manuscript copies of the same work, varieties of reading.

We turn now to the Scriptures themselves, to see what internal evidence can be found to help us in our investigation.

I would call attention, first of all, to two of the Psalms, 53 and 14, which are practically identical, with one notable exception, namely, that whereas Ps. 14 contains the name Elohim three times and Yahweh four, Ps. 53 contains the name Elohim seven times and Yahweh not at all. They are obviously two editions of the same psalm. The title, indeed, of the latter is fuller than, but not discrepant from, the former; but our critical friends put the titles of the Psalms out of court, so we need not stop to discuss that point.

Following upon this, let us place in juxtaposition two passages from the Pentateuch itself: Exod., chap. 3, and Lev. 24:10-23, taking them just as they stand in the narrative. The first passage records the well-known revelation of the name Yahweh to Moses, to be by him revealed to the children of Israel. The second describes a less familiar incident—the case of the man who “blasphemed the name” (*i. e.*, the tetragrammaton), with its reference to the divine oracle—and records the law that was laid down and the punishment that ensued.

It was only, of course, in later times, after nearly all the canonical books had been written, that this law was held to include and support the ineffable character of the divine name

Yahweh, and that the repugnance to using it then grew up. We meet something very like it in "the incommunicable name (τὸ ἀκοινώνητον ὄνομα)" of Wisd. 14:21. But the idea of the name as standing for the God is very many centuries older.

Now, if we consider the impressions likely to be made on men's minds by the first and second of these narratives, and then look back to the first of them, it does not seem to me at all unreasonable to suppose that there were two editions of the Pentateuch, and perhaps of some other portions of the Old Testament in existence before the finally accepted settlement of the text: (1) Yahwistic, in which the tetragrammaton was of frequent occurrence, though not to the exclusion of the name Elohim, as is testified by the occurrence of both names in Ps. 14; and (2) an Elohist edition for more popular use, perhaps always containing the name Elohim, or at any rate without the name Yahweh, so that there might be no risk of the incommunicable name being inadvertently read. Traces of this in the Hebrew text are perhaps still to be found in the printing of יהוה when it follows אֱלֹהִים with the points of אֱלֹהֵינוּ, and in the unusual phrase יהוה צבאות, which is usually explained as an abbreviation for יהוה אֱלֹהֵינוּ.

It would be quite possible, if this is so, to explain the present Hebrew text as a combination of such previous editions, by an eclectic process not always due to chance, or to taking first one text and then the other, at haphazard. Students of paleography know well how the text of a manuscript varies in quality; how parts of manuscripts are constantly lacking or illegible from the ravages of time, fire, worm, or water; and how missing words or passages have to be supplied from other sources. This has to be done whether the person doing it possesses a critical spirit or not.

Such a theory, to my mind, will give a much more satisfactory explanation than the prevailing one of how it is that suddenly in the course of the narrative the divine name is changed. Thus at the end of the account in Gen., chap. 19, of the destruction of the cities of the plain, which has the name of Yahweh throughout, the narrative is summed up in a single verse which uses the name Elohim:

"When Elohim destroyed the cities of the plain . . . Elohim remembered Abraham" (vs. 29). Or take the next chapter (20), which is Elohist till the last verse: "Abraham prayed unto Elohim: and Elohim healed Abimelech, and his wife, and his maidservants; and they bare children. For Yahweh had fast closed up all the wombs of the house of Abimelech, because of Sarah, Abraham's wife" (vss. 17, 18).

To a simple mind there does not seem to be any very obvious reason, at any rate in the second case, for assigning the account of cause and effect to two differently derived narratives. Driver¹ says 19: 29 belongs to P, and 20: 18 appears to be due to the compiler of JE. But if between vs. 17 and vs. 18 the Elohist text failed for some cause or other, and the Yahwistic text had to be resorted to, this would explain the transition from one name to the other at this particular point.

Other cases might be adduced, *e. g.*, the frequent change between Elohim and Yahweh in Gen. 29: 31—30: 24, which is so hard to explain with the prevailing theory. So Driver says of Gen., chaps. 29—32: "It must remain an open question whether the points of separation between J and E have in all cases been rightly determined." But what if J and E both contained the complete narrative, as my theory would suggest?

There remain two important points to be considered:

1. In Gen. 2: 4b—3: 23 we have a section of no great length in which both Yahweh and Elohim occur in juxtaposition. This is not hard to explain upon my theory. In this section we have a conflation of readings of the two types of manuscript, and perhaps with an object. In the previous section the creation of the world is ascribed to "the God of nature." In the present section the God of nature is to be identified with the "God of revelation"—Elohim and Yahweh.

2. The occurrence of Yahweh followed by Elohim with the possessive suffix: "Yahweh his Elohim, Yahweh my Elohim," etc. This form of expression does not occur, I believe, before the revelation of the divine name in Exod., chap. 3. The second name is then inserted by way of definition of the first. It is quite

¹ *Introduction to Literature of Old Testament.*

natural to imagine that at first, if we take the narrative as it stands, the new name required definition to those to whom it was revealed: "Yahweh, that is to be your special appropriation of Elohim to yourselves; he is my Elohim, our Elohim, your Elohim, and so on; and so even I am Yahweh thy Elohim;" and in one passage Balaam claims Yahweh as his Elohim.

In Deuteronomy, in particular, where the greater part of the book is devoted to the so-called utterances of Moses, it is reasonable to suppose that he to whom the name Yahweh is said to have been especially revealed, or the chronicler of his words, should be represented as using the double appellation. As time went on, this reason for the double name would be forgotten, while its use would still prevail.

Before leaving the paleographical question as regards the Hebrew, I should like to make one further remark.

There is no doubt, I think, that before the time when so much attention was directed to the accuracy, letter for letter, of the Hebrew canonical Scriptures, a considerable amount of abbreviation of words was used in their reproduction. There are frequent indications of this in the LXX; but I need not go into that now. What more concerns us, however, is the fact that the Hebrew fragments of Ecclesiasticus show that two or three forms of abbreviation were used for the tetragrammaton; and, if some similar form of abbreviation were used for the name Elohim, it is easy to see how constantly confusion might arise between the two names, in badly written or partly perished codices.

If I am asked what were the relative dates of the two editions, or their respective antiquity, I say that it is very difficult to speak with any absolute certainty. I think myself that the Yahwistic edition (with a certain amount of occurrences of Elohim) was, without doubt, the earlier, and the Elohistic the later. It may be that we have in this theory a reasonable account of what is said about the reading of the Law under Ezra in Neh. 8:8, where, according to the Revised Version, "they read in the book, in the law of God, distinctly" (marg. "with an interpretation"); but the theory does not, in any way, depend upon it. It is, at any rate, noticeable that the verb which is represented by the

word "distinctly" occurs certainly only twice besides in the Hebrew Scriptures (once also in the Aramaic, Ezra 4: 18; it is a misreading in Ezek. 34: 2), and that, of these two passages, one is Lev. 24: 12—the section about blaspheming the name, already treated at some length, where we read "to declare distinctly (or, to interpret) to them at the mouth of Yahweh;" while the other occurrence of the word is in the passage of a similar character to that in Leviticus where an authoritative interpretation was sought of how the sentence on the sabbath-breaker was to be carried out (Numb. 15: 34).

If this accounts for it, then an authoritative form of reading the law is to be ascribed to Ezra's time, and that would naturally be the form without Yahweh.

It is, at any rate, easy to conceive that at some time or other the narrative in Leviticus as to the "blaspheming the name" so impressed either individuals or the ecclesiastical authorities that a purely non-Yahwistic recension was put forth.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE LXX.

I now proceed to indicate what evidence I think exists in favor of this theory in the LXX.

I have already stated how persistently the LXX shows that the Hebrew Bible had, before the settlement of the text which superseded all others, many variations of text, though to all intents and purposes but little variation of contents; and that where these variations occur, they, with one exception, and that not in the Pentateuch, do not bear out in any way the contentions of the modern theorists.

We turn now to the use of the words *θεός* and *κύριος* in the LXX. *θεός* is the usual representative of Elohim, and *κύριος* of Yahweh, but not always; and this has evidently caused Professor Gray considerable perplexity, as is evidenced by his note on pp. 310–13 of his edition of Numbers. As to the Hebrew use of the two names, he comes very near, in some respects, to what I conceive to be the truth, when he says:

No conclusive and complete explanation of this usage [in Numb. 22: 2–24: 25] can be given. It is partly due to fusion of sources; it is perhaps partly due to an editorial principle incompletely carried through. It is to be

observed that in 22:2-21 God (*i. e.*, Elohim) is consistently used in the narrative, Yahweh in the speeches of Balaam. It is possible that God stood originally in (some of) the speeches, and has been deliberately altered by an editor in order to make it clear that Balaam owes what he has to say to the God of Israel.²

As to the Greek, the conclusions he arrives at are:

(1) An unsupported reading $\delta \theta\varsigma$ in the LXX is valueless as evidence of the original reading; (2) that such a reading adds little or nothing to other evidence favoring an original reading יהוהאלהים; but (3) that wherever $(\delta) \kappa\varsigma$ appears in the LXX, it deserves attention as a possible indication of the original text.

The whole of his note well repays perusal, but it seems to me that the theory I am advocating is much simpler and will supply an ample explanation of both Hebrew and Greek readings.

We must of course, be prepared sometimes to allow, when we remember how *θεός* and *κύριος* are written in Greek manuscripts ($\Theta\bar{C}$ and $\bar{K}\bar{C}$), that a confusion between the two Greek words is quite within the range of possibility, and that to this may be due the cases where the Greek manuscripts vary between the two names; but in other cases where there seems to be no doubt about the Greek reading, I am persuaded that it points to the occurrence of the corresponding Hebrew name in the text before the translator, whether that be the name in our present Hebrew text or not.

1. I would first of all draw attention to the fact that in the Yahweh-Elohim section of Genesis (2:4b—3:24), in five cases³ in codex A $\delta \theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ stands alone as the representative of the two names. B and N, of course, do not exist. This goes a certain way toward corroborating my theory that we have in Yahweh Elohim a conflate reading.

² For this statement he refers to Dillmann.

³ 2:5, 7, 9, 19, 21, in which E (the Bodleian Genesis) agrees with A. The same rendering occurs in Exod. 9:30 (B). For somewhat analogous renderings elsewhere we have $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ representing Yahweh El in Gen. 14:22 (AD), and both יהוהאלהים and יהוהאלהים etc., in Exod. 3:18 (BA) (here it is particularly noticeable, coming where it does, immediately after the account of the revelation of the name Yahweh), similarly in Exod. 4:5 (B); 5:3 (BA); 8:27 (23) (B), 28 (24) (B); 10:7 (B), 8 (BA); 20:10 (A); 29:46; 32:11 (A); Deut. 4:34 (B*); 6:1 (B*); 12:31 (B); 13:3 (4) (B); 16:11 (BA), 21 (B); 19:1 (BAF); 23:23 (24) (B); 30:5 (B).

2. In 104 passages ⁴ *θεός* stands for Yahweh.

It is noticeable that (1) in a large proportion of cases the reading of the uncial manuscripts quoted by Swete is unanimous; (2) that in several cases this use of *θεός* falls into small groups, or connected passages. This would tell in favor of my theory, if, as I suppose, resort was had from one edition to the other when the manuscript being used was defective. I believe that if the examination were carried on beyond the Pentateuch, similar phenomena might be observed in certain books. I have also tried to form a rough estimate of the spaces between these occurrences of *θεός* for Yahweh, to see whether the places where they occur would occupy similar places in a manuscript. It is difficult, of course, to form any reliable conclusion with the material at hand, but, taking Ginsburg's Hebrew Bible as the standard, nearly all the occurrences of this variant in Genesis would point to a manuscript in which each column contained something like ten or eleven lines of Ginsburg's printed text. There is also an indication in two cases that resort had to be made to a second, presumably Elohist, manuscript for material corresponding to about four lines of Ginsburg.

3. Only one instance, I believe, occurs in the Pentateuch of the use of *θεός* for Yahweh pointed with the points of Elohim, and that a very doubtful one: it is apparently used in B* in Deut. 3:24; but there are a number of undoubted instances elsewhere, though they are limited to the prophetic books.

⁴ Gen. 4:9 (A), 16 (AE); 6:6 (ADE), 7 (ADE); 8:20 (AE); 12:17 (A); 13:10 (ADE) *bis*, 13 (ADE) 14 (AD); 15:6 (AD), 7 (AD); 16:5 (AD); 18:1 (A), 14 (AD); 25:21 (ADE); 30:24 (ADE), 27 (ADE); 31:49 (ADE); 38:7 (ADE), 10 (ADE); Exod. 4:1 (BF), 10 (A), 11 (B), 30 (BAF^{mg}), 31 (BA); 5:2 (A), 17 (BAF), 21 (BAF); 6:26 (BAF); 8:29 (25) (BA), 30 (26) (BA); 9:5 (BA), 29 (A); 10:11 (B), 18 (B); 13:21 (BAF); 14:13 (BA), 31 (BAF); 15:1 (B); 16:7 (A), 7 (BA?AF), 8 (BAF), 9 (BAF), 33 (BAF); 19:3 (BAF), 7 (BAF), 8 (BAF) *bis*, 18 (BA), 21 (BAF) *bis*, 22 (BF), 23 (BAF), 24 (BAF); 22:11 (10) (BAF); 23:17 (BAF), where *κύριος* = *יהוה*; 24:2 (BAF), 3 (BAF), 5 (BA), 16 (BAF); 28:23 (29) (BAF); 32:30 (BAF); 35:30 (BAF); 36:2 (BAF); Lev. 3:9 (BA); 21:21 (BA); 22:18 (BAF); Numb. 9:19 (BAF); 15:30 (BAF); 16:5 (BAF), 11 (BAF); 22:13 (BAF), 22 (BAF), 23 (BAF), 24 (BAF), 25 (BAF), 26 (BAF), 27 (BAF), 28 (BAF), 31 (BAF), 31 (AF), 32 (BAF), 35 (BAF); 23:3 (BAF), 5 (BAF), 8 (BAF), 12 (BAF), 16 (BAF), 26 (BAF); 24:13 (BAF); 31:41 (BAF); Deut. 2:14 (B*), 15 (BF); 4:20 (B); 8:3 (BAF), 26 (BAF); 11:17 (A); 12:11 (BAF?), 21 (BAF^{mg}); 21:9 (A); 29:20 (19) (BA); 31:27 (BAF).

In ninety-one cases⁵ κύριος ὁ θεός is the equivalent of the name Yahweh by itself. With but few exceptions, these instances come under two heads: (1) those in the chapters immediately following the Yahweh-Elohim section of Genesis (2: 4b—3: 24)—there are 6 in chap. 4; and (2) the rest. The former, I would say, look back to copies of the Hebrew text where the conflation of the two names prevailed still further than it does at present; the latter, to a further use than exists at present of the interpretative Elohim with the possessive suffixes already spoken of. Whether this latter had its origin in a Hebrew text or in the Greek translation is not clear; it is, at any rate, immaterial to my present purpose.

On the other hand, there are only ten cases⁶ in which κύριος stands for Elohim.

One result seems to follow from a comparison of this list with that of the instances of θεός standing for Yahweh, namely, that the source of variation cannot have been a scribal error on the part of the writers of the Greek manuscripts. In that case the confusion between the two Greek words would have occurred in more equal proportions. It must have had its origin in the Hebrew.

I have not included in the above list a certain number of cases,⁷ eleven (twelve) in number, in which κύριος stands not

⁵Gen. 4: 6 (AE), 9 (E), 13 (E), 15 (AE) *his*, 26 (ADE); 5: 29 (AE); 6: 3 (AE), 5 (ADE), 8 (ADE); 7: 1 (ADE), 5 (ADE), 16 (A); 8: 21 (A), 21 (AE); 10: 9 (AE); 11: 9 (AD); 24: 40 (A); 29: 31 (AE); Exod. 4: 1 (A), 11 (AF), 22 (18) (A); 10: 9 (B^{ab}. A), 24 (BA), 26 (BA); 12: 31 (BAF); 13: 5 (BAF), 8 (BAF), 9 (B), 11 (BAF); 15: 26 (B); 19: 22 (BF); 20: 7 (B); 34: 14 (BAF); Lev. 18: 5 (BAF); 19: 12 (BAF), 14 (BAF), 16 (BAF), 28 (BAF), 32 (BAF), 37 (BAF); 20: 8 (A), 26 (BAF); 22: 3 (BAF), 9 (BAF); Deut. 1: 41 (BAF), 45 (B); 2: 14 (B^{ab}.); 3: 20 (BAF), 21 (BAF); 4: 3 (BAF), 12 (B^a), 20 (AF), 21 (B^{amg.}), 35 (BAF), 39 (BAF); 5: 11 (B^{abmg.}); 6: 12 (BAF), 18 (BAF); 7: 15 (B^aAF); 8: 1 (B), 20 (B^{ab}.); 9: 18 (BAF), 22 (AF); 10: 13 (BAF); 11: 4 (AF); 12: 14 (BAF), 25 (BAF), 26 (BAF); 14: 2 (BAF); 15: 2 (BAF), 4 (BAF), 20 (BAF); 16: 2 (BAF), 15 (BAF), 16 (BAF); 17: 10 (BAF); 18: 7 (B), 12 (BAF); 21: 9 (BF); 24: 4 (BAF); 28: 7 (BAF), 9 (AF), 11 (BAF), 13 (BAF), 24 (B), 64 (BAF); 29: 4 (3) (BAF); 30: 8 (BAF), 9 (BAF); 31: 4 (B).

⁶Gen. 19: 29 (A); 21: 2 (A), 6 (AD); 48: 15 (B); Exod. 3: 4 (BAF); 13: 19 (BAF); 18: 1 (BAF); 20: 1 (BAF); Lev. 2: 13 (BAF); Deut. 25: 18 (A). In addition to these, κύριος = יהוה in Numb. 23: 8, where the translator probably took יהוה as an abbreviation for Elohim.

⁷Exod. 8: 10 (6); 9: 30 (A-no suff. in Heb.); Deut. 4: 5 (B); 9: 5 (BAF); 15: 20 (B); 18: 5 (B), 12 (B); 30: 1 (B), 3 (BAF), 3 (B), 6 (BAF), 7 (A).

only for Yahweh, but also for the added interpretative Elohim with the possessive suffix.

To complete our lists we have to insert one⁸ of cases in which (ὁ) κύριος (ὁ) θεός stands for Elohim simply—twelve in all, as compared with ninety-one in which κύριος ὁ θεός corresponds to Yahweh alone.

I add to these the testimony of the other Greek versions:

Aquila agrees with LXX in reading θεός for Yahweh in Gen. 30:24. He also has θεός for the tetragrammaton in Exod. 4:24—a curious place for it, especially with such a translator as Aquila. Symmachus has, like Aquila, θεός for Yahweh in Gen. 30:24. In the Hexapla of Gen. 4:1 θεός is quoted as the representative of the Hebrew of that passage, and κύριος ὁ θεός is given for Yahweh *per se* in the Heb. of Gen. 4:26. Under the hexaplaric heading "ἄλλος," θεός corresponds to Yahweh in Lev. 7:35, Numb. 23:5; to Yahweh, in Numb. 14:9.

On the other hand, there are no cases of κύριος representing Elohim, and, so far as it goes, the evidence from the Hexapla bears out my theory that in one edition of the Hebrew Scriptures Elohim was substituted for Yahweh, but not Yahweh for Elohim.

The whole of all these uninteresting-looking lists of figures point, I think, inevitably to the following conclusions:

The prevailing type of Hebrew Bible before the establishment of the present Textus Receptus was very like it, and may be taken to be represented by, let us say, the text of Ps. 14, with Yahweh and Elohim used in varying proportion. But there was also another type, of later origin than the first, but represented by the text of Ps. 53, in which Elohim took the place of Yahweh altogether. This was prepared for the ordinary reader, who was saved from any risk of transgressing the law which was held to be the logical outcome of the law of Lev. 24:16. There are also less clear indications of a third class of text in which both names were used together. A fragment of this is to be

⁸ Gen. 6:12 (ADE), 13 (D?), 22 (A); 8:15 (ADE); 9:12 (AE); 28:20 (AD); Lev. 19:14 (BAF); 21:7 (BAF), 8 (BAF); 25:17 (BAF), 43 (BAF); Deut. 31:17 (BAF).

found in Gen. 2:4—3:24, and we have the alternative of supposing that the use of Yahweh *plus* Elohim with the possessive suffix is due to the same source, which is the less possible, or that the interpretative word with its suffix is such as Moses would naturally insert at a time when the new name was strange to the people, or would be ascribed to him by the narrator.

It is claimed for this theory that it goes to the root of the matter and endeavors to explain the actual phenomena as they occur. What would follow from it, if established, would be a re-examination of the whole question of the composition of the Pentateuch to see whether it was borne out in other respects. It is possible that other questions of terminology and phraseology might also find their settlement in it. It is quite conceivable that the Elohist version contained adaptations of language suited to the times in which it had its birth. The existence of euphemisms—*e. g.*, the substitution of other words for what might be called indelicate expressions, such as we find occasionally in the margin of the Massoretic text—falls quite within this theory of a popular version, if they are readings derived from an Elohist version.

I have endeavored to set forth the theory as it presents itself to my mind. May it find, if approached for impartial examination, just as much or as little favor as it deserves!

SUPPLEMENTAL.

Since the above paper was written, I have come across several confirmations of my theory from the Hebrew fragments of Ecclesiasticus, some of more force than others:

(1) Ecclus. 45:2, Hebrew text אֱלֹהִים = LXX *ἀγίων* (for this use of *ἅγιος* cf. Isa. 60:9; Jer. 3:21), but the Hebrew margin has יי, the two divine names being interchanged exactly in the way I suggested.

(2) Ecclus. 5:4, the only passage in the fragments of Codex C (in Lévy's edition D) which has the tetragrammaton. But in Codex A אֱלֹהִים is substituted. This, of course, may stand simply for אֱלֹהִים, as in one passage in the Pentateuch; or it may originally have stood as אֱלֹהִים for אֱלֹהִים. Here again the Greek has ὁ κύριος, as it has in many other places in this book for אֱלֹהִים.

(3), (4) Ecclus. 35:22, Greek ὁ κύριος, Hebrew אֱל, but margin אֱלֹהִים; 40, here the Greek had a different text; Hebrew אֱל, but margin עֲלִיָּהוּ. Is there not some probability of these two indicating that אֱלֹהִים and עֲלִיָּהוּ were later substitutes in some cases for אֱל or אֱלֹהִים and earlier than the substitution אֱלֹהִים?

Further, in the preceding paper I have not attempted in any way to discuss the question as to the use of the name Yahweh in the Pentateuch before Exod., chap. 3. I have recognized its presence there, and only said that in many places the LXX apparently read Elohim. At the same time, I have guarded myself still further by saying (1) that יי (as in the Ecclesiasticus fragments) might easily be confused with אֱ; and (2) that ΚC and ΘC might also easily change places.

A third reason might also be admitted, perhaps, in some cases. There is evidence that the translation of the LXX was in some places a matter of dictation, first of the Hebrew, then of the Greek. If a Jew were dictating the Hebrew to a Greek translator, he would substitute Adonai or Elohim for Yahweh, at the same time generally indicating the substitution he was making. If he occasionally forgot to do this, the result would be that *θεός* would appear in the Greek instead of κύριος.

I have been challenged to take one or two passages as test cases for my theory. The first is Gen. 4:1 which, if translated literally from the Hebrew, means, "I have gotten a man, namely, Yahweh." It is on all sides admitted that this is a very difficult passage. The LXX translates δὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, and the difficulty has been felt by Jewish commentators as well as Christian. The Targum of Onkelos reads מֵאֵל for אֱלֹהִים. If this was the original reading, then the δὸς τοῦ θεοῦ of the LXX, so far as the preposition is concerned, is on all fours with the δὸς (= מֵאֵל) κύριος of Josh. 11:20. But, to pass from this, so long as we simply take the received Hebrew text, it is conceivable that the objective case in opposition with "a man" might stand, either by looking at the etymology of the name Yahweh, or by holding that אֱלֹהִים represents אֱלֹהִים יְהוָה.⁹ We should, then, be

⁹It is noticeable, in this connection, that both the archaic Hebrew letters and the Greek form in the manuscripts ΠΙΠΙ represent a word of two syllables of identical value, so far as the consonants are concerned, such as יְהוָה would be, and not the form Yawheh or Jehovah.

able to look forward from this to the $\Sigma\upsilon\epsilon\lambda\acute{o}\epsilon\rho\chi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$; of Matt. 11:3 and other passages. But now comes in my theory. I cannot imagine a Jewish reader of the Hebrew Scriptures, even in later times (say, about the last one hundred or one hundred and fifty years B. C.), pronouncing the tetragrammaton. If he did not, he must have substituted another name for it. The form in the Massoretic text, יהוה , testifies to Elohim being one of the substitutes. Now, if this were substituted in the passage we are treating, it would clearly convey no meaning to the hearers or readers. "I have gotten a man, namely, God." Here the difficulty would arise, and then would come the need for a paraphrase, and the obvious one to give sense would be "by the help of" or "with the co-operation of God." For the use of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ by the LXX I have given the nearest analogy I can find. Unfortunately, Aquila's version for this verse does not exist; but I have no doubt that he translated the Hebrew $\sigma\upsilon\nu\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega$ (as Symmachus does in this passage), or still more probably $\sigma\upsilon\nu\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$. The Oxford concordance (*sub voce*, $\sigma\upsilon\nu$) shows how often $\sigma\upsilon\nu = \text{חַן}$; almost always, however, with the accusative; and the other translations or translators have been influenced by this use.

The second passage to be dealt with is also a difficult one—Gen. 4:26. Here again I take the Hebrew and the Greek just as they stand, and by comparing the two I say that $\kappa\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omega\tau\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ points to an extension of the Yahweh-Elohim section (2:4b—3:24) still farther than it goes at present. There are five passages in chap. 4 alone in which this is indicated, with a varying degree of unanimity, among the uncial manuscripts quoted by Swete; but, as is well known, the best uncials fail us for the greater part of Genesis.

CRITICAL NOTE.

THE PLACE OF GOD IN HUMAN EVOLUTION.

PRESENT-DAY theistic thought starts with the evolutionary order of the world. The theistic problem is to show the necessity for God, and the place of God, in the evolutionary order and process. The world has developed; matter from star dust; man from the animals; society out of social chaos; industry out of universal war; religion from the rudest superstitions. Ideas, customs, institutions, all have come by the evolutionary process. Nothing has been exempt. This will also be true in the future. The law of development is universal. The present order of society is but a link between what has been and what shall be. Neither present industrial systems nor current religious conceptions are final. Everything is still in flux—a world never made, but always in process.

The human stages of this evolution have been effected by the passing generations of men. Each generation, coming upon the field at a time when a given step in the process of development needed to be taken, has contributed that needed step. The whole process of development has been what it has—and has been possible at all—only by the contribution which each succeeding generation has made to it.

Now here appears the significant fact. No generation ever had any adequate conception of what the total process of development was to involve before it was completed, nor even whither it was immediately tending; nevertheless, each generation has performed its own part, taken its own step of progress in such manner that the march has never for once been interrupted. The men who first gathered about the grave of a departed ancestor to pay homage to his lingering spirit were forerunners of all modern worshipers. If they, or someone else, had not taken that first step, modern religion would have been impossible. The same is true of every step in the long development from those first rude beginnings to the present time. Yet each step has been taken in comparative, if not in total, ignorance of the heights to which those steps were to lead. If those who gathered about the graves of their departed ancestors in the long-ago past had foreseen that religion

today was to be the thing it is, then they might naturally have taken the right step, the step which would make it possible for religion to become what it since has become. But they did not foresee anything of the kind. They foresaw nothing. They took the step that invited them ; but somehow it was the step that led to the wonderful religious development of the race.

If ever, in some great congress of mankind, it had been decided with practical unanimity what the future of mankind should be ; what steps must be immediately taken, and what steps should be taken in succeeding generations, in order to make this plan of human development unfold as it should ; if, further, some measures had at that or at any time been pursued to make it certain that such steps and no others should be taken ; and if, after all this, the development of human society had gone on as it has gone on, about all this there would have been nothing strange whatever. It would have been exactly like an individual planning what he would do, and then by successive steps proceeding to do it. But that each generation should take the step that was necessary for the development of society, without any adequate knowledge of the goal toward which it was stepping, or many times even of the immediate direction — that is the significant thing. It is like an individual doing he knows not what, and yet somehow doing every time the right thing to make the total product what it ought to be.

The matter may be illustrated in the present stage of industrial society. No one supposes that present industrial conditions are permanent. We are moving on. But to what? Nobody knows. Or if anyone pretends to know, at least there is no unanimity of opinion. There are not enough of us who know, or who think we know, to make even a consistent attempt to turn society into the direction of the goal toward which we feel that we are tending. We do not know what that goal is. And yet we are very sure that some later generation, as it looks back upon our day, will see that the steps which we have taken in ignorance of the goal have somehow led straight toward it.

Two exceptions can be taken to this argument. They are in reality one, and the same answer will suffice for both.

It may be said, in the first place, that we might have arrived at the same place where we now find ourselves, by a route different from the one which we have taken ; and therefore that the route which humanity has followed has not necessarily been the best route to bring it to its present situation. To which it may be replied that if humanity had

been, in any previous age, an altogether different thing from what it was, it might undoubtedly have brought us to the present point over some other route. But humanity was what it was, and therefore took the route it did. Or if, in any previous age, humanity might as well have been something altogether different from what it was, then also it might have arrived at the present over some better road than the one it actually took. But to maintain this would be to maintain that in some age humanity has been independent of its own past. A large acquaintance with history teaches that in every age humanity has been what it could be and what it had to be; and therefore that the road over which it has traveled to the present is the only road over which it could have come.

Or it may be said, in the second place, that the situation into which we have thus far come is not the best situation at which we might have arrived, but that any one of an indefinite number of others would have been just as good. But it does not seem, for reasons just stated, that we could have arrived at any other place than the one to which we have come; unless, indeed, it be assumed that humanity might at any time have been an altogether different thing from what it has been. But that is to substitute another problem for the one with which we are dealing.

The question involved in both of these objections is the question: Does history justify itself? It is not necessary to maintain either that we have arrived at our present situation by the best route imaginable, or that the present situation is theoretically ideal. But, given mankind as in any age it has been, could it have come by some better route to where it now stands, or by any route to a better place? To maintain either of these propositions is to maintain that history has been a mistake.

Let us now gather our argument up into a single statement. The world has from the beginning been moving harmoniously on, by steps that now appear to have been inevitable, toward the present order; but nowhere, to any man or to any generation of men, has it been apparent what the present order would be. The world is still moving on, we believe toward something better, more fit, more satisfactory, than the present. The steps which society is now taking will lead on to this "something better." Yet what this "something better" is none of us can clearly see. If the world had been moving aimlessly backward and forward, there would be nothing to account for, since that is what we should naturally expect from the ignorance of the future in

which man has taken every step. Or if he had himself ever clearly, or even dimly, foreseen the end to which his steps were to lead him, then again there would be nothing left to account for; since the orderly development of the world is exactly what we should expect from actors who had an adequate knowledge of the relation of their parts to the whole. But that the development should have been orderly, each part falling into its place, each step toward the goal, and yet each part played and each step taken in ignorance of the total result, could anything have been more significant than this?

There is but one interpretation of this march of man toward an unforeseen goal. We cannot deny that the world-order, past, present, and future, is an order and not a chaos. We cannot abandon the conviction that each generation will play its part in the future, as in the past, so as to make it contribute to the total result. Yet we cannot pretend that any generation will ever do this because it knows what the result is to be, and therefore what it ought to contribute toward bringing that result about. What, then, can we say, except that there exists a Mind in which the whole process is present, and in whose thought the various parts played by successive generations of men stand in relation of parts to the whole — both whole and parts being perfectly conceived and related? All analogy and experience declare some such belief to be necessary. There is no explanation for this march of man toward an unseen goal, except that there lives and works in man a Spirit larger and wiser than his own.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

A NEW WORK ON PAUL'S EPISTLES.

THE predominant aim of this volume of popular introduction¹ is "to deal with the epistles in the historical spirit" (p. vi). The author sketches the occasion and object of each epistle, summarizes the evidence on any question in debate, and then proceeds to give a spirited and readable paraphrase of its contents, which is sure to be of use to preachers as well as to other intelligent readers of the New Testament. Mr. Shaw has not added another to the list of uninspiring volumes written on an inspired literature. He has not captured, indeed, any new aspect of his subject; but in this conscientious summary he shows something of his master Godet's religious penetration, and Paulinism is always more to him than a far-off happy thing or a mere historical phase of primitive Christianity. Thus Philemon suggests a survey of slavery, ancient and modern (pp. 305 f.), Kipling's "Recessional" is printed in full (pp. 262, 263), and Anglican episcopacy comes up for discussion in connection with Ephesians (pp. 391 f.). It would be interesting to defend and expound the paradox that the true preacher must be a critic, and the true critic a preacher; and Mr. Shaw's book might serve as a fair text for such a discussion. But meantime it is enough to say that he does not touch the relation of Paulinism to Jesus and to the popular Christianity of the age, its Hellenic and rabbinic coefficients, its inner development in the apostle's mind, its relative and transient factors, or indeed the vital problems of its evolution. His treatment approximates to that of Conybeare and Howson, rather than to Sabatier's; he stands nearer to Farrar than to Pfeiderer. Without being ungrateful for this useful contribution, one may be permitted to express the hope that English scholars will turn their attention for the next few years to problems of Paulinism which lie beyond the purview of commentaries and such general introductions. An essay in English, *e. g.*, is badly wanted on the relation of Paul to Jesus, something as critical and competent as Feine's recent monograph, but better balanced. Then, an inquiry into the relation between Paul and Philo

¹ *The Pauline Epistles: Introductory and Expository Studies.* By R. D. SHAW, B.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: imported by Scribner, 1903. Price, \$3.50, net.

(*e. g.*, in 1 Corinthians) would not be unwelcome. And there is room for a monograph, not merely on Paul's eschatology and on his idea of the Spirit, but on his ethnic environment; despite Wendland's *caveat*, the lines pointed out by Heinrici and Hollmann will surely lead to some fruitful results, if sensibly pursued. Finally, apropos of Ephesians in particular, the relation of Paulinism to the fourth gospel still awaits an adequate discussion in our language. For the advent of any of these *lactabitur deserta et inopia, et exultabit solitudo*.

Turning to the introductory and critical matter of the book, we find its pages still occupied with the landscape rather than with the geology of the epistles. Mr. Shaw practically takes the letters as they lie in our canonical text, rearranging them, of course, in what he considers (and considers rightly, I think) to be their chronological order, but never going beneath the surface to admit any process of editing or compilation prior to their reception into the canon. The spirit in which this discussion is carried on, it must be admitted, is candid and fair. The writer's habit of sketching both sides of a controverted point (*e. g.*, the South Galatian theory, pp. 89 f.) and refraining from dogmatism, reminds one of the abbé Jacquier, the most recent Roman Catholic writer on New Testament introduction, and such open-mindedness is all to the good. It is not stimulating, but it is certainly attractive. Benjamin Franklin somewhere observes that the only people who fall into the disagreeable habit of disputing about religion are "lawyers, university men, and generally men of all sorts who have been bred at Edinburgh." Mr. Shaw belongs to both of the latter classes. But he is not caught in the sweep of Franklin's curious net, as the present writer in particular is bound and happy to admit. All the same, one cannot but feel that this book, like several others of its class, would have been more satisfactory if it had been based on a method involving more reaction of the modern mind upon the material presented to it by an ancient literature. And this leads one to say how greatly it is to be desired that some scholar would pull aside the boughs and let us look into the tangled wood of early Christian literature, to see how the epistles, *e. g.*, rooted themselves each in its respective soil, and how they were multiplied by means of copies, as well as pruned or grafted. All this growth and circulation, this relation between organization and travel and correspondence, is of real significance to the criticism of the New Testament; it underlies most of the problems of structure and even authenticity raised with regard to the Pauline letters. Paul, we say, wrote 1 Corinthians from Ephesus about

the year 53 A. D. How many problems are suggested by that simple sentence! How difficult it is to fill up the words with a historical content adequate to the literary facts of the situation! When Paul dictated the letter—doubtless during several days or even weeks—had he anything before him but the letter of the Corinthians to himself? Had he, *e. g.*, in composing chapter 15, any written notes, as A. Seeberg² has conjectured for vss. 3-5? Did he keep any copy of this or any other of his letters (dictated perhaps to two or more amanuenses at once)—a point of great importance in connection with 2 Thessalonians? When the voluntary *tabellarii* brought it to Corinth, were copies sent out to the other churches in the district (1 Cor. 1:1), while the original was retained in the church archives? Was it or any other of Paul's epistles designed for a wider audience, like Seneca's letters to Lucilius? Questions of this kind start up, so soon as one endeavors to get behind the canonical text of the epistles. And, apart from the possibility of more or less serious interpolations in the course of copying and circulation, the collection of the epistles into a Pauline canon or into the New Testament canon itself must have exposed them to the possibility of some editorial handling. The textual phenomena of Romans and Ephesians alone are enough to warn us that something of the kind occurred in these epistles. It is almost as uncritical to suppose that Paul sent Romans, exactly as we now possess it, from Cenchreæ to Rome, as to imagine that it was wholly composed by some writer of homiletic fiction in the second century. Internal evidence detaches 16:1-20 (23) at least as a note to Ephesus (though Mr. Shaw, pp. 200-207, enters his *non placet*). And for the rest of the letter recourse must be had to some hypothesis, either of different editions sent out by Paul, or of Pauline material clustering around an epistle to the Romans to which it did not originally belong. For, apart from the doxology and possibly a sentence or two here and there, I do not see that any case has yet been made out against the view that all the contents of Romans came from the lips of the apostle. The problem here is one of compilation and structure rather than of authenticity. Similarly with 2 Corinthians,³ Mr. Shaw admits that the case for regarding 10-13:10 as, in whole or in part, the intermediate letter, "is plausible, and that the case for it tends to grow stronger rather than weaker" (p. 156). If so, this fragment must have been put in the wake of the larger (chronologically, the later) epistle, by editors

² *Der Katechismus des Urchristenthums*, 1903, pp. 45 f.

³ See, most recently, J. H. KENNEDY in *Hermathena*, 1903, pp. 340-67.

who knew both had been addressed to the Corinthian church, but were ignorant of the particular local circumstances of either. Some such hypothesis seems necessary to meet the entire facts of the case; nor is it unique.⁴ It is interesting, but no more than interesting, to buttress (with Cornely, I think) the canonical form of 2 Corinthians by adducing the *De Corona* of Demosthenes, in which a calm and moderate opening is succeeded by a finale of vehement personal polemic. The case of Ephesians is rather different, no doubt, from either of those which have been mentioned. Here we have a twofold problem, of authenticity and of destination, and the latter is really independent of the former. Ladeuze's conjecture of κατ' Ἱπιν for καὶ πῶροις⁵ seems little better than a *jeu d'esprit*, though the watershed of the Iris in Bithynia would certainly give a situation for Ephesians close to that of 1 Peter, with which the epistle has indubitable internal affinities. But, in any case, the textual state of Eph. 1:1 indicates some accidental or deliberate change, occasioned, probably, by the subsequent ecclesiastical employment of the epistle. On the general question of such alterations in the New Testament writings previous to the archetypes of our extant manuscripts, only three remarks need to be made by way of a general proviso. (1) Addition was more probable than omission. Any fragments of tradition would be reverently incorporated or tacked on to other works. It is unlikely that much of importance was lost, though Col. 4:16 may denote an accidental instance of this, just as a parallel to some deliberate omissions may be found in the LXX version of Proverbs, which deliberately omits certain headings of post-Solomonic tendency. (2) The good faith and tact of the church prevented any serious alteration of the sense, and detected any attempt in this direction, as is plain from the controversy with Marcion.⁶ (3) As Loisy emphasizes,⁷ no accidental alterations which can be traced in our texts introduce any doctrinal error or any belief foreign to the general trend of revelation. Besides, in Paul's letters there is but a handful of subordinate passages which can be reasonably treated as possible interpolations or marginal comments. It will always remain a question whether these were due (1) to the author's personal revision (as in the case of similar passages, *e. g.*, in the *Persae* of Æschylus, the satires of Juvenal, the *Æneid* of Vergil, and the poems of Gower); or (2) to copyists, *librarii ab epistolis*; or finally (3) to later editors of the

⁴ Cf. R. H. CHARLES, *Enoch*, p. viii.

⁵ *Revue biblique*, 1902, p. 573.

⁶ See also EUSEBIUS, *H. E.*, xxiii, 12, and JOSEPHUS, *Antiquities*, XX, xi, 2.

⁷ *Autour d'un petit livre*, p. 29.

volume, as in the case of the Old Testament in general or a book like Marco Polo's *Travels*. Diodorus Siculus mentions the booksellers as responsible for unauthorized additions to an author's text; but this possibility scarcely comes under the purview of a critic of the New Testament epistles. As for the later threat in Rev. 22:18, 19, it may be pointed out that this passage, like some others,⁸ follows the precedent set by former Jewish writings;⁹ like the threat of Irenæus to wilful or careless copyists,¹⁰ it is directed against those deliberate mutilations of a document which were due to doctrinal bias.

On all this (pp. 477 f.) Mr. Shaw's standpoint is conservative, open-minded but conservative, as indeed upon the structure of Romans, the date of Galatians, and the authenticity of 2 Thessalonians—the three questions most agitated at present in the special field of Pauline introduction. Some students, for example, will desiderate a graver attention to the question of the authenticity of 2 Thessalonians than is betrayed either here (p. 38) or indeed in the latest and rather dull edition of these epistles by Wohlenberg in Zahn's *Commentary*. The trouble in the air at present relates not so much to the apocalyptic section as to the literary relationship with 1 Thessalonians. The strength of Wrede's subtle and vigorous essay¹¹ really lies in the argument that the literary phenomena are incompatible with the Pauline authorship, and that the epistle must have been written by a later Christian (ca. 100 A. D.) who had 1 Thessalonians before him. A parallel instance (according to some) would be the composition of Ephesians upon the basis of Colossians. But, as I have already urged, such discussions really must be decided upon a larger scale than that of the particular epistles under review; the whole field of early Christian literature, with the normal¹² conditions of composition and circulation, need first to be surveyed, and the materials for this are as yet scanty as well as scattered. Harnack's excursus in his *Ausbreitung* (pp. 268 f.), Dr. Rendel Harris's suggestive articles on Paul as a writer of letters, and some of Professor Ramsay's studies, throw some light on the problem in a sporadic fashion, and there is a partial parallel in the two treatises of Philo on the Jewish persecution in Alexandria, both of which contain frequent coincidences of expression and ideas. Yet the *In Flaccum* and *Legatio ad Caium*, as Schürer himself admits, were probably written independently at different times; any direct

⁸ *Barnabas*, xix, 11. ⁹ E. g., *Enoch*, civ, 10 f., and *Ep. Arist.* (311).

¹⁰ EUSEBIUS, *H. E.*, v. 20. ¹¹ In *Texte und Untersuchungen*, for 1903.

¹² Cf. Col. 4:16 with *Apoc. Bar.*, 86.

literary dependence is not probable. There is always the possibility, of course, that some genuine Pauline epistle was worked up by a later hand, or interpolated, like the fourth-century *Dialogus de recta fide*, twenty or thirty years after it was composed. The structure of the pastoral epistles helps to render a hypothesis of this kind not unintelligible, and it might be applied to 2 Thessalonians, though I cannot understand how a critic like Pfeiderer¹³ hopes to solve the problems of Colossians by means of it, when he accepts *in toto* (except the minor interpolations in 1:1, 2:6 f.) an epistle like Philippians (pp. 176 f.), which might more plausibly (at 3:1 f.) suggest some theory of compilation.

Mr. Shaw seems right, upon the whole, in adhering (p. 99) to the position of Galatians immediately before 1 Corinthians. Of the two currents of critical opinion which would drift the epistle either earlier or later, the latter theory needs little notice. Pfeiderer's recent support¹⁴ is of little moment, and Clemen has now abandoned his peculiar theory in favor of an earlier date, as will probably be stated in detail by him in his forthcoming life of Paul. But if Galatians can hardly be moved on to the neighborhood of Romans, a better case can be made out for it as the first of the Pauline epistles. Corinth, as well as Antioch, may have been the place of its composition, and though I still think Ephesus most satisfactorily meets the varied requirements of the situation presupposed in the epistle, it must be allowed that the fresh reading of the history recently offered by Weber (and supported by Rohr,¹⁵ Belser, and others) suggests several exegetical considerations which compel careful notice. For any date and place the argument must, in the nature of the case, be cumulative; the data are mostly to be drawn from a comparative criticism of the Thessalonian epistles and Galatians itself, while a great deal depends on the view taken of Acts, chapter 15, and its historicity. On the latter question I hardly think Weber and his allies move with sufficient critical detachment. Apart from this, however, the early date of Galatians is certainly becoming more attractive and plausible. Wohlenberg (pp. 8 f.), I observe, accepts it; but he does nothing to remove the difficulty of understanding how the development among the Galatian Christians could ripen within so brief a period. Meantime on this, as on the question of the date of 2 Thessalonians, I should prefer to maintain an attitude of that *thätige Skepsis* which Huxley advocated with regard to Darwinism at the outset.

¹³ *Urchristentum*, Vol. I, pp. 190, 191.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 135-38.

¹⁵ *Allgemeine Litteratur-Blatt*, 1901, pp. 226 f.

Lack of space prevents me from saying anything about Mr. Shaw's good section (pp. 266 f.) on Ephesians, but I may add a sentence upon his candid, but unconvincing, defense (pp. 425 f.) of the pastoral epistles as directly Pauline. He has the merit of recognizing that there is really a problem here. But it is surely begging the question to declare that the "rather long and uncommon preamble" to Titus is "such as only the apostle himself would have ventured upon" (p. 430), and one must again protest firmly against the assumption (p. 432) that the pastorals are strictly private and personal letters. The two real desiderata of historical criticism upon the pastorals at this time of day are (a) a positive reconstruction of their origin and function in the sub-Pauline age, and (b) a recognition, together with a reconstruction, combining self-restraint with penetration, of the indubitably authentic material which the author has incorporated in these writings. Along these lines I have already attempted to work in my article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Vol. IV, cols. 5079-96, where most of Mr. Shaw's objections are answered by anticipation. I ought, however, to have alluded more explicitly in that article to P. Ewald's transposition of 1 Tim. 1:12-17 to a place between 1:2 and 1:3, and of 3:14-4:10 to a place following 6:2 (to which we might adduce a partial parallel from the pseudo-Philonic *De incorruptibilitate mundi*), though this theory of his still seems less valuable than some of the points which he makes against the mosaic work of analysts like Hesse and Knoke. Little importance attaches, I should imagine, to the occasional coincidences of language between the pastorals and Plutarch, which Albani has adduced in his interesting study.¹⁶ The linguistic argument against the Pauline authorship rests rather on "the change in the use of particles, and the comparative rarity of the definite article, along with the startling divergence in vocabulary"¹⁷—the first being a vital criterion of style in matters of this kind. And the evidence on this line is too minute and extensive to be explained by any hypothesis of different amanuenses. The difference between the pastorals and the authentic Pauline letters, either in language or in ideas, is too marked for any theory that refuses to go beyond the development of Paul's own genius and the limits of the seventh decade of the first century. Heinrich,¹⁸ von Dobschütz,¹⁹ Dr. A. Seeberg,²⁰ and Maurice Goguel²¹

¹⁶ In HILGENFELD's *Zeitschrift*, 1902, pp. 40-58.

¹⁷ *Church Quarterly Review*, 1903, 428, 429. ¹⁹ *Urchristliche Gemeinden*, 1903.

¹⁸ *Urchristenthum*, 1902, p. 100.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 16 f., 22, 37, 172 f.

²¹ *La notion johannique de l'esprit*, 1902, pp. 68 f.

are far from being radical, yet they are only the most recent among biblical theologians who find themselves driven from different sides to this position.

Finally, one finds oneself in substantial agreement with the results rather than with the methods of Mr. Shaw's good-humored discussion (pp. 63-84) of the Dutch school. The recent prominence of this criticism has given it quite a fictitious importance, but if these cloud-compellers, or rather children of the mist, are worth direct notice, the campaign will require to proceed from some ampler and more scientific base of operations than that afforded in the main by an acquaintance with van Manen's English lucubrations and some English discussion of the same topic. Otherwise, Mr. Shaw's reading has been wide and fairly thorough. But it is not hypercritical, I trust, to regret the absence of any allusion to so satisfying a book as Haupt's edition of the prison epistles (in Meyer), or to Principal Drummond's scrappy but suggestive little volume in the "International Handbooks" series. And, in pointing his moral or adorning his tale at several points, Mr. Shaw might have drawn upon Martineau's vivid pages instead of upon — well, some lesser writers who are very much in evidence!

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JUDAISM IN THE DAYS OF JESUS.

It has become customary to designate that period of the religion of Israel which is bounded at the one end by the Maccabean uprising and at the other by the disastrous struggle with Rome which crushed out Jewish national life in Palestine as "Late Judaism"—*Spätjudentum*. "Judaism," in a historical sense, is a term applicable only to the post-exilic phase of the religion of Israel; perhaps it may be said to begin with the act of 621. In contrast with the pre-exilic phase or Yahwism, which was a national religion, that is to say, the religion of a nation enjoying political life, Judaism may be characterized as the religion of a community developing into a church. While "Early" or pre-Maccabean Judaism is essentially concerned with the life of the small Jewish community shut in by the walls of Jerusalem, and playing the part of a mere onlooker while round about nations rage and kingdoms are moved, the later period displays volume, expansiveness, aggressiveness, and organization which all go toward the making of a church. Of the literature in which the spiritual movements of Late Judaism are recorded the single blank page between the Old Testament and the New in our English

Bible gives but scant evidence. The so-called apocryphal and pseud-epigraphic writings of the Old Testament are conveniently accessible in Kautzsch's German Bible (1900); to which should be added Philo, Josephus, and the older strata of the Mishna. The voice of prophecy is silent; psalm-writing is in its last stages; the stirring events of the day find painstaking, though sometimes interested, reporters; the Jewish religion is glorified and presented in the right light; wisdom makes herself heard; while the tradition of the elders is still handed down by mouth from master to pupil, numerous visionaries are busy revealing the mysteries of heaven. The official guardians of the religion, they who sit in the seat of Moses, are the teachers of the Law, those jurists so severely castigated in the gospels, yet counting as their own Hillel and Gamaliel. While Jewish piety in its periphery manifests itself in a variety of externals—in fasting, the washing of hands, the cleansing of vessels, the keeping away from forbidden food, and the scrupulous tithing of mint and anise and cummin—in its center it signifies an earnest and holy desire to do God's will; and the shortest, yet most comprehensive, formula in which the doctors are wont to sum it up—it won the approbation of Jesus (Mark 12: 34)—is “the taking upon oneself of the yoke of the sovereignty of God” (קבלת על מלכות שמים).

So near the gospel, and yet so far from it! Such is the verdict of a Wellhausen, a Harnack. The seven woes upon the hypocrite scribes and Pharisees ring in the ears of every Christian theologian; the Pauline estimate of the Law does the rest. The polemical tone of the gospels should warn a fair-minded student that there may lurk in those unsparing criticisms a bit of one-sided exaggeration; but the warning is quite often forgotten. It were idle to deny that Jesus sought to transcend the piety of the average representative of Pharisaism; I doubt whether he wished to destroy the whole system as worthless. It is a favorite undertaking to contrast the religion of Jesus and that of the Pharisees. A contrast there exists in all truth; it is the same that offsets the radicalism of Jeremiah (4: 3a) against the compromises of the men of Deuteronomy (Jer. 4: 3b; 3: 5b; 8: 8), or the religion of Tolstoi against that of the representatives of the Russian church. The prophet is always at variance with his time; he is impatient with the circuitous roads by which alone communities may be led to the service of God; he disdains to avail himself of such crude methods as he finds in current use in order to infuse his ideal into the hearts of men. The prophet's religion is truly his own. He must needs assume an inimical attitude toward organized piety, that is, toward ecclesiasticism. Jewish

piety in the times of Jesus showed the blessings, but also the evils, of all ecclesiasticism. Jesus emphasized its evils. That was his task as a prophet. Therein is grounded the contrast between his piety and that of Jewish officialdom. Bousset, the *Privatdocent*, discussed in 1892 the preaching of Jesus in its contrast to Judaism; in his work on "The Jewish Religion in New Testament Times,"^{*} which, mature in judgment and as a professor, he has now given to the world, he concedes that, in his previous effort, he "emphasized in too one-sided a manner the contrast between Jewish piety and that of the gospel."

"'Aḥad ha-'am" (A. Ginzberg), S. Bernfeld, and others of the Zionist camp will hardly dispute Bousset's thesis of the ecclesiastical character of early rabbinism, although the national limitations, which Bousset naturally considers as a defect, will be seized upon by them as evidences of the supremacy of an undying national assertiveness. From another camp, which, it seems, has not emancipated itself from the Mendelssohnian conception of the undogmatic character of Judaism, there has actually come the contention that Bousset has overestimated the importance which, in the religious system of rabbinic Judaism, was attached to articles of faith or to faith in general.^{*} I believe that Bousset's thesis cannot be shaken. Whether in Palestine or in the dispersion, the Jews of the post-Maccabean period faced the world as members of a religious organization, of a church in its beginnings. I say with Bousset, *in its beginnings*, although he and I will differ as to where the consummation is to be placed. For him the consummation lies in the Christian church; for me, in the Christian church on the one hand, but, on the other, also in mediæval Judaism and the Reformed Jewish church of our own days. Bousset's use of the word "church" for the Jewish religious body in New Testament times is to be commended; it is not only expressive—how cumbersome and vague is the term "religious community"!—but, above all, historically correct; witness the rabbinic expression: כְּנֶסֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל, "the church of Israel." Jewish nationalism is modern. Its causes need not be discussed here. But, so far as the past is concerned, Judaism represents a body of doctrines for which alone, individually and collectively, the Jew suffered martyrdom, and the organization of the Jewish communities, with the discipline it involved, was strictly ecclesiastical.

Bousset is particularly attracted by the eschatology of late Judaism,

^{*}*Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter.* VON WILHELM BOUSSET. Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1903. Pp. xiv + 512.

^{*}See PERLES, *Bousset's Religion des Judentums kritisch untersucht*, 1903.

in which he discerns a twofold and somewhat contradictory aspect. The hopes which have the establishment of the kingdom of God and the Jewish people in Jerusalem, and the subjugation of the heathen world for their subject are called by him Messianic; while the hopes which center about a transcendent world and a heavenly Jerusalem are termed by him apocalyptic. The two sets of hopes are not clearly differentiated, but fuse into each other to produce a peculiar tangle. Occasionally it is sought to bring order into the confused ideas; hence the doctrine of chiliasm. A dualistic conception of the world underlies the apocalyptic hopes: this world is evil and the evil one's; the world which is to come will be good and God's own world. Bousset finds in the presence of the apocalyptic hopes, based as they are upon a dualistic view of the world, a problem which needs accounting for. The apocalyptic ideas do not appear to him to be derivable from Jewish premises, but necessitate the assumption of foreign, particularly Parsist, influence. To this question the concluding pages are devoted. The problem and the answer have been presented by Bousset also in a popular booklet.³ Whether Bousset is quite successful with his derivation of Jewish eschatology from the Persian may perhaps be a matter of doubt; at all events, Baldensperger's remark⁴ just with reference to these supposed foreign mutations in Judaism deserves to be widely known:

There is this difference in the point of view of different investigators: the theologian says, "There exist foreign elements in Judaism, but they have been transformed;" the historian, "The foreign elements in Judaism have indeed been transformed, but they exist nevertheless."

Religions borrow ideas, as languages borrow words; and just as words become naturalized and in their transformation hardly recognizable as loanwords, so it is with religious ideas: they become transformed, fuse with the indigenous religion, become an integral part of its system. And, furthermore, it may be proper for the theologian who speaks for the living church to say whether a supposedly foreign doctrine fits in with the rest or not; the historian should be above the "disharmonies" between the old and the new, the native and the foreign. But the historical coolness frequently makes way for a theological "value-judgement."

I do not wish here to take sides in the contention between Bousset and his rather severe critic, Perles. Bousset has answered in a brochure

³ *Die jüdische Apokalypitik, ihre religionsgeschichtliche Herkunft und ihre Bedeutung für das neue Testament*, 1903.

⁴ *Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums* (1903), p. 194.

entitled *Volksfrömmigkeit und Schriftgelehrtentum*. Thus much is to be said: Bousset's too scrupulous regard for contemporaneous evidence deprives him of the use of the vast material stored up in the anonymous aggada. The historian should never be economical with his sources; he need never be afraid of having too many. And where his sources are not datable, they may be treated as late; but then, on the basis of them, an attempt ought to be made to reconstruct the past. A judicious perusal of the rabbinic literature would have been profitable. Of course, the subject is comprehensive, and the scholar combining the knowledge of the rabbinic literature with that of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic writings as well as the New Testament, all at first hand, is yet to come. Meanwhile let us thank Bousset for his contribution. I am sorry that, on p. 10 of his reply, Bousset has allowed himself to be carried away by polemics to assert that the world would have been no loser if rabbinic Judaism had not existed. His statement that Christianity was of itself capable of restoring true monotheism where it had been perverted may be questioned. The Hebrew Bible preserved by the Jews, not to mention other influences, was a factor in the Christian Reformation; and the preservation of the church of Israel to this day should, to a believer in divine providence, be evidence that the religion of love may still be in need of a corrective through the religion of law.

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No New Testament scholar is properly equipped for his work today who is not, at least, fairly well acquainted with the period covered by Bousset in the book before us—with its dominant ideas and tendencies, if not with its literature in detail. Incompetent interpreters used to be reproved for not reading individual texts in the light of the immediate context. Then biblical theology came and taught us that the real context of any passage is the whole scope and content of the book in which it occurs. Then this conception of "context" was extended to the whole circle of a given author's ideas, and a comparison with the usage and thought of other canonical writers was regarded as important. Now we are taught to read the New Testament in the larger "context" of the world of ideas within which it arose. This requirement is just and necessary. There can be no adequate historical study of New Testament literature and theology which does not take account of that special and peculiar world of thought and feeling in

which the first teachers of the Christian religion were reared and trained. The more clearly this has been seen, the more eager and thorough has been the study of those Jewish and Alexandrian worlds of thought which immediately preceded or were contemporary with the New Testament period. In this field the Germans have led the way, and it is safe to say that the historical study of the beginnings of our religion is now more largely occupied with this than with any other single interest. To this study the work of Bousset is one of the most important contributions. In its range it covers, roughly speaking, two centuries, from about 170 B. C. to 40 A. D.; that is, from the period of the Antiochan persecutions and the Maccabean war to the death of Philo.

As it is quite impossible within the limits of a brief notice to review this elaborate work in detail, I will select for brief comment the author's treatment of a few points of special interest to students of the New Testament. On the question whether late Judaism had a doctrine of the pre-existence of the Messiah, Bousset agrees, in general, with Dalman, that this idea was not native to Jewish thought. Nevertheless, he finds evidence—somewhat sporadic, indeed—of its existence. The Septuagint translation shows traces of the idea, in such passages as Ps. 109:3; Isa. 9:6, and especially, in the passage of chief importance, Dan. 7:13. In the similitudes of the book of Enoch the pre-existence of the *name* of the Messiah is emphasized, but this phrase is but a periphrasis for the Messiah himself. In 4 Ezra also the Messiah is conceived as a pre-existent heavenly being.

Whence, then, if this idea was naturally foreign to Jewish thought, did it come in the cases noted? The answer usually given is that it arose from a misunderstanding of the symbolic description of Israel in Dan. 7:13 as "one like unto a son of man." This phrase, it is said, was taken in a personal sense, and thus the title "Son of Man," as applied to the Messiah, and the conception of his heavenly pre-existence are alike explained. This explanation is the more plausible since the references to Messiah's pre-existence in Enoch and 4 Ezra seem to be echoes of this Danielic passage. Says Bousset:

Nevertheless, this explanation seems to me in the highest degree improbable. That so important and influential an idea as that of a heavenly, pre-existent Messiah should have arisen simply from a misunderstanding of a biblical text is absolutely inconceivable. . . . Rather is the idea connected, in the tradition, in the closest manner with the Messianic title "Son of Man." It is found only where this title is found.

But after recognizing certain difficulties which render this explanation by itself insufficient, the author concludes :

We are forced to the conjecture that in this figure of the pre-existent Son of Man two forms are blended: the Jewish Messiah, and a pre-existent heavenly being whose origin and derivation are still unexplained. The idea of a heavenly, original man in some form is combined with the Jewish Messianic idea.

In any case, Bousset concludes, the idea had a wide vogue and influence. He further thinks that the title "Son of Man" as a designation of the Messiah was more common than it is generally believed to have been. He differs from those who deny Jesus' application of the title "Son of man" to himself, and says of this explanation which has been so energetically supported by Wellhausen, Lietzmann, *et al.* :

The assumption that the title "Son of Man" first arose on Greek soil through a misunderstanding of Dan. 7:13 appears to be impossible (pp. 250-54).

Another theme of obvious interest to students of the New Testament receives a brief, but illuminating treatment: the vicarious sufferings of the righteous. This conception had already found striking expression in the exilic Isaiah. The synagogue elaborated it, especially in developing the doctrine of a "treasury of merit" accumulated by the sufferings of the good which might be drawn upon by the unworthy. Bousset shows how the sufferings of the martyrs in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes were viewed in this light. Their death is an *λασθήριος θάνατος*. One of the seven brothers prays that by their sufferings the divine wrath may be averted from their race. Another prays: "Be gracious to thy people, and let the sufferings which we are enduring for their sake suffice thee. Let my blood serve as a purification; take my life as a substitute for their life." These examples are from 2 Maccabees. Similar thoughts appear elsewhere, as when Josephus represents Abraham as expecting to derive benefit from the undeserved sufferings of Isaac. The merits of the saints were regarded as a protection from calamity and punishment. The presence of even one or two righteous men in a city was held to be a guaranty of safety.

These are mere isolated illustrations selected with a view to showing the interest which the book possesses for the student who wishes to pursue the study of the New Testament in a historical method. The time has gone when the study of our primitive Christian documents can be prosecuted in isolation. Grammar and exegesis have all the importance which they ever had, but they are no longer adequate.

Primitive Christianity is rooted in Jewish soil. Without some knowledge of that soil it cannot be historically understood, either in its kinship to, or difference from, the religion from which it sprang.

The plan of the work is very comprehensive. It includes a treatment of the sources, the development of Jewish piety, the national character of the Jewish religion, the theology of Judaism, and such collateral movements as the philosophy of Philo and the cult of the Essenes.

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THE VINDICATION OF CHRISTIANITY.

THIS essay¹ is described by its author as an attempt "to enter completely into the modern view of the world and show that Christian truth remains;" "for Protestant Christianity cannot consent to become the religion of the ignorant and the thought-weary." The course of Professor Knox's argument is as follows:

The "direct and fundamental proofs" of the Christian religion change with changing views of the world. A classic line of argument is formed when a common world-view has for some continuous period of time held the field, and when Christian thought has definitely adjusted itself to it. Defendants and opponents of Christianity at such a time alike avail themselves of common intellectual instruments, and the issue of the contest is decided by the applicability of the instruments to the situation and by the skill with which they are handled. Such an argument was formulated by Bishop Butler in his *Analogy*, and such a situation was common to orthodox and heterodox in the great Deistic controversy of the seventeenth century. Miracles, the ontological, cosmological, teleological arguments for the existence of God, design, natural *versus* revealed knowledge, etc., constituted the problems of the classic argument. All this has been changed by the development and promulgation of modern thought. Miracles as infringements of natural laws are scientific inconceivabilities: as phenomena obeying peculiar natural laws, they have no apologetic value. Kant dealt the three classic arguments for the existence of God crushing blows. That from design has been relegated to the limbo prepared for antiquated notions. Common consent has been overthrown as a question of fact, and it is seen to be worthless even if it were true. Truth

¹ *The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion.* By GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX. New York: Scribner, 1903. 197 pages. \$1.20.

is no longer determined by the numbers who hold a given opinion, but by the character of the opinion itself. Causation cannot lead us from the world to a first cause, for it is now seen that causation has but a relative value as delimiting in a practical way and for certain purposes some portion or portions of the all-inclusive web of activities which constitutes the ground of phenomena and exhibits the active, ever-present, immanent reality. A geocentric conception of our system has given place to a heliocentric. And beyond our system are other systems and other suns. "What is man, therefore," the modern scientist asks, "that he should be considered as the end and aim for the existence and course of the universe?" Space and time lead out and out and back and back, indefinitely, until man and his concerns appear quite as incidental to the universe as the soon-burst though brilliant bubble upon the ocean wave. Abandoning all *a priori* attempts at constructing the character, course, or meaning of the universe, the scientist takes the world as he finds it, struggling ceaselessly to lay bare its facts, to understand its laws, collecting, classifying, testing, until he finds the reality of things. What he *might wish* to be so is nothing to him; what *is* so is everything. Thus, assured of what he finds and intelligently ignorant of what is beyond him, he toilsomely builds up his conceptions, knowing full well that they are partial and certain to be included in larger views, but knowing also that they are well founded. Such, then, being the atmosphere by which we are surrounded, the question comes home: Can our religious, and especially our Christian, beliefs live in such an atmosphere? And if so, how?

It is plain that if religion is to make good its claim, it can do so only by becoming itself scientific. Science has come to stay. Its methods are definite, and its results are known. Harmonies between authority, religion, and science are out of date. The days of two-fold truth are no longer with us, and science is in possession of the field. Submitting our religious beliefs to its tests, two questions arise immediately: first, What is the nature of scientific method, and how does it get reality? second, What results do we obtain by the application of scientific method to religion?

Taking the first question, we find that science begins with matters of experience which engage our attention and challenge our insight. These matters of experience science examines, not simply in the present instance, but in as many instances as it can find. By careful examination it endeavors to obtain an accurate description of the experiences

in their various forms, and to bring to light the principle which governs them. When the scientist is assured that his observation is exhaustive (for his purpose) and his explanation by principle complete, he makes a test by way of putting the principle in operation and observing whether the precise experience or set of experiences demanded put in their appearance. If his experiment be not successful, he retraces his work, observing, comparing, constructing, trying one combination after another, until he obtains the desired result, viz., the ability to *produce* the set of experiences which he wishes to explain. When he is able to do so, he believes that he understands his fact and has obtained reality. One thing more remains, the result of scientific investigation is expressive of a form and order of experience which the scientist construes, but does not create. The reality is a definite something, into whose inner nature he can enter, but whose nature, although intelligible to him, is not his creation nor is subject to his mere wish or whim. In short, the reality, while definite and intelligible, is not a private experience, but something essentially public. For this reason the scientist publishes his results and appeals confidently to the judgment of his fellows. When they, repeating his experiment, are able to obtain experiences identical with his, the result is held to be entirely objective, and the reality, in so far, known.

Before passing to the second question, there is a further point pertinent to truth and reality, and significant for religion, which must be made plain. Facts appear to be of two orders. There are natural facts, or those with whose initial fabrication human experience has had nothing to do. They are real *data*. There are other facts, such as are contained in the processes of racial activity and expressed most completely in the actualities of civilization, which are not *data*, but *constructs* of human experience. The test of their truth or falsity therefore must consist in the question whether they serve efficiently the purposes which called them into being, and whether these purposes are in harmony with the complexities and tendencies of human life, as we know it. To this order of facts religion belongs, viz., to the order of phenomena which not simply *are*, but which involve the further question as to whether they *ought* or *ought not to be*.

Reverting to the main argument, we meet our second question: What result do we obtain by the application of scientific method to religion? The answer is furnished by the science of comparative religion. This discipline has established that man is religious by nature, and that religion has undergone a remarkable development in

the race. This development has brought out into clear light the object and function of religion. The object is God, conceived "as a super-sensible reality, recognized as real, as worshipful, as good, and as responding to us." The function is to supply an ideal for man, considered both in his social and in his individual capacity—an ideal which, however limited it may be in its earlier stages, emerges finally as a principle applicable to all mankind. This formulation enables us to adjudge the merits of those religions which have claimed universality, and finally to raise the question whether the religion adjudged to be the premier really fulfils the purpose set it.

This rank of primacy is adjudged by Professor Knox to Christianity, for reasons which are definite and well stated, but into which, for purposes of review, it is not necessary to go. What, then, is Christianity, and how does it stand the test of truth and falsity? As an experience, the Christian life is single, but must be regarded from two points of view. As a principle of social organization, it is an ethics; as an intuition of ultimate super-sensible reality, it is religion. Religion, operative as an ideal of conduct for men among men, is ethics, whereas ethics, conceived in terms of its ground and ultimate source, is religion. For this reason we must consider together and inseparably Christianity's ultimate conceptions—the brotherhood of men and the fatherhood of God. Man's experience of God as a Father is the basis and ground for his treatment of his fellow-men, without distinction of nation, color, sex, or rank, as brothers. His practical interaction with his fellow-men as brethren, and his sincere desire to realize this ideal among men, is the guarantee of the sincerity of his belief in a heavenly Father. We are now in a position to raise the questions: Is Christianity true? Is it scientifically demonstrable? As has been seen, the truth of every scientific hypothesis is presented and demonstrated in the form: it must have a basis in experience; it must propose a definite method of controlling experience; it must present a realizable aim for whoever would make the experiment. Now, Christianity, as all religion, rests in a basis of needs directed toward the organization and idealization of human society. It formulates its hypothesis in terms of the brotherhood of men—of the love of man for man as a practical principle—and the fatherhood of God as the ground and inspiration of this principle to its most efficient operation. Its test, its "direct and fundamental proof," centers, therefore, in the inquiry whether in the past it has organized society for what is best and highest; whether it is doing so at the present time; and

whether its ideal is so fitted to the demands of the most progressive societies, their needs, their aims, their idealizing forces, as to make it a certain, natural, and sane working hypothesis for the future. Christianity's record as a life, pre-eminently in that of its Founder, in a lesser but to a marked degree in that of his disciples, the identity of its principles and aims with the progressive agencies of society, the setting of standards which instead of being exhausted have not yet been adequately exploited, is the answer to this challenge. So tested, Christianity remains as a method of living whose claims cannot be gainsaid until it has been shown, by individual and by racial experience, that it is inadequate to produce that quality of life in inspiration, outlook, satisfaction, and power which it promises.

Life therefore, and the activities of life, are the test of the Christian religion. Theologies may come and go. Metaphysics may endeavor to explain and unify. The church may be true to its mission or not. But below all and through all, furnishing their renewing power or their condemning standard, is the vital hypothesis that life is good; that men are brethren; that they are the children of a heavenly Father; that this is to be realized in an ethical life, regulated by the best social ideals and refined by its own peculiar quality. Wherever such a life is found, there we must recognize the Christian; and the practical test by individual and social living is the one which must be resorted to in any doubt as to its truth and falsity. And, so tested, Christianity has nothing to fear. Finally, such a method leaves the intellect free to investigate in its own way the problems furnished by the different sciences and metaphysic. With reference to science, it maintains simply that religion has a right to view the universe from its own standpoint. With reference to metaphysic, the science of religion proffers its results as a contribution needed in the ultimate unification of the sciences to which all thought tends.

Such, I believe, is a fair statement, in outline, of Professor Knox's method and argument. It remains to indicate several criticisms. These must not be taken as interfering in any way with our sincere appreciation of the broad-mindedness, vigor, and skill of the author's apologetic. The volume will prove of inestimable value both within and without the church: within the church, because of the liberation which it will bring to many minds dissatisfied with orthodoxy, and yet unadjusted to newer views; without the church it will be read widely because of its intelligence, its sanity, its discrimination. The criticisms referred to would recognize this, but would raise a doubt as to whether

it is possible to maintain Christianity as more than an ethics on the basis of a purely scientific point of view.

Granting that Christianity as ethics presents a method of living whose significance has been by no means exhausted; granting its wonderful flexibility in adjusting itself to, and its marvelous power in, varied circumstances; granting even that, in its view of human personality, it presents a standard which leaves nothing to be desired—have we a right, *on a purely scientific basis*, to rise to the conception of God as a personal being interested in humanity as a father is interested in his child? I think not. Yet without this conception religion is shorn away, and we are left with Christianity as ethics and nothing more.

1. My first objection may be put in this form: Monotheistic religions conceive of God as ultimate reality. Christianity adds the further conception that this ultimate reality is personal. On the other hand, science is partial. It does not pretend to exhaust the whole of reality, but merely to exhibit it from certain points of view. The order revealed by each science may be true and objective, but can never be taken as the whole reality. For example, the physical sciences lead us to energy, the biological to life, the mental to consciousness or spirit. Religion in its development may lead us to the conception of personal moral order as objective, but on the basis of science we must place this order on the same plane with energy and every other scientific medium. For science, the moral order of the universe, however objective it may be, has no more right to be lifted to an absolute plane than has energy. In brief, its objectivity is seen to consist in its embodiment in human life. Thus we may speak of a human world, as well as of a physical world, a living world, a conscious world—meaning the objective groupings of phenomena. So considered, however, the religious object is absolutely identical with the moral order of the universe of which conscience is the embodiment in the individual man, and the institutions and ideals of civilization its fruition in the race.

How these several worlds stand related to each other, and how we are to conceive the reality of which they are partial embodiments, is the problem of philosophy. Whether this reality is to be conceived as an Absolute of whose nature the moral order is an essential part, but still only a part, or whether it is to be thought of as a personal reality, is a problem which Christianity must face. There can be no doubt that Christianity makes the magnificent assumption that the ultimate reality is personal, but this assumption it must make good. Science

may provide the material for casting up the account, but in its partial character it cannot present the reckoning. Thus the dilemma faces us: either, be scientific throughout, investigating facts and their laws, realizing the farther we go the little and ever less that we know, becoming involved ever more thoroughly in the great mystery of things—in short, consistently agnostic; or, let us be frankly metaphysical, taking the risk of failure for the hope of a noble success. In the first case, we shall eliminate God the heavenly Father, and worship at the shrine of the unknown. In the second case, we shall learn the rules of metaphysical procedure and, under the tuition of all who have gone before, test whether the Absolute be not also God. One is free to choose which way he will go, but it is not consistent to avoid the hard road of metaphysic and at the same time to assume as true the results which metaphysic alone can demonstrate.

It is a corollary from this position that Professor Knox has no right to rise from the consciousness of Jesus to the character of God. No man's consciousness can be taken as an exponent of anything beyond itself without examination in terms of the criteria appropriate to the "object" indicated by the consciousness. Otherwise we should have no basis for discriminating illusion from reality. An insane person has intense, distinct, and definite experiences—perhaps even more so than the normal individual. We admit the fact of the experiences, but by no means take them for what they think themselves to be. And, in like manner, we may admit the fact of Jesus' consciousness of himself, of man, of God, and yet maintain that its interpretation may be other than himself or the church has supposed it to be. At least it must be urged that, unless we would labor under the illusion of the *petitio principii*, we must demonstrate why and how the object of Jesus' consciousness is to be taken at its face value. To repeat: Let it be granted that Jesus' experience of religion was individual, grand, inspiring; let it be granted, also, that this experience was the fruition of a long religious development—the question must still be raised whether its object, God, is to be taken as ultimate reality, or as the hypostatization in full personal form of the social organization which religion in its varied forms has constantly hypostatized. It is not an impossible thing that Christianity, as the fruition of religion, may be considered simply as the expression in full, free outline of the fact that social activities arise, proceed, and end within the limits of personality. So interpreted, Fatherhood would emerge as the recognition of the generic unity of all men; and brotherhood, as the recognition in a free

way of the intrinsic worth of the individual man in the construction, maintenance and enjoyment of the social fabric.

I do not maintain that such is the proper interpretation of Jesus' consciousness, but that, if we would go farther, we must not rest in the mere fact of his experience or in religious intuition. Every "fact" which involves an inference must justify that inference, and no intuition can escape the necessity of giving an account of itself.

2. My second doubt is equally serious, and leads to a similar conclusion. The universal object and working hypothesis of religion is God. How has this conception originated and operated? What form of objectivity does it possess? These are questions which we must raise, and for which the psychology of comparative religion should provide an answer. And my criticism of Professor Knox may be put thus: Comparative religion does not reveal a process in which a super-sensible ultimate reality is intuited and progressively apprehended, but rather one in which man progressively differentiates the fundamental organizing principles of his social life, and mistakenly, though naturally, sets these up as realities independent of and pre-existent to the social organization to which they were then supposed to be revealed.

I shall now state more definitely the conception to which the analysis of comparative religions leads me, and present, in outline, the arguments by which it is supported. The conception, stated simply, is this: Religion in its origin and in its aim embodies or seeks to embody, in a unified way, the controlling conceptions, needs, and activities of the human society in which it is found. God is the working hypothesis or controlling instrument *in* which the conceptions are organized, *by* which the needs are satisfied, and *in accordance with which* the activities are directed. My arguments are as follows:

a) The highly complex division of labor which embodies the differentiation of social activities leads us steadily backward to a time when custom was supreme. This custom, whether fixed or plastic, organized into a single instrument of social control the conceptions, needs, and activities of the community. Now, it is significant for our purpose that custom, originally and universally, was religious. This point is recognized by investigators in the admission that every science, every art, every institution of mankind goes back ultimately to religion. It is evident, therefore that, as it appears among primitive men, religion embodies their communal life in its full scope and in a unified way.

b) Religion occupies a similar position in contemporary life, indi-

vidual and social. No one doubts that when religion is vital, it is and should be fundamental. Religion dominates our lives because it is the whole life. It is not one part among other parts, but the whole, of which the several parts are organic members. And thus whatever unifies our consciousness, and becomes its controlling instrument, takes on religious quality. After the same manner, whenever the consciousness of a social group is unified, either continuously or spasmodically, the experience of the group appears as religious.

c) Religion and the character of God depend upon and vary with the conditions and circumstances of community life. Anthropology and comparative religion agree that the lower natural religions, such as animism, spiritism, fetichism, embody the conceptions of primitive communities with reference to their environments and their own lives therein, the emotions and desires, the fears, hopes, etc., which such conceptions arouse, and the methods of action employed in controlling the social situation thus developed. To animism everything is alive as man is alive. Natural objects, consequently, must be treated with the consideration which is accorded to friends or enemies. To "spiritism" the object scruffs off, as it were, the shadow or higher part which, for good or ill, can move about freely. Man's social consciousness changes accordingly, and an entirely new religious quality appears. To fetichism the shadow or double can attach itself to or enter into other objects. Accordingly, man thinks about it anew, feels anew, acts anew.

In the higher forms of nature-religion the same process is seen, only in a more marked degree. Note the natures of the gods. Community life has now become more settled, customs more complex and more highly organized, the sanctions of social life more elaborately developed. The god—what is it? Anything and everything conceived as having an important or controlling influence in the life of the community—the sun, moon, fire, the thunderbolt, the seasons, the sea, agencies of every kind, good or bad. These are revered or propitiated because of, and in accordance with, their influence upon the life and destiny of mankind.

What of the god's character? It is the reflex of man's, *i. e.*, of controlling social principles; and in all but vital ethical religions it is the reflex of conservative, as opposed to ideal, social principles. Hence, when ethical religions emerge, *i. e.*, when religious reconstruction has consciously begun, the complaint is made that the gods have a lower standard of action than that which is proper to men. Again, the gods

are to such an extent the reflex of social principles that we find in their characters and relationships every phase of social development. Note, for example, the emergence of a hierarchy of the gods, paralleling the social distinctions of king, noble, serf; the genealogy of the gods, paralleling the tracing of social relationships by way of the father or of the mother; the gradual transformation of the character of a god, paralleling the change which the object, action, or person represented by the god undergoes in the estimation of the society by which he is worshiped.

In ethical religions the applicability of our hypothesis is once more apparent. Confucianism represents a static social organization which has taken on a strictly religious character. Hinduism, Brahmanism, Buddhism are expressions of a social system in which the bond of unity is negative rather than positive, and in which the relation of the members of society to the whole is mechanical rather than organic. For good reason, Hinduism and Buddhism are religions not of this world, and Brahmanism the cult of a class rather than the religion of the many. On the other hand, the Jewish community, virile and stubborn, torn asunder, conquered, deported, but still maintaining an active family life and the tradition of a social organization, emerges with the conception of the importance of the individual as individual, of the naturalness and necessity of a social life organized on ideal principles. This conception, freed from the limits which the conservative view of national tradition laid upon it, appeared in Jesus as a religion which taught the inherent worth of man as an individual, the necessity of the reconstruction of society on ideal lines, and the character of God as refulgent with all the warmth and tenderness which the vicissitudes as well as the enjoyments of life had trained into the Jewish household.

Now, if this analysis be correct, what follows as the upshot of the science of comparative religion? This: God appears, not as a super-sensible ultimate reality whose nature is progressively apprehended by man, but as the hypostatization of the social principle which has organized and unified community life. And by hypostatization I mean that a principle which lives and moves and has its being as a regulative instrument within experience is set up as an entity existing apart from and prior to experience. Thus we see the gods of the nations, which are no more than the expression of organized and controlling social conceptions, needs, and activities, regarded as realities which exist before and reveal themselves to mankind. The explanation of this "dialectical illusion," as Kant designated it, is to be found in the

relations of the individual to social life. At first the social organization into which he was born engulfed him. The activities and methods of social living evidently antedated *him*. They came from an unknown past, by means not understood, and still on the very surface of them much more complex than anything that the activities of himself or his fellows could explain. They embodied, moreover, the most sacred sanctions of every phase of social life. Consequently it was but natural for man to set up these activities and methods as realities pre-existent to him, yet furnishing the standards of life and conduct. Later (as among the Greeks, and from thence downward to our modern life), when the individual found himself to be a creative factor in social life and organization, this conception gradually changed until, among the Greeks, the idea arose that every vocation, every institution, every ideal, is by institution and of man, and not by nature and of the gods. This conception, set aside to a great extent after the decay of Greek civilization, has re-emerged in modern times victorious from the grand intellectual tournament. Accordingly, while appreciating the naturalness of the "dialectical illusion," we must not in our own scientific work repeat the error, even though its avoidance involves the setting aside of what to many would appear to be a direct intuition of ultimate reality.

Thus the science of religion forces upon us the belief that the supposed revelation of God to man is really the revelation of man to himself, and that the value-judgments which we are wont to refer to deity must now be attached to man's social organization. In brief, religion, understood psychologically and socially, emerges from the science of comparative religion as *ethics*. This result agrees, significantly, with the part in apologetics which the ethical plays for such a comparative religionist as Professor Knox.

Watchman, what of the night? It would now appear as though religion had been eliminated, and ethics substituted as the self-conscious formulation of the principle unreflectively expressed in religion. And viewed from the standpoint of science merely, I can find no other answer to the question. It does not help in the least to maintain that ethical activity unveils an objective moral order; that this order must contain immeasurably more than ethics has as yet obtained; and consequently that, if the science of religion leads to ethics, ethics in its turn leads to religion. Such a doctrine forgets (*a*) that social nature is just as objective as physical nature, and that consequently the social ideal is itself the reality and not the progressive apprehension of

the reality; (b) that natural laws are regulative conceptions and not eternal entities; (c) even though it were granted that social forces were apprehensions of such entities, we should still have no right to set up a co-ordinate factor in reality as the determining whole. And this is done most certainly when we set up the moral order of society as the God of the universe.

What remains? This, I take it: for a purely scientific point of view the way to a satisfactory demonstration of religion is blocked. Religion and the Christian Religion, as viewed by science, reduce to ethics. So reduced, they vanish as religion. Is this all? By no means. There remains the possibility that, from a world-view, reality may not appear other than personal in the full sense of the term, as it is employed in the Christian conception of God. Should such a possibility turn out to be an actuality, religion and the Christian religion would re-emerge as a conscious possession which had justified its right to the field which it would possess. This, however, is the rough and thorny road of philosophy, and leads us through the dry fields of abstract metaphysics. Along this road and through these fields the "enlightened leaders of religious and Christian thought" must pass, if they would place their beliefs upon a satisfactory footing.

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JOHN CALVIN

THE second volume of the great work on Calvin by Doumergue¹ meets the highest expectations of those who found such complete satisfaction in the first. It is taken up with a discussion of Calvin's first endeavors. While the first volume contained 634 pages, the second contains 815 pages. It is divided into five books, as follows: I, "Calvin in Italy;" II, "Calvin at Geneva—His First Sojourn;" III, "Calvin at Strasburg;" IV, "Calvin in Germany;" V, "The Return of Calvin to Geneva."

All through the work the classical school of history, as represented by Bonnet and Merle d'Aubigné, is set over against the documentary school, as represented by Albert Killiet, Fontana, Lecoultre, and Cornelius.

We have seen that Calvin visited Italy. How long did he remain?

¹*Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps.* Par E. DOUMERGUE. Tome II: "Les premiers essais." Lausanne: Bridel & C^{ie}, 1902. xii+815 pages, Fr. 30.

The classical school maintains that he remained about a year ; the documentary school shortens the time to about three months. Doumergue goes into a careful examination of the evidence, which comes principally from three editions of Beza's life of Calvin, and makes the sojourn about two months.

A second question is : Why did he go to Italy? D'Aubigné says :

One reason was that he wanted to meet Renée, duchess of Ferrara, a princess of exemplary virtue. But what thoughts occupied his mind? Was it a question of a council? Having seen Vergerius transferred to Germany to sustain the dominion of the pope, did he wish to be transferred from Switzerland to Italy to combat this dominion? Or was he attracted by the almost evangelical reputation of Contarini, Sadolet, and other prelates, and did he wish to meet them? Did he propose to see the papacy close at hand, and, like Luther, to study its scandals and its abuses? Did he wish to preach the gospel in the same country where Paul had preached it? Or was he attracted by the classical memories of the literature and civilization of that illustrious country? There was, without doubt, something of all this in the mind of Calvin. He wished to pay his respects to the land of heroes, of martyrs, of letters, of Renée of Ferrara, and of the popes. Yet we cannot doubt that his chief thought was to inculcate the principles of the Reformation; to announce to Italy that Christ had destroyed sin and opened the way to the Heavenly Father to all souls who sought him. Thus animated, our reformer, like Hannibal in earlier times, scaled the almost inaccessible heights of the Alps and pushed on toward that land which was soon to be drenched with the blood of the men of the Reformation.

This long quotation shows the strength and the weakness of the classical school. But really, how much of it is confirmed by the documents? Nothing, absolutely nothing, says the documentary school. What, then, do the documents teach us? Simply this: The young man who is crossing the Alps is the author of the *Christian Institutions*, which at this very moment is being read with astonishment, mingled with admiration and indignation, in all France and Germany. The dedication to Francis I. and the body of the work make the most effective weapon yet forged against the papacy, and consequently in favor of Protestantism. One may well ask whether Hannibal nourished a more deadly hatred against Rome than Calvin did against Romanism. Now, with a head and heart full of such sentiments, what must have been his emotions when he first looked upon the plains of Italy, where stood erect Babylon the harlot, bathing herself in the blood of the martyrs? Is it possible that he did not tremble when he first put his foot upon that soil where reigned the enemy which he had devoted his life to

combat, and where, if he were discovered, he would be taken to punishment? "Thus much," says Doumergue, "is warranted by the documents, and this is enough."

It is probable that Calvin took the shorter route in crossing the Alps and went through Venetia. His first halting-place was Ferrara. Doumergue goes into a minute and vivid description of the country through which he passed—the plains, the peasants with their peculiar costumes, the oxen with their immense curving horns. Ferrara at this time was a city of over 60,000 inhabitants. He shows us the town, with its picturesque streets and palaces, its piazza, and its cathedral, which arouses Ferrarese enthusiasm. One of the most interesting places is the house where Savonarola was born. A slab in the wall bears this inscription: "In this paternal house the first twenty-one years of his life were passed by Girolamo Savonarola—born September 21, 1452; burned at Florence 1498."

Calvin found a lodging-place in the palace of Este. His gate is pointed out, and the stairway leading to his chamber. From this retreat he wrote two letters—one to Duchemin, and the other to Gerard Roussel. These two letters are all that we have, but they are quite sufficient to reveal to us the state of the author's mind. The first was to Duchemin, under the title: "How necessary it is to flee from the papal ceremonies and superstitions to the observances of the Christian religion." Duchemin had asked Calvin for information, and this letter was the answer. A few extracts will show its author's point of view:

The Catholic church is that Egypt where so many monsters, idols, and idolatries are found; and where so many detestable sacrileges, pollutions, and filthinesses swarm. There is only one way to escape pollution. This way is to resist its beginnings, and never even contemplate it; for if we allow ourselves to contemplate it, we have already passed over its boundaries. True piety engenders true confession. Everything is here, and it is necessary to hold fast to it.

He then begins his attack on Roman ceremonies:

1. The gifts thrown into the box for indulgences:

Those who give or receive by the very act approve and consent to the detestable evil. The vulgar and common excuse that it is necessary to do something to appease the rage of the priests, and that this can be done with a piece of money great or small, is like the argument of one who throws a morsel into the mouth of a dangerous beast.

2. The holy water:

Finally, those who take the holy water consecrated by the diabolical

enchantments of the priest—do they dare to argue that they do it with impunity?

3. The mass. But it is, above all, against the mass that Calvin centers his attack :

Let us consider for a little what it means to assist at the mysteries of the mass. When they come to it, they forget that they came there to be the spectators of a horrible tragedy. Moreover, no one can deny that this sacrifice abolishes entirely the cross of Christ. These two points alone are sufficient to condemn the mass. But it is abominable idolatry when they pretend to think that the bread is God. It does not follow, however, if the Lord gives his body to the faithful who religiously adore the memory of his death, that he also gives himself to the beastly and infamous priests to be sacrificed and put to death whenever it may please them, unless perhaps we think there is some virtue in that stinking oil with which the priest has been consecrated, and that it has rendered the hands which it has anointed able to form Christ ; or unless we imagine that a priest has the authority of a celestial decree, to the end that he may have Christ suddenly at his side whenever he may be pleased to call him down from heaven ; or unless we attribute to the words of Christ some magic virtue which, being appropriately mumbled, show their virtue and efficiency. It is evident, then, that this God whom the priest, by making himself ridiculous, turns and twists here and there about the altar, is not drawn down from heaven, as they wish to make us think, but is such as has come from the mill.

He closes this letter with an eloquent passage in which he urges that this cause is so fundamental that we should be willing to spill our blood or lose our lives for it, if this should be necessary ; for death is only a passage from a very short period of sorrow to an immortal life and a joyful repose.

Calvin had scarcely finished his first letter when he took up his pen to write another. He had met a great disappointment. Duchemin was only a layman, but he had another friend, Gerard Roussel, who was a pastor. In the earlier stages of the Reformation he had rendered valuable service. But now, notwithstanding the corruptions of the church so energetically stigmatized by his master, he had allowed himself to be named priest of Oberon. The letter shows that Calvin trembled with rage. He had called Duchemin "strong man for good," "dear friend," "special friend." But here his tone changes. He entitles his letter to Roussel: "John Calvin to a former friend, at present a prelate." Here is a specimen of the contents :

I treat you very mildly when I call you a homicide and a traitor. For here is a crime wretched and detestable above all others in that you every day sell and crucify the Son of God.

A very interesting account is given of Calvin's meeting with the duchess of Ferrara. He became the director of her conscience and this was the beginning of a friendship and correspondence that lasted during the reformer's lifetime. In this, as in all other respects, he was a prophet with a prophet's characteristics. He had no time for the superfluous or for light conversation. All was serious, dealing only with the essential, and the essential is the life of the soul.

He returned from Italy, as Doumergue thinks, through the valley of Aosta, and finally reached Geneva. The way had been prepared for him. The movement is called the Calvinistic Reformation, and very properly so, for Calvin was to the movement what the soul is to the body. It is impossible to separate them. Without Calvin, Geneva would not have been Geneva, and without Geneva, Calvin would not have been Calvin. The preparation at Geneva was at first negative, then negative and positive. It was at first political, then political and religious; but always as much political as religious. The one side helped the other along, but the whole movement advanced by an irresistible evolution, sometimes arrested, sometimes precipitated by accidents more or less dramatic. An exact knowledge of these events is absolutely necessary to a knowledge of Calvin's work at Geneva. Our author accordingly goes into a thorough discussion of the entire situation.

Farel had done a great work in the way of destruction, but the ardent, intrepid temperament, so useful in conquest, did not serve him equally well for organization. At the opportune moment, July, 1536, Calvin arrived in Geneva, intending to remain over night. He was discovered. "Hereupon," says he, "Farel, burning with a marvelous zeal to promote the gospel, put forth all his efforts to retain me." Farel laid before him the condition of the church, and begged him to remain and assist him in the arduous undertaking. Calvin was troubled by the appeal, but pleaded his plans, his inclinations, his tastes. Then Farel, quivering with a holy indignation, arose and, with a voice of thunder, said:

"In the name of the Almighty God, I declare to you: Your studies, if you refuse to devote yourself here with us to the work of the Lord, God will curse, because you seek your own good rather than Christ!"

These words [says Calvin] so terrified and overcame me that I gave up the journey . . . not so much on account of the counsel and exhortation, as on account of a terrible conviction that God had extended his hand over me to arrest me in my plans.

The biographer then goes on and describes in detail, and in all its relations, the great work upon which our reformer entered at this critical juncture. He follows his subject during his exile into Strasburg, and into Germany, describing at length the cities, and the men whom he meets. His views of the marriage relation came out in full, and the account of his marriage with Idelette de Bure, and of their pleasant life together, makes one of the most interesting sections of the book.

The question as to Calvin's attitude toward art is very convincingly treated. In a general way, the Reformation, and especially Calvinism, has been accused of destroying artistic development. According to Maimbourg, "Calvinism is only a skeleton of religion, having neither substance nor grace, nor ornament, nor anything which quickens and inspires devotion." Voltaire agreed with this Jesuit verdict in some lines which Doumergue quotes. But the surprising fact is that two recent Protestant writers have concurred in this opinion. Douen calls Calvinism "anti-liberal, anti-artistic, anti-human, and anti-Christian." M. Courtois declares that Calvin "nourished a holy horror of everything that looked like an intrusion of art into the domain of religion." Once more: M. Brunetière has taken up the same opinion in these words:

The hatred of art is one of the essential traits and characteristics of the spirit of the Reformation, and of the Calvinistic Reformation in particular.

It looks as if those who have brought these charges have either not read what Calvin has said upon the subject, or as if they had read only portions of what he said, and portions which, taken alone, would make him say exactly the opposite of what he meant. Doumergue gives numerous quotations which show conclusively that Calvin was not opposed either to the liberal or to the fine arts. He did not condemn pleasure. He granted to sculpture the right to represent men and beasts, and he recommended historical painting, the landscape, and the portrait.

As to music he says:

We know that the chant has great power to move and enkindle the heart of men to invoke and praise God with vehement and ardent zeal.

This he said in 1542. In 1545 he added:

Now, among other things which are proper to recreate man and *give him pleasure*, is music . . . and we are to understand that it is the gift of God bestowed for that purpose.

It is our conviction that when this work is completed it will equal, if not surpass, any biography that has yet appeared. Its method is to

be recommended without qualification. Just as anatomists are now studying the human body in regions, taking all the neighboring parts in their relations, instead of tracing each muscle, artery, vein, nerve, and bone separately, so in history we are coming to see that the study of one subject involves the study of many other subjects which at first appear to have no necessary connection with it. Doumergue expresses the idea in one short sentence: "My method is to proceed from the circumference to the center."

In our opinion, then, we have here a work to command our attention, not for weeks and months, but for years, and many years.

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NORTH-SEMITIC EPIGRAPHY AND ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO SEMITIC STUDY.

THE progress made in the field of Semitic epigraphy and the interest taken in these studies are best illustrated by the fact that, besides the comprehensive *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum*, we have now two excellent handbooks of North-Semitic epigraphy, one in German¹ and one in English.² The former gives a full bibliography (up to 1898), a history of the discoveries and decipherment, an introduction to the study of the monuments, a complete vocabulary and grammatical sketch, and finally a selection of inscriptions—all published in transliterations and facsimiles. The latter, which has just appeared, contains a carefully selected number of inscriptions, published all in transliterations, and to a very small extent in facsimiles, with translations and commentaries based on the faithful study of an immense literature; furthermore, reproductions of Aramaic, Phœnician, and Jewish coins and seals, with ample explanatory remarks; and, finally, six extremely useful indices, and an appendix which treats of two important documents discovered after the completion of the bulk of the book.

Mr. Cooke's work deserves to be most heartily welcomed by everybody interested in biblical, as well as in general Semitics, archæology, history, and languages. For, as we all know, these branches of knowledge depend to no small extent upon the study of documents carved

¹ *Handbuch der nordsemitischen Epigraphik.* Von MARK LIDZBARSKI. Weimar, 1898.

² *A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions.* By G. A. COOKE. Oxford, 1903.

on stone. To the Old Testament student North-Semitic epigraphy is all the more interesting as the nations and languages represented by it are more closely related to the Hebrew people and language than any others. For him it is, therefore, as important to collect and to interpret all data concerning the religion of the Moabites, Phœnicians, and Arameans as it is to study the religion of Babylonia and Assyria; and the same is true, perhaps even in a higher degree, of the languages of the North-Semitic inscriptions, although, of course, the amount of material furnished by the cuneiform inscriptions is incomparably greater. Documents like those on the Moabite stone and in the tunnel of Šiloam, the inscription of Panammu and Bar-rekub from Zendjirli, of Sin-zir-ban from Nêrab, or the Tariff of Marseilles are indispensable now for a complete understanding of the Old Testament. If then, in the main, North-Semitic epigraphy claims the interest of many scholars, for the reasons just mentioned, it is nevertheless by no means only an *ancilla theologiae*; for the religion and the history, the script and the language, of the Phœnicians, the carriers of civilization from East to West, must be studied for their own sake from these inscriptions. And, again, the life, the history, and the language of Palmyra, the great commercial center of Hither Asia during the first three centuries of our era, are illustrated by the Palmyrene inscriptions. Also a large part of our knowledge of the Nabateans, who were the rivals of the Idumeans, and partly even of the Romans, and whose empire extended as far as Damascus at the time of the apostle Paul (2 Cor. 11:32), is derived from the Nabatean inscriptions.

To all this Mr. Cooke has paid special attention. Wherever he comments upon inscriptions relating to questions of history or religion, or contributing to our knowledge of paleography and linguistics, he deals with them most accurately and minutely, and frequently he has inserted or appended paragraphs which are in themselves almost essays. His interpretations of the many different *documents* are therefore exceedingly valuable. A certain defect, however, is to be felt in his interpretation of the *monuments* as such. This applies, to be sure, in many cases merely to archæological questions, but they should not be neglected. However small a monument may be, in every case a description, be it only in a very few words, should be given. In a number of cases Mr. Cooke has done so, but in others it appears as if he had considered the description and discussion of the monuments a matter of secondary importance.

Another defect is the lack of adequate accounts of the discovery of the single inscriptions. It always adds to our personal interest in a monument if we learn some details about its discovery; and I feel quite confident that students using the book will feel this lack.

It is, of course, an easy task to add here and there a little to such a comprehensive work as Mr. Cooke's volume, in which a vast number of details are collected. Not for the sake of criticising or of finding fault, but to show my interest, and to add if possible to the usefulness of the book, I present here a few remarks, among which I include the misprints noted.

First of all, attention may be called to the fact that several peculiarities or special expressions of the Phœnician language have a parallel in Arabic, partly even in the modern Arabic dialect of the country where two thousand years ago Phœnician was spoken. Thus, for instance, on p. 21, where the word מַמְלַכָּה, "kingdom" and "royal person," synonymous with מֶלֶךְ, is discussed, the well-known Arabic parallel *sulṭân*, "authority" and "ruler," might have been cited. More striking, however, are the following parallels:

On p. 34 Mr. Cooke remarks that בִּן (Eshmun-'azar inscr., l. 5) is probably בִּי, i. e., the verbal suffix of the 1st pers. sing. connected with a preposition. The very same form is frequently heard nowadays in Beirut and the Lebanon, viz., *bīnī*, especially in the phrase *mā bīnī šai*, "I have nothing," an answer to the question *šū bāk*, "what hast thou?" or "what is the matter with thee?" This reminds us, of course, at once of the curious suffix -*nū* for the 3d pers. sing. masc., found in the modern Arabic dialect of Bagdad, which seems to have had a similar history as the Phœnician כִּנִּם. The other parallel to be mentioned here is *šūš*, pl. *šišân*, which now in the Lebanon is the common word for "young chicken;" I believe it is the same word as צִיץ in the Tariff of Marseilles, l. 11 (see below). Perhaps also my remark on p. 131 is to be compared in this connection.

P. 25, ll. 28, 29: The expression "aspirated the final ת into a ה" is very indistinct and phonetically incorrect.

P. 26, l. 21: Read 'ellū instead of 'eltu.

Pp. 26, 27: The difficult passage in l. 3 of the Tabnith inscription: מִי אֵת כָּל אָדָם אֲשֶׁר תִּפְקֹא אֵיךְ הָאָרֶץ ז, seems to require above all: "Whosoever thou art—every man—that shalt find (or perhaps 'pass by') this coffin—do not, etc." The other crux of this inscription is the words מִשֶּׁר בִּלְתַּ in l. 5. Although the שֶׁ in מִשֶּׁר seems to be certain on account of its short shaft, it is not impossible, I think, to read מִשֶּׁר; for also in הִדְבֵּר of the same line the שֶׁ and the ר are not very distinct from one another, and perhaps there is some mistake on the part of the stone-cutter. I would then suggest to read מִשֶּׁר as an adverb, "honestly, truly,"

like מִי־שֶׁרִים in Hebrew; the word בַּלְת may be translated "alone," or, if we take it to be a defective spelling for בַּלְחִי, "by myself" (*cf.*, *e. g.*, bāhtiteya in Ethiopic). Ll. 4, 5 would then read: "for I have no silver, I have no gold, nor any jewels, truly by myself I am lying in this coffin."

P. 30: As is known, the man who carved the Eshmun-'azar inscription made several mistakes. In these cases it seems to me that in the transliteration, which is meant to be a restored and established text, the corrected letters should be given in parentheses, *e. g.*, מַמְלִ(כ)ח in l. 11, א(ש) in l. 15, רִיש(ב)ן in l. 16. These words would have to be explained afterwards in the commentary. This rule would then, of course, apply to all inscriptions, and, *e. g.*, on p. 113, inscr. 42, l. 21, we should read פִּל(ל) instead of פִּל. In a few cases Mr. Cooke has done so himself; *cf.* No. 91, l. 6 and l. 8, where we read מִד(נ)ח instead of מִדח of the original, and בִּיר(ח) instead of בִּירח. Parentheses are to be preferred, because brackets are commonly used for restored passages and letters, not for corrections.

P. 41, comm. on l. 2: With בַּר in theophorous names, which very probably means "member," we may compare the curious Abyssinian names composed with words denoting parts of the body or objects of personal apparel.

P. 75, l. 11: An Ethiopic word סַמֶּס for "sun" is unknown to me; in Geez, Tigrē, and Tigrīña "sun" is ṣahāy; in Amharic, ṭāy.

P. 91, ll. 6 ff.: The element צַד in certain proper names is perhaps nothing but an abbreviation of צַדִּיק (see below, note on p. 131); Professor Torrey has lately suggested the same.³

P. 106, l. 11: Read חַפֵּי instead of חַפֵּי.

P. 109, l. 5 of comm. on l. 1: Read marēḥa instead of warēḥa.

P. 114 and 120: As mentioned above, the word צִיץ in l. 11 of the *Tarif of Marseilles* is undoubtedly the same as ṣūṣ, "young chicken" (also used of the young of other birds, as partridges and quail). It would then be very tempting to translate צִיץ אֶנְקָא אֶנְקָא "a bird, grown or young;" for in the preceding paragraphs grown and young animals are distinguished, viz., ox—calf; ram or goat—lamb or kid. But I do not know how אֶנְקָא is to be explained in that case; perhaps it is a Greek or Latin word.

P. 115, l. 13 of comm. on l. 1: Read בַּעֲלֹחֶלֶץ for בַּעֲלֹחֶלֶץ.

P. 129, comm. on l. 7: It seems to me very likely indeed that עַבְד־לֵאִי is the same as עַבְד־לֹדִי, and that this name is one of the witnesses of a certain Arabic immigration into northern Africa as early as about 400 B. C. Also several other names which are commonly considered Berber or Numidian are easily explained as Arabic. Another very strong argument is, of course, contained in the fact that the Libyan alphabet shows striking similarities with the ancient North-Arabian alphabets, especially the Thamudene; even the dotted letters of the Libyan alphabet seem to have their prototype in

³*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XXIV, p. 223.

Thamudene (and in Safaitic). The י in עבדלאי recalls the final י in corresponding Sinaitic and Thamudene names, and the י in הלחי and בלחי, of which I have treated in my *Thamudenische Inschriften* (Berlin, 1904). It is true that the father and grandfather of עבדלאי have genuine Phœnician names, but, as Dr. Lidzbarski has already suggested, the Arabic name may have been chosen by an Arabic mother; similar cases, where a foreign-born mother gives her children names of her own country, occur not infrequently.

P. 131, l. 28: I believe that the Punic names חמלר and חמלרית are abbreviations of חמלקרת. This would be another case where a q is dropped in a Phœnician name (see above צד for צדק, note on p. 91). Now, it is well known that in the modern Arabic along the coast of Phœnicia and Palestine kâf is pronounced like hamzah, as also in dialects of Egyptian Arabic and of modern Abyssinian. In Arabic this pronunciation is as old as the tenth century A. D. It might therefore not be altogether impossible that these abbreviated Phœnician names point to a similar pronunciation; but I admit that this is very doubtful as yet.

P. 170: In connection with באשר in the sense of אַחֲרַי the Tigrê preposition 'asar, "after," might be mentioned.

P. 199, comm. on No. 70, l. 2: Μόμμος is undoubtedly Mun'im (מנעם), and has nothing to do with ממן, etc. It might also have been said that מלכח is very different from מלך; for the former indicates a certain deification of the king, as, e. g., עבדת אלהא (see Cooke's No. 95, l. 1).

P. 202: Mr. Cooke says: "It is questionable whether the Semitic ב is ever used to transcribe the Egyptian p." The word "Semitic" is certainly too general; for in Arabic bā would be the rule here (cf. بابة, Cooke, p. 212, and a great many other instances).

P. 204, comm. on l. 7: The terms "softer and harder aspirate" for ח and ח' should be entirely abandoned; neither of them is a real aspirate, nor is one of them harder than the other. Moreover, the so-called "softer aspirate" ח sounds much harsher than ח'.

P. 216, l. 3: Read נַחֲיוֹת for נַחֲיוֹת. The parallel of קטל and קטל does not count here, because in this word ת (or ט) is preceded by a p.

P. 222: It has recently been shown by M. Dussaud that אלת is to be identified with the planet Venus.

P. 232, comm. on No. 88, l. 1: It does not seem necessary to me to consider Shullai a name of the form fu'la; it might as well be a fu'ail form, which, although very rare, seems to occur in Semitic nomenclature.

P. 234, comm. on l. 5: Read מַנְדַּן for מַנְדַּן.

P. 245, l. 2 from bottom of page: Read אַל instead of אַל (the same on p. 378).

P. 254, comm. on l. 1: Mr. Cooke considers נִטְרָאֵל an Aramaic name. But, since נִטְרָאֵל is a very common name in Safaitic, it might with the same right be called Arabic, derived from the root *naẓara*, "to watch." In general Safaitic names might have been quoted much more frequently; for many Arabic names which are found in Nabatean, Sinaitic, and Palmyrene are the same in Safaitic, where their Arabic form appears the more clearly, as the additional letters *thā*, *dhāl*, etc., are expressed in writing.

P. 269, ll. 2, 3. The name of Bel occurs in a very early public inscription in Palmyra, which has escaped Mr. Cooke's notice, viz., in *Βελος Βήλου* in the Greek part of the bilingual inscription dated 10 A. D.⁴

P. 269, l. 21: Mr. Cooke speaks of the cult of Atergatis at Hierapolis in Mesopotamia: it appears, however, that Hierapolis in Northern Syria is meant. The latter (*Βομβήκη*, מַבְבֵּג, *Mabbōgh*, *Membidj*) is, of course, the place in question.

P. 275, ll. 2 ff.: There can be no doubt that מִלָּא is a hypocoristic.

P. 277, comm. on l. 4: Read מִנְבֵּן instead of מִנְבֵּן; the long vowel of the first syllable is also shown by the Arabic *kānūn*, which has the same meaning.

P. 280, l. 5 of comm. on l. 6: Read זְכִיכִית for זְכִיכִית; *ibid.* in l. 9, read מִמֵּד instead of מִמֵּד.

P. 288, comm. on l. 3: I ascertained myself at Palmyra that the name in question is נְבוּזְכַּר.⁵

P. 294, l. 10: Read B. C. instead of A. D. Moreover, this inscription (No. 132 = Eut. 102) is not the second, but the fifth oldest known; the second is Schroeder I, the third and fourth are de Vogüé in *Journal Asiatique*, 1883, Vol. I, p. 243, II and I.

P. 298, l. 7: Read חֲצִין instead of חֲצִין.

P. 303, l. 1: The altars containing Nos. 140 A and B are not really *small* altars, like the votive altars; their dimensions are given in my edition of these inscriptions.

P. 304, comm. on l. 1: Read חֲצִין instead of חֲצִין.

P. 309, l. 3 of comm. on l. 12: Read *womb* instead of *love*; Lidzbarski (p. 503) gives correctly *Mutterleib*.

P. 313: The Palmyrene Tariff is at present not *in situ*, but, as was reported a year ago, carried away by the Russians.

P. 333, comm. on l. 7: It would be better to quote the Syriac *ܫܢܝܫܬܐ* instead of *ܫܢܝܫܬܐ*, since the former has the meaning discussed here.

P. 338, comm. on l. 22: The salt lakes of Palmyra are at present being exploited by the Turks.

⁴ Vogüé in *Journal Asiatique*, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 242-44.

⁵ Cf. *Journal Asiatique*, 1901, Vol. II, p. 379; my *Semitic Inscriptions* (New York, 1904), p. 84.

P. 338, comm. on l. 29: There is scarcely any reason here for adding the upper dot to the \circ in אֶחָד־עָשָׂר .

P. 339, l. 4: Read אֶתְּ instead of אֶתְּ (the same on p. 381).

P. 372, col. 1: Add " דָּבָר 111 " after דָּבָר .

P. 380, col. 1: Read אֶמְצָא instead of אֶמְצָא ; *ibid.*, col. 2: read אֶמְצָא instead of אֶמְצָא .

In conclusion, Mr. Cooke's book is to be recommended, not only to students who devote themselves especially to Semitic epigraphy, but also to those who wish only to become acquainted with the contents of these important documents. For the latter it may be said that the majority of these inscriptions appear here for the first time in English, and that Mr. Cooke's English translations are not only reliable, but also readable. The chapter treating of the coins and seals is a very desirable addition; for this subject, although very important, as everyone knows, is often neglected, mainly for the lack of accessible material for study. The English and American student could scarcely have a better text-book of North-Semitic epigraphy than Mr. Cooke's work; but for a thorough study of the monuments he will have to use Dr. Lidzbarski's atlas of facsimiles together with it, since the reproductions of inscriptions given by Mr. Cooke, although beautifully executed, number only eight.

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THE LATEST VOLUME OF THE LYMAN BEECHER LECTURESHIP.

THE "Yale Lectures on Preaching" have resulted, since 1872, in the production of more than twenty volumes. Taken as a whole, the collection is probably the most valuable set of books in existence on preaching, and no clergyman's library can well afford to be without the entire series. Gordon's volume on *Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*¹ contains the lectures given by him in Yale University in the autumn of 1902, and ranks honorably with any of its predecessors. But the nine chapters of this volume do not appear or read like lectures, and the preface informs us that "the first and third chapters were not given as lectures, but are deemed essential to the course of thought." And so throughout, the author appears as the theologian and the writer, rather than as the lecturer before a body of students. But this fact takes nothing from the sterling quality of the book.

¹ *Ultimate Conceptions of Faith*. By GEORGE A. GORDON. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. xix + 399 pp. \$1.30, net.

There are preachers to whom the title of the book will suggest a kind of mystic vagueness. They find difficulty in showing the common people what "faith" is; "conceptions of faith" may seem still more intangible, while "ultimate conceptions of faith" involve such a sublimation of religious thinking as possibly to bring into controversy the great mystery of godliness. And without doubt not a few readers will take offense when they meet such a declaration as the following :

We have come upon a new day in theology. Within the last twenty-five years in Great Britain and in New England the traditional theology has passed away. Like the ice-fields that move south, these traditional beliefs have disappeared, melted under the power of the new intellectual climate into which they have floated. In the far north similar fields exist, and in the polar regions they always will exist in absolute safety; and in certain latitudes beliefs that cannot endure elsewhere are completely secure.

We have listened to a great deal of this sort in recent years. But, whether we like it or not, every honest theologian and preacher is called upon to reckon fairly with these assertions, so often and so widely made.

The first chapter treats of the preacher as a theologian. The professional theologian is an expert, a scholar, a teacher; and he has done a work of inestimable value. The preacher is usually thought of as a non-professional theologian, but the functions of the teacher belong to him also in a noteworthy way. He is not only a man of God, a prophet, deeply conversant in the spiritual life of man, but also a man brought into such close and sympathetic relations with the people that he can best address them "in the language in which they were born." He is the one anointed to translate the deep truths which are so often covered under the technical phrases of professional divines, and to present them in a more simple form to the popular understanding. It is not wide of the truth to say that most of the great theologians of the Christian church have been preachers. The theology of Paul is that of an educated mind, the product of profound and passionate thinking, but it is the theology of a preacher.

If one consider method, and method alone, there could hardly be a greater blunder than the judgment that described the author of the fourth gospel as the theologian. But if we consider him a theologian who in a large and noble way views all life in the light of the Eternal, then surely the writer who dates the career of Jesus from the mind of God, who recites the leading events of his ministry as of unique significance as manifestations of God, and who in thus regarding the history of Jesus gathers up into it the history of mankind, must be looked upon as the typical theologian. (P. 30.)

All this accords with the expressed conviction of the author that "the profoundest of the essentially vital ideas of the race may be presented in forms level to the average earnest understanding." He affirms his belief that William E. Channing and Henry Ward Beecher exerted a greater influence upon the people of the United States than all the professional theologians of their time.

In the discussion of ultimate conceptions of faith it is not difficult to show that faith has its necessary conditions of existence, its implications, its suggestions, its categories. Even the natural scientist, who claims to deal only with open facts of the physical world, finds himself time and again in the presence of ultimate questions about the reality and the nature of the external world. Nothing exists by itself alone. No atom, no organism, no entity in the universe can be conceived of apart from relationship with something else, and it is equally inconceivable that relations can exist without individuals related. Accordingly, there is no perceptible object in the world that does not necessarily imply something beyond itself. That ultimate something may be beyond our present knowledge, but no rational mind can evade the conviction that it exists somehow in real relations with that which we behold or know. And one may therefore say with Tennyson that if we could truly understand the "flower in the crannied wall, what it is, root and all, and all in all, we should know what God and man is." Hence the mind's perpetual inquiry after the ultimate reason of things.

In the third chapter, entitled "Faith and its Categories," the author speaks of the psychological process of knowledge in an infant's mind, and the analogous evolution of spiritual experiences which lead on to the unmistakable sense of moral accountability; and it is affirmed that "the process by which the conscience of the child becomes the consciousness of a moral world and a moral God is the subtlest, the deepest, and the most amazing in the life of man." In like manner we note the progressive work of the human intellect in determining the categories of thought by "setting in conspicuous isolation the more significant aspects of the world." We must concede the fact that some things are much more significant than others, and so "this search for the more significant aspects of things is the soul of all thinking" (p. 111). This process of observation, analysis, and synthesis is an inevitable movement of the human reason, and, because human, it is a movement inevitably incomplete. Continual inquiry after the real meaning of things upsets or modifies all the philosophical tables of categories, and is inevitably subject to revision and

expansion. The same is true of the categories of faith. Christian thought, experience, and confessions of belief have elaborated a great traditional theology. It was early seen that some things in Christian doctrine are not as central as others, and the great historic creeds are attempts to enunciate the great essentials. The work of such men as Origen and Athanasius and Augustine deserves our admiration.

The romance lying in those old thinkers, the poetry hidden under their outgrown discussions, is discovered when one thinks of their work as a vast and joyous response to the divine necessity of the time. They stand for an infinite spiritual possession beset with the gravest peril, calling for intellectual forms suitable to the age, forms of preservation for the Christian faith and forms of power for it. They stand for an immense creative movement in theology. (P. 64.)

The five points of Calvinism are so many categories of the most significant aspects of the world, as seen by those that maintained them. Our author regards it as worthy of note that the whole five exhibit "an emphasis placed upon will as the core of reality." In predestination and atonement the absolute will of God is the main object of thought, while in depravity, regeneration, and perseverance the human will is the point of concern. It is now the tendency of philosophy, and has been for a century past, "to emphasize will in the universe and in man as the central reality." But the traditional theology has been illogical, overconfident, and presumptuous in claiming to know too much about the secret will and purposes of God; and so the inevitable movement must go on in religious thought as in all other departments of human research.

A new theology is essential to set forth the new values discovered in the eternal gospel. The new categories of faith are affirmations of the larger meanings that have been found in faith. (P. 130.)

The ultimates, to a discussion of which the book allows one chapter each, are: (1) "The Individual Ultimate: Personality;" (2) "The Social Ultimate: Humanity;" (3) "The Historical Ultimate: Optimism;" (4) "The Religious Ultimate: Jesus Christ;" (5) "The Universal Ultimate: The Moral Universe;" (6) "The Absolute Ultimate: God." Our space will not permit a review of all these chapters. The one on personality is perhaps the most valuable. Human personality, the conscious self, would seem to be the only proper starting-point in a logical inquiry into the significance of man and his relations to the world. But human personality discloses such abysmal depths that no definition of it can be complete. Provisionally, we may say,

"it denotes the abiding and unique reality of the single human being," and it "is revealed in the process of knowledge and in the force of character" (p. 142). The capacity of the mind to combine and unify its operations shows that the personal *ego* is something more than a succession of states of consciousness. All the facts of perception, memory, imagination, and reason go to confirm this judgment, and to make the notion of man as a mechanical automaton absurd. The judgments men pass upon themselves, the formation of habits, and the creative activities of daily life attest perpetually the unique personal reality of the soul, so that a persistent denial of facts so obvious and so significant is sheer self-stultification. But with a definite conception of personality in the self-conscious exercise of emotion, intelligence, and will, the whole world becomes intelligible. Scientific research is the process of organizing into orderly relations all our possible knowledge of the objects and forces of the universe. Without the witnessing evidences of personality as an individual ultimate, there can be no proper understanding or appreciation of the great leaders of history, literature, and art; no explanation of the facts of human society and the state; no philosophy of religion; no faith in immortality.

In discussing the social ultimate, our author writes suggestively of perils peculiar to our time in current interpretations of human life. There is a widespread naturalistic view of life which is a most serious menace to civilization, for it reduces all life to the two questions of the food-problem and the race-problem. Like the lowest animals, man finds his highest concern in the struggle for existence. The whole creation groans and travails for no end more ultimate than physical well-being and the propagation of itself. All arts, industries, social science, politics, intellectual and moral acquirements, exhaust themselves in the life of this world. Right and wrong have only a biological significance, and anything like endless consequences of human conduct are thrust aside as at best only a poetic exaggeration. Super-sensuous ideas, conceptions of heaven and hell, yearnings after God, are either forms of mental disease or mythological creations. During the last fifty years the attitude of certain influential scientists has given great strength and currency to this naturalistic view of human life. The adoption in theology of this doctrine of the survival of the fittest is to play into the hands of a brutish animalism. It is a "new Calvinism of nature," that involves a wider result and a more horrible decree of reprobation than the worst forms of the old dogma. The theory of conditional immortality is a compromise with the difficulty at a

fearful expense. The only effectual offset to this low view of life is the gospel of a divine humanity, which emphasizes the uniqueness of personality and the stewardship of Christian love.

The historical ultimate is presented in an optimistic, as against a pessimistic, view of the course of human affairs. The foundations of a rational optimism are found in the facts of human progress and in God's world-plan for the education of mankind. There are tendencies in the social life of man which warrant the highest expectations of his future betterment, and which are inexplicable apart from the supposition of a coming new heaven and earth in which all our best ideals of righteousness and peace shall be realized. A similar line of thought leads to the universal ultimate of a glorious moral universe. Special interest attaches to the chapter which treats of Jesus Christ as the religious ultimate, whose majestic personality "has been so much to mankind that any scholar with ordinary historic imagination and common intellectual decency must uncover in his presence." His value for the religious life of mankind, his superiority over all other teachers, the finality of his gospel as embodying the essence of all moral and spiritual excellence, and his unique and adorable union with God, present him as the one supreme personality of human history. The author declares his profound sympathy with the highest christological tradition of the church, but he holds that "a social conception of the nature of God is the logical precedent for the true appreciation of the person of Christ," as, indeed, it is to the just appreciation of mankind.

The Filial in God, Eternal in his being, wrought into our entire humanity, in consequence of which men are men, is in perfect union with Jesus. . . . He is the supreme historic utterance of the Eternal Son; he is in perfect moral union with that in God so named. Before his advent Jesus was not; but the Son of God whose perfect human expression he is, is eternal in the heavens. . . . It is not Jesus who pre-exists before his advent; it is the Logos, the Christ, the eternal Son who pre-exists. Pre-existence concerns primarily the doctrine of God, and only in a secondary sense the person of Jesus. The position here maintained is that Jesus the perfect man is the sovereign historic expression of the eternal Son in the bosom of the Father, and that Jesus as perfect man is in an association with God ideal, unique, and unsearchable. . . . We have in Jesus the highest expression of the wisdom and love of God, the final single utterance of that in the Infinite which chiefly concerns our race — his goodness, his pity, his perfect moral being, and our complete involvement with that being. (Pp. 291-95.)

This view of Christ accords with the author's conception of God as

the absolute ultimate. The Christian idea of God is both a revelation and a discovery: from the divine side it is revelation, from the human side discovery. It is man's supreme achievement, and also his supreme comfort. He cannot find God beyond himself, if he do not also find him within himself. The character of God is love, and the mode of the divine existence is best conceived as of a social Being. The deep eternal truth of which the Trinity is a symbol may have its best solution by means of certain analogies of the human spirit which is God's offspring.

Mistaken anthropology is the root of impossible theology. The person who thinks of himself as a sort of Melchizedek, without father, without mother, without genealogy, as standing outside the circle of human relations in a false self-sufficiency, naturally thinks of God under the same conception. But if the maxim is true that one man is no man, it is no less true that a bare unitary God is no God. (P. 367.)

The God and Father of Jesus Christ is not an infinite Melchizedek, nor is he to be thought of as having ever dwelt solitary and apart before creating something to attract his love. He dwells eternally in relations of Love, and Wisdom, and Power. He is eternal Father, Word, and Spirit. Out of his own essential Pleroma human society has come, and Jesus Christ, as the supreme revelation of God to man, could lead only to the God who is in himself an eternal archetypal society. . . . Man must rise to Christ before he can see the true God. Anthropology must first rise to Christology; then it may rise to true theology. (P. 384.)

This concept of the Godhead, as essentially and eternally social, is not very unlike that which appears in the recently published essay of Jonathan Edwards on the Trinity. It would not be difficult to find objections to these views of God and of Christ. Many theologians will promptly reject them. But they may not be so readily refuted; they will be very acceptable to many, and anyone who deems them erroneous would do well to think deeply whether he himself be able to offer a better solution of the mystery. The volume deserves careful and repeated reading. It is not a deliverance of multifarious advice to preachers. It has little or nothing to say about the composition and delivery of sermons. But for the studious, thoughtful minister of Christ it may suggest more material for sermons than half the volumes of the excellent series of lectures to which it belongs.

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TWO RECENT DELIVERANCES CONCERNING THE ACT OF BAPTISM.

THE nineteenth century produced a very extensive literature with reference to the act of Christian baptism. But evidently the last word on this subject has not yet been written. The twentieth century already has witnesses to the fact that Christian scholars are still busying themselves with investigations and considerations concerning this ancient religious rite. Two works¹ thus early in the first decade of the century have come to us from across the sea. The first is by a graduate of Oxford. In what way he was moved to prepare his work he frankly tells us in his preface:

The study of which the following pages are the result was first suggested to me by a conversation with a friend who had joined the Baptist community because, having gone into the question, he had come to the conclusion that the original method of administering the sacrament was by submersion. I did not believe that he was right in his judgment, but was conscious that I had little definite with which to oppose his conviction. I knew that baptism by affusion was represented in the catacombs, but I had no idea of the mass of evidence from archæology that witnessed to it as the universal practice in early ages. I began my study in the belief that it was at least allowed at times; I ended it with the conviction that no other method was adopted till the general introduction of infant baptism in the early Middle Ages made submersion possible.

The evidence of a scientific spirit is a demand of the present day in any scholarly work. The presence of such a spirit in the volume before us, however, is certainly not to be expected after such a disclosure. The author has a very definite aim in the task he has undertaken. Avowedly he sets out to find something that will enable him "to oppose" the "conviction, which a friend who had joined the Baptist community" had in some way formed, "that the original method of administering the sacrament [of baptism] was by submersion." The scientific spirit is here entirely wanting. It was, indeed, commendable on the author's part that the inquiry into which he was led in the way described should be made, since he had, according to his own confession, little "definite" with which "to oppose" the conviction of his

¹ *Baptism and Christian Archæology*. By CLEMENT F. ROGERS. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1903. 361 pages. 5s., net.

The Sacraments in the New Testament: Being the Kerr Lectures for 1903. By Rev. JOHN C. LAMBERT, B.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: imported by Scribner. 430 pages. \$3.50 net.

Baptist friend, who evidently had something very definite. But what we want as the result of any investigation is the truth and nothing but the truth; and the author, by his own confession, admitting us as he does to his confidence, had in his purpose nothing more than a search for something that might prove helpful in the effort to gain a partisan end.

This appears in our author's work as plainly as in his confession. He made the study, as he tells us, "to oppose" a friend who "had come to the conclusion that the original method of administering the sacrament was by submersion." But why turn to archæology? His friend, unquestionably, had come to his conclusion by the study of his New Testament. Plainly, if one wishes to ascertain what was the act of baptism in the New Testament period, he must study the literature of that period in which the act is recorded. This our author, by his own admission, had not done. His previous study had given him "little definite" concerning the act of baptism. But it was something definite that he wanted and must have in order to "oppose" his friend's conviction. In other words, he had not so thoroughly informed himself with reference to the act of baptism in the New Testament that he had no need to study its teachings, or to examine the literature of the early Christian church in order to obtain any added information which that literature might furnish. The truth, if anywhere, was certainly to be found in such a study. But in his search for something "definite" our author waives all such study aside and betakes himself to archæology. Could anything be more unpromising of a helpful result? Archæology has its place in a study of baptism in the early church, yet not the first place, and it certainly cannot furnish anything decisive in an inquiry concerning the act of baptism in the New Testament period. In other words, the plain, direct, unquestioned testimony of the New Testament itself as to "the original method of administering the sacrament" is not to be set aside by any study of the pictorial representation of baptism which later centuries may furnish. Yet this is precisely what our author attempts to do. Here also he admits us to his confidence. He knew, he tells us, "that baptism by affusion was represented in the catacombs," and so he turned to archæology as promising something with which "to oppose" the conviction of his friend "who had joined the Baptist community."

Our author's search in this wide field of investigation was rewarded to his satisfaction:

I knew that baptism by affusion was represented in the catacombs, but I had no idea of the mass of evidence from archæology that witnessed to it as

the universal practice in early ages. I began my study in the belief that it was at least allowed at times; I ended it with the conviction that no other method was adopted till the general introduction of infant baptism in the early Middle Ages made submersion possible.

This is certainly an amazing conclusion, and yet is it not just what was to be expected when the author, in his search for "the original method of administering the sacrament," wishing "to oppose his friend who had joined the Baptist community," discarded the literature and history of the New Testament period and turned to archæology? The probabilities of reaching the truth of the matter in any such way plainly did not lie in that direction. The opportunity for misunderstanding and for misinterpretation in any such study is very great, as anyone knows who has given careful attention to the pictorial representation of baptism in the catacombs and elsewhere. Wide differences exist as to the age to which these representations belong, and even when there is an agreement as to the time, the representation may have a certain significance to one, and a very different significance to another. For example, take the well-known mosaic in the dome of San Giovanni in Fonte at Ravenna. The baptistery beneath the picture is ten feet long and three feet, six inches deep. The building was erected between 400 and 450 A. D. The picture is a representation of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan. The Savior is standing in water which reaches to his waist. John, on the bank of the river, is holding in his right hand over the head of Christ a patera, and above is a descending dove. Our author says that John is pouring water "from a patera over the head of Christ," and in his illustration of the mosaic water is falling from the patera upon the head of Christ. Our author, however, is frank enough to say that "according to Strzygowski the patera is a fourteenth-century restoration, as no such instrument was used till that date." But he might also have added that the photograph of the mosaic taken by Ricci of Ravenna shows no water falling from the patera (p. 278).

But suppose the patera were not a restoration, and that it belongs to the fifth century, misinterpretation of its significance is easy. It is a well-known fact that in the Greek church the act of baptism has always been trine immersion. If the representation at Ravenna of the baptism of the Savior by John is placed by the side of such a representation on a baptismal token in use in the Greek church at the present day, the similarity is remarkable. In both cases the patera is held over the head of the candidate, yet no one would claim for an instant that the representation of the baptism of Christ on this baptismal token

in the Greek church of today is a witness for affusion as the act of baptism as administered in that church. As is well known, the bestowment from the patera in the representation in the baptismal token is the perfected chrism which follows the administration of trine immersion. Why not in the Ravenna mosaic?

But even if the mosaic at Ravenna were a representation of affusion, how little could it be regarded as furnishing evidence as to "the original method of administering the sacrament"? Our author, in a footnote on p. 297, has a reference to Jacoby's *Bericht über die Taufe Jesu* (Strassburg, 1902). Calling attention to a representation of the baptism of Jesus in the Jordan mentioned by Jacoby, he says: "Our Lord stands with the water rising above his thighs, and Jordan hastens in astonishment away to the right." The fleeing of the Jordan, as is well known, is a legendary representation; but our author fails to add that Jacoby is authority for the statement that the pictorial representations of the baptism of Christ in art have been influenced more by these legendary accounts of the baptism than by the references to baptism in the New Testament.

This statement by Jacoby is suggestive of the weakness of the author's appeal to archæology in his effort to find something with which "to oppose" his friend "who had joined the Baptist community." And yet our author seems to be unconscious of it, and he calls attention to one pictorial representation after another in succeeding centuries, through "the ages of persecution," through "the ages of the councils," through "the ages of the northern invasions;" and with the result that, while he began the study in the belief that affusion "was at least allowed at times," he "ended it with the conviction that no other method was adopted till the general introduction of infant baptism in the early Middle Ages made submersion possible."

Surely great is archæology! It would be interesting to know what effect the author's work had upon his "friend who had joined the Baptist community," but unhappily here we are not admitted to the author's confidence. An early copy, we doubt not, was placed in the hands of this friend. It is difficult to believe that one "who had joined the Baptist community" because he had come to the conclusion that the "original method of administering the sacrament was by submersion" would be influenced by any such considerations as are here presented from the field of archæology. We have the authority of the author for the statement that his friend had become a Baptist from "conviction," and that conviction, we may well believe, had founda-

tions that would not be moved as easily as were our author's very indefinite beliefs.

It is interesting to notice how a Scottish theologian, writing at the same time as the author of *Baptism and Christian Archaeology*, and busying himself with the *Sacraments in the New Testament*, viewed the act of baptism at that early period in the history of the Christian church. While his task is avowedly a study of baptism in the New Testament as one of the sacraments, he turns for a confirmation of the opinion to which he gives expression to church history and to archaeology. In what he has to say concerning baptism, he refers to the "mode" of its administration, and calls attention to three lines of evidence within the New Testament "that have to be considered": (1) the meaning of the verb βαπτίζω and of the nouns derived from it; (2) the narratives of actual cases of baptism; and (3) any allusions to the form of the sacrament that appear to be made in the course of expositions of its doctrinal significance.

From this statement one might certainly expect a facing of the facts. The field to be traversed is accurately indicated, but it must be confessed that not only is the survey inadequate, but the results are meager. With regard to the word βαπτίζω, the author says (p. 222) that "no one questions that its primary and classical signification is 'to immerse;'" but it is evident, he adds, that the word in the New Testament is not used in this literal and general meaning, but has come "to bear a technical religious sense, in which, while its primary idea may never be lost, the real stress falls upon its spiritual connotation as an act of ceremonial cleansing" (pp. 222, 223). The author is, of course, aware of the fact that there are those who are not in agreement with him in this view.

Some of the ablest critical writers maintain that the idea of immersion is never absent when βαπτίζω is used in the New Testament. This is Meyer's position in his notes on Mark 7:4 and Luke 11:38. And Dr. Schaff (*Oldest Church Manual*, p. 50) quotes an emphatic testimony to the same effect from a letter by Harnack.

It is interesting, therefore, to notice the reasons that compel the author to differ with these "ablest critical writers." The first which he mentions is this, that

the theocratic ceremonies of purification are described as "divers baptisms" (διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς, Heb. 9:10), while βαπτίζω has come to be employed as the equivalent of the Hebrew word טָהַר, which is used in the Old Testament to describe the Levitical washings, and which in the Septuagint is translated by λούσθαι.

But in these "divers baptisms" of Heb. 9:10, which have reference to the washings prescribed by the Mosaic law, the idea of immersion, as Meyer and others maintain, is not wanting. Indeed, that these "divers baptisms" were in entire harmony with the admitted significance of βαπτίζω is evident from an examination of the Old Testament referring to these "washings," and from the Targum on the Pentateuch. For example, Onkelos translates Lev. 14:15, "He shall immerse his clothes and bathe [using the Hebrew word signifying "to swim"] in water." The facts are with these "ablest critical writers," it would seem, rather than with our author.

But he has another reason for finding in βαπτίζω, as used in the New Testament, "a technical religious sense," namely, that βαπτίζω, as applied both to the baptism of John and the later Christian baptism, is used absolutely, *i. e.*, without the addition of any qualifying or descriptive phrase, and precisely as we use the word "baptize."

"John came," we read, "who baptized in the wilderness;" "they then that received his word were baptized;" "I baptized also the house of Stephanus." To substitute the word "immerse" for the word "baptize" in statements like these would be to rob them of their most specific meaning.

It would certainly rob them of the "technical religious sense" which the author is endeavoring to force upon them, but to say that John immersed in the wilderness, or that they who received the word from the lips of the apostle were immersed, or that Paul immersed the household of Stephanus, would not rob the word of a single shade of its evident significance. It is our author who robs the word when he endeavors to give it a meaning for which the Greek language had other words.

But there are in the New Testament the narratives of actual cases of baptism; what is to be learned from them? our author inquires. They cannot be regarded, he says, as "decisive either one way or the other." It would seem to be otherwise, he is frankly ready to suggest.

The fact that we read of baptism in a river or pool, taken in connection with the strict meaning of βαπτίζω, would certainly favor the thought of immersion.

But this is a suggestion the force of which is at once broken by the added words:

although, no doubt, it is true that a candidate for baptism might stand in the shallow part of a stream or wayside pond, while the water was poured over his head—a form of baptism which appears to be represented in some of the early catacomb paintings.

It is, of course, to be admitted that the imaginative faculty has great capabilities, but our author certainly lays upon it a mighty task in suggesting the possibility of such a conception of baptism in the New Testament times. This was hardly to be expected from one who goes on to say that the presumed improbability that there would be a sufficient water supply in Jerusalem to permit the immersion of three thousand persons on the day of Pentecost, or that the jailer of Philippi would be provided with a bath or tank in which he and his household could be immersed on the spot, are considerations "too purely hypothetical to count for much in the way of serious argument."

In calling attention to the third line of evidence which he presents, the author makes the frank confession :

That immersion was the original method of baptism finds a very strong support in a figure which Paul uses both in Romans and Colossians in connection with a doctrinal reference to the sacrament (Rom. 6 : 3-5 ; Col. 2 : 12). He speaks of baptism as a burial with Christ into death, and a rising again with him from the grave. Undoubtedly this shows that immersion was the usual mode of administering the rite as known to Paul.

But why "usual"? Is there a particle of evidence to be found anywhere that it ever occurred to the apostle that there are "modes" of administering the rite? The apostle in his designation of the act used a word that was fixed, definite ; a word which Thayer, in his *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, says signifies "an immersion in water, performed as a sign of the removal of sin, and administered to those who, impelled by a desire for salvation, sought admission to the benefits of the Messiah's kingdom." Yet our author permits a suggestion of "modes," even when admitting that Paul's figure in Rom 6 : 3-5 and Col. 2 : 12 gives strong support to the view that the original act of baptism was immersion. This, however, is as far as his theory of a "technical religious sense" will allow him to go. He does not think that Paul's language in these passages "proves that there is a depth of spiritual significance in the twofold act of immersion and emersion which makes it an essential part of the ordinance." Our author's reason for his view is certainly a singular one :

"The great mass of the New Testament evidence goes to show that the idea of cleansing is the primary idea in the symbolism in baptism. The thought of a being buried with Christ is nowhere found except in these two Pauline passages. And the ideas of cleansing and burial are so different from each other that it is difficult, as the late Professor Candlish has said, to suppose "that the same was designed directly and properly to represent

them both;" and so the probability is that the comparison to a death and burial and resurrection with Christ "is merely an incidental allusion, and not the direct and principal signification of the rite."

But suppose it was an incidental allusion, and let it be granted that the idea of cleansing is the primary idea in the symbolism of baptism, is there even a hint in such an admission that the New Testament knows anything of any other "mode" of administering the rite than that indicated by our English word "immersion"?

But we have already exceeded the limits allowed to us. Enough has been said, however, to indicate that in the opening of the twentieth century Christian scholars in a study of Christian baptism are likely to find what they set out to find. We read history through our prejudices, Wendell Phillips once said; and this is true too often, even of our reading of the New Testament.

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SCIENCE AND THE FAITH.

IT is very difficult, perhaps impossible, for me to do justice to Mr. Capron's book.¹ And the reason may be put in a sentence. The work is one of the best sustained, and altogether the most ingenious, which it has been my fortune to read for some time; yet, save in one or two places, and these probably unimportant, it fails utterly to carry conviction to my mind. Having made this confession, I shall attempt little more than a bare presentation of Mr. Capron's general contention.

Mr. Capron proposes to show, on a basis of a frank acceptance of all the main consequences deduced by Spencer in the *Synthetic Philosophy*, that "the religion of the Bible, the sole repository of religious ideas," is true in itself, and able to stand the most rigid tests required by advanced scientific thought. He maintains this thesis through nearly five hundred pages, with amazing ingenuity and resource, somewhat as follows: Interdependence is the prime condition of terrestrial life. As the sun and the earth are to physical man, so are religion and science to intellectual man. Religion exercises the same vitalizing influence upon science as that exerted by the sun upon the earth. This is the first great "homology." The two, in both cases, are concurrent forces. So far the introduction. Part II deals with the

¹ *The Conflict of Truth*. By F. HUGH CAPRON. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. vii + 509 pages. 10s. 6d.

physical, and consists of the most detailed and acute attempt known to me to show that the biblical account of creation not only harmonizes with, but anticipates, the nebular hypothesis. I consider this the ablest portion of the book; at least, it is freer from unchastened fancy than the concluding part. Here is its final conclusion:

Translated out of their theological terminology into the exact and literal scientific equivalents of the terms employed, the first two verses of Genesis run thus: In the beginning the Almighty Being created space and matter. And matter was then in a gaseous condition; for it was formless, homogeneous, and invisible, and the Spirit of the Almighty agitated with molecular vibrations the fluid mass. (Pp. 212, 213.)

Its second conclusion is that man, according to the Scriptures, possesses four attributes: material form, vitality, consciousness, and spirituality. Genesis alleges that, while the last was created, the others were only formed; and the account of the formation is scientifically accurate. Similarly, the Bible foretells the end of the material universe quite correctly. Accordingly, we are forced to admit that the complete consonance of the Hebrew form of the creation legend with modern science, when fairly interpreted, has an immense negative value in removing a reproach from religion.

Not satisfied with this, Mr. Capron in Part III proceeds to investigate the spiritual nature of man, which was specially created, and to show, on the basis of assorted quotations from the Old and New Testaments, that here too, in a sphere which science knows not of, a perfectly scientific account is rendered of supra-physical phenomena. This he effects by the institution of certain far-reaching "homologies" between the spiritual and the physical, drawn mainly from a supposed analogy discovered in the phenomena of light and their nature and offices in the material universe. "Here, then, are the factors of spiritual sight, placed side by side with their physical homologues:

God	-	-	-	-	-	The Fountain of light
The word of God	-	-	-	-	-	The light itself
Christ	-	-	-	-	-	The ethereal medium between the light-giver and the light-receiver
The heart	-	-	-	-	-	The rudimentary organ of sight
Trust in Christ	-	-	-	-	-	The method of sight-evolution

"Our problem is to demonstrate, from these factors, the identity of the Bible doctrine of the development of spiritual sight, with the scientific theory of the evolution of physical sight" (p. 485). Thus, Paul's argument (Acts 17: 27) is this:

Hitherto (prior to the coming of Christ, the great luminiferous Medium between God and man) mankind (like the blind Silurian) has been groping in the dark, in the vain attempt to find the God of light by means of a feeler. . . . But now that Christ, the luminiferous Medium, has come, there is no longer excuse for thus groping in the dark; for now the light is accessible to all. (Pp. 487, 488.)

Molecular synchronism has its analogue in the spiritual sphere, and must be acquired ere the spiritual man can recognize the light of divine truth.

This outline gives a vague idea of what Mr. Capron has tried to do. It deprives his presentation of all its verve and skill. Thus, the book ought to be read by all interested in such matters; for it is the best thing of its kind, no matter what one may think of this kind. But it ought to be read with a continual remembrance of the question, To what purpose is this waste? Also it ought to be viewed in the light of such a problem as this: What might Mr. Capron say had he been duly instructed in the implications of epistemology?

Mr. Mallock has always been known to serious thinkers as an exponent rather of acuteness than of grasp, and his books excel in facility and *aplomb* rather than in constructive power and insight. In the present case^a it is not unfair to say that the balance in favor of the lesser virtues swings more strongly than ever. As before, the presentation is interesting, the criticism vigorous to the point of bitterness, the illustration apposite; but the impression continues to be that of a palace of ice. In brief, the work will do little or nothing to enhance Mr. Mallock's reputation. From the standpoint of a scientific philosophy, which recognizes all factors incident to the problem, and tries to face the issue—no matter how dread—squarely, the book must be judged weak alike in conception and in execution. And this debility appears emphatically in the author's lack of discrimination. He fails to observe where the stresses fall in philosophical problems as they stand today, and he fails badly at that. We seem to be reading articles, of a certain sort, which were wont to appear in the *Fortnightly Review* twenty-five years back. The author becomes the victim—willing because unconscious—of a species of conventionality which, sooner or later, seems to make writers of his faith its own. The main subjects of discussion and inquiry are, of course, those

^a *Religion as a Credible Doctrine: A Study of the Fundamental Difficulty.* By W. H. MALLOCK. New York: Macmillan, 1903. xiv + 287 pages. \$3, net.

incident to the so-called conflict between scientific results and religious beliefs. But, like so many before him, Mr. Mallock has identified science with certain metaphysical conclusions which, so far from being inferences from modern inquiry, are actually incompatible with its central principles. It were surely too belated, at this date, to take Huxley and Spencer as the representative protagonists of a scientific philosophy. As a natural issue, Mr. Mallock finds himself in a hopeless plight. To wit, it is reasonable to acquiesce in two orders of existence, not reconcilable in terms of reason. In this connection, the book indeed contains one most pertinent remark: "The geese of the days of Moses were as wise as the geese of today" (p. 60). While some few suggestions may be extracted from the twelfth chapter, on "The Practical Basis of Belief," one is compelled to conclude that, on the whole, the work is a good specimen of a prevalent species of quasi-popular philosophy, and not entitled in any sense to be classed as *Wissenschaft*. On the destructive side it is not without merit; the constructive is sadly to seek.

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THE SPEAKING OF WOMEN IN THE APOSTOLIC CHURCHES.

THE subject which Zscharnack¹ investigates is larger than that which I have chosen for my title. It includes the churches of the second and third centuries, as well as of the first, and the Gnostic and Montanistic churches, as well as the orthodox. But the part of his book which will prove most instructive to readers in general is the second chapter, in which he deals with the activities of women in the apostolic churches. Here he undertakes to prove that in the apostolic churches, and especially in those founded and guided by Paul, women took part in public worship, were missionary preachers, presided over church meetings, taught, baptized, and administered the Lord's Supper. I shall not review all the arguments with which he supports this courageous proposition, but shall limit myself to the more notable of those which have to do with the speaking of women in the churches.

One is derived from the term "fellow-workers" applied to both Prisca and Aquila in Rom. 16: 3. If the term "fellow-worker" had

¹ *Der Dienst der Frau in den ersten Jahrhunderten der christlichen Kirche*. Von LEOPOLD ZSCHARNACK. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1902. 193 pages. M. 4.80.

been applied to Aquila alone, we should have understood it at once as referring to the work of preaching. Why should we give it a strained and unnatural interpretation when it is applied to a woman? But to resolve all doubt concerning its meaning, we are asked to turn to Phil. 4:2, 3, where Paul exhorts his "true yoke-fellow" to help two women, Euodia and Syntyche, because, to quote his exact reason, "they labored with me in the gospel." But, "to labor in the gospel" is to preach the gospel. To think of it as anything else is to wrest the language from its obvious meaning in order to support a preconceived theory.

We now go back to Prisca, or Priscilla, for another proof. She is mentioned in the New Testament repeatedly in immediate connection with her husband, but in every instance save 1 Cor. 16:19 her name stands before his: Acts 18:18; 18:26; Rom. 16:3; 2 Tim. 4:19. In Acts 18:26, the most remarkable of these passages, Apollos is taught the way of Christ more perfectly, not by Aquila and Priscilla, but by "Priscilla and Aquila." One can hardly read the passages in which these two are mentioned and escape the conviction that they preached the gospel as evangelists and missionaries, and that the wife was more prominent in the work than the husband. Harnack has conjectured that the epistle to the Hebrews was chiefly written by Priscilla, and Renan has said that "Priscilla and Aquila passed almost into the rank of the apostles." But we need no such doubtful speculations to convince us that Priscilla was one of the foremost missionaries of the apostolic age.

Turning from these biblical arguments, we are directed to the Christian romance which we know, perhaps wrongly, as *The Acts of Paul and Thecla*. It is a very early piece of Christian literature, and Origen, Hippolytus, and Tertullian were acquainted with it. I have called it a romance, but many critics are disposed to find in it a large element of sober history. Yet, even as a romance, it would be true to the prevailing ideas of the age in which it was produced. Now it represents Thecla as preaching, not only to women in their houses, but to promiscuous throngs. Moreover, she baptized her converts. The force of this appeal to *The Acts of Paul and Thecla* is increased by the fact that the early Christian writers who refer to the book find nothing offensive and nothing un-Pauline in these representations.

But here we are confronted with the well-known passage, 1 Cor. 14:34, 35, in which Paul says: "Let the women keep silence in the churches: for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but let them be in subjection, as also saith the law. And if they would learn anything,

let them ask their own husbands at home: for it is shameful for a woman to speak in the church."

It is evident that this must be interpreted with an unbiased reference to another passage in the same epistle, 11:4-7: "Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoreth his head. But every woman praying or prophesying with her head unveiled dishonoreth her head: for it is one and the same thing as if she were shaven." Here one can scarcely escape the conviction that the church at Corinth, founded and guided by Paul, in which he forbade women to speak, permitted some women to engage in public prayer and prophecy. Nor can one easily escape the conclusion that Paul himself permits them to do so. Surely he is not writing about their praying and prophesying in assemblies composed exclusively of women. Why should a woman wear a veil on her head when speaking to women? It is not an act of insubordination against her husband. No one could object to it or put an evil construction upon it. The requirement of the veil on the head as a symbol of subordination cannot be explained without the acknowledgment that the assembly in which it was to be worn was composed both of men and women.

It has been supposed by some commentators that Paul imposed upon the Greek women who prayed and prophesied in mixed assemblies the oriental face-veil, a garment entirely new to them. But this is not so. He expressly prescribes a head-veil, and not a face-veil. The man must pray and prophesy with his head uncovered. The woman must pray and prophesy with her head covered. No man ever thought of praying or prophesying with his face covered, and hence the legislation in reference to the man relates solely to his head. So also the legislation in reference to the woman relates solely to her head. When it is said that for a woman to pray or to prophesy with her head uncovered "is all one and the same thing as if she were shaven," the reference is solely to the head, and not to the face. There is nothing on the face of a woman which could be removed by shaving. But prostitutes sometimes shaved the head. This interpretation of the law is corroborated by early Christian art, in which the "orante," or "praying woman," is often delineated, and usually with the veil on the head, but never on the face.

It is clear from all this that Paul was not thinking of the mere danger of encouraging immodesty in the women who prophesied, but of the danger of encouraging wrong ideas concerning the auxiliary posi-

tion of women in the constitution of the human race. These wrong ideas might arise in the mind of the prophetess, or in the minds of other Christian women who heard her and interpreted her liberty as authorizing license. They might be attributed to Christianity itself by its pagan critics, much to its disadvantage. It was necessary, therefore, on every account to require that the woman praying or prophesying in mixed assemblies should indicate by some slight and not inconvenient symbol the fact that she was not a revolutionist, but an advocate of conservative views. An explanation of the head-covering would often be asked, and the answer would set the whole matter in its proper light.

If we turn, now, to the later passage in the same epistle, where women are required to keep silence in the churches, and to "ask their own husbands at home, if they would learn anything," the difficulty which it presents is not very great. It states the general rule. But it surely does not forbid the very exception already permitted in an earlier chapter. The general rule is perhaps a good one for all times and all places; but the exceptions may also be good for all times and all places. The rule would be necessary in the apostolic age, when women were incredibly ignorant, and in a Greek community, where they had all the curiosity, vivacity, and irreverence of the Greek race. Their offense at Corinth seems to have been a disposition to interrupt the service with senseless questions, better asked at home, and with frivolous difficulties, both of which marked a departure from the subordination proper to their sex, and not by the desire to pray, to prophesy, or to teach. Those who preach in certain pagan communities today know how multitudinous and absurd such interruptions can be.

Has not the discrepancy between the two passages now disappeared?

There still remains 1 Tim. 2 : 12 : "I permit not a woman to teach, or to have dominion over a man, but to be in quietness." Zscharnack solves the difficulty presented by this passage by declaring that the epistle is later than the apostolic age, and does not represent Paul, either here or elsewhere. There is no need of this violence. The epistle is from the apostle. But confessedly it was written near the close of his life. The churches by that time were organized under officers, among the highest of whom was the teacher. The bishop must be "apt to teach." In these late epistles the apostle is legislating concerning the officers of the churches. He excludes women from the official position of teacher, on the ground that it involves the exercise of authority over men. The unofficial missionary teaching which

came before us in the early part of this article would involve no such abuse. The praying and prophesying which were permitted at Corinth would involve no such abuse if they were guarded, as the apostle guarded them, by the requirement of the head-covering.

If now we should apply this entire legislation to our own days, it would debar woman from the official ministry, but not from a modest participation in the social meetings of the church.

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A GREAT WORK IN TEXTUAL CRITICISM.

IN the thousand pages of the book before us¹ is concentrated the honorable labor of a lifetime. Students of the New Testament have long been acquainted with the *Prolegomena* to Tischendorf's critical edition of the Greek text which (after Tischendorf himself had died in 1874) Dr. Gregory, with considerable assistance in the earlier stages from his fellow-countryman, Ezra Abbot, published in 1884, 1890, and 1894. Written in Latin by an American domiciled in Germany, and acknowledging much help from England, they have a cosmopolitan character, and by their own merit have won a recognized position as the standard book of reference for all that concerns the materials of New Testament textual criticism. An ordinary man might have been content with this achievement; but Dr. Gregory is not an ordinary man. He has taken the vast mass of his *Prolegomena*, revised it, brought it up to date, added here, omitted there, and finally translated the whole into German, and published it as an independent work, which now lies complete before us, less than nine years since the preface to the earlier work was penned.

A survey of the contents of the new work will show in what respects (apart from language) it differs from its predecessor. In place of the life of Tischendorf and catalogue of his writings, which would be superfluous here, we have a brief introduction, treating of the functions of textual criticism (pp. 1-5), and a short summary of paleographical data (pp. 6-15). Then follows the catalogue of the uncial manuscripts (pp. 16-123), of which it need only be observed that they now extend through the Latin and Greek alphabets and to the Hebrew letter Vav (ו), and that the fragments grouped under the letter T reach to T⁷. Indeed, it is evident that the system of nomenclature

¹ *Textkritik des Neuen Testaments*. Von CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY. Two vols. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1900, 1902. x + 993 pages.

adopted for the uncial MSS. is nearly breaking down, and will very speedily do so if separate letters are assigned to each fresh scrap which the sands of Egypt reveal to us. Gregory's list includes some fragments from the Rainer collection of papyri in Vienna, which have never before been printed (Tⁱ, T^u, T^v), and some Græco-Coptic leaves from Paris, which had better have been left to the records of the Coptic versions; on the other hand it does not include the gold and purple copy of Matthew (the kinsman of Σ and N), now at Paris, published by Omont in 1900. The rest of the first volume (pp. 124-478) is occupied by the catalogue of minuscule MSS., which is substantially a German translation of the corresponding section of the *Prolegomena*, with the necessary corrections and extensions. The numbers of gospels MSS. is carried on from 1287 to 1420; the additions, which are mostly from oriental monasteries, have generally been very slightly examined, and add little to our knowledge. In dealing with the additional MSS. of the other parts of the New Testament a new system has been adopted, in order that all parts of a manuscript shall in future bear the same number, instead of having one number in the catalogue of MSS. of the gospels, and another in that of the Acts and catholic epistles, and yet a third in that of the Pauline epistles, and a fourth if it also appeared in that of the Apocalypse. Accordingly, the numbers do not run continuously after Act. 420, Paul. 487, Apoc. 185. The totals amount to 450 copies of the Acts and catholic epistles, 520 of the Pauline epistles, and 194 of the Apocalypse; totals, however, which are to some extent fictitious, as it is known that some of the MSS. included in them are really lectionaries, or are not copies of the New Testament at all.

The catalogue of the lectionaries is introduced by a discussion of their value, which is one of the new features of the present work. Dr. Gregory sets a higher value on them than has usually been allowed, arguing that the conservatism of liturgical usage justifies us in expecting to find relatively early forms of text preserved in them. As an instance, he refers to the retention of the Psalter of the Great Bible in the English prayer-book of the present day; and he might have added the retention of Jerome's "Roman" Psalter at St. Peter's. He does not claim, however, to have tested this estimate by the actual collation of any of these MSS.; that task may be reserved for later labors, or left to other scholars. An elaborate description of the normal contents and arrangement of these books occupies pp. 329-86, and is followed by the catalogue of the MSS., which amount to 1072 in the

case of *Evangelia* (such, Dr. Gregory shows, is their true title, not *Evangelitaria*, still less *Evangelistaria*) and 303 in that of the *Apostolos*. Among the new additions is a leaf from the Rainer collection (Evl. 1043) which is assigned to the fourth or fifth century.

More than half the second volume (pp. 479-746) is occupied by the versions. This, though undoubtedly the lists of MSS. which it contains are useful, is, I think, the weakest portion of the work, whereas in the last edition of Scrivener it is precisely this part that is the strongest. Fuller indications of the character of the more important MSS. might be expected; and even the purely bibliographical information is not as complete as in the other sections of Dr. Gregory's work. In the account of the Peshitta Syriac, Gwilliam's article on it in the Oxford *Studia Biblica*, which forecast the general results of his edition of the gospels in this version, is merely named, without any mention of its contents. The edition itself, of course, appeared too late for mention by Gregory, and so perhaps did Mr. Burkitt's full exposition of his theory that the Peshitta is to be attributed to Rabbula, though it was published before the end of 1901; but a partial proof of it had been made public earlier. Similarly, Mr. Burkitt's article on the Palestinian Syriac version,* which revolutionizes the criticism of it, appeared early in 1901; and even if the first sheets of the volume had been printed off by then, discoveries such as these might surely have been mentioned in an appendix. In the chapter on the Coptic versions Horner's edition of the Bohairic gospels (1898), which supersedes all others, is briefly named in small print on p. 538; while Forbes Robinson's article in the first volume of Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible* (1898) is not named at all. The account of the Middle Egyptian versions (little as is known of them) is inadequate, and does not distinguish between the different dialects already identified by Coptic scholars. A much fuller list of the extant Sahidic fragments is given by Scrivener. In dealing with the Armenian version one would have expected to find more extensive use made of the interesting reports of Conybeare on the manuscripts at Edschmiadzin. No doubt these defects are partly due to the fact that the oriental languages lie outside the sphere of Gregory's personal work, and they do not, all told, amount to very much; but the high standard reached elsewhere causes one to feel disappointment when one looks for a reference in this part of the work and does not find it. The treatment of the Latin versions is altogether fuller and better.

* *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. II, p. 174.

The subject of the patristic evidence is one upon which Gregory had wished to say something in his *Prolegomena*, but had been constrained to refrain from want of space. Here he confesses that he now feels unequal to the labor of grappling with this immense and growing subject, and this part of his work (pp. 747-823) is practically nothing but a revised version of the corresponding section in the *Prolegomena*. The fact is that no single writer can at present deal with all the problems connected with the patristic citations from the New Testament. It is only of late years, since Westcott and Hort established the crucial importance of this branch of evidence, that much attention has been paid to it, and we are still in the stage of collecting materials. A generation or two hence, when all the Fathers have been scientifically edited, it may be possible to sum up the results; at present they are partial and provisional.

A chronological table of witnesses (pp. 824-46), as in the *Prolegomena*, concludes this part of the work. The remainder of it (848-993) is occupied by a history of textual criticism in the past, one section dealing with the external form of the New Testament (the order of the books, the divisions into chapters and verses, punctuation, orthography, and the like), while the other gives a chronicle of textual science from the earliest days to the year 1902. Bibliographically this is very full, and very useful for purposes of reference, and a fair and unprejudiced statement is given of the positions occupied by the several critics. In the case of Westcott and Hort a Latin sketch of their theory is given, which in a large measure is from the pen of Hort himself. What we do not get is any discussion of the whole subject by Dr. Gregory himself. True to the principles which have guided him through all his life of work upon the subject, he has suppressed his own opinions, and has made himself the recorder of the work of other men. It is this self-suppression, this objectivity, which, added to the accuracy of his workmanship, gave his *Prolegomena* their universally recognized position as the standard book of reference on the subject; and we find these qualities still in the *Textkritik*, which is, in fact, the *Prolegomena* recast as an independent work. But now that this is done, may there not be opportunities for Dr. Gregory to take his part as a constructive workman in the field of textual criticism?

For what is the position in which we stand today? No one will suppose that with the completion of Dr. Gregory's monumental work textual criticism has said its last word; at the same time, the appearance of such a work affords a natural opportunity for taking stock of

the situation. Twenty-two years have passed away since the publication of Westcott and Hort's *Introduction*; the dust and smoke of the controversy arising out of it have died down, and we can see where we stand. Some of the principles for which they contended may be taken as generally admitted; others are still subject to discussion and modification. The classification of the main types of text, which they took over from Bengel, Semler, and Griesbach, and modified and established on a firmer foundation, may now be reckoned among the accepted data of criticism. We have the four main families, whether we call them, with Westcott and Hort, Syrian, Neutral, Alexandrian, and Western, or, as I have elsewhere advocated, the α , β , γ , and δ families. Even for the third class, the outlines of which were rather shadowy, fuller evidence has been derived from Egyptian sources of late years.

Further, on the main issue of the controversy which followed on the publication of Westcott and Hort's theory and the Revised Version of the New Testament, I think it may be claimed that a decision has been reached. As between the α and β types (Syrian and Neutral), the general sense of scholars has pronounced emphatically in favor of the latter. The old "Textus Receptus," which was defended so strenuously by Burgon and his lieutenant, Miller, is now practically without a champion among scholars. Its claims are to some extent maintained by Mr. Gwilliam, from the standpoint of the Peshitta version; but the position of the Peshitta has been steadily undermined by successive discoveries, notably by Mr. Burkitt's recent proof that it was not used by Ephraem. On the whole, the position is now conceded that the type of text which predominates (amid all variety of detail) in the great mass of later authorities, and finds its English form in the Authorized Version, is of a secondary character, taking shape about the period of Chrysostom. Future investigation may reveal something more of its history, but will hardly rehabilitate it in its former authority.

But textual research during the last twenty-two years has not been content with the establishment of this result. Since the first heat of this primary controversy began to cool, its energies have been chiefly directed to the investigation of the positive character and history of the β text, and especially to the examination of the δ or Western text. This investigation has followed two channels. In the first place, there has been the discovery of certain fresh documents, notably the Sinaitic Syriac palimpsest, the text of which has

augmented the body of available evidence on the subject, while older documents, such as the fragments of the Old Latin version, have been more minutely and scientifically studied. Secondly, the evidence of the early Fathers has been searched and weighed with a thoroughness previously unknown. It was one of the main merits of Westcott and Hort to show how crucial is the evidence of the Fathers for the history of the text; and their disciples have followed up the line of investigation which they pointed out. The process is not yet complete. In spite of the labors directed by the Austrian and Prussian academies, and of individuals in other countries, not all the early Fathers have yet been scientifically edited; and from time to time fresh little discoveries are made which increase our knowledge in this field.³

Nevertheless, some definite results are already discernible. It is clear that the type of texts—related, but yet very divergent among themselves—which Westcott and Hort called “Western” predominated in all parts of the Christian world in the earliest period to which our evidence at present carries us, that is, in the second century and the beginning of the third. We find it in Syria, Egypt, Africa, Gaul; in Justin, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Cyprian, Irenæus. On the other hand, the available evidence tends more and more to connect the “Neutral” text with the school of Origen, with Egypt and Palestine; and even here it did not by any means hold undisputed sway. Consequently, it is natural that many scholars are increasingly inclined to magnify the claims of the δ type, and especially of that form of it which appears to be the earlier, and is embodied in the Bobbio fragment known as k and the quotations of Cyprian. When this subgroup of early authorities is in agreement with the Syriac subgroup headed by the Sinaitic Syriac MS., we unquestionably have a strong and broadly based consensus of authorities, the testimony of which is deserving of all consideration.

Still, even when we have got so far, we are far from a definite conclusion in which we can rest. The evidence of the western group is so divergent and so incomplete that it would be a very hard task to construct a continuous text of this type which could be regarded as satisfactory, even by its adherents. On the other hand, the β text has

³For instance, the fragmentary text published in the third volume of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, and brilliantly identified by DEAN ARMITAGE ROBINSON with part of IRENÆUS, *Adv. Hæreses*, Book III, hitherto known to us only in a Latin version, suggests that Irenæus's gospel citations were even more “Western” in their character than was previously realized.

very strong intrinsic claims to respect, in regard of age, of character, and of internal probability; as is shown by the very pre-eminent position assigned to it by Weiss (whose examination was conducted on quite different lines from those of Westcott and Hort) in respect to its freedom from secondary accretions. Where, then, are we now to look for further light upon this problem? The conclusions of Westcott and Hort, though not displaced, have been challenged, perhaps modified; but a definite result has not yet been arrived at.

This must be the task of the future; and already the methods to be employed have been indicated, and work upon them is in progress. In brief, what we have to do is to endeavor to trace the history of the New Testament; and in order to do this effectively it is necessary to break up the various authorities into groups, and deal with them separately. The work of Tischendorf and Tregelles practically represents the limit which can be reached by the method of simple comparison of authorities, without special regard to their history or classification. The historical method was introduced by Westcott and Hort, who first systematically applied the evidence of the Fathers to show at what dates and in what localities the various types of text came into being. But this line of inquiry has to be pushed further. The manuscripts and versions need to be examined more minutely, especially in the light of the evidence of the Fathers. Small groups have to be isolated, located, dated, and their importance estimated. In this way it may be possible to trace more accurately than hitherto the history of the New Testament text, and thereby to work back nearer to its primitive form.

The method is not new. It has been applied with considerable success to the criticism of the Septuagint, notably by Lagarde. It has been found possible to identify certain groups of MSS. and versions as containing respectively the Origenian, Lucianic, and Hesychian recensions of the several groups of books; and it is hoped that the larger Cambridge edition will provide materials for carrying the inquiry still farther. In the case of the New Testament, Ferrar set the example by his identification of the group of four minuscule MSS. which is commonly known by his name. The further researches of the abbé Martin and Rendel Harris have increased the size of the group and located it in southern Italy. Another group, consisting of Evv. 1, 118, 131, 209, has recently been investigated by Lake. The purple uncial MSS. of the gospels (N, Σ , Σ^* , and Φ) form another group which must have proceeded from one scriptorium. Yet another

group, which needs further examination, centers round the uncial A. Bousset, following up the method which has been successfully applied to the Septuagint, has sought to find in the β group (B, \aleph , etc.) an edition by Hesychius; and this suggestion has been carried farther by Schmidtke, who has added another member (Ev. 579) to the group. In the Acts and epistles, again, the MSS. with the apparatus of Euthalius stand by themselves, and require separate treatment.

But most of all is searching investigation needed into the history and relationships of all the members of the δ group. The labors of Wordsworth, Sanday, Burkitt, Harris, and others have done much in this direction already. The kinship of the Bobbio MS. ξ with the text used by Cyprian has been established, and the authority of the Old Syriac version has been set upon a firmer basis. Fresh fragments of evidence are from time to time being brought to light from the quotations of the early Fathers. What we have not arrived at, however, is any theory which will account for the very wide divergences among the various members of this group, or guide us to the discovery of the common form underlying them, if indeed any one archetype of the group, short of the autographs of the original authors, ever existed. Blass's well-known theory, which seemed plausible at first sight in the case of the Acts, is less plausible when applied to the third gospel, and fails entirely to account for the phenomena in the other books. The solution of the problem is not yet reached; and it is only by patient research and accumulation of facts that a solution will ever be reached at all.

The application of the historical method, it appears, is to be the leading principle of the new edition of the New Testament which is now in course of appearance, that of von Soden. How far he has been able to go by its aid is not yet evident; for the volume already published deals mainly with the enumeration and external characteristics of the MSS. It is a curious coincidence that the year which saw the conclusion of Gregory's labors in their final form should also witness the appearance of a new list of MSS. which aims at superseding them. Whether it will do so is doubtful. The new numeration is somewhat complicated, and the amalgamation of uncials and minuscules has its drawbacks. Only as relieving us from the difficulty (before alluded to) of the nomenclature of the uncials is it to be recommended. It is difficult to recognize one's old acquaintances, \aleph , A, B, etc., under the guise of δ_2 , δ_4 , δ_1 , and so on. This, however, is not the place for a review of von Soden; and it is not so much his

new system of numeration that interests us as the results of the fuller collations of the minuscule MSS. which he has procured, and of his use of them to elucidate the history of the text. Successful or unsuccessful, it must carry the good work forward by the stimulus it will give to investigation and the material it will provide for its prosecution.

Dr. Gregory has earned the right to stand by and watch the further progress of the studies which he has done so much to facilitate; but it is to be hoped that he will prefer rather to bring his knowledge and his trained experience actively to the help of his successors. Whether he does so or not, students of New Testament textual criticism owe him a debt which they can neither adequately express nor repay.

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IS GOD KNOWABLE ?

NO THEME can be more central than that suggested by this question. Two works¹ dealing with the problem, one in a revised edition and the other a new contribution, make clear that our age regards it as neither settled nor outworn.

The revised edition of Professor Bowne's *Philosophy of Theism* is, like his other works, characterized by clearness and force. The arguments from epistemology and metaphysics are given a much larger place in the new edition, and lead to the assumption of a supreme Intelligence, a Person, while man must be regarded also as a free agency in the process of knowing and in his moral activity. Religion is a constituent element of man's nature and underived.

An interesting point in the discussion is (p. 14) as to whether the arguments for theism are religiously worthless because of the priority of the religious experience. But the author holds that the speculative arguments do have worth even for the religious consciousness, although we must not go to the extreme of thinking that the purely metaphysical arguments can give the full religious conception of God which is the outgrowth of man's intellectual, emotional, æsthetic, ethical, and religious nature. It is easy to fall back upon the religious consciousness as the only source of our knowledge of God, but I believe it an

¹*Agnosticism*. By ROBERT FLINT. New York: Scribner, 1903. xviii+664 pages.

Theism, comprising the Deems Lectures for 1902. By BORDEN P. BOWNE. New York: American Book Co. xii+323 pages.

error to do so ; it is equally an error to regard the theoretical arguments for or against the existence and nature of God as the only trustworthy source of knowledge, refusing to recognize the religious experience as of speculative value. The correct way is to regard all the data, both scientific and religious, as material for analysis and synthetic construction. The theistic argument is such a construction. Of course, this means that there is no proof, ontological, cosmological, or teleological, for the existence of God. These famous arguments are only phases of the construction reached in view of all the data of experience.

Here a word of criticism of Professor Bowne's treatment might be offered. Much time is given to the refutation of a logical, deductive proof of God's existence, as though that kind of proof could be essentially different from any other proof. Professor Bowne would have saved himself labor had he gone into the nature of proof deductive and inductive. In deductive proof we are simply passing from some conceived whole to a special notice of its factors, and from the factors to the whole in the inductive process. In other words, the mind is trying to form its unity of knowledge out of the unorganized total of experience, and to maintain its integrity when formed. When the mind thus constructs its whole of knowledge as faithfully as possible, and recognizes the relations of the factors in this whole, it has all the proof of anything attainable. Now, let the mind consider analytically and synthetically its scientific, ethical, æsthetical, and religious experience. If the resulting intellectual construction requires the belief in a divine personality, we have theism, and the only proof of theism possible. Of course, the assumption must be made that, when this is done as indicated above, we have knowledge of reality. But it is an assumption, for the possibility of knowledge cannot be proved.

Again, Professor Bowne shows that "the mind is sure to conceive the universe so as to provide for its own interests" (p. 28), and that logic has a regulative use in setting forth clearly the postulates of these practical interests. This is an important point, for it emphasizes the unity of the human life. Its implication is that we cannot believe religiously what contradicts the principles of logic and theoretical science, although the religious experience may be the source of truth not attainable without the data for consideration gained from that religious experience. We have both in popular and in scientific religious thinking a tendency to separate between the speculative and the realm of faith. Some are apparently ready to believe anything in the realm of religious conceptions, and for them it is rather an evidence of

abiding faith if they hold themselves ready to accept even what is contradictory to reason. For example, the Ritschlians require a complete separation between theology and theoretical science, and are not at all clear as to the manner in which the truth of theology—if it can be called truth—can form a unity with the truth of metaphysics. Professor Bowne makes clear at once the true position when he says our right to make postulates to satisfy our life-needs cannot

warrant us in contradicting logic and metaphysics, and no such contradiction can escape final destruction. . . . The lack of proof may be atoned for by practical necessity, but disproof can never be ignored or set aside by any sentiment (p. 33).

Again, the treatment of the main theme may be characterized as theoretical and practical. The theoretical considers the nature of reality and of knowledge. A strong argument is made against the mechanical, materialistic view of the world-process and of the nature of knowledge. It is impossible to do justice to these arguments here. Indeed, the author has, I think, treated the speculative portion too briefly, crowding into it the gist of what he has said in several extended works. The result, however, is that the metaphysics of nature leads to the conception of the world-ground as one, as intelligent, indeed as a self-conscious Personality. The nature of knowledge also requires the conception of the world-ground as intelligent and of man as free in his cognitive activity. Hence the error of the mechanical, materialistic conception of nature and man.

I need only call attention to what seems to me unsatisfactory in the treatment. For example, too much is made of the mechanical theory of the world and of human life. What is the mechanical except a method of explanation of the objectively presented? And such explanation implies some orderly relation. We must so think of the objectively presented experiences, if we think of them at all and try to explain them. Likewise, if we try to conceive what man does, we think of each step of his activity in relation to its conditions; in short, as having determinate relations. But when we think of the will-act, we are not usually thinking of it in this objective fashion; if we do we must think of its conditions as in the case of any other object. Instead, we describe the will-act in terms of the conceived ends and motive for the subject and state what it is in the subject's experience. If our interest were that of seeking conditions of the act, as it might be, we should fall back into the explanatory method, presupposing the objective determining conditions of the will; in short, its mechanism. We ought to keep the two points of view distinct.

The author holds an ambiguous position concerning the existence of things apart from the subject. At one time, things are regarded as real, causal existences apart from the subject. At another time, these things are all embraced in the absolute, and we are told that we know only the subjectively presented object; and yet the main argument would maintain the reality of things apart from the subject. Too little attention is given to such views as those of Bradley, Royce, T. H. Green, and others on this point. What is the thing? Why not say it is a thought-object—a thing for mind, as Green says? Can the causal category bridge over from the self to the real thing? But the causal category is a thought-relation having its application in connection with the objects of thought known in the subject's constructed world of reality. Surely there are difficulties here that the author has not satisfactorily recognized.

A similar remark is in order concerning the treatment of the human self. Like Lotze, the author is positive that the self is a real existence in its own right, for it must be thought of as free, causal intelligence in knowledge and morals, and yet, on the other hand, the self must be thought of as somehow within the absolute. Had the author recognized the difference between the mechanical explanation of the objectively presented which requires the conception of the unity of all things in a whole, and the method of description of subjective processes of knowing and willing ends already referred to, there need not be this uncertain position as to whether the self falls within the absolute whole or not. Of course it does, but we are primarily interested in the self from the subjective standpoint of conceiving ends for self-activity. We are not usually interested in the question whether, objectively considered, these processes are conditioned and conditioning factors in the world-whole. Were we so interested, we could not but so regard these processes.

In conclusion, I have only commendation for the author's treatment of the practical interests of life. It is thoroughly wholesome and helpful, and is intended more fully to establish belief in the moral goodness of God in spite of present evil, and to assure the fulfilment of the best interests of life. This empirical vindication consists, not in demonstration, but in illustration of our faith. "The deepest things are not reached by formal syllogizing, but by the experience of life itself" (p. 259). This reminds one of Kant's statement in the *Critique of the Judgment*, where he says that the practical interests of faith in a supreme causal Intelligence do not follow from speculative

arguments, but may seek in the theoretical their confirmation. Such confirmations and illustrations of our faith are, according to Professor Bowne, abundant, and examples are presented in a clear and forceful manner.

The work as a whole will be especially useful for those who desire a comprehensive sketch of the theistic argument. It is a book which interests the reader because the author has given his own thought and has not filled his pages with extended interpretations and criticisms of others.

Professor Flint deals with a negative phase of the problem positively discussed by Professor Bowne. But it is a theme on which there has been plenty of positive utterance. At the outset he seeks to make clear what he understands to be the significance of the term "agnosticism." He says that agnosticism is a theory of the limits of knowledge—the denial "to the mind powers of knowledge which it really possesses" (p. 21). While Professor Flint does not restrict himself to religious agnosticism, but regards it as only one of the general phases of rejection of knowledge "on the ground that the human mind is incapable of knowing" (p. 22), yet his work is intended to serve as a fitting introduction to natural theology and to confirm and support religious belief (p. 640).

It may be asked in passing: If a gnostic ascribes to the mind more, an agnostic less, power of acquiring knowledge than it really possesses (p. 26), who, then, may not say that another has too much confidence in the mind's power to know (gnostic) or too little (agnostic)? One can only give his own theory of knowledge, and this is what Professor Flint tries to do. Nor can I understand how agnosticism can be called a system (p. 30), since agnosticism is only a name for a certain aspect of a speculative view abstracted from the whole to which it belongs. We are interested in the general position of the Sophists, and the peculiar reasons, historical and speculative, which caused them to regard the limits of knowledge just as they did. Likewise we are interested in Kant's, Spencer's, and Huxley's limits of knowledge as an important aspect of the general theory of each. But the Sophists, Kant, Huxley, and Spencer, are not the same, nor are their doctrines the same. How can there be, then, any system of agnosticism to be attacked in such a work as we have before us?

This point of criticism is so important, if valid, that I must state what I mean more fully, namely, that, given our total experience, we are called upon critically to examine it and to construct a consistent

view of it. We must be "agnostic" toward other theories while we are forming our own. Then, when we have done our best, we accept as true the result of our constructive activity. It, then, makes no difference whether another believes more or less and attacks us accordingly. We must measure all others from our own standpoint. If one is a materialist for, to him, good and honest reasons, what point is there in an idealist calling him an agnostic? The things of importance are the two speculative systems as such and the reasons why, concerning certain objects, there is such a difference of view. How, then, a system of agnosticism?

The work before us is an illustration of what has just been said. All the author succeeds in giving is what he accepts as true and the reasons for his position concerning the nature of knowledge, but, instead of proceeding directly to his task, he picks up this abstract term "agnosticism," regards it as a real thing, and proceeds to demolish it according to his own view of what ought to be held. Of course, the author finds difficulty, as is very evident in the first part of the book, in fixing upon a meaning for the term "agnosticism," since he is trying to create something concrete out of certain aspects of different systems abstracted from those systems. A mass of historical material, intended as a review of theories of agnosticism and interesting in itself, but too briefly presented for a history of thought, is introduced in such a manner as seriously to interrupt the continuity of thought. I may mention, for example, the chapter on "The Agnosticism of Hume and Kant" (pp. 136-238). But why call Hume an agnostic, unless we give due value to his views as a whole? Hume was, indeed, a critic of the faculty of knowledge, continuing Locke's problem expressed in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, namely, the sources, certainty, and extent of human knowledge. In fact, he was not so much a philosopher as he was a critic of the faculty of knowledge. For Hume, knowledge consisted of impressions, and faint impressions or ideas united by association according to the laws of contiguity, resemblance, and causality. We know only conscious states, and self and things are only names for groups of conscious states. At this point Professor Flint criticises Hume in a manner which neglects the difficulty to which Hume called attention. The perception is, for Professor Flint, the perception of an extra-mental thing-in-itself, and the subject knows himself as a real existence having the perception. Wherefore? The extra-mental thing is cause of the perception, and in the perception the subject directly knows that extra-

mental causal thing-in-itself. Equally so the percipient subject immediately knows his own soul-in-itself as a substantial existence over and above the conscious states. It is enough to say that Professor Flint here commits the psychological fallacy of making the conscious state cause of itself in the case of perception, and covers up with the term "agnosticism" the value of Hume in the history of philosophy. All that Hume did—as Professor Flint himself acknowledges—was to give a definite answer to the problem of knowledge, as he understood it, and apply those principles consistently to the soul, things, and God. Is not the center of interest these very principles, why Hume believed them, and their significance in the history of thought? To call Hume an agnostic is of little consequence; it is only Flint *versus* Hume.

The criticism of Kant as an agnostic is made from the same realistic point of view. Professor Flint says that Kant's inference

as to the nature of space is that it is only a subjective condition of sense. I admit none of the premises from which the inference is drawn, and reject the inference itself. If space be not known by us as objective and external, nothing is so known by us, and we can have no intelligible and consistent conception of objectivity or externality. The mind has no consciousness of space as subjective. It knows it only as independent of itself, as out of itself, as what it and what the objects are in. It knows it not as what is given by the mind, but as what is given to the mind and apprehended as an external quality. And we have no right to assume that it is not what it is apprehended as being (p. 77).

While we agree that Kant made an illegitimate distinction between phenomena and noumena, we think that Professor Flint is decidedly missing the truth in Kant's theory of knowledge, which, allowing for its excesses, after all contains the core of truth concerning knowledge. But the psychology of spatial perception—a difficult subject at best—does not, I think, support Professor Flint when he says that the extra-mental thing is the object of the perception, and that space is extra-mentally real and that in which things and the mind are. Instead, our knowledge is throughout a subjective affair, and the subjective gains objectivity within consciousness, and we construct our world of thought and reality. We can not prove that our faculties are adjusted to what Kant calls the "noumenal" world, or that our categories of thought are categories of being. This is an implicit assumption of knowledge. What the nature of that "noumenal" world is is a still further problem, which can never be answered except by analyzing the content of conscious experience to determine how we must think of reality. This is precisely the problem of metaphysics, and it is not to be decided by

the easy method of saying: "We have no right to assume that it is not what it is apprehended as being" (p. 178). This principle would make the sense-object exist extra-mentally just as it appears to sense-perception with its color, hardness, form, and extension, and the history of philosophy from Locke to Kant would have been in vain.

Moreover, it seems to me that to call Kant an agnostic and a teacher of agnosticism is utterly to misrepresent Kant's purpose and work in his three critiques. Kant was pre-eminently an investigator of the processes of knowledge, although he promised a metaphysic, but never wrote it. Having determined the principles of knowledge, Kant defines their scope. To call this agnosticism is to have little regard for the great positive service Kant rendered to the student of the theory of knowledge; indeed, to all philosophy. Nowhere does it more clearly appear that Professor Flint is mistaken in holding that there is a system of agnosticism as though it were some distinct system of philosophy. Instead, agnosticism is rather a name applied to the recognition of the limits of human knowledge which the thinker becomes conscious of through reflection. Of course, the important thing is the theory of knowledge held. If this be so, the title of Professor Flint's work is a misnomer. Indeed, the reader is impressed at times, especially in the first part of the work, with the feeling that the author is at a loss to know whether his subject is a system of philosophy, an attitude of mind on the part of the one who is searching for the truth, or the negative results of philosophical investigations.

Professor Flint's own position concerning the nature of knowledge is well stated as follows :

No object of belief or thought, not evidently self-contradictory, should be assumed to be unknowable. . . . All that we have reason to believe real we have also reason to believe knowable. . . . Existence and knowableness—reality, truth, and probability—are coincident and inseparable. . . . It seems erroneous to suppose that we can draw definite, objective lines of demarkation between the knowable and the unknowable (p. 357).

The mind is, of course, limited by its own laws and the evidence submitted. We lack knowledge of that for which we have not sufficient evidence.

Nothing, however, sufficiently proved by evidence of any kind is to be rejected because it cannot be proved by evidence of another kind. . . . Proof, and thoroughly satisfactory proof too, has many forms. . . . Demonstration is the proof appropriate in mathematics, but it is a kind of proof which one has no right to demand in psychology, ethics, or history, or even

in the physical sciences (p. 353). The existence of obscurity, mystery, or difficulties in connection with the objects of knowledge does not disprove knowledge of them (p. 355).

These statements are sufficient to show that Professor Flint's meaning coincides practically with what I have said above concerning the work of the mind, when it was shown that the mind analyzes its experience and constructs its thought-world which it accepts with belief as knowledge of reality—indeed, as reality in the last analysis. That Professor Flint really means this is also shown by his treatment of agnosticism from a religious standpoint. Agnosticism "may be religious, anti-religious, or simply non-religious." Our chief interest concerns religious and anti-religious agnosticism. Religious agnosticism is the more dangerous of the two, for it holds that we have no basis for knowledge of God and yet asserts a belief in him (p. 423), while "the anti-religious maintains that we are both unable to know God and unentitled to believe in God" (p. 424). But Professor Flint rightly shows that we must not make such a separation between belief and knowledge. They go together. Belief enters into all judgment, and "whatever a man judges to be true he also believes to be true" (p. 479). But we never believe without reasons which commend themselves to the judgment in some form. It is true we may not know fully, but we do know enough to be "sufficient evidence" for belief. We must seek a reasonableness of faith. "It is wrong to believe without evidence and still worse to believe against evidence" (p. 480).

But what is "sufficient evidence"? Do we mean we should not believe unless we completely understood? Instead we accept much on evidence that is not exhaustive, even in the sciences. Especially when action is required, we often act on a small basis of evidence rather than not act at all; of this, the principle of authority is an illustration, be it the authority of parents, of officials, of the church, even of the Scriptures; and in each the authority does a reason's work, indeed, is what it is because it is implicitly "sufficient evidence" to produce belief. All authority must in some form justify itself to the reason. The Scriptures are no exception. "The authority of the Bible cannot reasonably be taken on trust any more than the authority of the pope. The Bible, too, must produce its credentials and submit its claims to criticism" (p. 548).

Such being the nature of belief in general, religious belief is a species of belief, and the Christian belief a still more limited form of religious belief; but all forms share in the nature of the genus belief,

whose general characteristic is belief according to "sufficient evidence" of one kind or another. The Christian belief is likewise to be based on reasons, unique indeed, yet good and sufficient reasons for the believer (pp. 458 f.). Thus it is clear that Professor Flint holds to the necessity of the critical analysis and constructive synthesis of all the data of experience the result of which is accepted with judgment and belief as the truth about reality—it is a unity of all experience, both theoretical and practical.

That Professor Flint means what has just been stated is shown by the fact that he does not agree with what he calls religious agnosticism, which claims that we cannot theoretically know God, but that by faith we do know him. For example, the Ritschlians insist that theology must be kept free from metaphysics and natural knowledge, and be drawn exclusively from the revelation of God in Christ expressed in the Scriptures (p. 594). This should be done because, according to Ritschl, theology sums up the significance of Christ's worth to the believer in value-judgments which are not the representative of anything except what is subjectively satisfactory, and so theology cannot claim to be science, since the value-judgments which it summarizes are simply individual and subjective, and not necessarily in accord with any other reality than the present feeling of the subject (pp. 595, 596).

I may remark, in passing, that I do not think this interpretation of Ritschl's value-judgments—the usual interpretation—is what Ritschl meant. I understand him to say in the third volume of his *Justification and Reconciliation*, in substance, the following: May not the soul respond to reality in a unique way in its religious experience, thus acquiring data for constructive synthesis, *i. e.*, for its world-view (*Weltanschauung*), which can be acquired in no other way? The principles of which the believer becomes conscious in the active living out of his faith are recognized because they constantly succeed in life, they harmonize experience, they cannot help satisfying because by them the life is in process of becoming. Hence these principles are of value and are principles of reality, so far as that subject has experience of reality. At this point the value-judgments, in my opinion, form a unity with theoretical knowledge, which is knowledge in the last analysis only because it is that intellectual construction which satisfies the subject in view of his experience, and to which he responds with belief. So both theoretical judgments and value-judgments go back alike to the subject's repose in these unique forms of self-satisfaction, repose in a given conceptual arrangement of his experience. If this interpreta-

tion be correct, Professor Flint, with many others, has failed to do justice to Ritschl in charging him with violating the principle of the unity of truth and the integrity of the human faculties.

It is impossible further to present Professor Flint's views. Enough has been said to show that he himself holds to the unity of the mental life, both theoretical and practical, and regards as knowable and true whatever satisfies the whole man in his mental and spiritual needs. As an expression of this central thought, this work is instructive and helpful, while a vast amount of historical matter is woven into the discussion.

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THE LATEST HISTORY OF ISRAEL.

AMERICAN scholarship has made another contribution to the literature of the Old Testament.¹ The author, Professor H. P. Smith, of Amherst College, has given us a compendium of the latest views, not only of strictly historical problems but also of literary questions.² Every book of the prophetic canon and hagiographa is briefly interpreted with reference to the age to which it belongs. The narrative is rendered piquant with modern terms. We are ushered into the presence of sheikhs, wezirs, and emirs; we hear the oriental cry for back-sheesh; the harem and the durbar give the narrative an oriental flavor. At times the style is racy; the sentences are short and pithy. These characteristics, too often wanting in theological works, lend Professor Smith's work great attractiveness.

It is debatable whether the designation *Old Testament History* accurately describes this treatise. The author would have been more exact, as he himself acknowledges, if he had entitled his book "A History of the Hebrews," or "A History of Israel."

The thread of the narrative is carried down to the occupation of Jerusalem by Herod in 37 B. C., and consequently sources are drawn upon which fall outside the limits of the Palestinian canon. Where apoc-

¹ *Old Testament History*. By HENRY PRESERVED SMITH. New York: Scribner, 1903. 512 pages. \$2.50.

² For example: The Song of Songs is a collection of erotic lyrics, with no higher meaning (pp. 426 f.); the book of Ruth is a pamphlet of the more liberal party against those who desired to abolish connubium with aliens (p. 398); Proverbs and Ecclesiastes are products of the Greek period; yet with all his modernity, our author will disappoint the advance guard of *Mucri* and *Jerahmeel*.

rypha and apocalypses furnish the details of the picture, while the Old Testament point of view is absolutely discarded, it is not scientifically exact to term the treatise *Old Testament History*. Our author is not to be held responsible for the title, as it is due to the editor of the series to which this work belongs. In the "International Theological Library" another work is promised, entitled *Contemporary History of the Old Testament*. This will both account for the title chosen in this case and also for the omission of much archæological material.

The author is to be highly commended for not having made either the fall of Judah or the return from the Babylonian captivity the *terminus ad quem* of his history. For the historiographer the centuries of silence are but a baseless myth. Professor Smith devotes a chapter to the Greek period, and two to recounting the great renaissance under the leadership of the Maccabean family. We are under the impression that the average student and minister ignore this very important period, and it is to be hoped that such a presentation as we have before us now will assist in dispelling the mists in which that heroic age has been shrouded. It is growing upon both exegetes and theologians that the contemporaries of Christ cannot be understood without a thorough acquaintance with the ideas and ideals which were current among the Jews of the centuries immediately preceding the advent.

It is impossible to keep literary criticism and historical research separate. Our author correctly states that Old Testament history is dependent on the higher criticism of the Old Testament. As a man's theology may be determined along general lines, if his philosophical theories are known, so the historian's narrative may be forecast by his analysis and criticism of the sources. In his dating of the hexateuchal sources, in his estimate of the historical value of the Priest's Code and the Chronicler's narrative, in his view of the origin and development of the Hebrew religion, Professor Smith is a true son of Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen. He is, however, not a blind follower of any scholar, but has obviously come more or less under the influence of every important writer of the above-mentioned school. He is no doubt acquainted with the writings of those who have antagonized this school of criticism, but their views, opinions, and discussions are more frequently ignored than mentioned. One of the serious defects of this treatise is its lack of discussion. Views are presented, at times confessedly tentative and radical, without giving the reader any adequate evidence for these positions.

The most fundamental question that can be asked in regard to a

historian is his attitude to the documents which furnish him his information. Is he a well-balanced and judicious critic of his sources, or is his criticism marred by groundless skepticism? Our author belongs to the latter class. He is equally incredulous of his later sources and of his earlier. He sifts J, E, and P for material in order to depict the Mosaic age, and his result is as follows:

There may have been an Israelite clan that sojourned in Egypt. Its exodus was not improbably due to a religious leader. Under this religious leader the people entered into a covenant with other desert-dwelling clans at Kadesh. (P. 72.)

Our account of Ezra and his activity is due to the Chronicler, who was a mere fabricator. Hence, Ezra is either the eponym of a powerful guild or the impersonation of a tendency (pp. 390, 396). The same incredulity and skepticism are manifest in his estimate of the Letter of Aristeas:

The only historical basis for the letter is the interest taken by Philadelphus in the Alexandrian library. All else is fiction pure and simple. (P. 477.)

There is very little of the harmonist about our author when he has two parallel accounts or histories. For the earlier period, instead of having one tradition, the sources furnish him with four. There are innumerable discrepancies and contradictions when the various hexateuchal documents are compared. It is impossible to get any exact historical picture on account of these differences. Kittel,³ with this same problem before him, after having submitted his sources to searching criticism, comes nearer the truth when he remarks:

A complete laying bare of the strata that make up the mass of tradition forces us to see that, although there are many differences in detail, there is throughout a remarkable agreement as to the general course of events.

The present writer is convinced that in attempting to reconstruct the history of the patriarchal and Mosaic ages on the basis of the separate accounts, historical criticism has undertaken a task beyond it on account of lack of data. Confessedly, according to the theory of documentary analysis, each one of the documents, as we have it, is a mere torso. If we possessed J, E, and P entire should we have all the discrepancies and doublettes that the historians of the documentary school have postulated? For the historiographer the documentary analysis unquestionably makes more problems than it clears up.

The writers of the Old Testament histories were pragmatists. A real desideratum is a frank recognition of the necessary difference

³KITTEL, *A History of the Hebrews* (English Translation), Vol. I, p. 168.

between scientific modern historiography and the books of the Old Testament written for purposes of edification.⁴ Of the former we may demand that it be scientifically exact in its minutest details; of the latter, that they present no falsehood, in order to convey their moral or religious truth. Modern Old Testament scholars have too often made the serious error of regarding the prophetic and priestly historians guilty of wholesale invention and fabrication. This view is in evidence in the work before us.

With these preliminary remarks, let us look at some of the problems and questions raised by Professor Smith's treatment of special periods. The material found in our book of Genesis is treated in two chapters. The first is entitled "The Origins;" the second, "The Patriarchs." In this section of his treatise our author is manifestly under the influence of Gunkel. All the stories of Genesis are etiological myths, sagas, and poetical transformations of historical events. Gunkel is followed in the interpretation of the story of the fall and paradise. It accounts for "the present toilsome lot of the laborer, and for the present painful parturition of woman when compared with the easy travail of the animals." Not only does this view fail to do justice to the story, but it gives no real ground for such an elaborate myth, inasmuch as the Bedawy woman does not find childbirth as terrible an ordeal as her more civilized sister. The Hebrew mind was serious, and in the story of paradise and its sequel we find it grappling with that problem which has vexed the greatest minds of all ages and races. It gives the Hebrew writer's view of the origin of evil. Dillmann⁵ caught the true import of this story when he affirmed that in it we find coming to light the fundamental truths of the Bible in regard to sin and its relation to man.

We are assured that to the legend-building imagination we owe the figures of the patriarchs as individuals. As a conclusion, it is stated that there is no sufficient warrant for supposing individuals Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob to have been ancestors of the people. That Jacob or Israel was the name of a clan (or that they were the names of two separate clans) seems to be made out. Isaac and Abraham are as yet unaccounted for—that is, we know of no tribes or clans that bore these names. (P. 50.)

⁴In his article "Jesus Christ" (*HDB.*, II), SANDAY sanely remarks that had the writers of the gospels had a nineteenth-century environment and education, in many instances they would have written very differently from what they have actually done. *Mutatis mutandis*, the Old Testament historian might take this common-sense view to heart.

⁵DILLMANN, *Die Genesis*, p. 47.

There is no need for such extreme caution for this statement concerning Isaac and Abraham. If Jacob is the personification of a tribe, so are the other two. Undoubtedly, to the mind of the writer of the book of Genesis they all three belong to the same genus.

We shall endeavor to show that this view of the patriarchs rests upon a faulty definition of history, and is purely subjective. The advocates of this position fail to discriminate in their exegesis, and their final conclusion is really based upon a *petitio principii*. Gunkel maintains that history treats only great public events, and must be put into written form. If these two conditions are necessary in order to have history, then the early narratives of the Old Testament are obviously not historical. Professor Smith nowhere expressly defines history, yet from several of his arguments (p. 49) it is evident that he would indorse Gunkel's contentions. If, on the other hand, we accept König's definition of history "that events in general form the content of history,"⁶ and acknowledge that such events can be accurately transmitted by oral tradition, the *a priori* buttress of Smith's theory will be demolished.

The modern view of the patriarchs really involves us in an exegetical question which is neither mentioned nor elucidated in this work. In Genesis there are many passages of genealogical lists. The common phraseology is X begat Y, and Y begat Z, or Y was the son of X. The tenth chapter of Genesis will occur to all. The verb "begat" is used metaphorically, and the names are gentilics. The plurals and the gentilic endings show this unmistakably. There are three exegetical questions raised by Professor Smith's treatment of the patriarchal narratives: Is the verb "begat" always used metaphorically by Hebrew writers? Are all genealogies the mere skeletons for illustrating the relations of clans and tribes to each other? Are narratives full of personal interests and vivid with details to be treated in the same manner as mere schemes and tables? The exegete must discriminate carefully in his answer to the above questions, else he will find himself in the meshes of a *petitio principii*.

It is to be freely acknowledged that in the story of the patriarchs the writer intertwined the details of personal history with interracial movements. This may be true with respect to the narrative concerning Hagar, Ishmael, Moab, and Ammon. Yet, with this admission, the individuality and historicity of the fathers of the Israelitish nation remain untouched.

⁶"Die Geschichte hat zu ihrem Inhalt Geschehnisse überhaupt."

Our author maintains that the clans of Israel were never at Sinai. His own statement is as follows:

We are justified in assuming that the earliest traditions made Israel journey from Egypt directly to Kadesh. (P. 62.)

The chief prop of this view is his interpretation of Exod. 15:22: "And Moses led Israel onward from the Red Sea, and they went out into the wilderness of Shur; and they went three days' journey out in the wilderness, and found no water." He interprets this verse as follows:

The wilderness of Shur is known to us as the district lying immediately east of the isthmus of Suez. It is evidently the thought of the author that the Israelites marched straight eastward. The objective point in his narrative has been displaced in the compilation, but we can hardly doubt that it was Kadesh. (P. 62.)

"Displaced in the compilation," and "but we can hardly doubt," are specious phrases in lieu of a proof. We ask: How did the triple tradition of J, E, and P arise in later Israel, if they never were at Sinai? Kittel says:

If the passage through the Red Sea has been shown to be a historical fact, as we believe we have proved above, the natural direction of the Israelite march would be toward Sinai.⁷

The best proof that we have for the crossing of the Red Sea is the song, Exod., chap. 15. It is essentially a contemporary document, and two such authorities as Driver and König recognize it as Mosaic. Of course, our author does not have the difficulty of explaining how a contemporary made the mistake of putting Israel into a position that would take them to Sinai, for, according to him, Exod., chap. 15, belongs to a late age.

The period of the conquest presents the historian with several serious problems. There are two sources—portions of Joshua, and the first chapter of Judges. The former seems to represent that Canaan was first allotted to the several tribes, and that then they undertook the work of conquest as united tribes, while the latter appears to regard the tribes as acting each for itself, and supposes the whole movement to be gradual, extending over a long period of time. In the work before us no attempt is made to harmonize the two accounts and show their relations, as Kittel, for instance, has done in a masterly way. The narrative of Joshua is waved aside with the remark that it is a book of edification. Joshua's victory at the Waters of Merom is a later reflection of Barak's victory at Bethhoron, of Saul's at Michmash. It may

⁷ KITTEL, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 232.

be observed that no proofs are offered for these identifications. Our author does not state his view of the personality of Joshua. Was he an Ephraimite eponym hero, or a later reflection of Moses?

The book of Judges opens: "And it came to pass after the death of Joshua." If this is regarded as a redactional gloss, as is now generally conceded, and the remainder of the chapter is compared with a series of passages in Joshua, it is discovered that the account of Judges is parallel with the former. These passages in Joshua and Judges, chap. 1, are excerpts from an older account of the conquest. The person of Joshua is inseparably connected with these passages in the book bearing his name. This proves that he was the conqueror of Canaan, and the problem before the critical historian would be to discuss whether the remaining sections of Joshua that bear upon the conquest are out of harmony with this or not. Our author does not discuss this problem at all.

Several statements in the chapter on David are worthy of attention, as illustrative of the author's method and point of view. The story of Goliath in any form is legendary. We are not informed whether the legend-building imagination is at work in this saga attempting to explain the subjugation of the Philistine. With König we may ask: If Goliath and his duel with David be a myth, how are we to explain the sword of Goliath which was handed to David by Abimelech with the remark, "The sword of Goliath the Philistine, *whom thou slewest in the vale of Elah*"? The removal of the ark to Jerusalem is not to be considered a stroke of statesmanship like the choice of that city for his capital. The latter step was taken to consolidate his kingdom, while he had no idea of centralizing the worship of Israel. Did the *Grand Monarque* desire merely the presence of the ancient palladium of his nation at his private sanctuary? Once again our writer's conclusion has been vitiated by his view of the sources and by the development theory applied to the religion of Israel. One fact is overlooked in regard to Israel. Religion was identified with the national life. To have a central sanctuary meant a consolidation of the tribes. This was David's idea in purposing to build a permanent sanctuary. The bringing the ark to Jerusalem, and later the erection of the temple, were the culminating acts of two great masters in the art of statecraft.

With respect to Solomon the statement is made "that he nowhere saw the royal opportunity to codify and publish the law of the land for the guidance of his subjects and its officials" (p. 173). This is a statement based upon the silence of our documents. A kingdom like Solo-

mon's must have a code of laws. The antiquity of the code of Hammurabi makes untenable the position of the dominant school of Old Testament criticism in regard to the age of origin of the Book of the Covenant. The Babylonian code reflects a complex civilization, while the word "city" is not once used in Exod., chaps. 20-23. The Hebrews had long since ceased to be pastoral nomads, and in the age of Solomon had begun to leave behind them even the agricultural stage.

Passing to the close of the Babylonian captivity, we discover that our author is a follower of Van Hoonacker and Koster: the decree of Cyrus is a forgery; there was no return except in the mind of the Chronicler; the temple foundations were not laid in 537 B. C.; Ezra is the product of the Chronicler's fancy; and Nehemiah visited Jerusalem under Artaxerxes II. Mnemon. For the last ten or twelve years no period of Hebrew history has been subjected to closer scrutiny than the age of Ezra and Nehemiah. Professor Smith has given us the latest views on the subject. The lack of discussion is again apparent. A sweeping statement is made, without making clear to the reader the real reason for it. The monographs which present the grounds for these conclusions are inaccessible to most readers. Consequently these omissions necessarily curtail the usefulness of the book. For example, Nehemiah's master is Artaxerxes II. Mnemon. We are not told that this theory depends entirely upon making the high-priest Jaddua contemporary with Alexander and Darius Codomannus; *cf.* Neh. 12:11, 22. Wellhausen has indicated that this is a baseless conjecture.*

The historian's view of this age will depend very largely upon his estimate of the decrees of Cyrus and the other Persian kings recorded in the book of Ezra. Meyer,⁹ the distinguished historian, has vindicated the genuineness of the decrees of Ezra, chaps. 4-7, and is of the opinion that no one whose judgment has not been vitiated by wrong conceptions of the origin of Judaism can deny the force of his logic. He argues further that the Jews would never have succeeded in rebuilding their national sanctuary and re-establishing their religion without the support and aid of the Persian kings. The toleration and support of all religions was part of Persian policy.

Meyer, with others, makes light of the decree of Cyrus, and regards it a forgery. But critics of no mean ability think that this decree is recited only in general terms with Jewish phraseology and from a

*WELLHAUSEN, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*, p. 165.

⁹E. MEYER, *Die Entstehung des Judenthums*.

Jewish standpoint. The chief reason for rejecting the commonly held view of the laying of the foundation of the temple in 537 B. C. is the silence of both Haggai and Zechariah in 520 B. C. The *argumentum ex silentio* is always precarious, and in this connection we ask: Was it necessary for these prophets to mention this event to the men who had been the chief participants in it?

In the last analysis, all these difficulties are due to the alleged unhistorical character of the Chronicler. To a follower of the Grafian school he can at best be an unconscious falsifier who has saved himself from more serious charges by his religion. If all the institutions and ceremonies of P are post-exilic in origin, the Chronicler cannot plead innocent to this charge. As a guide to the history of this age he is an *ignis fatuus*. Wellhausen and Meyer agree in a very low estimate of him as a historian, and yet follow him in the general order of events. We believe Professor Smith is more logical. If the Chronicler read into the age of David and the monarchs the institutions and ideals of his own time, have we any guarantee that, writing 300 B. C., or later, he did otherwise in regard to the age of the Restoration?

So far our examination of Professor Smith's work has been conducted from the standpoint of the historian. We are justified in looking at it also from the point of view of the theologian, for in his preface the author says he intends to treat the subject in its relation to our religion. He recognizes the important position which the Old Testament has always occupied in the Christian church. The crucial question of the theologian is whether the religion of the Old Testament is a revealed religion or not. To us it seems that Professor Smith belongs to the school which denies that the faith of the Old Testament leaders came to them from direct contact with the living God. Yahweh is the ancestral God of Midian, with whom Moses became acquainted during his sojourn in that land. Yahweh was the God of the desert, and the desert life was the life pleasing to him. The religion of the desert is polydemonism and the worship of the *jinn*; and tribal religion is naturally totemism. In this respect Israel is no exception. From this we would infer that Israel's faith in its origins at least is not specifically different from other Semitic religions. It must be confessed that in the Old Testament there appear to be facts looking in two different directions. Both liberal and conservative scholars frequently lack discrimination in their treatment of apparently conflicting data. They fail to distinguish between the beliefs of the masses and the faith of the leaders. Semitic heathenism floated in all centuries through the lives

and hearts of the masses. They were syncretistic, but it was otherwise from the leaders of Israel from first to last. If this discrimination is carefully made, we can still believe without doing any violence to the facts of the Old Testament, that Moses received his knowledge of the Divine Being from direct contact with him.

With these remarks on the religion of Israel, we shall close, recommending Professor Smith's work to all those who desire to become acquainted with the latest phases of Old Testament historical research. From the standpoint of the school of Wellhausen, no more interesting and attractive volume on Old Testament history has been published either in America or abroad.

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HISTORIANS are born, not made. This is but another way of saying that the first requisite in a student of history is the possession of the historical spirit. No amount of erudition will atone for the lack of historical insight and sympathetic appreciation of the great forces that make history. This is nowhere more true than in the case of the interpreter of Hebrew history. Here the problems are so complicated, the data so fragmentary, and the danger of dogmatic presuppositions so great as to render the task of historical interpretation extremely difficult. Furthermore, the audience of the Old Testament historian is a peculiarly difficult one to satisfy, including, as it does, men of the most widely diverging opinions and points of view in reference to the subject—a subject upon which men not only think, but feel most deeply. Hence no statement of Old Testament history can hope for universal approval; least of all the work under review. It caters to the views of no party, but moves straight forward in steadfast adherence to its purpose, viz., “to put into narrative form the results of recent Old Testament study” (p. vii). This purpose is certainly fulfilled. The narrative possesses all the interest and charm so characteristic of Professor Smith's pen; its freshness, vigor, and coherence compel attention. Familiarity with the most recent literature is manifest on every page. The “results of recent Old Testament study” may not be acceptable to us, but such as they are, this book presents them. In few cases can the author be fairly accused of offering new and untried hypotheses. Therefore, if the results are unsatisfactory, it is the Old Testament study of the last ten or fifteen years with which reckoning must be made. But Old Testament study as now conducted is a new

science, a product of the last half-century; and, as in the case of every new science, results have accumulated rapidly and brought about great changes in previous conceptions. When, therefore, the work of the last decade is organized and presented in clear constructive style, as in this book, it is inevitable that the minds of those not in the closest touch with recent historical thought be startled. Our author has a sharp eye for the defects of ancient tradition, and is, perhaps, at times too ready to decide against doubtful cases; but, on the whole, the treatment of mooted points is eminently sane and fair.

The mythical character of the early stories is frankly recognized, but at the same time their religious value is rightly emphasized; the treatment of this material is especially discriminating and illuminating. The eponymous character of the patriarchs is granted, but the traditions are used to good purpose as furnishing evidence of early tribal relations and customs. The chapter on the conquest of Canaan is an especially good piece of work. The work of the Chronicler is accorded scant courtesy, hardly receiving its just due; *e. g.*, the invasion of Zerah the Ethiopian is unmentioned; Uziah's contest with the priests is discredited; Manasseh's journey to Babylon is strongly suspected; and the whole story of Ezra's mission is declared to be a product of the legalistic spirit of later times, having no basis in fact. The return under Cyrus and the resulting attempt to build the temple are regarded as unhistorical, with Kusters, Cheyne, and many recent critics. The ascription of Ezek., chaps. 25-32, to another hand is at variance with the practical consensus of critics, and does not commend itself. Nor is the author on safe ground in treating Isa., chaps. 40-66, as a unit and assigning it to the period following Malachi, merely because of alleged similarities between chaps. 40-55, and chaps. 60-63. The attitude taken toward Ezra, Ezekiel, and Isa., chaps. 40-66, needs a fuller exposition and defense than the scope of this work permitted. These are advance steps in criticism and cannot be yielded without thorough discussion.

An admirable characteristic of the book is the large attention given to the development of Israelitish thought. Israel's history was essentially religious. Her contribution to the world is not marked by great events, but by great ideas. This fact Professor Smith ever keeps to the front, giving much consideration to Israel's literature. The exilic and post-exilic periods consequently occupy two-fifths of the book—a proportion more nearly in keeping with their actual importance in Israel's history than is usually given them. This appreciation of Israel's

inner life and thought is the strongest feature of the work, and is in itself the book's sufficient *raison d'être*. This history is a worthy successor to the author's excellent commentary on Samuel and is a credit to American scholarship.

The following corrections may be noted: p. xi, l. 33, *Grundriss*; p. xviii, l. 14, *Sesosthis*; p. xxi, l. 24, *Jüdische*; p. 75, l. 26, *Europa*; p. 84, n. 1, *Steuernagel*; p. 89, ll. 31 and 34, *Cushan*; p. 126, l. 33, *forlorn*; pp. 206 f., *Adad-nirari* is a better reading than *Ramman-nirari*; p. 246, n. 1, *Kürzer Hand-Commentar*; p. 293, n. 1, the *Handkommentar* on Ezekiel is by Kraetzschmar, not Giesebrecht; p. 345, note, *Gadatas*; p. 352, l. 28, *It*; p. 378, n. 1, *Abfassungszeit*; p. 499, note, *Schrifttums*. The policy of Tiglath-pileser III. was not so entirely new as is represented on pp. 225 f.; deportation, for example, had been carried on as early as the reign of Tiglath-pileser I. (see G. S. GOODSPEED, *History of the Babylonians and Assyrians*, pp. 170, 239).

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THE WORKS OF ZWINGLI.

ONLY a few years have passed since, by the issue of the eighty-seventh volume of the *Corpus Reformatorum*, the enterprising publishing house of Schwetschke & Sohn completed its edition of the works of Calvin.¹ Though the pecuniary success was more than doubtful, the firm has not allowed itself to become discouraged in continuing the task once undertaken, viz., to render accessible to this and coming generations in truly standard editions the works of those who as well as Luther were heroes of the Reformation. This was a commendable decision, for in truth Zwingli deserves to be better known and more widely read. The latest edition of his works² has long since become antiquated. Two distinguished Swiss scholars, of whom one has already become well known by a first-class bibliography,³ and the other by monographs upon Zwingli,⁴ have now united to supply a want ever more keenly felt as the years go by. The first instalment of this monumental undertaking is here before us.⁵

¹*Joannis Calvini quae supersunt omnia*. Ediderunt GULIELMUS BAUM, EDUARDUS CUNITZ, EDUARDUS REUSS, Theologi Argentoratenses. 59 vols. Brunsvigae et Berolini, 1863-1900.

²Zürich: Schuler & Schulthess, 1828-42. 8 vols. Supplement, 1866.

³*Zwingli-Bibliographie*: Verzeichnis der gedruckten Schriften von und über Ulrich Zwingli. Zusammengestellt von GEORG FINSLER. Zürich, 1897.

⁴EMIL EGLI, *Zwingliana*. Zürich, 1903.

⁵*Corpus Reformatorum*. Vol. LXXXVIII: *Huldreich Zwinglis sämtliche Werke*. Herausgegeben von EMIL EGLI UND GEORG FINSLER. Band I, Lieferung 1. Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1904.

The "Preface" and "Editorial Principles" immediately following it state the general plan of the edition. We gather therefrom that the work will appear in instalments of five folios each. At the most there will be one hundred and twenty instalments at the price of three marks each. For the present there are to appear annually at least three to four instalments, but later the issues are likely to follow more rapidly. For this edition a convenient octavo size has been chosen, while the works of Calvin, as those of Melancthon before them, came out in quarto. Above all, the greatest possible completeness is aimed at, so that the edition shall in reality contain the whole of Zwingli's writings. The arrangement is such that the works of exegetical character and the letters are treated as special matter and are relegated to the end. Each document is preceded by a historical and bibliographical introduction. Though the work is planned primarily as a text edition, it is to be accompanied by brief topical and grammatical annotations. It is to close with indices (of topics, places, persons, and biblical references), a glossary, and eventually a bibliography.

The first instalment contains the following writings: (1) and (2) *Das Fabelgedicht vom Ochsen* (Latin and German), a didactic politico-patriotic poem narrating events for the enlightenment of the Swiss people in the form of fable; (3) *De gestis inter Gallos et Helvetios relatio* (fall of 1512), a narrative of the expedition of the Swiss League in the spring and summer of 1512, which had its culmination in the taking of Pavia (called in consequence the "Pavia expedition"); (4) *Der Labyrinth* (spring of 1516), a didactic poem starting from a particular example drawn from mythology, and having a general moral purpose; hitherto "The Labyrinth" was accepted as the first of Zwingli's writings, but the editors have in detail established its later date; (5) *Gebetslied in der Pest* (close of 1519, consequently written already in Zürich); (6) and (7) *Zeugenaussage und Predigtworte zu den Soldverträgen mit dem Ausland*—at present only the introduction.

The introductions and the editing of the text give the impression of exceedingly careful work. On this account we express the hope that the unremitting toil of the editors and the great cost—a delicate risk of which German publishing enterprise can be proud—may not remain unrewarded. In America the interest in the study of church history is so lively, and, particularly, appreciation for the history of the Reformation so keen, that we do not doubt there will be found very many subscribers for the works of Zwingli beyond the ocean.

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RECENT LITERATURE IN PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS.

FROM all corners of the philosophical and theological horizon come evidences of the progress of that tendency of thought to which it is becoming customary to apply Professor James's somewhat ill-chosen name of "pragmatism." However the tendency be labeled, it certainly constitutes the most significant and most typical philosophical movement of our time; and it is the more interesting because it is still pretty vague, multiform, and inchoate. The common essential in all its forms, however, is the conviction that all our beliefs about reality—including the presuppositions of natural science—must ultimately depend upon judgments of worth, upon affirmations dictated by the needs of our practical nature, upon our total "will-to-live" and our will to believe that life is livable, rather than upon any strict intellectual necessity. This involves a negative or skeptical attitude toward "intellectualism," a lack of confidence in the ability of the pure theoretical reason to reach the logically certain, absolute, and demonstrative knowledge that it desiderates. For religion, "pragmatism" implies that, on the one hand, the essential religious and moral truths do not force themselves by any sheer logical constraint upon man's acceptance, but await the voluntary response of his whole active and emotional nature; and, on the other hand, that, in the absence of such constraint, a voluntary religious faith—*i. e.*, a faith in the reality of that which is demanded by the ultimate and irreducible needs of man's spiritual nature—is justifiable and reasonable. Professor James has been a notable and path-breaking representative of this tendency in epistemology; very recently two groups of academic philosophers, the one in Oxford, the other in Chicago, have put forward elaborate technical expositions of it; Mr. Charles Ferguson has popularized it in some rather dithyrambic prose essays; and now, interestingly enough, the same opinion manifests itself in French Roman Catholic theology, and comes to us with the *imprimatur* of the Superior General of the Oratory. Father Laberthonnière, an Oratorian, in his *Essais de philosophie religieuse*¹ expounds and defends, with dialectical subtlety as well as with eloquence, a doctrine which he calls *le dogmatisme moral*; this doctrine declares that our judgments—in so far as they concern real existences and not merely the formal relations between ideas—are essentially free acts of the personality, determined solely by the need for action and for self-development.

¹ *Essais de philosophie religieuse.* Par le P. LABERTHONNIÈRE. Paris: Lethiellux, 1903. xxxi + 330 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Truth, although it comes to us, does not impose itself upon us; it does not enchain nor constrain us. It invites us, it presses upon us, . . . but it does not take us by violence; rather it suffers violence. . . . We can attain to the truth only by the action of our whole being, by *un mouvement de vie*. . . . People often express a desire to be led deductively, by a "chain of reasoning," to the full and complete affirmation of the truth, *i. e.*, to the affirmation of a conception of oneself, the world, and God. If this desire could be realized, the truth would impose itself upon us. Someone may say that this is just what we need, in order to have certitude and to be assured that we are in possession of the truth. But if the truth forced itself upon us, we should not possess it, it would merely possess us; we should be subject to it, and it would control us in our own despite. We should no longer be autonomous, should no longer be truly persons.

This non-compulsive character of truth is as apparent in our scientific as in our religious judgments, except that the practical needs which there lead to affirmation are of a different sort. Scientific truth is relative to man's

needs for those things which he must have in order to attain the ends that he pursues in his ordinary living. But here too the activity of the subject has a part to play. . . . Although scientific truth cannot be said to be moral in its nature, as little can it really be said to impose itself objectively, and of its own force, upon the mind. And if we are to call affirmation in metaphysics *moral dogmatism*, we ought to call affirmation in science *utilitarian dogmatism* (p. 122).

With these "pragmatist" contentions Father Laberthonnière joins a theological doctrine that represents Catholic mysticism in its best and most attractive form. To the non-Catholic reader the author's efforts to reconcile these views (which make knowledge of the truth and religious illumination essentially an inward possession of the individual) with the church's demand for submission to an external authority, will seem a fruitless misapplication of ingenuity.

Similar "pragmatist" conclusions are reached—albeit through different and often rather unintelligible arguments—by the Connecticut clergyman who has written a small brochure on *The Place of Values*.^{*} Mr. Montgomery's pragmatism is, indeed, sometimes so exaggerated—or rather his terminology is so confused—that the volume has the aspect of an unintentional caricature of the doctrine. It is, to say the least, a rather crude way of putting it to say that "religious positions are not held because of their truth—for geometry is true, yet not a

^{*} *The Place of Values*. By GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY. Bridgeport, Conn.: Published by the author, 1903. 62 pages. \$0.25.

religion—but they are held because of their value;” or that, “be the proof never so clear, reasoning has never yet been able to overthrow a single religious tenet—the only way to remove a religious position is to show its lack of value;” or, again, that “whatever has a value is proportionately real and therefore is true.” This is not the place in which to attempt an estimate of pragmatism; but it ought to be said that, as the doctrine becomes popular, and thereby distorted, there is great danger that it will be taken by many as providing a plenary absolution from intellectual responsibility, and a free license to believe anything that one pleases to regard as having “value.” In order to guard against this danger, the limits and the practical application of the pragmatic principle ought to be very carefully defined.

Neither the general doubts of Kant and of the pragmatists about the possibility of theoretically demonstrative proofs in theology, nor Kant’s special objections to the teleological proof, suffice to discourage theologians from reviving that argument; and, in truth, it will, as Kant recognized, always abide in some form as a natural ground of theistic belief. But the Scotch writer who has presented certain phases of the argument in his *The Creation of Matter*³ would have done well to learn from Kant that the teleological proof can never amount to a demonstration, and that the expression of it “should be toned down to the moderate and modest statement of a belief that satisfies the mind without being strictly compulsive.” The present book, which essays to show, after Tait and Stewart, that atoms, ether, protoplasm, etc., “bear the stamp of the manufactured article,” has too much of what Kant called the “dogmatische Sprache eines hohnsprechenden Vernünftlers;” it overstates the argument with much tasteless and truculent rhetoric. It expresses, however, a modern and modified form of the teleological proof, which is partly due to Kant’s objections and to the reasoning of the *Kritik of Judgment*. For it finds the evidence of design, not in the ultimate products or processes of nature, but in the (supposed) original structure and distribution of the elements of things—from which it does not, apparently, deny that all subsequent developments have come by a strictly necessary and mechanical causation.

Three recent books in ethics tend to corroborate the declaration of one of them (that of Professor Palmer) that “today there appears a strange unanimity as regards the ultimate formula of ethics,” namely,

³*The Creation of Matter*. By W. PROFEIT. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. vii + 176 pages. \$1.

the principle of self-realization, by which "morality has ceased to be primarily repressive and is now regarded as the amplest exhibit of human nature, free from every external precept." The books in question differ very materially as to method to be followed in ethical inquiry, and especially as to the manner of reconciling the principle of self-realization with the claims of objective social duties; but when the question is raised concerning the specific *quale* of the good, these three very dissimilar treatises substantially agree in defining it in terms of human self-development, and in rejecting alike hedonism, ethical rigorism, and perceptive intuitionism.

What distinguishes Dr. Warner Fite's *Introductory Study of Ethics*,⁴ and what will make it widely interesting to the general reader, is the exceptional degree in which it brings systematic ethical inquiry into relation with the practical problems that confront the modern man under existing social conditions. Dr. Fite rejects the too sanguine view that "we know well enough what is right, and that the province of ethics is merely to tell us *why* it is right;" he shows forcibly how full modern life is of apparent conflicts of duties and how often the code of established common-sense is dumb, while the rational will cries out for guidance by some clear and verifiable principle. The outcome of the argument, however, seems at first sight little better than a mocking echo to this cry; for Dr. Fite concludes by pointing out only "the permanently problematical character of human life" and the lasting necessity for a compromise "between our ideals and our conditions"—with no higher principle to indicate the proportions to be observed in the mixture. Moreover, the author's conception of the nature of the two elements in the compromise seems to be equivocal and shifting. He conceives the whole ethical problem as that of achieving an adjustment between two antithetical, though not strictly contradictory, tendencies in human life; but when the attempt is made to define this antithesis with precision, it proves to be a rather Protean thing. At first the contrast is between two radically opposed moral aims, hedonism and idealism—the former being defined as the attitude which "represents the claims of material needs and self-interest," the latter as "representing the claims of idealistic and disinterested aims" (p. 31). These are the two combatants that oppose one another through two-thirds of the book; but presently the reader finds himself facing an essentially different, and much milder antithesis: that, namely, between

⁴ *An Introductory Study of Ethics*. By WARNER FITE. New York and London: Longmans, 1903. xi + 383 pages. \$1.60.

the ideally desirable and the practically possible. The author, having got his contrast into this form, shows sensibly enough that many things which in themselves would be good ought not to be aimed at because, in the complexity of present conditions, the realization of them would incidentally entail disproportionate evils. In the concluding chapter this lesson of going slow in reforms, and of taking constant account of conditions as well as of ultimate ideals, is wisely and effectively enforced. But even here Dr. Fite finds his middle course between the two extremes only by tacitly appealing throughout to a third and paramount criterion—that of general social well-being. In the expository part of the book the treatment of hedonism, if intended as an account of present tendencies, is decidedly misleading. There are no contemporary, hardly any modern, moralists of importance, of whom the various things that Dr. Fite says of the hedonist are true. It is not a fact that hedonism is necessarily, or (now) even usually, connected with the psychological theory that only one's own pleasure can be desired, or with an empiricist epistemology, or with a mechanistic cosmology; and it is either ambiguous or absurd to say that "by pleasure the hedonist means the pleasures of sense." By pleasure the contemporary hedonist means "whatever state of feeling is, when possessed, welcome to the possessor." Of such modern and refined forms of utilitarianism as those of Mr. Sidgwick and Mr. Alfred Hodder the book gives no account and no criticism. Apart from these points, Dr. Fite's study has, in its bearing upon practical issues, so many fruitful suggestions and so much admirable good sense that it is likely to do good service in promoting a more enlightened and more honest attitude toward the problems of duty that arise out of the new exigencies of our period of social, industrial and religious transition.

One hesitates to determine either the meaning or the merits of M. Duprat's study of the "psycho-sociological bases of ethics" from the English version alone.⁵ For it is evident that the translation is hopelessly bad—apparently the work of one impartially unskilled in both tongues, and not unduly solicitous about his author's meaning. Especially fruitful of unintelligibility is the translator's habit—when his original employs several nouns with a single postpositive adjective—of rendering the adjective only with the last noun. Thus M. Duprat is made responsible for the fantastic proposition that for "conduct to

⁵*Morals: A Treatise on the Psycho-Sociological Bases of Ethics.* By G. L. DUPRAT. Translated by W. J. GREENSTREET. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. \$1.50.

be rational, it must not be inspired by ideas, tendencies, or contradictory motives." What he said was manifestly: "If conduct is to be rational, it must not be inspired by contradictory ideas, desires, or motives." The translator constantly uses the English word "tendency" where the author apparently means "desire" or "propension." Often the reader can penetrate to the sense of the original only by a hypothetical reconstruction of the French. Still, M. Duprat's main drift becomes tolerably clear. Impressed by the seriousness of the present moral crisis, he desires to re-establish morals upon a new and solidly "scientific" basis, that shall be dependent upon neither theology nor metaphysics. This basis, however, is not to be found in utilitarianism, either egoistic or universalistic. Man is much more than a pleasure-seeking animal; his nature includes notably the consciousness of an obligation to act rationally, and a capacity to be moved by this idea of reasonable action. This rationality requires, first of all, as Kant declared, that the maxims controlling conduct shall "have the form of universal legislation;" it further requires that the whole action of the individual shall be made organic and coherent by its reference to a single and stable system of ends; and that this system shall be as wide and comprehensive as possible. Rational, then, is "the line of conduct consistent in itself and in harmony with a wider system tending to realize the highest conceivable degree of human activity," in the agent himself and in the whole community. M. Duprat then analyzes the conditions necessary for such full and normal human activity, first in the individual, and then in the organization of the social relations of individuals. In the latter connection he discusses such practical matters as the rights of property, the functions of the state (and specifically state monopoly in education), marriage and divorce, etc. The writer declares that "it is the duty of society to work without relaxation for the just redivision of material property," and holds that this must chiefly be accomplished by a larger measure of state intervention in economic matters; but he finds thoroughgoing socialism unfavorable to the realization of the maximum powers of the individual. The book ends still more practically with a consideration of the agencies to be employed in "the struggle against immorality."

One turns with some refreshment from M. Duprat's diffuse discussion, overloaded with digressive citations and criticisms of other writers, and from the obscurities and infelicities of his translator, to Professor Palmer's limpid and exquisite English and his admirably direct, simple,

and sequential exposition. *The Nature of Goodness*⁶ is a book in which ethical science employs the language of common speech — a book with never a footnote, rarely the mention of the name of any of the historic moralists, and almost no technical jargon; yet it exhibits perhaps a more closely wrought logic and a more fully and constantly self-conscious method than either of the books already mentioned. The method followed at the outset of the argument is not, indeed, altogether convincing. Mr. Palmer proposes to discover the moral criterion by an analysis of the common or essential elements implied in the diverse usage of the word "good." But even if usage pointed far more clearly than it does to some single and instructive meaning for the term, this linguistic fact would not suffice, without further and much more elaborate argument, to define either the grounds or the content of moral obligation. And, in truth, good is merely the most general term for the approved or the admired; and men approve or admire things for a great variety of reasons besides those mentioned in this book. In particular, the average man calls other men "good," not necessarily because he sees in their conduct an "organic inter-adjustment of functions," but because he finds that conduct conforming to a type that he has (usually by imitation) learned to think approvable. Just this common, essentially ethical, and plainly ateleological use of the term "good" Mr. Palmer, somewhat surprisingly, leaves out of his account; a full consideration of it would bring into view some fundamentally important aspects of the moral consciousness not touched upon in his book. The chapters on "Self-Direction," "Self-Development," and "Self-Sacrifice," while always philosophic in temper and never didactic, are as profitable for the "moral ideas" as for the "ideas about morality" which they contain; they are full of a shrewd perception of the complexities of human nature combined with a rare fineness of ethical taste. The student of ethics and the teacher of morals alike will find them fruitful of suggestion. The present book deals only with the general and more inward traits of moral character, and will hardly give much direct guidance in those objective casuistical problems of social duty to which Dr. Fite and M. Duprat especially address themselves. But it is to be hoped that Professor Palmer's sequence of ethical studies, of which this volume is the second, may at least develop into a trilogy.

Dr. Bolliger, professor in the University of Basel, proposes "a new

⁶ *The Nature of Goodness*. By GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. vii + 248 pages. \$1.10.

answer to an old question" in his monograph, *Die Willensfreiheit*.¹ He attempts to refute psychological determinism empirically by a re-examination of the process of volition; the whole argument depends for its validity upon the correctness of his psychology of the will. He assumes at the outset, without much argument, the truth of psychological hedonism; all choice is made *sub specie boni*; it aims always at an end, and that end is the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The motive to action is always the present representation of one's own future pleasure. It is certainly curious, at this late day, to find this venerable and all too simple theory of the will, now generally abandoned even by hedonistic moralists, put forward as an accepted and self-evident truth of psychology. Dr. Bolliger wholly ignores the elaborate criticisms on this theory which, among others, James and Sidgwick have made; his book could hardly have been written if he had taken more account of the literature of ethical discussion in English. The principle of psychological hedonism, however, is set up only as a foil to the argument for indeterminism. We choose always some pleasure; but introspection and experience show, Dr. Bolliger declares, that we do not always choose the nearest pleasure, or that of which the present representation is most pleasurable. This is evidence that our will has a certain *zeitüberspannende Potenz*, a power to subordinate the immediately alluring end to the remoter and larger one. If, however, our will were, as the determinist maintains, necessitated to follow always the stronger motive, it could not thus resist the allurements of immediate pleasure; for "the strongest motive would be to realize the greatest pleasure attainable at this present moment." Hence, the author concludes, volition is not completely nor invariably determined by the strongest motive; and the will is free with a strictly indeterminate, though not an unlimited, freedom. However excellent the conclusion, the logical weakness of the argument is obvious. It attempts to prove freedom from the psychological fact that man is capable of prudential self-control. But the determinist will at once answer that precisely what requires to be proved is that the prudent man, at the moment when he prefers the remoter to the nearer good, is not more interested in, more strongly attracted by, that good; that the idea of it has not greater power to fix attention and thus arouse desire. Dr. Bolliger's surprisingly crude and superficial psychology of the will certainly does not succeed in meeting the psychological deter-

¹*Die Willensfreiheit: eine neue Antwort auf eine alte Frage.* Von ADOLF BOLLIGER. Berlin: Reimer, 1903. vi+125 pages. M. 2.40.

minist's argument that, in such a case, the prudent man's choice is determined by what is, for him, the "strongest motive" of the moment. The book ends with a sketch of a rather vaguely utilitarian ethical theory, and with some thoughtful considerations on the religious significance of the doctrine of human freedom, especially in its relation to the problem of evil.

A number of special studies in the history of philosophy must be dealt with very briefly, since the only alternative is to deal at length with points of detail. The series called "The World's Epoch-Makers" appears to be devoted chiefly to philosophers and religious leaders—in other words, to the initiators of the more momentous revolutions in the realm of ideas. In such a series it is a little surprising to find Hume rather than Locke chosen as the representative of the British empiricist philosophy of the eighteenth century. There is a fairly clear distinction between those who originate new tendencies and those who carry a prevailing tendency through to such completion that a further movement of thought becomes necessary; and in this case Locke as surely belongs to the former class as does Hume to the latter. Nor has Professor Orr's scholarly and interesting volume on Hume⁸ just the scope that one might expect in view of its title. The biography, though well done, is rather fuller than it need have been, after the work of Burton, Huxley, and Knight; while the analysis of Hume's influence upon his contemporaries and successors is all too summary and inadequate. There is, for example, no indication of Hume's important influence upon Helvétius. The book is chiefly a brief exposition of Hume's ideas, accompanied by less brief criticisms of them from the standpoint of the orthodox Scotch realistic school; it will most interest those who wish a clear and forcible setting-forth of the arguments of that school against Hume's positions, and in proof of the reality of a substantive and rational self, the objectivity of the external world, the illegitimacy of the argument against miracles, and the insufficiency of a utilitarian ethics.

In the same series⁹ Professor W. H. Hudson deals with one of Hume's contemporaries whose place as an "epoch-maker" none could dispute. The picture of Rousseau's amazing personality and career could hardly be more vividly and justly drawn in equal space—for

⁸ *David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology.* By JAMES ORR. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. viii + 246 pages. \$1.25.

⁹ *Rousseau and Naturalism in Thought and Life.* By W. H. HUDSON. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1903. x + 260 pages. \$1.25.

Mr. Morley's splendid handling of the subject takes a far larger canvas. Mr. Hudson's biography is conspicuously free from the sentimentality which characterized the subject of it; the truth is told about Rousseau's character with great plainness of speech, yet in entire good taste. Perhaps, however, the note of grave pity should be more often combined with well-justified sarcasm, before the spectacle of the inconsistencies of a nature so strangely mixed of the vile and the generous, and so unhappily starved in physical heredity and early training. The analysis and discussion of Rousseau's writings are excellent. Here again one could wish for a relatively fuller treatment of both the antecedents and the influence of Rousseau's ideas; and what there is of this sort is so competently done that one especially desiderates more from the same hand. The significance of Rousseau's religious influence is well brought out.

A book²⁰ which, like Professor Orr's volume, attests the continued philosophical productiveness of Glasgow, deals in a more technical manner with the influence of an earlier and eminently epoch-making philosopher. Mr. Norman Smith's *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy* gives a fresh and penetrating analysis of the determining assumptions of the Cartesian metaphysics and epistemology, and then traces the logical working out, the vicissitudes, and the gradual weakening of these assumptions in each successive school until, in the system of Kant, they all but "vanish into the imperceptible," and are replaced by a radically new set of presuppositions. The assumptions in question are those involved in Descartes's theory of representative perception; his conceptual rationalism; and his view of causation and of the causal agency of mind. Within the limits of these problems, the book constitutes an analytical history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant.

Descartes's influence upon Spinoza is rather minimized by M. Paul-Louis Couchoud, in his study of the Jewish philosopher in the "Collection des grands philosophes;"²¹ and, undeniably, the customary fashion of classifying Spinoza as a Cartesian is misleading. His most distinctive affinities are with certain of the later schoolmen, with the mediæval Jewish Platonists and Aristotelians, with Bruno, and, for his ethics, with the Stoics; Cartesianism was distinctly a minor factor in his original

²⁰ *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*. By NORMAN SMITH. London and New York: Macmillan, 1902. viii + 276 pages. \$1.60.

²¹ *Benoit de Spinoza*. Par PAUL-LOUIS COUCHOUD. Paris: Alcan, 1902. xii + 305 pages. Fr. 5.

synthesis of old ideas. Numerous as are the books on Spinoza, M. Couchoud's volume will undoubtedly take a distinctive and important place among them. It especially attempts to present Spinoza, less as a thinker *in vacuo*—having his being, as it were, only *sub specie aeterni*—and more as a product of his time; to this end the author endeavors to reconstruct the many-sided historic *milieu* to which Spinoza's ideas belong—the philosophic fashions of the enlightened, the controversies of the Protestant theologians, the tendencies of the rabbinic schools, the taste for Stoic moralizing, the aristocratic republicanism of the wealthy burgesses, etc. The volume includes an extended analysis of both the major and minor writings of Spinoza.

A serviceable text-book in the general history of modern philosophy has been prepared by Mr. A. S. Dewing.¹² No attempt is made at originality of exegesis, nor at any new correlation of the historic doctrines, and the work will have no interest for the specialist; but as a book for the beginner in philosophy it has some merits. The great outlines of modern thought are made to stand out with unusual clearness, and the treatment of the several systems is, for the most part, well-balanced and readable. The section on Kant, the longest in the book, is also the worst. "The interpretation of truth in terms of what ought to be" is, for example, not a very fortunate definition of what Kant meant by "dogmatism;" and throughout the chapter the pith of Kant's arguments is pretty consistently left out of the author's exposition of them.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

MODERN scholarship in the New Testament field is altruistic. Though unable to give final conclusions, unanimously agreed to, it nevertheless is seeking to popularize its methods; and to those who are willing to receive anything short of flat assertion and positive dogma it offers now an abundance of light. The group of recent books on the reviewer's desk are chiefly of the popular, though no less scholarly, class.

The six lectures, delivered in 1902 in Saint Margaret's church, under the eaves of Westminster Abbey, edited and now published by

¹² *An Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy.* By ARTHUR STONE DEWING. Philadelphia and London: Lippincott, 1903. 346 pages. \$2.

Canon Henson, are by six of the most eminent British specialists, who speak to educated laymen.¹ The lectures were designed "as a first step in a serious effort to awaken popular interest in biblical science, and to set out clearly the broad principles on which that criticism proceeds;" and they maintain their purpose of being a "serious effort," with no puerile condescension to ignorance, while at the same time elementary.

Professor Sanday, in the first lecture, defines the lower and the higher criticism, and then states what may be regarded as the average opinion among scholars respecting the authorship, the date of composition, and the relationship of the several New Testament writings to each other. He thinks that there is enough common ground within the region of literary criticism to make the conflicting opinions no longer, as they at one time seemed, irreconcilable, while the subjects of criticism outside of the literary sphere require further investigation by professed scholars before they can be brought down into popular use. Professor Sanday's usual breadth of view and fairness of statement are apparent in this lecture.

Dr. F. G. Kenyon, assistant keeper of manuscripts in the British Museum, under the title "Manuscripts," describes the problems and the processes of textual criticism, and makes plain to an intelligent mind the reason why revised versions of the New Testament are necessary and should be superior to the old. This lecture has a practical and immediate value in promoting an appreciative reading of the Scriptures.

Mr. F. C. Burkitt, writing upon "The Ancient Versions of the New Testament," gives an account of the Latin and Syriac versions, and their contributions to the criticism and the correction of our New Testament text.

Professor F. H. Chase describes the processes by which the canon of the New Testament arose, down to about 200 A. D., and was confirmed, down to 400 A. D. Four influences were at work in fixing the canon: (1) the custom of Christian worship, which required a standard book for reading; (2) the literary habit of Christians, who cited apostolic writings and, besides registering popular usage, tended to co-ordinate the custom of different churches; (3) translation, which

¹*Criticism of the New Testament:* St. Margaret's Lectures, 1902. By W. SANDAY, F. G. KENYON, F. C. BURKITT, F. H. CHASE, A. C. HEADLAM, and J. H. BERNARD. Edited by H. H. HENSON. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1902. x+230 pages. \$1.80, net.

set limits to the sacred literature conveyed from one language to another; and (4) controversy, under the influence of which a cycle of written authorities became recognized.

Rev. A. C. Headlam, best known in America as co-author with Professor Sanday of the volume on Romans in the *International Critical Commentary*, discusses in a separate lecture "The Dates of the New Testament Books." The apostolic fathers, whose writings fall between 70 and 110 A. D., prove the existence of the New Testament books before them, by their witness (1) to the subject-matter of the New Testament, (2) to the different types of teaching in the New Testament, and (3) by use of the actual words and phrases in the books which we possess. Mr. Headlam believes in the Johannine authorship of the fourth gospel, and characterizes such special pleading as that of Professor Schmiedel and Dr. Abbott in the *Encyclopedia Biblica* as "long and elaborate theories constructed to explain away simple facts." To this lecture is added an appendix of twenty-five pages, containing the quotations from the apostolic fathers alluded to in the body of the lecture.

Discussing "The Historical Value of the Acts of the Apostles," Dr. J. H. Bernard, dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin, follows very nearly Paley's course of reasoning, though with modern illustrations, showing the author's accuracy in the use of titles and designations, in topographical nomenclature and description, and in general harmony with the statements and allusions to the epistles of Paul. As for sources, Dr. Bernard recognizes a Hebraic source for the first twelve chapters, of which as yet no complete account can be given, and a Hellenic source for the rest of the book.

In the lists of lectures offered students in German universities it has been noticed that the majority of introductory courses are given by the older professors, who have made reputations by lifelong investigations in their chosen fields, while the more advanced, specialized topics are discussed by the younger *Dozenten*. Similarly this volume of St. Margaret's Lectures has the flavor of dignity, solidity, and moderate conservatism which is best suited to lead the uninformed dispassionately into an acquaintance with great themes.

Mr. Griffinhoofe's brief handbook,* while useful in bringing within easy reach ninety-eight "sayings" of Christ which are not contained in

* *The Unwritten Sayings of Christ: Words of Our Lord Not Recorded in the Four Gospels, Including Those Recently Discovered.* By C. G. GRIFFINHOOF. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1903. xii + 128 pages.

the New Testament books, is yet marred by a too ready acceptance of slight resemblances between extra-canonical and canonical sayings as evidence that the former are quotations of the latter, or at least are to be regarded as genuine sayings of Christ. For popular use the book does not equal Part IV of Dr. Bernard Pick's recently revised edition of *The Extra-Canonical Life of Christ*.³ It is commendable, however, as a pastor's effort, combined with much reading and study, to bring to popular attention the results of such works as Alfred Resch's *Agrapha*, J. H. Ropes's *Die Sprüche Jesu*, and Eberhard Nestle's *Novi Testamenti Supplementum*.

Principal Randolph's brochure,⁴ originally a paper read before the Confraternity of the Holy Trinity at Cambridge, may prove satisfactory to persons already convinced, but will hardly carry conviction to the doubting. The author's point of view is evident from the statement: "To suppose that anyone can hold the Catholic doctrine of the incarnation without believing the miraculous conception and birth is, in the writer's opinion, a delusion." The author considers four arguments: (1) current belief in the second century, which he gathers from Ignatius, Aristides, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen; (2) the testimony of the gospels of Matthew and Luke; (3) the silence of other New Testament writers; and (4) an *a priori* consideration (entitled "Our Lord as the Second Adam") that the idea of an incarnation involves the actual descent of God to human conditions, yet without human generation, and not the elevation of a man to a deified form, as Nestorianism puts it. The silence of Mark, John, and Paul respecting the immaculate conception is explained as being what we should naturally expect. One wonders that no reference is made to such variant readings of Matt. 1:16 as occur in the Sinaitic Syriac version and in the cursive manuscript *k*.

Through Mr. Stewart's study⁵ runs a double purpose; to find the facts of the temptation, and then to show their significance for men today. The second purpose leads to no little preaching, for the most part good. The first object results in much good exegesis, particularly in the sympathetic discernment of the experiences of Jesus in relation to persons. Yet there are some extreme, and some timid,

³New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1903.

⁴*The Virgin-Birth of Our Lord*. By B. W. RANDOLPH. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. xii + 59 pages.

⁵*The Temptation of Jesus: A Study of Our Lord's Trial in the Wilderness*. By A. MORRIS STEWART. London: Melrose, 1903. xi + 230 pages. \$1.25, net.

statements. An instance of the latter kind is found in the author's reference to the devil. While interpreting the account of the temptation as largely figurative, and tracing the psychological processes toward an evident conclusion, he turns from the conclusion, as though afraid to express it, and, with no further investigation than is indicated in the following simple declaration, confesses a belief in a personal devil: "he is persistent all through the Bible; and we shall do well humbly to recognize his presence in our Lord's experience, and also to accept the fact of his agency in our own." A personal devil can scarcely be honored by such naïve acceptance!

A good book⁶ deserves a good literary style. Barring lapses in English⁷ and an occasional overdrawn statement,⁸ unqualified commendation can be spoken of Mr. Heuver's study. His special merit lies in his recognition of historic conditions, as the subtitle of his book indicates. Professor Peabody in *Jesus Christ and the Social Question* excels in exegesis; but Mr. Heuver takes into account the climate, soil, products, customs, traditions, and the social and economic conditions of the people, as bearing upon the teaching and the intent of Jesus respecting possessions and their employment. His conclusions are uniformly sane and informing.

The cause of missions has been forced to meet many an attack of varying kinds. Theological opposition, with the conviction of a Sidney Smith, has declared that infinite power would convert the heathen in due season without human assistance; expediency has interposed strenuously the number of heathen at home; parsimony has held the

⁶ *The Teachings of Jesus Concerning Wealth: Reviewed in the Light of His Environment and Compared with His Contemporaries.* By GERALD D. HEUVER. Chicago: Revell, 1903. 208 pages.

⁷ For example: an individual is called "this party," p. 68; "like he" occurs on pp. 69, 196; "suspicion" is used as a verb, p. 79; "no one said that aught had was his own," p. 98; "unfortunate wealth conditions," pp. 116, 118; "one" where "us" would be better, p. 119; "bible" where "Old Testament" is meant, p. 132; "make the unrespectable respectable," p. 171. The author is overfond of inverted sentences.

⁸ It cannot be said of the country known to Jesus that snow has fallen to the depth of five feet and remained on the ground for several days (p. 15). Such a statement applies only to the extreme north, to the vicinity of Hermon and the Lebanons. On p. 18 the density of population in Galilee, as described by Josephus, is allowed, and then on p. 128 Nazareth is spoken of as being virtually "country." It is probable that eventually exegetes will agree that Nathaniel's question respecting the Messiah's coming from Nazareth should be understood as alluding neither to the wickedness nor to the smallness of Nazareth, but to its lack of mention in the Old Testament, its lack of renown, and its entire disassociation from the current messianic expectation.

purse-strings and bound up the exchequer; and a "larger hope" of various shades and intentions has hacked away at the nerve of missions. Recently in Germany exegesis itself, hitherto the friend, has been arrayed among the foes of missions. A scholar like Harnack has declared it impossible for a Jew of Matthew's time to have written the great commission, "preach the gospel to every creature," and that such an utterance could not have come from the lips of Jesus, for passages like "I was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel," and "it is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs," prove that Jesus must have had a limited, national, and not a world-wide, view of salvation; that he was a Jewish Messiah, not a universal savior, and that, contrary to his intention, his disciples of a later time added the command to evangelize the world. Professor Bornhäuser, of Greifswald, answers this new charge in a little pamphlet, important beyond its size.⁹ He shows that the Old Testament, the Judaism, and even gentilism of Jesus' day had a world-wide horizon and sought proselytes; and he maintains that Jesus could not have been less broad than his contemporaries. It is further shown that Jesus' ideas of God, of the kingdom of God, and of the Messiah embrace man as man and not merely the Jew; and the utterances, therefore, which appear as restrictions upon this world-wide motive, mean simply an order of development, that Israel must be first, but the gentiles are not excluded.

A new work on Christian ethics¹⁰ comes forth partly in answer to the contention of Friedrich Nietzsche that love, as the basic principle of conduct, runs into two errors: (1) by relieving all needs, as it would if unflinchingly followed, it would take all discipline out of life and produce weakness; and (2) when persistently carried out, it absorbs great persons in the petty details of kindly ministrations, and thus favors a race of slaves rather than of heroes. Grimm seeks, back of the mere words of the synoptic gospels, which, in the form of aphorisms, seem but specimens of a larger mass of teaching not preserved, the principles and the motives of Jesus; and finds as the great basic principle, manifest in the person as well as in the teaching of Jesus, love of truth, genuineness, reality. Motive and its expression in action are the tests of Christian character; the test of motive is love,

⁹ *Wollte Jesus die Heidenmission?* Eine moderne theologische Frage für die Missionsgemeinde beantwortet. Von K. BORNHÄUSER. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. 80 pages.

¹⁰ *Die Ethik Jesu.* Von EDUARD GRIMM. Hamburg: Grefe & Tiedmann, 1903. 293 pages. M. 4.

not a weak, sentimental sympathy, such as Nietzsche might object to, but a great, noble love which interprets the Golden Rule in terms of fitness for all the world—not simply what you may like yourself, for you may desire flattery, or to be let alone, but what is best for all the world. The author keeps in mind two objects throughout his book: first to discover the meaning of Jesus, and then to show the application of that meaning to present-day men. His book is well written and admirably accomplishes its purposes.

Whether one agrees with Dr. Abbott's conclusions¹¹ or not, one cannot help feeling the charm of his confidence and frankness. He takes his readers into his study and chats with them, tells them how he was prompted to write, how he was led on from one inquiry to another, and exposes his whole *modus operandi*. Such a method results in a book more bulky than is needful, yet yielding compensatory acquaintance and association with the author himself. Three utterances of the voice of heaven (the *Bath Kol*) are examined, viz., at the baptism, at the transfiguration, and shortly before the crucifixion. There was no voice, but merely internal thought. While rejecting the Johannine authorship of the fourth gospel, and deeming its literal statements as often erroneous, yet Dr. Abbott regards the narrative of the fourth gospel "the noblest attempt at indirect biography" ever made, and regularly prefers his interpretation of the testimony of this unknown author to anything which he can find in the synoptists. In these days of an almost exclusive dependence upon Mark, it is refreshing to come upon the novelty of having the fourth gospel exalted to the first place. Dr. Abbott's labor evinces wide learning, but does not avoid the defect of exercising a too great ingenuity in the service of subjective conclusions.

Another work¹² in defense of a novel position in New Testament criticism is from the pen of Professor Bolliger, of the University of Basel. The novelty of the position is that it is a complete return to the explanation of Augustine, given fifteen hundred years ago, that Mark is the abbreviator of Matthew! The view rests upon two arguments: (1) that Papias, as quoted by Eusebius, in his statements respecting Mark implies the opposite statements respecting some

¹¹ *From Letter to Spirit: An Attempt to Reach Through Varying Voices the Abiding Word*. By EDWIN A. ABBOTT. London: Black, 1903. xxxvi + 492 pages. 20 s., net.

¹² *Markus, der Bearbeiter des Matthäus-Evangeliums: Altes und Neues zur synoptischen Frage*. Von ADOLF BOLLIGER. Basel: Reinhardt, 1902. 100 pages.

other author, who must be Matthew; and (2) that a comparison of the two gospels, paragraph by paragraph, shows the priority and superiority of Matthew's. The second argument, presented in detail through eighty-eight folio pages, is a foregone conclusion from the first. The first is the main contention. When Papias quotes Presbyter John as saying that Mark was not an eyewitness, he has in mind, according to Professor Bolliger, one who was an eyewitness; since Mark did not write in order, someone must be referred to who did so write; and as Mark did not compose a complete account, some other author must be referred to whose narrative was complete; and as neither the third nor the fourth gospel is mentioned, while Mark and Matthew are, these hidden, unspoken references must be to Matthew; and, *ergo*, Matthew is prior to, and superior to Mark. This is the *argumentum e silentio* run mad!

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RECENT LITERATURE IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THIS collective review is intended to give a general survey of a number of important books in the field of systematic theology. In many cases the books deserve a more extended notice than space will allow. The attempt has been made, however, to indicate the general scope and scientific value of each publication.

The emphasis which is being laid upon special investigations in comparatively restricted fields makes the appearance of any comprehensive treatise a rare event. In cases where the entire field of theology is considered, the tendency is to publish introductory studies, or epistemological monographs.

Seeberg¹ attempts to give a philosophical basis for the presuppositions of dogmatics. His epistemology consists in a rather naïve argument for the existence of an Absolute drawn from the psychological difficulties in our concepts of time and space. The second dogmatic portion consists in a defense of theological ontology in opposition to Ritschl. The treatise is marked by ingenuity rather than by profundity.

A stimulating and suggestive little pamphlet by Von Lüpke² attempts to show the significance of Eugen Kühnemann's method of

¹ *Vorstudien zur Dogmatik*. Von PAUL SEEBERG. Leipzig: Wöpke, 1902. 60 pages. M. 1.20.

² *Tat und Wahrheit: eine Grundfrage der Geisteswissenschaft*. Von HANS VON LÜPKE. Leipzig: Dürr, 1903. 35 pages. M. 0.50.

studying philosophy and literature. One cannot investigate a man's thought by abstracting it from the man who thinks. Thought is fundamentally an expression of personal valuation. The scholasticism of theology has arisen because doctrines *per se* have been the object of study. If theologians come to realize that doctrines are expressions of personal religious values, and begin to study personality rather than theories, they will again become the most honored of scientists. For science does not exist for its own sake. It exists for the sake of man. Theology, which is the supreme expression of man's significance, will thus stand supreme among the fields of scientific achievement.

Herrmann³ has published a fourth edition of his famous book, the first edition of which appeared in 1886, and which was somewhat extensively revised in the second edition of 1892. This last edition differs from the third edition of 1899 mainly in the endeavor to meet the arguments of the two extreme wings of Protestantism, both of which Herrmann opposes. On the one hand are the radicals, who assert that the teachings of Jesus abstracted from his personality form the basis of Christianity. On the other hand are the conservatives, who emphasize the fact of personal salvation, but who insist that the personal Christ who saves us must first be critically and doctrinally defined on the basis of the New Testament records. Herrmann, as it seems to me rightly, characterizes both positions as legalistic; *i. e.*, according to both, one must take upon himself external principles without inner verification. The man of scientific spirit today refuses to do this. Herrmann declares that such men need to have an approach to the gospel pointed out which shall not involve legalistic principles. The general argument of the book is unchanged from previous editions. The new introduction, however, gives a stirring appeal for the religious rights of the modern man for whom traditional theology has lost its power.

An attempt to recommend Christianity to such modern men is furnished by Wilkin.⁴ In this book the "control" is affirmed to be "cosmic," "individual," "social." Having discussed this thesis in the first part of the work, the latter part is devoted to a treatment of the "Subversion of Control" and the "Restoration of Control," *i. e.*, sin

³ *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, im Anschluss an Luther dargestellt. Vierte Auflage. Von DR. W. HERRMANN. Stuttgart und Berlin: Cotta, 1903. x + 298 pages. M. 4.50.

⁴ *A Discussion of the Fundamental Principles of Social Order and Progress*. By GEORGE F. WILKIN. Introductory note by AUGUSTUS H. STRONG. New York: Armstrong & Son, 1903. xxi + 284 pages. \$1.25.

and salvation. The four species of control in evolution are, according to our author, gravitation, chemical affinity, life, and rational will; and these constitute a progression, each later species of control, moreover, entering the territory of its predecessor and subjugating it and making it subservient to its own later and higher functions. Thus the controlling principle of evolution at the present time is the rational will of man. But, since the stream does not rise higher than its source; rational will, that is, personality, must be the principle of world-evolution. Passing now to the individual, he, so our author continues, is an evolution physically, intellectually, and morally. To man's three-fold character there correspond three species of control: animal appetites and passions, intellect, and rational will. The analogous line of argumentation is applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to society as an evolution. In the treatment of the subversion of control, the "nature of counter-evolution" is first taken up. While *normal* resistance of a lower to the introduction of a higher order furnishes difficulty in the way of social evolution, the greatest difficulties arise from an *abnormal* resistance due to "anti-evolutionary self-determinations by the supreme controlling principle—the rational will—itself." To proceed, the "consequences of counter-evolution" are: (1) all human history has been a conflict between two directly antagonistic evolutions; (2) the predominance in society of theological as distinguished from rational phenomena; (3) voluntary transgressing; (4) moral deadness; (5) necessity of the restoration of rational will. Then comes the problem of restoration. The human condition of the triumph of evolution over counter-evolution is that the rational will apply itself in every practical way, in the individual and in society, to counteract the downward trends of evil. But it is a long, hard task, and faith in immortality is needed. This faith is supported adequately by the philosophy of John Fiske. And theism is needed, and this faith is supported by the Bible—"the Word of God, infallible and perfect." Having reached this standpoint, the author deduces the well-known plan of orthodox salvation, which requires no reproduction here. Dr. Strong, in his introductory note, says that the author "has given us an important application and supplement to the evolutionary doctrine," and "has done much to put science and religion at rights with one another."

A symbolic exposition of Anglican orthodoxy is given in Mortimer's book⁵ on the creeds. The author has collated with praiseworthy

⁵ *The Creeds: An Historical and Doctrinal Exposition of the Apostles', Nicene and Athanasian Creeds.* By ALFRED G. MORTIMER. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902. xx+321 pages. \$1.80, *net*.

thoroughness all the information available concerning the origin and history of the three ecclesiastical creeds. The historical portion of the work thus forms an admirable compendium of information. The expository portion, however, is controlled by an uncompromising spirit of scholastic dogmatism. It is thus a purely objective reproduction of authoritative dogma. It is difficult, for example, to see how any man with even a smattering of psychology can with sober face defend the coexistence of two independent wills in Christ. The extreme sacramentarian views of the author lead him occasionally into unwarranted statements, as, e. g., that "Luther invented a doctrine of justification which is absolutely immoral."

In the field of Christian ethics, Häring's⁶ book is published as a companion volume to Hackenschmidt's popular compendium of dogmatics. The primary purpose of the book is therefore to make the subject lucid and interesting to the general public. The author's standpoint is that of a conservative, but not legalistic, evangelical. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, he attempts to furnish the reader with such a survey of problems as will facilitate individual moral judgment. This attempt often leads to so complicated an enumeration of the various aspects of a problem that one gains information rather than insight. Moreover, his discussions of social and economic problems savor of the doctrinaire method so prevalent before present historical and evolutionary conceptions changed the scientific method of approach. On the whole, however, the book is excellently adapted to its primary purpose, and will furnish laymen with a thoughtful discussion of current problems by a man of open-minded scientific spirit and of genuine moral earnestness.

Of more interest to scholars is Otto Ritschl's⁷ little pamphlet, which he intends as an introduction to a forthcoming treatise on ethics. The significant feature of the discussion lies in a clear distribution between ethics as a science, and ethical culture as a matter of technique. As a science, ethics must deal with the facts of moral consciousness, setting forth the principles of moral distinctions and of moral action. Thus ethics properly deals with an autonomous personality. Moral legislation, on the other hand, has for its end the utility of society. It is thus an expression of the historical exigencies of men living in definite

⁶ *Das christliche Leben, auf Grund des christlichen Glaubens dargestellt.* Von TH. HÄRING. Calw und Stuttgart: Calwer Verlagsverein, 1902. 455 pages. M. 4.

⁷ *Wissenschaftliche Ethik und moralische Gesetzgebung.* Von OTTO RITSCHL. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. 43 pages. M. 1.

historical conditions. It is designed to organize human action, not on an ethical (autonomous) basis, but on the basis of authoritative compulsion. The moral consciousness of the individual is developed by social requirements, and by the imposition of ethical ideals on the part of teachers and parents. Heteronomy is an indispensable training school for autonomy. But a moral character is developed only as the child is inspired by contact with moral personalities. The pamphlet is scarcely more than a series of keen observations and fruitful suggestions. The larger treatise will be eagerly awaited.

The chief interest in the theological world continues to lie in the realm of apologetics. This is inevitable at a time when all branches of learning are feeling their emancipation from theological restrictions. This emancipation of secular science has compelled theologians to ask anew what the content of Christian truth is and how it may be adequately established. The echoes of Harnack's famous lectures on the nature of Christianity are becoming gradually fewer. English students will welcome a translation of Cremer's reply to Harnack.⁸ Cremer has admittedly given one of the strongest presentations from the traditional point of view. The German original has already received notice in this Journal.⁹

Lepsius, the vigorous editor of *Das Reich Christi*, has published a critique of Harnack's book,¹⁰ which pertinently asks if Harnack is true to his own fundamental conception of Christianity. According to Harnack, the personality of Jesus, rather than his teachings, is the ground of Christian faith. Yet in Harnack's exposition of the gospel of Jesus the teachings are emphasized even to the exclusion of a Christology. This means that Harnack's gospel is an attenuated legalism. We are to be saved by approximating the ideals of Jesus. Lepsius insists that Harnack's contention that "words effect nothing; it is the power of the personality that stands behind them" would logically compel him to abandon a didactic for a dramatic presentation of the gospel. We need, not so much Jesus' ideas about God as the assurance of God's benevolent attitude toward us. This latter is given

⁸ *A Reply to Harnack on the Essence of Christianity*. By HERMANN CREMER. Translated by BERNARD PICK. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls, 1903. xiv + 268 pages. \$1, net.

⁹ Vol. VII, January, 1903, p. 186.

¹⁰ *Adolf Harnack's Wesen des Christentums*. Von JOHANNES LEPSIUS. Berlin: Reich Christi-Verlag, 1903. Erste Auflage, 93 pages; zweite Auflage, 70 pages. M. 1.50.

by the cross and the resurrection of Christ. Lepsius's criticism is one of the keenest discussions of a difficulty which many readers have felt in Herrmann's *Communion with God* as well as in Harnack's treatise. It deserves careful consideration.

Rau,¹¹ as an enthusiastic disciple of Feuerbach, shows the same opposition to Harnack's critical historicism. The gospel was not preached by Jesus to critical scholars, but to men as such. It must therefore meet psychological needs rather than rationalistic canons. Rau's critique, however, is really only a device to call public attention to Feuerbach, who, Rau believes, towers like a giant above Harnack, and whom he calls the "second Luther" who alone can save Protestantism from dissolution.

An admirable little treatise, inspired by religious insight rather than by controversial interests, comes from the pen of Richard R. Bowker.¹² The author does not pretend to deal exhaustively with any of the problems which he raises, but rather to give helpful hints to show that religious value may remain even when the problems are not intellectually solved. He is abreast of the best liberal tendencies of the times and true to the critical scientific spirit, but his aim is constructive. Religion is described as an intensely practical interest of the human spirit. Even a man whose intellectual attitude must be agnostic may possess an essentially religious spirit. No one nation has an exclusive claim to true religion. Christianity is the clearest and fullest expression of what all religions seek. The book is heartily commended to all perplexed spirits.

The perennial problem of miracles continues to receive its quota of attention. Fortunately, the fact is coming to be more generally recognized that a miracle is not merely an "isolated wonder," but is primarily an event of supreme religious significance. It is refreshing to read the clear and stimulating discussion of Whiton's,¹³ which puts in popular form certain fundamental aspects of the problem. The passing of miracles from the prominent place which they formerly held is declared to be due to a perception of the fact that spiritual truth cannot be accredited by physical events. If, then, miracles are to have

¹¹ *Harnack, Goethe, D. Strauss, und L. Feuerbach über das Wesen des Christentums.* Von ALBRECHT RAU. Delitzsch: Walter, 1903. 49 pages. M. 1.

¹² *Of Religion.* By RICHARD R. BOWKER. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. 73 pages. \$0.50.

¹³ *Miracles and Supernatural Religion.* By JAMES MORRIS WHITON. New York and London: Macmillan & Co., 1903. 144 pages. \$0.75, net.

evidential value, it must be because of their spiritual quality. Dr. Whiton regards the resurrection of Jesus as a resuscitation from a trance. It is thus explicable by natural laws. Yet it retains all its spiritual significance, however it be explained; for the continued spiritual life of Jesus after the crucifixion is the important thing. The true supernatural is to be found in the spiritual and moral realm which brings its own authentication. While passing over many problems which will readily occur to a theologian, the book is admirably adapted to direct the attention of puzzled laymen to the fact that a causal explanation of miracles does not destroy the religious interest in the supernatural.

From France comes a popular discussion of the same problem.¹⁴ The author divides miracles into two classes, relative miracles and absolute, according as the phenomena in question are or are not conformable to natural law. In the case of a relative miracle, the marvel ceases when one explains it scientifically, while absolute miracles lie outside the domain of science. Thus the real significance of the miraculous cannot be ascertained by science. The religious consciousness must supply this. From the religious point of view a miracle is "an intervention of the divine liberty in the ordinary course of things, abstracting from all theory concerning the mode of this intervention." Science and piety are like two parallel lines which never meet; hence no conflict is possible. Science can neither affirm nor deny the religious significance of events; neither can piety assert that miracles must be a breach of natural law. The second part of the book deals with the question of the historical reality of objective miracles. But this question would seem to be superfluous on the basis of his first lecture.

Soltau,¹⁵ with his usual radical criticism, has attempted to answer the historical question whether Jesus actually performed the miracles attributed to him. By a documentary comparison of the gospel narratives, he excludes all miracles not found in the earliest sources—*i. e.*, in Mark and in the Logia. This disposes of the most difficult miracles as idealistic constructions of later traditions. The remaining miracles are chiefly deeds of healing, which can be naturalistically explained. The person of Jesus is asserted to be the true spiritual miracle. The dogmatic presuppositions of the author, and his exclusively historico-

¹⁴*Deux conférences sur le miracle.* Par DOCTEUR PIERRE. Paris: Fischbacher 1903. vii + 111 pages. Fr. 1.50.

¹⁵*Hat Jesus Wunder getan?* Eine biblische Widerlegung kirchlichen Aberglaubens. Von WILHELM SOLTAU. Leipzig: Dieterich, 1903. viii + 104 pages. M. 1.60.

critical method, make of the volume a case of special pleading rather than of real insight into the problem.

An instructive application of the theory that the religious value of an alleged miracle may be retained even if the objective miracle be denied is given by Lobstein¹⁶ in his treatise on the virgin-birth of Christ. This essay was first issued in French in 1890, and was revised and enlarged in a German edition in 1896. Approaching the subject from an exegetical standpoint, Lobstein calls attention to the genealogies of Joseph in Matthew and Luke, and to the silence of Paul, John, and Jesus himself on the subject. He concludes that the virgin-birth formed no part of the primitive apostolic teaching. It arose at a later period, and was accepted by the church as one way of accounting for the divine personality of Jesus. It thus is the vehicle of a fundamental element in the Christian faith. We may here, as in the case of the creation poem in Genesis, distinguish between the inspired substance and the external form. Professor Lobstein has done a real service in showing that, even if one finds it impossible to accept the historicity of the miraculous birth, one may still regard the narratives with reverence and may use them to express profound religious faith in the divine origin of Christ. To prosaic minds it has always seemed incredible that revelation might employ fiction or legend or myth as the vehicle of a spiritual message. To recognize the possibility of this means to find a way out of some very real difficulties which modern biblical criticism has uncovered. The reverent spirit and constructive purpose of Professor Lobstein, combined with his unflinching courage in facing the facts, must commend the book to all, whether one agrees with him or not.

Two characteristic books dealing with what the Germans call the "formal principle" of the Reformation suggest that perhaps the real principle of the Reformation has not yet been clearly stated. In Kropatscheck's¹⁷ first volume, which has two sections, the practical usage of Scripture at the end of the Middle Ages, and the principle of Scripture of the theologians, are treated. Though preliminary to the second volume yet to appear, it is in itself a valuable work, the fruit of patient and exact investigation, of philosophic insight and power of

¹⁶ *The Virgin Birth*. By PAUL LOBSTEIN. Translated by VICTOR LEULIETTE, with an Introduction by W. D. MORRISON. New York: Putnam; London: Williams & Norgate, 1903. 138 pages.

¹⁷ *Das Schriftprinzip der lutherischen Kirche: Geschichtliche und dogmatische Untersuchungen*. Von FRIEDRICH KROPATSCHECK. I. Band: "Die Vorgeschichte, das Erbe des Mittelalters." Leipzig: Deichert, 1904. vii + 459 pages.

combination. It should be referred to again in connection with the second volume. For the present we shall content ourselves with a simple reference to the conclusion at which our author arrives, which should contribute a little toward clearing the atmosphere today. His investigations show clearly that the so-called formal principle of Protestantism had gained much fuller expression in the Middle Ages than popular expositions would ever lead us to imagine. Neither the formula *sola scriptura*, nor the emphasis upon the literary sense, nor the inspiration theory, nor anything else in the line of the requirement of a pure scriptural doctrine, is a creation of the Reformation. But none of these biblicists of the Middle Ages became a reformer of the church. Therefore the essence of the Reformation must consist in something other than the exhibition of the principle of Scripture. The question what that something is, is carried over into the next volume. But the direction in which the answer is to be sought is here indicated already in a new-found sentence from Melanchthon: "*Evangelium non est philosophia aut lex, sed est remissio peccatorum et promissio reconciliationis et vitae aeternae propter Christum.*" We shall await with interest the appearance of the second volume.

Thimme's¹⁸ book is a licentiate thesis accepted by the Göttingen faculty of theology. The author erects Luther's attitude to the Scriptures—both as to his inner freedom and his dependence—to normative dignity for all Christians. This is, of course, an exaggeration, but easily accounted for on the basis of the Lutherolatry of so many of the German pastors. But this aside, it is a good piece of work that we have here. As there were two Augustines, so there are two Luthers—Luther the Protestant, and Luther the Catholic. It is true that Luther went back to the Bible. But the Catholic system would not object to this, since in the Catholic church the Bible was acknowledged to be authority. But the new thing was Luther's special understanding of the Scriptures, which followed from his peculiar way of putting the problem. It was peculiar to Luther, not to bind himself to ecclesiastical interpretation, but to employ the Scriptures as critical principle for church doctrine. To distinguish fundamentally between Scripture and church doctrine—this was new. New also was it that he did not exempt even the canon from criticism. His criticism was far less historical than practical or religious; and he attributed worth only to the Scripture which treated what he held to be the center of Christianity, and in a way

¹⁸ *Luther's Stellung zur heiligen Schrift*. Von KARL THIMME. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. 104 pages. M. 1.80.

which he held to be correct. In this regard Luther's principle was the redemptive certainty of the individual. From the basis of *his own* experience of salvation, he criticised the Scriptures. This was new especially in the connection in which it stood. Thus Luther proceeded, not by the way of external authority, but by way of inward experience. Such was Luther the Protestant. But he was a man of transition, often dominated by ideas of the past, and held by bonds which he could not entirely break. This is the toll which he, the Catholic, had to pay to his time. He is not to be blamed for it, since it is a law of life. But we are to be blamed if, in spite of this, we appropriate the "whole Luther." And the excellence of this book, as an impartial study of the subject, is somewhat marred by failure to give this consideration its due weight.

In the treatment of specific theological doctrines several publications deserve special notice. Pfeiderer's⁷⁹ address at the international theological congress, held at Amsterdam last September, is an exceptionally fine example of the newer apologetic in view of the recent discoveries made in the field of comparative religions. Recognizing the fact that nearly all of the external and formal elements in Christian thought—including the thought of an incarnation and miraculous birth, and the ideas involved in the blood-atonement, baptism, and the Lord's Supper—find parallels in other religions, Pfeiderer nevertheless finds in the historical Christ the full significance of the eternal verities which all other religions were striving to express. Yet the primitive Christian conception of Christ contained temporal, Jewish elements which had to be replaced by new forms. This emancipation of the Christian ideal was at the cost of clothing it in the fleeting forms of myth and ritual. The discovery of these fleeting forms should teach us not to look for essential Christianity in any fixed element of the past, but rather to find it in the living religious experience of today. Whatever may be thought of Pfeiderer's philosophy of religion, the present address is a remarkable exposition of the fact that Christianity can fearlessly bear comparison with the best of other faiths.

Quite in contrast with the historical method of Pfeiderer is the treatise of Bensow⁸⁰ on the doctrine of the kenosis. This work is divided into three parts: The dogmatico-historical development of the

⁷⁹ *Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung.* Von OTTO PFLEIDERER. Berlin: Reimer, 1903. 116 pages. M. 1.60.

⁸⁰ *Die Lehre von der Kenose.* Von OSCAR BENSOW. Leipzig: Deichert, 1903. viii + 320 pages. M. 6.

problem, with special reference to the period from Thomasius to the present; the biblical-theological investigation of the teaching of sacred Scripture concerning the kenosis; and the systematic exposition of the doctrine of the kenosis. Special attention is given to the development from Thomasius on, partly to continue the work of Dorner, partly because the kenotic problem became so acute in the last half of the previous century that a real continuation of work on the subject was not possible without a thorough orientation as to the solutions already attempted. No explanation of the second and third divisions is needed, since such an approach to the problem is simply a matter of "good form" in German theology. The author does not consider the exegetical and dogmatic denial of the pre-existence of Christ. Yet this consideration is vitally necessary, for it is evident that the pre-existence of Christ is the necessary presupposition of all kenotic hypotheses, in any real sense of the word "kenosis." For those who do not believe in pre-existence the kenotic problem does not exist; and they can be considered neither as kenotists nor anti-kenotists. In their view, kenotism and a real human development of the Savior are not capable of being understood as compatible. The same would be true of kenotism and the ontological integrity of Deity; thus Biedermann would be right in saying that kenotism is not so much kenotism of Deity as of common-sense. This book is a ponderous architectonic contribution to the literature of the subject, but is deservedly foredoomed to the limbo of all books that seek to employ Christian mythology as ontological reality. The time has quite come to declare all such discussions as we have here antiquated, since the foundations on which they rest no longer seem to be rationally or scripturally tenable.

We are reminded anew of the loss which Protestant theology has suffered in the death of Sabatier²² by a little volume of his on the atonement. His historico-critical method of approach enables one to see the positive significance of historic theories, and frees one from the dogmatic and polemic spirit so often characteristic of theological speculation. Particularly refreshing is it to find the biblical ideas of expiation discussed without the attempt to read into them later theological conceptions. Sabatier views the conceptions of ritual sacrifice and of penal satisfaction as the temporal clothing which is cast aside as Christian thought rises to the ideal of the death on the cross as a sublimely moral deed with a supremely moral purpose. A more sym-

²² *La doctrine de l'expiation et son évolution historique.* Par AUGUSTE SABATIER. Paris: Fischbacher, 1903. 115 pages. Fr. 1.50.

pathetic presentation of the history of the doctrine could hardly be found.

Feine,²² whose previous studies in Paulinism have won favorable notice, attempts in an academic address to show that Luther's Reformation was a revival of Paulinism. In a large sense this is true; but Feine's comparison of the two is based too exclusively upon the citation of isolated texts to give an entirely accurate picture of either Pauline or Lutheran thought.

Weidner's²³ volume on the church is compiled with the spirit and method of his "Theologia," already reviewed in this JOURNAL.²⁴

The various considerations which may be urged in support of a belief in immortality are gathered together in a readable volume for laymen by Gilbert.²⁵ Literature as well as philosophy and theology is laid under tribute. The book will doubtless be of value to preachers in embellishing sermons on immortality.

An admirably careful and thorough study of the attitude of Clement of Alexandria to the problem of asceticism is given by Wagner.²⁶ The two opposing elements of positive valuation of the world and of withdrawal from the world are both found in Clement's teaching. Wagner thinks that the optimistic element comes from Clement's Christianity, and the ascetic element from his Cynic-Stoic philosophy.

Foakes-Jackson²⁷ sees a striking parallel between Marcion's "mystic," "sentimental" attempt to "set theory against dogmas resting on alleged historic fact," and the modern critical attitude toward [Anglican] Christianity. He reviews Tertullian's refutation of Marcion in order to show the way out of modern difficulties. Unfortunately his homiletic purpose leads to an eclectic and superficial treatment of history; and his way out of present-day difficulties is simply impossible for one who has felt the compulsory power of modern science.

²² *Die Erneuerung des paulinischen Christentums durch Luther*. Dekanatsrede von D. PAUL FEINE. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 30 pages. M. 0.50.

²³ *Ecclesiology; or, The Doctrine of the Church*. By REVERE FRANKLIN WEIDNER. Chicago and New York: Revell, 1903. 120 pages.

²⁴ Vol. VII, October, 1903, p. 780.

²⁵ *Side-Lights on Immortality*. By LEVI GILBERT. Chicago and New York: Revell, 1903. 233 pages. \$1, net.

²⁶ *Der Christ und die Welt nach Clemens von Alexandrien*. Von WILHELM WAGNER. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. 96 pages. M. 2.40.

²⁷ *Christian Difficulties in the Second and Twentieth Centuries*. By F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON. ("The Hulsean Lectures," 1902-3.) London: Arnold, 1903. 175 pages, 3s. 6d., net.

Professor Fisher has rendered a timely service by the publication of a hitherto unpublished manuscript of Edwards on the Trinity.²⁸ More than half of the volume is devoted to a survey of the theological activity of Edwards and his influence upon subsequent thought in New England. Probably no living scholar could have put in so brief a compass so appreciative a sketch of Edwards's life and work. The volume is thus of rare value. Edwards's doctrine of the Trinity is not especially original, being a form of the Augustinian analysis of the activity of the Godhead into psychological functions. The philosophical necessity for the tri-personality of God Edwards finds in the fact of his independent sovereignty; *i. e.*, God must have an object of love within the Godhead; otherwise he would be dependent upon the existence of a creature for the exercise of his nature.

Professor Baumgarten²⁹ is editor of the *Monatschrift für die kirchliche Praxis*. Recently six hundred German pastors signed an abortive petition demanding his removal from his professorship on the grounds of heresy. These sermons would indicate that his spirit is Christian, his thought evangelical, and his purpose serious. They are brief and to the point: no "homeopathic grains of thought in an Atlantic of utterance." He does not preach upon railroad disasters, or the latest novel, psychic research, or radium. This heretic, rather, chooses such themes as the following: "Jesus the Light and Life from God;" "Christ the Sinner's Savior;" "Christ's Cross a Divine Necessity;" "Christ's Cross Our Redemption;" "Our Daily Bread;" "The Criterion of Christianness;" "The Formation of Conscience;" "Transitoriness." In each of these sermons the human heart, bewildered with its problems, sick and sore with the load of life, hears the mystery and melody of the old eternal gospel, and is comforted.

A volume has been published containing a collection of popular addresses and magazine articles³⁰ published by Harnack from time to time for the last twenty years or more. The *Reden* of the first volume exhibit in a way the orderly course of church history; of the second, the more important ecclesiastical problems of the present. A review

²⁸ *An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity*; with Remarks on Edwards and his Theology. By GEORGE P. FISHER. New York: Scribner, 1903. xv+142 pages.

²⁹ *Predigten aus der Gegenwart*, gehalten in der Kieler Universitätsaula. Von O. BAUMGARTEN. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. 272 pages. M. 3.50.

³⁰ *Reden und Aufsätze*. Von ADOLF HARNACK. Erster Band, 349 pp.; zweiter Band, 295 pages. Giessen: Ricker, 1894.

of each separate piece is not practicable in this connection, but the volumes will soon appear in English translation, and the name of the author is guarantee for their excellence and attractiveness.

GEORGE B. FOSTER.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH.

RELIGION IN CONDUCT.

WE may begin our sketch of works on socialized religion with a reference to the serious and dignified addresses of the pious and liberal bishop of Peoria,¹ whom the nation loves to think of as, dressed in miner's garb, he made himself at home in the anthracite region during the great strike. Here he writes serenely of religion, agnosticism, education, the future of faith, and the victory of love. One who really desires to see how the subject of religious education looks to a devout, broad-minded, democratic, American Roman Catholic will read this volume with satisfaction. That the genial prelate is a faithful defender of the ancient church is clearly shown in his distinct statement of the infallible authority of the church as the representative of Christ (pp. 153, 154); but he rarely asks us to believe anything on that basis. The mystical and even clerical note is heard in the last lecture. When he touches on the necessity of religion as a factor in elementary education, the Catholic argument is deployed, but the conclusion and practical recommendation are left in a degree of obscurity. Yet, on the whole, this is no sectarian book, but the universal, the Christian, the American view of life and the world. The discussion is intensely religious, inspiring, ethical, and the witness stands for the spiritual element as a factor in history and culture.

*God and Music*² is a book which should be read with an orchestral accompaniment. Those whose æsthetic faculties have become atrophied through disuse, and to whom God is nothing but a New England conscience, will hardly understand how music has any place in apologetics. Formally the argument is that the harmony and law of music implies the existence of God; but, after all, only one who is ready for God will respond to such a plea. The man disciplined in nature sciences, and who has not yet set a value on religious experience, may be inclined to doubt the logical power of the writer; but to those who

¹ *Religion, Agnosticism, and Education*. By J. L. SPALDING. Chicago: McClurg & Co., 1902. 285 pages.

² *God and Music*. By J. H. EDWARDS. New York: Baker & Taylor, 1903. 318 pages.

have already in some way come to reverence the Ideal-Real of beauty, truth, holiness, and love, these charming pages will come as a voice in tune with the organ. On the ethical side the author makes a strong case for the belief that religion includes all that enriches human personality, and that to starve a faculty is partial suicide, is the suppression of one of the means of honoring the Creator. The social function of the church in relation to culture gains in significance in the light of this discussion. The allusions to Darwin and Spencer seem to be unfortunate (p. 123), so far as the author finds them in conflict with his thesis; for their task was explanatory, while the author is dealing with spiritual valuation and significance. To show how our musical nature has been developed is a scientific labor of explanation; to interpret the divine purpose and spirit is the work of poet, philosopher, and theologian. They do not come into antagonism unless, as appears here to be the case, there is a misunderstanding.

With the well-meant and devout effort to Christianize American thought, feeling, and conduct one may have great sympathy without accepting the counsel of a recent author³ in respect to placing the name of God in the constitution of the United States. The historical reasons for omitting any direct expressions of a creed in that document do not seem to be appreciated in *Social Ethics*. The preface states the object of the book to be to treat social phenomena "from a distinctively Christian point of view;" but the more specific purpose is disclosed at the end: "There is need of such a change in law as shall acknowledge Jesus Christ as the King of the state;" although the author sees that such an outward modification will not be made until there has been a general spiritual change in the souls of men.

The framework of the essay of Mark⁴ is Herbartian, but the mode of statement and illustration shows the independence and direct insight of a practical teacher who is in deep sympathy with childhood and is a devout believer in Christianity. The audience for whom the pages are written are not persons with severe training in psychology and philosophy, but ordinary intelligent teachers and parents. The distinction between teaching and training divides the book into two main parts, and nurture has as large a place as instruction. The organization and administration of the Sunday school are not adequately

³*Social Ethics: An Introduction to the Nature and Ethics of the State.* By J. M. COLEMAN. New York: Baker & Taylor, 1903.

⁴*The Teacher and the Child.* By H. THISELTON MARK. Chicago: Revell. 165 pages.

treated. The popular form of presentation forbids contributions to the deeper analysis of subjects. The work is valuable for the purpose of the author, who says in his preface: "The book, which is new, if at all, only in aim and setting, and not in subject-matter, is not written for the initiated few, but for the interested many."

The most thoroughly systematized movement of ecclesiastical philanthropy in the world is the Inner Mission of the state church of Germany.⁵ As our modern theologians seek to simplify doctrine, and to amputate all useless and unethical members, more vitality is liberated for Christlike service of humanity. Priest and Levite in our day find time to stop by the road with the heretical Samaritan long enough to bind up the wounds of the victim of sin and the child of misery. "Mere morality" has been found to be the true cross of the Lord.

Dr. Schäfer's text-book⁶ for classes of deaconesses and other laborers in the German Inner Mission has had a deserved success. The present volume is much larger than those of earlier editions. The historical paragraphs have been enriched, and the fundamental motives of the movement have thereby been made more clear. In its present improved form there are two principal divisions, the historical account and the present situation. In the latter part the author discusses the works of the Inner Mission and its agencies and personal factors. Dr. Schäfer, as manager of a deaconess training school at Altona, as lecturer and writer, has a remarkably clear and adequate view of the entire field, and his book is a classic in the subject.

The book of Wurster and Heunig⁷ is written for popular use in the churches of Germany. The author of *Die Lehre der Inneren Mission* has a large share in this publication, and his power of analysis is evident throughout. After a clear statement of the scope of the work and a historical sketch, the authors describe in some detail the evangelistic, charitable, and civic methods of bringing rescue and hope to the outcast members of the nation. The curious portraits and pictures lend additional interest to these pages. The statistics are brought up to a recent date.

⁵For a brief sketch of this movement, with bibliography, the present writer may refer to his articles in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 1896.

⁶*Leitfaden der Inneren Mission.* Von D. THEODOR SCHÄFER. Fourth Edition. Hamburg: Agentur des Rauhen Hauses, 1903.

⁷*Was jedermann heute von der Inneren Mission wissen muss.* Von P. WURSTER UND P. M. HEUNIG. Stuttgart: Kiehlmann, 1902. 270 pages.

Dr. Schäfer writes an introduction to the German translation of a fresh and strong Danish book on the Inner Mission.⁸ The author dwells especially on the movement in Scandinavian countries, into which it was carried by German and, to some extent, by English agencies. American discussions are freely and intelligently used. The topics treated are substantially the same as those of Schäfer's *Leitfaden*, but there is much local color of a high degree of interest.

The former professor of church history at Strassburg left a number of lectures on missionary enterprises,⁹ and his friends brought them together for publication. The topics are: the intensification of the missionary spirit in the parish; the historical preparation for the victory of Christianity in the Roman Empire; world-commerce and culture in relation to missions; the future of foreign missions; the Chinese troubles and the evangelical missions; the apologetic significance of Christian charity in the present age. The last lecture reveals the spirit of all the others. The author shows that the scientific demands of our time require real manifestations of life in the present; that an appeal to miracles does not win but repels faith; and that the power of an endless life must overcome antagonism by contemporary evidences of moral vitality and divine love. The Inner Mission is one expression in devoted service of this inner life, and the only language which convinces unbelievers.

Fortunately we have in English dress a readable and reliable account of one branch of the Inner Mission which should have an audience in the United States. Golder¹⁰ gives a brief history of the deaconess work down to the Reformation, traces the modern movement in Europe and America in various denominations, and devotes a chapter to the theory of the subject, the mission and aim, and one to the hospital and the training of nurses. The volume collects much interesting information, but leaves room for a more systematic and technical treatment, such as one finds in Schäfer.

Ex-Mayor Low has said that the chief problems of city government are not of civil-service reform, division of powers, and methods of securing honest council members, but of caring for the plays and other

⁸ *Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit*. Von N. DALHOFF. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1904. 322 pages.

⁹ *Zur äussern und innern Mission*. Von P. E. LUCIUS. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903.

¹⁰ *History of the Deaconess Movement in the Christian Church*. By C. GOLDER. Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye, 1903. 614 pages.

occupations of children. Mr. Lee " has illustrated the indirect methods of philanthropy which are so much more effective than those of direct relief-giving. He has himself been active in such enterprises in Boston, and has made himself acquainted with the methods successfully employed in other cities. Many of these activities are such as may well be taken up by those who desire to give useful expression to their Christian benevolence and yet wish to do something better than scatter pennies among the poor. The topics briefly, but very suggestively, treated are: savings and loans, health and building laws, model tenements, vacation schools, playgrounds for children, baths and gymnasiums, playgrounds for boys, outings, clubs, industrial training and preventive agencies for adults.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON ISLAM.

WHILE any good addition to our literature of Islam is always welcome, Professor MacDonald's excellent book¹ will be sure of an unusually cordial reception from all those who are interested in the study of Moslem institutions. For, as the author well says in his preface:

In English or German or French there is no book to which a teacher may send his pupils for brief guidance on the development of these institutions; on the development of law there are only scattered and fragmentary papers, and on the development of theology there is practically nothing.

The author is careful to point out the unity of church and state in Islam, but is compelled by the necessities of the case to divide his work into three parts, treating, respectively, of the development of the state, the development of legal ideas and schools, and the development of theology. Of these the last part is much the longest, embracing roughly two-thirds of the body of the book. There are three appendices. Appendix I consists of "Illustrative Documents Translated from the Arabic;" Appendix II is devoted to a selected bibliography; while Appendix III consists of a chronological table covering events from 11 to 1275 A. H. An index of names and Arabic words fills the last fourteen pages of the volume. It is manifestly impossible, in a

¹*Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy.* By JOSEPH LEE. With an Introduction by JACOB A. RIIS. New York: Macmillan, 1902. 242 pages.

²*Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory.* [The Semitic Series.] By DUNCAN B. MACDONALD. New York: Scribner, 1903. xii+386 pages. \$1.25.

limited space, adequately to review a book covering such a wide field and dealing with so many intricate questions. Special attention, however, may be called to the chapter on Al-Ghazzali, of whom the author well says that he was "the greatest, certainly the most sympathetic, figure in the history of Islam, and the only teacher of the after-generations ever put by a Muslim on a level with the four great Imams." Chapter 2 of Part I, giving a sketch of the origin of the Fatimids, the Druses, the Assassins, etc., is extremely interesting. In discussing the claims of the Ottoman sultan to be the caliph, pan-Islamism and the Brotherhood of As-Sanusi, the author touches on problems the interest and importance of which are manifest. To any who might be inclined to underestimate the vitality of Islam the reviewer would commend a careful consideration of the author's words on p. 6:

If, as some say, the faith of Muhammad is a *cul-de-sac*, it is certainly a very long one; off it many courts and doors open; down it many peoples are still wandering. It is a faith, too, which brings us into touching distance with the great controversies of our own day. We see in it, as in a somewhat distorted mirror, the history of our own past. But we do not yet see its end, even as the end of Christianity is not yet in sight. It is for the student, then, to remember that Islam is a present reality and the Muslim faith a living organism, a knowledge of whose laws may be of life or death for us who are in another camp. For there can be little doubt that the three antagonistic and militant civilizations of the world are those of Christendom, Islam, and China. When these are unified, or come to a mutual understanding, then, and only then, will the cause of civilization be secure.

The documents translated from the Arabic are really illustrative and constitute a valuable feature of the book. The selected bibliography, with such comments as the author has chosen to give, will prove very useful indeed. Professor MacDonald has done well to call attention to the fact (p. 6) "that no work can be done in this field without a reading knowledge of French and German, and no satisfactory work without some knowledge of Arabic." Professor MacDonald has written an excellent book, and one which may be most cordially recommended to any who are interested in the subjects of which it treats.

In his *Gazali** Baron Carra de Vaux has given us a companion volume to his *Avicenne* published two years earlier; in fact, the index published with the present volume covers both works. Some idea of the author's treatment of his subject may be gathered from the titles of

* *Gazali*. Par CARRA DE VAUX. Paris: Alcan, 1902. viii+322 pages. Fr. 2.

the chapters which are, respectively, as follows: "Theology before Gazali;" "Gazali—His Life and His Bibliography;" "His Struggle against the Philosophers;" "Gazali's Theology;" "Theology after Gazali;" "Ethics;" "Mysticism before Gazali;" "Gazali's Mysticism;" "Arab Mystics subsequent to Gazali;" "On the Persian Mystic Poets." Special attention may be called to what the author has to say on the influence of Christianity on mysticism in Islam. The author's treatment of his subject is impartial, his style is clear, and he has produced an interesting and valuable book.

Dr. Hirschfeld's studies in the Qoran³ appear as Vol. III of the Royal Asiatic Society's *Asiatic Monographs*, having been reprinted from the *Indian Antiquary*. In the discussion of the topics which this volume treats there is room, as every student is aware, for considerable difference of opinion. Therefore we are not surprised, for example, to find the author disagreeing (p. 32) with both Geiger and Wellhausen in his estimate of the influence on Islam exercised by Judaism and Christianity, respectively. Again, some of the author's etymologies will not meet with universal acceptance. But the book is written with fair-mindedness and great learning, and, whether the student agrees or disagrees with the author in some matters of detail, he will find his discussions to be stimulating and helpful. The reviewer would like to call special attention to the chapter entitled "The Parable in the Qoran," with the Appendix, "The Mathal in Tradition."

In Part V⁴ of his series of pamphlets entitled *Der Islamische Orient* Dr. Hartmann presents an outline of an East Turkish book which gives the popular version of the story of the life and death of a dervish of Turkestan. The student, not only of Islam, but of oriental religious ideas in general, will find this outline, with Dr. Hartmann's introduction and notes, most interesting, for it affords a vivid glimpse into a world of ideas absolutely different from that to which we are accustomed.

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³*New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qoran.* By HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1902. ii + 155 pages.

⁴*Metreb der weise Narr und fromme Ketzer: Ein zentralasiatisches Volksbuch.* Von MARTIN HARTMANN. Berlin: Peiser, 1902. Pages (of the series) 147-93, inclusive.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

CANTWELL, EDWARD N. *Personal Salvation: A Treatment of the Doctrines of Conversion and Christian Experience.* New York: Eaton & Mains, 1903. Pp. 216. \$0.75.

DEANE, SIDNEY NORTON. *St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; an Appendix on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo; and Cur Deus Homo.* Translated from the Latin. "Religion of Science Library," No. 34. Chicago: Open Court, 1903. Pp. xxxv + 288. Cloth, \$1; paper, \$0.50.

Students of theology and of philosophy will be grateful for this excellent English version of the chief work of the great mediæval theologian.

GRAVES, HENRY C. *Handbook of Christian Doctrine.* Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1903. Pp. xi + 176.

A well-arranged brief compendium for elementary students of theology, based upon Dr. Hovey's *Manual of Christian Theology*.

HANEWINCKEL, F. *Ist die Bibel Gottes Wort?* Zwickau i. S.: Schriftverein der lutherischen Gemeinden in Sachsen, 1903. Pp. 16.

HASHAGEN, FRIEDRICH. *Longinus über das Erhabene. Verdeutsch und eingeleitet.* Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. Pp. 118. M. 1.20.

An admirable version of Longinus for the use of German students.

KEPHART, EZEKIEL B. *A Brief Treatise on the Atonement.* Dayton, O.: United Brethren Publishing House, 1902. Pp. 75. \$0.50.

KUNSTMANN, J. VON. *Die Bibel ist alleinige Quelle und Norm in Glaubenssachen.* Zwickau i. S.: Schriftverein der lutherischen Gemeinden in Sachsen, 1903. Pp. 22.

LEPSIUS, JOHANNES. *Macht und Sittlichkeit im nationalen Leben.* Berlin: Reich Christi-Verlag, 1902. Pp. 39. M. 1.

Les contemporains. Vingt-deuxième série. Paris: Maison de la bonne presse.

NAUMANN, JOHANNES. *Ist lebhaftes religiöses Empfinden ein Zeichen geistiger Krankheit oder Gesundheit?* Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. Pp. 24. M. 0.50.

An address by a chaplain in an asylum for the insane. He concludes that religious sensitiveness is not usually a predisposing occasion of insanity.

PIREYRE, L'ABBÉ A. *Pourquoi ne peut-on pas se faire protestant?* Paris: Maison de la bonne presse, 1903. Pp. 63.

A partisan defense of Catholicism which exhibits Luther's defense of the bigamy of Philip of Hesse and Henry VIII.'s marital career as the most significant events in Protestantism. Protestants in France are declared to be the tools of English influence, and to be moved largely by avarice.

RADE, MARTIN. *Die Leitsätze der ersten und der zweiten Auflage von Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre nebeneinandergestellt.* Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. Pp. 70. M. 1.20.

This latest addition to the valuable "Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellschriften" exhibits on parallel pages the condensed paragraph-statements in the two editions of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. Students of Schleiermacher will find this an invaluable text-book. The first edition is often of great assistance in interpreting the second.

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A PLEA FOR THE HIGHER STUDY OF THEOLOGY.

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THE study of theology is the highest, the most comprehensive, the only universal study, for it is the study of God and of all things in their relations to God. Theology is sometimes used in limited senses for the doctrine of God, as distinguished from other doctrines in systematic theology; or for systematic theology itself, as distinguished from other divisions of theology; or, in more popular usage, for those studies which belong especially to the theological seminary and to the Christian ministry, as distinguished from those studies which belong to other callings in life. While there is some propriety in these specific uses of the term, they must not blind us to the comprehensive and proper use, which can be no other than the study of God and of all things in their relations to God.

For this reason theology is now, ever has been, and ever must be the queen of studies; for all other studies have to do with certain particular provinces of the realm of truth, whereas theology has to do with the entire realm of truth, as it considers all things from the point of view of God, their creator and sovereign. When this situation is emphasized, as it is in ancient Scripture, wisdom and theology are practically identified, as by that Hebrew sage when he said in his Praise of Wisdom:

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,
The knowledge of the All-Holy is understanding.¹

¹ Prov. 5: 7.

Theology is queen of knowledge, not by any provisional or temporary appointment, not by the choice of the sciences, or by usurpation over them, but by divine right grounded in the very nature of things. Wisdom herself tells us in the words of that same sage:

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way,
 Before his works of old.
 I was set up from everlasting from the beginning,
 Or ever the earth was.
 When there were no depths I was brought forth;
 When there were no fountains abounding with water.
 Before the mountains were settled,
 Before the hills was I brought forth:
 While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields,
 Nor the beginning of the dust of the world.
 When he established the heavens, I was there:
 When he set a circle upon the face of the deep:
 When he made firm the skies above:
 When the fountains of the deep became strong:
 When he gave to the sea its bound,
 That the waters should not transgress his commandment:
 When he marked out the foundations of the earth,
 Then I was by him as a master-workman:
 And I was daily his delight,
 Rejoicing always before him;
 Rejoicing in his habitable earth;
 And my delight was with the sons of men.
 Now therefore my sons hearken unto me:
 For blessed are they that keep my ways.
 Hear instruction and be wise,
 And refuse it not.
 Blessed is the man that heareth me,
 Watching daily at my gates,
 Waiting at the posts of my doors.
 For whoso findeth me findeth life,
 And shall obtain favour of the Lord.²

I.

An eminent American scholar,³ not many years ago, wrote the story of a conflict between science and religion, in which the sciences one after the other won their freedom from the sway of religion. A

² Prov. 8: 22-35.

³ J. W. DRAPER, *The Conflict between Science and Religion*.

wiser American historian,⁴ still more recently, gave a fuller and more accurate narrative of this struggle, which he defines in his title as the warfare of science with theology, but in his introduction more specifically as a struggle between science and dogmatic theology. There can be no doubt that there has been such a warfare, in which science has waged many a battle and won a succession of victories. But this warfare has not been a struggle of science against religion, or theology, or even dogmatic theology, as these authors wrongly say. Religion and theology have taken part in this struggle, but they have not warred *against* science, but rather *on the side of* science against a common foe—*ecclesiastical domination*, the greatest foe of theology, as it is also of all learning. For every martyr to science there have been a hundred martyrs to theology in this conflict against ecclesiastical domination, which has been waged for centuries. The men of science have battled nobly and well—all honor to them—but they never would have won their victories if it had not been for the theologians who fought by their side and suffered cruel wrongs on behalf of truth and righteousness.

The Reformers battled for freedom against the tyranny of Rome; but they found princelets and prelates no less determined for ecclesiastical domination than Rome had been. Dissenting bodies protested and separated from state churches for liberty of conscience, but John Milton saw at once that presbyter was "priest writ large," and other religious bodies found that Independents claimed independence for themselves, but were unwilling to give it to others. The free churches have suffered no less from ecclesiastical domination than the state churches. No form of government, no method of organization or discipline, has been able to escape it. It is rooted and grounded in human nature; it is one of the most aggressive strains of original sin. Jesus told his disciples:

The rulers of the gentiles lord it over them,
And their great ones exercise authority over them.
Whosoever would be great among you shall be your minister,
And whosoever would be first among you shall be your servant.
The Son of man came not to be ministered unto but to minister,
And to give his life a ransom for many.⁵

⁴ A. D. WHITE, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*.

⁵ Mark, 10: 42-45; Matt., 20: 15-28; Luke, 22: 25, 26.

If that is the genuine Christian spirit, then ecclesiastical domination can be no other than an anti-Christian spirit.

It was necessary that the sciences should at all cost free themselves from ecclesiastical domination, but it was just as important for theology also. To identify theology with ecclesiastical domination is a historical wrong of most serious consequences. The sciences need theology just as truly as theology needs the sciences. But they need a theology which is as free as themselves. They cannot afford to give theology over to the tender mercies of ecclesiasticism. They should welcome and give every encouragement to a truly scientific theology.

The peril of ecclesiastical domination no longer exists in this country to any appreciable extent, apart from the organized ministry and the theological seminary. There is no longer any need of banishing religious education from the public schools, or of ignoring and limiting theological education in the colleges and universities; for there is a true religion and a true theology which underlies as a rock-bed, a solid foundation, all the variations of religion.

It is the work of *theological encyclopædia* to give a survey of the whole field of theology; to show the relation of theology to all other departments of learning; to analyze and subdivide theology itself into the various disciplines and departments; to give a history of each and all; to show their proper methods of study; and to present the sources of the disciplines, and their chief literary products.

It has been one of the most unfortunate results of the divorce of theology from the university that theology has not had its just share in the great advance of education in the past half-century. The study of theology has undoubtedly been improved in methods, and has been enlarged by the introduction of a great number of elective studies; but the number of years required for theological study is no greater than it was seventy or eighty years ago. The requirements for entrance to the Christian ministry have not been advanced to any appreciable extent. In many respects they have been lessened.

When one considers the enormous development that has taken place in the medical schools of the country, the advance in the study of law, the unfolding of graduate departments of the universities, and the increased length of preparation for men entering the various other vocations of life, the lack of advanced requirements for the Christian ministry is evidently a serious matter.

The Christian minister is no longer, what he used to be and what he ought to be, the best-educated man in the community. As things are now, he is ministering to men and women, as well educated as, if not better educated than, himself. What other result could be looked for under these circumstances than a relative decline in the public position of the clergyman and in the public estimation of the church? It is necessary, if the church is to regain its true position, and the minister is to be the religious teacher of the next generation, that he should have a much higher education than he can get at present in our theological seminaries. This can be given only in graduate schools in theology where the choicest men may be able to give two, three, and four additional years to the study of theology. If the graduate school is necessary for the higher study of medicine, if graduate schools are necessary in numerous other branches of learning, can theology—the highest, the most comprehensive, the most difficult, and the most important of all studies—do its work without the graduate school? Theology will certainly go on sinking in relative importance and carry with it by inevitable gravitation the ministry, the church, and Christianity itself, unless graduate schools of theology can be established, fully equipped and maintained, in which the study of theology can be carried on to the highest degree of excellence and in the most comprehensive thoroughness.

It must be evident to all who discern the signs of the times that the Christian ministry can no longer win adherents by the dogmatic assertion of the doctrines, institutions, and ceremonies of any of the religious denominations. Authority has its proper place and importance in religion. But the authority of any one religious organization, in the midst of a multitude of others, is practically reduced to a minimum. The only authority that will sway intelligent, educated Americans is the authority of the truth, stated by a man who shows himself to be master of it. No man can become master of the truth until he has searched it through and through and considered it in all its relations and bearings; until its importance has taken possession of him and given him conviction and certainty. Then, seeing clearly and thoroughly himself, he will be able to state the truth clearly and thoroughly, with a moral earnestness and a religious vigor that will convince and give certitude to others.

The church certainly needs a ministry to do the simple, practical work of the congregation; the most of the ministry must, from the nature of the case, be fitted for this kind of work. They may be regarded as the infantry of the Lord's army. But, however necessary the infantry may be in war, the Lord is ever on the side of the strongest artillery. Theologians usually win religious wars. An educated ministry is certain to overcome an uneducated ministry. That church will control the future of religion in this country that will put the best-educated ministry into the field. They will batter to pieces and render untenable every theological position of their adversaries. They will resist every attack with a fire that will annihilate a multitude of enemies. Numbers amount to little in such a warfare. They are but ants trodden under foot by man. In such a combat

How should one chase a thousand,
And two put ten thousand to flight.⁶

II.

An eminent preacher from the Highlands of Scotland once said: that the whole of theology was given to our first parents in the garden of Eden, and that there has been no development in theology since that time, but only apostasy. Doubtless there are some who still entertain this opinion; but that was not the teaching of the prophets of Holy Scripture. Lessing said that the history of mankind is the divine training of the race. His countryman Schiller said that the history of the world is the judgment of the world. These are two sides of the same truth, which was not original to these great German poets, but was taught millenniums before by the Hebrew prophets. In fact, the history of mankind is a history of God's training of mankind; the history of the world is a series of divine judgments of the world. But what is that but to say that the history of the world is essentially a history of theology?

Thus theology is in its very nature a study for all mankind. God never limited his discipline to a single race. He never made any one religious body the unique object of his favor. Any election of a people or an individual that God ever made was an election to a service of others. As the ancient covenant of Israel has it:

⁶ Deut. 32:30.

Now therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me, from all peoples: for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and an holy nation.⁷

Not Israel alone were the people of God, for, as Amos said:

Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir?⁸

And the Psalmist sees an ideal Jerusalem in which all nations are registered among its citizens. Jesus Christ established a religion which was not to be national, provincial, or sectarian, but truly universal for mankind, everywhere and in all ages.

Clement of Alexandria saw clearly and taught explicitly this Christian universalism when he said:

Perchance the philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily till the Lord should call the Greeks. For this was a schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind, as the law the Hebrew, to Christ.⁹

A deeper study of the origin and early history of Christianity has made this more evident. There can be no doubt that the Greek language, Greek literature, and Greek philosophy furnished Christianity with the best possible form in which to give expression to the great essential doctrines of Christianity. So Roman administration and law gave the very best possible forms in which to incorporate the Christian religion.

There are some who think that the whole fabric of Christianity is imperiled by these historical facts. They have been accustomed to think that the whole of Christianity had a unique divine source. When such a one learns that the greater part of the structure is human in origin, and can be explained by Greek philosophy and Roman law, without thinking at all of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, Christianity seems shaken to its foundations.

But, in fact, there is no real cause for alarm, but rather for thankfulness; for we are now able to make distinctions which are indispensable for the progress of theology and of Christianity. It is certainly true that the great fundamental doctrines of the person of Christ and of the holy Trinity were stereotyped in the forms of Greek philosophy. It is as certainly true that Christian institutions were stereotyped in Roman forms. No one can fully understand them unless he

⁷ Exod. 19: 5, 6.

⁸ Amos 9: 7.

⁹ *Stromata*, I, 5.

studies them in these forms. It is necessary, if they are to be translated and explained to the modern mind, that we should be able to discriminate the forms from the substance; we must ascertain all that is really Greek, all that is really Roman, all that is really Hebrew, and all that really came as a new formative and divine teaching from Jesus Christ himself.

Church history has become to the modern theologian of tremendous importance. It is a very different study from what it used to be. Church history must take a very prominent place in the graduate department. It must search out and by historical criticism determine all these problems. Christian institutions, canon law, the government and discipline of the church, must be searched through and through by the most thorough, patient, and exhaustive investigation.

But after this has been fully accomplished, when the analysis has reached its final results, what shall we say? Is that only Christian which can be traced to Jesus Christ himself? Is there no other Christianity save the essence of Christianity? God forbid! Jesus promised his disciples the divine Spirit to guide them unto all truth. He gave them a few simple, original, formative, divine principles, and commanded them to teach all nations and make the whole creation Christian.

Such a universal religion must, from the very nature of the case, use all that is appropriate in other religions. The Greek language the Greek literature, and the Greek philosophy were just as truly preparing the way of Christianity as the Hebrew. Christianity used the forms of the one just as truly as the forms of the other, molding them, transforming them for its own divine purpose. So it used the administrative genius of Rome in the same divine way to give the best organization to the Christian religion. And these Greek and Roman forms, thus used, thus organized, thus transformed, to incorporate and to fix for all time Christian doctrine and Christian institution, are just as truly Christian as the essence of Christianity, and its very substance is embodied in them. The only distinctions that can be made are those of relative importance.

So when the Germanic and Slavonic races came upon the stage of history, and were transformed by Christianity, they did not cease to be Germans and Slavs; they did not become Roman and Greek; they

stamped indelible marks of their own races upon Greek and Roman Christianity, even at the cost of endless divisions and confusions. These divisions and confusions were an inevitable result of the expansion of Christianity. They have certainly enriched Christianity, but at the expense of its unity. Many of them are the results of misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Many of them are due to exaggeration of differences and depreciation of agreements. Many of them represent situations which no longer exist, due to misinterpretations of Holy Scripture, ignorance of Christian history, or use of technical terms in different senses, and the exaggerations inseparable from theological warfare.

It is the work of *Christian symbolics* to determine the real differences and to state them accurately. It is the work of her sister, *irenics*, to look them in the face, search them thoroughly, and so far as practicable reconcile the differences in higher unities.

Christianity now faces the countless millions of eastern Asia and central Africa. We have learned something from the past. We ought not to think of making these nations sectarian Christians or American Christians. We should be content to have them become *real* Christians, leaving them to organize their Christianity in accordance with the genius of their own races.

It is just here that one begins to realize the importance of the study of the religions of the world, a study of their history, a comparison of them, one with another and with Christianity; a discriminating study of them, not rejecting them *en masse*, but conserving and adapting everything that is good in them for the service of Jesus Christ our Lord. The study of the religions of the world is an indispensable part of the work of the graduate school of theology. The more these religions are studied, the more evident it becomes that Jesus Christ did not come into the world to make men Jews, or Greeks, or Romans, or even Britons or Americans, but, as the great apostle tells us: In the new man of Christianity

there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcision and uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman, freeman; but Christ is all and in all.¹⁰

From this point of view any narrowing of the lines of Christianity, whether by sectarian, provincial, national, or racial distinctions, is a distortion of its essential genius.

¹⁰ Col. 3: 11.

A few months ago Germany was startled by what is known as the *Babel-Bibel* controversy. Dr. Delitzsch, of the University of Berlin, stated some facts known to most biblical scholars, indicating that a large part of the religion of Israel was common to Israel and the Babylonians, and in fact derived by Israel from Babylon—raising the question whether there was anything left in the Old Testament that could be regarded as divine in origin. Dr. Delitzsch was correct in the main, so far as he stated facts; but as soon as he began to use archæology as a basis on which to speculate for a revision of theology, he went into waters beyond his depth.

A considerable number of scholars have taken part in public controversy on this subject, and so it has become necessary to explain to the Christian public that the greater portion of the religious institutions of the Bible are not, as has usually been supposed, divine in their origin, but were primarily human institutions, which Israel derived from other nations older and more cultivated than herself. To many people brought up in old-fashioned views of things the whole fabric of the Old Testament seems to be in dissolution. They have vainly struggled against textual criticism and higher criticism and historical criticism, and now archæology—the study of the monuments of Babylonia and Assyria—upon which they had been taught to stay their hopes, breaks in their hands, and pierces them to the very soul. Is, then, the whole Old Testament a vain delusion? Is there nothing more substantial in the Old Testament religion than in other ancient religions?

The situation is, indeed, a cruel one for the anti-critics, but few Old Testament scholars are disturbed by it. They have known all about these things from their first discovery. They have not shut their eyes to any of these facts. They have long ago accepted them and adapted their theology to them.

The religion of the Old Testament, as the religion of the New Testament, was a religion not for Israel alone, but it contained in itself from the start universal principles. As the Christian religion did not hesitate to clothe itself in Greek and Roman forms, so the Old Testament religion clothed itself in the forms provided for it by the great races of antiquity.

As I showed many years ago, Hebrew poetry shows traces of the

influence of Egyptian and of Babylonian poetry alike.¹¹ The poetry of both these great nations of antiquity underlies Hebrew poetry—gave it its forms, its parallelisms, its measures, its strophical organization, and in part even its terminology and phrases. But take Egyptian and Babylonian poetry at their best, and no one would for a moment venture to compare them in religious genius, doctrinal breadth, or ethical power with Hebrew poetry. Only inspired poets could take the forms produced by the greatest nations of antiquity and shape them so as to become the media of a divine religion, not for Israel alone, but for all nations. To what literature can you go where you will find such religious poetry as the Psalter, which expresses now, as it always has and always will, the worship of Jew and Christian alike in all lands and among all nations?

When we study the religious institutions of Israel and trace them in their historical evolution, it is easy to see that the influences which have come upon them from the great nations of antiquity—Babylonia, Egypt, the Hittites, Phœnicia, Syria, Assyria, Persia, and Greece—produced potent effects upon the formal development of the Old Testament religion. Each of these great nations of antiquity made its contribution to Hebrew institutions and to Hebrew thought. Israel was tossed to and fro between them as a shuttlecock, battered and bruised, shaped and reshaped through the centuries. Ever ready to perish, but imperishable; overwhelmed by the religions of the conquering nations, yet unconquerable. All other religions perished, each in its turn; but Israel's religion remained, its unique substance unfolding and adapting itself to every new situation with the ever-recurring vigor of perpetual youth; taking from each religion in turn anything that it could appropriate and use, it went on growing stronger and stronger, richer and richer, more and more comprehensive, until it remained the only really potent and living religion in the ancient world; and out of it was born, as out of it alone could be born, the Son of man, the divine Savior of the world.

It must be evident in the present situation of biblical study in both the Old Testament and New Testament departments, that it is necessary that some men at least should pursue all these questions to the very end. These must be men who are determined to face all

¹¹ *General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture*, pp. 376 ff.

the questions of biblical criticism, biblical theology, and biblical archæology, frankly and fully. These questions must be studied in part by undergraduates. But much will remain which can be accomplished only in graduate courses.

It is the greatness and grandeur of the Jewish religion, as of the Christian religion, that, as the universal religion, it does not despise anything that is human, but in all ages its divine nucleus unfolds in the use of everything that is true and right and good in the other religions of mankind.

The incarnation of the Son of God is the culmination and climax of that divine training of mankind which in every age and every nation clothed itself with all those human forms which were appropriate for its sublime purpose, which could be no other than the gradual, slow, but never-ceasing lifting up of mankind to the Creator, Father, and Savior of the world.

III.

It is evident, from what has been said, that the history of the world is essentially the history of theology, or the history of the knowledge of God.

The knowledge of God does not depend wholly upon the willingness, the ability, and the purpose of God to make himself known. We may be certain that it is the eternal purpose of God that mankind should know him. "This is life eternal," said Jesus Christ, "that they should know thee, the only true God and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ."¹² The ancient prophet predicts that

the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.¹³

And Paul tells us:

And we know that, to them that love God, all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to his purpose. For whom he foreknew he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren.¹⁴

We may be sure, therefore, that any defect in the knowledge of God that ever has been among men has been due altogether to a

¹² John 17: 3.

¹³ Isa. 11: 8; Heb. 2: 14.

¹⁴ Rom. 8: 28, 29.

lack of intellectual or moral capacity in man. The human is capable of the divine, but only in part, whether we think of the individual or of nations or races—learning little by little, year by year, generation after generation, age adding to age.

The realm of knowledge has been so constituted by God that even the knowledge of himself depends in great measure upon the knowledge of man and of the world. In primitive times, even to the Hebrews, God was a God of the Holy Land, attached to local sanctuaries, exile from which involved absence from their God. When the national gods sank to the rank of angels or demons, and Israel's God became the God of gods, the supreme Deity enthroned in the highest heavens, he was still conceived as essentially reigning over the limited territory bounded by the Mediterranean, the Libyan desert, and the mountains of central Asia. They could do no other than conceive of him as a faultless oriental monarch. Even the early Christians were compelled by their mental and physical limitations to think of God to a great extent as a Roman Cæsar, exalted above all human defects and limitations. It was inevitable that Augustine should conceive of his God as essentially sovereign, and of salvation as a free gift of sovereign grace.

The God of the Middle Ages was a superior feudal chief, and every sin, even the least, was against the divine majesty, and so, from that point of view, deserving everlasting punishment in hell fire. The well-nigh universal Christian opinion in the fourteenth Christian century was that the earth was a flat surface, and Jerusalem its center; that the sun and moon and stars were luminaries in the heavens, to give light on the earth; that the entire universe had been created out of nothing a little more than five thousand years before. What could be expected of a theology constructed with such a conception of the universe? They knew nothing of America, or the islands of the East and West Indies; nothing of the millions of eastern Asia, or Africa south of Ethiopia and the great desert. They knew but little of geology or astronomy, or of any of the modern sciences. Their theology was so interwoven and inextricably entwined with errors as to man and nature that to separate them was like plucking tares from a field of growing grain. The greater part of the traditional theology was formed in such an environment

as this. The discovery of America and the rediscovery of ancient classic literature inevitably enlarged the scope of theology and had much to do with the Protestant Reformation; but when one studies the Reformation in its environment, he cannot fail to recognize that in many departments of learning a modern schoolboy is wiser than the greatest of the Reformers.

If we could suppose that their theology was a thing apart—a knowledge having its own independent development, entirely free from influences from other departments of knowledge—we might continue to adhere to it as faithful disciples of masters wiser than ourselves. But it is impossible to take that position. It is certain that the theology of the Reformation assumed the forms of thought provided by the intellectual grooves of the sixteenth century; the systems of theology of the Reformers were determined by the molds of their times; and as these were defective, inadequate, and to a considerable extent erroneous, their systems of theology cannot be regarded as the norms of the modern knowledge of God. The great principles of the Reformation were born of God, and the essential substance of the theology of the Reformation was a normal development of Christianity, but the systems in which these were framed have lost their validity, and many of their dogmatic statements are not in accord with truth and fact.

It was possible to believe, with the Westminster divines, in the baptismal regeneration of elect infants, when the baptism of children was universal in the Christian world. But that limitation of the salvation of infants has become incredible to modern Christians. It was possible, when all that was known of the heathen world were the adherents of the false prophet, a few negroes of the accursed race of Ham, and a fringe of American Indians, who were commonly supposed to be remnants of the lost tribes of Israel—it was possible under such circumstances to affirm with the Articles of Religion:

They also are to be held accursed that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature.¹⁵

But now that the world is known, and it is evident that the

¹⁵ Art. 18.

heathen world greatly outnumbers the nominally Christian world, it is incredible that these countless millions were doomed from birth to everlasting perdition. Modern theologians, whether Catholic or Protestant, have been obliged to find a way of salvation for the heathen world as well as the Christian world, whether we think of a "baptism of desire" or of a following of the light of the Logos "which lighteth every man," or of any other possible scheme. An enlarged knowledge of the world makes many statements of the old theology impossible.

An enlarged view of the universe makes still greater changes inevitable. The heavenly luminaries of the ancients have become to the moderns a multitude of worlds as large as, and many of them vastly larger than, our own. Are any of these countless millions of worlds inhabited? We do not know as yet. It is probable that many of them are. If so, theology must adapt itself to the inhabitants of these other worlds. The older theology excluded from redemption all but the descendants of Adam. It is difficult to find sufficient reasons for such a limitation. It has no biblical support.

Paul conceives of Jesus Christ as the image of the invisible God, in whom all things were created, "things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers;" he stated that "it was the good pleasure of the Father through him to reconcile all things to himself, whether things upon the earth or things in the heavens."¹⁶

On this basis theology may reconstruct itself so as to regard Jesus Christ as the Creator and Redeemer of the universe, no matter how many worlds there may be, even if there be as many inhabitable worlds as there are inhabitants of this world of ours. Jesus Christ the image of the invisible God is the Mediator and Savior of them all.

Some years ago the self-constituted guardians of theology were terribly frightened when geology showed that this earth of ours was myriads of years older than the biblical chronology allowed; when astronomy raised the years of the universe to enormous dimensions; when the law of development made it impossible to accept any longer the order of creation as given in the first chapter of Genesis, or the dogma of the creation of all things out of nothing, in six suc-

¹⁶ Col. 1:15-20.

cessive days. Real biblical scholars, whose minds were open to instruction, were never greatly troubled by these discoveries of modern science. They studied their Bibles, and found that their Bibles were not responsible for the errors of ecclesiastics; that their Bibles did not claim to give an inerrant history of the creation of the world; that the religious value of their Bibles became greater when they were stripped of responsibility for scientific impossibilities. They saw how much more sublime the God of modern science is than the God of the ancients: a God who did not spend an infinitude of years in idleness to begin at last a six days' work of creation, as an episode in endless time, making out of nothing, as by divine magic, an island of existence in a boundless ocean of nonexistence. They knew that there were other and later chapters of the Bible than the first chapter of Genesis, and that some of these teach that God rejoices in creating;¹⁷ that He laid the corner-stone of the earth in festival when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy.¹⁸

God's creative activities reach back into the infinite past. His creations were so wise and grand that they do not need constant attention to correct defects in their construction. They were organized in accordance with wise and all-comprehensive laws, providing for eventualities and emergencies, with a holy and beneficent purpose to carry on the whole and all its parts toward an ultimate ideal, training the entire creation for a final end of glory.

Nothing can be more absurd than for theologians to be afraid of truth and facts, or to shrink from the synthesis of religion, doctrines, and morals, as well as all other things in immutable and eternal laws. Theology is not dependent for its existence upon the amount of the miracle or of the supernatural that may be left after science and criticism have done their work. If it should ever transpire that all miracles could be explained from the use of appropriate means, and all that is called supernatural could be summed up under the category of law, the real facts, the real doctrines of our religion would not change; but only the methods of their explanation. Which is the more glorious—a God who is constantly interfering with his own laws, or he who has so perfected his laws that they brook no

¹⁷ Prov. 8: 30-33.

¹⁸ Job 28: 6, 7.

interference? Which is the nobler life—to submit to the laws of nature as the beneficent laws of our God, or to seek to avoid them and beg for ourselves special exemption from them? The laws of nature are just as truly laws of God as the laws of Moses. The records of the rocks are just as true as the records of Holy Scripture. The prophecies of astronomy are as sure as the predictions of the prophets. There is no schism in the realm of truth; it is all alike, in various degrees and proportions, the teaching of God.

The systematic theology of the future will not be constructed out of arbitrary interpretation of isolated texts of Holy Scripture; it will not be a denominational theology fused in the heat of sectarian polemics; it will not be a sum of the gradual deposits of traditionalism; but it will be constructed by a thorough use of the inductive and genetic methods, searching all the sources, Bible and nature, history and Christian experience, and out of them all organizing a truly living and comprehensive doctrine of God, a divine teaching for the modern age.

We have come into an age of the world in which theology is passing through its greatest transformations. Nothing that is essential to Christianity, nothing that is substantial, nothing that is really valuable, has suffered, or can suffer, the slightest impairment. Christian theology has gone on developing through the centuries under the guidance of the divine Spirit, and this development has been normal and valid. But at certain intervals there must be a thorough renovation, for there is constantly accumulating about the eternal, imperishable doctrine of God, false, imperfect, and distorted conceptions due to the defects of its environment and the intellectual and moral incapacity of man. There is no other way of keeping Christianity pure than to put it in the fire. Only in the fire will the pure gold of theology shine forth, and the wood and stubble of human follies crumble to ashes. There are, however, two kinds of fire. There is the fire of polemics, of dogmatic assertion, of ecclesiastical persecution. But there is also the fire of irenics, of charity and love. Both of these fires have rendered service for the progress of theology. The one is a consuming fire. It is usually kindled in bigotry and designed to prevent any development of the truth. But in reality it is destructive only of error; it refines and makes more glorious the truth. The other

is a fire which quickens with the power of life and enflames with the enthusiasm of progress.

The age of irenics has come—an age whose supreme conception of God is love, whose highest estimation of Christ is love, whose ideal of Christian perfection is love. The time has come when love should become the great material principle of theology—reconstructing theology itself, reconciling differences between theology and other departments of learning, resolving the difficulties of Christianity, and working toward an ultimate reunion of Christendom.

The great fields of study that invite us here are Christian ethics, Christian sociology, Christian ecclesiology, and Christian irenics. Upon these studies of the graduate school of theology to a great extent depends the future of Christianity in our land and throughout the world.

We fully recognize that the church needs great preachers and great workers as truly as it needs great theologians. But such men are few. They are born with the necessary gifts and endowments. They cannot be made. But such may be persuaded to postpone marriage; to decline calls to comfortable fields of service; to refuse the temptation to a premature exercise of their natural gifts and graces; and, after the example of Jesus and his apostles, and many of the greatest heroes of Christianity, they may determine to hold themselves in reserve until they have cultivated themselves to the utmost possible degree for the greatest of all ministries.

It is a common complaint that the ministry is not what it used to be; that it does not summon to its work as high a class of men as in former times; that the strongest and the most ambitious of the young men prefer other pursuits. This is in part true and in part false. The reason for the real facts of the case are serious defects in theological education. Theology does not, as it is commonly taught, appeal to the best intellects. It does not give the scholar the same freedom of investigation and liberty of conscience that he is sure of in other studies. It does not promise him a sufficiently secure field of usefulness. It does not often invite him to heroic endeavors.

The graduate school of theology should strive to overcome these evils. It should offer to the student the highest, the most compre-

hensive, the most thorough of all studies. It should guarantee him entire freedom of investigation and perfect liberty of conscience.

Then the study of theology will become again a study worth vastly more than any sacrifice or hardship it may cost. It is a study upon which more than any other the future of humanity depends. It is a study which brings into fellowship with prophets and apostles, with all the saints, with Jesus Christ, and with God the Heavenly Father. It is a study which calls forth all that is best within a man—his moral and religious as well as his intellectual powers. It is a study which in all its parts may be animate with love to God and love to mankind. It is a study which men may share with angels and the spirits of the blessed. It is a study which knows no end. Other studies will pass away with the decay of the body and the departure of the world; but the study of theology, begun in this world, will go on forever, richer, fuller, and more glorious, in any and every world, in any and every dispensation, in which God may place us through all the ages of eternity.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

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PROFESSOR SALMOND, writing in the *Critical Review*¹ of the appearance of Gore's Bampton lectures for 1891, on *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, said: "It is a book of note, both for its own merits and as a token that the time is at hand when the attention which has been concentrated on questions of criticism will pass to the great questions of doctrine." The remark was abundantly justified during the following decade, at least as regards the doctrine with which Canon Gore dealt. Perhaps no similar period in the history of the church witnessed the production of so large a volume of literature upon Christology. Canon Gore's lectures, revealing the intrusion of kenotic views into the Anglican fold, were in part responsible for this activity, but beyond the bounds of that communion there was scarcely less thought along the same line. Fortunately, there has been little controversy. There have been sharp differences of opinion, but few charges of heresy, and only one case of arraignment for views advanced, viz., that of Professor Gilbert, of Chicago Theological Seminary. Hence no smoke of battle has obscured the field of investigation.

Gore followed his Bampton lectures with his *Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation*, in which, besides discussing the virgin-birth and the relation of the idea of transubstantiation to the doctrine of the incarnation, he developed further his kenotic views with relation to the consciousness of our Lord in his mortal life. Fairbairn set forth *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*, with especial reference to the critical movement in Germany. Gordon, in his *Christ of To-Day*, showed the relation of the doctrine of Christ to some of the larger scientific, philosophical, and ethical movements of the time. Powell, in his *Principle of the Incarnation*, has unconsciously given the *reductio ad absurdum* of the two-nature

¹ Vol. II, p. 101.

hypothesis. Ottley, in his *Doctrine of the Incarnation*, has retraced the path of Dorner along the line of history. Somerville has expounded *St. Paul's Conception of Christ* by a careful biblico-theological investigation. Forrest, in his *Christ of History and of Experience*, has attempted to follow the mundane consciousness of Christ over into his supra-mundane activity. Gifford, in his *Incarnation*, has produced a painstaking study of the crucial passage, Phil. 2:5-11. Gilbert, in his two volumes, *The Revelation of Jesus* and *The First Interpreters of Jesus*, has familiarized English readers with the "ideal pre-existence" formerly advocated by Beyschlag and Harnack, now in part abandoned by both. Paine, in his two works, *The Evolution of Trinitarianism* and *Ethnic Trinities*, has attempted to show that the whole Trinitarian movement is the outgrowth of a false philosophy. W. L. Walker, in perhaps the most noteworthy work of all, *The Spirit and the Incarnation*, has set forth the two Christian doctrines of the Holy Spirit and the incarnation in their indissoluble relation.² I have not been able to trace a similar activity of thought in other than English-speaking lands, but no list of works upon Christology within this period would be complete without reference to the New Testament biblical theologies of Beyschlag and Holtzmann, and to Wendt's *Teaching of Jesus*, which are quite as significant as anything which has been written.

But, in spite of the learning and skill devoted to the study of the subject, there is one branch of it that has received very little attention, and that is the movement of thought within the New Testament itself. That there are different types of teaching upon the subject in the New Testament is patent to every thoughtful reader, but interpreters have almost uniformly sought a mere reconciliation of these types. The result has been determined by the dogmatic pre-

² Other works upon the theme within this period, of more or less significance, are: ORR, *The Christian View of God and the World*; STEENSTRA, *The Being of God as Trinity and as Unity*; WHITON, *Gloria Patri*; *The Divinity of Jesus Christ* by the authors of *Progressive Orthodoxy*; MASON, *The Conditions of Our Lord's Life on Earth*; BRIGGS, *The Messiah of the Gospels* and *The Messiah of the Apostles*; SWAYNE, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*; DU BOSE, *Soteriology of the New Testament*; BISHOP HALL, *Christ's Temptation and Ours*; F. J. HALL, *The Kenotic Theory*; HAWKESWORTH, *De Incarnatione*; RICHEY, *The Incarnation and the Kenosis*; ADAMSON, *Studies in the Mind of Christ*; SIMON, *Reconciliation through Incarnation*; ILLINGWORTH, *Divine Immanence*; STALKER, *Christology of Jesus*; GRIFFITH-JONES, *Ascent through Christ*.

suppositions of the author. One school accepts the more rudimentary type of New Testament teaching, and either by *tours de force* of exegesis reduces all seemingly higher types to the level of the lower (Beyschlag, Wendt, Gilbert), or else regards all higher types as simply speculative perversions of the simplicity of Christ's teaching (Harnack, Holtzmann, Paine). The other school, to which the majority of the writers named belong, plants itself upon the higher type of teaching, and either reads it into the lower type by forcing the meaning of terms, or else claims that the higher type supplements or supersedes the lower with a more authoritative doctrine. Meanwhile the question remains unanswered as to the way in which there came to be varieties of doctrine in the New Testament. What were the psychological processes in the minds of New Testament writers as they meditated upon the person of Christ? Do the different types of thought lie merely side by side, psychologically unrelated to each other, or are they stages of a process of thought; and, if the latter, are they related to each other simply as less and more, or are there transitional views, not permanently tenable in themselves and significant only as showing a trend? The answer to these questions will furnish the only possible irenicon between contending schools.

To put the problem in a different form: Here was a being who lived a human life—was born, grew, lived, spoke, thought, suffered, and died as a man. Within at most a century of his disappearance from the earth he was worshiped as God, and a belief in his deity was frankly avowed by large circles of sane and intelligent people. That a man of the common people should have been exalted to such rank would have been a startling fact even in Athens or Rome, with all their pantheons and their myths of apotheoses and divine incarnations. That it came about in monotheistic Judea, with its transcendent Deity, is at first thought simply amazing. Our problem is: How did it occur? We must leave out of account the question as to the justification of the process in order to determine the process itself. Most christological investigation is unsatisfactory because of the insecurity of its biblico-theological foundation. Most investigation of the New Testament doctrine is vitiated by the intrusion of dogmatic presuppositions. Dogmatic conclusions are indispensable,

but it goes without saying that they should never be drawn until the facts upon which they rest have been properly determined.

Two of our gospels open with narratives of the miraculous conception of Jesus. It has frequently been assumed that belief in his deity was the result of the acceptance of this putative divine Fatherhood. But the fact is that the miraculous conception formed no part of the apostolic preaching, and could not have been generally known in Christian circles until after the process of which we are speaking had been substantially completed. Jesus was recognized as divine by the early Christians long before they knew anything of the miraculous conception. So far as our present investigation is concerned, belief in the miraculous conception of Jesus might much rather have been a consequence of belief in his deity than a cause of it. In general, the story of the miraculous conception is inadequate to account for a belief in the deity of Jesus. Nothing in the narratives of the miraculous conception enables us to discern in it more than a physical fact. The deity of Jesus was in any case a spiritual fact. Neither our metaphysics nor our psychology enables us to establish a necessary connection between the physical and the spiritual in any particular case; how much less did those of the first century? So far as can be seen, Jesus might just as well have been divine by a natural conception. He need not have been divine by a miraculous conception. As Whiton says,³ it is "a most inconsequent bit of logic by which theologians assert that a specific physiological process—the miraculous conception of the Holy Child—is the necessary basis of such a spiritual fact as a life whose ethical glory is manifestly divine."⁴ Christian theology has never been able to establish any plausible relation between the reputed fact and the accepted doctrine. The only suggestion that has ever been made is that the miraculous conception was necessary to free Jesus from the taint of the sinful inheritance of humanity, but no plausible reason has ever been assigned why that taint would not descend in one line of human ancestry as well as in two. The narratives of the miraculous conception therefore lie outside of our present investigation, and stand or fall on their own merits, irrespective of other Christian teachings.

We have left, then, as our starting-point, only the self-consciousness

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

⁴ WALKER, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

of Jesus as reflected in his words. Every belief regarding him must in the end justify itself out of that self-consciousness. No one could ever have known anything about the inner depths of his nature of which he himself was ignorant. For his words we are confined to the first three gospels. In view of its obvious differences from the first three, we cannot use the fourth indiscriminately. Criticism has in general established the reliability of the synoptic gospels, while it discredits the fourth, denying to it the character of a colorless narrative of the deeds and words of Jesus.

The Jesus of the synoptic gospels does not call himself God, and does not speak as God. On the contrary, the God of his people is his God. He worships that God, to him he prays, of him he speaks as his Father. He acknowledges dependence upon God even in his ethical life in words as plain as it is possible to make them. To be sure, he never associates himself with his disciples in any allusion to God by the use of the first person plural, but neither, according to the Pentateuch, did Moses thus associate himself with Israel. The fact may arise from Jesus' consciousness of a unique fellowship with God in which he was aware the disciples had no share. He need not have been conscious of co-essential deity to be conscious of an entirely unique relationship to the Father which would make an association of himself with his disciples in allusions to the Father inappropriate. He never asserts nor intimates pre-existence.

To all this it may be replied that Jesus does accept from others the title "Son of God," and that he directly or indirectly designates himself as "the Son," thereby confessing to essential deity. But everything here turns upon the question what the term "Son of God" connoted on the lips of those who used it. What did demoniacs, Peter in his great confession, and Caiaphas at the trial of Jesus, mean by it? Whatever the Jews may then have anticipated regarding their Messiah, they did not anticipate in any sense that he would be divine. Even if it were true that a divine revelation had been vouchsafed to Peter, or a Satanic revelation to the demoniacs, Caiaphas had received no revelation, and he used the term only in its current signification. If used by him as a title of the Messiah, the presumption is that it was so used by others. But Caiaphas plainly makes it a synonym of Messiah: "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?"^s

^s Mark 14:61.

The charge of blasphemy that follows would certainly have lain, according to Jewish conceptions, against anyone falsely assuming messianic prerogatives. That "Son of God" was a current messianic title cannot be proved from contemporaneous Jewish literature, but such use lay close at hand, and probably it was so used, though the literature does not reflect it. No Jew acquainted with the second Psalm and with 2 Sam. 7:14 could fail to identify the title with the Messiah. It was doubtless something more than a mere designation of the Messiah, as it added the thought of the peculiar honor in which he was held of God. On Jesus' lips it is the expression of that filial consciousness out of which messiahship flowed.

All men, as creatures of God, his children; Israel the favorite heir and first-born among the peoples; the theocratic kings the sons of God in an especial sense; the Messiah the unique Son and middle point of a kingdom in which the conception of sonship finally again embraces all and regains its original universality upon a higher plane—these are the stages of the gradual narrowing and reactive widening which this chain of ideas runs through in its now theoretic-natural, now human-ethical applications.⁶

But neither in the popular view nor in Jesus' own did sonship imply pre-existence. As to the other title by which Jesus commonly designated himself, "Son of man," happily that type of exegesis is becoming obsolete which inferred that because Jesus so designated himself he meant precisely the reverse. The dispute over the Aramaic original of the term and its signification is not finished, but it can at least be said that if Jesus used the term as messianic, following the usage in Enoch, which in turn is based upon Daniel, then it was the most colorless of current designations of the Messiah—a "veiled" term, as Beyschlag calls it—and was most open to such special content as Jesus chose to put into it.⁷

While all this is true, there are at the same time utterances of Jesus which open mysterious depths in his consciousness, flashes of a life that is altogether unique among the sons of men. He forgives sin. He claims lordship over the sabbath. He calmly expands or nullifies the divine law, given, according to Hebrew tradition, at Sinai. He assumes a position of sonship over against God's servants, the prophets. He anticipates sitting as the final judge of men. He

⁶ HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 265.

⁷ BEYSCHLAG, *op. cit.*, 2d ed., Vol. I, pp. 65 ff.

gives the keys of the kingdom of heaven. He speaks of his coming on the clouds of heaven. He promises to confess before his Father in heaven those who confess him upon earth. If the baptismal formula be an authentic utterance of Jesus, then he associates himself with the Father and the Holy Spirit as an object of confession. "All things," he says, "have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son save the Father, neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him."⁸ This passage determines the measure of the term "Son" in its inner significance for Jesus. It means that to him had been granted the final and perfect revelation of God to men.

The justification of the expression depends upon the religio-ethical absoluteness of Jesus, by virtue of which he is the complete revelation of God, in himself hidden.⁹

These utterances may be divided into two classes—assumptions of a unique official position with reference to men, and expressions of a unique fellowship with God. The latter are reinforced by his whole life, by the perfect freedom of his relation to God, by the absolute assurance of his approach to the Father, and by the absence of any traces of a consciousness of sin.

He who has widened to infinity the bounds of personal obligation, and intensified in men the abiding sense of lost opportunities and dishonored ideals, himself retains the unclouded serenity which is "the bright consummate flower" of self-realization. This is not a different attainment in goodness, it is a different type of moral character, another order of humanity.¹⁰

His saying, "None is good save one, even God,"¹¹ receives its significance in the light of this fact of consciousness.

He will not allow the rich young ruler to imagine that his goodness proceeds from within himself, and that it is some secret by which the young man, too, can be taught to make himself good with a self-made goodness, and worthy of eternal life. Such a notion could only start the man again upon that weary path of pharisaic self-righteousness which inevitably ends in failure and bitter disappointment. "If you think me good," he seems to say, "I can assure you that that goodness comes from a source that is higher than myself, and that source is one from which you also may draw. The only way in which human character can be trained for eternal life is by humble, constant waiting, hanging upon God."¹²

⁸ Matt. 11:27.

¹⁰ FORREST, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁹ BEYSLAG, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 77.

¹¹ Mark 10:18. ¹² MASON, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

In other words, the passage confirms the thought of the unique fellowship of Jesus' soul with the Father. The measure of the exaltation of Jesus' life above every other is the fulness of the inflowing into him of the divine character.

Such utterances lead us, and must have led his immediate disciples, into the presence of a deeper mystery about the consciousness of Jesus. There were depths not easily fathomed, heights not easily scaled. In every human life there are

. . . obstinate questionings
Of sense and outward things,
Fallings from us, vanishings,
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized.¹³

We are, none of us, merely human. But in Jesus this divine background of life was intensified in the highest possible degree, into the consciousness of an entirely unique and unutterable fellowship with God. God was infinitely close to Jesus of Nazareth, where, in spite of all "blank misgivings," he is infinitely distant from other men. Such fellowship, being ethical, tends toward the limit of personal identity.

The disciples of Jesus found that through their relationship to him they, too, were brought into a closer relationship to God. They were led in the direction of the same consciousness that reigned in him. The characteristic of the Christian life was this new fellowship with God, and Jesus was its mediator and fountain.

The men who entered into his consciousness looked at God with his eyes, thought of God in his way, learned to speak of God in his terms, and bequeathed to us as their abiding legacy an interpretation of Christ which was an interpretation of God.¹⁴

It was inevitable that before the fact of this new life all thought of Jesus in a merely official relation must give way. Messiahship must take on a purely spiritual character, and divine sonship must become more and more the expression of this character. Traces of this change of view are present in the synoptic gospels, but it is a witness to the trustworthiness of those narratives that this spiritually heightened significance of messiahship has not been allowed to

¹³ WORDSWORTH, "Ode on Intimations of Immortality."

¹⁴ FAIRBAIRN, *op. cit.*, p. 376; see also GORDON, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

influence Jesus' own words. It appears in the words of the evangelist, or in the words of others regarding Jesus—words the tradition of which we may conceive to have remained in a more fluid condition than that of Jesus' own utterances. Such, for instance, are the words of the angel of the annunciation in the first chapter of Luke.

Paul knew Christ immediately in no other way than as the source of a new relation to God, the mediator of forgiveness and of a new spiritual life. Hence messiahship takes on for him an altogether spiritual character. Jesus is Messiah because he has wrought this spiritual result. "When it was the good pleasure of God . . . to reveal his Son in me"¹⁵—sonship here is palpably exalted above any possible current conception of messiahship.

The Christ of Paul is the Christ of his experience, Christ interpreted to him by his vivid consciousness of the divine life which he owed to him. His Christology is the account of that experience in the terms suggested by thought and reflection upon it.¹⁶

Paul's thought of Christ as his Master began with the post-existent Christ, Christ in exaltation in the heavenly world. Every spiritual gift was "in Christ" and "through Christ." In other words, that post-existence had as its function the mediatorship of the fruits of his earthly life, reconciliation with God and the life of sonship, to the members of his mystic body, the church. Hence the uniform association of Christ with God. The earliest sentence which we have from Paul's pen, the salutation of First Thessalonians, may stand for the whole: "Paul, and Silvanus, and Timothy, unto the church of the Thessalonians in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ: Grace to you and peace."

The most difficult problem in Paul's Christology is to determine how his thought passed from the post-existence to the pre-existence of Christ. Holtzmann¹⁷ and Beyschlag,¹⁸ together with most Lutheran interpreters, find the middle term in the heavenly man of 1 Cor. 15:47. This man is "a life-giving spirit." He is the spiritual archetype of humanity. But I cannot persuade myself that this passing allusion to the second Adam as the man from heaven is

¹⁵ Gal. 1: 15, 16.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 68 ff.

¹⁶ SOMERVILLE, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 66 ff.

important enough to carry the weight laid upon it. It seems rather like an inference from an already accepted idea than the means of attaining that idea. His allusion to Christ as "the spiritual rock" which followed the Israelites¹⁹ might seem more vital, as it carries the mediatorship of his post-existence back into his pre-existent state.

But it is not to be overlooked that even in First Corinthians, hence in the earlier stage of his thought (Holtzmann would say, in his only genuine writings), Paul ascribed to Christ cosmic functions. "To us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him; and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we through him."²⁰ We can here see mediatorship of the new spiritual life of believers passing over into mediatorship of the divine life in general to the world. Such mediatorship could not have begun in time. It must have preceded creation, and its bearer was necessarily "the first-born of all creation."²¹ Such mediatorship between God and the world of his creation was the *motif* of most of the systems of thought of the age. Especially did Philo busy himself with the problem. Palestinian theology was scarcely less interested in it, as is witnessed by the functions assigned to the *Memra* in the teachings of the rabbis. Paul could hardly have been uninfluenced by these speculations. In later writings Paul (or, according to some critics, a Pauline writer) was busy with the intrusion of these speculations into the church in a form which threatened the sole mediatorship of Christ.

In general, the thought of pre-existence could not have lain far from Paul's thought of the Messiah. The investigations of Clemen and Charles may be accepted as having demonstrated the pre-Christian origin of the similitudes of the book of Enoch, and so as having proved, not only the use of the term "Son of man" in a personal sense of the Messiah, but also the idea of a pre-existent Messiah as current at least in some circles of Jewish thought. It would be strange if the Messiah had not been thought of as pre-existent. Moses was thought of as pre-existent,²² the heavenly Jerusalem was

¹⁹ 1 Cor. 10:4.

²⁰ 1 Cor. 8:6.

²¹ Col. 1:15.

²² *Assump. Mos.*, 1:14. The offices assigned to Moses in this book run so closely parallel to those assigned by Christian thought to the Christ that it is hard to avoid a suspicion that the book was written as a polemic against advancing Christianity.

shown to Adam and to Moses,²³ every soul was created before the foundation of the world,²⁴ and even the place of abode of each soul.²⁵ In the Old Testament we have the furniture of the tabernacle, hence the tabernacle itself, pre-existing in heaven.²⁶ John sees the holy city, the new Jerusalem, descending out of heaven from God;²⁷ and Paul speaks as if the good works of Christians pre-existed, prepared beforehand by God that we should walk in them.²⁸ This mode of thought is more than Jewish, it is Semitic. The Mohammedan believes that the Koran pre-existed, written on leaves of gold; one Mohammedan sect believes that Ali pre-existed;²⁹ and I doubt not authorities could be found for the pre-existence of Mohammed himself. The "ideal pre-existence" formerly urged by Beyschlag and Harnack, and more recently by Wendt and Gilbert, is precisely what no Semitic thinker could conceive. All pre-existence was real. The purely ideal was beyond his grasp.

It is not fair, however, to assume that the pre-existence of Christ meant no more to Paul than the pre-existence ascribed to so wide a variety of objects.³⁰ In these cases it signified no more than the sheer inability of the Semitic thinker to grasp the purely ideal. Pre-existence was purely passive. In Paul the pre-existent Christ emerges from this passivity to become the organ of creation, and so to assume a most important function. The Jewish idea of a pre-existent Messiah forms only the background of Paul's thought. All else is accounted for by the growing thought of mediatorship.

But how did Paul conceive of the pre-existent Christ? Here the crucial passage is Phil. 2:5-8. Gifford's study,³¹ expanding Lightfoot's notes,³² must for the present be taken as the basis of discussion. The crucial word in this passage is *ἀρπαγμόν*, translated in the Authorized Version "robbery;" in the Revised Version, "a prize;" in the American Revision and margin of the Revised,

²³ *Apoc. Bar.*, 4: 2-7.

²⁶ *Exod.* 25: 40; *cf.* *Heb.* 8: 5.

²⁴ *Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, 23: 5.

²⁷ *Rev.* 21: 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 49: 2.

²⁸ *Eph.* 2: 10.

²⁹ CURTISS, *Primitive Semitic Religion Today*, p. 107.

³⁰ BEYSCHLAG makes this assumption, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 261 f.

³¹ *The Incarnation: A Study of Phil.*, 2: 5-11.

³² *Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians*.

"a thing to be grasped." Gifford rightly rejects the first rendering, because it is no proper alternative to what follows the *ἀλλά* ("but"). But he then accepts the second rendering, following Lightfoot's definition, "a highly prized possession, an unexpected gain."³³ This misses the fundamental significance of the word brought out in the third rendering. Derived from *ἀπράζω*, "to seize," it can mean only the act or the object of a violent seizure, and this Lightfoot's earlier references abundantly prove. In this passage the meaning "the act of seizure" being excluded, it can refer only to the object of a seizure, past, present, or future. But it is ethically unthinkable and grammatically impossible that it should here be asserted that Christ Jesus regarded "being on an equality with God" as the object of a past act of seizure, as the booty of an act of violence. Consequently the act of seizure is yet in the future, and its object is not yet in his grasp. The force of the passage is that he refused to be guilty of that act.

We now have the key to the meaning of the whole passage. Paul exhorts the Philippians to imitate the example of Christ, who, contemplating that existence on an equality with God which he did not possess, but which he conceivably might have seized, renounced such an expression of ambition, and instead laid aside even that advantage which he already possessed, and illustrated the profoundest humility. He emptied himself—of what? Not of the "being on equality with God," for he did not possess that. There is only one thing left of which he could have emptied himself, and that is the "existing in the form of God."³⁴

To this Gifford makes two objections: first, the imperfect participle "existing" (A. V. and R. V. "being," *ὑπάρχων*) refers to indefinitely continued action, not to action terminating when that of the principal verb begins.³⁵ Certainly, but the principal verb is "thought," *ἠγγήσατο*, not "emptied," *ἐκένωσεν*, which refers to a subsequent act. An imperfect participle does not express action necessarily continued forever, and in this case the action terminates when that of *ἐκένωσεν* begins. Secondly, Gifford argues that

³³ GIFFORD, *op. cit.*, p. 65; LIGHTFOOT, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³⁴ This is essentially the view of PFLEIDERER, *Paulinism*, Vol. I, pp. 147 f.

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.

the word "form," *μορφή*, has the Aristotelian meaning of "the nature or essence, not in the abstract, but as actually subsisting in the individual. and retained as long as the individual exists."³⁶ Consequently, "the form of God" could not be laid aside. But Lightfoot and Gifford have gone far afield for their interpretation when they have turned to the refined and artificial usage of Aristotle. Paul did not usually go to the philosophers for his vocabulary. The only other undoubted passage in the New Testament where the word is used is the description of the transfiguration in Luke, where it is said that "the fashion (*μορφή*) of his countenance was altered."³⁷ In the parallel accounts it is said that he was "transfigured" (*μετεμορφώθη*).³⁸ According to Aristotelian usage, this would mean that his countenance lost its distinguishing features, or even that it ceased to be a countenance at all; whereas all that the context suggests is that his countenance acquired a peculiar light or glory that shone upon it or from it. Indeed, the frequent use in the New Testament of the cognate words *μορφώω*, *μεταμορφώω*, *συμμορφίζω*, *συμμορφός*—all expressing changes of form which leave the individual still existing—refute the idea that the Aristotelian usage is normative. Nay, in our passage Christ is referred to as taking upon him "the form of a servant," which even Gifford must admit left his individuality untouched. If a *μορφή* could be assumed without prejudice to the individuality, it could equally well be laid aside.

Paul does not further define what he means by "the form of God" in which Christ pre-existed, but it stands in contrast to "the form of a servant" which he assumed. Now, servitude to Paul means bondage under the law,³⁹ and the law acquires its power through the flesh.⁴⁰ If we may hazard a guess, it is that by "the form of God" Paul meant an existence as pure spirit, and by taking "the form of a servant" he meant the assumption of the flesh with all that it involved.

Paul's pre-existent Christ therefore was not God. He did not even exist on an equality with God. His final exaltation was not to deity,⁴¹

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁷ 9: 29. Mark 16: 12 is similar, but it is in the disputed conclusion of the gospel.

³⁸ Matt. 17: 2; Mark 9: 2.

⁴⁰ Rom. 8: 3.

³⁹ Rom. 8: 15; 5: 1; Gal. 4: 24.

⁴¹ *Contra*, HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 371.

but only to "a name that is above every name." With this agree Paul's allusions to "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,"⁴² and his doctrine of the final surrender of the kingdom to God.⁴³ Paul never calls Christ God. The only possible exceptions (Rom. 9:5; Tit. 2:13) are equally well explained in other ways; and, in spite of Sanday and Headlam's conclusion⁴⁴ that the weight of authority is slightly in favor of the reference of the term "God" to Christ in Rom. 9:5, we must hold to the uniform usage of Paul, unless compelled to abandon it by exegetical necessities. Much, indeed, is to be said in favor of the idea that the doxology of this passage is the gloss of an early copyist.

Thought could not remain at this point. Paul's Christology is in transition. His pre-existent Christ is a person in every sense of the term, but a person alongside of God—not God, and certainly not man. Paul falls short of the mediatorship which he is seeking because his Mediator is neither strictly God nor strictly man. Much of the confusion of christological discussion arises from regarding Paul as having reached the highest point of thought regarding the person of Christ.

The epistle to the Hebrews marks a slight advance in the direction of the identification of the Mediator with God. He is the "effulgence" (*ἀπαύγασμα*) of the divine glory, and "the very image (*χαρακτῆρ*) of his substance."⁴⁵ He is related to God as light to flame, as seal to the die which is cast from it. The only reference in Paul which approaches this is that to Christ as "the image (*εἰκόν*) of the invisible God;"⁴⁶ but "image" does not suggest the intimacy of relation implied by the words in Hebrews, nor can it be related to the "substance" (*ὑπόστασις*) of God, as can the other. Before the end of the chapter, and in those immediately succeeding, we find sonship treated as something deeper than spiritual fellowship, that is, as something metaphysical. Moreover, the Son is, in quotations, directly addressed as God and Lord, in the Old Testament sense of the latter term. The Son of the epistle to the Hebrews is unequivocally divine, though this deity is won at the expense of ditheism.⁴⁷

⁴² Rom. 15:6; 2 Cor. 1:3; 11:31; Eph. 1:3.

⁴³ 1 Cor. 15:24-28.

⁴⁴ *International Critical Commentary on Romans*, p. 238.

⁴⁵ Heb. 1:3.

⁴⁶ 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15.

⁴⁷ HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 298.

The final stage of the christological development of the New Testament is found in the prologue to the fourth gospel. Here mediatorship is carried into the Godhead itself as an eternal, integral part of the infinitely rich and complex life of the Deity. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him; and without him was not anything made that hath been made." *In the Godhead is mediatorship.* There is no need of a separate personality alongside of God to be Mediator between God and the world, for God includes in himself the function of mediation. In due time this mediatorial activity or life of God became incarnate in the historical human being, Jesus of Nazareth. "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth."

To this subsumption of the Word under God the objection is made that in the clause, "the Word was God," the predicate noun lacks the article (*θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*), and hence all that is asserted is that the Word was divine, not that the Word was God. The answer is that the use of the article would have converted the clause into an identical proposition; the word was identical with God, was the whole of God, was all that there was of God. The author means nothing of the kind, while he does mean that the Word was one of the eternal modes of the divine Being. The Greek word *θεός* was not used in the New Testament in such a loose way as is our word "divine."

Thus far all is comparatively simple and clear. When we come to the gospel itself, we have expressions from Jesus which carry us back to a personal pre-existence alongside of God—a continuity of consciousness between his earthly and his pre-existent state. "No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man."⁴⁸ "What, then, if ye should behold the Son of man ascending where he was before?"⁴⁹ "Before Abraham was I am."⁵⁰ "Glorify thou me with thine own glory which I had with thee before the world was."⁵¹ These utterances recall the double aspect under which the fourth gospel is to be viewed. On the one hand, it is not a mere work of fancy, not the elaboration of a theological system in the form of a historical romance. It is bound by the

⁴⁸ John 3:13.⁴⁹ 6:62.⁵⁰ 8:58.⁵¹ 17:5.

tradition of the historical Jesus. On the other hand, it is an interpretation of Jesus rather than a literal report of his words and deeds.⁵² The whole gospel is written in the light of the teaching of the prologue, and with a view to illustrating the various ideas there advanced, as Holtzmann demonstrates.⁵³ The word "Logos," to be sure is not repeated because it would have been inappropriate on the lips of the historical Jesus; because, in fact, he did not use it. On the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that utterances of the historical Jesus receive an interpretation in the light of the ideas of the prologue by which they are somewhat altered. "I and the Father are one."⁵⁴ "The Father knoweth me and I know the Father."⁵⁵ "The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing."⁵⁶ "I am come [down from heaven], not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me."⁵⁷ Omitting the words in brackets in the last quotation, all of these expressions would be appropriate on the lips of the Jesus of the synoptics. The utterances of the synoptics pointing to a mysterious background of consciousness have already been discussed. Can it be doubted that, underlying the expressions of the fourth gospel implying continuity of consciousness with a pre-existent state, there are utterances similar to those of the synoptics—utterances which have received a peculiar turn, in view of the doctrines held by the author and set forth in the prologue?⁵⁸ What better explanation can be found of the fact that the Jesus of the synoptics is never conscious of pre-existence, while the Jesus of the fourth gospel is sometimes conscious of a pre-existence in all the divine glory, and again is conscious only of the same relation of subordination to and dependence upon the Father as the Jesus of the synoptics?

This brings us to the question of the personality of the Logos. It is hardly possible in this connection to avoid the equivocal use of the word "person" which has vitiated so much modern Trinitarian discussion.⁵⁹ That the Logos was personal in and with the personality of God, that the Logos was not a mere emanation from God, or a power going forth from God, may be asserted with all confidence. But the question is: Had the Logos a personality separate from the

⁵² FAIRBAIRN, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

⁵⁵ 10: 15.

⁵³ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 396 ff.

⁵⁶ 5: 19.

⁵⁸ WALKER, *op. cit.*, pp. 218 f.

⁵⁴ John 10: 30.

⁵⁷ 6: 38.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

personality of God the Father? No such question rose consciously upon the mind of the author of the fourth gospel, for the very conception of personality had not been formulated in ancient thought, Greek or Hebrew. All we can seek is latent presuppositions. Holtzmann here lays stress upon the use of the masculine instead of the neuter pronouns.⁶⁰ But how could the masculine *ὁ λόγος* be represented by anything else than masculine pronouns? The Logos certainly acquired a personality separate from God and complete in the historical Jesus, and it is easy to see that all the appearance of separate personality of the pre-incarnate Logos might be a reflex of this later state. Even this appearance of separate personality is lost in the opening sentence of the first epistle of John, where the pre-existent entity made manifest in the historical Jesus is boldly treated as neuter. If the above account of the development of christological conceptions in the New Testament is correct, then it is clear that the tendency of thought is toward the inclusion of the eternal Mediator between God and the world, and God and man, within the personality of the one God.⁶¹ All that gives a different appearance to the Logos of the fourth gospel is his identification with the historical Jesus of Nazareth.

But what of the justification of this process of reflection? Is it a mere speculation, of no more significance to us than a mere judgment of value? The question is whether such a life as that of Jesus of Nazareth recounted in the synoptic gospels, with all its mysterious heights and depths of consciousness, could have been lived without forcing a modification of the conception of God held before his coming? Here was a man who certainly stood closer to God than any other who had ever lived. Did he not give thought a new approach to God, a new fact to work upon, and that a fact surpassing every other in its significance for the interpretation of the divine nature? There can be but one answer to this question. Accepting the necessity of a modification of the thought of God in view of the life and consciousness of Jesus, it remains to ask whether that modification could have proceeded, or does today proceed, on any other lines than those laid down in the New Testament, pre-eminently in the prologue

⁶⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 394.

⁶¹ WALKER, *op. cit.*, p. 214; HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 414.

to the fourth gospel. In that prologue, to use Hegelian language, thought returns upon itself. The apprehension of God the Father implicit in the consciousness of the historic Jesus is unfolded and made explicit. We are carried back from the language of feeling and immediate consciousness to the eternal facts presupposed in them. If Jesus was what the synoptics represent him to have been, then God is what the prologue to the fourth gospel represents him to be.

I am not prepared to enter upon the discussion of the christological controversies of the church; but if Paine is approximately correct in his statement of the facts, then Arius planted himself upon the shortcomings of Paul's teaching; Athanasius and the Nicene fathers stood in general on the ground of the epistle to the Hebrews; Augustine and the pseudo-Athanasian creed have moved on to the prologue of the fourth gospel; modern Trinitarianism reads all in the light of a clearer apprehension of the historical Jesus and of the nature of personality.

THE LOGIC OF EVOLUTION.

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THE word "evolution" is one of the significant and masterful words in the thought of our times. As everyone knows, various classes of people regard the doctrine of evolution with very different emotions. Some conjure with it and construe everything in its categories. Others fear it and lose no opportunity of discounting its claims. But among scientific writers, says Professor LeConte, there is no longer any discussion of the general truth of the law of evolution; the only differences of opinion relate to the causes of the law. Among Christian theologians there has long been a widespread fear of the law of evolution, due in a large measure to the feeling that it means the elimination of religion and immortality and God from human thought.

It is not the purpose of this paper to appraise or to controvert the theory of evolution. Whether evolution, as it is now defined, be a valid and satisfactory theory of the origin and development of things does not here concern us. The fact is that many persons accept the theory as a logical and reasonable explanation of the origin and development of the cosmic and vital order. And the fact remains, also, that in the name of evolution many of the things that Christian men hold dear are questioned or rejected by many evolutionists. And the further fact remains that in the name of evolution conclusions are often drawn which seem to negative many of the Christian's dearest hopes.

For one, I am convinced that this is a great mistake. I am satisfied that the logic of evolution does not negative one of these dear hopes of the Christian believer. The truth is that many of those who profess and call themselves evolutionists are wholly unaware of the logical implications of their belief. They accept the theory, but they are unacquainted with its logic. Philosophy has been defined as the art of thinking things together; and not many of the masters of evolutionary speech have thought together the things of evolution and the other things of life; and hence they have failed to see some of the

wider and higher implications of their theory. In what follows we shall consider what evolution is, what are its laws and factors, its forces and methods; then we shall be in a position to consider some of its logical and necessary conclusions. Whether evolution as a hypothesis is able to explain all the phenomena of nature and life we do not here consider. The fact remains that it is the working hypothesis in the scientific and practical thought of our time. For the time being, therefore, we accept the hypothesis at its face value, and we ask: What are its laws and methods? What is its system of logic? What are its logical implications?

I. The law of evolution, according to Herbert Spencer, is a progressive movement from the simple to the complex, and from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. The formula in full stands thus:

Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.¹

Mr. Spencer maintains that this is the character displayed equally in the earliest changes which the universe at large is supposed to have undergone, and in those latest changes which we trace in society and the products of social life. The term "evolution," according to Professor LeConte, connotes "a continuous progressive change, according to certain laws, and by means of resident forces."²

In the popular mind the term "evolution" is mainly confined to the development of the organic kingdom; and for this reason he applies the term chiefly to the changes of this kingdom. These changes, he maintains, take place according to certain laws that are called the laws of differentiation, of heredity, and of progress of the whole. The resident forces include not only the vital energies in the organism, but also the cherishing energies of the environment.

The factors of evolution in the organic kingdom, according to its best exponents, are four at least: (1) The physical environment—heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, and all the other conditions of existence—affects functions of organs, and function affects structure; both changed function and changed structure are inherited by off-

¹ *First Principles*, sec. 145.

² *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*, p. 8.

spring, and so increased from generation to generation, becoming greater without limit. (2) The increased use or disuse of organs enforced or permitted by change in the environment induces change in form, size, and structure of the organs. (3) Variation, a natural process for which we are not yet able to account, and which produces at birth structures which may prove advantageous when tested by natural selection, and which may be transmitted to the posterity, to the improvement of the species, or to the origination of a higher species. (4) Natural selection, or survival of the fittest among divergent varieties of offspring. How far can these factors explain the law of evolution?

It is generally believed that the human race has descended from a common ancestor. Yet in the race, as we find it today, there are endless varieties of people: black, yellow, red, and white; some are tall and some are short; some have "long heads" and others have "short heads." These external differences are paralleled by internal differences no less marked; in mental and linguistic qualities, in religion and morality, in social ideas and social practices. How do we account for these differences, which are patent to all mankind? The explanation is that these variations are due primarily to the conditions of life amid which the different divisions of the race have lived. Food and climate, scenery and altitude, with the other natural conditions, have determined these diverse racial characteristics. The changes in the environment to which man is subjected, it is contended, are sufficient to account for all these changes in the human race.

What is true of human life on a small scale, it is maintained, is likewise true of all sentient life on a large scale. Between the organism and the environment there has been a constant action and reaction. The changes in the environment have induced changes in the organism in form and structure, and these changes have come under the influence of natural selection, and some have been perpetuated from generation to generation. But not all of these variations are perpetuated, for not all are found advantageous to the organism. The variations that are found useless—that is those which give the organism no advantage in the struggle of life—are rigidly eliminated by the process of natural selection. Thus only the variations that are found useful—that is, those which give the organism some advantage in the struggle of life—are retained and perpetuated.

It does not fall within the scope of my purpose to consider this vexed question of the origin of variations. For a long time the battle has raged around this point, and the issue is not yet clearly decided. It is now pretty well agreed that what are called acquired qualities are not transmitted to the offspring. Yet it is no less agreed that variations occur, and under the influence of natural selection a harmony is maintained between the organism and the environment. The element of sex, it is plain, plays an important part in the drama of evolution. According to Professor Weismann, each new generation grows out of the united germ plasms of the two parents, whence arises a mingling of their characters in their offspring. This occurs in each generation; hence every individual is a complex result, reproducing in ever-varying degree the diverse characteristics of his two parents, four grandparents, eight great-grand-parents, and other remote ancestors; and thus the ever-present individual variation arises which furnishes material for natural selection to act upon.³ Through this funding of individual differences in a common offspring there is a tendency to divergent variation in this offspring. Then, when a complex organism is thus sexually propagated, there is an ever-present cause of change, which, though slight in any one generation, is cumulative, and is sufficient to keep up the harmony between the organism and its slowly changing environment.

It has not been possible for scientists to determine fully and accurately the causes of variation and change. How far the causes of such variation and change are subjective or objective; how far they are produced by the parental factors or are induced by the cherishing quality of the environment, we may never be able fully to determine. But for our purpose it matters little. These changes and variations may be produced by the factors within the organism, or they may be nourished by the environment without. Through all one fact remains; the variations that are found useful—that is, those which give it some advantage in the struggle of life—are perpetuated and transmitted; and, on the other hand, those variations which are not found useful—that is, those which give it no advantage in the struggle of life—are rigidly eliminated. And one other fact remains: there is a constant and vital relation between the organism, which we

³ See WALLACE, *Darwinism*, p. 439.

may call the subjective term in the relation, and the environment, which we may call the objective term in the relation. Thus the conservation of a variation and the perpetuation of an organ indicate two things: first, these variations and organs are advantageous to the organism; and, secondly, these variations and organs find their warrant and reason in the environment. Every change that is proved advantageous is approved as a true step; and this true step is indicated by the relation between the organism and its environment.

Again, life, according to the modern scientific definition, is the continuous adjustment of internal relations and external relations. The degree of life is measured by the number and dignity of these correspondences. Thus, we say that the bird has more life than the flower, because it is in relations with a much wider environment. The flower may respond to certain external relations, such as warmth and moisture, but there are whole worlds of reality that are wholly beyond its range. The bird, however, responds to these relations, and to many more; it lives in a world of light and sound, and this correspondence brings it a certain amount of pleasure or pain. In like manner, man possesses more life than the bird, for the reason that he is in relations with a much wider range of environment. The man lives in a world of color and beauty, of intelligence and morality; and, what is more important, these external relations find certain subjective responses within his own being.

According to the theory of evolution, this development of life is effected by the action and reaction of the organism and the environment. Some new change appears in the environment, and this is followed by a change in the organism. The new and improved organ that appears is the response of life to the conditions of its environment. The changes and variations that appear in the organism are retained simply and solely on the ground of their advantageousness to the living creature. There is an objective term, the environment, and this gradually induces the subjective term, the organ, to come into being. The subjective term is here because the objective term is here also. But we may reverse this process and may say that the changes in the form and structure of the organism are the direct result of the conditions of the environment. These

changes in the organism are the subjective response to the objective conditions. The objective term begets the subjective; the objective condition is the occasion of the subjective term. The subjective term is real; hence the objective term must be no less real.

Thus, there are in the world vibrations of ether that in an adapted organ produce the sensation of light. Through the ages of the past, according to the evolution hypothesis, there has been an increasing subjective response to the objective reality; and thus the eye has been developed from the primitive pigment spot that is merely able to distinguish light from darkness, to the human eye that can detect the finest shades of color. There is no chance-work here. The eye and the light are made for one another, and the presence of the one implies the other. The light has induced the eye and the eye is produced by the light. Sight in the organism is real because light in the environment is real. The progress of the eye has been secured through its progressive adaptation to external relations. The subjective term, the eye, is as it is because the objective term, the light, is as it is. The sense of sight, the subjective term in the relation, is here because the objective term, the reality of light, is here also. The presence of the subjective term, the sense of sight, implies the reality of the objective term, the reality called light.

In the larger bearings of the theory we are told that the changes in the organism have been induced by the conditions in the environment, and the progress of life has been achieved through the adjustment of living beings to external realities; and only those changes and adaptations have been preserved that have been advantageous to life. For the present we may accept this as a provisional explanation of the processes of development. But now let us consider some of the logical implications of this theory.

II. There are several important corollaries that grow out of all this. We may name these: the rational world, the moral order, the personal God, and the immortal life.

1. *The rational world.*—That man is a rational creature is a commonplace of thought. To deny this is to commit intellectual suicide; to deny this is to appeal to reason for the ground of one's denial. In saying that man is a rational creature we do not mean that all men are rational; for common observation shows the

contrary. There are many men—one is almost inclined to say a majority—who live in their impulses and prejudices, and not in their reason and conscience. But in saying that man is a rational creature we affirm that rationality is the normal attitude of man, and that irrationality is the abnormal thing. By this term “rational” we mean that man possesses the faculty of reason; that this faculty enables him to perceive that things move in an orderly and methodical way, to perceive the relation of one thing to another, to adapt means to ends, to classify and arrange his knowledge, and to formulate laws and principles. This faculty of reason in mankind is found at all stages and in all degrees. In the lowest races, so called, the faculty exists in a crude way and in lowly degrees; but the lowliest man is able to reason, to perceive the relation of one thing to another, and to adapt means to ends. In the higher races, so called, this faculty exists in a developed form and in larger degrees; and this gives birth to arts, literatures, and sciences. Rational man is able to make mental note and record of the things that his senses report to him; but he is able to do a great deal more. He is able to perceive how things are grouped and by what laws they are organized. He is able to know and classify the objects around him; he is able to discern and systematize the chemistry of all worlds; he is able to apprehend and formulate the laws of planetary motion; he is able to discern and state the principles of mathematics that prevail throughout the universe; in a word, he is able to perceive a true objective reasonableness in the world of which he is a part.

According to the evolution hypothesis, this faculty of reason in man has been developed in and through a natural process. For its earliest beginnings we are told that we must look far down in the scale of life; to understand its development, we must trace its progress through all the ranges of world-life. Through a process of adaptation to environment and of natural selection this faculty has been evolved, from primitive sentience, through animal instinct, up to human reason. Whatever we may think of this explanation, two things are to be noted: every adjustment whereby a creature sustains life is called a true step, and every maladjustment whereby life is wrecked is called a false step; and the adjustments that make for rationality in life are true steps and have rigidly been conserved, and all mal-

adjustments that are against rationality are false steps and have rigidly been eliminated. This means that reason is the one faculty which the natural process is seeking to inwork into conscious life; this means that the natural process is working for rational ends through rational means. *Ex nihilo nihil*—this is a fundamental postulate of all evolutionary and rational thought. The rational faculty has been inwrought into life in and through the processes of life. This means that there is a rational order in the universe that has induced this rational faculty to appear in the organism. This rational faculty has come forth in man's being, because the energies of the universe have put it there. When we say that any faculty or power is the product of evolution, we affirm that it is something which the energies of the universe are laboring to bring forth. Reason, the subjective term, is existent in man; hence reason, the objective term, must be existent in the universe. To say that the subjective term may be existent when the objective term is non-existent is without precedent in the whole history of creation, and is wholly contrary to the evolution hypothesis. Man is a rational being; hence, by the very necessities of the case, the universal order must be rational; that is, there must be in it a reason equal to man's reason. But the more man studies the universe, the more wonderful it becomes, and the more rational appears its order. The science of astronomy is just beginning to give man glimpses of an order in the greater universe that lies beyond the range of his unaided eye.

We are not here concerned with the nature of this reason that is revealed in and through the order of the universe. We know that it is a reason like man's, but greater; we know that the term "rational" when predicated of the universe may mean more, but it cannot mean less, than the term "rational" when predicated of man. According to the logic of evolution, the faculty of reason has come forth in man because the rational energies put it there. The qualities of rationality have been found advantageous to the organism, and gains in rationality have been approved as true steps. There is a subjective rationality in man, and hence there must be an objective rationality in the universe. It is sometimes said that man projects his own mental processes into the world around him, and reads in the universe the projections of his own imagination. But this explanation does not

explain anything. For the one thing to be accounted for is this very faculty of reason in man. This faculty of reason has not come about by chance, for evolution excludes all chance; it has not been snatched out of some empty and irrational heavens, for evolution allows no such thefts. It has, therefore, come forth in man as the subjective response to the objective conditions; it has developed in life because its development has been approved as a true step.

2. *The moral order.*—Is the universe moral? In their study of the moral order men have given very different interpretations of the processes of life. There are those who find nature a non-moral sphere, who declare that from the natural order we can derive no moral laws for the guidance of life. Thus John Stuart Mill declares that the order of nature, in so far as it is unmodified by man, is such as no being whose attributes are justice and benevolence would have made.⁴ "Conformity to nature has no connection whatever with right and wrong."⁵ Professor Huxley, at the very close of his life, finds in nature no trace of ethical principles; the cosmic process has no relation to moral ends; social progress means the checking of the cosmic process at every step, and the substitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process.⁶ Professor Lester F. Ward, Mr. Winwood Reade, and Mr. Benjamin Kidd follow the same line of reasoning and come to the same conclusions. Professor Huxley, "after sharing the fortunes of evolution all his life, in his latter days, by a remarkable *tour de force*—the last thing which his former associates might have expected of him—ejects himself from the world-order and washes his hands of it in the name of the Ethical Man." The critics have not been slow to point out the extreme illogicality of his position. Well may Mr. Spencer ask in significant language: "If the ethical man is not the product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?" According to the thorough-going evolutionists, the cosmic process has produced everything that exists; whatever results have been secured have come about in and through this process. It is not easy to understand how the cosmic process can produce something that wholly transcends and reverses that process.

According to Professor Huxley, man's moral conceptions have

⁴ *Three Essays*, p. 25.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

⁶ *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 81.

grown out of his experiences and relations with other men, and not out of his experiences and observations of the universe as a whole. But, according, to Professor Huxley, man himself is the product of this cosmic process; and hence it follows that man's moral conceptions are the product of the same cosmic process. The fact is that men in all ages have felt that the order of the universe had a moral significance. Nature was believed to take note of man's doings, and to be hostile to the evil-doer and friendly to the well-doer. The customs of many peoples were largely based upon this conviction. Fire will burn the transgressor, water will drown him, the lightning will strike him, the viper will sting him. Among many peoples we find indications of this belief in the ordeals by fire and water and poison. In all these cases there is the belief that the objects and order of nature have moral discernment and are hostile to the evil-doer. In all ages men have endeavored to construct systems of ethics based upon their interpretation of the meaning of the world and the order of nature. In these later times efforts have been made to develop principles of ethics that are based wholly upon induction from the order and processes of the world. Mr. Spencer, as is well known, rules revelation out of his thought, yet he constructs a system of ethics that is fairly satisfactory to the Christian theologian, in its principles and requirements. The conclusion is therefore inevitable that nature is not non-moral or immoral, as some have represented it to be, but that it has a definite moral method. Mr. Spencer rejects the theological basis of ethics as unsatisfactory, and controverts the utilitarian theories as being inadequate. When these false teachers are put to silence, he interrogates the universal order for himself, that he may know the truth of the matter. By a synthetic study of this order he is enabled to construct a system of ethics, and for this system he claims cosmic warrant.

For our purpose it matters little how the moral sense with its moral conceptions has been inwrought into human life; the fact remains that man has the faculty of making moral distinctions and that he possesses a system of moral ideas. Whatever may be their origin, moral ideas prevail as part and parcel of man's thought and life. It is possible that the evolutionary hypothesis is correct in its contention that man's ethical ideas have grown and developed with the develop-

ment and progress of man himself. It is possible that these ideas have come up through lowly form of cosmic life. It is possible that these ideas have been stripped of their grosser vestments till they have stood revealed in the present ethical ideas of mankind. But, instead of undermining man's ideas of ethical obligation, as some have unthinkingly supposed, evolution really confirms that obligation and gives it universal warrant. *Ex nihilo nihil*. This, as we have seen, is a fundamental postulate of all rational thought of the universe and of life. The sense of moral distinctions, with the consequent feeling of moral obligation, has been inwrought into life in and through the processes of the world. The idea of ethical distinctions, with the conception of ethical obligation, has not come about by chance, for chance has no place in the universe; it has not been snatched out of the air, unless the air itself is a vast ethical depository; it has not been invented by cunning priests and kings, for this leaves the idea and the obligation unexplained.

According to the evolution hypothesis, this ethical consciousness has come forth in man's life because the energies of the universe have put it there. Man possesses a moral consciousness; and in all ages men have found a moral significance in the cosmic order. The subjective term, the ethical consciousness, is here in man, because the objective term, the ethical order, is in the universe. The subjective term, the ethical consciousness, has come forth in man's life, because there is an objective term, an ethical texture, in the very universe itself. As the wing of the bird is the subjective response to the objective air; as the fin of the fish is the subjective term that answers to the objective reality, water; as the subjective eye and ear have been produced because there is an objective stimulus that calls them forth; so the ideas of ethical truth have come forth in human thought and have developed in human society because the reason and order of the universe have called them forth and have given them warrant. Mr. John Fiske was regarded by Mr. Herbert Spencer as his ablest American exponent. Mr. Fiske, in his address on "Evolution and Religion" delivered at the Spencer banquet in New York, November 9, 1882, said:

For clearly, when you say of a moral belief or a moral sentiment that it is a product of evolution, you imply that it is something which the universe through

untold ages has been laboring to bring forth, and you ascribe to it a value proportionate to the enormous effort that it has cost to produce it. . . . [Thus] we see that the very same forces, subtle and exquisite and profound, which brought upon the scene the primal germs of life and caused them to unfold, . . . we see that these very same subtle and exquisite forces have wrought into the very fibers of the universe those principles of right living which it is man's highest function to put into practice.

The distinction between right and wrong, we hence see, is "rooted in the deepest foundations of the universe." According to the hypothesis of evolution, the ethical sentiment is the product of evolution; it has come forth into life because there is an ethical texture in the universe itself; according to the logic of evolution, the distinction between right and wrong is rooted in the deepest foundations of the universe, and the universe is ethical from center to circumference. Ethics is the nature of things.

3. *The living God.*—There are those who say that evolution has to do with the method of creation, and as a consequence it has nothing to say concerning origins or ends. But a method that starts nowhere and goes nowhither is no method at all. However, for the moment we pass over all questions of origin and end, and consider only facts and methods.

In our study of man we find that the idea of God is part and parcel of his mental furniture, and is practically universal. Man is a religious being—"incurably religious," in fact. The form of his religion may be crude, and his ideas may be superstitious; the object of his worship may be unknown and misjudged; but the universal belief and impulse and practice declare that religion belongs to the nature of man. Now, according to the evolution hypothesis, this idea of God is a product of evolution, and, like all other things, it has come up from lowly beginnings. The thoroughgoing evolutionist endeavors to explain the method by which man's religious ideas have come into human thought. At first through an experience of sleep and dreams, man arrives at the idea of a disembodied spirit; he easily makes the transition to the belief in ghosts of the dead. These supernatural agents are supposed to do men favors or to send men disease, and hence they are to be feared and propitiated. From ancestor-worship man passes on to the worship of idols and fetiches; through nature-worship man passes on to the belief in deities, and by

a process of exclusion he arrives at the idea of Deity. This may all be, though it must be confessed that not all the proof has as yet been made complete. But for the moment we accept this hypothesis at its face value, and ask: What does it imply? What is the logical outcome of it all?

The idea of God, it is admitted, is here as a part of man's mental furniture. How has this idea got itself wrought into human life? The idea could not have come by chance, for evolution allows no place for chance to enter and to work; it could not have been snatched out of the empty heavens, unless the very heavens are divine; it could not have been invented by cunning priests, for this fails to explain the consciousness in priests and people. Nor can the idea of God be explained on the ground that man has projected his mental processes into the world around him, and has read in the universe the projections of his own thought; for this view utterly fails to account for the mental state in man himself. How has it come about, also, that men's ideas of God, at first low and base, have become purer and higher? This *tendency* itself must be accounted for, or nothing is explained.

According to the theory of evolution, whatever changes occur in the organism are changes induced by the environment. The changes that promote the welfare of the organism are called true steps, and are rigidly conserved; the changes that are useless to the organism are called false steps, and are as rigidly eliminated. In the long run, only those changes are conserved which are found to promote life. But, according to the theory of evolution, the condition of the environment is the occasion of the changes in the organism. The changes in the organism are the resultant and correlate of the conditions of the environment. The presence of the subjective term implies the reality of the objective term. The subjective term is a reality, and hence the objective term must be a reality also. For whatever changes and improvements are found in the organism are changes and improvements induced by the environment. To say that the subjective term can be existent when the objective term is non-existent is wholly without precedent in the whole history of creation, and is in direct contradiction of the logic of evolution. Says Mr. Fiske:

All the analogies of evolution, so far as we have been able to decipher it, are overwhelmingly against any such supposition. To suppose that during countless ages, from the sea weed up to man, the progress of life was achieved through adjustment to external realities, but that then the method was all at once changed, and throughout a vast province of evolution the end was secured through adjustments to external nonrealities, is to do sheer violence to logic and to common sense.⁷

According to the logic of evolution, the idea of God has come to birth in man's consciousness because the energies of the universe put it there. The idea of God, the subjective term in the relation, has come forth in man's consciousness because there is an objective term, a Divine Reality, in the universe itself. When therefore men say that the religious ideas of man are products of evolution, they assert that these ideas are something which the universe is laboring to bring forth. Says John Fiske again:

The doctrine of evolution asserts, as the widest and deepest truth which the study of nature can disclose to us, that there exists a Power to which no limit in time or space is conceivable, and that all the phenomena of the universe, whether they be what we call material or what we call spiritual phenomena, are manifestations of this infinite and eternal Power.—*Excursions of an Evolutionist*, p. 301. The poet who speaks of the universe as the star-domed city of God, he continues, and reminds us that through every grass blade, but most through every living soul, the glory of the present God still beams, means pretty much the same thing as Mr. Spencer means, save that he speaks with the language of poetry, with language colored by emotion, and not with the precise, formal, and colorless language of science.

When the Hebrew prophet declared that "by Him were laid the foundations of the deep," but reminded us, "Who by searching can find Him out?" he meant pretty much what Mr. Spencer means, when he speaks of a Power that is inscrutable in itself, yet is revealed in every throb of the mighty rhythmic life of the universe.

These words derive additional meaning from the fact that they were spoken in Mr. Spencer's presence, in exposition of his relation to religious thought. At the conclusion of Mr. Fiske's address, Mr. Spencer said:

Fiske, should you develop to the fullest the ideas you have expressed here this evening, I should regard it as a fitting supplement to my life-work.

⁷ *Through Nature to God*, pp. 189, 190.

If the religious nature of man has no reality corresponding to it; if the subjective term has no objective reality answering to it, then, indeed, man is put to hopeless and permanent intellectual and moral confusion. A rational, moral, and religious being cannot be produced by an irrational, unethical, and godless universe. *Ex nihilo nihil.* According to the logic of evolution, we have found that this is a rational world; that is, intelligence and reason are revealed in and through its processes and methods. And we have also seen that there is an ethical order; that is, an ethical will is revealing and realizing itself in and through the processes and methods of life. And in addition we have found that there is a divine Power; that is, there is an infinite and eternal Power that is disclosing and fulfilling itself in and through the order of the universe. Summing up and combining our logical results thus far, we find that evolution makes us know that there is a rational and ethical Power who is revealing and realizing himself in and through the order of the world and the life of man. This Power may be as much greater and higher than man as the universe is larger and grander than he, but one thing is certain: it cannot be less or lower. This Power may possess something higher and larger than the fact that we call personality in man; but one thing is certain: it cannot possess anything less or lower than personality.

4. *The immortal life.*—In like manner we may apply the logic of evolution in its bearing upon the idea of life everlasting. We are not here concerned with the origin and development of this belief; the belief in an invisible world, whatever may be its origin, is here as an indisputable fact in life. It may be, as the evolutionists maintain, that this idea has been inwrought into human life in and through a process of evolution; it may be that the idea had its beginnings in very lowly ideas of sleep and dreams, of swoon and catalepsy; it may be that it has been wrought into life through the belief in ghosts and spirits, and that it has been wrought out through a process of development. But all this is not to explain away the idea; this is not to deny its validity; nay, rather, this is to confirm it; this is to give it cosmic and universal warrant. For to say that the belief has come into life through the process of evolution is to put the prestige of the universe behind it. The moment we say of an idea or a sentiment

that it is a product of evolution, we affirm that it is something which the universe has been laboring to bring forth. And when we say that it is something which the universe has been laboring to bring forth, we assert that there is a world of reality above and behind the visible. This sentiment could not have developed, were it not advantageous to man; and it could not have been advantageous to man, were it not the correspondence of internal relations to external relations. As the eye has been made because there is an objective stimulus to call it forth; as the ideas of ethical truth have come forth into human thought because the very texture of the universe has an ethical significance; so the sentiment of immortality has been inwrought into human life by the very universe itself. Man believes that he is related to an invisible and eternal world; and, according to the logic of evolution, the reality of this belief argues the reality of this world. To suppose that the subjective term in the relation is real, when the objective term is non-existent, is utterly without precedent in the whole history of creation. According to the teaching of science, any adjustment whereby life is sustained and advanced is called a true step, and any maladjustment whereby life is hindered and wrecked is called a false step. This means that Nature throughout her realms pitilessly rejects all false steps, and as invariably conserves all true steps. Nature throughout her course has carefully conserved the steps leading man up into the belief in an invisible and eternal world; and hence the analogies of life confirm man's belief in this world, and give that belief universal warrant and validity. This belief, the subjective term in the relation, is a fact in human life; and this implies an objective reality, the other term in the relation. The whole logic of evolution, hence, yields the conclusion and conviction that throughout all the ages of the past the human soul has been established in this conviction and belief, because there is an objective reality in the universe to call it forth. Thus the belief in an invisible and eternal world has the entire prestige of nature behind it. The deepest and strongest implication of the doctrine of evolution confirms us in the conviction that there is an invisible and eternal world of which man is a part and for which he is made.

In the name of evolution all kinds of objections are framed against the fundamental Christian ideas. In the name of evolution agnos-

ticism is being promulgated as the wise man's attitude with respect to the questions of Deity and immortality. The cure for an agnostic evolution is a logical evolution. It is possible that man will never be able to demonstrate God and immortality as one demonstrates a proposition in geometry. Here we walk by faith and not by sight. But some things of God may be known from nature, says the apostle, even his eternal power and Godhead. Whether evolution shall finally be accepted as the full and logical explanation of the origin and method of things, it is not for us here to determine. The one fact that concerns us here is this: that the Christian believer need have no fears for the logic of evolution, though that logic be applied to the last letter. It is possible that some of the other great Christian ideas lie wholly beyond the range of evolution and logic, and that they must forever remain matters of revelation and faith. But I am of the opinion that the great realities that we know as revelation, incarnation, redemption, and retribution can also be given a place within the logic of evolution. At any rate, when we have thus much evidence that there is an infinite and eternal Power who is rational and ethical, who has made man for honor and immortality, we have a firm foundation for our faith and a splendid beginning for our theology.

A fire mist and a planet—
A crystal and a cell—
A jelly fish and a saurian,
And a cave where the cave men dwell;
Then a sense of law and beauty,
And a face turned from the clod;
Some call it Evolution,
And others call it God.⁸

⁸ W. H. CARRUTH.

PERSIAN DUALISM.

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"WHILE formerly nature was studied as at rest," says Professor Conn, "today it is studied as in motion."¹ This happy description of present methods applies to historical study as well as to the natural sciences. A nation, a language, or a religion is not regarded as a fixed quantity. They resemble rivers, not rocks; organisms, not crystals. Their significance lies essentially in their movements, coming forth from pre-existing facts, passing on into succeeding events and effects. All that remains today may be the fossil word, yet this was once the living, spiritual thought, which moved and grew in the flowing current of time.

Religions, then, are no longer studied as at rest, but as in motion. They were not born full-grown. The laws of heredity and environment were as active in early days as now. The conditions back of early forms may now be pre-historic. Still, the old religious records rest, often consciously, upon a past inheritance. "Examining into antiquity" are the first words of the first three books of the *Shu King*.² Confucius called himself "a transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients."³ "This is an old rule," runs the *Dhammapada*,⁴ teaching that hatred ceases by love. In the *Papyrus Prisse*, called the most ancient book in the world, the Precepts of Ptah-Hotep, in the fifth Egyptian dynasty, declare that "justice is great, invariable, and assured; it has not been disturbed since the days of Osiris." And again: "The limitations of justice are invariable; such is the instruction which every man receives from his father."⁵ Nabuna'id discovered at Sippara the platform foundation of the temple of Shamash, laid long before by Naram Sin, son of Sargon, "which during a period of thirty-two hundred years no king among my predecessors had seen." Thereupon,

¹ *The Method of Evolution*, p. 1.

³ A. W. LOOMIS, *Confucius*.

² *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. III, p. 32.

⁴ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. X, p. 5.

⁵ *Records of the Past*, New Ser., Vol. III, p. 19.

"amid joy and rejoicing, I raised its brick-work—not an inch inward or outward—upon the platform foundation of Naram Sin, the son of Sargon."⁶ Not an inch inward or outward! What an illustration of religious conservatism! Reverence for the past is no recent invention.

The study of religions in motion means, also, that they are to be considered in their mutual relations and influences. The civilizations that flourished in the valleys of the Indus and the Euphrates, the Nile and the Jordan, shared, to some extent, in a common intellectual and religious life. Beneath the contrasts and rivalries of national and theological thought may be found deep resemblances in ideas, words, and customs. Some of the Babylonian penitential psalms seem to express the same religious psychology and the same attitude of the soul toward Deity that are found in many of the Hebrew psalms. Eloquent expression of faith in the universal providence of the Creator is voiced in the Egyptian "Hymn to Amen Ra," in a manner quite analogous to Psalm 104. This community of thought is as distinct in the Aryan peoples as in the Semites. Darmesteter has shown that the Indo-European race, in India, Persia, Greece, and Italy, was one in the worship of the one supreme God, under the names of Varuna, Ahura, Zeus, and Jupiter; all of these nations holding this deity to be sovereign, omniscient, and moral.⁷ This common conception is traced back to a pre-historic Aryan root, which Darmesteter considers was a nature-god, representing the over-arching heaven. But far wider than this is the great Aryan equation, which Max Müller pronounced "the most important discovery which has been made during the nineteenth century with respect to the ancient history of mankind." This equation stretches over four thousand years of time and over well-nigh four thousand miles of Asia and Europe.

Sanskrit *Dyaush Pitar*=Greek *Zeus Pater*=Latin *Jupiter*=Old Norse *Tyr*.⁸

The study of Persian dualism grows in interest when viewed in the light of these two principles of progress and of interaction of thought. Apart from these principles, indeed, regarded separately,

⁶ G. S. GOODSPEED, *History of the Babylonians and Assyrians*, p. 370.

⁷ *Contemporary Review*, October, 1879.

⁸ *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1885.

by itself, the historic fact is not without importance, for it is one of the outstanding phases of Asiatic religious thought, to be contrasted with the monistic, pantheistic theologies which developed eastward, in India, and with the monotheistic tendencies of the Semites, to the west. But this dualism which developed in Iran is vitalized for us when studied "in motion," as a living organism, with a past and a future, and as a plastic substance, influenced by and influencing its environment.

What was the origin of Persian dualism? The linguistic scholars, who have traced the thought through the words, have held that the Persian, Mazdean religion was derived from the Vedic, or pre-Vedic, religion of India. They were led to this conclusion through the similarity and connection of many important words found in the theologies of both nations. The three most important of these words were the Indian *Asura*, *Deva*, and *Mitra*, which became the Iranian *Ahura*, *Daēva*, and *Mithra*. By a curious reversal of meaning, the *Devas*, the "Bright Ones" of the Vedas, become the opponents of the Deity, and the demons of darkness, in the Avesta. The general racial and linguistic argument may be conceded; there probably was a connection of language and a common racial descent, but the dualism of the Iranian religion cannot be deduced from Vedic, or Indian, sources. Darmesteter says that the vague and unconscious dualism of the Indo-Iranian religion passed by a long and slow movement, by insensible degrees, to the sharply defined dualism of magism.⁹ Haug finds the origin of the Persian doctrine in the contest between the *Devas* and the *Asuras*, contained in the Aitareya Brahmana.¹⁰ Here the *Devas* are the gods, and the *Asuras* the opposing demigods or demons. It is easy to see how from an early usage, when both *Asura* and *Deva* were terms for deity, the Persians could have chosen one for their one God, and used the other to signify demon. The New Testament Christian use of the Greek words *θεός* and *δαίμων* gives an exact analogy to this. But it is well-nigh impossible to believe that Persia could have borrowed its dualism and reversed *both* terms. The Persian could have said, "Your god is my devil," but could he have also said, "Your devil is my god"? And this is involved in Haug's theory of a dualism

⁹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. IV, p. lxii.

¹⁰ *Religion of the Parsis*, pp. 269 ff.

derived from India. Granting that the Persian word *Ahura* is derived from the Indian *Asura*, it could have been derived only at a time when *Asura*, in India, meant "God," and not "opponent of the Devas." The dualism of the Aitareya Brahmana must therefore be later than this time, and hence could not have been the origin of Persian dualism. The proof that the word *Ahura* was derived from *Asura* is proof that the dualistic conception of Mazdeism was not derived from the same Indian source. In the Brahman systems the tendency toward pantheism and a monistic view is so pronounced, and the connection of these monistic systems with the old Vedism is so clear, that we must turn away from India to find the origin of dualism.

If not from India, whence did it arise? Professor Lehmann, of Copenhagen, considers that there was a pre-historic, Scythian root of animism and nature-worship, which is the source of Iranian dualism.¹¹ This is a conjecture which admits of little proof or refutation. Animism, in general, has strong affinities with a dualistic view of nature and providence. The Gathas, however, seem to portray the followers of the true religion as farmers and herdsman, whose peaceful agricultural life is threatened by northern, nomadic Deva-worshipping foes.¹² It would, therefore, be highly improbable that the Mazda-worshippers borrowed the characteristic element in their religion from the animism and shamanism of their Turanian opponents and oppressors.

There is a clear and historically logical origin of Persian dualism, and it is strange that it has been overlooked by many in their search. It lies close at hand. It is the Babylonian myth of the struggle between Merodach and the dragon, between the God of intelligence and the Tiamat monster of the chaos deep.

There are many points of resemblance, and even of identity, between the Babylonian and Zoroastrian dualistic conceptions. In the creation tablets, Tiamat, which corresponds to the "deep" of Genesis and the "abyss" of the Apocalypse, is personified as the Power that rules over the primeval chaos and darkness and the horrid brood of

great serpents,
Sharp of tooth, merciless in attack.

¹¹ DE LA SAUSSAYE, *Religionsgeschichte*, Vol. II, p. 171.

¹² GEIGER, *Civilization of Eastern Iranians*, Vol. I, p. 12.

Marduk, as the selected representative of order and light, advances to meet her. In graphic, Miltonic strain is recorded the mighty contest between the deity and the dragon, when "the fates are decided." By his outspread net and his destructive wind, Marduk slays his enemy, and of her cloven body forms heaven and earth. George Smith says:

At the head of the seven evil spirits stood Tiamtu, the representative of chaos and darkness. One of the most remarkable Babylonian legends yet discovered is one which tells of the primeval struggle between Tiamtu and Mero-dach, between light and darkness or good and evil.¹³

These last words show that, in the mind of the great Assyriologist, the Babylonian myth revealed the dualism of the later religion.

In the Zoroastrian scriptures the primeval contest between Auharmazd and Aharman is described most fully and picturesquely in the *Bundahis*.¹⁴ Here the relation of the powers of light and darkness is stated in the precise and formal manner which indicates that the work is a product of the later scholastic Mazdeism. The evil spirit is represented as distinctly inferior in attributes and power. On account of his backward understanding, he was not even aware of the existence of Auharmazd until he arose from the abyss and came to the light. The light arouses his opposition and his desire maliciously to destroy it. Feeling his inability to accomplish this single-handed, he retires to his abode of gloom, and forms many demons and friends, "creatures terrible, corrupt, and bad," to assist him in his evil enterprise. After a colloquy with Auharmazd and the appointment of nine thousand years of conflict, Auharmazd recites the sacred formula, the Ahuna, and reveals to the Dark Spirit the final outcome of the struggle and the annihilation of the demons. As the three parts of the Ahuna are recited, the evil spirit contracted his body through fear, fell upon his knees, and in the end became utterly confounded, and remained three thousand years in confusion. Compared with the simpler, cruder form of the Babylonian nature-myth, this Zoroastrian narrative reads like the symbolism of an ethical philosophy. And yet the natural, logical evolution of this ethical speculation from the folklore myth which had prevailed a millennium or two before seems to be easily traceable.

¹³ *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, p. 106.

¹⁴ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. V, pp. 3-9.

An interesting question as to origins confronts us here. It is this: What was the naturalistic source of the Babylonian myth of the struggle between Merodach and the dragon? A suggestion occurred to the writer, which would not be presented did it not receive the support of so high an authority as that of Dr. A. H. Keane, F.R.G.S., in the prologue to the English edition of Bousset's *Antichrist Legend*. It is that the origin of the legend of the conflict with the dragon monster was the dim recollection of the pre-historic contests of man in the Mesopotamian valley with the saurian reptiles. Dr. Keane says:

There can be no doubt that the struggle with these relentless foes must have been maintained from age to age throughout the Old and New Stone epochs right into pre-historic times. . . . The interval between the dawn of Babylonian culture and the last amphibious monster slain by neolithic man cannot have been too long for the oral transmission of such reminiscences from pre-historic to historic times.

The naturalistic origin of other legends is discussed by Professor B. K. Emerson in a very interesting manner.¹⁵ He shows that the Chimera myth is the "poetry of petroleum," the Chimera being a stream of inflammable gas issuing from a crevice in the mountain Yanar-dagh, "The Burning Mountain," in Lycia; Niobe is "the tragic side of calcareous tufa," being an unusual formation in a vertical wall of limestone in the valley of the Nif, back from the Gulf of Smyrna. Seen from below, it presents the figure of a woman with flowing robes, the drip of the waters from the limestone roof representing the tears. In like manner, the Pillar of Salt, or Lot's Wife, is the indirect effect of cliff erosion, and Noah's flood shows the possibilities of the cyclone and the earthquake wave working in harmony.

In the Babylonian narrative of "The War of the Seven Evil Spirits against Heaven," and in the Akkadian poem on "The Seven Evil Spirits," is to be found another Babylonian root of Persian dualistic conceptions.¹⁶ The seven evil spirits of these primitive myths are storm-spirits who were supposed to attack the moon in an

¹⁵ *Proceedings of the A. A. A. S.*, 1896; E. S. HARTLAND, *Legend of Perseus*, Vol. III, p. 66.

¹⁶ *Records of the Past*, Vol. V, p. 161; Vol. IX, p. 141. See GÜNKEL, *Schöpfung und Chaos*, p. 294.

eclipse. They are plotting against high heaven, but Bel-Merodach places the moon, with the sun and Ishtar, to guard the approach to heaven, and close in front of the moon the evil powers are repulsed. This is the simple dualism of nature-religion, but it provides a natural, historical origin for the Zoroastrian conception of the sevenfold hierarchy of both the good and evil powers—Ahura Mazda with his six Amesha Spentas opposed by Angra Mainyu with his six attendant evil spirits.

A third distinct line of connection of thought is found in the dragon or serpent, as the symbol of evil. Mummu-Tiamat is represented as a "dragon of the prime," and as the mother of a swarming brood of reptiles and poisonous vipers. In the account of the Babylonian religion given by Berosus there was a "time when there was nothing but darkness and an abyss of waters wherein resided most hideous beings."¹⁷ The influence of this Babylonian sea-dragon conception upon the Old Testament and the Apocalypse has been demonstrated brilliantly by Gunkel.¹⁸ The influence of the Babylonian ideas upon Mazdeism was more immediate and effective.

In the Vendidad the first creation of Ahura Mazda was the land Airyana Vaëgō. The first counter-creation of Angra Mainyu was "the serpent in the river, and winter, a work of the Daëvas."¹⁹ The contest with the serpent appears in another form in the struggle between Atar, the son of Ahura Mazda, and Ahi Dahaka, the three-headed serpent in the Vouru-kashu Sea; although this legend may also run back to a Vedic source.²⁰

In the exorcisms or incantation formulas may be found a fourth point of resemblance in the dualistic ideas of both religions. There is the general conception, which is found in many other religions, that ills and diseases are the effects of personal spirits, and that these effects can be averted by religious performances which neutralize or overcome the power of the individual demon. But in the Vendidad there are forms of exorcism which recall the Magical Texts of the Babylonian religion:²¹

¹⁷ CORY, *Ancient Fragments*, p. 58.

¹⁸ *Schöpfung und Chaos*, p. 114; and *Legends of Genesis*, p. 90.

¹⁹ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. IV, p. 5.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. lxii.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

Perish, O fiendish Drug! Perish, O brood of the fiend!
 Perish, O world of the fiend! Perish away, O Drug!
 Rush away, O Drug! Perish away, O Drug!
 Perish away to the regions of the north,
 Never more to give unto death the living world of the holy spirit!

Turning to the Babylonian texts we read

Away, away, far away, far away,
 For shame, for shame, fly away, fly away,
 Round about face, go away, far away,
 Out of my body, away, etc.²²

The dualistic resemblances between the Babylonian and the Mazdean religions are thus found to cover more ground than the one point of the primeval contest between Marduk or Ahura and the opposing power. And we may here note the fact that Professor Jastrow considers that the Babylonian legends did not originally place Marduk as the Bright God of deliverance from chaos, but that Marduk's prominence in the legend followed his political or theological supremacy as the patron God of Babylon.²³ This only shows that the dualistic conception was more deep-rooted and generic in the national religious thought than the particular cult of Merodach. And, if so, this conception was more likely to survive through the political and theological changes which brought in the Zoroastrian religion.

If this argument for the Babylonian origin of dualism may be regarded as tenable, on account of the foregoing positions, it is strange that it has not received more consideration. Jastrow, in his able work on *The Religions of Babylonia and Assyria*, speaks of "the sharp contrast" between the Babylonian and Mazdean religions, and holds that with the influx of the new Zoroastrian ideas the further development of the Babylonian worship was cut short. At the close of his work he notes the influence of Babylonian religious ideas on the Hebrews, on talmudism, on the Apocalypse of John, on the Egyptian religion, on the widespread Mithra cult, and on various Gnostic sects, but has not a word on its influence upon the religion which supplanted it in Mesopotamia.²⁴ Lehmann, while allowing the possibility of some Babylonian and Elamitic influence on Parsism, does

²² JASTROW, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 287.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 409; GOODSPEED, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

²⁴ JASTROW, *op. cit.*, pp. 45, 696 ff.

not trace it definitely in any point.²⁵ Geiger, although reacting from the view that all Zoroastrianism is to be traced back to Indian, Vedic sources, does not find a source in the prior, Persian religion.

Turning now from the origin and antecedents of dualism to its effects or its influence on other religions, we notice that the Babylonian legends, with their nature-dualism, had a clear influence on the Hebrew conceptions. Gunkel's work in establishing this position has already been mentioned. The Tehôm, or resounding deep; the Rahab and leviathan of the Old Testament; the dragon, "that old serpent, which is the devil and Satan," of the Apocalypse of John, are conceptions which are certainly connected with the Babylonian Tiamat-Marduk legend. Now, while it is certain that Babylonian dualism influenced both Parsism and Judaism, how far did Parsism, in a later day, influence Judaism also? Stave's effort to establish this influence may be regarded as successful in part, especially in regard to eschatology and angelology.²⁶ The books of Daniel and Tobit illustrate this specific Zoroastrian influence clearly. But in many points the influence is more in the line of suggestion and stimulation, rather than the transplanting of a complete conception.²⁷

But are there any direct effects of the Parsi dualism in the land where it once flourished as a faith? The Guebers of Persia have preserved the ritual and ceremonialism of Mazdeism, and seem to have retained the beliefs of the ancient religion. The Parsees of India also retain the ceremonies of the religion of their fathers, but appear to be strict monotheists, resolving into idealism the ancient conceptions of the reality of the evil powers. But, according to the testimony of missionaries in Persia, distinct traces of the old dualistic ideas may be found in the country districts, where the dominant Mohammedanism is mingled with beliefs and practices which are retained tenaciously, and are quite inconsistent with the nominal Mohammedan creed. These Yezedi, or mongrel Mohammedans, sacrifice to the devil, on mountains, and preserve a serpent at the place of sacrifice. The popular name for Satan is Malik Tawus, "King Peacock." This retention of ancient dualistic conceptions among

²⁵ DE LA SAUSSAYE, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 154.

²⁶ *Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judenthum.*

²⁷ HASTINGS, *Bible Dictionary*, Vol. IV, p. 993.

the country folk is strikingly analogous with the preservation of primitive Semitic conceptions of Deity and of sacrifice which Professor S. I. Curtiss has found among the Bedouins of Syria.²⁸

There is a tendency among Zend scholars to deny that Mazdeism was essentially or unqualifiedly dualistic. Haug has held that, although dualism is to be found in the authentic teachings of Zarathustra, it was a philosophical conception, but that his religious ideas were monotheistic. After studying Haug's argument, and the passages bearing on dualism in the Avesta and the later Pahlavi scriptures, it would seem as if the opposite conclusion could be easily maintained. The practical, ethical, spiritual religion of Mazdeism was dualistic; the speculative, philosophical theology was monotheistic.²⁹

The earliest statement of dualism in the Avesta is conceded to be in the Gathas, Yasna, xxx. Professor L. H. Mills translates this metrically thus:

Thus are the spirits primeval
Who, as Twain, by their deeds are famed.
In thought, in word, and in deed,
A better, they two, and an evil:
Of these, let the wise choose aright,
And not as the evil-minded!

Then those spirits created
As first they two came together,
Life and our death decreeing
How all at the last shall be ordered;
For evil men Hell, the worst life,
For the righteous the Best Mind, Heaven.³⁰

The other Gathic passage which teaches dualism clearly is Yasna, xlv, 2. This is translated by Geiger as follows:

Announce will I the two spirits at the beginning of the world:
Of them spake the blissful also unto the destructive:
"Neither our thoughts, nor our commands, nor our intelligence,
Nor our belief, nor our speeches, nor our deeds,
Nor our doctrines, nor our souls correspond."³¹

²⁸ "Primitive Semitic Religion Today," *Church Quarterly Review*, April, 1904.

²⁹ *Religion of the Parsis*, pp. 300, 303.

³⁰ *The Gathas of Zarathustra, in Metre and Rhythm*.

³¹ *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians*, Vol. I, p. lx.

The Vendidad, the purification code of the Parsi scriptures, representing a later stratum of Persian thought than the Gathas, contains, in the first Fargard, the account of the sixteen lands created by Ahura Mazda, and of the sixteen pests or pestilences created in opposition by Angra Mainyu. The Vendidad is full of the incantation formulas for the averting or expelling of the evil spirits at well-nigh every exigency of life.

Throughout the Vendidad and in the Yasts there is the constant, practical, religious dualism between purity and impurity, fertile warmth and winter cold, truth and falsehood, light and darkness, life and death. Evil is no philosophical speculation or abstraction, as in Haug's theory. It is the constant foe which must be constantly exorcised and overcome. The language of the exorcisms is the language of intense, ethical, religious struggle, not the calm of philosophical thought.

In the Bundahis, in a still later period, we find more distinctly the speculative, theological monotheism, along with practical, religious dualism. With careful precision of statement, the doctrine of the sole sovereignty of Auharmazd is expounded. He is supreme in omniscience and goodness, and peerless in splendor. His dwelling is in the region of endless light. On the other hand, Aharman, with backward and limited understanding, with malicious nature, dwells in the darkness of the abyss, ignorant of the future, and destined finally to be brought to naught, with all his creatures.

Dr. E. W. West, in his introduction to the Bundahis, in the *Sacred Books of the East* series, says that the powers of Aharman "are considerably less than those generally assigned by Christians to the devil, who is certainly represented as being a more intelligent and ubiquitous personage."³² He argues that if belief in Aharman as the author of evil makes the Parsi religion a dualism, it is difficult to understand why a belief in the devil as the author of evil does not make Christianity a dualistic form of belief. If it be dualism to hold that evils of body and mind proceed from a supernatural, malevolent power, then Genesis and Job, the gospels and the Apocalypse, are dualistic. The practices of the mediæval church, in exorcism and the like, were distinctly dualistic, in this sense of the word. But Dr.

³² *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. V, p. lxix.

West is not arguing that Christianity is dualistic, and Parsism also. He is opposing the view that Parsism is dualistic. He does so on the ground that in a late, scholastic treatise of Mazdeism, the Bundahis, the attributes of the evil power do not include omniscience, omnipresence, or immortality. But the earlier, simpler statements of the Avesta go much farther than the mere reference of evil to supernatural powers. Life, the human soul, the universe, are viewed as battlefields of contending powers. The call of Zoroastrianism was the moral, personal appeal to take sides in the essential conflict between truth and falsehood, light and darkness, good and evil, life and death. It may be said that Christianity makes the same appeal. It certainly does. But this does not prove that Parsism was not dualistic. It shows that morally and ethically, not speculatively and theologically, Christianity is about as dualistic as Parsism. But in the later Pahlavi writings we find dualistic expressions that no Old Testament or New Testament writer could have used. In the Dinkard, the demon Aresh is represented as shouting, "Auharmazd and Aharman have been two brothers in one womb."³³ In the fifth century A. D. the Christian Armenian Eznick attributes to the Persians the belief in Zeruian, "Endless Time," as the first existence. He is the father of twins, Ormuzd and Arhmen, the one being the fruit of his sacrifices, the other the fruit of his doubts.³⁴ No opponent of Judaism or Christianity could ever have presented a similar account of the relation of Jehovah and Satan.

The earliest classical references to Zoroastrianism emphasize its essentially dualistic character. According to Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle held that the Persians believe in two principles (*ἀρχαί*), which are respectively a good daimon and an evil daimon, the name of the one being Zeus and Oromazdes, the name of the other being Hades and Areimanios.³⁵ Plutarch, in *De Iside et Osiride*, teaches the Persian view to be a dualism of persons, Oromazdes springing from purest light, which is the substance resembling him most closely; Areimanios coming from darkness and sharing its nature. Such references to Zoroastrian dualism might be multiplied, but there is

³³ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXVII, p. 242.

³⁴ HAUG, *Religion of the Parsis*, p. 13.

³⁵ A. V. W. JACKSON, *Zoroaster*, p. 242, 235.

no need. Along with the quotations from the Avesta, and the later Parsi scriptures, they prove that the first exponents of Mazdeism, the subsequent elaborators of its belief, and its foreign critics among the classical writers, all agreed that dualism was an essential characteristic of the religion.

It is true that later speculations placed Zervan Akerana, "The Boundless Time," back of both Ormuzd and Ahriman. Dr. E. W. West has shown that this doctrine is not in the Avesta, and that time is represented as the creature of Ormuzd, not as his creator.³⁶ Persian thought did not make Chronos the father of Zeus. Greek mythology probably introduced the idea into the later Parsi speculation. But this later speculation shows more. It shows that strict, formal monotheism was an achievement, or development, in Mazdeism. If Ahura Mazda, with all his lofty, supreme qualities, had also been considered as clearly, monotheistically, the only supernatural power, then later thought would not have devised another deity, Zervan Akerana, back of him. We cannot imagine, in any talmudic treatise, a deity Olam back of Elohim.

Dualism is an elemental idea which will always endure, under advancing forms of interpretation. In the earlier Babylonian myths it was naturalistic. The balance and antagonism of natural forces was typified in the conflict of the God of order and intelligence with the forces of chaos. This represents the primitive expression of the law of the struggle for existence and the invariable conditions of progress. "Variation is figured by variance, differentiation by difference; and the process of creation becomes a warfare of elemental powers."³⁷ In the subsequent Persian religion this natural dualism became distinctly an ethical dualism. This change was wrought out in some individual soul; very probably in the experience of the historical person, Zoroaster himself. It is an idea which found a congenial soil for a modified growth among the Semitic Yahweh-worshippers. It is a permanent idea, and will endure as long as man distinguishes between good and evil.

Philosophy is essentially monistic; it searches for the One among the many. It is impatient of all antagonisms of thought, and ever seeks a higher unity that embraces all diversities.

³⁶ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. V, p. lxx.

³⁷ C. J. BALL, *Light from the East*, p. 3.

Ethics is essentially dualistic, and has always seen the universe cloven into two irreconcilable parts. Just so far as theology has been dominated by speculative philosophy, it has been monistic, pantheistic. God is the One. He is in all, even in the evil wills of men. But just so far as theology is dominated by ethical principles, rather than by speculative ideas, so far will the sharp, uncompromising, irreconcilable division between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil, be recognized. And it is far more than the intellectual perception that there are two sides. It is the inexorable call to the soul to take sides.

A monistic, evolutionary philosophy and theology may say that sin is the remnant of the brute, clinging to the evolving individual. We may grant that there is a deep truth in this. The first man is of the earth, earthy. First there is that which is natural, afterward that which is spiritual. But the essential law of that moral progress from the natural to the spiritual is the law of the struggle for spiritual existence, under the consciousness of the distinction between good and evil. The beginning of morality in man is depicted truly and most deeply in the "eternal mythus" of Genesis. The man comes to moral self-consciousness as he comes to the knowledge of the dualism of good and evil. His moral self then begins its struggle for existence and realization. Speculation, faith, theology, say that Good is over all, and back of all, and the goal of all. But life, experience, conscience, manhood, say that good and evil are both present, and that the conflict is on!

In his Romanes lecture on "Evolution and Ethics," Huxley has given a noble expression of this truth. He holds that there is a distinct opposition between the cosmic, evolutionary process and the moral, social progress of man. This later ethical progress means "the checking of the cosmic process at every step." It "is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence." "It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence." "The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."

We need not be concerned with Professor Huxley's consistency of thought in making this address, or even with the self-consistency of the address. There are certainly superb illustrations in this essay

of the gladiatorial art he professedly condemned. But possibly he did not realize that the more he emphasized the conflict between the natural order and the ethical order, the more he expressed the common law, seen in both orders, namely the law of conflict and antagonism. This law of conflict is both "cosmic" and ethical. And there can be no modern enunciation of this principle of antagonism, made by science, or theology which is not influenced in some degree by the ancient Persian dualistic ideas. "Are God and nature then at strife?" Faith and hope answer No! Faith and philosophy both believe that

somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill.

But this unity, this goal of triumphant good, is the belief of faith, not the evidence of sight; it is the philosophic vision, not the experience of today. Struggle, conflict, the constant antithesis of all the forces of nature, and of spirit—this is the present fact. The old Persian sage recognized this, as probably no man had before him. This thought has been bequeathed as an abiding legacy of spiritual thought. Judaism and Christianity enlarged and purified the conception. It penetrated, with too exclusive influence, the gnosticism of the early church; it intensified the Manichean revolt against the world and the flesh;³⁸ it lay at the heart of the asceticism which arose in moral protest against the luxury and sensuality of the age; it entered into the Puritan conception of the separation of the sacred from the secular. Growing more subtle, more sensitive, and more spiritual, a practical, religious dualism of right and wrong is the deepest fact in every soul today.

³⁸ UMONT, *Mysteries of Mithra*, p. 207.

FAITH AND MYSTICISM.

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I.

CERTAIN tendencies in the religious thought of the present render a consideration of the relationship between faith and mysticism not only pertinent but important. The idea of evolution, which germinated long before our era in the mind of Heraclitus, was in the last century given a soil to root in through its verification in biology and its application to the criticism of history. Its tremendous organizing power has left no department of human culture untouched. Not only has it knit hitherto unrelated sciences into the great web of universal science, not only has it displayed a prophetic gift by the disclosure of new fact, but it has also compelled the disintegration and reabsorption of old and once powerful systems of thought. Under its all-dominating shadow they have been converted into the rich mold that nourishes the growth of human knowledge toward something more stalwart and comprehensive than it has been before. Guided by the idea of evolution, the human mind has been bent upon the task of rendering the universe more rational. It has felt the zest of knowing and the mastery over things that reason can give. It has seen troop after troop of new facts surrender and fall into line under the spell of its new watchword. It has routed whole cohorts of superstitions and fears, which have waged a guerrilla warfare against human peace for centuries. But the conquests of reason have made it somewhat ruthless in assuming that everything is hostile and irrational which does not yield at once to its commands. Even the rational faculty may become intoxicated with its own achievements. And this is what we mean by "rationalism"—reason intoxicated by the sense of its power. The attempt to unravel the tangle of the universe and reel it off as a single thread may lead to an impatient snapping of the thread when the tangle refuses to yield. Evolutional philosophy, which is the form of much present-day rationalism, has shown some of this impatience.

Because it has been able to include a larger array of facts than its predecessors, it has sometimes been ready to deny facts which must be dealt with in an entirely different way. For example, because it has wrought the animism of the pagan world and Christian superstition into one evolutionary process, it has looked to see the whole fact of Christianity volatilize, leaving only a vaporous Unknowable. But the human spirit protests against this over-simplification of its world. It is in possession of more facts than have been dreamed of in this philosophy. In reply to the protest that matter and energy and life and mind cannot in their essence be known, and that therefore God and the meaning of the universe are unknowable, it points to its experience of God and bids philosophy be just to that. If the process of knowing which consists in linking fact to fact in an endless chain of causation cannot comprehend religious experience as being the grasping of reality, then there must be other ways of knowing.

Faith and mysticism are names for the two forms of experience to which appeal is made against an all-engulfing rationalism. Evidence that such a protest is one of the important signs of the times is close at hand. From within the pale of the Christian church we hear it in the watchword "back to Christ." The new rationalism manifest in our modern philosophy of nature and of history may menace the old rationalism which framed our theologies, but behind these theologies is a living experience. Back to the source of this experience and know Christ first-hand through the personal acquaintance of faith! Renew the living intercourse with God through his perfect embodiment, which is the material of all theology, and then insist that the philosophy of religion shall do it justice. This same trend of thought receives expression in the emphasis which the most recent theological literature places upon the importance of *personality* in religion. As examples may be cited the recent books of President King of Oberlin College. With him the way to knowledge of reality in its fulness is that of personal relationship, or faith, because the full reality is always personal. On the continent of Europe the Ritschlian school of theology carries similar tendencies to a greater length. Revolting not only from the old rationalism, which substituted the *fides quae creditur* for the *fides qua creditur*,

but also from the new, which tended to eliminate faith altogether, it has gone so far as to exile philosophy from the realm of religious truth, claiming for faith exclusive rights in dealing with the supernatural.

The new emphasis upon mysticism comes chiefly from non-Christian circles. • The discussion of the "mind-cure movement" by Professor James, of Harvard, in his recent Gifford Lectures shows that mysticism is one of its important elements. Although he does not treat of this movement under the head of mysticism, yet it is evident that the verifications of the mind-curers' teachings, the experiences of physical and spiritual renovation, are often of a mystical type. Professor James has dignified what he calls the mind-cure movement by his treatment of it. Other modern "isms" of a less estimable sort—various esoteric cults and theosophies—display even more markedly the spirit of mysticism. They are wont to be regarded with more or less disdain, but nevertheless they have this in common with the more normal and substantial movement already noted in Christianity itself, that they are a protest against the negations of a too successful rationalism. Moreover, the importance of mysticism in the evolution of Christianity should be a warning against an indiscriminate condemnation of its modern forms.

It thus appears, on the one hand, that faith and mysticism may be coupled together as constituting a reaction against the rationalistic thinking of the century just past, and, on the other, that they are, in point of fact, divergent tendencies. Nor does this divergence consist solely in the proneness even of the vital piety of the Christian church to ignore the religious growths external to it. The Ritschlian school of thought at least assumes that there exists between the two a radical opposition of principle. It does not hesitate to condemn the mystical elements in the fruitful movements of Pietism and Methodism, and to ascribe their services to the presence in them of forces of a contrary nature. On the other hand, Professor James's analysis in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* leads him to say "that personal religious experience has its root and center in mystical states of consciousness."¹ Of the reality of such states he aims

¹ P. 379.

to convince us, and also "of the paramount importance of their function." Again he says, using the very terms we have employed, "faith-state and mystical state are practically convertible terms."^a

These conflicting points of view furnish the theme for the present article. Are faith and mysticism contrary principles in the spiritual life? Do they ultimately yield different religions? Or are they, rightly understood, compatible; and if so, what is the adjustment between them which yields the soundest spiritual life and the fullest experience of God?

To secure a basis for comparison we need to return to the antithesis to rationalism which is common to both faith and mysticism. The existence of such an antithesis in current thought has been pointed out. How deep and well-grounded is it?

First as to *rationalism and faith*. What meaning shall these terms have for our present discussion? By "faith" I understand that attitude of free submission of the soul through which the reality and power of God are sought and found. By "rationalism" I intend to denote the absolutism of the discursive intellect—the insistence that the reasoning process is our only means of establishing reality.

At the outset it should be observed that, contrary to the usual conception, it is rationalism that is dogmatic in its attitude and faith that is empirical. The idea of faith which has just been defined, and which corresponds to the movements in religious thought already noted, does not involve the acceptance of a system of doctrine in its systematic wholeness. It says: "Back to Christ, back to the sources of inspiration; know for yourself that God is in the world; experience in your own life his creating and his recreating power; and then give this experience the best utterance you can." This utterance must be as full, complete, and systematic as possible. Truth is useful in proportion as it is clearly comprehended and compendiously stated. When our truth is carefully formulated, other things being equal, we are best prepared for action. When truth is fitted to truth in a systematic whole, we are most ready to shape a comprehensive plan. Nevertheless, the life is more than the system; it precedes it and is in turn its goal. The experience of God must always be profounder than its expression, unless that expression is

^a P. 424.

to be hollow and unreal. Thus faith, as a distinct principle of life, is truly empirical. So far as it has failed to be this, so far as it has failed to make experience the foundation of doctrine and to hold doctrine subject to the verification of experience, it has been identical with rationalism, and has partaken of that spirit which the piety of the present finds to be fatal to its life.

At all events, in the face of the negations of modern science there is small hope for a rationalistic conception of faith. Science makes its appeal to experience, and refuses to speculate beyond the realm of possible experience. This is the reason for its convincingness. This is the strength of its veto power, when it deals with long-cherished beliefs. Its peculiar authoritativeness results from the fact that it has deliberately abandoned the realm of mere abstract logical possibility and estimates the worth of a system in proportion to its verifiableness. If now in our religious thinking we urge the claims of doctrine without regard to their verification in the experience of faith, basing them solely upon the thinkability of the dogma in question and upon the needs of our system, then we alienate at once minds imbued with the spirit of scientific thought. On the other hand, it is a distinct gain to recognize this degree of identity between the methods and spirit of science and faith. Each founds its beliefs upon experience; each regards verification as the final court of appeal.

But when science becomes agnostic philosophy, then we have that rationalism against which faith revolts, and then we have a dogmatism exactly similar to that with which theology has so often been reproached. This modern dogmatism, it is true, differs in one point from that of the ancient nature-philosophy and from rationalistic theology. It is not a dogmatism of system, but rather a dogmatism of method. That is to say, it is willing to submit its results and its system to correction and revision from experience, so long as that experience is *of a certain kind* and is regulated by a *certain method*. All other methods, however, and all other kinds of experience are ruled out. They do not give objective truth, but are fatally infected with subjectivism, and must ultimately lead to delusions as baneful as those which rigid scientific method has only just succeeded in dispelling.

A few words from Professor James will set forth what I mean by this dogmatism of method:

There are plenty of persons today—"scientists" or "positivists" they are fond of calling themselves—who will tell you that religious thought is a mere survival, an atavistic reversion to a type of consciousness which humanity in its more enlightened examples has long since left behind and outgrown. If you ask them to explain themselves more fully, they will probably say that for primitive thought everything is conceived under the form of personality. The savage thinks that things operate by personal forces, and for the sake of individual ends. For him even external nature obeys individual needs and claims, just as if these were so many elementary powers. Now science, on the other hand, these positivists say, has proved that personality, so far from being an elementary force in nature, is but a passive resultant of the really elementary forces, physical, chemical, physiological, and psycho-physiological, which are all impersonal and general in character. Nothing individual accomplishes anything in the universe save in so far as it obeys and exemplifies some universal law.³

The process by which the universe has been thus depersonalized is a familiar one. The concrete data of sense are broken up into qualities. From these certain ones which seem more essential are abstracted and the rest are ignored. These abstracted qualities are linked together as cause and effect, and thus we arrive at a single general law in the place of the many concrete individuals. So it comes about that the whole universe is conceived from the standpoint of motion, the narrower realm of living beings, from the standpoint of organizing spontaneity, and the still more limited sphere of conscious life, according to the laws of association of ideas. These groupings of vast ranges of fact under general laws are of the highest value. They give us synopses of the universe. They enable us to react on the outer world intelligently, because they deliver us from the bewilderment of details. We can deal with our environment handily by means of these compendia. Our actions become swift and sure. It is from the point of view of *controlling* our environment that the laws of science are valuable. They enable us to foresee events, to eliminate the injurious elements and secure the beneficial ones. They contribute to man's mastery over nature and the freedom of his spiritual life.

If, however, they are given absolute finality, if they are regarded as the sole expression of reality, then they impoverish the world and

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

enslave man. The full palpitating reality of the individual is ignored; man is a thrall instead of a freeman. The human person, like all other particular manifestations of matter and force, is a vanishing phase of an infinite process. No act that he performs is original. No thought he thinks could be other than it is. All those sentiments and aspirations which are founded on the belief in himself as a free and permanent power are utter delusions. These delusions with respect to one's own inner life cannot indeed be dispelled, but with respect to reality other than the human person they can and must be. Much in the universe may be essentially unknowable, but that which is knowable, and accordingly that which is the only reality for us, is the aimless but relentless whirl of the infinite cosmic process.

But this absolutism which some scientists have been ready to claim for their view of the world is the result of forgetting two things. In the first place, there has been the tendency to overlook the fact that science obtains its results by abstracting certain elements from reality in its concrete fulness. To be sure, it takes what is most important from a certain point of view. But those aspects of things which it neglects may be from other standpoints of vastly greater consequence. In the second place, it seems to forget that there are such other standpoints, or at least that they may be used for the interpreting of the world about us. It is for this latter reason that we may accuse much of our so-called modern science with being simply rationalistic philosophy, and charge it with having escaped from dogmatism as to results only to fall into an equally fatal dogmatism of method.

Why then, we may ask, should the processes of intellect be held to be our only means of becoming acquainted with reality? Why may not the *way we react* on the world about us have something to do with the meaning we find in it? The impressions which things produce upon man are not limited merely to sensations, nor to the mechanism of cause and effect which the mind constructs out of our sensations. These impressions strike through to the deeper levels of our consciousness; they awaken the emotions and the acts of will which constitute our very life. But the emotional and volitional nature of man is the seat of his individuality. This is the realm where there is the least uniformity, where the peculiar and specific

are at their maximum. Evidently the kind of experience one gets on these levels will depend in part upon the attitude which prevails there. The heart and the will have something to do with detecting the meaning of the world. The pure in heart see God.

Dark is the world to thee: thyself art the reason why;
For is He not all but that which has power to feel "I am I"?
Glory about thee, without thee; and thou fulfillest thy doom,
Making Him broken gleams, and a stifled splendour and gloom.

Is the universe without a heart to us? Let us tune our own hearts to the right pitch and, when by sympathetic resonance it catches the tone of an infinite harmony, trust its message. Is the ceaseless toil and travail of the universe all to no purpose? Let us bend our energies toward realizing the best we know, and the seemingly aimless moiling will be revealed as a working together for good. "*Ask*, and it shall be given you; *seek*, and ye shall find; *knock*, and it shall be opened unto you; for everyone that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened." These words, spoken not simply of petition, but of all willing, contain a theory of knowledge, a philosophy of life.

In such words as the foregoing faith bears witness to its experience. It does not controvert any of the conclusions of science that have been reasonably verified or have any hope of verification. It does not require science to prove any particular conclusion of its own. But it values its own experience as knowledge. It has experienced the reality and power of infinite love and righteousness. It has the conviction empirically verified that the world is the work of God and is realizing his ends. For science to deny the reality of these experiences of faith, and to insist that they are not knowledge, is pure dogmatism. So far as men of science take such an attitude, they fall victim to a superficial rationalism. The empirical attitude of faith is broader philosophically and leads to the profounder insight.

But not only does a sound philosophy justify the present reaction against negative rationalism in favor, not of a positive rationalism, but of faith; it even requires science to sign articles of friendship with the latter. The two are in fundamental respects akin, and ultimately science must recognize the primacy of faith. By the preliminary definition already given, faith is that attitude of free sub-

1000

mission of the soul through which the reality and power of God are sought and found. Faith is thus primarily a function of our active natures, of the feelings and the will. Its experience of God is conditioned upon a moral attitude of the practical side of our being, just as the prerequisite of vision is facing the light. Now, taken a little more generically, faith might be said to be any attitude of the will that is the condition of getting knowledge. But when the conception is thus enlarged, it appears as the common ground on which science and religion meet. The will to believe is not only an indispensable constituent of the religious life, but it enters to some degree also into our most scientific experience. Let us consider for a moment the relation of the will to our knowledge.

The new psychology, says President King, has added one distinctive contribution of rapidly growing influence—the central importance of action. Body and mind we are made for action. Nor is this a rebound to a new extreme. The natural terminus of all experiences, bodily and mental, is action. For the very sake, therefore, of thought and feeling, one must act. The emphasis on action is indeed a protest against mere intellectualism or romanticism, but it is at the same time an insistence on the unity of man and on the *whole* man.⁴

What is recognized here is the reflex influence of the will upon our intellectual life. But modern criticism of knowledge goes farther and recognizes the will at the very foundation of the knowing process. Sigwart in his work on logic, from which I translate somewhat freely, says that in our purpose to know nature we implicitly

make the presupposition that the perceptions which come to us from the outer world will conform to the requirements of our thinking and will submit to being arranged in a system of concepts connected according to law. This presupposition is a postulate and rests ultimately upon our will.⁵

That is to say, the whole fabric of science rests upon the will to know, and consequently upon the belief that the real world is of such a nature that it will lend itself to the forms of human reason.

Professor Le Conte⁶ draws a parallel between science and religion to show how both rest upon postulates, that is, faiths:

The necessary postulate of science, without which scientific activity would be impossible, is the rational order of the universe; and similarly, the necessary

⁴ Reprint from AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. III, p. 302.

⁵ *Logik*, Vol. II, p. 19.

⁶ Essay in ROYCE's *Conception of God*.

postulate of religion, without which religious activity would be impossible, is a moral order of the universe. As science postulates the final triumph of reason, so religion must postulate the final triumph of righteousness. Science believes in the rational order, or in law, in spite of apparent confusion; she knows that disorder is only apparent, only the result of ignorance; and her mission is to show this by reducing all appearances, all phenomena, to law. So also religion is right in her unshakable belief in the moral order, in spite of apparent disorder and evil; she knows that evil is only apparent, the result of our ignorance and our weakness; and her mission is to show this by helping on the triumph of moral order over disorder. We may, if we like—as indeed many do—reject the faith in the Infinite Goodness, and thereby paralyze our religious activity; but then, to be consistent, we must also reject the faith in the Infinite Reason, and thereby paralyze our scientific activity.

The antithesis between rationalism and faith is not an antithesis between science and faith. Rationalism is only an abuse of the authority of science. That authority rests upon a faith which springs from a pressing human need, and upon the abundant verification which the vigor of that faith has been able to secure for itself. It cannot be used to veto another faith which rests upon a profounder need and which has its own verification.

One point remains in the comparison of rationalism with faith, which is also important for determining the relation between faith and mysticism. In making the subjective basis for the experience of faith the will to believe, do we not cut loose from rational standards and so take ground inferior to rationalism? What is to exclude pure arbitrariness in matters of faith and to prevent one from willing to believe whatever one desires? This would be a real danger, were it not that the will as well as the intellect has its norm, its test of rightness and wrongness, of the true and the untrue. This norm is the simple sense of "ought," to which consciousness holds without exception every volition subject. Only the will to believe which springs from the ethical demands of our nature can be called religious faith. So long as our conception of God is the conception of a Being of infinite righteousness and love, so long will the faith by which we have experience of God arise only from consciousness of a moral need. That which lays hold of us with absolute authority and becomes the very voice of God to us, the very power of his presence, must be something that evokes in us *what ought to be*. The infinite would fall short of divinity were it anything less than that. The willing in which the

experience of God comes is moral willing. Faith, though it be but as a grain of mustard seed, is always a moral act. As soon as God lays hold of any heart, its moral experience begins. And no other attitude than a willingness to be made righteous can ever make possible the knowledge of God.

We have seen that faith makes its protest against rationalism on the basis of unique experiences, that these experiences involve the levels of our being which lie deeper than the rational faculty, and that the norm by which they are tested is the moral consciousness. Should reflection upon *the antithesis between mysticism and rationalism* yield the same results, then we might agree with the dictum already quoted, that "faith-state and mystical state are practically convertible terms."

In the first place, mysticism repudiates the veto of its experiences which rationalism would pronounce on the ground that they are not directly describable, and cannot be fully apprehended, by the rational faculty. On the contrary, those experiences on which it places the highest value are unique and ineffable. On this point there is a certain kinship between mysticism and faith. James names as the first characteristic of the mystic state *ineffability*.

The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others. In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect. No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists.⁷

Herrmann, on the other hand, who repudiates the notion that mystic state and faith-state are synonymous, says nevertheless:

On one point we agree, that the inner life of religion is ultimately something mysterious and incommunicable. No man can by anything that he imparts help another to possess that which is best in religion. The individual must experience it for himself as a gift from above.⁸

The coincidence in the descriptions given of faith and mysticism by men who have judged so oppositely as to the relationship between the two suggests the possibility that the views of each on this latter point should be somewhat modified.

It will be instructive to pursue the comparison farther. The

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 380.

⁸ *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, p. 14.

second characteristic of mystical states mentioned by James is *noetic quality*.

They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain.⁹

But it is to insights which the discursive intellect cannot fully interpret that Herrmann refers when he says that the foundation of religious faith cannot be technically established, but must be found by each individual in a personal experience.¹⁰

In the third place, we find mystical experiences to be characterized, according to James, by *transiency*:

Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade into the light of common day. Often, when faded, their quality can but imperfectly be reproduced in memory, but when they recur it is recognized; and from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in what is felt as inner richness and importance.¹¹

With this compare the words of Herrmann in description of faith:

The mood in which the thought "God is present" is the expression of a direct experience cannot, to be sure, permeate the soul even of the most religious every moment. . . . But in the soul through which this mood has passed its traces still remain and keep alive the longing for its peace.¹²

Herrmann would not, to be sure, regard faith as merely transient experience, but still its maximum is of this character. He says that the religious life reaches its maximum in the hallowed moments of immediate experience of God, and without these all the rest is so empty and vain that it simply does not deserve to be called religion.¹³

Finally, mystical states are marked by their *passivity*. Says James:

Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism prescribe; yet when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power.¹⁴

But on this point also we find a general agreement with Herrmann's analysis of faith:

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 380.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 381.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. iv.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 381.

We are convinced that without the mysterious experience of God's *inworking* in the soul all religion would be nought. The nucleus of faith is the sense of being apprehended, wrought upon, changed by the power of God. To be sure, this activity of God in us, if it be real, must mean activity on our own part toward his ends, but its beginning is in passivity, submission, obedience.

We have taken these two authors for comparison, because they agree in their reaction against rationalism in favor of the authority of the spiritual life, and yet maintain contradictory positions with respect to the relation of the two great forms of spiritual experience, faith and mysticism. The one declares that faith-state and mystical state are identical; the other seeks to rule out mysticism from the life of faith. It would seem, however, that the absoluteness of these latter judgments requires some modification. On the one hand, the general resemblance between the characteristics of faith and mysticism which has been noted indicates that to insist on eliminating the mystical from our religion would mean an impoverishment of faith itself. On the other hand, the history of Christianity shows that an undue valuation of ecstasy, transport, and trance states, which constitute mysticism in its acute form, has been one of the great menaces of the religious life. There is need of a reconsideration of what these conceptions connote, if we are to estimate the forces they stand for intelligently and to avoid doing injustice to important religious interests.

An essential point in the discussion appears when James says that "personal religious experience has its root and center in mystical states of consciousness," and adds: "My own constitution shuts me out from their enjoyment almost entirely." This is equivalent to saying that personal religion is a matter of temperament, a type of experience that is possible or impossible according to the quality of one's nervous system. James has carefully guarded against a depreciation of the *worth* of religion, either from the moral or the metaphysical standpoint, on account of its temperamental character. Nevertheless, religion *as an experience of the divine* is something from which a large portion of mankind would be excluded for lack of the requisite nervous endowment. Hence his effort to persuade us that possibility and permission of believing "are all that the religious consciousness requires to live on."¹⁵

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 429.

But if we revert for a moment to what has been said in developing the conception of faith, we shall see that certain of its elements have not been absorbed by mysticism. While it resembles the latter in giving knowledge of a unique and individual sort not easily communicable, and while this knowledge is acquired through a passive relation to a higher power, yet the two types of experience differ at important points. In the first place, mystical states are almost wholly affairs of the feelings, while faith relates both to the heart and to the will. The passivity in which the supernatural is apprehended is with faith an act of submission. The subjective conditions of the experiences of faith are not matters of temperament, but are determined by the will. For faith as for mysticism the spirit is like to the wind which bloweth where it listeth. But the conditions of its reception are not indeterminate and occult. "He that willeth to do His will shall know." The only function that the will can play in mysticism is to prepare the mind by exercises physical or mental for its ecstasy. In faith it is the will itself that is in the grip of the supernatural; and so, while there is passivity toward the higher power, there is, as a result, a broader and deeper activity on the side of human relations.

The fact that the uniqueness of faith's experiences depends upon an attitude of the will points to a second great difference between it and mysticism. As has already been said, our whole voluntary life is subject to the norm furnished by our moral consciousness, and it is only the attitude of the will which is determined by this consciousness that can be called faith at all. This must necessarily be, so long as faith is an experience in which God is found. Unless we surrender the hard-won conception of God as a purely moral being, we are bound to insist that faith, which claims to have communion with him, must be to some degree a moral posture of the soul. Thus in this second respect faith is distinguished from all states which are conditioned upon a certain temperament. One's personal constitution cannot exclude one from a moral attitude of heart and will, nor from the experiences which depend thereon.

There is enough in common between faith and mysticism to enable us to understand why they should both appear in the common rôle of protestants against rationalism. But, in the light of the distinctions just developed, one cannot hesitate as to the relative

value to be placed upon them with reference to each other. Faith, and not the mystical state, is the root and center of personal religious experience. It makes the same claim as does mysticism to insight and to immediacy of relationship with the supernatural; but it transcends the latter in being able to accredit its experiences before that bar of the human soul, the moral consciousness. And further, because its foundation is not in individual temperament, but in our common voluntary life, it is able to transmute its experiences, private and personal though they are, into a social force for the spiritualization of the human kind. The primacy, then, as between these two supra-rational modes of experience, belongs to faith. Does the heart, in humble submission to the best that it knows, find itself upborne from feebleness to strength and from groping to insight? Then it must needs say, "This is God." On the other hand, is it suddenly rapt away from things of sense and thrilled through and through with things ineffable? It has only a mystery to ponder. It was not the unspeakable words unlawful for man to utter that made Paul the prime minister of the kingdom of Christ; it was rather the strength made perfect in weakness.

By the two great tests of spiritual experience, moral authority and social regenerative power, we affirm the superiority of faith over mysticism as a way to knowledge of the supernatural. It is true, James explicitly submits the experiences of mysticism to the practical test, and inquires after their fruits for life. And this is a tacit admission of a part of the contention just made. But what he has failed to recognize is that the faith-state exists as something distinct from the mystical state, and that accordingly the subjective conditions of personal religious experience are such as to make it, not an affair of individual temperament, but rather a prerogative of all mankind.

On the other hand, so long as the primacy of faith is recognized, we have seen as yet no reason why the experiences of mysticism should not be tributary to it. A general similarity between the two has already been shown to exist. It is surely arbitrary to rule out the mystical altogether, even though its peculiar authority must be disputed even for the individual who feels it. The strange elation, the clarifying, doubt-dissolving insight, the poignancy, the tidal joy

of which the mystic strives to tell—these, it may be, are the initial or reinforcing experiences which secure that submission of the will whereby God is known.

II.

The radical difference between faith and mysticism, as already developed, consists in the fact that the former type of experience is impossible except as it includes a moral attitude on the part of the one who has it. This difference, then, is concerned with the subjective aspects of the two kinds of states. But an equally radical difference appears when we look for their objective grounds. Faith recognizes as its objective basis historical revelation. Especially in Christianity the source of the life of faith is that God is revealed in Jesus Christ. It is otherwise with mysticism. The chief motive for Herrmann's arraignment of mysticism is its rejection of the historical. "It is a form of piety," he says, "that feels the historical element in the positive religions to be burdensome and so throws it aside."¹⁶ And this is just what James has done in shaping the Gifford Lectures. At the very outset he puts aside, not only ecclesiastical, but all historical, religion. And this is not simply for the sake of limiting his material; it is because he does not consider them germane to his topic, which is personal religion. Historical religion—by which we mean religious life which is sustained by a historical revelation—is classed as second hand. That "acute" religion which is personal communion with God is sought elsewhere and found only in mysticism.

Both Herrmann and James are in reaction against rationalism, and both are emphasizing the supreme worth of a religion as a direct personal experience. But the latter is thereby led to reject the historical, and accordingly is left with nothing but pure mysticism as a type of positive experience of God. The former finds his ideal satisfied by the historical, and consequently rejects the mystical altogether. There is danger to religion as a social regenerative force in the one position, and in the other there is risk of quenching the very spontaneity of religious life which Christianity generates. In order to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, let us ask the following questions: (1) Is it not possible for the experience generated by historical revela-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

tion to be direct, personal communion between the soul and its God?

(2) Is there not something truly mystical in the way historical revelation influences the individual, and are we not therefore bound to recognize the mystical, even in its more marked types, as a possible form of communion with God?

When we ask after the possibility of direct experience of God, we probe to that which both faith and mysticism declare to be ineffable; yet since with faith the inner conditions of the experience are not accidents of temperament, but a disposition of the voluntary life, it is feasible to delineate its general form.

The simplest exposition of the soul's claim to have communion with God is that it means the disclosure of a Being of absolute power and righteousness, the Supreme Reality and the Supreme Goodness. If after any fashion whatever the soul attains the vision of a Reality, whose authority over it is absolute, and from whom it receives a power that masters all other powers, then it knows the meaning of God. It matters not whether the vision flashes or dawns upon consciousness, nor whether the power lays hold upon the soul with violence or steals in like solar heat; if the command is that from which there is no dissent, if the mastery is such that it sets one free, they can mean nothing but the presence of God.

The finality of such experience cannot be questioned, and yet there is nothing in it which excludes the historical from being the form in which it is clothed. Nor would the finality be enhanced by the exclusion of the sensible or the historical. Mystical experiences, it is true, impress the recipients at times as being entirely divorced from sense, but they cannot escape the suspicion of having had as their accompaniment a widely diffused stimulation of brain activity. We will not dogmatize as to the extent to which psychic and cerebral processes condition each other, but the credentials of the supernatural are not to be found in the absence of physical concomitants. Both the sensible and the historical may be the envelope that enwraps truth transcending place and time.

But it is not simply true that the supernatural is not precluded from historical religion. On the contrary, the question should be raised whether the latter is not peculiarly the channel of supernatural influence. Leaving aside the miraculous in the realm of physical

nature as not germane to our particular theme and as being of subordinate significance in the question of personal religion, we ask by what avenues we may best hope to know the reality of such Supreme Authority and Power as alone can constitute the divine. Mr. James himself helps us when he declares that personality is the only full reality of which we have knowledge. To quote his words:

As soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.¹⁷ . . . Any concrete personal experience is a full fact, even though it be an insignificant fact; it is of the kind to which all realities whatsoever must belong; the motor currents of the world run through the like of it; it is on the line connecting real events with real events.¹⁸

The philosophical reflections leading up to such a point of view must be omitted as lying beyond the scope of our present inquiry. But assuming that personality, according to our best philosophical thinking, is the true reality, then it is a natural corollary that the revelations of a Supreme Reality, who is also personal, are to be looked for in personal lives.

The conceptions of revelation which are coming to prevail bear out this view. In religious history it is seen that personalities are the dominant forces. For example, the initiation of Hebrew religion as a unique spiritual force is not to be understood apart from the personal energy and faith of Moses. The forces which gave to that religion its maximum of specific gravity, so that of all the elements of the early Israelitish state it alone stood fast through the exile, were the personalities of the prophets. The inspiration of the Psalms, and above all of Job, is the autobiography they conceal. The voice crying to mankind to prepare in the wilderness the way of the Lord was a human voice, behind which stood a rugged intense soul. The supremacy and divinity of Jesus are the supremacy and divinity of personality. The most casual letters of Paul and John are sacred scripture, because of the divine significance of the lives from which they come. It is in their personalities that the revelation of God is found. Those lives speak a message that is diviner even than the sacred words they wrote. Nay, they become the very power which recreates and vivifies the mind of faith. They *are* channels for personal communion with God.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 498.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 499.

We are also justified in assigning this function to historical religion because of the central importance of the ethical element in faith. The Supreme Being is supreme because moral; the experience in which his reality is apprehended is moral. What can these facts stand for, if they do not mean that the ethical is the key to the supernatural? We have already emphasized the truth that personality is the only full reality of which we know. For this reason we cannot but believe that the Supreme Reality is personal. But therewith we have not given the characteristic mark of the supernatural. Psychology brings many aspects of personality under the scope of the natural, links them in with the series of causes and effects, and makes them parts of the outer, phenomenal world. That which gives personality its inwardness and originality is the ethical. Moral consciousness and moral effort—these are the regal facts in our experience. The pole of our being, the point where new energy is generated, the central glow of life, is the moral will. The ethical, then, is the supernatural. So far as that word has a positive meaning, it is derived from these most personal of all experiences, which give our lives whatever of independence and intrinsic value they may have.

But if the supernatural, which the soul seeks by direct experience to know, is moral life, then the claim of historical religion to be the form of that experience is emphasized. Through *moral* personalities the motor currents of the world run. This is the verdict of faith. The most commanding things in all the range of experience are characters. The most uplifting, energizing, compelling forces that impinge upon the human will are personal lives filled with moral energy.

But a defender of mystical as over against historical revelation might urge that what has just been said concerning the personal character of revelation really confirms the supremacy of mysticism. Faith in historical revelation, according to the account just given, becomes faith in other men's faith; in other words, it is precisely the second-hand religion which may for the present be ignored, instead of that first-hand religion to which we wish to penetrate. The prophets, the sons of God, the independent ones, must rest solely upon mystical experience. Now, it is not the animus of this essay to eliminate all mysticism from religion, but only to recognize the

normative character of historical revelation. Let us then simply ask: Is historical religion merely faith in other men's faith?

If this be so, it means that Christ himself misconceived one of the most essential points in religion. Christ surely meant to lead men to a personal relationship to God in the most intimate and direct sense. This is the central import of his preaching of the kingdom. The question of the social aspects of the Kingdom as Christ conceived it cannot be debated here. How far current messianism influenced his thought, how far he intended to forecast an ideal social community—these are important questions from other standpoints. But the whole spirit of Christ's religion would be missed if the kingdom of God be not understood to include God's kingship in the heart of the individual man. "Thy kingship come!" he taught us to pray. "The kingship of God is at hand," was his message. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; for lo, it is within you."

More fully still is this the significance of God's fatherhood. God the Father, man the son! All that human experience contains, of trust, fellowship, oneness of life, is drawn upon to express the closeness of the life with God to which he would lead man. "When thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father, which is in secret, and thy Father which seeth in secret shall recompense thee." God and the soul, the soul and its God! They are to live a secret life together. Individual, independent, personal religion has never received a fuller expression than this.

And yet in addition to this, or to secure this very end, Christ pointed men also to himself. "Come unto me," he said as he went about among them. "I will come unto you," he said in the days before his death. Both messages are enunciated with perfect clearness, and yet without the slightest sense of contradiction. The apostolic judgment: God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, is borne out by the naïve and almost unconscious way in which these two messages of Jesus are uttered as meaning, to all spiritual intents and purposes, one thing. As we are avowedly on empirical grounds in our present inquiry, we need go no farther. To use a modern phrase of scientific innuendo, Jesus was a religious genius. He was consciously founding a new religion. And yet he deliberately

interwove God and the God-consciousness in himself into a single object for the faith of his followers.

But let us go farther and consider the actual results of this identification of the individual life with God and faith in his revelation. No one could withhold from the apostle Paul the right to claim a personal experience of God. But whose faith in God was ever so inextricably bound up with faith in Christ as his? The constant coupling of the Father and Christ in the epistles shows that the one was no less in his thoughts than the other. How entirely these two aspects were one in practical significance is seen in that wonderful summary of his inner life in 2 Cor. 4:6: "Seeing it is God, that said, Light shall shine out of darkness, who shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." It is God himself, his own glory, that is known, and yet this knowledge was given in the face of Jesus Christ. When we think how to the great apostle God was all in all, the one in whom, not in a philosophical but in a very vital sense, he lived and moved and had his being; and, on the other hand, how Christ—his life, his love, his death—signified God to him, we understand that the things he united belong very essentially together. Here is a great religious personality, a life of maximum energy, nobility, and sweetness, whose ideality looms up with peculiar impressiveness before our time, being an original and full embodiment of traits which, though far less refined and harmonious, are the pride of the present age. But all these qualities are rooted in the revelation of God in Christ. His world-consciousness, his caste-demolishing faith in the equality of men before God, his undismayed execution of a world-mission—all of which must rank among the purest and directest inspirations that God has given to man—these all have their source in the personality of Jesus. Once more from the empirical standpoint we say that faith in historical revelation and personal experience of God may be most deeply one. Let us find a way to understand it if we can, but at all events let us not ignore the facts.

Again the very life of Christ furnishes us with suggestions as to the worth of historical revelation for individual religious experience. When he went into the synagogue at Nazareth, read the words, "The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me

to preach good tidings to the poor," and, closing the book, said, "Today hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears," can we doubt that he was thrilled with the consciousness that God spoke to him in those words? And, in general, the close connection between the gospel of the kingdom and prophecy, which modern historical study has so helpfully exhibited, points to the thought that God revealed in the prophets wrought with we know not what other modes of divinity in producing the obedience of the Son of man. On the mount Moses and Elias, the voice and the cloud, are all parts of the transfiguring experience. The zeal of the evangelists to find fulfilments of Old Testament prophecy, however unskilled its manifestations may at times have been, rests back on Jesus' consciousness of the presence of God in the revelation of the Scriptures as a fact of personal experience to him.

It is then a general fact of the Christian consciousness that historical revelation puts the soul into direct relationship to God. Above all is this the experience that emanates from Christ. From him the truth and power of God flow into our lives. "The Christian," says Herrmann, "has in the personal life of Jesus a positive intuition of God." It is a misconception to say that such experience is merely faith in other men's faith. And this would not be said were it not that a wrong view of faith is ever at hand to confuse our thought. Mere intellectual credence may rest on other men's faith. But the faith which is a type of life must from its very nature be independent. It is an act of submission, it is true, but only to God. It is a state of dependence, but only upon the heavenly Father. Toward other men, except as divine authority and power are recognized in them, faith maintains the attitude of freedom. The very thing that Christ fought for was to free men from a religion which was merely faith in other men's faith. This is the judgment of Harnack as from the historical standpoint he views Christianity and Christ:

Jesus sought to kindle independent religious life, and he did kindle it; yes, that is his peculiar greatness, that he has led men to God, so that now they live their own life with him.¹⁹

Pharisee and Sadducee were set aside by Christ, the law and the theocracy were set aside by Paul, the hierarchical church was set

¹⁹ *Das Wesen des Christenthums*, p. 7.

aside by Luther, that men might come to God. The revelation of historical Christianity has been the bulwark of personal religion since the days of the prophets. To react against the principles of Christian revelation in the name of personal religion is to divide a kingdom against itself. Ecclesiasticisms and outworn dogmatic systems need in truth to be sloughed off, but the power by which this is to be done is pre-eminently the faith that in Jesus of Nazareth was given to men the very self-revelation of God.

We need not then convert faith into mysticism in order to further the cause of personal religion. But now let us return to our second question: Is there not something truly mystical in the way historical revelation influences the individual, and are we not therefore bound to recognize mysticism, even in its more marked types, as a possible form of communion with God?

President King in his Harvard Lectures of 1901, which now constitute the volume on *Theology and the Social Consciousness*, after drawing a distinction between the truly and the falsely mystical, says:

The truly mystical may all be summed up as simply a protest in favor of the whole man—the entire personality. It says that men can experience and live and feel and do much more than they can logically formulate, define, explain, or even fully express. Living is more than thinking.²⁰

If the truly mystical is a protest in favor of the entire personality, the converse statement would appear equally true, that there is something mystical in the activity of personality and the relation of person to person.

Personal relationships are something so familiar to us that at first thought it would seem to be taking all distinctive meaning out of the word “mystical” to apply it to them in general. And, in truth, it is necessary to pass beyond the casual aspects of personal relationship in order to detect their mystical quality. Much of what goes under the name of social and personal relation can be very definitely comprehended under the laws of habit or of paths in the brain substance, of association, of ideo-motor action. Although the energies that lie behind these laws are mysterious enough, the experiences themselves are entirely general, communicable, and capable of expression in

²⁰ *Theology and the Social Consciousness*, p. 77.

regular formulas. But there are influences which pass between man and man that cannot be thus grasped in general statements. Moreover, it is to these that we attach the higher value. In them the true personality, that unique thing for which the individual stands, is revealed. Personal relationship in the specific sense consists primarily in these hours of luminous insight into the sanctuary of another's being. Recall the lines of Arnold in "The Buried Life:"

Only—but this is rare—
When a beloved hand is laid in ours,
When, jaded with the rush and glare
Of the interminable hours,
Our eyes can in another's eyes read clear,
When our world-deafened ear
Is by the tones of a loved voice caress'd—
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast,
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again.
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know.
A man becomes aware of his life's flow,
And hears its winding murmur; and he sees
The meadow where it glides, the sun, the breeze.
And there arrives a lull in the hot race
Wherein he doth forever chase
That flying and elusive shadow, rest.
An air of coolness plays upon his face,
And an unwonted calm pervades his breast.
And then he thinks he knows
The hills where his life rose
And the sea where it goes.

But after these insights have been had, they cast an interpretive light over the more ordinary and habitual intercourse. Acts that to another are opaque are to the seeing eye lit with the afterglow of the greater experience: a spirituality pervades the grosser substance of conduct. There is an aroma, a lilt and gleam to be caught from the prose of our common life, when once the inner sense has been anointed. This power of personality to kindle that secret fire of our nature, which when lit it is a holy ministry to nourish, is something not to be reduced to the grooves of law—it is mystical.

If a mysticism pervades the deepest relations of person to person, then, since revelation, as the theology of our time emphasizes, is

personal and is grasped only in the personal experience of faith, it follows as a logical deduction that there is a mystical aspect to the experience of God through historical revelation. But the general kinship between faith and mysticism has already been shown. What we seek now is actual verification of the union of the two in historical religion. Before asking after the presence of a mystical element in our own experience of revelation, it would be well to inquire into the place of mysticism in the great source of revelation, the Scriptures.

The appearance of prophecy in the life of Israel was characterized by phenomena which indicate mystical experience. At the time when Israel's fortunes are at their lowest ebb, and destruction of the people at the hand of the Philistines is impending, bands of men called prophets appear. They are the beginning of a new national-religious enthusiasm that, under the leadership of Saul, was to free the people of Jehovah from the yoke of the Philistines. What the psychological character of this new movement was is shown by the meeting of the newly anointed Saul with a company of these prophets. In 1 Sam. 10: 10 we read: "Behold, a band of prophets met him; and the Spirit of God came mightily upon him, and he prophesied among them." Again in 19: 20: "Saul sent messengers to take David: and when they saw the company of the prophets prophesying, and Samuel standing as head over them, the Spirit of God came upon the messengers of Saul, and they also prophesied." A second and third body of messengers came and likewise prophesied. At length Saul himself comes and is seized with the same spirit. Vs. 24: "And he also stripped off his clothes, and he also prophesied before Samuel, and he lay down naked all that day and all that night." The phenomena, then, are a psychic atmosphere charged with excitement and enthusiasm—a sudden seizure of the individual whereby he comes under the influence of this atmosphere and delivers utterances, perhaps resembling those of the modern trance state. The cause of it all is assigned to "the Spirit of the Lord." As Professor Davidson says:

In early times God was conceived more as a natural than a spiritual force; his operation, even where he might operate on the ethical side of man's nature, was physical. Hence "spirit" connotes the suddenness and violence in the divine operation. When one is seen performing what is beyond man to do, or what is beyond himself in his natural condition, both to himself and to the

onlooker he appears not himself; he is another man, he is seized and borne onward by a power external to him—the Spirit of the Lord is upon him.”

We should not hesitate to call these crude and extravagant manifestations mystical. We have already seen that as religious experience mysticism must be held in subordination to faith. In the wide range of mystical phenomena there is much that can have no religious significance whatever. “Religious mysticism is only one-half of mysticism,” says James.²² It is true that prophecy in its fully developed and most influential form is a very different thing from this early mysticism of physical ecstasy. It is the grand achievement of modern biblical criticism that it has set prophecy in its true light as essentially ethical religion. The prophet’s arraignment of kings, priesthood, and people, his premonition of doom for the sinful nation, his assurances of hope beyond disaster, the whole message which he delivered as the will of God, rooted solely in the consciousness that Jehovah was the God of righteousness. But different as seed and fruit appear, there is a continuous process of development connecting them. The name “prophets” applied to the early enthusiasts is identical with that by which the later preachers of righteousness are known, and in some sense the latter have grown out of the former. Indeed, traces of the outcome are not entirely wanting in the crude beginnings. Although there is nothing distinctly ethical in the particular features of that early prophesying, yet the significance of the whole movement must have been ethical. It was a rallying of enthusiasm, courage, faith in Jehovah. It was an assertion of the national consciousness, out of which fruits for individual morality and religion were to grow. Jehovah, although then conceived of as bound up with the destinies of Israel regardless of the character of the nation, was still the guardian of morality, so far as it had become a distinct element in the national consciousness. The origin of the great prophets from the undisciplined wild enthusiasm of the earlier prophets will never be understood as a simple evolution, yet there is a continuity between the two. The all-important ethical character of later prophecy is indistinctly manifest in the earlier, and the question for our present consideration is: Does not the mysticism

²² HASTINGS's *Dictionary of the Bible*, art. “Prophecy and Prophetism,” p. 114.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 426.

characteristic of the early phenomena frequently reappear in the later?

Professor Davidson²³ has connected with the accounts of Saul and the bands of prophets who were seized by the Spirit of God the fact that

the Spirit of the Lord suddenly carries Elijah away, one knows not whither,²⁴ and men fear it may cast him upon some mountain or into some valley; and how "with the hand of the Lord" upon him he kept pace with Ahab's chariots.²⁵ Again when Elisha was visited by the kings of Judah and Israel and Edom, seeking aid against Moab, he called for a minstrel: "And it came to pass when the minstrel played, that the hand of the Lord came upon Elisha," and he prophesied. "The hand of the Lord" appears to become a technical expression for the power by which the prophet is rapt away beyond his habitual self-consciousness. Music contributes to the inducing of the ecstatic state. It should be noted that the band of prophets whom Saul met prophesying were "coming down from the high place with a psaltery, and a timbrel, and a pipe and a harp before them."²⁶

Of the greater prophets, Amos and Micah do not withdraw the veil from their personal experience; Hosea discloses to us how his revelation of God has grown out of the tragedy of his domestic love, whereby we learn that not mysticism but fidelity and faith fathom deepest into the things of God; while Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel relate the visions with which their prophecies began.

Consider for a moment the vision of Isaiah in the sixth chapter of his prophecy.²⁷ The predominance of the ethical in this experience is plain. Self-consciousness and will are not in abeyance. The frame of mind, though impassioned, is lucid. The revelation of God does not mean an absorption of the finite self. Indeed, it rather intensifies the distinction between the two. Over against the divine holiness the prophet's sinfulness stands out in his consciousness with woful clearness. The cleansing, the call of the Lord, the grateful, valiant response "Send me," are distinctly moral experiences. The call is an experience of faith, involving the manifestation of God to a submissive, willing heart and the active response of the life to the revelation.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

²⁵ 1 Kings 18: 46.

²⁴ 1 Kings 18: 12.

²⁶ 1 Sam. 10: 5.

²⁷ Isa. 6: 1-8.

But it does not magnify the ethical in the narrative to ignore the mystical. The vision of the Lord, his thrice holy presence, the quaking foundations of the temple, the smiting sense of sin, and then the voice of the seraph saying, "Thy sin is purged"—these are all recounted, not in an allegorical or didactic spirit: they are real features of a profound inner experience, out of which came an intensification of energy, an enhancement of life for all future time. These results are conditioned upon that wonderful will of Isaiah, so full of spring and temper, ready in its submission to the perfect holiness, swift in its rebound in response to the divine question with, "Here am I; send me!" But this is not all that the story betokens. Something swept into the consciousness of Isaiah that day which converted the courtier into the prophet. The whole experience was a moral one. It did not carry him away from active life into a meditative retirement. On the contrary, it called him to a life of publicity and strenuous endeavor. But the initial vision bears the marks of mysticism nevertheless. Not that it is any better or more religious for that. Its significance is entirely determined by its fruits. It did not bring him any nearer God than Hosea was brought by the all too articulate experience of his suffering love. But its characteristic mystical tone should not on that account be overlooked.

The visions mentioned in the first chapter of Jeremiah are symbolical of his message. The account of the prophet's call is a plain narrative of the inner conflict between the appointment of Jehovah and his own sense of weakness. But when this struggle issues in a new consciousness of strength, when the word of Jehovah comes, "Behold, I have made thee this day a defensed city, and an iron pillar, and brazen walls, against the whole land," then we recognize that enhancement of life in which the moral and the mystical unite. The sudden elevation of the personal energies to a new plane, distinctly moral though the experience is, always has something mystical about it. Jeremiah again gives us an insight into his prophetic consciousness in 20:7-9: "O Lord, thou hast enticed me, and I was enticed; thou art stronger than I and hast prevailed. . . . And if I say, I will not make mention of him, nor speak any more in his name, then there is in my heart as it were a burning fire shut up in my bones, and I am weary with forbearing and I cannot contain." Of

this passage Professor Davidson says: "There is nothing more than such moral constraint as was felt by the apostles in the early days of the church or by one now with earnest convictions."²⁸ But for all that, the mystical is there. The prophet feels himself carried on to his work of prophecy by a divine energy. This is not, indeed, without his consent. The act of will in which he struggles against the divine power ends in consent. His personality is not abrogated. And yet it becomes infused with a power not its own.

Passing to the prophet Ezekiel, we recognize that with him the vision has become a literary form. Even the vision connected with his call to the work of the prophet is elaborated in a somewhat studied fashion. And likewise in the following chapters the symbolical acts performed are shaped according to a literary and didactic purpose. But here and there a passage shows that living experience underlies it all, and that, too, of the more mystical sort. For instance, in the third chapter we read: "Then the Spirit lifted me up, and I heard behind me the voice of a great rushing, saying, Blessed be the glory of the Lord from his place. And I heard the noise of the wings of the living creatures as they touched one another, and the noise of the wheels beside them, even the noise of a great rushing. So the Spirit lifted me up and took me away: and I went in bitterness, in the heat of my spirit, and the hand of the Lord was strong upon me." The note of reality here seems unmistakable; the words are descriptive of the prophetic ecstasy.

One other aspect of prophecy may be referred to, although it carries us on to debatable ground. That is the element of prediction. Historical criticism has not eliminated prediction from prophecy. Detailed references to future persons and things are not given in the prophetic books, as was formerly supposed. But certain great events are forecast, and the fact that these predictions were correct had much to do with fixing the prophetic books in the Scriptures of the Jews. We cannot discuss explanations of this predictive power here, but can only suggest that the recognition of mystical experience as a frequent element in the prophetic consciousness affords a point of view from which it might be regarded. Even Davidson, who rejects Giesebrecht's theory of a faculty of presentiment, says:

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

There may be obscure capacities in the mind not yet explored; and there may be sympathetic rapports of human nature with the greater nature around, and of man's mind with the moral mind of the universe, which give results by unconscious processes; and if there be such faculties and relations, then we may assume that they would also enter into prophecy, for there is nothing common or unclean in the nature of man.²⁹

The beginnings of the Christian church, though on an altogether different level from those of prophecy, have certain analogies with the latter from the point of view of our present inquiry. Here again there are mystical experiences of a marked type. The speaking with tongues on the Day of Pentecost seems clearly indicative of such states of consciousness. It was recognized by Peter as a reproduction of similar elements in ancient prophecy, and so as a fulfilment of the prediction of Joel. There was also something of extravagant enthusiasm and physical ecstasy in these manifestations, as with the first bands of prophets. Those speaking with tongues were taken to be full of new wine. But the gift of tongues was not an isolated phenomenon; it was widespread in the early church. The possession of it came almost to be regarded as a seal of conversion. The mystical experience which these phenomena give evidence of cannot therefore be passed over lightly in forming a conception of what communion with God may mean.

It is true that the more physical aspects of this new mysticism came to have undue prominence. Mystical experience, as has been repeatedly emphasized, does not contain its norm within itself. It must be measured by its fruits for the life of faith. Paul found it necessary to write to the Corinthian church that the gift of tongues was not from the Spirit of God if it led a man to say Jesus is anathema. His whole treatment of spiritual gifts in the twelfth and fourteenth chapters of First Corinthians aims to show that mystical experience must have ethical results or it cannot be thought to come from God.

But, on the other hand, Paul was far from denying that mystical states of consciousness might be a means of communion with God. He values the gift of tongues. "I thank God, I speak with tongues, more than you all," he says. Moreover, whatever this gift may have become later, its first manifestation at Pentecost was an event

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

of the highest ethical significance. It was unmistakably an outpouring of the *Holy Spirit*. Men were raised to another level of spiritual life by the influx of new power. The effect of that mystical experience is with difficulty singled out from the influence of Christ before that time and the daily life with God afterward, but it was indispensable, and was no less ethical than these.

But what is commonly referred to as the mysticism of Paul was not the gift of tongues nor the rapture of the third heaven, but the simple life with Christ. There had come to pass such complete union between him and the spiritual power which had been incarnate in Jesus, the *Holy Spirit*, that he could say: "I live: and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me;" and again: "To me to live is Christ." It may be said that one of the marks of mysticism is lacking here, viz., *transiency*. It is true that the relationship between Paul and Christ transcended that of the merely mystical. It was a relationship of faith, an abiding experience in which the whole personality of the apostle entered. To the first of the passages just quoted he adds: "And that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself up for me." The love and the final sacrifice of Christ are the interpretation of faith, and faith is the completest name—the apostle's own name—for the new life he is now living, which is, to use his own words, "the life unto God." But while his union with Christ is no transient ecstasy, the other characteristics of mysticism all color more or less his description of faith. His relationship to Christ partakes of the ineffable. It is so immediate and full that there is naught to say of it but: "For me to live is Christ." It is a state of profoundest insight. Consider how all the truths of the gospel are apprehended by Paul "in Christ." We are justified in Christ, we are sanctified in Christ, we have freedom in Christ. Finally, it is a state of passiveness and receptivity, not, to be sure, through suspension of personal modes of being, but through submission of the will.

In this very insufficient survey of some of the great events and characters through which Christianity finds God revealed, we have found in varying degrees elements of mystical experience. The limitations of the present article forbid us to make the inquiry more adequate. We must pause now to ask after the value and signifi-

cance of these elements. The question returns upon us: Do not the facts pointed out require us, after all, to concede that the religion of the great characters, those who have first-hand experience, is mysticism, and that all else is second-hand, merely faith in other men's faith?

I answer, No. The particular point of our inquiry in our last topic has been to discover the mystical in the experience recorded in Scripture, and consequently a false emphasis may seem to have been laid upon that which is really subordinate. If so, the balance must be restored again. The whole tendency of the mysticism we have found has been to subordinate itself to faith. In this very fact consists its religious worth. The transition from early prophesying to the great revelations of the later prophets consists in the gradually increasing dominance of faith. Instead of finding God solely in isolated phenomena of a startling character, the people of Israel came to see him in great personalities.

So with the early stages of Christian experience. The revelation of God is completer in the lives of Peter, John, and Paul than in the wonders of the Day of Pentecost. Moreover, Paul's religion is not mysticism in the sense that mystical modes of experience, in themselves considered, are all-important and central. They are simply aspects of something larger. The emphasis falls elsewhere, whether we look at his life as a whole or consider his teaching. That for which he counts all things loss is that he may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of his own, but that which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith. In spite of the mysticism which hovers in the words "gain Christ" and "found in him," the thought centers here about the more fully personal experiences of faith and righteousness.

But if historical revelation is none the less a religion whose essence is faith, because of the mystical elements it contains, neither does it render inferior the relationship to God which the man of faith may now have. What was said earlier in the discussion in regard to the directness and the immediacy of the relation to God that revelation affords remains unaffected by the specific forms in which that revelation comes. What is essential for communion with God is that the soul should stand in the presence of that which it must recog-

nize as the absolute authority and power over its life. But this it does when it is penetrated by the meaning of the life of Christ, and in a measure also when it is wrought upon by the spirit of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, or Paul. It is the peculiar property of faith, as it is of all living things, that it is able to generate its own kind. And so it is that the one life of perfect faith in God, wherever it does its regenerative work, tends to produce fulness of faith. Christ's work in man is the progressive fulfilling of his own prayer: "Even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us."

We have now already implicitly given a reply to the question to which we have so long deferred a direct answer. There is, indeed, something mystical in the power of historical revelation over the heart of faith. With Paul we have arrived at an experience that has for its objective ground the same realities that we ourselves have. And something of the Pauline mysticism is doubtless reproduced in every heart in which the Pauline faith lives again. If we cannot honestly say, "For me to live is Christ," yet we can say that when we do truly live, it is no longer our own living, but Christ liveth in us. God has helped us; he has laid hold of our hearts; what good there is in us is through submission to him; and our hope for the future is that he will never leave us alone. A sense of reconciliation is one of the marks of the mystical state recognized by James. But that is what the knowledge of Christ crucified has always wrought in the human heart. That is the freedom through submission, the strength made perfect in weakness, which forms the core of Christian experience.

Let us draw our conclusions concerning these two forms of personal religion.

We have seen that, just as something mystical pervades the profounder forms of all personal relationship, so throughout the Christian religion, which is simply personal life with God, there runs a mystical strain. Ineffable truths, solutions of the enigma of life not translatable into the forms of the discursive intellect, are apprehended in the life of faith. As James says, in the faith-state and in the prayer-state there is an actual inflow of energy. "In the communion with the Ideal, new force comes into the world and new departures are made here below."³⁰ These conclusions, which he

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 521.

sets forth as simple facts, are likewise the outcome of reflection upon the experiences of the typical Christian consciousness.

On the other hand, the more radical implications of his theory, that personal religion, as a thing founded on direct experience, is a matter of temperament, and that experience derived from historical revelation is not direct experience of God, must be set aside. The fuller name for the religious state, the one more adequate to the voluntary and moral elements essential to it, is not mysticism, but faith. The unique and striking forms of mysticism may result in an enhancement of moral energies. If so, they too must be counted as experience of God. But the purely mystical must always be held in subordination to the normative experience of faith. And this involves the recognition of the adequacy of historical religion; for the testimony of the Christian consciousness is that the light of the knowledge of the glory of God was given in the face of Jesus Christ.

CRITICAL NOTES.

THE MADRID MANUSCRIPT OF LAODICEANS.

THE pseudo-Pauline Letter to the Laodiceans, composed as early as the fourth century, according to Harnack, but in the second, according to Zahn, to displace a heretical letter of that name, is extant in some fifty Latin manuscripts, from Victor's Codex Fuldensis, of the sixth century, down. Harnack's list includes twenty-seven manuscripts,¹ from most of which Lightfoot published readings, and Lightfoot named sixteen others that he had observed in Oxford, Cambridge, and Lambeth libraries.² Four other manuscripts in Spanish libraries are registered in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 73-76. One of the more important of the collated manuscripts is the great Gothic Bible formerly at Toledo, but now in the National Library at Madrid, which stands sixth in the lists of Lightfoot and Harnack. It is assigned by Lightfoot to the eighth century, and by Harnack to the tenth. Its text was published in full in Joh. Mariana, *Schol. in Vet. et Nov. Test.*, p. 831, Paris, 1620, and again at Rome in 1740, in Bianchini, *Vind. Canon. Script. Vulg. Lat. Edit.*, p. cxcv, from the copy of Palomares.³ In giving the readings of the Madrid-Toledo manuscript (*Codex Matritensis, olim Toletanus*), Lightfoot in his first edition (May, 1875) followed Mariana's text, but abandoned it later, upon observing the difference and evident superiority of the text published by Bianchini. The differences existing between these two published copies of the Madrid manuscript seem to justify the publication of a fresh transcript of its text, made by the writer in the course of a search for patristic manuscripts in the National Library at Madrid, in the autumn of 1903.

The manuscript is a ponderous codex of 375 parchment leaves measuring 33.5 by 43.5 centimeters. They are gathered into forty-seven quires, usually of four double-leaves each, which are numbered in Roman, and apparently also in Arabic, in the middle of the lower margin of the last verso. The leaves are of heavy parchment, with the writing in three

¹ HARNACK, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur*, Vol. I, pp. 36, 37. The list is largely drawn from Lightfoot.

² LIGHTFOOT, *Colossians* (1890), pp. 282, 283.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

columns of sixty-three lines each, and show a variety of numberings.⁴ There are numerous marginal notes in Arabic throughout the book. A Latin colophon on the last verso indicates that the copy was originally made for Servandus, bishop of Ecija, in the time of the Moors, and was given by him to John, who is said to have been successively bishop of Cartagena, Cordova, and Seville, and who in his turn gave it to Seville cathedral.

The punctuation of the manuscript cannot be perfectly imitated in type, and the abbreviations of Iesus and Christus are, as often, in the Greek form—*ihs*, *xps*.

Fol. 213, verso, col. 3.

Incipit Epistola	
ad Laudicenses	Laudi
Paulus non hab hominibus	censes
neque per hominem sed p(er) Chr(istu)m	
ie(su)m. fratribus qui sunt laudociae	
gratia vobis et pax a deo	
patre. et d(omi)no ie(s)u Chr(ist)o.	
Gratias ⁵ ago Chr(ist)o per omnem ⁶	
[[mnem]] ⁷ orationem meam ¶. . . ¶	
quod p(er)manentes estis in eo.	
et p(er)severantes promissum	
expectantes in die iudicii .	
neque destituit vos quorundam	
vaniloquentia insinuantium	
[[. . .]] ¹⁰ ut vos evertant a veri	
tate evangelii quod a me	
predicatur : et nunc faciet d(eu)s.	
ut qui sunt ex me [...] perveni ¹¹	
ant ad profectum veritatis	
evangelii. deservientes . et	
facientes benignitatem.	
operumq(ue) ¹² salutis vitae aeternae:	
et nunc palam sunt vincula	
mea. quae patior in Chr(ist)o.	
in quibus letor et gaudeo.	

⁴ The hand is so curious that the attendant who finally found it for me was persuaded that it was a Hebrew manuscript, and brought it to me by way of convincing me that, this being the only remaining biblical manuscript from Toledo that I had not seen, there was in the National Library no such Latin Bible from Toledo as I sought.

⁵ G *corr.*

⁷ mnem (aut nem ?) *del.*

⁹ *litt. tribus del.*

¹¹ per *corr.*

⁶ mnem *corr.*

⁸ am *corr.*

¹⁰ *litt. duobus del.*

¹² operum q(ue) ?

et hoc mihi est ad salutem
p(er)petuam. quod ipsum fletum

Fol. 214, recto, col. 1.

ad laudicenses

orationibus vestris et adminis-
trantem sp(iritu)m s(an)c(tu)m sive p(er) vitam
sive per mortem.—est enim mihi
vivere vita in Chr(ist)o. et mori
gaudium: et ipsum in vobis
faciet m(i)s(eri)c(o)rdia sua. ut ean-
dem dilectionem habeatis .
et sitis unanimes . Ergo
dilectissimi . ut audistis
praesentiam mei . ita retinete .
et facite cum timore dei. et
erit vobis vita in aeternum:
est enim d(eu)s qui operatur in vobis:

Et facite sine¹³ tractu quod
quomq(ue) facitis. et quod est
dilectissimi gaudete in Chr(ist)o
et praecabete sordidos in lu-
cro homines: Sint petitiones
v(est)rae palam apud d(ominu)m¹⁴: et es-
tote firmi in sensu Chr(ist)i, et quae
integra , et vera , et pudica
et iusta . et amabilia sunt
facite: et quae audistis et
accepistis in corde retinete.
et erit vobis pax:

Salutant vos s(an)c(t)i:

Gratia d(omi)ni n(ost)ri ie(su) Chr(ist)i cum
sp(irit)u v(est)ro et facite legi colos-
sensium vobis.

Expl(icit) Epist(o)la ad Laudicenses.

EDGAR JOHNSON GOODSPEED.

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¹³ n corr.

¹⁴ d(eu)m ?

THE MARTYRDOM OF JOHN THE APOSTLE.

IN Vol. III of this JOURNAL I called attention, under a similar title,¹ to evidence tending to show that John did not die naturally at Ephesus in Trajan's reign, but was martyred in Jerusalem some thirty years earlier; and that therefore the fourth gospel could not have come from his hand. There were (a) that statement of Papias that "John the divine and James his brother were slain by the Jews;" (b) the fact that the ancient Syriac calendar commemorates on December 27, and specifies as martyrs, "John and James the apostles in Jerusalem;" (c) the implication in Matt. 20: 23; Mark 10: 39 that John should be, or had been, baptized with the same blood-baptism as James; (d) the absence of John's name in Heracleon's list of apostles who had died natural deaths; (e) the non-mention of John's name in the Ignatian epistles to the Ephesians and Polycarp, emphasized by the fact that the writer makes a point of noticing the apostolic associations of those whom he addresses. I then endeavored to show that the contrary evidence—viz., that of Irenæus, Polycrates, the Muratorian fragment, and John 21: 22—was dubious.

It is with no intention of repeating myself that I now revert to the subject—still less so, seeing that the arguments (except that supplied by the Syriac calendar) have recently been repeated by Professor Schmiedel in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*—but in order to add certain supplementary points. Though none of them, taken separately, may be of much importance, yet, taken in conjunction with the evidence previously adduced, and in view of the far-reaching consequences of the establishment of John's martyrdom, they seem to be worth collecting.

1. The Syriac calendar above mentioned is by no means unique in its representation. Years ago Dr. Sinker, of Cambridge, pointed out that the Armenian calendar commemorates the two brothers together on December 28; the Ethiopic, on December 27. The Gothico-Gallic missal combines them in the same way, and distinctly represents them as martyrs: "Natale Apostolorum Jacobi et Joannis." The Carthaginian calendar runs: "VI Kal. Jan. Sancti Joannis Baptistæ et Jacobi Apostoli quem Herodes occidit;" but as another day is assigned to the Baptist (viz., in July), and none to the apostle, it seems obvious that there is a mistake. "I must say," wrote Dr. Sinker recently, "in view of all the evidence before us, I do not now feel any doubt that 'Baptistæ' is a *lapsus plumæ* for 'Evangelistæ.'"

Even in the Western Church, though James has been relegated to a

¹ "The Martyrdom of St. John," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. III, pp. 729-40.

separate day of his own, the commemoration of John the Evangelist on December 27, between Stephen and the Innocents, still points to a time when John was regarded as having been a martyr in no less real a sense than his brother.

Iconography perhaps supplies some further evidence in the same direction. Representations of John are found, not with the conventional chalice, but with a palm branch; and with a viper indeed, but one twined around a sword.²

2. In the Ebionite gospel the apostles are enumerated in the following order: John and James, sons of Zebedee, and Simon and Andrew.³ From the Syriac calendar's point of view—viz., that John and James were the pillar-martyrs of Jerusalem, and were there buried—this phenomenon is quite understandable; and any other explanation presents grave difficulty. Professor Hilgenfeld has suggested that the Ebionite gospel may have originated in Asia, and have had a design of increasing the Ephesian John's prestige. But against this there is the *a priori* improbability that this gospel originated elsewhere than in Syria, where the Ebionites had their headquarters; and also, considering that this gospel was comparatively late, the improbability that Ebionites would, at Peter's expense, exalt the prestige of an apostle whom most of their hearers already identified with the author of our fourth gospel.

3. If the Carthaginian calendar commemorated John as a martyr, like his brother, not merely in intention, but in fact, one would naturally expect some allusion in north African writers. Such allusion is found, unqualified by any gloss which would attenuate the effect, in the tract *De Rebaptismo*, ca. 250 A. D.: "He said to the sons of Zebedee, 'Are ye able?' Because he knew that the men had to be baptized, not only in water, but also in their own blood."⁴

4. Clement of Alexandria is inconsistent on the point. On the one hand he cites with approval the story of John and the robber (which involves the former's residence in Ephesus, and his protracted age). But elsewhere he states without any qualification that the apostles were all dead by 70 A. D.: "The teaching of the apostles, embracing the ministry of Paul, ends with Nero."⁵

5. In Gregory of Nyssa's *Laudatio Stephani* we have the following: "Of these champions the leaders and chief are Peter, James, and John, who ran their race after the same fashion to the end of life, contending in

² HUSENBETH, *Emblems of Saints*, p. 115.

³ HILGENFELD, *Evangelia extra canonem receptum*, pp. 33, 35.

⁴ ROUTH, *Reliquiae Sacrae*, Vol. V, p. 319.

⁵ *Stromata*, VII, 17.

different kinds of martyrdom." Then, after saying that Peter was crucified and James beheaded, Gregory proceeds: "The blessed John, contending in many and diverse contests through his life, and distinguishing himself in all righteous acts of piety, being condemned into boiling water—this goal—was numbered in the choir of martyrs. Even thus was the manner of their death [*i. e.*, of Peter, James, and John], who through death have bequeathed their deathless memory to the churches."⁶

6. Similarly Chrysostom: "My cup ye shall drink, and with my baptism shall ye be baptized. Wondrous glories he prophesied for them! That is to say, Ye shall be judged worthy of martyrdom, and suffer the same things as I. Ye shall lay down your life by a violent death, and in these things be fellow-sharers with me."⁷ Again: "Ye shall die for me, and be slaughtered for the sake of the preaching, and be fellow-sharers with me in suffering."⁸ Again: "The cup is passion, but the baptism death itself."⁹

This all seems clear enough; but elsewhere one finds a *Milderung* on Chrysostom's part: "James was beheaded, and John died oft."¹⁰ It would seem, then, that Chrysostom wavered on the point, or perhaps that he held different views at different times.

Now, to turn from the positive evidence of martyrdom to the accommodations by which, even before the close of the second century, it was endeavored to get rid of martyrdom in the real sense. Once the tradition of John the apostle's long residence in Ephesus was well established, some escape

⁶ MIGNE, *Patrologia Graeca*, Vol. XLVI, p. 750. The Greek text is obviously corrupt, but its general drift seems clear: ὁ δὲ μακάριος Ἰωάννης ἐν πολλαῖς καὶ διαφόροις κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀλλήσας ἀγῶσι καὶ ἐν πᾶσι διαπρέψας τοῖς κατορθώμασι τῆς εὐσεβείας κενὸν μὲν εἰς ὕδωρ τοῦτο πέρασ κεκριμένος τῷ χορῷ τῶν μαρτύρων συνηρίθμηται. For πολλαῖς read πολλοῖς; for κενὸν μὲν read, with Zacagni, καίωμενον, or ζέομενον. Zahn, with less probability, suggests καὶ εἰς σίδηρον. It must be added that one of the two Vatican recensions of Gregory's works attenuates the force of the above quotation by inserting after συνηρίθμηται the following: παρὰ (ἰ. πέρασ) γὰρ δικάζουσιν οὐκ ἀποτίσει (ἰ. ἀπὸ τῆς) ἐκβάσει τοῦ πάθους ἀλλὰ παρ' αἰρέσεως [read προαιρέσεως] τοῦ πάθους κρίνεται τὸ μαρτύριον. This statement, that martyrdom is to be judged not so much by the actual issue as by the readiness to suffer, points doubtless to the idea that John escaped; but while there would be strong reason why a scribe should insert such a gloss, it is most unlikely that finding it before him, he would excise it. And, besides the extreme difficulty of referring τοῦτο πέρασ to anything else than the termination of life, the context, both that preceding and that following, appears to exclude the idea of escape.

⁷ In *Matthaeum*, MIGNE, Vol. LXV, p. 620.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum*, MIGNE, Vol. LXIV. Critics are of opinion that this work comes from another hand than Chrysostom's. But the "spuriousness" of course increases the value of the passage in this present case, as providing the testimony of an extra witness.

¹⁰ πολλὰκις ἀπέθανε.—*De pet. fil. Zeb.*

from the implication of Matt. 20:23; Mark 10:39, was inevitable, and hence the extraordinarily wide acceptance of such miracles as the poison-cup and the boiling caldron. Do these command more respect than any other prodigies found in the *Acta Apocrypha* of the same period?

As regards the poison-cup, hagiology shows many examples of the transference of details from an obscure saint to a more famous; and Papias's record of the escape of Joseph Barsabbas from a cup of "viper poison"¹¹ supplies a starting-point for the idea of such a miracle. The transference to John was probably the easier, owing to the fact that from him, as a virgin, Christ was said in Encratite parlance to have "taken the poison of the serpent," i. e., sexual desire.¹² As to the boiling caldron Renan, with one of his brilliant flashes, has suggested that a historical origin may possibly be found in John's having been smeared with pitch, not boiling indeed, but warm, to serve for one of Nero's flambeaux. But from flambeaux to caldron is a long leap. And if there is antiquity in Jerome's statement that John, instead of being hurt, was reinvigorated by the boiling oil,¹³ then what we have before us looks like the rejuvenating caldron of Medæa; perhaps the more appropriate in view of the tradition of John's longevity. Whether the "boiling water" above mentioned—from which, however, John did not escape—is more than a variant of the boiling oil may be doubted; but if an independent origin be sought, such may be found in some transference from the history of the Baptist, at whose entry into the Jordan for Christ's baptism, so we frequently hear, "the waters boiled," and the Baptist "escaped."¹⁴ Of course, there remains the alternative, perhaps a probable one, that boiling oil, or boiling water, was actually the instrument of John's martyrdom, and that the escape was simply a device for reconciling Syriac traditions with Ephesian.

If martyred, when? Professor Schmiedel has suggested that it was on the same occasion as his brother: "He slew James, and John his brother, with the sword," but against this one has to put the disparity of the subse-

¹¹ *ὁν ἐχιδνῆς*. See DE BOOR, *Neue Fragmente des Papias*.

¹² FORBES ROBINSON, *Coptic Apocryphal Gospels*, p. 93: "John, I have sanctified thee, and have taken from thee the poison of the serpent." Cf. *Acta Apocrypha*, ed. TISCHENDORF, p. 76; *Apocalypses*, p. 142: "Flee from the serpent, that his poison may not be poured into your mouth." "Desire, which is the venom of the serpent." The common source of this language would probably be the *Evangelium secundum Aegyptios*.

¹³ *Adv. Jov.*, I, 26: "purior et vegetior exiverit quam intraverit."

¹⁴ WARDROP, *S. Nino*, p. 27: "The waters arose, the son of Zacharia fled." *Chron. Pasch.*: ἀνεχύλασαν τὰ ὕδατα. EPHRAEM: "The waters bubbled." SEVERUS: "The waters were made hot."

quent reputation of the two brothers, which is at least most easily accounted for by longer activity on the part of John. See, for example, the inversion of rank in Acts 1:13, "Peter, John, James, Andrew." And what a contrast between the almost complete silence of tradition and legend in the case of James, and the wealth of Johannine literature! Would an apostle who perished so early have been chosen as a peg to hang these documents upon? Could the author of the fourth gospel have come forward as impersonator or literary executor of an apostle so long dead? And then, again, there is the triumvirate of Gal. 2:13: "James, Cephas, John;" and though the hypothesis of a substituted John, after the analogy of the substituted James, is conceivable, yet the coincidence would be extraordinary; and one cannot easily postulate in a second case that exceptional qualification which enabled the Lord's brother to take the place of his namesake.

Having adopted the idea of an early martyrdom, and thus disconnected the apostle entirely from Patmos and Ephesus, Professor Schmiedel naturally proceeds to discredit the evidence of the existence of two Asian Johns. It is a trifle that he rigidly confines the evidence of two Johns in Ephesus to the works of Dionysius of Alexandria, Eusebius, and the *Apostolic Constitutions*, passing over the *Book of the Bee*, where one hears of "John, and John, his disciple;" for, though some ingredients of this book are very early, the work itself is late. But how can one get over the evidence of the Apocalypse, and the second and third epistles—whether written by genuine Johns or impersonators signifies little—the Apocalypse with its "I John in Patmos," the epistles with their local personal detail—except on the hypothesis that there were, or had been, in Asia two well-known Johns, both qualified to address the Asian churches in a tone of authority?

One of the chief points that seem to have influenced Professor Schmiedel's judgment, viz., Polycrates's only mentioning one John, can be explained readily by the fact that Polycrates is speaking of tombs: "In Asia also mighty luminaries have fallen asleep;" and if the author of the Apocalypse had died elsewhere, had been martyred in Jerusalem, his name would not have answered Polycrates's purpose any more than Paul's. If, however, Professor Schmiedel be right in thus putting the martyrdom so early, and attributing the Apocalypse to other than the apostle, then the Judaically minded writer whom it seems to be necessary to desiderate in his place may perhaps be found in the person of John Mark. For reasons below given,¹⁵ it appears almost certain that John Mark is not to be identified

¹⁵ (a) 1 Pet. 5:3: "Mark my son." But the companion of Paul and Barnabas in 44 A. D. would by this time be a disciple of more than twenty years' standing, and

with Mark, Peter's interpreter. And the curious coincidence that tradition makes both the apostle and Mark of priestly descent, and describes the priestly *πῆταλον* to both,¹⁶ is somewhat suggestive of a confluence of personality.

In any case, whoever be the author of the Apocalypse, the evidence of the existence of a namesake of the apostle's seems almost inevitable. Not to repeat what has been said on this subject before, one may notice that in the Syriac *History of the Virgin*, recently published by Dr. Budge, though only one John is mentioned, he is entitled "the Less;" a fact suggesting that, in the tradition behind, some distinction between two Johns had been necessary. Also, one may notice the strange incongruity that appears in Polycrates's description of the John who slept at Ephesus. On the one hand he describes him as the one that leaned on Christ's breast, and, therefore, inferentially, the author of the most spiritual of the gospels; on the other hand he describes him as ultra-Judaic, decked in the old Jewish accoutrements. And then, again, he describes him as *μάρτυς*, which in its full sense (and the polemical, pragmatic tone of Polycrates seems to require this full sense) cannot easily be predicated of any John buried at Ephesus. He mentions him second to Philip, who, if *μάρτυς* were used in other than the full sense, might have been so labeled too. Moreover, as he distinguished Philip as "one of the Twelve," and also as the father of prophesying daughters—thus almost certainly blending the personality of Philip the apostle and Philip the deacon—there is the more opportunity for suspecting confluency also in his description of John.¹⁷

in age over forty. (b) The limitation mentioned by John the elder, that the evangelist was entirely dependent on his recollection of Peter's preaching, would scarcely be applicable to so early a disciple as John Mark, a Jerusalemite, and companion of Barnabas. (c) Dionysius speaks of John Mark in a way which proves that he had not the slightest idea of identity with the evangelist, traditional founder of his own see.

However worthless may be the list of the seventy disciples by Pseudo-Hippolytus, yet the fact that three Marks are there enumerated (viz., the evangelist, bishop of Alexandria; the cousin of Barnabas, bishop of Apollonia; John Mark, bishop of Bibloulpolis) reminds one how thin a thread connects the New Testament Marks together.

¹⁶ EPIPH., *Haer.*, XXIX, 4; cf. *Passio Marci*, quoted in ROUTH, *Reliquiae*, II, 28: "Quem quidem B. Marcum juxta ritum carnalis sacrificii, pontificalis apicis petalum in populo gestasse Judaeorum, illustrium virorum syngraphae declarunt: ex quo manifeste datur intelligi, de stirpe cum Levitica, immo pontificis Aaron sacrae successionis originem habuisse."

¹⁷ A similar confluence, owing to homonymy, seems to have taken place in the case of Simeon. When Hegesippus informs us that Simeon, first cousin of the Lord's, was martyred under Trajan at the incredible age of one hundred and twenty, it is the most reasonable explanation that he is confounding a grandson with a similarly named grandfather.

Let us now pass on from the evidence of the existence of two Johns to the question of the credibility of Polycrates and Irenæus, with whom may perhaps be joined Proclus the Montanist. It is not in their favor that the Asian assertion of apostolic claims should be made in fierce controversy. Polycrates, in the interest of Quartodecimanism, and Proclus, so it would seem, in the interest of Montanism, magnified the Asian claims as against Rome, and pointed to the tombs of John and Philip as a counterpoise to those of Peter and Paul. But it would seem that this claim was not admitted without protest. If Professor Rendel Harris be right in identifying Caius, the Roman opponent of Proclus, as one of the *alogi*, there is considerable probability that it was on the ground of some historical flaw, such as is obvious in the case of Philip, that Caius rejected, not merely the Apocalypse, but also the fourth gospel.

When we consider the previous history of the Ephesian church, the claim advanced in the latter part of the second century becomes still more dubious. For, in the first place, why did not Ephesus become a patriarchate? Jerusalem, Antioch, and Rome acquired that dignity, both by reason of being missionary centers, and also on account of apostolic residence. What a unique position of dignity Ephesus would have held, if an apostle resided there thirty years after his colleagues were all extinct! In the second place, would not any genuine Ignatius have addressed churches, so recently under the apostle's governance, in the same deferential tone which he employs to the Romans? Would he have ventured to admonish Polycarp, if an immediate and intimate disciple of an apostle, and to teach him his religious alphabet? Does not the same consideration apply almost equally to an impersonator of Ignatius, one writing not later than 150 A. D.?

Far more important than the evidence of Polycrates is that of Irenæus; for, in his case, the identification of the Ephesian John as one of the Twelve is clear. We find that Irenæus, too, had an end to serve—that, in opposition to recent Gnostic heresy, he was straining every nerve to prove that he himself, by reason of his connection with Polycarp, was in possession of direct apostolic tradition. Consequently his statements, like those of all partisans, require rigid scrutiny.

As an example of the length to which Irenæus allows himself to be carried by his febrile bias, one may notice his sweeping denial of the honors of martyrdom to any sects outside the church: "The heretics have nothing of this kind to point to . . . with the exception, perhaps, that one or two of them, during the whole time which has elapsed since the Lord appeared on earth, have occasionally, along with our martyrs, borne the reproach of the name."¹⁸ Contrast with this the acknowledgment of Asterius Urbanus

¹⁸ *Adv. Haer.*, IV, 33, 9.

that heretics—Marcionites in particular—had supplied “a great number” of martyrs.¹⁹

Coming now to the particular point under discussion, at every step Irenæus’s language leaves him open to suspicion of extreme exaggeration. To begin with, he tells us that Polycarp had not merely met John the apostle, but also “many who had seen Christ;”²⁰ and, even accepting the earliest possible date that has been suggested for his martyrdom, viz., 155 A. D.,²¹ and admitting the statement in the *Martyrium* that he reached the great age of eighty-six, we still have a gap of forty years between Polycarp’s birth and the crucifixion. Yet Polycarp had seen “many”! Even could it be so, yet, as they could only have seen Christ in boyhood, and been seen by Polycarp in his own boyhood, the evidentiary value of Polycarp’s testimony would be less than Irenæus represents. After speaking of the “many,” Irenæus goes on to state that Polycarp “was not only instructed by apostles, but was also by apostles in Asia appointed bishop of the church in Smyrna.” In using the plural “apostles,”²² it appears probable that Irenæus, like Polycrates, was wrongly identifying Philip the deacon as one of the Twelve. And it is only by making Polycarp’s ordination take place at a very early age, about twenty-five, that even this younger Philip’s intervention becomes quite credible. Alternatively, considering that in 2 Cor. 8:23; Eph. 4:11, the title “apostle” is extended to a younger generation, such as Titus and Timothy, it is not impossible that Irenæus is restricting some earlier wider use of the term, by Papias or Polycarp, into a rigid reference to the Twelve.

Next, one may notice the authority which Irenæus alleges for his own startling notion that Christ, when he suffered, was nearly fifty: “as the gospel [*i. e.*, John 8:57] and all the elders—those who were conversant in Asia with John, the disciple of the Lord—testify that John conveyed to them that information. And he remained among them up to the time of Trajan. Some of them, moreover, saw not only John, but other apostles also, and heard the same account from them, and bear witness to the statement.”²³ Now, in the first place, considering that such an authority as

¹⁹ EUSEBIUS, *H. E.*, V, 16; *cf. ibid.*, IV, 15. If Montanist martyrs be included, the references might be considerably increased; but it is doubtful whether Irenæus regarded Montanism as heresy.

²⁰ *Adv. Haer.*, III, 3, 4.

²¹ An earlier date is precluded by Polycarp’s visit to Anicetus.

²² *Adv. Haer.*, III, 3, 4.

²³ *Ibid.*, II, 22, 5. The original Greek is partly preserved in EUSEBIUS, *H. E.* III, 23.

Melito had distinctly limited our Lord's age to thirty-three,²⁴ Irenæus is here giving another flagrant example of his one-sidedness: his object being to score a point against the Valentinians, who laid stress on the usual figures. Moreover, he never pauses to consider whether his own idea (not necessarily that of his authorities²⁵), that the ministry lasted nearly twenty years, can be reconciled with the data, which he accepted, of Luke 3:1, 23. But passing over this indication of levity, if we accept Irenæus's statement of authority literally, that at least three witnesses testified on the direct evidence of at least three apostles, there is no alternative but to accept the "nearly fifty years." And if "nearly fifty years" be inadmissible historically, there must be some misrepresentation of authority. One can easily imagine a statement by Papias (obviously the authority whom Irenæus is building on) which would account for the statement as we have it. Papias probably said that he had it from the elders who were familiar with John the elder,²⁶ and among them Polycarp, that John the elder had made such an assertion; and Polycarp had also known Philip. Irenæus was just the man to turn a statement like this into one such as he gives us. Alternatively as before, one may suppose some looser use of the word "apostle" on the part of Papias.

What grounds could Irenæus have had for identifying the Ephesian John, who survived "till the time of Trajan" (*i. e.*, later than 98 A. D.), with the homonymous apostle? In the first place, he had before him the works of Papias; but then we find Eusebius in exactly the same position, drawing a precisely opposite conclusion. And it is difficult to see how and why Papias, if he had, or had had, an apostle of the first rank within reach, should have bothered himself at all with second-hand reports about other apostles; or have had any need of the care and scrupulosity in weighing evidence with which he credits himself. In the second place, Irenæus had his own personal recollection of Polycarp's discourses. But what was this worth? In his own words, he was *ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ, ἔτι παῖς ὢν*; and though it has been pointed out that these expressions do not necessarily exclude the idea of manhood, that cannot be said of their context. Irenæus

²⁴ ROUTH, *Reliquiae*, I, 121: "He indicated his deity by his miracles during the three years that elapsed after his baptism; his humanity during the thirty which preceded his baptism." By the way, it may be noticed in passing that Irenæus's disregard of Melito, when Melito did not suit, serves to explain his similar disregard of Papias's evidence (*supra*, p. 539) as to John's martyrdom.

²⁵ *Vide infra*.

²⁶ The fact that a hundred miles or more separates Hierapolis, Papias's home, from Ephesus will account for Papias's saying, as he appears to do, that his obligation, even in the case of John the elder, was partly second-hand.

insists on the fact, as *something remarkable*, that he can even remember the place where Polycarp used to sit, and what was his appearance; and though he professes to remember the gist of Polycarp's discourses, he contents himself with giving a single direct quotation. We may conclude, then, that Irenæus was about twelve. But, even granting two or three years more, how much does a man remember of the sermons heard at such an age? A few disjointed sentences of Polycarp's, a general impression of appeals to the name of John—that is all that reason warrants our ascribing to Irenæus.

More especially might a hearer of Polycarp's have made a mistake as to identity, if Polycarp referred to John his master as having seen Jesus. The last man who could say "I saw Jesus" must, in the ordinary course of nature, have been one who saw him in childhood; and in such a case there is nothing improbable in survival "till the time of Trajan." One cannot, indeed, lay very much stress on the expressions in 1 John 1:1; for what the writer says that he has "seen" and "handled" is not the person of Jesus, but "concerning the Word of life," the Logos invisible and intangible. And Origen's comment suggests itself: "No one is so foolish as not to see that the word 'hands' is taken figuratively, as when John says, 'our hands have handled.'"²⁷ But there is really much in favor of the idea that John the elder had seen Christ in childhood. The commanding position which he attained requires some exceptional qualification; and, however little of real value his memory might retain, still, if he had seen with his eyes, and handled with his hands, that fact would ultimately set him quite apart. Moreover, to those who had seen Christ in childhood would last be applied the cherished promise, "Some standing here who shall not taste of death." One can understand how, after a century's mist, such a figure would have loomed into apostolic proportions.

To sum up, then, with regard to Irenæus: Florinus, whom he attacked, might well have replied: "You say that you knew Polycarp, who knew John, who knew Jesus. If for 'knew' you substitute 'saw', I may admit your statement; but the link in all three cases is vitiated by youth, or childhood. It is the rare exception if a child ever realizes those points on which in later life information appears most desirable; and however incapable

²⁷ *C. Celsus*, VII, 34. As confirming the idea that it is not his physical knowledge that the writer of 1 John 1:1 is attesting, but the certainty of his spiritual convictions, and also as showing that the expressions there used were proverbial, one may notice *Recognitions*, I, 17: "He set forth so openly who that prophet was, that I seemed to have before my eyes, and to handle with my hand, the proofs which he produced; and I was struck with intense astonishment how no one sees, though placed before his eyes, those things which all are seeking for."

you may be of conscious dishonesty, what you are doing with your pretended traditional succession puts you, for practical purposes, almost on a par with those impostors who found their systems on some Glaucias, interpreter of Peter, or Mariamne, disciple of James, or Theodates, disciple of Paul."

To turn now from Irenæus to the fourth gospel itself: Was not Irenæus justified in appealing to John 8:57, "not yet fifty years old," to prove his point? The evidence certainly seems clear that John the elder believed Christ to have been over forty; and if the fourth gospel came from his hands, John 8:57 is explained. Could an apostle have entertained such an idea? The argument in the above case is vitiated by the reflection that perhaps, after all, the idea may be partly true.²⁸ But it is decidedly difficult, if not impossible, to make such a concession in the following test case—lately treated by Dr. Wendt, though not very fully—as to the date of the commencement of Christ's ministry. Did the public ministry begin before or after the Baptist's arrest?

(a) In Matt. 4:12 we are distinctly told that "Jesus began to preach" only after the arrest; and a similar statement is found in the parallel passages, Mark 1:14, 15; Luke 3:18, 21; the latter, with its notice that Christ's baptism took place "when all the people had been baptized," putting the case more strongly. (b) The statement in Matt. 11:2; Luke 7:18, "Now when John heard in prison the works of the Christ, he sent his disciples and said to him, 'Art thou he that cometh?'" points in the same direction; and if other than the obvious interpretation of these words, considered by themselves, is possible, it is precluded by the context, in which the least of the newcomers, recognizing Christ's true office and character, is declared to be on that account greater than John. (c) Similar representations that Christ's ministry only began "after the baptism that John preached," and that John's highest witness to Christ was reference to an unnamed superior, who was to follow at some indefinite interval, are found in Acts 10:37; 12:24, 25; 19:4. (d) The captious attitude of John's disciples (Matt. 9:14), during their master's imprisonment, is difficult to reconcile with the idea that he, before his imprisonment, had defined his own personal relationship to Christ. (e) Most striking of all is the casual artless notice that not only Herod, but many others, believed that Christ was "John the Baptist risen from the dead" (Matt. 14:2; 16:14; Mark 6:14; 8:28; Luke 9:7, 19); which bizarre idea shows clearly that the two men cannot ever have shown themselves publicly side by side.

²⁸ Not, indeed, in the extravagant form in which Irenæus gives it, that the ministry lasted nearly twenty years, but that Christ was older than Luke thought when it began.

Thus the dating of Christ's ministry, as commencing only after the close of the Baptist's, is, in the synoptic gospels and Acts, no mere incidental chronological note, excisable as an error, but belongs to the warp and woof of these documents.

Contrast the Johannine representation, John 1:15, 19, 37; 5:33. John receives a delegation from Jerusalem, and repudiates the idea of his own Messiahship publicly. The superior who was to follow is already "in the midst of you." The descent of the Spirit at Christ's baptism is attested. And John points to him in person as "the Lamb of God." Then, after Christ's visits to Cana, Capernaum, Jerusalem, which require some weeks, we find in John 3:22-30; 4:1, 2, that he and John are both established on the Jordan, so continuing, as it would appear, for some months. And John repeats his testimony in more decisive terms, which leaves no legitimate room for any further question among his disciples as to their master's absolute recognition of Christ's claim and their own duty to submit to it. Thus the overlapping of the two ministries is no less of the warp and woof of the fourth gospel than the nonoverlapping is of all other evidence. That the fourth evangelist was fully conscious of what he was doing, fully conscious that he was contradicting previous evidence, is proved by his deliberate, calculated assertion, "for John was not yet cast into prison."

Which of these absolutely incompatible representations is unhistorical? Dispassionate judgment can scarcely fail to answer, the Johannine. In the synoptic gospels and Acts the story is told with no *arrière pensée*; and there is absolute congruity. Moreover, the subsequent history of the Baptist's disciples—the fact that a considerable, perhaps the main, body persisted in preferring their master's claims to Christ's,²⁹ corroborates this representation. On the other hand, the fourth gospel stands absolutely alone in its chronology; and the motive (*i. e.*, that of compelling the submission of the Baptist's disciples, who appear from Acts 19:1-7 to have had a special center in Ephesus) is obvious. Could an apostle have deliberately distorted facts to such an extent? Could one so near Christ have lied? But it is understandable that one who had little historical knowledge of his own, only such as he had gained in childhood, might in a moment of inspiration supply what, from an apologetic point of view, was requisite.

There remains to be noticed that standing difficulty of John 21:22, "If I will that he tarry till I come"—a difficulty which Professor Schmiedel evades, with the remark that it is obscure because intended to be obscure. The one thing quite certain is that, of all explanations offered, the ordi-

²⁹ *Recognitions*, I, 60; EPHRAEM, ed. MOESINGER, p. 288.

nary orthodox ones are the very weakest. How great the difficulty really is, and how early there was a deficiency in genuine tradition, may be gauged by the fact that even before the close of the second century³⁰ there was already current the legend of John's miraculous disappearance and translation to paradise. And the difficulty remains, whatever view of the authorship and authenticity of the fourth gospel be adopted. If the authentic work of the apostle, one would expect the prediction to be justified. If the work of an impersonator of the apostle, writing after the apostle's death, one would expect this justification still more. We are told by apologists (*e. g.*, Dr. Salmon) that John in extreme old age was still in doubt as to the meaning of Christ's promise, and wrote to point out that the general expectation was not necessarily well founded. But if there is no more in the passage than this, the objection lies that, though the condition "If I will" saves a positive false statement, we are most distinctly left with a *suggestio falsi*. Moreover, while carnal misunderstandings like that of vs. 23, "Then went abroad this saying," are a regular feature of the fourth gospel (*e. g.*, 2:30; 3:4; 4:11, 33), in every other case these misunderstandings are reported in order to bring out some deep underlying spiritual truth. More especially should we look for such truth here, in an emphatic position, at the gospel's close. "No business of yours" would, as a termination of the fourth gospel, be extraordinary.

Another objection is furnished by the fact, that, whereas all previous notices of the beloved disciple have the effect of equalizing him to Peter, or putting him above Peter, here we should have an insulse, otiose notice with no such effect. This last-mentioned difficulty is only increased by

³⁰ At any rate, at the beginning of the third century; for we find HIPPOLYTUS mentioning, as to the mystery of the Beast's number, that John was indefinite about it, "for when he appears, the blessed one will show us what we seek to know" (*De Antichristo*, 50; *cf.* PSEUDO-HIPPOLYTUS, *De Antichristo*, 21); and it is scarcely necessary to point out that this notion of John's reappearance at the end of the world as one of the witnesses, to convict Antichrist and be slain by him, implies the idea that he, like them, had not seen death, and, like them, must eventually be subjected to the inexorable fate of humanity. It is apparently a post-addition to the *Acta Johannis* (ed. BONNET, Vol. II, p. 216) which supplies the story of John vanishing Undine-wise, leaving a spring in the place where he lay down; but we have what looks like an allusion to it in *Acta Philippi* (ed. BONNET, p. 58), where John is called *υἱὸς βαπτῆρᾶ* (*v. l. βαπτῆρ*, בַּרְכִּיָּה) *ὁ ἑστὸς τὸ πῶς τὸ ἔω*. And the very wide prevalence of the idea that John was to be one of the final witnesses (*teste* Photio; *cf.* Pseudo-Methodius, *Sclavonic Daniel*, and *Codex Templariorum* in John 17:26), points to the legend of the disappearance being early. According to John Malalas, who, however, is untrustworthy, it was even accepted by Irenæus, and though the now extant works of Irenæus do not support this statement, there is nothing very unlikely in it, seeing that Irenæus was the teacher of Hippolytus.

making the "coming" refer to a natural death, in contradistinction to Peter's martyrdom; a natural death which would distinctly leave the beloved disciple at a disadvantage! And, besides the frigidity of such reference to mere natural death, Peter's martyrdom was no less the Lord's "coming for him;" and thus, as Alford points out, the contrast between the destinies of the two disciples would be lost.

Less open to objection is the referring of the "coming" to the fall of Jerusalem. Such visitations are spoken of as a "coming," e. g., in Rev. 2:5, 16: "Lest I come and remove thy candle-stick;" "Or else I come to thee quickly." And it is very understandable how the author or readers of Matt., chap. 24, connecting the fall of Jerusalem closely with the second advent, and disappointed as to the latter, should after 70 A. D. try to persuade themselves that in some sense Christ had really "come" already. But, as I pointed out in my previous article, this explanation will certainly not bear to be surcharged with the further hypothesis that John survived the catastrophe. "Tarry till I come and thirty years after" would leave the promise singularly pointless. And John still in doubt as to the meaning, years after the promise had been fulfilled! Besides what credit would it reflect on John, merely that he was for a few years to survive Peter?

No, there must be some genuine significance in John 21:22, standing in the emphatic position it does, and the effect must be John's special exaltation. The following explanations supply these requisite qualifications: (1) Strauss's—that the fourth gospel was designed to supersede previous gospels; that John's high spiritual teaching was to be permanent as contrasted with Peter's; and he notes that the writer immediately proceeds to speak of the authorship. The obvious objection to this is the difficulty of supposing that the writer who had just recounted Peter's pastoral commission would proceed to indicate that Peter's teaching was to be ephemeral. (2) Jerome's—that there is a reference to John's virginity; "Quid ad te si eum volo sic esse?" To be a virgin, says Jerome, is to be immortal: "Virginitatem non mori."³¹ We do find in the *Dormitio Mariae* and *Pistis Sophia*³² that John's virginity is made the ground for equalizing him to, or putting him above, Peter. And one might compare passages in Methodius and the *Acta Thomæ*, where chastity is styled "the root of immortality." It is, indeed, difficult to extract this special, definitely restricted sense from John 21:22, seeing that the gospel contains

³¹ *Adv. Jov.*, MIGNE, Vol. XXIII, p. 246.

³² Cf. *Judicium Petri*, HILGENFELD, *Evangelia extra canonem*, p. 111, where John heads the apostolic list. These authorities exalting John seem to have a common source in the *Evangelium secundum Aegyptios*.

no reference to virginity. But if for virginity we substitute John's deeper spiritual perception, deeper than Peter's (20:8; 21:7), something similar to Jerome's idea seems sustainable. "He that believeth in me shall never die;" "John's union with me shall be continuous." It is noticeable that before in this gospel, when "coming again" is spoken of (14:3, 18, 19, 21, 23, 28), it is not so much the resurrection, paraclete, or the advent on the clouds that is alluded to, as the realization and indwelling of Christ in the hearts of believers. The weak point in this mode of interpretation is that it scarcely allows the natural force to "until"—an expression which certainly seems to fix a definite *terminus ad quem*. (3) Irenæus's—that the reference is to John's vision in Patmos; "cujus prora ac puppis," remarks Bengel, "est frequens illud ac solenne, 'venit,' 'venio;'" Irenæus's words being, "Joannes in Apocalypsi sacerdotalem et gloriosum Regni ejus videns adventum." True that the Apocalypse is not the advent, but a prophecy of the advent; but, strange though it sounds to modern ears, the apocalyptic thought of the time dated events, not from the time of their actual occurrence on earth, but from the time of their predetermination in the divine will; indeed one might say their heavenly enactment. Thus we find Dr. Wendt saying: "It was a current conception of Jewish theology that the messianic blessings had a heavenly existence before their earthly realization." Proofs of this mode of thought might be multiplied; but it is sufficient here to cite the Apocalypse itself: "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world": "Write, for these things have come to pass." There is this additional merit in the reference of John 21:22 to the Apocalypse, that, as in the very next verse authorship is spoken of, "This is the disciple who testified these things, and wrote these things," the statement serves as a literary identification. The Apocalypse being already a recognized work of John the apostle, vss. 22, 23, hitched the gospel on to the same authority. Moreover, one may observe that the possible points of differentiation between Peter and John are, after all, limited; and the process of exhaustion seems now to be complete.

The conclusion follows, I think, that John 21:22 cannot be made evidentiary against the idea of John's martyrdom. The evidence against that idea is all of it dubious, and is more than counterbalanced by that on the other side.

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[P. S.—Since the foregoing article was written, Professor Bacon, of Yale, has published on the same subject in the *Hibbert Journal*. He adopts Professor

Schmiedel's views, but carries them still farther, denying that even "John the elder" was at Ephesus. He is of opinion that both John the elder and Aristion were Palestinians, the former perhaps to be identified with the Jerusalemite "bishop" of that name (Eus., *H. E.*, IV, 5), and the latter with Aristo of Pella. Papias and Polycarp, he suggests, may have met John the elder in Palestine. Granted that Papias's expressions, considered by themselves, leave this explanation possible, yet do the attendant circumstances allow it? I venture to suggest that in the face of Rev. 1:4, 9, and of 2 and 3 John—to say nothing of the *Acta Joannis*, Polycrates, Irenæus, Proclus—Professor Bacon is assuming the possibility of too much smoke in Ephesus without any fire.—F. P. B.]

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

TO WHOM WAS THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS ADDRESSED ?

STUDENTS of Paul will welcome a new contribution¹ to the investigation of the intricate, if not insoluble, problem of the readers addressed and the writer's purpose in the epistle to the Romans. The problem in question consists in the dual character of the epistle, apparent in the fact that the dogmatic and religio-historical part (chaps. 1-11) is chiefly an attempt at an accommodation between the Pauline gospel and Judaism, while in the course of the letter the apostle addresses the Roman Christians as if they were chiefly gentiles. Appropriate to Jews or Jewish Christians are the declaration (1:2) that the "gospel of God" is a fulfilment of the promise to the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, the reference to the "righteousness of God," "witnessed by the law and the prophets" (3:21), and the concession of a great "advantage" to the Jews (3:1); while the objections, "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" and "Shall we sin, because we are not under the law?" appear to be assumed to be made by Jews against the gospel of Paul, and to be answered as if so made. Chaps. 9-11 are explicitly addressed to the Jews, and their salvation is represented as the object and conclusion of the divine plan of redemption, while that of the gentiles appears to be incidental and subordinate.

On the other hand, the apostle appears several times to address the readers as gentile Christians. In this sense may be interpreted the words "among all nations" (*ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*) ". . . among whom are ye also" (1:5, 6), and "some fruit in you also, as in the rest of the gentiles" (*ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν*, 1:13). The Romans are directly addressed as gentile Christians in 11:13: "I speak to you that are gentiles," and in vs. 30, where "ye" (gentiles) stands in contrast with "these" (Jews). In 6:17-19 the former sinful life referred to appears to apply most appropriately to converts from heathenism; and in 9:3 and 10:1 f. the form of the expression—the third person—seems to indicate that the apostle was writing of his Jewish brethren to gentiles who regarded them with disdain.

Dr. Feine maintains, with Pfleiderer, Weizsäcker, Jülicher, and others,

¹ *Der Römerbrief: Eine exegetische Studie*. Von PAUL FEINE. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. 2+159 pages. M. 5.

that the majority of the Roman church was composed of gentile Christians, and argues for this hypothesis at no little length against that of a Jewish-Christian party of considerable, if not of preponderating, strength, which is supported by Baur, Lipsius, Zahn, Reuss, and other scholars of note. The intricacy of the problem becomes apparent when the frail supports are considered on which Dr. Feine often rests his judgments. He argues, for example, at considerable length that the "weak in faith," who eat only herbs, are the Jewish-Christian minority, while the "strong," who "eat all things," are the gentile-Christian majority (14: 1 f.; 15: 1 f.). Yet there is nothing in the text that indicates either that the division is on the line of race, or that the ascetically disposed were in the minority, and the "strong" in the majority. An asceticism that requires abstinence from meat far exceeds the requirements of the Jewish law. Moreover, there is certainly nothing in the matter or the form of words in 15: 1, "Now we that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak," that indicates an appeal to the "majority" of the church. They might as well be addressed to a minority, or might be regarded as a general exhortation applicable to all Christians and including the writer himself, who appears in the "we."

Equally ineffective are some of our author's attempts to explain in accordance with his hypothesis the passages that appear to indicate a large, if not a preponderating, Jewish-Christian constituency in the Roman church. The words in 4: 1, "What then shall we say that Abraham our forefather according to the flesh hath found;" in 7: 5, "When we were in the flesh;" and in 7: 6, "But now we have been discharged from the law," are most naturally interpreted as expressly applicable to Jewish Christians, especially since at the beginning of the chapter the apostle addresses those "that know the law." There is no little violence in applying this section to gentile Christians on the ground that "*de jure divino* they stood before their conversion under the Mosaic law"! It is far more probable that Paul should have said to Jewish Christians that they knew the law, even though the remark be, as Dr. Feine thinks, a "commonplace," than that he should have so addressed gentiles.

Only by a forced construction can the conclusion be avoided that Jewish Christians were in the apostle's mind when he wrote (8: 15), "For ye received not the spirit of bondage again unto fear," where *πάλιν* most naturally refers to a former condition of bondage to the Mosaic law, *πάλιν εἰς φόβον* being equal to *εἰς τὸ πάλιν φοβεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς*. In like manner the passage 6: 15-23 is set in a clear light only when regarded as addressed to believers who are no longer under the Mosaic law, but under grace. That gentile Christians could have been in the writer's thought is

improbable, since the opposition of law and gospel is the prominent idea throughout. It should not be overlooked that by νόμος Paul almost always means the Mosaic law. The former sinful condition might well have been under the law, as of Jews not believing in Christ, and is not necessarily to be referred to heathenism.

The section, chaps. 9-11, is hardly intelligible unless interpreted as an attempt to set aside the Jewish-Christian prejudice against the gospel of justification by faith, which they understood as rendering nugatory the promises of God made to Israel. There is an evident intention in 9:1-5, 10:1, and 11:1, 2, to appease the Jewish-Christian consciousness by assurances of the apostle's sincere sympathy with his people: "I speak the truth, I lie not, my conscience bearing witness with me, that I have great sorrow and unceasing pain in my heart. For I could wish that I were anathema from Christ for my brethren's sake, . . . who are Israelites." "I say, then, did God cast off his people? God forbid!" Moreover, the admonitions in 13:1-7 respecting obedience to the civil authorities are far more likely to have been addressed to the Roman Jews, who were disposed to sedition and tumult, than to the gentile Christians.

While, then, it must be conceded that there are not a few indications in the epistle that gentile Christians were in the apostle's thought when he wrote it, there appears to be good reason for the conclusion that it was not addressed to them as a preponderating party or a majority in the church, and that, accordingly, a solution of the problems it presents cannot be reached on this hypothesis. Hence Dr. Feine's argument, which rests upon this presupposition, cannot be regarded as convincing.

It would appear, accordingly, that, if the problems presented by the epistle are not insolvable, some light ought to be thrown upon them by a consideration of the purpose for which it was written. To regard it either with B. Weiss as having its occasion not so much in needs of the Roman church as in a necessity in Paul himself "to fix in his own consciousness the spiritual result of his gentile-Christian work in the Orient and of his conflict with Jewish Christianity," or with some other expositors as not in reality an epistle, but rather a doctrinal treatise for the benefit of Christians of all times, would be to assign it a purpose that has no analogy in the other Pauline writings and to make a considerable part of it unintelligible. While the object of the epistle is not explicitly stated, there are not wanting intimations of it, or at least statements from which an intelligible one may be inferred. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that, since the apostle purposed to visit the Romans (1:11; 15:24), he should have wished to prepare the way for his coming by removing Jewish-

Christian objections to his gospel and by attaching the gentile-Christian part of the church more closely to his cause. Accordingly, the purpose to defend his gospel against misconceptions is apparent in the epistle, and the tone is more conciliatory than that in Galatians and 1 and 2 Corinthians. It is in accordance with the analogy of other epistles of the apostle that the purpose of this one should be found in conditions existing in the church that needed his direction and counsel. Not only does the dominant tone of the letter indicate that there were Jewish-Christian objections to him to be set aside, but also that divisions existed that he wished to heal. Chaps. 3-8 are intelligible only as an apology for the gospel of justification by faith, through which the law is done away, and it would be difficult to find a motive for writing them, apart from the supposition that among the Roman Christians were persons of weight to whom it seemed necessary to address the argument that they contain, and exhortations to harmony are addressed to the "weak" and to the "strong" (14:1-23), and to apparently mutually antagonistic Jewish and gentile Christians (15:5-9).

Dr. Feine rejects Weizsäcker's hypothesis that the epistle was chiefly directed against Jewish-Christian propagandists, who had attempted, in hostility to the apostle, to get possession of the Roman church, and that it is a controversial writing in opposition, not only to their teachings, but also to their activity. Paul, so Weizsäcker maintains, had long had his eye upon Rome as a missionary field, and his Jewish-Christian opponents no less, who had anticipated him, and had shown whither the gospel leads when preached, after his manner, without the law. It cannot be denied that the doctrinal part of the epistle is largely occupied with a refutation of the Jewish or Jewish-Christian contention, whether or not one concede to Weizsäcker that the polemic is "more complete and finished than elsewhere, even in the epistle to the Galatians." But Dr. Feine's objection is hardly valid, that if Paul had been addressing Jewish-Christian opponents, he would have brought the christological question more to the front, since the method of his argument must, according to the analogy of his epistles, be assumed to have been determined by the conditions known by him to exist in the Roman church.

It would appear that Dr. Feine is disposed to reject all hypotheses that assume the epistle to have had a purpose determined by conditions existing in the Roman church. Accordingly, he cannot accept that of Jülicher, which is a slight modification of Weizsäcker's; and Pfeiderer's fares no better at his hands, which finds that the purpose of the epistle was conciliatory, that is, calculated to win for the apostle's gospel the Jewish-Christian

minority in the church and reconcile it with the aggressive gentile-Christian majority. Hence the endeavor, that this scholar finds in the epistle, to overcome the objections of the Jewish Christians to his gospel, and to help the gentile Christians to a deeper insight into its nature. In opposition to all other hypotheses, Dr. Feine finds the epistle to be a polemic writing in opposition to unbelieving Jews rather than to Jewish Christians. He does not, however, make it appear otherwise than a strange idea that the apostle should have addressed such an argument to a church composed chiefly of gentile Christians, and that he should have thought such a procedure adapted to prepare the way for his contemplated visit to the Romans. Since the conditions existing in the church can hardly be shown to have called for such a letter, the Roman epistle is interpreted apart from the analogy of all the other Pauline writings, and the problems that it presents are by no means helped to a satisfactory solution.

Considerable space is given in the book to a refutation of Spitta's hypothesis that Romans is composed of two epistles written some years apart. But the limits of this review do not admit of giving a summary of the argument.

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THE BOOK OF CERNE.

AMONG the manuscripts which George I. in 1715 presented to the University of Cambridge was a quarto volume of leaves of vellum then recently bound. In this book the binder had brought together three independent writings. One was a collection of some fifty charters and other like documents, relating to the Benedictine Abbey of Cerne in Dorsetshire. The handwriting of these papers indicates a series of dates in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. Another was a collection of anthems or "sequences," to be sung before the gospel at the holy communion, followed by an inventory of the relics which were possessed by Cerne Abbey. These pages, as the writing shows, belong to the fifteenth century.

Between the two was a manual of private devotion, made up of hymns and prayers and passages from the Bible. This manual contained no reference to Cerne. Nobody knows why the binder inclosed it between the charters and anthems. Perhaps he found it there. Perhaps he put it in, according to the suggestions of taste or of economy, because the three were of like size. Anyhow, there it was when the book passed from the hands of the bishop of Ely into the hands of the king of England, and thence

into the library of the University of Cambridge. The bound volume was naturally called "The Book of Cerne," and that title attached itself to the central portion when this was found to be of more than common interest.

The Book of Cerne,¹ then, as the name is now used by liturgical scholars, means the manual of private prayers thus bound between Cerne papers. Nobody can say whether or not it was in use at Cerne. The handwriting is of the early ninth century. Certain Anglo-Saxon interlineations are said to be in the dialect of Mercia. One page contains an acrostic on the name Ædelwald Episcopus. These indications give a clue to the date and place of the present copy. The fact that from 813 to 830 there was a Bishop Ædelwald, or Ethelwold, at Lichfield would seem to point him out as the prelate of the acrostic. But the acrostic contains several words which nobody can make out. It is therefore guessed that these strange syllables come from the errors of a copyist. It is pretty sure that he wrote in the early ninth century, but it is by no means sure that the book was then for the first time made. Indeed, it is certain that the volume is a compilation rather than an original composition, since it contains various renderings of the same prayers, and other devotions which are extant in other books. The man whose pen traced these letters, then, had other books before him. Thus the date is pushed back.

It is observed, moreover, that the prayers here contained are cast in two quite different molds. Some are quiet, dignified, restrained and rhythmical. Others are hurried, impetuous, full of enthusiasm, and full of intimate detail. These differences are too great and marked to represent no more than various moods of a devout soul. They indicate distinct manners, habits, and temperaments. These types are almost as distinct as is an Anglican collect from a Methodist extempore prayer. Was there ever a time when two such temperaments existed side by side in England? Yes, plainly enough, in the days of the conversion of the English.

The conversion of the English, as everybody knows, was brought about by two forces which for a long time worked in separation, then in antagonism, but finally in co-operation. One of these was the Roman mission led by St. Augustine of Canterbury; the other was the Irish mission, led by St. Columba of Iona. The one affected the south, the other the north of England. One developed continental Christianity; the other represented primitive and insular British Christianity. One was dignified, conservative, the

¹*The Prayer Book of Aedelwald the Bishop, Commonly Called the Book of Cerne.* Edited from the MS. in the University Library, Cambridge, with introduction and notes, by DOM A. B. KUYPERS, Benedictine of Downside Abbey. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1902.

faith of men who had great executive ability; the other was enthusiastic even to wildness, full of fire and passion.

The two evangelizing companies met at last at the conference of Whitby, and two men of the Roman mission won the great debate. That was in 664. From that time the continental ways of thinking and speaking, even of praying, gradually gained ascendancy. Such a date is indicated in this manuscript. The dominant spirit is Irish, but the Roman influence is making itself felt. These prayers were composed by men who had been nurtured in the ways of the Columban mission, who still instinctively expressed themselves in the old tumultuous fashion, but who were being brought into subjection to the sobrieties and conventions of an older civilization. And, happily, there was a convenient Bishop Ethelwold who just at the right time for our acrostic was seated in the cathedral chair of Lindisfarne, just in the right place.

I have here condensed and stated in non-technical phrases the conclusions of a good many pages in which the learned editor, Dom Kuypers, has worked this matter out. He has brought to his task the Benedictine tradition of sound scholarship, and has justified the reputation of his order. Mr. Edmund Bishop, in a long appendix on the liturgical books used by the authors of the Cerne prayers, shows the same minute attention to the least details. These scholars have examined this old document with microscopes.

What we now see, then, is not a church prayer-book. The prayers, as Mr. Bishop shows, echo the phrases of mass and breviary as the private devotions of a churchman echo the phrases of the Book of Common Prayer. But these are not services. The book is not, in the strict sense, liturgical. These devout pages were prepared for a man's own room, where he knelt to address God beside his own bed. Thus they are a revelation of the interior life even clearer than is seen in the prayers and praises of the church. Here is how good men prayed in England at the end of the seventh century, and at the beginning of the eighth. Thus they presented themselves before the Almighty, and then rose up to go on missions or to enter into battle.

One quality which appears in these prayers is profound realization of God, and especially of God in Christ. The saints are invoked, indeed, but the essential desire and expectation of the suppliant is in God. He earnestly endeavors to realize God, in His attributes, which he recites in long lists, and in His acts of mercy and of judgment, which he recounts in extended detail.

Another noticeable quality is a strong sense of sin, with astonishingly frank confession of it. Here again occur the same recitations of particu-

lars. The suppliant declares that he has offended the Most High in every nerve and muscle and function of his body. He prays for mercy on his criminal head, his polluted eyes, his most unworthy ears and nostrils, his wicked mouth, his unrighteous lips, and so on through a whole anatomy of confession. There is, as the editor observes, "a pious *abandon* that surrenders itself to an overpowering consciousness of guilt and seems to lose the sense of proportion."

A like delight in repetition and a similar childlike susceptibility to the impression made by a long series of like phrases are to be found in the praises and meditations. "Take me, O omnipotent Father," he prays, "*Ubi resplendent semper angelorum milia regem regum laudantes, Ubi viginti, quattuor seniores sunt prout agnum dei laudantes, Ubi patriarchae, Ubi prophetae, Ubi Sancta Maria*,"—and so on *ubi* after *ubi*—"Ubi est felicitas, Ubi est securitas, Ubi gaudium verum"—till the sequence of celestial joys ends with "*Ubi regnum regnorum saeculorum in saecula. Amen.*"

Some such sentences of devotion must have been upon the lips of Aidan and Oswald; thus they must have prayed at Iona and at Lindisfarne before there were any formal "offices." These prayers are like the inter-twisted lines which decorated the Celtic crosses.

The book of Nunnaminster is a private prayer-book which contains a like mingling of Irish and Roman forms. The prayers of Alcuin show a similar combination, and indicate an influence of the Irish type of devotion upon the men who shaped the religious thought of mediæval Europe. A dim echo still sounds in the obsecrations of the litany: "By thy baptism, fasting and temptation: by thy cross and passion."

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THE OLD TESTAMENT AND ARCHÆOLOGY.

It is always refreshing to have from the pen of a master the generally assured results in any particular department of science. This is the situation in the case of Dr. Pinches, ex-official of the British Museum, who in the volume before us¹ sums up what is most certainly known about the Old Testament and oriental archæology. He tells us in his "Foreword" that "the present work, being merely a record of things for the most part well known to students and others, cannot, on that account,

¹ *The Old Testament in the Light of the Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia*. By THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1902. 517 pages. \$2.50.

contain much that is new." But it is a great satisfaction to obtain such a record from one who is so able to sift the probable from the barely possible. His sole aim has been, as he tells us, to bring together as many of the old discoveries as possible in a new dress. Controversial matter he has purposely avoided, and the higher criticism he has left altogether aside. So, throughout his large volume, theories are kept in the background as much as possible, and prominence is given to such facts as recent discoveries have revealed to us.

He divides his material, chronologically, under thirteen chapter headings: (1) "The Early Traditions of the Creation;" (2) "The History as Given in the Bible from the Creation to the Flood;" (3) "The Flood;" (4) "Assyria, Babylonia and the Hebrews, with Reference to the So-called Genealogical Table;" (5) "Babylonia at the Time of Abraham;" (6) "Abraham;" (7) "Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph;" (8) "The Tel el-Amarna Tablets and the Exodus;" (9) "The Nations with Whom the Israelites Came into Contact;" (10) "Contact of the Hebrews with the Assyrians;" (11) "Contact of the Hebrews with the Later Babylonians;" (12) "Life at Babylon during the Captivity, with some Reference to the Jews;" and (13) "The Decline of Babylon."

From this analysis it is obvious how exhaustively the author has covered the historical results of archæology, and how closely he has applied them to the Old Testament. From first to last the volume is complete and, with a few trifling exceptions, scientifically accurate. The author has a judicial mind, knows his department as a specialist, and is one of the safest guides of all those who have recently written upon the subject. He is a recognized authority, and in the truest sense an archæologist. He has adorned his volume with some sixteen reproductions of the most striking inscriptions at his command; the mechanical work is neatly done; an index of thirty double-columned pages rounds out the work; and altogether it is the most finished, complete, and authoritative of all the one-volume works upon the subject of the Old Testament archæology as yet published. And in saying this we are not forgetful of the masterful essay of Canon Driver in Hogarth's *Authority and Archaeology*, or of H. A. Harper's *The Bible and Modern Discoveries*, or Price's *The Monuments and the Old Testament*, or of Hilprecht's *Explorations in Bible Lands during the XIX. Century*, all of which are real contributions to the subject and exceedingly valuable. Dr. Pinches shows marvelous power of discrimination, and never allows himself to depart so far from the main purpose he has in view as to lose his reader in a maze of details.

We purpose to set forth in brief some of the most important positions

and decisions reached by Dr. Pinches in his own personal investigations. Concerning the origin of the Hebrew account of creation, he assures us that it may be regarded as one of the traditions handed down in the thought of many minds, extending over many centuries, and as having been chosen or elaborated by the inspired writer of Genesis for the purpose of his narrative, the object of which was to set forth the origin of man and the Hebrew nation to which he belonged, and whose history he was about to narrate in detail (p. 11). At the same time, he urges with great emphasis that when the two accounts of the creation—that of the Hebrews and that of the Babylonians—are compared, it becomes evident that, “to all intents and purposes” (a favorite and oft-repeated expression of the author), they are two distinct narratives. Points of connection confessedly exist between them, but should we ask whether these points of similarity are sufficient to justify the belief that two so widely divergent accounts as those of the Bible and of the Babylonian tablets have one and the same origin, in the mind of Dr. Pinches there is but one answer, and that is, that the two accounts are practically distinct, and are the production of peoples having entirely different ideas upon the subject, though they may have influenced each other in regard to certain points (p. 48).

As most would allow, the merely formal likenesses between the Hebrew and the Babylonian accounts are most strikingly similar, whereas the theological differences are enormous. Dr. Pinches seems to have grasped the problem from its religious side, and his decision is wonderfully sane, therefore, on this very account.

Concerning the name of Jehovah, there seems to be a trace of its early use among the Babylonians in their illustrious galaxy of gods. He says: “A large number of deities of the Babylonian pantheon are identified in the Assyrian proper names, with a very interesting divinity whose name appears as Aa, and which may possibly turn out to be only one of the many forms that we meet with of the God Ya’u or Jah, who was not only worshiped by the Hebrews, but also by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Hittites, and other nations of the East in ancient times.” Moreover, he affirms that not only have we a large number of deities identified with Aa, but a certain number of them are also identified with the deity known as Ya, or Ya’u, or Au, the Jah of the Hebrews (p. 59). Among these may be cited Bêl-Yau, “Bel is Jah;” Nabû-Ya, “Nebo is Jah;” Ahi-Yau, “Ahi is Jah;” etc.; from which Dr. Pinches infers that there is but little doubt that we have in these names an indication of an attempt at what may be regarded as concentration; that is to say, a desire and tendency toward monotheism. Friedrich Delitzsch also had already pointed out in his

Babel und Bibel (p. 61) that three tablets, dating from the time of Hammurabi, contain the three words: "Yahveh is God." Such discoveries are bound to have a great effect upon the critical interpretation of Exod. 6:3, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac and unto Jacob as God Almighty, but by my name Jehovah I was not known to them;" and also upon the use of this divine name in pre-Mosaic history, for example, in the book of Genesis. It looks now as though the passage in Exodus was not intended to convey the impression that the name Jehovah, *as a mere name*, was not known to Abraham and the other patriarchs, but rather that Jehovah had not manifested or revealed himself to them as a redeeming, self-existing, covenant-keeping God; now, however, the time had come for such a new revelation of himself. Moses's mother's name, Jochebed, which obviously contains the abbreviated form of Jehovah, is an additional confirmation of the earlier existence of this divine name.

In reference to the location of Eden, Dr. Pinches agrees with Friedrich Delitzsch that the Akkadian *Edina*, "plain," and the Babylonian *Edinnu* are the same as the Eden of Genesis. Yet he is not able to follow the German professor in his identification of the rivers of Eden. To the "Tree of life" he finds a parallel in the Babylonian belief that there existed a plant which "would make an old man young again." He also believes that he has found a parallel to the biblical "tree of knowledge of good and evil" in the cedar tree beloved of the great gods, particularly of the "lord of knowledge" (pp. 75-77).

The name Adam he traces back to the old Akkadian language, which, non-Semitic as it is, yet has the same word Adam to mean "man," as is shown in a certain bi-lingual inscription, which in Babylonian translates it by *nammaššu*, which seems to mean "a number of men." The Phœnician and Sabæan share with the Akkadian the same root with the same significance.

The origin of the Hebrew word *Kerub* he traces back to the Babylonian *Kirubu*, a word meaning simply "spirit," and conceived of as one who was always in the presence of God. Behind the meaning "spirit" for the Babylonian word there seems to have been another significance, like "intimate friend" or "familiar." The cherubim, therefore, were the good spirits who performed the will of God, and, in the mind of the Babylonians, watched over and guarded the man who was the "son of his god," *i. e.*, religious man (p. 82). No real parallels in Babylonian have as yet been found to the story of Cain's murder of Abel; and very little light is as yet shed by archæological discovery upon the question of the patriarchs of the early

ages succeeding Adam. It is coming to be generally recognized, however, that many thousands of years separate Adam from Abraham.

Concerning the "sons of god" and the "daughters of men" mentioned in Gen. 6:1 ff., Dr. Pinches, on the basis of an oft-employed phrase in Babylonian, "a son of his god," apparently to designate "a just man," or something similar, concludes that "the sons of God" may be regarded as the pious men of the time. The "daughters of men," on the other hand, would then probably stand for the "daughters of the people." This explanation not only stands athwart the usual modern interpretation of the passage by such expositors as Dillmann and Delitzsch, but also seems to contradict Jude's and Peter's conception of the story (*cf.* Jude, vs. 6, and 2 Pet. 2:4), on which they seem to base their doctrine of fallen angels.

In the Babylonian story of the flood contained in the eleventh tablet of the great Gilgameš series many likenesses in form and fact between it and the Hebrew account are recognized by the author, yet he does not fail to see that the Babylonian is "evidently the production of a nation steeped in idolatry." In the genealogical—or, better, the ethnographical—table of Gen., chap. 10, the expression that "Cush begat Nimrod" (vs. 8), which implies that the inhabitants of Babylon were all Cushites, Dr. Pinches explains by supposing that the plain of Shinar represents the meeting-point of two different races—one Cushite and the other Semitic—there being abundant evidence that a non-Semitic race (or races) existed in the plain of Shinar. The origin of the ancient Akkadians he traces back to the intermingled stock which peopled Babylonia prior to the rise of the Semitic dynasty of Hammurabi. With the advent of this dynasty, the change from non-Semitic to Semitic predominance took place. Moreover, the statement that "out of that land (Babylonia) went forth Assur" (Gen. 10:11) is in all probability correct; for it is exceedingly likely that the Babylonian civilization of Assyria is wholly due to emigration of settlers from Babylonia. On the other hand, the enigmatical "Nimrod" (vs. 8-10) he explains as none other than the well-known head of the Babylonian pantheon Merodach (p. 126). His final conclusion concerning the reference to Nimrod and Asshur, and also the story of the tower of Babel, is that there

is no escape from regarding them both as interpolations, giving statements from ancient and possibly fairly well-known records, recording what was commonly believed in the ancient East in those early ages, and without any claim to an inspired authority being either stated or implied.

The name Shem, "name," which in Assyro-Babylonian is *šumu*, also signifying "name," leads us to regard Shem as bearing *the name par excel-*

lence, and as probably deified under that appellation. A name similar to Abram occurs in a contract tablet older than the patriarch himself, belonging to the reign of the fourth king of the dynasty of Babylon (*ca.* 1950 B. C.), under the form of *Abtramy*, which is not quite the same as Abram, but very near.

Dr. Pinches throws immense light upon the life and times of Abraham, bringing out clearly how the patriarch in his migrations was all the time journeying within the borders of his own native land and under the governors of the same king who ruled in the place of his birth; and how the first stratum of the Hebrew nation was, as he thinks, "to all appearance" Babylonian; the second stratum, Aramean, probably a kindred stock; while the third was "to all appearance" Canaanitish. All these must have left their trace on the Hebrew character. They were consolidated under Hammurabi (Amraphel) into one single state. The ancient Akkadian laws were still in force, the Babylonians being especially fond of litigation, due no doubt to the tendency they had to overreach each other. It is, therefore, very probable that this is the reason why we meet with that remarkable contract of the purchase by Abraham of the field of Machpelah from the children of Heth (*Gen.*, chap. 23). Forty pages farther on, the author, however, makes the astounding statement that "the ancient Babylonians had to all appearance no code of laws in the true sense of the term" (p. 190). This sentence was probably written before the discovery of the famous Hammurabi code of laws by the French expedition in 1901. For otherwise one must wonder how he could possibly make such a statement. In an appended note at the very end of his volume he makes reference to de Morgan's new discovery, showing that he is impressed with the importance of the new "find;" but then it was probably too late to change any previous statements made in the text. A second edition will probably bring this portion of his volume up to date.

As to Hammurabi's part in the expedition of the four Babylonian kings against the five kings of the plain, recorded in *Gen.*, chap. 14, Dr. Pinches shows how Hammurabi was probably forced by circumstances to aid Chedorlaomer to reconquer what really belonged to Babylonia. Indeed, it was Chedorlaomer whom the five kings had acknowledged for twelve years as their overlord, and against whom in their thirteenth they rebelled. More than one of these claimed to be sovereign of the West-land, though we have no record of their having made expeditions to Canaan.

Of one thing there can be no doubt, however, and that is that the Elamites and Babylonians were quite powerful enough at the time of Abraham to make an expedition of the magnitude described in *Gen.* 14 (p. 232).

Thus, afresh, the historical character of the fourteenth chapter of Genesis is winning ground.

Passing on to the other patriarchs, Dr. Pinches finds that the name Jacob occurs many times in the tablets of the period of the first dynasty of Babylon under the forms of *Yakubu*, *Yakubi*, etc., and that there are also forms with the word *ilu* attached—*Ya' kubi-ilu*, *Yakub-ilu*; likewise, what is apparently the same name as that of Joseph, viz., *Yašujum*, with its longer form *Yašup-ilu*, "God hath added," which Dr. Pinches considers the true and correct derivation of the word Joseph. In reference to the discoveries in Egypt bearing upon Old Testament scripture, the author follows the conclusions of Mr. Flinders Petrie, the famous Egyptologist. He leaves it, however, in doubt whether Joseph came down into Egypt in the reign of Apophis, or earlier; but, in view of the fact that he did not, like Jacob, order his body to be conveyed at once to Canaan, he concludes that Joseph must have passed at least part of his life under native Egyptian rule, and that at the time of his death national feeling must have been more violently anti-Semitic than ever (p. 266). Again, if it be asked why the Hebrews did not go out of Egypt with the Hyksos, the answer probably is that Joseph was, "to all appearance," still known and honored by the native Pharaoh, when he came to the throne, for what he had done for the country, and it was not till after Joseph's death that a Pharaoh arose who knew him not, viz., Amosis, the founder of the eighteenth dynasty.

Dr. Pinches makes just here one embarrassing slip, when in two different contexts he speaks of the patriarch Isaac having visited the Land of Egypt. For example, on p. 250, he says:

That there should be such an omission [of the name of the Pharaoh] in the comparatively unimportant references to the visits of Abraham and Isaac (?) to Egypt is, perhaps, not to be wondered at, but that there should be no clue to the identity of the Egyptian ruler under whom Joseph entered Egypt, nor to the persecutor of the Israelites under whose reign they went forth from what had become to them practically a hostile land, is noteworthy, and a matter of great regret.

How Dr. Pinches knows that Isaac visited Egypt is more than the writer can understand. In Gen. 26:2 he is expressly commanded by God *not to go down into Egypt*, and there is no intimation elsewhere in the Bible that he actually did. This blunder is aggravated by being repeated a little later on p. 253, where he says: "It is clear that the visits of Abraham, Isaac (?), and Joseph, including Jacob and his family, all fall within this period," i. e., the rule of the shepherd kings (2100–1587 B. C.).

The exodus he treats as a fact of history (p. 269), and dates it about 1335 B. C. (p. 307). Lieblein's view, that it occurred during the reign of

Amenophis III., or during that of his son Amenophis IV., of the eighteenth dynasty, is treated with respect; but that the Ḥabiri mentioned in the Tel el-Amarna letters as roving bodies of men which went about stirring up the people, and even compelled them by force to renounce Egyptian rule, were the Hebrews, Dr. Pinches disallows, but thinks rather they were "companions"—whether an advance guard of the Hebrews must be left to the judgment of the student (p. 292). On the whole, he thinks that Dr. Edouard Mahler's view, to the effect that it was one of the sons of Rameses II. who met with his death in the Red Sea when pursuing the departing Israelites, and that, "therefore, the exodus took place during the reign of Rameses II., is regarded as presenting fewer difficulties than any other that has yet been put forward" (p. 309). One regrets that modern archæology has done so little of real value in the way of reconstruction of Old Testament chronology. The synchronisms which one is forced to make so frequently require the student to discard entirely explicit statements of Scripture, like those contained in Exod. 12:40 and in 1 Kings 6:1, as artificial, and therefore untrustworthy; but, fortunately, as Dr. Pinches shows, the difficulties become fewer after the schism. Into the details of these later periods it is unnecessary, however, to enter here. One fact of peculiar interest is his conclusion concerning the "Taylor" cylinder of Sennacherib, which he considers a sure witness to there having been two campaigns by the great conqueror, whose achievements are recorded in 2 Kings 18:13—19:37. A wide gap probably exists, he thinks, between the sixteenth and seventeenth verses of the eighteenth chapter. The author's final chapter, on the reconstruction of the life at Babylon during the captivity, furnishes a vivid and most gratifying conclusion to the whole.

In conclusion, the work is a monument of the greatest scholarship, and reflects much credit upon its author. While there is not that graphic perspicuity of statement characteristic of Dr. Driver's essay in Hogarth's *Authority and Archæology*, and while a conscious uncertainty in reference to certain details is betrayed—for example, when he says, on page 366, that "in Assyriology, more than in any other study whatever, things are not what they seem"—yet, as a whole, the author has rendered valuable service to the society for which he has performed his arduous and important task. Apparent inconsistencies in statement, like those on pp. 11 and 49, and on pp. 164, 215, and 366, will doubtless be so much better expressed in a new edition that they will no longer seem even apparently inconsistent; likewise, typographical slips like those on pp. 85 and 143.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE JUDAISM OF NEW TESTAMENT TIMES.

WITHIN a comparatively few years important additions have been made to the means at hand for a thoroughly scientific interpretation of our New Testament writings. The appearance of two such works as Dalman's *Worte Jesu* and Deissmann's *Bibelstudien* was of no small moment. For Dalman's work has made it forevermore impossible to interpret the Greek New Testament without reference to the Aramaic basis that underlies so much of the New Testament phraseology, while Deissmann has opened our eyes to the fact of the popular Greek idiom, which must be interpreted after its own laws, not after the laws of classical or scholastic Greek. A similar and equally important service is being rendered by the renewed interest in the study of the various currents of Jewish thought of New Testament times which found expression mainly in the apocalyptic literature of that age. The evidence of such a renewed interest is abundant, and it may not be out of place to call attention, in passing, to some of the more significant works that have recently appeared. The careful re-editing of the apocalyptic and similar literature has become a necessity, and has been partially accomplished in Germany in the two volumes on the Old Testament apocrypha and pseudepigrapha in Kautzsch's translation of the Old Testament, and in England by the valuable editions of various apocalyptic works by R. H. Charles. The new translations of the Babylonian Talmud by Wünsche and Goldschmidt, and the constantly growing number of good modern translations or editions of special rabbinical tractates, contain valuable material for the student of the New Testament period. The new edition of Weber's *System der altsynagogalen palästinischen Theologie*, Wünsche's *Neue Beiträge zur Erläuterung der Evangelien aus Talmud und Midrash*, and W. Bacher's *Die Agada der Tanaiten* are of great value. Of works whose object is a more general presentation of the Jewish religious thought of New Testament times the most recent, and in some respects most usable, is Bousset's *Die Religion des Judenthums* (1903). The new third edition of Schürer's invaluable work must, of course, be mentioned. Along more special lines we have Charles's *Eschatology, Jewish and Christian*, Baldensperger's *Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums*, and Volz's *Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba*.

The field covered by the above-mentioned works is not, indeed, one newly discovered or hitherto entirely neglected. The titles of many works which appear to have dealt with these subjects, and to have done so satisfactorily, will easily suggest themselves to the New Testament student. It must be admitted, however, that until recently the proper point of view had

not been clearly perceived. What was needed was a presentation of the main elements and phases of the Jewish thought by themselves, for their own sake, not with special reference to New Testament ideas, as, for example, the Messiah idea, or taking the New Testament as a standard of comparison. A treatment of the latter kind could only give one-sided, if not positively warped, results. Another needful thing was a more comprehensive view. It has at last been perceived that the rabbinic literature alone, granting that early rabbinic teaching can be ascertained, is no sufficient source for our desired knowledge of the Judaism that was contemporary with the New Testament. It is one, but only one, such source. And, once more, it has been found needful to present the religious and theological movements of Judaism apart from a general history of New Testament times. This, speaking broadly, may be said to be the aim of the new school, represented by such men as Bousset, Baldensperger, Charles, and Volz, to study the Judaism of the two centuries preceding the downfall of the Jewish state church as a complex, many-sided development, intimately related to the political and other movements of the age, reflecting the various and often conflicting hopes of the different elements of the people; in short as a vital process full of intensest feeling and anxious thought. It is evident that by such a study alone is it possible to produce the prolegomena to a scientific New Testament theology.

That it is only recently that this has been perceived is incidentally evidenced by these significant facts. When, ten or twelve years ago, R. H. Charles began to prepare his lectures on Jewish eschatology, he found that, strictly speaking, but little available and satisfactory material was at hand. The whole body of apocalyptic literature needed new treatment, and his special subject had not yet been handled in a scientific manner. As to Charles's work on eschatology, it is only a sketch, by no means exhaustive, and not always satisfactory. Furthermore, Bousset's book on the religion of the Judaism of New Testament times is the only work of importance, since Gfrörer's *Jahrhundert des Heils* of 1838, that gathers its material from the whole field of evidence. And the learned author confesses in his preface that, as his work grew on his hands, he realized, as he had not when he began, how much special investigation was yet necessary in order to reach trustworthy conclusions.

Of the works named above it is the purpose of this article to direct special attention to two, those by Baldensperger¹ and Volz.²

¹ *Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums*. Von W. BALDENSPERGER. Dritte, völlig umgearbeitete Auflage. Strasburg: Heitz, 1903. xii+240 pages.

² *Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba*. Dargestellt von PAUL VOLZ. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. xvi+412 pages. M. 7.

Baldensperger's book is the third edition of the first half of his *Selbstbewusstsein Jesu* (1888), but so thoroughly revised as to constitute a new study. The significance of this work lies in the relation it bears to the larger work of which it is the introductory part. It was necessary that one who set before himself the task of writing on the self-consciousness of Jesus should first of all feel the pulse of the age to which Jesus belonged and with which his work was so intimately connected. To do this it was necessary to get behind the gospel narratives, with their true but limited representation of contemporary thought and life. And the one great source of information regarding the religious life of Judaism—not in its more scholastic or in its ceremonial aspects, but in its most vital hopes and convictions and ideals, the very elements with which the gospel has so much to do—is the apocalyptic literature. We have long been well informed as to the main facts of the formal, organized, and regulated Judaism of Jesus' day. The tenets of the Pharisees and Sadducees, the ceremonial customs, the rule of the Law, theological opinions of various kinds held by the Jewish doctors—all these are easily ascertained from standard Lives of Christ or commentaries and similar works. But all such information is insufficient to put us in sympathetic touch with the Jewish world of Jesus' day. We need to know that world from the inside, if possible. We want to know what were the regnant tendencies, the formative influences, the molding forces, the spirit of the times in which Jesus moved, to which he addressed himself, in which he planted his gospel, and under the influence of which the first formulations of Christian doctrine took place. Did Jesus also feel those influences; did he think *with* his age; did he use its terminology? If he did, even in part, to know that age means simply to get a truer point of view whence to see him, to hear him, and to understand him. It is just this service that is rendered by Baldensperger. Limiting himself to one great element of the Jewish thought, the messianic, he attempts to set before us the character and significance of the messianic hopes and doctrines, the part they played in the Judaism of New Testament times. After a brief review of the sources, marked by cautious reserve regarding dates and origin of many parts of this literature, in a masterly treatment he details the various conflicting and often mutually reacting conceptions which contributed to the building up of the sum-total of the messianic ideas. He shows that underneath the legalism, often considered the main characteristic of later Judaism, other opposing, and nearly as powerful, influences or tendencies were at work. Messianism was, in fact, the opposite pole of legalism. It was at once more profound and more vital. It led to deeper thought concern-

ing God and the economy of his world-government, the place of Judaism in the world, the destiny of man, the nature of the unseen world, and the character of the unknown future. These messianic speculations, crude in form as they may appear, grew out of restless thought, deep piety, ardent hope, intense nationalism, and profound conviction. Mere legalism was self-contented and dead. Messianism was alive and dealt with living problems. As such, it had a strong hold on the masses; it was popular. It is particularly noteworthy that these ideas which figure so prominently in the apocalyptic literature are just those with which Jesus' teaching had much in common. When he talked to men of the kingdom, of the world to come, of eternal destiny, he was talking along lines in which his age was more interested than they were in the length of a sabbath day's journey. How, then, was this whole movement—call it messianism or apocalyptic, as you will—related to the general religious and political development of Judaism between the days of Ezra and Nehemiah and the New Testament times? How did it arise, and what were the main notes in the progress of the movement? To answer this question Baldensperger devotes the third division of his book (pp. 91-171). We shall not attempt to summarize his treatment, but would call attention to the main result of the investigation, which is, in brief, that the whole development was exceedingly complicated; and that, while there was progress, the thought ever becoming more definite as well as complicated, it was progress intricate in detail, and full of numerous side developments and reactions. This, again, only signifies how near to the popular heart, and how sensitive to all the varying moods of popular feeling, these messianic-eschatological hopes and theories were. The concluding portion of Baldensperger's work, full of suggestion, but all too brief, is on the nature (*Wesen*) of apocalyptic. It came near to being a philosophy of history; in many respects it was an attitude or a tendency rather than a given set of teachings. It was an influence that put life into much that would otherwise have been mere dead formalism.

Not so attractive in style, but more comprehensive in scope and exhaustive in treatment, is Volz's *Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba*. Volz has chosen the same term as Charles, but uses it in a more inclusive sense. Under it he includes all that Baldensperger means by the title of his work, and much of what Bousset has given in his *Religion des Judenthums*. With Bousset, Volz proposes to place the rabbinical theology alongside of that of the apocalyptic writers, and supplement these two sources by whatever may be found in the Old Testament apocrypha, Philo, Josephus, or any other Jewish writer of the period. All of this material Volz has gone

through with painstaking care, more thoroughly than has been attempted hitherto, with the result that he has given us a work that will, if we mistake not, be the standard reference work on the subjects it treats for a long time to come. After a review of the sources—not, as is the more usual method, in order to decide questions of date and authorship, but to indicate what eschatological material is contained in any given source—he passes to the first of the two main divisions of his study—the *development* of the various eschatological ideas in Judaism in the two centuries from Daniel to Akiba. What we get here is a view of the origin and development of the elemental ideas on the basis of which the eschatological schemes or systems were built. Such conceptions were those of the new age or era, the nation and man in general, the world as an organic force or kingdom, a judgment, salvation, etc. In his second main division Volz deals with the eschatology proper, or, as he calls it, the eschatological *Akte und Zustände*. The order of treatment is so suggestive that we repeat it: The *date* of the end—when? the last evil time or age, culminating in the “day of God;” the messengers or agents of salvation, the ideas culminating in the doctrine of the messianic king; then the great matters of destiny; the reappearance of the departed ones; the judgment with its final doom on the forces of evil and wicked men; the great renewal with the new era of the unopposed reign of God; the eternal salvation, those who will share it, and the nature of their experiences. All this might seem to be taken from the New Testament. It is not, however; it is all purely Jewish; and Volz makes only incidental reference to the New Testament writings. As has been said, these points constitute the elements of the Jewish eschatology. To say that they give us the system, the commonly accepted system of Jewish theology of the last things, would be a mistake. Volz makes this perfectly clear. On many of these points there was no uniform opinion. Apocalyptic writers differed among themselves as well as from the rabbinic authorities. These also were by no means at one.

Barring differences on minor points, it is remarkable that all these specialists—Charles, Baldensperger, Bousset, and Volz—are in substantial agreement as to their main conclusions. Volz’s work will, however, be the one to which we shall turn to get the fullest information or to find the needed reference to the sources. His treatment of the disputed points, such as the significance of the term “Son of man,” is exceptionally fair and helpful.

It remains to say a word on the bearing of these and similar studies on the interpretation of the New Testament. For some time Old Testament students have been conscious that the influence that was once called

verbal inspiration was rather a shaping, formative, selective influence, operating in the life of Israel, often in intimate connection with conceptions and practices and modes of expression which Israel shared with peoples round about her. Is the same view to be extended to the New Testament, even to the teachings of Jesus? These recent studies give clearest proof of at least this fact, that much of the phraseology of the New Testament, even on important subjects, was current coin. Is not the New Testament exegete then compelled to go behind the grammar and lexicon, into the thought of that age, and try to discover what these phrases or statements meant as they passed from mouth to mouth or from book to book in those days? And then the difficult task of ascertaining what they meant on the lips of Jesus or in the writings of Paul! Can a phrase that was coined in the discussions of the schools, or in the fervid utterance of an apocalyptic writer, and, thence passing into popular use, at last found itself used by Jesus, bear the same interpretation as if it had been newly coined by him? This, at least, may be said: If the quantity of the supposed revealed truth in the New Testament writings be diminished by such investigations, the quality of what is left will only be the purer. Or may we not take a broader view, and see in all this restless thought of the apocalyptic writers the workings of the Spirit of God preparing the way for the teachings of the gospel of Christ? Answer such queries as we may, we are face to face with a new set of facts which must profoundly affect all future interpretation of the New Testament.

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NEW WORKS ON THE BOOK OF NUMBERS.

It is surely a singular event that three commentaries¹ on the book of Numbers should have appeared within one twelvemonth or less. This portion of the Old Testament has waited long among the English-speaking

¹ *The International Critical Commentary: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers.* By GEORGE BUCHANAN GRAY. New York: Scribner. lii+489 pages. \$3, net.

Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament. Herausgegeben von KARL MARTI. Lieferung 19: *Numeri*. Erklärt von H. HOLZINGER. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr (Siebeck), 1903. M. 3.75.

Handkommentar zum Alten Testament. Herausgegeben von W. NOWACK. I. Abteilung: *Die historischen Bücher*. 2. Band, 2. Teil: *Numeri*, übersetzt und erklärt, und *Einleitung zu Exodus-Leviticus-Numeri*. Von BRUNO BAENTSCH. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903. M. 5.80.

people for adequate treatment. In the possession of Dillmann the Germans have been far more fortunate. Apparently these are three independent commentaries. Neither Dr. Gray nor Dr. Holzinger mentions either of the others in his list of commentaries. Although Dr. Baentsch mentions the titles of the other two books, it seems impossible that he could have taken account of them in the body of his commentary. In his list of corrections and additions at the end of the volume he cites the work of Dr. Holzinger twice.

In his preface Dr. Gray makes suitable explanations and acknowledgments. The literature referred to is full and varied. The Introduction takes up the usual topics. "The connection with preceding and following books" shows a sense of an actual literary unity in the Pentateuch which is occasionally neglected under the influence of the analysis. The statement of the "Sources" follows the current analysis and that view of the date of the Jehovistic, Elohist, and priestly documents which seems to be in the way of becoming a tradition. The value of the book of Numbers is said not to be great from a strictly historical point of view, but to be great as showing the early and popular religious customs and beliefs under the monarchy in its earlier and later history. These views are not only summarized in the introduction, but the arguments for them are presented in the exegetical discussions where the text affords the evidence for them.

The commentary by Dr. Holzinger contains no translation, but this series of commentaries, while disclaiming necessary agreement in full with *Die heilige Schrift des Alten Testaments* published under the editorship of Dr. E. Kautzsch, regards that as the translation to be accepted when not challenged in the commentary. In that work Numb. 10: 29—13: 1, and chaps. 21—24, were translated by Dr. Albert Socin, and the rest of the book by Dr. E. Kautzsch; and the volume bears the date of 1894—nine years earlier than the commentary. This volume contains xviii and 176 pages. The special feature of the introduction is a table giving the literary analysis of the book of Numbers. This might have been expected of the author of the *Einleitung in den Hexateuch*, which Dr. Holzinger published ten years earlier.

In the body of the work the book of Numbers is divided into twenty-four sections, and several of these sections are further subdivided. At the head of each section or subsection are notes for textual criticism derived from Greek versions specifying MSS. or editions, the Samaritan Pentateuch, the Syriac and Latin Vulgate versions, and the Targums. These notes are followed by a discussion of the analysis. The textual and literary notes are in fine print. The exegetical notes are in larger type and

are intended to be compact. Sometimes translations in Dr. Kautzsch's edition which are new are left to the lexicon for their justification. The fine-print matter is nearly or quite equal in amount to the exegetical matter in larger type.

The work of Dr. Baentsch contains pp. 443-702 of the volume of which it is a part, and the introduction, lxxxii pages. With this second part of the second volume the series is now complete. The general characteristics are those which the past ten years have made familiar to us, viz., a careful introduction, and a painstaking translation with a running commentary underneath it. In this running commentary all notes on the criticism of the text, on the meaning of words, on the structure of sentences, historical and all other illustrative matter, are fused together. In the other commentaries the complete treatment of a passage must often be looked for in two or more places. Each method has its advantages.

The introduction has a quite careful discussion of the three documents which contribute to Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers. The contents of each document are given. The mode of thought, the tendency and unity of each, its representation of God, and its own type of legislation are presented in detail. The parts assigned to each document are indicated in the translation. This is the only one of the three commentaries which gives a list of corrections and additions. Each one has an index. Dr. Gray alone gives a Hebrew index.

A comparison of the treatment of the same passages in the three works is of value. שָׂחַם הָעֵץ (24:3, 15) is a phrase which occurs nowhere else. It is explained variously: (1) שָׂחַם הָעֵץ (or שָׂחַם הָעֵץ) "who sees truly," supported by the LXX (ὁ ἀληθινὸς ὁρῶν) and the Targum Onkelos. This is accepted in the two German commentaries. (2) שָׂחַם for שָׂחַם, "closed," supported by the Latin Vulgate. (3) שָׂחַם, "open," supported by the Syriac, Targums Jon. and Jerus., and accepted by Dr. Gray. The root is found nowhere else, and Semitic lexicography has not thus far seemed to offer a key to the meaning. Dr. Gray calls (1) unintelligible and unnatural, and says that (2) and (3) rest on very insecure philological foundations, and that (2) is over-subtle. He further objects to (1) because שָׂ "is not elsewhere found in these poems." Dr. Baentsch does not really give reasons, but translates *dessen Auge vollkommen(?) ist*. Dr. Holzinger apparently objects to (2) and (3) on the ground that emphasis upon the reality of the prophetic gift is to be looked for rather than emphasis upon the externalities. It does not aid us in seeking Dr. Holzinger's opinion to consult the translation of Dr. Socin, for he gives none in the text, and merely says "perhaps" (3) in a footnote, mentioning in addition the possibility of (2).

כך (24:17), a star "will march forth." If the text is correct, the figure is a bold one. This text and translation is accepted by Dr. Socin, and by Dr. Holzinger after him, who says that a correction "is perhaps not necessary, since the images, though not perfect, are sustained—the scepter which comes out of Israel." The LXX ἀνατελῆ, supported by the Latin Vulgate and the Syriac, and perhaps Targum Onkelos, favors the presence in the text of some verb meaning "to rise," as the sun rises. They thus suggest the Hebrew קם as the true reading of the text. This reading is favored by Dr. Gray. Dr. Baentsch gives a yet third explanation. He quotes H. Winckler, who accepts a second root קרר, meaning "shine, radiate," with which he associates the name Marduk. Accordingly, in his translation he renders: a star "will rise with splendor" out of Jacob.

These two instances seem to the present writer to exemplify some of the leading characteristics of the several commentaries, and, in fact, to reveal the mental attitude of each of the authors. If we could have three commentaries on all parts of the Old Testament as good as these, and each entirely independent of the others, the comparison of the three in their work and characteristics would yield knowledge of great value to the exegete and psychologist. Doubtless English-speaking students will use Gray's commentary for main work and the German commentaries, if they have them, for broadening their view. For this reason more detailed attention should be given to the work in English.

Dr. Gray's method can well be seen in his treatment of chaps. 22-24. Here, as in several other places in the volume, the preliminary treatment of a subject expands into a discussion as full as an article in the Bible dictionaries. These discussions are almost monographs. Dr. Gray begins by summarizing these three chapters. He then devotes four or five pages to the discussion of their literary composition, two pages to the date of their constituent elements, and about eight more pages to the personality of Balaam and the religious presuppositions of the story. He skilfully presents his evidence for the analysis, so far as it goes.

The most conspicuous evidence of compilation [in chap. 22] is as follows: (1) the doublet in 22:3a and 3b; (2) the irrelevance of vs. 4b after vs. 2; (3) the inconsistency of the two definitions of Balaam's home in vs. 5, one clause placing it on the Euphrates, the other in "the land of the children of Ammon" (so read with *℣*); and (4) the parallelism and inconsistency of vss. 22-35 with much that precedes.

The greatest emphasis is laid upon the last point. Chaps. 23 and 24 are thought to be "not the work of a single writer." In the detailed analysis of these chapters, as elsewhere in the book, Dr. Gray appears to shrink

from those extremes which many analyses exhibit. His statement is neither so minute nor so positive as is frequently found. He is not dogmatic in his statement respecting the date of the Balaam narratives and poems. The narratives are assigned to J and E. The four poems in chaps. 23 and 24 are thought to belong to the earlier life of the monarchy, when the feeling of national strength and prosperity was at high tide. Dr. Gray decidedly declines to follow those who attribute avarice to Balaam on the ground of anything in these chapters. That weakness is attributed to Balaam in Deut. 23:5 f. (4 f.).

What historical basis is there for this section of the book? His answer (p. 315) is:

In the main the episode is a creation of the Hebrew national spirit in the days of national prosperity, and self-confidence sprung from reliance on the national God, Yahweh. It may, indeed, contain other historical features; such as the name of Balak, who may have been an actual king of Moab; but no means at present exist for distinguishing any further between the historical and legendary elements and those which are supplied by the creative faculty and the religious feeling of the writers.

The present writer remembers hearing a distinguished New Testament commentator described as "greater in excursus than in exegesis." This cannot be said of Dr. Gray, even though he excels in excursus. There are several other such valuable discussions, but none as long as that concerning Balaam. His exposition of the text is certainly on as high a level as his excurses. He maintains a careful and continuous examination of the text and of the evidence for it. For instance, in the analysis of these three chapters he presents the evidence respecting the use of the divine names, and he shows that the Massoretic text is not a reliable basis for exact analysis, so far as proper names are concerned. We wonder what the analysis might be if we could use the actual text of the Hexateuch current 400 B. C.

The amount of emendation proposed is probably less than the text needs. Many suggestions of Canon Cheyne are rejected. The sensible attitude maintained is exemplified in the notes on 24:10, 14. These brief notes are significant beyond their brevity. In the main, the evidence of the versions which is of importance is cited quite fully. The Latin Vulgate *stirpis*, for רִבֵּעַ (23:10), was surely worth noting. The citations from the versions in these three chapters are, we believe, accurately given, with one exception. On 24:14 by some oversight both LXX and Syr. are cited as testifying for לַעֲמִי instead of the Massoretic לַעֲמִי. This is correct in regard to LXX. The Syriac, according to the editions of Walton's Polyglot, of Lee, and of Ooroomia, testifies to the reading לְאֲרִי. (Holzinger

notes both the Vulg. *stirpis* (23:10) and the Syr. ܣܬܪܦܝܬ (24:14). His method of giving the actual words of the versions is helpful in securing against the almost unavoidable oversights that are sure to occur once in a while.) One other error has been noted: p. 359, l. 7 from the bottom, "W. of the Dead Sea" should undoubtedly be "E. of the Dead Sea."

The treatment of these chapters is strong in lexicography. One instance will exemplify many. **רָאָה** (24:17) was rendered in the A. V. (1611) text, "smite *the corners* of Moab," with a margin, "smite through *the princes* of Moab." This margin harmonizes with the translation of Luther and the marginal note of the Geneva version. The Variorum Bible gives "smite in pieces *both sides* of Moab." Dillmann (1886) gives it, "crush *the two temples* of Moab." Dr. Gray also translates, "and he smites through *the temples* of Moab." His justification of the translation is: "רָאָה demands as its object, if not persons, at least parts of the person (*e. g.*, heads, loins). Hence the dual **רָאָה** must be the two sides of the head, *i. e.*, the temples." Thus "Moab is personified (much as Israel is in Isa. 1:5b, 6) as a man smitten by his antagonist through his two temples."

Careful grammatical notes frequently meet the eye. Occasionally Ewald's and Davidson's *Syntax* are cited. Much more frequent are references to Driver's *Hebrew Tenses* and the Kautzsch edition of Gesenius. Most numerous, in these chapters, are the references to König's *Historisch-kritisches Lehrgebäude der hebräischen Sprache*, mostly to Vol. III, which seems to be a favorite syntax, for it is cited sometimes, as 22:37, where a reference to the Gesenius-Kautzsch (1139) would answer as well.

Cursory examination of the entire volume gives reason to believe that the qualities found in the treatment of these three chapters are shown in equal degree everywhere in the book. It is not too much to say that the work is devoted to the complete—one feels at times, almost exhaustive—presentation of the results of a sound grammatico-historical exegesis. The author has levied freely on the available resources of the lexicography of the Semitic languages, of Hebrew grammar, of oriental archæology, of historical research, and of the current discussions of the religious development of Israel. The evidence is handled in a judicial temper and is well adapted to win the confidence of the student.

The work, as a whole, is one which, if thoroughly studied by a solitary student, could give him an adequate discipline in exegetical method as applied to narrative literature. It deserves a high rank among the other volumes of this series.

The views cited above respecting the historical value of chaps. 22-24

may well serve to call attention to the present unsatisfactory state of a large area in the Old Testament domain. It is doubtless true that it is no more unsatisfactory than the former condition of things. The heathen Balaam as a prophet of Jehovah, his prophetic consciousness, and the speaking ass taken as authentic history presented difficult problems. Now we are confronted with another and, at present, quite as difficult a problem, if these chapters have the kind of basis which is stated in the passage cited above.

We know that our Lord used parable and allegory with the utmost freedom in his teaching. In the Old Testament prophets we see that the Holy Spirit used the same freedom. It may be that the Holy Spirit used a larger freedom than was formerly supposed, in the writings which have come to us in the Old Testament. It was once incumbent upon the exegete to deal with the problems which these chapters presented, as if they were authentic history. It is now needful for the exegete to solve the problem presented by the later position. *What place has folklore, believed to be history, in the divine pedagogy?* Let us hope that this volume, while not answering the question which is so urgent to many minds, yet because it is the most worthy that English readers can use on this part of the Bible, may prove a valuable auxiliary in reaching the solution that is so much needed.

A question closely allied to this concerning the historical value of any part of the Hexateuch is that of the date of the documents. A post-exilic date for the priestly document has come to be assumed as proved. The phenomena of the existence of the Samaritan Pentateuch and the theory of post-exilic production of P, and of the subsequent composition with J E D into the Hexateuch, present a problem which demands more serious treatment than the present writer has been able to find. Unless this problem has been solved, the post-exilic date of P is still open to question.

Without any doubt, the literary study of the Bible has come to stay. Thus far it is singularly one-sided, for it chiefly concerns one element of literary form—unity of a work. Relatively, style has been ignored in comparison with unity. Before we can gain balance in our study of the Bible, the style of the writings in the Bible, their clearness, force, and beauty, must be studied quite as much as the unity. Neither of the three commentaries under examination is a pioneer in this method of literary study. They do not absolutely ignore style, but pay some attention to it as a makeweight in the study of the unity of the work. The qualities of style have too much to do with the power of the Bible as a literature to be neglected after this fashion. Before the present movement in biblical

study has reached its legitimate culmination, the style of the biblical writings must be treated with as much fulness as is now given to literary analysis. It is just possible that this type of study, carried on as it should be, will temper the absurd extremes of literary analysis which are sometimes presented to the public.

The two German commentaries have their own excellences. The brevity of Dr. Holzinger has its advantage in not overloading the discussion. It has the disadvantage of leaving out subjects which one is anxious to find. This is the disadvantage which comes from the theory of the series of commentaries of which this is a part. The chief excellence seems to be the collection of material for textual criticism. The work of Dr. Baentsch is fuller, and more diverse from that of Dr. Gray; and it is therefore adapted to supplement the English commentary. The present writer is not sure that either of the two is as good as Dillmann's.

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EUSEBIUS—CHURCH FATHER, HISTORIAN, AND APOLOGIST.

THE year 1903 has honored Eusebius with editions of two of his works, each in the first rank of importance or interest.¹ Schwartz's edition of the *Church History*, of which the text of the first five books has appeared, undoubtedly fills the long and strongly felt need for an adequate text; but critical examination of this must wait on the appearance of the *Prolegomena*.

Gifford's edition of the *Preparation for the Gospel* comes complete, text, translation, and notes—two stout volumes each of text and translation, and one of notes, some 2,700 pages in all, and gotten out in the best style of the Oxford University Press, in a convenient octavo size, neat cloth-binding, and admirable choice of type for the distinction between the text of Eusebius and the many excerpts from other works which form so large a part of the *Preparation* and are the characteristic element of the method of the work.

¹ *Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae praeparationis libri XV*, ad codices manuscriptos denuo collatos recensuit, anglice nunc primum reddidit, notis et indicibus instruxit E. H. GIFFORD. Oxonii: E Typographeo Academico, 1903, 4 vols. in 5.

Eusebius' Werke. Zweiter Band. *Die Kirchengeschichte*. Bearbeitet im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der königl. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften von EDUARD SCHWARTZ. Die lateinische Uebersetzung des Rufinus, bearbeitet im gleichen Auftrage von THEODOR MOMMSEN. Erste Hälfte. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 507 pages.

The text, though in some sense an afterthought of the editor, and not a contribution in any such sense as the new text of the *Church History*, is an advance on previous texts, and is most welcome as putting the work in a convenient and accessible form. The notes are well judged and abundant, and the scholarship adequate, although there is a curious reflection of Eusebius's own habit in the inveterate use of quotation. The most important contribution of the work is, however, the translation. This is, in the first place, a *princeps* "nunc primum reddidit." Moreover, this was the editor's starting-point and first love, and it is for this that he (however well equipped for the rest) is best equipped. The translation of the *Preparation* is a task of peculiar difficulty on account of the immense variety of styles involved, and the lack of help from previous translations, of which there are few in any language. The work of the translator here gives the impression of high linguistic competence for this task, both as regards his command of the Greek and the flexibility of the English.

The introduction to the translation and the preface to the text, although more full than large, throw some light on the life of Eusebius in general and on this work in particular, while the excellent indices to all three parts are of greater importance still for the study of the *Preparation*.

Thanks to this full apparatus of text, translation, notes, introduction, and indices, both students and laymen are now in a far better position to appreciate the work than ever before.

The *Preparation for the Gospel* consists of fifteen books directed against the double charge that the Christian Greeks are leaving their native gods and are taking up with the doctrine of the barbarians. It is intended, first of all, to clear away objections, and especially to set right those who think that Christianity demands "an unreasoning faith and an assent without examination," an "uncritical and untested faith." It is written with the intention of "suiting itself to our recent converts from among the heathen"—possibly, therefore, for students of the alleged theological school in the house of Pamphilus.

In the first three books the author treats of two forms of the Greek theology—first the mythical or poetical, and then the physical or speculative or philosophical. He then passes on, in the fourth book, to treat of political or state religion, in particular the oracles and worship of demons, refuting these by showing the intrinsic wickedness of the system, and passing on in Book VI to refute again on the ground of the falsity of their oracles. Discussing the oracles and the doctrine of fate, he reaches the conclusion that the so-called oracles are not gods, or even good demons,

but a set of jugglers, cheats, and deceivers. Having here finished with the Greek, he passes to the Hebrew, with intent to show that in borrowing from the barbarians, and from the Hebrews in particular, the Christians are acting with good judgment, in view of the excellence of the opinion and manner of life of those of whom they borrow, as testified to even by the Greeks, and are doing nothing more nor less than the best of the Greek philosophers have already done. He makes a special point, in very extended treatment, of the accord between Plato and the Scriptures, as well as of his differences from them; and then passes on to the other philosophers, and to one of his favorite arguments—the differences of opinion of the philosophers among themselves.

At the beginning or the end of most of the books is a summary of what immediately precedes. In the fifteenth book is a complete summary of all that precedes.

A good clue to the understanding of Eusebius's treatment of his subject is found in the special audience (*i. e.*, recent Greek converts) for which the work is intended. The *Preparation for the Gospel* and the *Demonstration of the Gospel* are complements of one another, and form one work. The two portions correspond to what had become the conventional encyclopædic division of the early apologetics, "Against the Greeks" and "Against the Jews." The early Christians were facing two systems—the heathen, wholly outside and rejected; and the Hebrew, accepted in substance and spirit, but rejected in part as to form. The familiar question of the Greek was: "Why leave the doctrine of our fathers and take up with the barbarian Hebrew doctrines?" This is answered in the *Preparation*. The question of the Jew was: "Why, if you accept so much, do you not accept all?" Against this the argument of the *Demonstration* was directed, but the work being intended rather for heathen than for Jewish converts, the method is altered accordingly, as it is also in the *Preparation*. It is intended rather to confirm than to convert; to cultivate intelligence of faith and equip for controversy rather than to controvert.

To this end the two characteristic features of Eusebius's method are well adapted—the convicting of adversaries out of their own mouths by long quotations from their own writers, and the discovery of contradictions between the writers themselves. This discovery of disagreement is a favorite proof with him, as with many modern apologists in the warfare with science; but here, as always, it is weak, save as a reply to the charge of differences among the Christians themselves. Differences do not prove that both are wrong.

The method of quotation, on the other hand, is always at least as forcible as the arguments quoted, and has besides a definite rhetorical influence. It is this use of quotation, which belongs to the *Church History* as well as to the *Preparation*, which is the most effective element of Eusebius's style, and which, quite accidentally, gives the greatest value to his work; for, whatever may be said of the value of his contributions in his own language, neither they nor the work as a whole can be compared in importance with the quotations. This is accidental and comes from the fact that so many of these passages are nowhere else preserved. If they were all extant elsewhere, the relative value would be quite different.

The *Preparation* is almost a better example of Eusebius's method of quotation than the *Church History* itself. It contains some 475 excerpts from more than fifty writers, and twice that number of works. It contains extracts from nearly forty works preserved to us only by Eusebius. These include fragments of Euripides, Pindar, and the Orphic Hymns, from Sanchuniathon, Alexander Polyhistor, Philo, Julius Africanus, Plutarch, Porphyry, Aristocles, Numenius, Atticus, and many others. To have preserved the much-discussed fragment of Sanchuniathon, and the sarcastic and delightful Ænomaus, alone would be enough to give distinction to any work, and the writings of Porphyry, against whom the work seems to be specially aimed, alone would be an invaluable contribution to a knowledge of the spirit of the time.

But, however accidental the great importance of the work through the loss of the originals from which the extracts were made, the inclusion of the extracts themselves was no accident. It was the result of the author's most deliberate and characteristic method. The reason for the method is perhaps to be found in the fact that he was a librarian. Whether he would be counted a professional or not, he was at least *de facto* librarian in the remarkable library of Pamphilus. His method of gathering and organizing great excerpts from other writers, rather than expressing in his own language, is the librarian's instinct for gathering the best that has been written on any topic in order to guide his readers. It is as if one of the theological students in the house of Pamphilus had asked him the best thing to read on each topic. It is the habit which makes it natural that Mr. Garnett should write an *Anthology*, or Mr. Larned a *History for Ready Reference*. The wide sweep of field and organizing of material into a unified work is the spirit of Mr. Winsor's co-operative historical writing. It is a mistake to suppose that this use of excerpts is necessarily mechanical and without originality. It takes no mean type of genius to

be able to put the finger on just the thing which best points the moral and adorns the tale; and this is a genius which Eusebius had in a superlative degree. Moreover, the very weaving of the more or less heterogeneous fragments into a homogeneous whole is a matter which requires a great amount of constructive energy.

But the quotations themselves and the skilful use of them are by no means the only merits of the work. It is noteworthy for the topics discussed and for the spirit in which they are taken up. This at least. The discussions of the oracles, of fate, of the Logos (in spite of his doctrine of the second God), of the Platonic philosophy, and of the Essenes are types of the many topics which are of permanent interest and importance. The discussion on human sacrifice is a perfect thesaurus of usages, invaluable to the modern student of the subject; and that on the interpretation of the philosophy expressed in myths should be of great value to the new psychology. Some of the live matters then are surprisingly alive today; what could be more so than the following:

For my part indeed I say that the man who asserts that the parts of the world are parts of God is guilty of the utmost impiety, and still more he who declared that God is the same as the world, and besides these the man who thinks that the Creator of the universe is the mind of the world.

It is rather the fashion to speak slightly of Eusebius's style. Gifford is no exception to this rule, and he speaks of Eusebius as an editor or compiler, rather than an original writer, and of his style as awkward and unattractive, though simple and unaffected; but he justly takes issue with Bishop Lightfoot's criticism of the arrangement, and traces the orderly and very comprehensive plan. But certainly simplicity and unaffectedness lie near the very roots of good style.

The spirit in which Eusebius writes is most delightful, as may be seen from the following quotations, taken from near the beginning, middle, and end of his work. Defining religion, he says:

Now, the chief of these blessings must be religion . . . and this consists in looking up to . . . the One and Only God; and in the kindling of the life after God, wherein friendship also with him is engendered.

His attitude toward his work appears where he says:

We will pass on to the eighth book . . . and, after invoking the help of God, etc.

Finally, we have a sort of confession of faith in:

We . . . cling solely to piety toward God, the Creator of all things, and, by a life of temperance and all godly behavior according to virtue, strive to live in a manner pleasing to him who is God over all.

The time of publication of the *Preparation* is a much-discussed question, carefully considered by the editor, who finds that some of it was certainly written after 314, and some of it probably not later than 312. He concludes, therefore, that it was begun about 312, "but not finished till a few years after." Besides this discussion of date, there are in the introduction discussions on the occasion, method, style, and contents of the work, a very important study of the quotations, and a very interesting study of the relationship of Eusebius to Pamphilus, in which the author comes to the conclusion that Eusebius was quite possibly the legally adopted son of Pamphilus, adopted in order to make him heir.

It has been said that Gifford's work on the text is inferior to that on the translation, but yet a contribution. The three manuscripts which he rightly accepts as his main basis have been wholly recollated for him by various hands. He also has the use of Heikel's work, and follows him pretty closely. He, moreover, discusses the relations of the manuscripts to some purpose, and uses texts of the authors included with some effect. In his discussions he comes out (with Heikel) on the ground that A H and B I O are parallel groups, but he regards A H as representing the better transcription, while Heikel counts one as good as the other. He applies his evidence on this basis with good use of his linguistic knowledge, and the result is undoubtedly an improved text. Without attempting to go into discussions which would require an examination of all his readings, it must be said that the very method of discussing the evidence of the manuscripts rouses the suspicion, which a study of the various readings confirms, that the editor does not make the most of the possibilities of the genealogical method. In the first place, he presents no table of the manuscripts. It is safe to say that the table which, following Heikel, Harnack prints in his *Altchristliche Literaturgeschichte* is worth, in itself, more than all Gifford's discussion in the Prolegomena for a study of the various readings, to most students. This table shows agreement with Gifford in the putting of A H and B I O as parallel groups, but it reveals also the fact that a consensus of B D as against I is final in Books I and II, and that of B I or O I final as against O or B respectively in Books III–XV, B and O together being equal to I. Now, as A H cover only the first five books, the evidence of the later books is restricted to B I O. Taking several passages from Josephus and Clement in the later books, it is found that there are eleven places in which the author rejects the reading of I O. This means that either the table needs revision, or that Gifford's method is too eclectic; and, since B O is discarded in seven cases and the readings of the originals are not decisive, it would seem that the latter is the case. This could be justified only by the demonstration

that there had been much intercorrection by scribes, but the editor has not even attempted to show this, save in the matter of the text of Plato and A. This applies therefore only to the first five books (since A contains but five), and it is not probable that there was much intercorrection of B I O, save possibly in Books I and II of I.

The text, in brief, falls a little short of the ideal in the matter of collations, and still farther in satisfactoriness of discussion; but it must be repeated that it is a real contribution, and extremely welcome, apart from its practical convenience, for its apparatus of various readings.

The prolegomena to the text also falls somewhat short from the bibliographical point of view. Of manuscripts only the eleven which the editor regards as of possible value are even enumerated, although Heikel names nearly twenty and Harnack-Preuschen gathers up various others. There is no effort to add to this list. In the enumeration of translations, there is only one edition of the Latin of George of Trebizond—the 1470 edition mentioned on the authority of Fabricius. There are, in fact, not less than a dozen. The large number of editions of the Latin translations before the end of the sixteenth century (1470, 1473, 1476, 1480, 1491, 1494, 1497, 1500, 1501, 1522, 1534, 1539, 1542, 1559, 1570, 1581) is a fact of significance of which Gifford makes no mention. Nor does he seem to know of the Italian translation (Venice, 1549), or of the selections published in English and German. It would be captious to the last degree to lay stress on matters of such minor importance; and with these small qualifications the work is to be welcomed as of the most useful and most scholarly character.

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THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

TWO RECENT volumes¹ by Mr. F. R. Tennant constitute an important contribution to the study of a subject to which the historical and critical method has been as yet but sparingly applied. The first of the volumes named is composed of four Hulsean Lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge in 1901-2. In these discourses the author traversed the views hitherto prevalent concerning the doctrines of the fall and original sin, pointed out how small a place they hold in the Bible compared with

¹ *The Origin and Propagation of Sin.* By F. R. TENNANT. Cambridge: University Press; New York, Macmillan, 1902. 232 pages.

The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. By F. R. TENNANT. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Macmillan, 1903. 362 pages.

that which they have occupied in ecclesiastical theology, and advocated a conception of the origin of sin accordant with the theory of evolution. The lectures created a considerable stir in theological circles. This result the author had anticipated, and in publishing them he gave notice that in a forthcoming work he would supply a more adequate historical basis for the conclusions which he had announced. The second of the volumes named is the fulfilment of that promise.

The two works with which we most naturally compare these are Julius Müller's great treatise, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde* (sixth edition, 1889), and Clemen's Part I ("Die biblische Lehre," 1897) of a projected work bearing the same title. But the differences are marked. Müller's work is essentially speculative in method, and presents a philosophical theory of sin. Its value is great, but its method is not sufficiently historical and its exegesis is dominated by a more or less antiquated conception of the nature and purpose of the biblical books. The published part of Clemen's work deals, as the title indicates, with the biblical materials of the doctrine only. Mr. Tennant's treatment is at once broader and narrower—broader in the scope of its materials and narrower in its theme. He treats, not of the nature and effects of sin in general, but of the specific problem of its origin, and his aim is to show what various conceptions of this subject were developed in Judaism and early Christianity, and how theology has elaborated these conceptions in its doctrines of original sin.

The author may be said to have undertaken four tasks: (1) critically to examine and to estimate the fall story in Genesis; (2) to trace out the notions which prevailed on the subject in the apocryphal and pseud-epigraphic books, in Alexandrian Judaism, and in rabbinic literature; (3) to sketch and interpret the Pauline conceptions of the fall and its effects; (4) to illustrate the development of the doctrine of original sin in the theology of the church before Augustine. It is evident that the author's undertaking is, in great part, that of a pioneer.

These volumes are conceived and executed in the spirit of the investigator, rather than that of the dogmatician. The author does not propound his conclusions, and then defend them; he critically examines the documents which bear upon his subject, and draws the conclusions which the data seem to warrant. We have in these books an example, all too rare, of a strictly historical method of treating a dogmatic subject. It is, in a word, the method of science. The scriptural data are not simply massed together on the assumption that they are all of the same nature, import, and value; the texts are estimated as well as counted. Nor does the author make the equally groundless assumption that the conceptions found in the canonical

books are entirely *sui generis* and independent of the thought-world which we find illustrated in the extra-canonical literature of Judaism. It should be added that the author's acquaintance with the original sources is equaled by his knowledge of recent investigations which bear upon his theme. He has also furnished us good indices of texts, authors, and subjects.

Most readers will turn with keenest interest to the discussions of Genesis, chap. 3, and of the Pauline passages. We will therefore briefly illustrate Mr. Tennant's results by reference to those parts of his work. He points out that the fall story does not represent Adam's moral condition as being essentially changed by his act of disobedience; that the awakening of the sense of shame is not attributed to the guilt of Adam and Eve, but to the acquisition of knowledge conferred by the fruit of the magical tree; and that the changes brought about by the transgression are represented as primarily physical—subjection to the ills of human life. The story does not carry the idea that Adam was originally a man of extraordinary capacities and endowments, nor does it represent his nature as changed by his disobedience. The conception that his sin was the source or explanation of the sinfulness of his descendants finds no place in the narrative; nor does it come forward afterwards in the Old Testament. The later theological theory that human freedom was lost in the fall, or that by it a root of evil has been implanted in human nature, is not even suggested. Cain's sin was due to his own choice alone; the guilt of his sin rested solely upon himself, and he was guilty of no sin but his own. This Jahvist narrator did not conceive the sin of Adam as the *fontes et origo* of all subsequent transgression, but regarded it rather as

the first of a series whose members are arranged in ascending order of magnitude: the disobedience of the first parents, the fratricide of their son, the increased bloodthirstiness of Lamech, the general corruption calling for the deluge (p. 11).

In respect to the much-disputed question regarding the nature of the "knowledge" which was conferred by "the tree of knowledge of good and evil," Mr. Tennant adopts the opinion of Wellhausen, that it was not moral knowledge (as commonly held), but general knowledge or cleverness. The former is assumed to have been already possessed by Adam and Eve before their sin, since they understood in advance the difference between obedience and disobedience. The knowledge, then, which, according to this story, was forbidden them was that knowledge which properly belongs only to God, by the appropriation of which man was conceived to have encroached upon divine prerogatives, and to have made himself independent of, and equal to, God (p. 13).

When, now, we turn to Paul's allusions to the fall narrative, we find a

use made of it for which its own terms are entirely inadequate to account. This narrative does not explain either Adam's mortality or the sinfulness of the race by his sin. Yet Paul adopts and builds upon both these ideas. This fact can be explained only by a study of the intervening development of Jewish ideas on the subject. Paul's allusions to "original sin," out of which theology has spun so many elaborate theories, are shown to be chiefly echoes of rabbinic Judaism. To trace these lines of connection is the object of the middle portion of the book. Especial use is here made of Professor Porter's investigation of the Jewish doctrine of the *Yezzer hara*. The author's conclusion, in this portion of his work, is thus stated:

It must be concluded from the foregoing chapters that the doctrines of the fall and of original sin have their beginnings, as doctrines, neither in the Old Testament nor in the New, but rather in the Jewish speculation and the uncanonical literature of the age which intervened between them (p. 272).

It is obvious how widely this conclusion diverges from the assumptions which underlie current theological views. Whether it is wholly warranted or not, one thing is clear: it can be met only in the author's own field—the forum of historical research.

The method of dealing with this subject in the past which has had the widest vogue was to bring forward the categories of mediæval realism or seventeenth-century federalism as a means of constructing a theory of Paul's meaning. On the one hand, we are told that when Paul says that "death passed unto all men because all sinned," his meaning is that all men sinned when Adam sinned. But how could this be? How except on the view that Adam *was* the race in embryo? He was incipient *humanity*. (For some reason Eve is not counted; this never seemed to me quite fair.) Hence, when he sinned, *man* sinned. Mankind was all there *seminally*, and took part in his sin, and is therefore guilty of it and condemned for it. Human nature had not, at the time of that first sin, begun to be distributed into parts; as the distribution went on, each individualized portion carried away with him the guilt which was his due for his part in the original race-sin. This scheme of thought, based on Platonic realism and first elaborated by Augustine, enables the theologians to round out Paul's enigmatic *πάντες ἡμάρτον* into a complete theory of original sin.

But query: Can a man sin while he is still, *ex hypothesi*, an impersonal part of the mass or lump called human nature? Can a man be said to exist at all before he is "individualized"? There arose even within conservative circles those who answered these questions in the negative. They said: This realism is an untenable, *a priori* theory of man. No man can sin in his ancestors. But what, then, *does* Paul mean? The answer is

to be found a few verses farther on, where he says that "through one man's disobedience the many were made (or constituted) sinners." They did not actually sin, when Adam sinned, but when he fell, God, by a sovereign dispensation, constituted them sinners; that is, proceeded to regard and treat them as such. But how can God regard, condemn, and punish as sinners those who have not actually, that is, really, sinned at all? Answer: He made a covenant with Adam that he should stand forth as the representative of the race. Mankind should stand or fall with him. If he succumbed to temptation, then all his descendants were to be dealt with *as if* they had committed his sin; that is, were to become the objects of God's wrath and to be exposed to the doom of eternal death. If one asks: How is this fair or just? How can men be condemned for the sin of a representative in whose choice they had no part? Answer: Who art thou that repliest against God?

Such are the historic, orthodox theories of original sin. Each contradicts the other, and both claim to be Pauline. Now, the author of the books under review is of opinion that Paul knew nothing of Augustinian realism, much less of that series of covenants (mostly made in Holland) by which one school of seventeenth-century Calvinists resolved sundry theological problems. I have mentioned these theories merely to point the contrast between the *a priori* and the historic method of approaching and treating theological problems. The latter proceeds on the supposition that, if Paul is explicable at all, he is explicable as a part of his own world and time.

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THE APOCRYPHAL ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.¹

DURING the last twenty years considerable progress has been made toward a right understanding of the vexed questions relating to the apocryphal books of Acts. The pioneer work was begun long ago by Grabe and Fabricius, but they had not the necessary tools with which to work out their problems. Thilo, whose "marvelous learning" rightly evoked expressions of admiration from Lipsius, published critical editions of the Acts of Thomas (1823), Peter and Paul (1837 f.), Andrew and Matthew (1846), and fragments of the Acts of John (1847). His careful labor did much to render possible Tischendorf's great work, the *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha* (1851),

¹ *Die alten Petrusakten im Zusammenhang der apokryphen Apostellitteratur nebst einem neuentdeckten Fragment.* Untersucht von Carl SCHMIDT. ["Texte und Untersuchungen," Neue Folge, IX, 1.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. viii+176 pages. M. 6.

which long remained the standard edition. In the seventies several English scholars contributed new material; *e. g.*, Wright's publications from the Syriac, including the first complete text of the Acts of Thomas (1871); Malan's translation of the *Certamen Apostolorum*, made from an Ethiopic version (1871); and Phillips's *Doctrina Addaei*, in Syriac and English (1876). In 1880 Zahn published his *Acta Johannis*, furnished with valuable notes on this and other apocrypha, the whole forming an important contribution to the subject. Three years later Lipsius began to publish his studies entitled *Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden* (1883-90), following these up with the best critical edition of the texts, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha*—the new Tischendorf—which was completed by Bonnet (1891-1903).

Meanwhile several other specialists have been investigating the subject, and new discoveries have been made. In England M. R. James, and in Germany Harnack, have thrown light upon the Acts of Paul and of John. Corssen, Erbes, and most recently Ficker have advanced various ingenious theories, which at least must stimulate further research. And now Carl Schmidt, of Berlin, has published a valuable Coptic fragment of the Acts of Peter, accompanying it with learned discussions of the apocryphal literature as a whole. If he has not definitively solved all the problems, he has certainly done much to aid in their solution, and his forthcoming edition of the Acts of Paul and of the Gnostic writings (from the Coptic) will be eagerly awaited.

It was formerly supposed that the apocryphal Acts were forged by heretics, and this view still has many adherents. In its support ancient authorities are cited, from Eusebius down to Photius. Of late, however, this theory has more and more been called in question. Zahn and others have made it clear that the Acts of Paul were Catholic from the outset. Eusebius ranks them higher than the rest, and Augustine appeals to them almost as confidently as to the New Testament. These Acts embraced the well-known Acts of Paul and Thecla, the apocryphal correspondence between Paul and the Corinthians, and other material. The whole work was current in the fifth century and appears to have enjoyed canonical authority in some sections of the church. Harnack's arguments in favor of a Catholic origin of the Acts of Peter are cogent enough to have won apparent assent from a naturally conservative critic like the Roman Catholic Ehrhard. Another scholar of the same church, Bardenhewer, recognizes considerable sections of the apocryphal acts as orthodox. Schmidt finally comes forward with the sweeping assertion that there were originally no heretical Acts at all. This theory, if true, completes the historical rehabilitation of

these books. But it is not destined to pass unchallenged, for, in spite of Schmidt's confidence, there is grave doubt whether his theory can be accepted without important modification.

Schmidt holds that the apocryphal Acts originated in orthodox circles, and circulated at first separately, being widely read by all sorts of Christians; that they were collected into a *corpus* by the Manichæans, in the fourth century, when disputes arose over their canonicity; and that the high authority they enjoyed among Manichæans and Priscillianists led to their rejection by the Catholic church. The trouble was that the books had fallen into bad company. But they were too popular to be spared. The church, therefore, while protecting the purity of her doctrine, found it necessary at the same time to satisfy the public demand for religious romances by revising these books, eliminating whatever was adjudged dangerous, and putting them forth again, in expurgated form, with her official sanction. Thus arose the *virtutes* and *passiones apostolorum*, such as are found, for instance, in the Abdias collection. But before the fifth century, in Schmidt's view, the apocryphal Acts suffered no worse textual corruption than did other books, against whose orthodoxy no objection could be urged. He rightly insists that we should guard against allowing ourselves to be misled by the unfavorable opinion of ecclesiastical writers from Eusebius and Epiphanius onward, all of whom failed to understand the conditions of an earlier age, and, when they found ideas which were either obsolete or positively rejected among themselves, supposed the writings which contained them must of course have originated among heretics. Schmidt himself does not find anything in the Acts of Peter which need have caused anxiety to the orthodox mind of the third century. He regards the books in question as a valuable source for the study of contemporary popular Catholicism, and incidentally as an illustration of the interesting process by which fiction came to be viewed as history. They also indicate the kind of missionary preaching then in vogue.

The only objection to his hypothesis, which Schmidt anticipates, arises in connection with the Acts of Thomas, which contain the well-known Gnostic hymns. He attempts to destroy the force of this objection by reminding his readers that the Acts of Thomas originated in Syria, where the influence of Tatian and Bardesanes was so strong that not even Catholics could escape it. That is to say, Syrian Catholicism in the third century was substantially Gnostic—which many persons will think doubtful. Von Dobschütz has brought forward other objections to Schmidt's thesis in the *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung* (1903, No. 12), showing that he himself is not convinced.

One point, not satisfactorily treated in the book before us, is the evidence of Philaster of Brescia. It is quite true that testimony drawn from writers

of the fourth and fifth centuries must be used with caution; but, on the other hand, it cannot be neglected. And the first step toward using it rightly is to understand what it means. Schmidt justly complains that Lipsius misinterpreted the passage from Philaster,² but he himself has committed the same fault. The passage runs as follows:³

Scripturae autem absconditae, id est apocrypha, etsi legi debent morum causa a perfectis, non ab omnibus legi debent, quia non intelligentes multa addiderunt et tulerunt quae vulerunt haeretici.

Lipsius understands Philaster to mean that various redactions of these Acts, some of them falsified by heretics in the interest of their views, were then current, wherefore all such books should be read with caution, and by some not at all. But there is nothing in the text to justify the assertion that Catholic and heretical recensions of these Acts were then in circulation together. Schmidt expounds Philaster's meaning thus:

Er begründet seinen Standpunkt damit, dass *non intelligentes* vieles hinzu- und hinweggethan haben, was die Häretiker (als ihre Lehre) gewollt haben. Er unterscheidet also scharf zwischen *non intelligentes* und *haeretici*. Diese *non intelligentes* sind aber katholische Christen, die in ihrem Unverstande den ursprünglichen Text verdorben und auf diese Weise den Lehren der Häretiker Vorschub geleistet haben.⁴

But instead of "sharply distinguishing between *non intelligentes* and *haeretici*," Philaster certainly refers to the same persons in both phrases. He complains that the heretics, in their blameworthy ignorance of the truth, have taken liberties with the text of the apocryphal Acts. This form of expression is frequent in Philaster's work; e. g., in cap. 60 he speaks of heretics thus: "*non intelligunt virtutem scripturae*;" and in cap. 89: "*et quia addiderunt in ea [i. e., the epistle to the Laodiceans] quaedam non bene sentientes, inde non legitur in ecclesia . . .*" Ignorance and evil thinking are with this writer the attributes of heretics, not of Catholics. Zahn has rightly understood the passage, "die Ketzer in ihrem Unverstand haben sie [i. e., the Acts] vielfach interpolirt."⁵ So far, then, as Philaster's evidence goes, we must conclude simply that he believed heretics had taken great liberties with the text, but this does not necessarily militate against the theory of Catholic origin for these apocrypha.

Lipsius was no doubt mistaken in the verdict he passed upon some of the writings which he edited; yet concerning others we can perhaps do no better today than to repeat his carefully guarded opinion: they originated in heretical, "oder doch später häretisch gewordenen Kreisen." This,

² *De Haeresibus*, cap. 88. ³ Ed. OEHLEK (Berlin, 1856). ⁴ *Petrusakten*, pp. 131 f.

⁵ *Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons*, Vol. II, p. 843, note.

however, is not to deny the genuine value of Schmidt's work, for the early history of these Acts is undoubtedly much more accurately understood than before, by reason of his careful and learned investigations.

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JESUS AND THE GOSPELS.

FOR many years now it has been true that every representative sheaf of new writings on the origin of Christianity has presented a great variety of conflicting views. This fact, whether we regard it complacently as a sign of life, or see in it an evidence of the inexplicable character of the problems, is still daily illustrated. The books now to be noticed are no exception. On the one hand, we are told that no inconsiderable part even of Mark's gospel is to be credited to the redactor, that Luke invented some of his "facts," that the author of our Matthew adapted the ancient gospel material to catechetical and liturgical use, and that the fourth gospel does not claim to be historical, but is a defense of orthodox Gnosticism; and, on the other hand, we read a work, approved by high ecclesiastical authority, which demonstrates that the four gospels were written by the men whose names they bear, that they contain no additions of a later age, not even the conclusion of Mark's gospel or the Johannine story of the woman taken in adultery—a work that allows the present necessity of a critical study of the gospels chiefly in order to answer the difficulties of "Protestants and rationalists," and that closes with the genealogy of the Virgin.

Yet if the critical field, like Dante's world, appears at times to be a wilderness, or even, like a section of his "Purgatory," a "forest of thick-crowded ghosts," nevertheless it will still be cultivated, and will doubtless produce ever richer harvests.

It is an interesting fact that two veteran Old Testament scholars—Wellhausen and Briggs—have almost simultaneously published the results of critical investigation of the gospels. The work of Wellhausen¹ which we are to consider is a compact and suggestive commentary on Mark. It gives also a translation of the text, which is a practical part of the book for the German reader, as it marks an advance on the revised Luther Bible. It takes no account of other interpretations of the gospel, ancient or modern. The reader gets without delay or confusion the results of the author's study. As regards the Greek text, especial attention is given to the readings of the Sinaitic Syriac and D. To the latter source Wellhausen gives more weight

¹ *Das Evangelium Marci*. Uebersetzt und erklärt von J. WELLHAUSEN. Berlin: Reimer, 1903. 146 pages.

than does Schmidt,² whose work we shall compare in some points with that of Wellhausen. In the first place, Schmidt sees in our Mark very little that need be regarded as later than Mark—few additions to his gospel; while Wellhausen finds a great deal. Among the more important of his editorial passages are 1:2, 3; 2:15-20; 3:7-12, 13-19; 6:7-13, 14-29, 30-33; chap. 13; 14:17-21. Very often, if not in the majority of cases, the separation of this editorial matter is a little too off-hand and positive. Thus, *e. g.*, of 2:18 it is said that it comes from a later revision and is wanting in Matthew and Luke (p. 20). No support for this dictum is given, for, of course, the fact that the verse is not found in Matthew and Luke is not a proof that it may not have stood in Mark. Again, the sending out of the Twelve in Galilee (Mark 6:7-13) is said to contain "no historical tradition" (p. 46); and the sole ground for this conclusion is the following statement: "The apostolate is here established by Jesus, yet does not really appear on the scene. The Twelve make an experiment, and are afterward just as dependent and passive as before, though the experiment was successful." But this is not clear. Is there any evidence that Jesus did not wish to have the Twelve with him, as they were, after this mission through Galilee? Because once sent out, must they continue to preach and heal; or was it their duty to leave their Master from time to time and go forth to exercise their apostleship?

It is worthy of note that both Wellhausen and Schmidt, contrary to the general view of scholars, think that Mark may well have concluded his writing at 16:8. Schmidt sees in the ending only a certain stylistic negligence (p. 49); Wellhausen regards it as in harmony with 16:4, and says: "Es fehlt nichts; es wäre Schade wenn noch etwas hinterher käme." He thinks the author intended to announce the resurrection in the statement that the women who came with spices found the stone rolled away. This had been done by the Lord as he came forth (pp. 145, 146).

The method of Wellhausen in dealing with the origin of Mark characterizes his interpretation of the details of the gospel. Thus, *e. g.*, take the case of the demoniacs in the synagogue of Capernaum. Wellhausen does not, indeed, make out of this demoniac an agent of the Pharisees, as does Lincke,³ but he thinks that the words both of this demoniac and of the others are a late interpretation of inarticulate cries. In proof he refers to Mark 1:26; 5:5; 9:26, and Luke 9:39. These passages, however, do not

² *Die Geschichte Jesu*. Erläutert von D. PAUL WILHELM SCHMIDT. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 423 pages.

³ *Jesus in Kapernaum: Ein Versuch zur Erklärung des Markus-Evangeliums*. Von KARL F. A. LINCKE. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 44 pages.

appear to establish, or even necessarily to favor, that view. The fact that sufferers are sometimes said to have cried out, when no words are given for their cry, does not indicate that when words are given these must be regarded as unhistorical. Doubtless, according to the popular belief, demons could see what flesh and blood cannot, but it appears difficult to separate the words of the demons from the original Mark.

The feeding of a multitude one evening by the lake is regarded as historical (p. 53); but Wellhausen's treatment of the event is not more satisfactory than other attempts to understand it without the acceptance of a great "sign." He says: "The wonder disappears with the numbers, which in oral tradition habitually degenerate." What actually happened was that Jesus took the provision which his disciples had on hand and shared it with the invited guests. But if this was all, why did the act lead to an attempt to make Jesus King?

Another illustration of the point in question is furnished by his treatment of Mark 6:46-52. He makes some remarks on the location of Bethsaida, and dismisses the narrative as a whole with the words that it is "an exaggerated variant" of the story of the stilling of the storm. Now, it is plain that the evangelist did not so regard it, and probable that the Christians of his day did not regard it in this light—men not wholly unfitted to judge. Therefore an interpreter of the gospel who puts forth such a view is under some obligation to be less oracular and more illuminative.

Take as a final example the discussion of the title "the Son of man." Wellhausen gives more space to this than to any other single point in the gospel (pp. 17, 65-69). But there is a lack both of clearness and conclusiveness in his argument. It is not wholly clear, for the author at one time speaks of the title as a messianic "self-designation" (*Selbstbezeichnung*), and says that on the lips of Jesus it means Messiah; and then later declares that it is scarcely intelligible in the mouth of Jesus, is unsatisfactorily attested, and that it only became current in the Christian community. Nor is his explanation conclusive. He starts from the Aramaic *barnascha*, which, he says, means nothing more than "man;" but he gives no proof of this assertion. The evangelists, who may be supposed to have known Aramaic, certainly distinguished between *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* and *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. Wellhausen imagines that the title came into use in the following manner: The early Christians believed that Jesus had prophesied his parousia. They hesitated to make him say outright, "I shall soon come as Messiah in might and glory," and hence represented him as saying only that the man of Daniel should appear with the clouds of heaven. He could say that without meaning himself. But the Christian interpretation soon read him

into this announcement, then used the title in the prophecies of the passion and resurrection, and finally as a simple equivalent of the first person singular on the lips of Jesus. Schmidt, on the contrary, regards the title as historical, though believing that it was not greatly used by Jesus. There is not space for any discussion of Wellhausen's view of this title. I think, however, that it will not readily establish itself. If the name Son of man was a coinage of the early church, why is it not found in Paul and elsewhere in the New Testament? Again, how is the Christian coinage of this title to be harmonized with the tendency in the church to exalt Jesus? It does not suggest glory, but lowliness.

A word more in regard to the work of Schmidt. It is a companion volume of the *History of Jesus* published in 1899 and noticed in this JOURNAL, Vol. III, No. 4, by W. Taylor Smith. The first half of the book is occupied with the source of our knowledge of Jesus, and with certain fundamental questions, and the latter half is made up of notes explanatory of the earlier volume. The book is therefore somewhat miscellaneous in character, but is a monument of painstaking industry, and is worthy of a more extended notice than can be given in this place.

Lincke's pamphlet seeks to show that we have in Mark a double report of the event in the synagogue at Capernaum (1:21-28), that the original narrative—whose author is referred to in 2 Cor. 8:18, had to do only with the mighty teaching of Jesus, and was historical. To this was later added the miraculous power over demons. The author's method and ability to deal with his subject may be indicated by two of his conclusions. The gospel according to Luke, since it puts the temptation connected with the pinnacle of the temple *last*, represents the gospel as having gone out from Jerusalem, while in Mark it went forth from Capernaum. Again, the Sermon on the Mount rests on the Wisdom of Solomon, the Teaching of the Twelve, and the manual of morals by Epictetus.

From this style of treatment of the gospel to that of Messrs. Poulin and Loutil,⁴ whose book is ecclesiastically attested as containing nothing which is not in accord "avec la doctrine la plus autorisée," is a long way. It is difficult to regard either method as scientific and adapted to increase our knowledge of the gospels.

It may be noticed, incidentally, that Lincke ascribes the fourth gospel to the Alexandrian Apollos, or some other member of the Ephesian school of John (p. 31); Schmidt ascribes it to one familiar with Alexandrian thought, and as containing comparatively little that can be regarded as

⁴ *Les évangiles et la critique*. Paris: Maison de la Bonne Presse. xlvii+278 pages.

historical; while Haussleiter⁵ advances in support of the traditional view the hypothesis that the "we" of John 21:24 are Andrew and Philip, Andrew being the author of this supplemental chapter.

Another book which has to do with Christ and the gospels, but which cannot be grouped with those already mentioned, is that by McConnell.⁶ The two features of this volume which I shall notice are, first, its protest against certain traditional views, and, second, its critical basis. As a protest, it is certainly vigorous. The failure of the church, the inadequacy of the current doctrines of Christ and of God, and the unsatisfactoriness of our conception of Christian discipleship are forcibly discussed. Yet the aim of the author is not simply destructive. His vigor and intensity are evidently due to a conviction that he sees something better than the old views, a higher conception of the church, a truer and more inspiring vision of Jesus and of God. And on this constructive side the book has much with which I sympathize; for example, the endeavor to learn what Jesus thought about himself and his work, and to give final authority to this. However, where it ought to be strongest, viz., in its mastery of the fundamental gospel, it is open to some criticism. It would go back to Christ, but in reality stops at Paul and John. The author says that "Paul lifted the conception of Christ out of history into cosmology." It was his conception of Christ that "saved humanity from perishing from off the face of the earth through sheer moral rottenness." John in using the word "Logos" identified "Christ with the essence of God." He "mediated between the self-consciousness of God and the self-consciousness of man. That is only possible by in some way coalescing these two in one self-conscious person." Again, when our author gets back to the testimony of Jesus in the synoptists, in the discussion of such terms as "Son of man" and "Son of God," he does not seem to reach the standpoint of the age in which Jesus lived. One can hardly be satisfied with such an utterance as this: "The Ideal man recognized both parents, begotten of his Father who is in heaven in the virgin (!) womb of humanity, his mother."

The book gives comparatively slight attention to the revelation of the fatherhood of God, and does this near its close. Thus this element loses the fundamental importance which it has in the gospel, and which it had in the personal religion of Jesus himself.

On one side, the book of Dr. McConnell probably voices the thought

⁵ *Zwei apostolische Zeugen für das Johannes-Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zur Lösung der Johanneischen Frage.* Von JOHANNES HAUSSLEITER. München: Beck, 1904. 58 pages.

⁶ *Christ.* By S. D. MCCONNELL. New York: Macmillan, 1904. 232 pages.

and belief of many intelligent people both within and without the church, and is a sign of the times; but on another side, that of its critical acquaintance with the earliest Christian tradition, it will scarcely satisfy the historical student.

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THE CODE OF HAMMURABI.

THE discovery of the Code of Hammurabi is the most important event which has taken place in the development of Assyriological science since the days of Rawlinson and Layard. In his Introduction, pp. xi, xii, Professor Harper¹ gives an admirably clear and brief exposition of the discovery and nature of the code, which I cannot do better than quote *verbatim*:

The monument on which the Code of Hammurabi is engraved was found in December, 1901, and January, 1902, on the acropolis of Susa by an expedition sent out by the French government under the director general, M. de Morgan. It is a block of black diorite, nearly eight feet high, broken into three pieces which were easily rejoined. Another fragment was found which does not belong to this monument, but which contains a text corresponding to Column 41, 72-80, and this leads to the conclusion that another copy of this famous code existed in Susa. On the obverse we have a bas-relief exhibiting King Hammurabi receiving the laws from the sun-god, to which the story of Moses receiving the ten words from Yahweh corresponds. Under this relief are engraved sixteen columns of text, four and one-half of which form the prologue. There were originally five more columns on the obverse, but these have been cut off by the Elamitic conqueror. On the reverse there are twenty-eight columns, the last five of which form the epilogue. There are many reasons for believing that this code of laws was published in many places. We may accept the opinion of Scheil and Winckler that the copy found at Susa may have been taken as plunder by Šutruk-Nahunte (about 1100 B. C.) and brought to his Elamitic capital.

Hammurabi, identified by most Assyriologists with the Amraphel of Genesis 14:1, was the sixth king of the first dynasty of Babylon and reigned for fifty-five years, about 2250 B. C. We have a good account of his life and deeds in the letters which he wrote to Sin-idinnam and in *The Chronicle of the Kings of Babylon*, both of which have been edited with great care by Mr. L. W. King.²

¹ *The Code of Hammurabi, King of Babylon about 2250 B. C.* Autographed Text, Transliteration, Translation, Glossary, Index of Subjects, Lists of Proper Names, Signs, Numerals, Corrections, and Erasures, with Map, Frontispiece, and Photograph of Text. By Robert Francis Harper, Ph.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: Luzac & Co., 1904. Frontispiece; i-xv; 2-192 pages; photograph of text facing Plate I; Plates I-CIII.

² *The Letters and Inscriptions of Hammurabi*, in 3 vols., 1898-1900. Also D. H. MÜLLER, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis* (Wien, 1903); HUGO WINCKLER, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis* (Leipzig, 1903).

From the prologue and epilogue we learn that he was a great soldier and a pious, god-fearing king who destroyed all his enemies to the north and south and made his people to dwell in peace and security. He codified the existing laws that the strong might not oppress the weak, that they should give justice to the orphan and widow, and for the righting of wrong. He rebuilt cities and canals; he restored temples and endowed them with means for sacrifices; he re-established cults; he reunited his people.

Thus far Professor Harper. Very little is known of the kings of this first Babylonian dynasty save the names. Hammurabi is called the first king of the first dynasty, which simply means that he is the first king known to us, as there must have been many rulers of Babylon before the historical period. It is probable that Babylon was not independent—*i. e.*, that that city did not secure the hegemony of Babylonia—until the days of Hammurabi, in whom we find the first really great king in Semitic history. He was the first monarch to make a united Babylonia. Previous to his time the country had been under the sway, first of one and then of another southern Babylonian city. This union effected by Hammurabi lasted until the days of Cyrus the Persian, 537 B. C. Hammurabi had to meet very great difficulties in establishing his supremacy. For example, he found the Elamites firmly fixed in the country, and he had not only to subdue them, but also to conquer the various petty states of Babylonia which up to his time had shared in turn the rulership of the country. The fact is that the time was probably fully ripe for the destruction of the non-Semitic states, and in Hammurabi was found "the man on horseback" in whose government we see the triumph of the Semitic power.³

There can be no doubt that this king was the same person as the biblical Amraphel⁴ of Gen. 14:1. Amraphel is mentioned in Gen., chap. 14, as being associated with a number of allies in western campaigns. This account of victories in Palestine and Syria agrees well with what is known of the general situation at the time of Hammurabi, but it forms merely an unimportant episode in the Babylonian history.

The close similarity between the Hammurabi laws and the Mosaic

³ Cf. ROGERS, *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, Vol. I, p. 388.

⁴ The name of Hammurabi seems to be a combination of *hammu*, "ruler," and *rabā*, "great," *i. e.*, "great ruler." The word *hammu* occurs in the proper name *Nabū-hammu-ilāni*, II R., 64, 48a. The stem *hamāmu* means "rule, lead;" cf. *Hwb.*, 282a; MUSS-ARNOLT, *Assyrian Dictionary*, p. 320a. For the name Amraphel, evidently a late Hebrew corruption of Hammurabi, cf. EBERHARD SCHRADER, *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, and FRANZ DELITZSCH, *Genesis* (1887), Excursus.

code of the Hebrew Old Testament has attracted widespread attention. This resemblance shows itself even in the prologue to Hammurabi's code, where we read:

When the lofty Anu, king of the Anunnâki, and Bêl, lord of heaven and earth committed the rule of all mankind to Marduk, the chief son of Ea when they pronounced the lofty name of Babylon, when they made it famous among the quarters of the world and in its midst established an everlasting kingdom whose foundations were firm as heaven and earth—at that time Anu and Bêl called me, Hammurabi, the exalted prince, the worshiper of the gods, to cause justice to prevail in the land, to destroy the wicked and evil, to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak, to go forth like the sun over the Black Head Race, to enlighten the land and to further the welfare of the people. With this should be compared the proclamation of Yahweh in Exod. 34:6 ff.:

And Yahweh passed by before him [Moses] and proclaimed Yahweh, Yahweh Elohim, merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness and truth. Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear (the guilty), visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children and upon the children's children unto the third and fourth generation.

In both these introductions to a legal code we have the statement of divine supremacy, on the one hand, and the will of the God clearly expressed, on the other hand, that justice and right should prevail among the chosen people (the Black Head Race in Hammurabi's code and the Hebrews in the Mosaic code), while evil of all sorts should be overthrown. Furthermore, as has already been indicated above in the quotation from Professor Harper, Hammurabi, like Moses, received his laws from the divine hand itself (see frontispiece, representing Hammurabi receiving his code from the sun-god).

The following comparisons between the Hammurabi and Hebrew codes cannot fail to be of interest to all those who study the Old Testament from a critical point of view:

Adultery.—Harper, p. 45, § 129: "If the wife of a man be taken in lying with another man, they shall bind them and throw them into the water. If the husband of the woman would save his wife, or if the king would save his male servant (he may)." With this *cf.* Deut. 22:22: "If a man be found lying with a woman married to a husband, they shall both of them die." Here the manner of death is not specified, but it was in all probability stoning. It should be noted that immoral lapses on the part of men were only punished, according to both codes, where the crime interfered with the rights of other men. The ancient Semitic laws were much more severe against immoral women. Harper, p. 45,

§ 132: "If the finger have been pointed at the wife of a man because of another man, and she have not been taken in lying with another man, for her husband's sake she shall throw herself into the river."

Both codes were equally severe against the rape of a betrothed girl: Harper, p. 45, § 130: "If a man force the (betrothed) wife of another who has not known a male and is living in her father's house, and he lie in her bosom and they take him, that man shall be put to death and that woman shall go free." Cf. Deut. 22:23-26: "If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband and a man find her in the city and lie with her: then ye shall bring them both unto the gate of that city and ye shall stone them with stones that they die; the damsel because she cried not, being in the city; and the man because he hath humbled his neighbour's wife; so thou shalt put away evil from among you. But if a man find a betrothed damsel in the field and the man force her and lie with her; then the man only that lay with her shall die." The Hebrew law is much more explicit on this point.

The disobedient son.—Harper, p. 71, § 192: "If the son of a NER.SE.GA⁵ or the son of a devotee⁶ say to his father who hath reared him or to his mother who hath reared him: 'My father thou art not;' 'My mother thou art not,' they shall cut out his tongue." Harper, p. 73, § 193: "If the son of a NER.SE.GA or the son of a devotee identify his own father's house, and hate the father who has reared him and the mother who has reared him, and go back to his father's house, they shall pluck out his eye." Harper, p. 73, § 195: "If a son strike his father, they shall cut off his fingers." The biblical law is not so explicit. Thus Deut. 21:18-21: "If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and that when they have rebuked him will not hearken to them, then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him and bring him out unto the elders of his city and unto the gate of his place, and they shall say unto the elders of his city: 'This our son is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard.' And all the men of his city shall stone him with stones that he die." On the other hand, the so-called Sumerian Family Laws give a similar case,⁷ but do not prescribe death for the rebellious son.

Divorce.—Harper, p. 49, § 138: "If a man would put away his wife who has not borne him children, he shall give her money to the amount of her marriage settlement, and he shall make good to her the dowry which she brought

⁵ NER.SE.GA=*mansas pâni*, II R., 39, 46g; literally "a front place," then applied to a high official as here. Cf. *Hwb.*, p. 457a. *Mansas pâni* also=*amel gal-te*, *Senn.*, i, 30; II R., 51, n. 2, rev. 18. The ideogram NER.SE.GA should be read *gir-se-ga*, i. e., "one who places or gives the foot" (*gir*, "foot"+*sega*=*nadânu*, "give, place," hence "a retainer").

⁶ Literally *sinništi zikrum*, "woman of a vow." This word *zikru*, "vow," is from *sakûru*, "impress, remember," the same stem as זָכָר, "male," literally "impresser, impregnator."

⁷ Cf. DELITZSCH, *Ala*, p. 114.

from her father's house, and then he may put her away." With this should be compared Deut. 24:1, 2: "When a man hath taken a wife and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her; then let him write her a bill of divorcement and give it in her hand and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house she may go and belong to another man." The Hebrew code, it will be noticed, makes no mention of a restitution of dowry.

False witness.—Harper, p. 11, §§ 3, 4: "If a man in a case (pending judgment) bear false (threatening) witness or do not establish the testimony that he has given, if that case be a case involving life, that man shall be put to death. If a man (in a case) bear witness for grain or money (as a bribe), he shall himself bear the penalty imposed in that case." The Mosaic law was on similar lines. Thus in Deut. 19:16-19: "If a false witness rise up against any man, to testify against him that which is wrong; then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before Yahweh, before the priests and the judges which shall be in those days . . . and behold, if the witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against his brother; then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to have done unto his brother." The Hebrew law here is really a variant of the *lex talionis*, which was also the underlying principle in the Hammurabi code (see below).

Incest.—Harper, p. 55, § 154: "If a man have known his daughter, they shall expel that man from the city." It is curious that there is no express prohibition against intercourse between a father and daughter in the Mosaic code, although it is undoubtedly implied, as the son's wife is forbidden to the father of the son. Harper, p. 55, § 155: "If a man have betrothed a bride to his son and his son have known her, and if he [the father] afterward lie in her bosom⁸ and they take him, they shall bind that man and throw him into the water." § 156: "If a man have betrothed a bride to his son and his son have not known her, but he himself lie in her bosom, he shall pay her one-half-mana of silver, and he shall make good to her whatever she brought from the house of her father, and the man of her choice may take her." In Lev. 18:15 it is expressly stated: "thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy daughter-in-law. She is thy son's wife." The penalty is imposed in Lev. 19:12, where in such a case it is ordered that the guilty parties "shall be put to death." Incest with the mother was punished even more severely. Harper, p. 55, § 157: "If a man lie in the bosom of his mother after (the death of) his father, they shall burn both of them." In Lev. 19:11 it is stated "the man who lieth with his father's wife [not necessarily his own mother] . . . they shall both be put to death." It was evidently incon-

⁸ The word *šunu* is euphemistically translated "bosom" by Professor Harper. It was probably a legal term for *pudendum feminae*. I connect it with the *šini* of *I. R.*, 27, n. 2,33: *muči bāb šiniša lā ikāšir*, "the mouth of its sewer he may not close up" (see MUSS-ARNOLT, *op. cit.*, p. 285).

ceivable to the Hammurabi code-makers that incest with the mother could take place during the father's lifetime.⁹

Kidnapping.—Harper, p. 17, § 14: "If a man steal a man's son who is a minor, he shall be put to death." § 15: "If a man aid a male or female slave of the palace or a male or female slave of a freeman to escape from the city gate, he shall be put to death." The Mosaic code imposes a similar penalty: Deut. 24:7: "If a man be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel and maketh merchandise of him or selleth him; then that thief shall die."

Lex talionis.—This is the underlying principle in all the penalties, but it is nowhere so clearly set forth as in Harper, p. 73, § 196: "If a man destroy the eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye." § 197: "If one break a man's bone, they shall break his bone." Compare this with the famous passage, Deut. 19:21: "And thine eye shall not pity; life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot." Lev. 24:19, 20: "And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour, as he hath done so shall it be done to him. Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (see below).

Rape was a capital crime only when the woman wronged was the betrothed wife of another man (see above *s. v. Adultery*).

Theft.—There were two degrees of theft according to the Hammurabi code: *i. e.*, first order: entering a palace or temple and stealing from an open place or temple; this was punished by death. The second order consisted in receiving or selling stolen goods, which was also a capital crime (see Harper, p. 13, §§ 6, 7, 9, and p. 23, § 34). Only in the case where the thief had stolen an ox or sheep, ass or pig or boat, might he have the privilege of restitution. *Cf.* Harper, p. 13, § 8: "if it be from a god (temple) or a palace, he shall restore thirtyfold; if it be from a freeman, he shall restore tenfold. If the thief have nothing wherewith to pay, he shall be put to death." The principle of restitution for theft was known also to the Mosaic code. Thus Exod. 22:1: If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill it or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep.

All law is the concrete expression of the practical necessities of community life. It may be predicated of every law-code in existence that it is a combination on the one hand, of certain ancient, fixed principles descending from the days of the first nationalization of the people who evolved the code, and, on the other hand, of various later modifications which became necessary as the national life ripened under the influence of new conditions, incidental to a growing culture. This is peculiarly true of the Hammurabi laws, in which the ancient principles descending from the earliest Semitic fathers are perfectly apparent. A special study

⁹ A very interesting article on the Jewish laws regarding incest has been published by J. D. EISENSTEIN in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. VI, p. 571.

would be needful to set forth the reasons for the systematic order, following which the Hammurabi laws are put together in a code.¹⁰

There can be no doubt that the first and chief principle of the ancient Semitic lawgivers was the *lex talionis*: "life for life, eye for eye," etc. As already mentioned in this review, this idea underlies the entire codes of Hammurabi and of the Old Testament. Such a law was fundamentally necessary in a rude community, and indeed may be said to be inherent in human nature. The essence of self-protection both for the individual and for the community was retribution, not only for deeds actually done, but for deeds *planned*: "And ye shall do to him that which he had *thought* to do unto his neighbour." This is a clear development of the *lex talionis*.

Another principle was "one crime, one punishment." Thus in nearly every case the death penalty excluded any other punishment, therein showing us a more merciful law than that against high treason followed by our English forefathers as late as the very beginning of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, punishment on the body excluded a fine.

Three laws of Hammurabi require our especial attention in this connection, viz.:

Harper, p. 39, §§ 115, 116: "If a man hold a (debt of) grain or money against a man and he seize him for debt, and the one seized die in the house of him who seized him, that case has no penalty. If the one seized die of abuse or neglect in the house of him who seized him, the owner of the one seized shall call the merchant to account; and if it be a man's son (that he seized) they shall put his son to death. . . . Harper, p. 77, §§ 209, 210: "If a man strike a man's daughter and bring about a miscarriage, he shall pay ten shekels of silver for her miscarriage. And if that woman die, they shall put his daughter to death." Harper, p. 81, §§ 229, 230: "If a builder build a house for a man and do not make its construction firm and the house which he has built shall collapse and cause the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put to death. If it cause the death of a son of the owner of the house, they shall put to death a son of that builder."

In these three cases the innocent child of the person who caused a death is to be slain. D. H. Müller correctly points out¹¹ that this is not an increase, but a decrease of penalty, as the life of the child was evidently considered as being of less value than that of the principal. This law seems to me to be a natural one among a half-civilized people, and need not, according to Müller, be regarded as a survival from a more primitive

¹⁰ See, however, for an excellent article on this subject, D. H. MÜLLER, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis*, pp. 190 ff.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 226, 227.

period than that of Hammurabi. The punishment for a death caused by what is now termed "criminal negligence" has never been so severe as the penalty for a death caused by premeditation.

It is interesting to notice that society in the days of Hammurabi consisted legally of the following three great classes: (1) the householders, constituting the upper classes, called in Babylonia *awilum*; (2) the poor man, who was always a free retainer, called in the code *muškēnum*;¹² (3) the slaves of both sexes, the so-called *wardum*, "male slave;" *amtum*, "female slave." The rights of all these classes are most clearly defined.¹³ This is probably a very ancient classification. It is apparent, however, that these classes were capable of subdivision. Thus we find court officials, priests, soldiers, freeborn men, and slaves. Again, among the free workingmen there are mentioned field superintendents and shepherds, as well as artisans of all sorts, such as tailors, locksmiths, etc. The class just above the slaves was that of the day laborers. This division probably belonged to later days when society had become more complex.

It is a grave question, and one which cannot be decided off-hand, as to whether the Mosaic law was not in some respects even more archaic than the Hammurabi code. There can be no doubt as to the connection between the two legal systems. Both have as their fundamental principles certain universal ancient Semitic ideas of justice, which are easily recognizable. It is safe to assume at this period of our investigation that the

¹² DR. LITTMANN in the "Sprechsaal" of ZA., Vol. XVII, pp. 262-65, has endeavored to show that the proper meaning of the Arabic *miskīn* is "leprous." There can be no doubt that *miskīn* is used very generally today in the Arabic of Syria in this sense, and that the Syriac ܡܫܟܝܢ had the same meaning. It is highly probable that Syr. ܡܫܟܝܢ = Arabic ܡܫܟܝܢ is a derivative from the Assyrian *muškēnu*, but it is not likely that *muškēnu* originally meant "leprous," as Dr. Littmann suggests. He admits freely, however, that the *muškēnu* in Hammurabi's code need not necessarily have this signification. The fact is that *muškēnu* must have meant "a poor man," not "pauper" (ZIMMERN in JOH. JEREMIAS, *Moses und Hammurabi* p. 10, n. 1). The word is a Shaphel formation from the stem *kānu* ܟܢܐ, "pay homage, humble oneself, especially before a god" (BA., Vol. II, pp. 397 ff.). Harper has shown that Hammurabi's *muškēnu* was a class of poor freemen. The idea that these people were lepers is not admissible at all. From the meaning "poor" came the ideas "miserable," and later "leprous," in Syriac and in Syrian Arabic. In Egypt the regular words for "leprosy" are ܒܠܐ *bala* and ܝܘܫܡ *juzm*; "leprous" = *abras*. The word *miskīn*, on the other hand, is universally used in Egypt in the same sense as فقير, *faqīr*, "poor." On Hebrew ܡܫܟܝܢ, cf. Jensen in ZA., Vol. IV, p. 271, and ZIMMERN, *ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 353.

¹³ See HARPER, p. xii.

origins of the Hebrew law code go far back into the times when, according to a tradition which has never been proved untrustworthy, the forefathers of the Hebrew state were in Babylonia. Whether or not this period antedated the days of Hammurabi is still an open question. Personally I am inclined to the belief that the first Abrahamic horde left the East at an earlier date than 2250 B. C., carrying with them those Babylonian traditions which resulted, not only in the Mosaic legal system, but also in the so-called Psalms of David. The Babylonian affinities of the biblical psalms are quite as well marked as are those of the Mosaic laws.¹⁴ If this theory be true, the Hammurabi and the biblical codes had a common origin.

Perhaps the most important phonetic feature of the language in the Hammurabi code is the appearance of the original *w*-stem in such forms as *warku* for later *arku*, "afterward, subsequent;" *awllum* for later *amelum*, "nobleman," etc. This form *awllum* for *amelum* is proof positive of the existence in Semitic Babylonian and Assyrian of a nasal *m*-like *w*. The grammatical and phonetic peculiarities of the Hammurabi dialect have been discussed by D. H. Müller.¹⁵ The vocabulary of the code has been tabulated into a glossary by Professor Harper, pp. 147-92.

Professor Harper has done a great service in presenting the Hammurabi code with a satisfactory translation to the English reader. The book should be valuable, not only to Assyriologists, but also to every careful student of ancient law.

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TWO RECENT WORKS ON THE EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS.

IN recent years there has been a notable revival of interest in the two letters to the Thessalonians traditionally ascribed to Paul, and especially in the second letter. This revival of interest may be due in part to the renewed study of apocalyptic tradition,¹ and to the recognition of the fact that there was a more frequent interchange of letters between churches and their founders than has generally been admitted.² At all events, the

¹⁴ An interesting popular article on this subject has been written by KNUT TALLQVIST in the *Finsk Tidskrift*, Vol. XXXII, pp. 193-214, "Fornbabyloniska och hebräiska psalmer."

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 245 ff.

¹ E. g., W. BOUSSET, *Der Antichrist*, 1895.

² E. g., J. R. HARRIS, *Expositor*, 1898, pp. 170 ff.

actual work done on the Thessalonian epistles during the last decade indicates an interest in questions of introduction, literary and historical, rather than in questions of minute exegesis. For the purposes of this brief review, the essay of Wrede³ and the commentary of Wohlenberg⁴ may serve as a point of departure.

Previous to the appearance of this latter work the student was usually referred to the English commentaries of Ellicott (1858), Jowett (1859), Eadie (1877), Hutchinson (1883), and especially, in more recent years, to those of Findlay (1892), Lightfoot (1895, notes), and Drummond (1899); or to the German commentaries of Schmiedel (1893), Bornemann (1894), B. Weiss (1896), as well as to those of Schmidt (1885), Zimmer (1885 and 1893), and Zöckler (1894). Of these commentaries at least two were of primary importance, that of Schmiedel—which, however, does not compare in exegetical insight with his “Corinthians;” and that of Bornemann—a thorough, though unnecessarily discursive, volume of 708 pages, of which pp. 538–708 are devoted to specimen interpretations quite on the analogy of Lilienthal.⁵ Now when Zahn’s series was announced, it was expected that there would be a thoroughgoing treatment of the subject within the lines marked out by Zahn himself in the preface to his own commentary on Matthew, but a perusal of the work of the Altona pastor (already known as the editor of the Epistles of the Imprisonment in the second edition of the Strack-Zöckler series, 1895) at critical points makes clear that the commentary of Bornemann still remains *the* commentary on Thessalonians. The introduction (pp. 1–13) is meager and unsatisfactory. The reader is referred to Zahn’s *Einleitung* for details. Spitta’s arguments for the authorship of 2 Thessalonians by Timothy are dismissed as *nichtig*, and Wrede’s important study is characterized in a brief footnote as contributing “nothing new and nothing important.” In spite of Schürer’s exorcism, the demon *Proselyten des Tores* is still at large (p. 3). A selection of important literature follows (pp. 14–16), which, however, knows no English commentary but Ellicott and Malleon, about which latter Wohlenberg seems to be in as much doubt as was Bornemann before him. Pages 170–209 are devoted to an excursus on 2nd Thess. 2:3–8, a review namely of ancient and modern interpretation.

³ *Die Echtheit des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefes*. Von W. WREDE. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. viii+116 pages. (=“Texte und Untersuchungen,” etc., N. F., Vol. IX, No. 2.)

⁴ *Der erste und zweite Thessalonicherbrief ausgelegt*. Von G. WOHLBERG. Leipzig: Deichert, 1903. 214 pages. (=“Kommentar zum Neuen Testament,” herausgegeben von TH. ZAHN, Vol. XII.)

⁵ *Biblisches Archivarium des Neuen Testamentes*, 1745.

Pages 210-14 give selected extracts of eschatological import from the Didache and Daniel. This leaves pp. 17-169 for the commentary proper, which, in keeping with the general plan of the series to which the book belongs, is continuous in character rather than *glossatorisch*, abundant use being made of footnotes. There are advantages in this method, as E. Haupt has shown in his superb commentary on the Epistles of the Imprisonment. The exegesis follows in general the lines of Hofmann. Mooted points, as 1 Thess. 2:16; 4:15; 5:7 ff., 5:23, are cautiously approached and conservatively answered. It would have been advantageous to the author, had he stated his method in textual criticism, and had he made a study of words from the point of view of the usage in late Greek, and especially in the papyri. Without intending to disparage faithful work, it must still be confessed that Wohlenberg has "contributed little or nothing new or important" (to use his own characterization of Wrede).

Turning from commentaries proper, in which, as we said, relatively little work has been done in the last decade, to studies in introduction, we notice that relatively a good deal of work has been done—work fruitful, however, not so much in results as in the definite statement of the problem. The real problem is the second epistle. First Thessalonians, in the opinion not only of Harnack, Jülicher, McGiffert, and Bacon, but also of Schmiedel, Pfeiderer, and Holtzmann, is a genuine work of Paul. Second Thessalonians, however, is, according to a growing tendency in Germany at least, not only un-Pauline, but actually the work of a *falsarius*, that is, forger. So Baur,⁶ Weizsäcker,⁷ Holtzmann,⁸ Wrede,⁹ and Hollmann.¹⁰ To be sure, this opinion is not shared by Zahn, Wohlenberg, Harnack, Jülicher, Bacon, McGiffert, Askwith, and Lock, who, on the contrary, hold the second as well as the first letter to be genuine.

Two minor and two major arguments are advanced to prove that the second epistle is un-Pauline: (1) the alleged lack of the personal equation; (2) the language. The first point seems to be of little importance, and may be dismissed without comment. The second point is likewise of secondary importance. Indeed, there is an increasing tendency to disregard the argument from language pure and simple; and rightly, for it is confessedly a precarious argument. Wrede puts little or no stress on it.

⁶ *Paulus*, Vol. II, 1867², p. 107.

⁷ *Das apostolische Zeitalter*, 1892², p. 251.

⁸ *Zeitschrift für die neuestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1901, pp. 97-108.

⁹ *Vide supra*.

¹⁰ *Zeitschrift für die neuestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1904, pp. 28-38.

McGiffert,¹¹ however, makes a brief but important analysis of the vocabulary and phraseology (not an unsifted collection of material like Brüning's¹²), and observes that the uniqueness appears just in those passages which are apocalyptic—2:1-12; 1:6-12—which latter is considered by McGiffert as possibly an interpolation, but which more probably is a fragment of a Jewish-Christian apocalypse like 2:3-12. So far as the argument from language is concerned, there is nothing un-Pauline in 2 Thessalonians.

The two serious arguments against the genuineness of 2 Thessalonians are (1) the eschatological situation, and (2) the similarity of 1 and 2 Thessalonians. As to the first of these, it may be said at the outset that the theory which considers 2 Thess. 2:1-12 an interpolation is futile, for it is precisely this passage which is new, precisely this passage which accounts for the letter. Nor is the view tenable which holds that 2:1-12 presupposes the Nero Redivivus theory. Both Wrede and Hollmann recognize the difficulty and are forced quite unnaturally to assume that the *falsarius*, writing *ca.* 100 A. D., either forgot the destruction of the temple or used the passage in a figurative sense. The real difficulty, consequently, is the alleged contradiction between 1 Thess. 5:2 (which seems to indicate that the parousia is coming immediately, "as a thief in the night," without the warning of premonitory signs, in spite of the fact that Paul, on the assumption that 2 Thessalonians is genuine, had been in the habit of telling the Thessalonians about the signs), and 2 Thess. 2:3 ff., where the parousia is not to come until certain definite things have happened. It is to be noticed that the same apparent contradiction exists in the apocalypse of Mark, chap. 13, and parallels. It but begs the question to assert, with Hollmann, that such a contradiction is impossible to Jesus and Paul, although possible to the evangelists. It is to be noticed, further, as Hollmann concedes, that both 1 and 2 Thessalonians (if genuine) presuppose that the parousia is to come within the lifetime of Paul. It would seem as if Paul in 1 Thessalonians were not interested so much in the question of the exact day and hour of the advent (*cf.* Mark 13:32) as in the fact that, when it comes, it will come catastrophically, as a supernatural event. The godly are warned not to be caught napping, but to be thoroughly prepared. In 1 Thessalonians there was no need of a distinct emphasis on the premonitory signs, but the more acute situation of 2 Thessalonians called for a definite reminder of what had been said previously.

¹¹ *Encyclopædia Biblica*, Vol. IV (1903), Col. 5036-46.

¹² *Die Sprachform des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefes*. Naumburg: Lippert, 1903. (The first part of a licentiate's dissertation.)

Wrede rightly sees that the eschatological argument is secondary, not primary, in the case against genuineness.

The second main argument against 2 Thessalonians is the literary relation between 1 and 2. It was McGiffert who first saw this and made it the most serious objection to the genuineness of 2. Independently of him, both Holtzmann and Wrede emphasize this as the important point. Wrede, indeed, rests his case ultimately on this one argument. It is the excellence of his essay that it indicates, with admirable thoroughness, the strikingly similar relation between 2 and 1. The new material of 2 is found chiefly in 1:5-12; 2:2-12, 15; 3:2, 13, 14, 17. The rest of the letter follows closely the arrangement, divisions, phrases, and words of the first letter. So close is the agreement, that the dependence of 2 on 1 is to be admitted. The explanation of this dependence is the present problem. The following explanations have been offered: (1) The similarity of the letters is due to the similarity of the situation. This is the usual answer. The difficulty, however, is that the two letters were not written (on the assumption of the genuineness of both) at exactly the same time; at least three months intervened between them. (2) The similarity is due to the fact that Paul read a copy of 1 before writing 2. So Zahn and McGiffert. The possibility of the conjecture is to be admitted. (3) Timothy wrote 2 at Paul's request. So Spitta.¹³ But 2:5 seems to be against this theory.

If the sole argument against the genuineness is the similarity between 1 and 2, then we are dealing with an argument even more precarious than that from language, namely, the psychological argument. We are reduced to an either-or. Either Paul wrote it—the literary situation being at present psychologically unclear—or a *falsarius* wrote it. The latter position is taken by Holtzmann, Wrede, and Hollmann. Holtzmann, who emphasizes the alleged contradiction in eschatology as well as the literary relation, is inclined to suggest that 2 was written to compensate for 1. After the death of Paul, 1 Thess. 4:15-17 continued to be read, and yet the "survivors" were fewer and fewer in number. Hence the necessity for a redaction of 1 Thessalonians which should omit the personal references of it, while retaining the religious interests, and should be worked over into a more formal churchly style. In the process 1 Thess. 4:1-10 is eliminated, and 4:11, 12 is enlarged into 2 Thess. 3:6-12. 2 Thess. 2:2; 3:17, are inserted to give currency to the letter as Pauline. The forgery was concocted at some distance from Thessalonica, and was intended for general reading in the churches. Wrede agrees in the main with Holtzmann, and assigns the date (as Hollmann) *ca.* 100 A. D. In order, however, to

¹³ *Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums*, Vol. I (1893), pp. 122 ff.

escape the difficulty already alluded to, that there is nothing in 2 Thess. 2:1-12 which presupposes a later date than the year 70, he is obliged to assume either that the *falsarius* overlooked the reference to the temple or treated the reference figuratively. It is apparent, I think, that the main argument upon which the denial of the authenticity of 2 Thessalonians depends is psychological. The question is: Could Paul have written 2 three months after he had written 1? The hypothesis of a *falsarius* is, of course, not to be dismissed summarily. It is to be noted, however, that the *falsarius* probably wrote while the temple was still standing. Indeed, it rather seems to me that this same *falsarius* not only betrays a singularly accurate knowledge of the acute situation in Thessalonica at exactly the time when Paul wrote the first letter, but also that he makes perfectly clear in the second what is rather unclear in the first. A single illustration must suffice. In 1 Thess. 5:14 appears the phrase *νοθεύετε τοὺς ἀτάκτους*. This noun has usually been translated "disorderly," "unruly," or "unquiet." The *τάξις* implied has been assumed to mean very generally the Christian norm of conduct, although 1 Thess. 4:11 seems contextually to restrict the norm to labor. In 1 Thess. 4:12 the purpose of the exhortation is that they should conduct themselves decently in reference to gentiles, and that they should have need of nothing or no one. The gender of *μηδενός* and the covert reference are quite unclear. When, however, we turn to 2 Thess. 3:6-12, which, to Holtzmann, is an elaboration of 1 Thess. 4:11, we get the clue. Paul and his companions were never idle when they were with them, nor did they ever beg their food from the church treasury or from the gentiles, but kept at work in order that they might be independent of others for their living. Their principle was to earn their *own* food, not beg for it. Their motto was: No food without work. The man who elaborated 2 Thess. 3:6-12 from 1 Thess. 4:11-12 had contemporaneous sources of information. In a quite unconscious way he makes certain that *οἱ ἀτακτοί*, of 1 Thess. 5:14 are the well-known idlers, and that the *μηδενός* of 4:12 has a covert reference to the begging in which the loafers were indulging. He singles out and emphasizes the phenomenon which always accompanies the eager expectancy of the advent, namely, the "flight from labor," as von Dobschütz puts it.¹⁴ That *ἀτακτέω ἀτακτος, ἀτάκτως*, words appearing in the New Testament only in 1 and 2 Thessalonians, have reference, not to a departure in general from the Christian norm of conduct, but from the specific norm of labor, and that they should be translated "to be idle," "idler," "idly," seems confirmed by the use of *ἀτακτέω* in a document dated in the thirteenth year

¹⁴ *Die urchristlichen Gemeinden*, 1902, p. 72.

of Nero.¹⁵ The intimate knowledge which the *falsarius* betrays not only of Paul's letter, but of Paul's mind, makes one dare to hazard the conjecture that the *falsarius* was Paul himself.

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GOSPEL CRITICISM AND CHRISTIAN ORIGINS.

TWO IMPORTANT works on gospel criticism appear almost simultaneously—V. H. Stanton's *The Gospels as Historical Documents*,¹ and J. Drummond's *The Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*.² The fact that thus far only Vol. I of Stanton's work, covering the early use of the gospels, has appeared, while Drummond's, although purporting to consider both external and internal evidence, devotes a somewhat disproportionate amount of space to the early traces of the use of the fourth gospel, makes the two cover to a considerable extent common ground. Stanton, in fact, is able to utilize no small part of Drummond's work from the fact that the two chapters on "Justin" and "Basilides," which together occupy nearly one-quarter of the whole, were published, the former in the *Theological Review* for October, 1875, and April and July, 1877, the latter in the *Journal of Biblical Literature* for 1892. Stanton's two chapters on "Justin" and "The Asiatic Tradition in Regard to the Apostle John" occupy, however, almost exactly one-half his entire volume, so that it is easy to see where the focal point of critical discussion lies.

In respect to scholarship and scientific temper it would be almost an impertinence regarding either name to offer words of praise. One can only wish that the same high level might be maintained in all future discussion, and especially that partisans and dogmatists might emulate the open-mindedness of Principal Drummond, who in coming to his conservative conclusions regarding the authenticity of John runs counter to the conviction of both his most revered teachers, James Martineau and J. J. Tayler, while certainly not conciliating the leading thinkers of the Unitarian denomination, though the parallel with our own Ezra Abbott is very close. For these most important qualities of both books we have a general verdict of praise, as well as for their external aspect, so greatly superior to the crowded, con-

¹⁵ *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part II, 1901, p. 275, ll. 24 ff.

¹ *The Gospels as Historical Documents*. Part I: *The Early Use of the Gospels*. By V. H. STANTON. Cambridge: University Press, 1903. ix + 288 pages.

² *An Inquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*. By JAMES DRUMMOND. Oxford: Published for the Hibbert Trustees. New York: Imported by Scribner, 1904. xvi + 528 pages.

fused pages of the typical German treatise. If, then, we confine ourselves to points of dissent, it will not be deemed detraction.

It will be already apparent that in Stanton's work the reader must expect a treatment of those evidences of the use of our four gospels by the apostolic and post-apostolic fathers which in "Introductions" are classed as "external evidence." Here, however, the discussion is more detailed, and follows the historical order. The advance made over previous discussions could not well be in the way of adducing new data, but in larger treatment and the application, if possible, of a more discriminating and impartial critical judgment. It is certainly a convenience to have the parallels so fully adduced, and in most instances we think the reader's judgment will coincide with the author's. We must already take our first exception, however, on p. 43, where Hermas's parable of the Vineyard is appealed to as employing "a characteristic Johannine thought and expression" in the phrase "rejoiced with the Servant at the witness which the Master witnessed to him." Stanton himself would admit that the dubious resemblances adduced on p. 46 are quite insufficient to prove acquaintance with our fourth gospel, whereas "*the Epistle of St. James and the Epistle to the Hebrews*" are adduced as particularly in evidence. But the reviewer has showed³ that the phrase as here used is characteristic of just the Roman-Palestinian group, Hebrews, James, First Clement, Hermas (*cf.* Heb. 11:2, 4, 5, 39; 1 *Clem.*, 17:1, 3, 5), and therefore cannot be cited as evidence for use of the fourth gospel. Since in the final summing up (p. 275) this alleged evidence from Hermas is used in support of the statement that all four of the gospels "seem to have been in use in the Church of Rome some thirty years earlier" than elsewhere, the importance of this correction will be apparent.

The habitual moderation and good sense of Stanton are well shown in his discussion of the all-important evidence of Papias. His method requires him to introduce first (pp. 52-57) what relates to Mark and Matthew, afterward (pp. 166-71) what relates to John. As regards Mark, it is probably in one sense true to say that "there is no valid ground for doubting that the reference in the fragment about a writing by Mark is to our St. Mark." But the sentence is ambiguous. Whose reference? That of Papias, or that of John the Elder? The former would be generally conceded. The latter is disputed, and on very cogent, though to the reviewer not yet convincing, grounds. The verdict of criticism against identification of the Matthean *σύνταξις τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων* (or *λογίων*) with our Matthew

³ "The Doctrine of Faith in Hebrews, James, and Clement of Rome," *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1900), pp. 19 f.

is frankly accepted, with an exhibition of the determining reasons remarkable for its simple conciseness. But here also there is the same lack of discrimination between the tradition as Papias *found* it (where it concerned itself with a compilation of oracles of the Lord in Hebrew) and as he *gave* it (doubtless referring to our Matthew regarded as one of the "translations"). The distinction is observed regarding the word ἡρμήνευσε, but the statement (p. 55), "Plainly this cannot refer to written translations," requires some qualification. If, as Holsten showed,⁴ the import of the "traditions of the Elder" regarding the two gospels is harmonistic, the purpose of "the Elder" will not have been to give historico-critical information, but to account for variation in the reported story of Jesus. This has a decided bearing on the question what is referred to; especially as we have not ἡρμήνευε = "would, or was wont to, translate," but ἡρμήνευσε = "made a translation," and the question of the relation of the *Gospel according to the Hebrews* to canonical Matthew may well have been current among the hearers of the "Elder."

The treatment of Justin Martyr, with special regard to the question of his use of the fourth gospel (pp. 81-93), has the advantage of employing the work of Drummond as first published. The question is properly limited to "the extent of his use of it" rather than the fact. The echoes of "Johannine" phraseology are so generally admitted today that the real subject of debate is whether their admittedly great relative infrequency, the complete absence of any appeal to the fourth gospel as the work of John, or as in any sense authoritative, although Revelation is so appealed to, and the independence, if not disagreement, of Justin's Logos doctrine from the Johannine, do not require us to hold that he employed it only in some such way as those other subordinate gospel sources which have left similar traces in his writings.

Of the alleged echoes only the two generally admitted (John 3:3-5 in *Apol.*, I, lxi, and the Scripture, Isa. 40:3, given as an utterance of the Baptist) carry any degree of conviction, and curiously we look in vain in Stanton for any reference to the second of these. *Per contra*, it is not a fair statement of the case to cite the type of "the Brazen Serpent" in *Dial.*, xci, as a parallel to John 3:14-17 without acknowledgment of the fact that Justin employs, if not the *Epistle of Barnabas* itself, at least its "types;" and that the type in question is no monopoly of either Justin, Pseudo-Barnabas, or the fourth gospel, but in *Barnabas*, if not in early Christian apologetic generally, including the fourth gospel, is simply an adaptation of *Wisdom*, 16:5-12. The conclusion is (p. 90): "The fact, then, that

⁴ *Drei ursprüngliche noch ungeschriebene Evangelien*, opening sentence.

Justin makes more limited use of St. John than of the synoptics, or rather of St. Matthew and St. Luke, does not warrant the inference that it seemed to him to stand on a lower level." One can hardly regard the argument as likely to carry conviction except to those already convinced.

There is more originality in the effort to prove that Justin's coincidences with the *Gospel of Peter* are due to employment, not of this, but of a common source which probably contained the "Acts of Pilate" referred to in *Apol.*, I, xlviii, and may also be reflected in the *Gospel of Nicodemus*. The tracing up of the sources of this apocryphal material belongs among the best elements of the book.

The latter half of the volume (pp. 162-277) is principally occupied with the Johannine tradition in its development from Papias to Irenæus, considering: (1) the silence of the sub-apostolic age regarding the residence of John at Ephesus; (2) the evidence of Papias; (3) John the Elder; (4) the contrast of gospel and Apocalypse; (5) Quartodecimanism; (6) the Alogi; (7) Irenæus and Polycrates on the elders in Asia.

It is admitted (p. 166) that the silence as to John in Asia cannot well be accidental, but the general bearing of the whole discussion is relied upon to outweigh it. Harnack's argument from the silence of other excerptors against the alleged Papias fragment (probably from Philip Sidetes) is justly held to be of great weight against a martyrdom of John in Palestine; but the argument lacks an explanation of Mark 10:39. Papias's grouping of "John and Matthew" is still alleged as evidence for use of the fourth gospel, in disregard of the fact that we have evidence that Papias used Revelation as the work of the apostle, and none whatever that he used the gospel. "John the Elder" we are glad to see not only clearly recognized in his distinct personality, but even that "it is not by any means clear that he resided in Asia." Only what ground is there (apart from the demonstrably exaggerated and incorrect understanding of Irenæus) for thinking that any of the rest of the group of "apostles and elders" with which this elder John is connected, Aristo (of Pella?), Andrew, Peter, Philip (the apostle), and Thomas, James, John, and Matthew, resided in Asia? Admittedly none "in the sub-apostolic age." Yet, aside from the admission without comment of the designation *μαθητῆς τοῦ κυρίου*, as if not even the "chronological difficulty" admitted by Lightfoot were felt, the treatment of "John the Elder" is highly judicious, and conservative in the best sense.

Similar good sense and careful scholarship characterize the full and interesting discussion of Quartodecimanism (pp. 173-97), where again Drummond had preceded. The two discussions form the high-water mark of English treatment of this intricate but important subject. Stanton

indorses the conclusion of Schürer that Quartodecimans celebrated, not the institution of the sacrament, not even the death of Jesus by itself, but "the Christian Passover"—a New Testament counterpart to the Mosaic annual Feast of the *Redemption*. The various types and practices of Quartodecimans earlier and later, in Palestine, Egypt, and Asia Minor, form an intricate problem, the solution of which may throw light upon the origin of the fourth gospel, which is not unconnected with the practice; but this preliminary conclusion is admitted to be a neutral one, so far as the Johanne controversy is now concerned.

The general conclusion is a vindication of Irenæus, the champion of tradition; not, indeed, without concessions to the critics, and not without rebuke of the special pleading of Zahn. The anti-Marcionite elder of Book IV is rightly distinguished from those of Book II and Book V, whom Irenæus knew only through the references of Papias. But the reader neither anticipates nor finds an adequate criticism of Irenæus's exegesis. Stanton's vindication of Irenæus's real knowledge of Polycarp, as claiming to have celebrated the Passover with John and other apostles, and as relating sayings and mighty works of the Lord as he (Polycarp) had heard them from apostolic lips, might be admitted without detriment to the critical position. The weak point of the whole case for Irenæus, and the tradition for which he stands, is his undeniable misunderstanding and misdating of Papias, which Eusebius exposed. With this Stanton struggles in vain.

Nor can it be said that Drummond's more voluminous treatment reaches a more satisfying result. The external evidence, treated with the greatest fulness, has apparently determined the author's position, and leads to a conclusion which for its effect upon those who look to Drummond as their champion must recall the fable of the judge and the oyster. The authenticity is rescued at the expense of the historicity!

Book I deals with the internal evidence. It gives first a brief comparison with the synoptics, which shows the different view of the duration and scene of the ministry, and of the particular events related, the remarkable omissions and notable additions, the different style and substance of the teaching, and different representation of Christ's person. Acquaintance with the synoptic cycle of tradition is demonstrated; literary use of any one of the three is left doubtful. The special note on the speeches shows that the difference of the Johannine from the synoptic is not a matter of word-counting or measurement of sentences, but more fundamental. The discourses of the fourth gospel have a different *purpose*; not ethical, but "spiritual and doctrinal." Their central subject is the significance of Christ's person, the incarnation and atonement.

The purpose, accordingly, is found to be not purely biographical, nor a supplement to the synoptics; not anti-Gnostic, but theological in the sense of interpreting fundamental Christian doctrine for the edification of believers. It is "written from inward experience." But let us add: "against a background of *misinterpretation* rebuked in the epistle."

The question, How far is the gospel historical? is introduced by a significant comparison to Machiavelli's *History of Florence*, and reference to Deutsch's description of the unparalleled license of the haggadic method of teaching in the matter of substituting edifying fiction for history. The words of Deutsch are quoted:

The persons of the Bible . . . became, apart from their presupposed historical reality, a symbol and an allegory. And what the narrative had omitted the Haggadah supplied in many variations. It filled up these gaps, as a prophet looking into the past might do; it explained the motives; it enlarged the story.

No opponent of Drummond's idea of the authorship will deny that his illustrations are apposite; nor that he well and truly describes the different standards of "historical" writing current in circles affected by the philosophy of Philo, to say nothing of Thucydides or Machiavelli. If Wünsche can compare the synoptics to Palestinian Haggadah, the fourth gospel certainly illustrates Alexandrian. None will question the fairness of his application of these standards to the contents of the fourth gospel. The proof is adequate: (1) that the speeches are not verbal reports, but have the style of the evangelist himself, are without regard to time or place, differ from the synoptic, introduce Pauline universalism, and controversy with "the Jews," also an unhistorical self-presentation as the Messiah, and an eschatology adapted to the conditions of 70-100 A. D.; (2) that the events narrated, the visits to Jerusalem, the account of the Last Supper, the picture of John the Baptist, the cleansing of the temple, and the raising of Lazarus, must "be accepted more in the spirit than in the letter." "We seem to wander amid majestic thoughts and expositions, but hardly to come into contact with a living man." The difference between Drummond and his critical opponents will not be in his estimate of the internal evidence, so strongly opposed to the idea of historicity. They will differ from him on the question whether the external evidence is so strong as to require us to believe that such a companion of Jesus and witness of the cross as the Galilean fisherman, John the son of Zebedee, is supposed to be, could prefer to offer to the Christian church as his farewell gift such a "Machiavellian" fiction, in preference to his plain remembrance of the teaching and work of Jesus of Nazareth.

It is not needful to rediscuss the mass of second-century evidence

employed to buttress the interpretation put by Irenæus, the archchampion of tradition, on the *Exeges* of Papias. Principal Drummond himself admits that Eusebius's correction of Irenæus's misunderstanding was in substance justified, and if "on a review of the whole argument" he "pronounces the attack on the traditional belief a failure" (p. 235), the failure must be due to the mistakes of its supporters rather than the merits of their case.

If space permitted, it would be desirable to indicate that the alternative to Principal Drummond's conclusion of a "Machiavellian," or at least haggadistic, apostle is not some one individual, combining the qualities of a Paul and a Philo, but a stream of tradition of the Pauline "spiritual" type, developing along the Alexandrine haggadistic lines so well described by Drummond. The fourth gospel has an individuality, and a unity which can hardly be exaggerated by comparison with Mark or Luke. But the very fact that it comes to us with an appendix admittedly attached by a later hand proves that it is not *aus einem Guss*. Let it be the task of true criticism not to minimize the vestiges of its history still traceable in discrepancies and incongruities of the text, but by means of them to trace what we may of the history of this "Gospel of Paul."

Wernle's *Anfänge unserer Religion*, Vol. I, has been translated for the "Theological Translation Library" under the title *Beginnings of Christianity*.⁵ Vol. II, *Die Ausbildung der Kirche*, has not yet appeared. The selection was eminently fitting, and the translation is more nearly adequate than could have been anticipated, considering how terse, epigrammatic, and idiomatic is the original. We note only occasional infelicities, as on p. 98: "The whole of the 'redemption' was naturally of a transitory character." One needs the German "Diese ganze 'Erlösung' war ihrer Natur nach von vorübergehender Wirkung" to get the sense: This whole phase of Jesus' redemptive activity (viz., the miraculous healings) had from the nature of the case no more than a temporary effect.

A curious slip is the introduction on p. 130 of five lines from Luther's "Ein' feste Burg" as "an early Christian hymn."⁶

Wernle is of those whom Matthew Arnold designated critics of vigor

⁵ *The Beginnings of Christianity*. By PAUL WERNLE; translated by G. A. BIENEMANN. Vol. I: *The Rise of the Religion*. New York: Putnam; London: Williams & Norgate, 1903. xvi + 389 pages.

⁶ The German has "In den Kreisen der Gläubigen erklang das Lied:

Nehmen sie uns den Leib,
Gut, Ehr, Kind und Weib,
Lass fahren dahin!
Sie haben's kein Gewinn,
Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben.' "

and rigor. Proof of the strictness of his method was given in his admirably condensed and scientific *Das synoptische Problem*, 1901. The present work is the fruit of lectures on New Testament theology delivered in the University of Basel in 1900, designed "to present a clear idea of the real meaning of the gospel, and to trace the great changes it underwent up to the rise of Catholicism." The author is vigorous and rigorous simply because he has the full courage of his convictions. Believing the divine revelation to reside in the facts, not the mere report of the facts, save in so far as the report itself belongs among the phenomena, he shrinks from no conclusion to which a scientific historical criticism appears to point.

Thus the author's unaffected loyalty to Jesus does not prevent him from criticising Jesus' acceptance of the messianic title and dignity as a disastrous compromise with nationalistic Judaism entailing a whole sequence of later misunderstanding and debasement of the truth. "There was no harmony between Jesus and the messianic idea. He accepted the idea under compulsion, because it was the outer form for that which was final and highest. He labored with it, broke it up, recast it; yet a portion of the deception which it contained was transmitted to him" (p. 52). There is not only boldness, but true and sympathetic insight, in the saying (p. 101): "Christianity is in its essence a layman's religion, for its prophet was Jesus, a layman." The movement of the Baptist continued by Jesus presents, indeed, a striking analogy to that of Amos, the herdman of Tekoa—a revolt from religious professionalism back to the first principles of the normal religious consciousness. But the statement becomes paradoxical when the author makes the most essential features of the real redemption to be "redemption from the theologians and from the church." Only that both have found their way back to a greater dominance than ever.

In view of this free treatment of all for which the church has demanded exemption from criticism, the reader feels a certain surprise at the abrupt capitulation which seems to be, one might say, volunteered on p. 39, in discussing the self-consciousness of Jesus with relation to his call. We expect Wernle to present this self-consciousness of Jesus as purely and perfectly normal, its uniqueness arising from that very fact. We expect an acknowledgment of its transcendent mystery, but as something it holds in common with our own, not requiring to be made superhuman or abnormal in order to be divine. We do not expect him to follow the time-worn plan of enumerating a series of passages in which something superhuman can be held to be implied, and then abruptly conclude:

It is clear that a self-consciousness that is more than merely human speaks from these words. And this is the mystery of the origin of Christianity. What

we need to do above all is to accept it as a fact—a fact which demands a patient and reverent hearing.

It certainly is not our duty to accept so tremendous a conclusion without adequate evidence. And the array of proof is slender enough—a half-dozen passages from the synoptists, in all of which the implication of a more than human self-consciousness is at least disputable, into some of which it is imported by sheer mistranslation. Thus on p. 38 we are told that Jesus says: "Here is one greater than Jonah, greater than Solomon, the least of whose disciples is greater than John the Baptist." And yet the original makes it perfectly clear by the use of the neuter (*πλεῖον*—"a greater matter") that Jesus did not thus tastelessly compare *himself* with Jonah and Solomon, but God's *message* to this generation of which John and he had been the bearers. More had been done for these who said of the Baptist, "He hath a devil," and of Jesus, "a gluttonous man," than for the Ninevites who yielded to Jonah's words of doom, or the Queen of the South who was won by the sweet reasonableness of the wisdom of Solomon. "Therefore these shall rise up in the judgment with this generation and condemn it." Only sheer mistranslation can find here a claim of Jesus to be "greater than Jonah or Solomon;" and there is scarcely better reason for the substitution of "least of my disciples" for "least in the kingdom of heaven."

But neither do the other citations carry conviction. What more need be implied by Jesus' assurance of forgiveness of sins to those who have manifested penitence and faith, than the sense of a unique *mission* to gather the lost sheep of the house of Israel before the impending Day of Yahweh? The same consciousness of a unique *mission* appears in the new Law, wherein Jesus opposes out of a moral consciousness like that of Amos the external nomism of "the scribes and Pharisees." But the authority of one who speaks out of the conviction of a special call and message, even if that call be in the nature of the case unique, does not imply a "more than merely human self-consciousness," save as this is true of every prophet. Aside from the invitation of Matt. 11:28-30, which there is reason to regard as a "Wisdom" utterance wrongly attributed to Jesus (*cf.* Luke 11:49-51 = Matt. 23:34-39), the nearest approach to the expression of a more than merely human self-consciousness discoverable in the synoptic gospels is the justly famous logion of Matt. 11:27 = Luke 10:22. But, as the context shows, this simply contrasts the traditional lore of the scribes with the knowledge of God which Jesus derives directly from his Father in heaven. So far is this from being a "superhuman consciousness" that it is expressly set forth as a wisdom from above, given to those that ask, freely and without

upbraiding—a wisdom hidden from the wise and prudent, but vouchsafed to “babes” in common with himself. Here we have, indeed, the revelation of a consciousness of sonship which means more than mere messianism. Jesus has, indeed, a personal sense of “sonship” which is broader and deeper than the ideal of the scribes; for theirs rested on Exod. 4:22, and ignored that of our common humanity. In revolt against scribal arrogance and exclusiveness he speaks in the name of the “little ones” when declaring that the sense which belongs to “sonship” is revealed by the Father just as knowledge of the Father is not given to the wise and prudent, but to him who by imbibing the Father’s spirit has become one of his “children,” better qualified than by all the wisdom of the scribes “to reveal him.”

In the very fact that Jesus here falls back upon the capacity of normal, unsullied human nature, the “babes,” the “pure in heart that see God,” he evinces a higher than the messianistic idea of sonship, and shows himself a Son of man transcendent over the bounds of mere nationalism.

We have no room for even a word on Wernle’s analysis of Paulinism, though more than half the volume is devoted to this division of the subject alone. In fact, the three brief chapters devoted to the Apocalypse produce something of a sense of disproportion without the second volume on *The Development of the Church*, which discusses successively (1) “The Origin of Ecclesiastical Organization;” (2) “Growth of Ecclesiastical Theology;” (3) “Piety in the Post-Apostolic Age.”

Wernle himself provides a summary of his work in a paragraph of “Concluding Reflections,” which we would gladly transcribe entire:

Christianity is the result of the labors of men. John is the forerunner as prophet. Jesus comes next with a consciousness more than human as Son of God. The apostles transmit his message. Prophets and teachers join their fellowship. Paul—stamped as it were out of the ground (*sic*)—brings about the great transition from the Jews to the Greeks under the sense of a divine calling. Finally, on the outbreak of the struggle with Rome, the Christian prophet writes his wild book as the word of God. . . . All have one and the same message—it is eschatology transformed into a practical demand. . . . There is no thought of any new great world-organization. Hence the minimum of ecclesiastical forms.

And if, after all, there is even in this present world something new and that endureth—then it is the life of the disciples of Jesus. Their church is but miserable to look at; their theology—setting aside St. Paul’s alone—is a wretched jumble of Jewish words and conceptions and Christian insertions and additions, but the new life in these communities is of surpassing greatness: to be a disciple of Jesus means to be a redeemed man.

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VERSITY OF CHICAGO.

REPORT NO. 1.

DR. E. J. BANKS, Field Director of the Expedition (Babylonian Section) of the Oriental Exploration Fund of the University of Chicago, has reported that the excavations at Bismya began on December 25, 1903, and that they are now proceeding to his full satisfaction. With the commissioner, one servant, and a consular kavass, Dr. Banks left Bagdad by carriage for Hilleh on December 11. December 13, in company with Koldewey, he spent examining excavations at Babylon, and on the following day he visited Birs Nimrud. The party reached Diwanieh on December 15, and presented their letter to the muttessarif. No obstacles were placed in their way, and the authorities claimed that it would be unnecessary to take a large guard to Bismya. With two mounted and four foot-soldiers, and four workmen from Diwanieh, the party started for Bismya on December 17, and on the second day reached the village of Selman, the sheikh of the El-Bedin Arabs in whose territory Bismya is located. They were received hospitably by the chief, and on the following day Dr. Banks, with about twenty horsemen, spent a few hours at the ruin, which is three hours from the village. It was the intention of the Field Director to begin the excavations with about forty men, but, on account of the numerous Montefik Arabs who had wandered north to escape the fighting about Nasarieh, the country is unsafe. Selman, who has been informed by the Turkish authorities that he will be held responsible for the safety of the party, was cautious and insisted that it would be unwise to remain at Bismya with less than sixty armed workmen. On December 22 men were placed at work upon two wells in what Dr. Banks believes to be the bed of the old canal Shatt-en-Nil, and also of a later stream which dried up at the breaking of the Hindieh dam. At the end of the second day one of the wells reached a depth of ten meters, when the dry sand suddenly caved in, nearly burying the workmen, and they

were forced to abandon this well. On December 24 work was begun on two more wells, and on the 25th, as he was arranging to send to Hai for some water-skins and to establish a water caravan of several donkeys, the workmen announced that the sand seemed moist, and at nine o'clock on Christmas morning—the best Christmas gift possible—water sprang up through a hole made by a workman's pick, and the water was sweet. There was great excitement among the workmen; they ran about the well dancing, singing, and swinging their baskets in the air. The Field Director was no less pleased than they, and he ordered a sheep to be sacrificed for their baksheesh. A third well progressed slowly. On December 28 water was also found in it. Thus one of the difficulties which have kept excavators from Bismya is settled, and there is every indication that the water will suffice for every season of the year.

Bismya is a very large ruin, only Nippur, Warka, and perhaps Babylon surpassing it in extent. Its height does not exceed twelve meters, but it is considerably higher than Telloh, Fara, and other ruins where excavations have been successfully made. The length of the entire group of mounds, including a small low hill two hundred meters or so to the northwest, is 1,695 meters; the width is 840 meters. In a general way, the ruins form a rough and oblong square. The square may be described as consisting of two parts, separated by a valley running east and west. The northern part, which is by far the larger, is lined on its western edge by nearly a dozen high circular mounds, as if representing so many buildings apparently overlooking the canal. The hill gradually slopes away to the east, which Dr. Banks believes to be the old necropolis. The southern part is not extensive. Its highest hills are in the southwest corner. Dr. Banks is of the opinion that the mound has not been inhabited since Babylonian times. There are no walls visible above the surface; the few heaps of brick which the Arabs have collected have been mistaken for walls. The surface of the mound is smooth, and has not been dug over by the Arab antiquity hunters, as have been most other Babylonian ruins, for Bismya is so far from water, and in so dangerous a locality, that a single man, or a small company of men, could remain there for only a few hours at a time.

Already a village has sprung up at Bismya. Scattered about the Field Director's tent are many houses with women and children; three shops, a carpenter, and a butcher; and even street dogs have found their way there.

Excavations are proceeding with a force of one hundred and forty

men. As yet only the surface has been scratched, and, in no place have they gone to a greater depth than ten meters; but wherever they dig they come upon some wall or tomb. The men, some of whom have worked in every ruin in Babylonia, agree that Bismya is by far the richest and the easiest to excavate. The results which are so rapidly coming in are evidence of this.

"Of the three hundred inscribed fragments which have been found this week a few contract tablets are perfect. Several fragments of a very large tablet with fine writing on each side were found twelve feet below the surface in room 3. In the same room I found a nearly perfect tablet, 5 × 8 inches, with five columns of writing on each side. It is still too wet to clean. The style of writing is very late Babylonian" (January 15).

"Yesterday they came upon the immense mud walls of a palace, and in one of the chambers they found six tablets and a stamped brick of Bur Sin. I therefore take this to be the palace of that important king of Isin, and in a few days when the work at the temple has progressed sufficiently for the present, I shall send all the workmen to this place" (February 17).

"Instead of keeping the men at VI it has seemed to me best to transfer them to III, the palace at the West Corner, which I believe is next in importance to the temple, and there I hope to find the remaining fragments of the cylinder" (March 1).

The Arabs have given the Field Director much trouble. There seems to be a dispute about the ownership of the site of Bismya, and the following letters have passed between the Field Director and the sheikh of the Montefik :

LETTER RECEIVED FROM ABDUL RAZAK, SHEIKH OF THE MONTEFIK.

MR. BANKS, *American* :

We have learned that you are digging in the limits of our property and are bringing from the ground many things. Although, according to the regulations and the law, no one may touch the land of another without the consent of the owner, yet the land which you now inhabit is actually included in the limits of our property, of which we have in our hands the title deeds describing the limits. Since you have come to live in this district without our consent and without obtaining our permission, you are doing business and spending money with other people who have neither power nor right in this district, and who can afford you no protection. Moreover, as you are to spend a large sum of money, it should be with us as the original

owners of this land. Now, as you have knowledge of this entire matter, it is for you to judge what is proper.

(Signed) ABDUL RAZAK IBN FEHAD PASHA.

REPLY TO THE LETTER OF ABDUL RAZAK.

To the most honorable Abdul Razak, Bey:

SIR: We have received your kind letter of the 21st in which you inform us that the land of Bismya belongs to you, and is included within your territory according to your deed. Until the present time we have been ignorant of this, and, moreover, Sheikh Selman, sheikh of the El Bedin, to whom the Ottoman government, through the mutessarif of Diwanieh, has recommended us by letter, also asserts that he is the sheikh of this territory, and that no one else has a right to interfere with it.

Consequently we beg you to send us your papers, that we may study them and judge who is in the right. However, if you wish, you may also write to Sheikh Selman in order to settle the matter with him.

(Signed) Field Director of the Excavations at Bismya.

DR. BANKS, *American*.


Dr. Banks has since reported that he and Sheikh Abdul Razak have arranged their difficulties amicably, and that the sheikh is most friendly to him.

"I am just in receipt of a telegram from Mr. Paige (the architect), saying that he and Mrs. Banks have arrived at Busreh. There is cholera in Busreh, and hence they are quarantined. The conditions in quarantine are extremely miserable and I have sent Hussein the consular kavass to help them. I expect them here in ten days (March 1)."


Bismya is an exceedingly rich ruin, and there is not a yard of it without something of interest. The excavations have already demonstrated what the ruins contain, and if funds were available to employ several hundred workmen, not only would the security, which just at present is very uncertain, be perfect, but the entire ruin could be satisfactorily excavated before the expiration of the irade. The expense of the staff, which is by far the larger part, would not be materially increased.

ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, *Director*.

HASKELL ORIENTAL MUSEUM,
May 25, 1904.



A FACSIMILE OF THE IRADE ISSUED BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
(The firman granted permission from the Sultan to conduct archaeological excavations at Bismya in Babylonia.)



A MAP SHOWING THE LOCATION OF BISMYA, WHERE EXCAVATIONS ARE NOW BEING MADE BY THE ORIENTAL EXPLORATION FUND OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE ORIENTAL EXPLORATION FUND OF THE
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I subscribe herewith the sum of \$10.00 for purposes of exploration and excavation under the direction of the Oriental Exploration Fund during the year July, 1904-July, 1905, and thereby request enrolment in the General Committee and participation in the privileges of membership¹ therein during that period, it being understood that no liabilities are incurred by me in such enrolment.

Signed _____

Address (to which documents are to be sent).

Date _____

¹ The BIBLICAL WORLD will be sent monthly beginning with the date of this blank.

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THE RELIGIOUS FORECAST IN ENGLAND.

By A. TAYLOR INNES,
Edinburgh, Scotland.

THE religious situation in England may perhaps come to be a religious crisis. Sharp voices fill the air; and there are sighs for that in the past which has gone down irretrievably, and aspirations after what has yet to rise upon us in the future. Yet, speaking as a mere outside observer—a fly upon that great wheel for the last fifty years—I do not think that the driving forces of religion in the present, or its chances for the future, have altered very much during that long time, or even during the century gone by. At the present moment there is keen resentment roused by the recent Education Act. It was probably unwise, and was certainly an innovation on that passive defense of the *status quo* which was long ago recommended to the English Establishment by Sir Robert Peel. But all establishment is in the free state presumably indefensible, and an institution even of injustice requires sooner or later to be added to, if it is not to decline. Again, within the Church of England itself there is not so much change as the literary onlooker might suppose. The Oxford movement has during the last fifty years deeply affected the clergy, and has also swept into it women and æsthetes from the upper classes. But it has left the mass of the laity unmoved, if not indeed repelled; and the great majority of earnest church people are dumbly and obstinately Protestant. Twice at least in the course of the present Parliament a distinguished prime minister, with an enormous majority

behind him, had to withdraw well-planned overtures for conciliating high-churchism or Rome, in face of imminent revolt in his own party and in the Commons. Between this high-church clergy and low-church laity there was at one time what could claim to be a broad-church party. If it has melted away, it is because its work is now less needed, and the resulting critical sediment has been diffused among reading men not unequally on both sides. Hence arise, on the part of the clergy, powerful manifestoes like *Lux Mundi*, while the less articulate laity find representation of their low-churchism rather on the outside, among dissenters or in parliament. For the possibilities of the English religious situation, now as at all times, do not turn solely on the Church of England. They depend rather on a Protestant England, within which there is an ancient church in unstable equilibrium—a Protestant England, flanked by Scotland on the one side and Ireland on the other, and looking abroad to a Latin communion in the south, and to Germany and America on the east and west.

Churches and parties are held to be very external things. But if you go deeper into matters of individual reason and conviction, it may be doubted here also whether the religious question of the present time is absolutely new, or can hope for an immediate solution. Take the influence of biblical criticism alone. That influence tends in some ways to strengthen the authority of the church, and to suggest that it, and not Scripture, is the pillar and ground of the truth. Yet this is balanced by the constraint which criticism lays, even on churchmen, to plead their church claim before the double tribunals of historical evidence and original Christianity. Among the English laity, within and without the church, there are very many men whom a modern teaching has set free to grasp and use the principles of the early faith, while they are no longer troubled as to mere details of its records, and thus cultivate, on their own behalf, as on that of others, the new virtue of tolerance all around. It is well, but the men of this tolerant virtue—*how strive they*, as compared with their fathers, upon whose souls Wesley and Chalmers smote; or with the evangelical households of last century, which fed on Olney hymns and built up missionary societies; or even with the more ardent souls who stood in the van of the Oxford "movement"? Here again there is a cer-

tain unexpected equipoise. It once more suggests to us that the forces of the religious situation in England, while they are greatly enlarged, and perhaps enriched beyond what they were a few generations ago, are not *relatively* much changed. There are no longer, indeed, the old hard-and-fast lines between the sections; the life which has vivified each of them, and made it plastic and somewhat passive, has also interfused and so far reconciled the whole. For such reasons I avoid questions ecclesiastical and political, and decline to follow those who inquire into the chances of the immediate future. I am more attracted here by the thinkers who take this up as a chapter in the philosophy of the history, and who seek to determine, not what England will presently be—nor even what it ought now to be—but what sooner or later it must necessarily be.

More than one philosophy—idealist, or semi-idealist, or anything but idealist—has confronted this problem, and seemed to itself to solve it because the conclusions were couched in its own phraseology. Such efforts, however vigorous, I pass by. But behind them all there is the pressure of one great movement, the strength of a constraining presupposition or common thought. The pressure is that of the scientific spirit, and the thought is that the religious situation, in England as everywhere else, is merely a step in the process of the subjective evolution of religion. England is no doubt a peculiar, and in some respects a very peculiar, country. But English religion is merely the universal religion as that is found in England today. It is the same water here as on every shore—an influx from a world-stream; only here it flows in a narrow channel, and between English banks, barriers, and limitations. But if so, while in the present it is the English peculiarities and differentia that strike the eye, is it not certain that in the future—the immediate future, and the further future in a rapidly increasing ratio—the forces molding and governing and impelling it will be simply the central laws of religious evolution? It is they that will roll out the half-baked, half-fused, imperfectly stratified, and imperfectly crystallized mass of English religious and social life into something progressively better and more beautiful. And if, as most men—and most wise men—earnestly believe, Christianity is historically the highest form of religion or religions, then English religion, already predominantly Christian, needs only

the application to the molding of its future of the ordinary psychological laws. In the expectation of some, it will be essentially a church religion, and not one of separate and individual convictions. In the expectation of others, it will be a religion of culture, or even itself a mere form of culture. In point of fact, such a religion would almost certainly be *both*, and would embrace or tolerate very many subvarieties inside and outside of these main roots. I have spoken of the peculiarities of English religion. But, admittedly, the great peculiarity of England, and still more of English religion, is that it has long held historically, and is proud to hold, an intermediate position, resting on a basis of mere compromise. It has done so for centuries, and we have seen that the tendency of criticism and other recent influences is to intermediate still more, and to soften the angles of conviction that remain. If so, the task of evolution is in this case already largely anticipated. For while development of the kind desired should elevate religion, it will certainly average and equalize it; not by refusing civil or social privileges to any views, however extreme (the day for that has nearly passed away), but by embracing and harmonizing all on a basis of subjectivity, and treating religion itself as a legitimate or necessary expression of the nature of man.

Such, generally, is the forecast. The objection to it, as a philosophical or evolutionary theory, is that it ignores the ultimate fact of evolution itself—which is also the fact on which English and all other religion must build.

Take evolution in its rawest, and least religious, form. We have to begin with, nothing but matter. But out of matter arise gradually, not only symmetry or crystallization, but organization and growth, both resulting in a world of unconscious vegetable life. Then far down in the history of that unconscious world this amazing thing happens: it develops bodies which not only collide with other bodies, but are conscious of the collision—nay more, which perceive the world which is around them, and feel and act accordingly. And in an era farther on, the selected highest of these perceptive animal forms are raised to an astonishingly higher plane still. For the time comes when in these a new idea arises—an idea for which millenniums of the mere knowledge of *that which is* could never have prepared them—the quite other question: What *ought to be*? And now the uni-

verse, which was apparently dead matter to begin with, has become an intelligent and a moral universe; it has evolved, that is, as its highest products certain beings who not only investigate all that exists, but who judge of what ought to exist, and even judge themselves. Apparently, the chief aim and furthest attainment of this system of things is to evolve personalities. But these are beings to whose mind and heart evolution can itself speak. And its last word to them is, that the source and center of the universe must be the center as well as the source of all the personality that is in it. They are personalities themselves, the most precious products that we see. But they are fleeting and frail—mere bubbles that form and break as the world-stream moves. Yet that too is a stream that flows from a fountain; and the source of personality must be infinitely more intense than is any exemplification of it here. Yet each of these has a spark transmitted (or perhaps only reflected) from the center; sufficient, therefore, for mutual relation and mutual recognition, perhaps even for mutual response.

Throughout all history religion has been no mere subjective phenomenon. It has been the tie between men and the central Personality of the universe. Their apprehension of it—say rather, of Him—was at first distorted or fragmentary; but in modern times evolution is perhaps doing as much as Christianity to insure that we shall never think of the universe without thinking of its oneness and its center, and that, if we admit religion into our thoughts at all, to us there is but one God. In earlier days he appealed to the mass of men, not so much as the central Mind or the central Heart, but rather as the central Conscience of the universe, from which none could escape, and to which all might appeal. The arbitrary and avenging powers of mythology had no evolutionary future, but the Hebrew recognition of a Judge of all the earth—"a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he!"—prevailed over the more local and limited ideas of that race as of all others. It prevailed, but not at all by being softened down into a vague enjoyment of subjectivity or of legend. The trend was very much otherwise. Their God, more and more acknowledged as the God of all, became also more and more the God with whom they had to do. And even when the national ethic was sublimed into loving the seen neighbor as

oneself, it demanded first of all for one Unseen a love with all the heart and with all the soul and with all the mind. Of course, under a God-consciousness so direct as this all self-complacency broke down. It was exchanged in the multitude for a wistful look at the altar, and in select souls for an inward cry for forgiveness, while the lesson taught to both by the whole story, as prophet after prophet unfolded it to the world, was personal dealing with that divine Personality.¹ And this evolution of the individual out of the nationalist or multitudinist mass is a process which has never been reversed. Even before Christianity and outside Palestine, it had become plain that the religious future of our race could not always be constrained within the original solidarity of the savage family, the civic commune, the sacerdotal guild, and the conquering empire. And so philosopher, stoic, and mystic anticipated the beliefs of the future, and relieved the oppressed heart of their own present, when they individually turned to the unknown God or central *Anima Mundi*. But then came Christianity with its leap to a higher plane. Throwing down all middle walls between Greek and barbarian, it made instantaneous appeal to men of every race to seek personal reconciliation with the Cause and Father of all. Incidentally, it may be remarked that it is by no means clear that the response of the barbarian was less prompt, or less important for the history of the past, or even less likely to be repeated in the future, than that of the "Greek." But the main fact is that the question was no longer one of races at all. Races were merely the vague, and generally the mistaken, names of groups of individual men with personalities infinitely apart, every one of which was now invited to become "partaker of the divine nature" by a process of beholding that other Personality with open face. The previous history had been mainly a history of men blindly seeking God, "if haply they might find" one who, as the center of a world of dead matter evolving spirit, must presumably be Spirit himself. Christianity now affirmed his existence as a living and loving Personality, responding to the call and rejoicing in the love of man. It was an amazingly great, though surely not at all a strange,

¹ The most characteristic utterance in Hebrew literature shows a conscience, burdened with treachery to a murdered friend, coming to God with the strange words, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned," and refusing to depart.

thing to affirm of the Center of the universe. But a greater lay behind. If the center of all is a Personality and a living heart, it may well be that it will not leave initiative to its own creatures of clay. It will not merely be sought and found; it may itself seek. And the special message of the new faith was this, that from an immeasurable distance the Center of things had drawn near, and from an infinite height the Absolute had bowed down, to attract to itself the spirits whom it had made.

In the present age this faith in a Personality of the universe has found assured foothold also in science. But even in the present age it will not be victorious without a struggle. The Latin section of Christianity has exchanged the direct commerce with heaven, which was the privilege of private Christians in the time of the apostolic epistles, for a directorship under the responsibility of the Christian church. The Greek section has still less individualism; and, unlike the other, it has the task of keeping its masses in subjection, not only to an orthodoxy, but to a nationalist imperialism. And before it, as before us all, lies the problem of the yellow and black races; with the persistent suggestion that neither evolution nor Christianity can do anything for them, and that they must be merely drilled and utilized, like other inferior animals, consumers of corn or food for powder. In England, and in Europe generally, the line is not drawn at color; it is the peasant and proletariat mass who have long been excluded by the imaginations of the privileged from counsels of perfection alike in civilization and in Christianity. The white workingmen see the outrage of this clearly enough in their own case, and band together to force their way to most legitimate equal rights. But the socialist leaders are in the meantime disposed to simplify their future by way of making it easier, and to deny the value of all that inner world which cannot be conquered by external organization. And with so many forces pulling backward and pulling together, we are sure to have the attempt to unite them by some underlying philosophy. It will in any case be suggested that nature, which in past ages has been so careful of the type and so careless of the single life, still reckons those things alone to be useful which are useful to the species as a whole; that individualism in spiritual matters is selfishness, and the only fitting object is the

greatest good of the greatest number; and that therefore, if religion is to be recognized at all, it should be religion regulated for the baptized mass, with due regard to its national prejudices and traditions, and maintained for it under an authority which may be described indifferently as that of the church or of the state. And in answer it will have to be again and again pointed out, in the interest of the present and of the future, that Nature is so far from being careful of the type that she makes a thousand types continually pass away, as the lower life in them rises higher; and it seems, indeed, as if her whole interest in successive species were the gradual selection of creatures who, at last, while still full of animal frailty, shall be as gods knowing good and evil, judges of themselves and of her, and facing the precipice of moral responsibility. Such creatures, being molded out of warm clay, learn to feel and to do chiefly through their relations to others around them, loving at first the brother whom they have seen more than the God whom they have not seen. So, too, the individualism of Christianity, when it comes, is found to be one of self-sacrifice and altruism, enlarging rather than destroying our earthly relations. But we need also a higher love. Earthly relations crumble into earth, and the races and the works of men flit before them into the dark; and only the Great Companion is not dead. Sooner or later the craving of science for a central life, and of the heart for its ideal, will together upheave their way through the embattled selfishness of our time; and on both sides of the Atlantic we shall know that, while all things around men pass away, the ancient Lover and Friend of men remains.

But let us return finally to England. The proposal to Englishmen to believe in religion as culture, rather than in God as fact, finds in the English character some things to favor and some to oppose it. The habit of compromise, the desire to mend rather than end whatever is doing any good work, the passion of the uneducated for material fact, the corresponding passion of the educated for historical sequence, the preference of both for the conservative customs of the race, and the disposition of all to accept existing authority so long as it does not definitely press upon either conscience or comfort—these things sooner or later create a willingness to make the best of both worlds and muddle through somehow. But they are,

I believe, more than counterbalanced by the sturdy individuality of the people. The Englishman is not an idealist, and he is certainly not a theorizer. But individuality is in the long run a greater gift than idealism; and there is enough of it in the central stem of our world-wide race to assure us that it will sooner or later break down to the true roots, and burst outward in the highest products of our complex life.

It will probably not do so until the English working class comes to its own. That class includes elements so dissimilar as the keen factory hands of the north and the slow agricultural laborers of the south. But it is one people, and it is really the people of England, for whose benefit all legislation should be undertaken, and by whom all legislation will more and more be controlled. The education, commenced by the school boards and for the moment checked, will be in some form resumed, and will mold the mass into one, while it will at the same time give it political supremacy. That twofold height, when it is attained, may bring the testing-time for the religion of England. For then, and only then, will be fulfilled the great word which dropped from Sir Harry Vane before he went to the scaffold: "The people of England have been long asleep; *they will be hungry when they awake.*" And when they awake, it will not be to any question of class supremacy, especially if class equality has by that time been substantially realized. Rather, the attainment by all citizens of the necessities and comforts of life, in so far as the state can assure these, will instantly reveal the spiritual inheritance beyond, and a corresponding vacuity within which neither trade unions nor imperial unions can do anything to satisfy. But church organizations, too, will not satisfy it. The Catholic claim, to dispense truth to all men and to direct the conscience of each, would make a strong appeal at such a crisis to the national imagination. But, for reasons already indicated, it will probably never be submitted to by the English race. It may be doubted even whether they will take kindly to the quasi-authority of the Protestant aggregate or confessional church, a body of national dimensions founded on a human expression of divine truth. In matters of creed, the English organization of the future may broaden back to the *Areopagitica* of one great Englishman. In the coming evolution the individual is pretty sure at least

to treat mere things of external order—including especially the organizations of the sacerdotalist and the socialist—as matters of very inferior interest. It is much less certain what he will do—will do at least in the first instance—when set free in the other direction to deal individually and positively with religion, and with God in the heart of it.

For it must be confessed that, as man ascends in the evolutionary scale, the elements of his nature take on a greater instability, and it is precisely those who are called to a more glorious future who encounter higher moral risks. He who climbs to the golden bar of heaven, and misses it, may have a crashing fall. It is probably safe to predict that ere long the English masses will be face to face, as they have never been before, with the claims of religion and the higher life. But it would be rash to prophesy that they will embrace those claims—at least, at once. History has had too many cases of failure of a generation of men to listen to the higher call, and these failures may be repeated “as the great ages onward roll.” Yet we seem dimly to discern better things in the later years of the century whose threshold we have been permitted to see. At all times the highest moral results have been attained by men who fixed their gaze, not upon these directly, but upon the central Personality in whom they are gathered up; that is, these results have been attained through religion rather than ethics. This has been eminently so under Christianity. And the attainment has not been by men who accepted a philosophical or ecclesiastical system, but rather by those who suddenly found a bond with a Father reconciled; and, even in their case, most of all in the first tenderness of reconciliation. It is at this stage, too, and in this form that religion, with its priceless ethical accompaniments, has proved to be powerfully sympathetic and even contagious. For within Christianity even more than outside it, man’s experience of religion has come in the way of pulsation and vibration and recurrent waves of life. These are bare facts and phenomena of history, and they might perhaps repeat themselves in the coming England without giving absolute promise of a new dawn. They might be held to be consistent, so far, with the evolution of a merely subjective or psychological religion. Yet if even *that* religion rose so high in the hearts of young Englishmen as to be a passion for the reconciled First

Good and First Fair, we should all be disposed to find in it a golden promise and potency. And if, as these pages suggest, religion is an objective fact of evolution—the gradual recognition by many personalities of the central One—then the main hope may come, not from ourselves, but from the other side. The Center of all life must have infinite initiative, and may well be found in His own time inconceivably responsive to the appeal of man.

ART, RELIGION, AND THE EMOTIONS.

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I.

THE Good, the True, and the Beautiful are generally considered to be the proper aims of education and culture. But man must have some conception of what these qualities mean, if he would attain to the position for which he is destined by nature and by his native faculties. If he would live in human society, he must know and practice the Good. If he would adapt himself to the environment in which he lives, and desire to conquer it, he must know what is true and false; otherwise he is a mere toy in the hands of natural forces, like a savage. If, again, he would rise above the beasts of the field in his enjoyments, he must have some conception of the Beautiful. Only when man is educated along each of these lines does he develop all his faculties, since, speaking psychologically, the Good means an appeal to and development of the will; the True, of the intellect; and the Beautiful, of the feelings. Thus the whole mind of man is educated and trained. From a pedagogical point of view each one of these ideas has been considered of sufficient importance to be ministered unto by a special branch of knowledge. Ethics takes for its aim the development of the will, science that of the intellect, and æsthetics that of feeling. It would seem, therefore, as if no place and no function were left for religion in the education of man; and attempts have not been lacking to put philosophical ethics, science, and æsthetics in the place of religion.

Is this claim true or false? Has religion no longer a function in the education of man? Is it, more particularly, true, that æsthetics can replace religion in the education of the emotions? Have these questions, especially the last one, been definitely settled, or is there still something to be said for religion? It seems to me that there is; and this essay is an attempt to indicate along what lines the function of religion cannot be replaced in education by any other agency.

I.

Perhaps the best way to approach the problem will be to discuss the relation of art and of religion to the emotions. Both art and religion have very close relations to the emotions, and therefore to each other. Art and religion both deal with the same psychological faculty—feeling; both have the same aim—to purify and clarify feeling; and both employ similar methods—to objectify and transform feelings into emotions through the medium of the intellect.

Feeling is the elementary and fundamental psychological faculty. The proof for this statement cannot be given here, since it would necessitate a long, and perhaps fruitless, discussion with the intellectualists and voluntarists in psychology. It will be best, consequently, to proceed with the argument directly, and let the essay speak for itself. Feeling is, then, the elementary psychological faculty, and as such is largely subjective. But just because feeling is primarily subjective, it is so powerful. When a man has a strong feeling, it seems as if a power from the outside had taken hold of him, since he is so little master of himself. Bodily pains, for instance, often have such an influence over us that we do things which ordinarily we would never permit ourselves to do. Pleasures often have the same effect. This is the reason why the Greeks and other nations of antiquity attributed strong feelings to demons. Man is not free, not master of himself, when under the influence of a strong feeling. It seemed, therefore, to the ancients as if a foreign power was controlling him, and in some sense the demon was considered to be a divine power. From this attitude there was only one step to the position that all feelings were religious. This is the only explanation for the fact that the cult and worship of Astaroth among the Phœnicians, and Aphrodite and Venus among the classical nations, was regarded as one of the highest religious functions. It is also the explanation for the fact that the sexual feelings have been considered as the root of religion. But while religion is feeling in its innermost nature, it does not follow that every feeling is religious. The contrary is nearer the truth, as we shall see later.

Art likewise appeals to, and is an offspring of, feeling. An artist who is coldly intellectual and has no warmth of feeling cannot even be imagined. In order to create, an artist must have an experience of

some kind which has stirred him to the depth of his heart. Goethe is a conspicuous example in this respect, since he attributes all of his poetical works to real experiences. A man who looks at art merely with the eye of the intellect may become a fine critic, but never an artist. And what is true of the artist is also true of him who enjoys art. If a poem, a picture, or a statue does not produce pleasure, it is a failure as a work of art. It may be a sermon, it may teach a moral precept, but it is not a work of art.

Art and religion deal, then, with the same psychological faculty—feeling.

But they also have a common aim—to purify and clarify feeling. The essential characteristic of man as a spiritual being is his *freedom*. That he should be master of himself at all times and under any circumstances, that he should be *compos sui* over all the strong and various currents of his mental life, distinguishes him from the animals, since the latter are always at the mercy of their impulses and instincts. Man is, however, not free when under the sway of a strong feeling. He acts blindly, impulsively, and irrationally. And a human being that acts permanently in this way cannot be considered as a fully developed personality. Children, idiots, and savages, who are driven to act by their feelings, are just on that account not held responsible for their deeds. Feeling has the power to induce to prompt action. It has a dark, mysterious background. Its origin is often hidden from us; and we can seldom give an account to ourselves, in sober moments of reflection, just why we acted in such an impulsive manner while under the sway of an emotion. The reason is, perhaps, because feelings are so closely associated with our bodily condition. We touch here upon that mysterious borderland of mind and matter which is so fascinating just because of the futility of our efforts to penetrate it. If the much-debated question of subconsciousness were settled in the affirmative, we might say that the feelings arose from there. Indeed, the way some of our instinctive feelings of aversion and attraction arise seems to give substantial support to the theory of subconsciousness. Some of these feelings are so strong and powerful, and seem withal so unreasonable in the light of clear reflection, that their origin clearly points toward a background of our conscious life as a source and feeder of the latter. They do certainly

not arise through a clearly discernible intellectual process. We are not able to analyze them in any way; they come and go whither they list. All that we can do is to watch their development and decline. But these are merely the borders of feelings. Their essence eludes definition and analysis. As Professor James Ward says: "Feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of *being* rather than of direct knowledge."¹

Whether feelings arise, then, from subconsciousness or from the complexity of intellectual and volitional processes, it is certain that they have a most important bearing on our mental and physical well-being, and prompt us to actions which are not always conducive to our welfare. They make us captives and hold us under their spell. Man is, then, not free when impelled to action merely by his feelings.

In order to be free, we must be liberated from the thrall of our own feelings, for man is free only when the intellect guides and the will rules. Art and religion have the aim to accomplish this task. They accomplish this result by making feelings objective. The psychical energy which constitutes feeling must be diverted into some other channel. But there are only two ways of doing this. A feeling may be objectified either through the intellect or through the will. We may turn the psychical energy of a feeling, or at least part of it, either into reflection or into a deliberate action. One of these two things must be done, otherwise feeling—*e. g.*, anger—will feed upon itself or impel us to a blind action, and thus work great mischief. But, by being diverted, a new channel is opened up for the psychical energy which would otherwise be used up in feeling, and an immediate relief is the result. Unless such relief is procured, the "pent-up emotions"—just because they are purely subjective—will work mischief. Let us use an illustration. When a man is in a bad humor, a gloomy mood, he is not only conscious of his humor and mood, but he feels heavy; his whole mind seems to be working under difficulties; it is as if an iron hoop were placed around his mind and were drawn constantly tighter. We feel repressed, strained, confined, shackled, hampered, or—to use an expressive German word—*unfrei*. The whole mind is under a painful and disagreeable tension, and the

¹*Encyclopædia Britannica*, article "Psychology," Vol. XX, p. 71.

chief characteristic of this tension is that of lack of freedom within the mind. It is impossible to define the feeling in such a mood, and hardly possible to describe it; but any person who has experienced it will perhaps recognize it from this description. Now let someone make a joke. We laugh, and the atmosphere clears up immediately. The tension disappears; we feel light, happy, and free. The feeling of buoyancy takes the place of heaviness; hopefulness, that of depression; freedom, that of confinement. Our whole mental attitude changes in an instant, and if we reflect on the matter, we wonder how a small thing like that joke could work such a miracle. The simple fact is that our feeling has been liberated, by being objectified. We are no longer under its thrall, because our psychical energy, which was under the domination of a feeling, has been turned into a different channel. It is no longer purely subjective, it has become partly objective. It feeds no longer upon itself, since it includes an object. The strangeness and suddenness of such a change in our mental attitude can be compared to the changes which are sometimes wrought in the physical atmosphere. When a heavy fog holds a landscape captive, everything appears dull and monotonous: no tints of shades and lights, no clearness in the outlines of objects, no characteristic distinctions in the shapes of hills and mountains; everything is a dull, monotonous gray. Now let the sun shine upon this landscape. Immediately every object receives its own outlines, appears in its own tints and colors, and is clearly marked off in its own individuality from other objects. The landscape which was held captive in the fog has been set free by the sun.

We need not look, however, only to a joke to work changes of this kind in our mental attitude. Any agency which diverts psychical energy from feeling will accomplish a similar result. Sometimes it is a happy suggestion or intuition which throws light on a difficulty. Nor need the feeling be as intense as a temporary gloomy mood to require objectification for the purpose of liberation. A feeling of this kind may continue for years; joys and sorrows may come and go, and still there may be an undercurrent in our consciousness which gives a sinister coloring to our whole mental life. We may never be able to read and interpret the coloring, since it seems to mingle with all our moods and to give a certain tint to our consciousness.

Then suddenly the gloom may be lifted by a happy suggestion. Perhaps the best illustration of what I mean is the incident reported by Virgil.² Æneas and his party had been wandering around different seas and countries, meeting all kinds of fates, but being more or less gloomy for not knowing where they were ultimately to settle. Several attempts had been unsuccessful. When they reached the shores of Latium, they were so ahungered that they ate up even the flat cakes which served as tables. Whereupon Virgil continues:

"What! Eating up your boards beside?"
In merry vein Iulus cried.
That word at once dissolved the spell:
The father caught it as it fell,
With warning look all utterance stilled,
And marveled at the sign fulfilled.

Anchises had said:

"Whene'er on unknown shores you eat
Your very boards for lack of meat,
Then count your home already found:
There build your town and bank it round."³

Sometimes an undercurrent of sadness takes hold of the consciousness of a whole people or age. This was the case with the ancient Greeks, and they never were able to shake it off entirely because of their belief in *moira*. They were cheerful and light-hearted on the whole; they enjoyed nature and sensuous pleasures as perhaps no other nation has ever done. But all through their literature we find a note of sadness—indefinite and fleeting, but omnipresent and depressing. Even in its loftiest flights, as in Homer and Sophocles, this strain of sadness is never absent. We miss the note of hopefulness and buoyancy in their literature. This undercurrent of sadness was due to two causes—the absence of a definite conviction concerning immortality, and the conception of an iron and implacable fate ruling everything and dominating even the gods. Whatever dim hopes they had concerning immortality was not of a cheering quality, since Achilles tells Odysseus that he would rather be keeper of swine in the upper world than king in the under world. The liberating word was spoken in this respect by Christianity, with its definite promise of immortality and its conception of God as a

²*Æneid*, Book VII, ll. 107-47.

³JOHN CONINGTON'S translation, pp. 236, 237.

loving Father. And not to the Greeks only, but to all the nations of antiquity this promise and conception came as a word of liberation. Christianity objectified the longings and made definite the vague hopes of the nations for continued personal existence.

Feeling must, then, be objectified, if we are to become free.

Both art and religion aim, however, at liberating us from the thrall of mere feeling, since both have the purpose of clarifying, purifying, and elevating feeling. A religion which does not fulfil this function is of little value to man. An object of art which does not call forth in us a pure pleasure has no claim on the name artistic.

II.

It will be necessary now to show that feelings need to be clarified in order to become religious and æsthetic. If we consider every feeling as religious, we return to the conception which mankind had concerning this matter in its childhood, the age when all feelings without any exception were referred to a deity.

We should relinquish, consequently, the result of a long struggle—the attainment of our freedom, the most precious fruit of the many and hard battles of man with himself and his environment. Moreover, if feelings *per se* are considered to be religious, we could not very well deny religion of some kind to animals, since they undoubtedly have feelings. If we are, then, to hold fast that which we have gained, and if we do not want to make an absurd assumption, we must distinguish natural feelings from the religious and æsthetic. In other words, the former must be transformed into the latter.

How is this done? The natural feelings must become emotions by being referred to an idea through the instrumentality of the intellect. This is accomplished in religion by the reference of the feeling to the idea of God. Through this reference the *ego* recognizes itself as determined by God even in its innermost nature, its feelings.

Two illustrations will make this clear. The craving for food is a purely natural feeling.

When a healthy man sits down to a well-prepared meal, he is animated by the desire to satisfy his hunger. The feeling is natural and healthy, but not religious. How is it changed from the former into the latter? By saying "grace." This means that the food is considered a gift from God, not merely for the satisfaction of physical

appetite, but for the strengthening of the body to enable us to do more work. It is this reference of the natural feeling beyond its immediate purpose—to satisfy an appetite—which redeems it from its natural character, and gives it a religious bearing.

The feeling of revenge is also natural. To strike back when you have been struck is as natural as to crave for food when you are hungry. And still, if this emotion were given free rein, society would be impossible. Revenge must, therefore, be changed into a feeling of indignation over wrong done. It must be referred to the standard of justice in society and in God. This standard requires punishment, not for the sake of retribution, but for that of the improvement of the criminal. In this way revenge becomes, through its reference to the idea of justice, an ethical or a religious feeling. The feeling of revenge is objectified and transformed.

Art has a similar purpose in regard to the feelings. The pleasure we have in looking at a beautiful object is immediate and natural, but it is not æsthetic enjoyment. The natural pleasure is turned into the latter by becoming imagination, since the latter means not only an immediate sensuous pleasure, but an interplay of the emotions with intellect and will. Uncontrolled imagination or fancy is, of course, mental activity without let or hindrance, but in artistic imagination this mental activity is guided by a principle. The creative artist desires to embody an idea in his statue and picture, and the connoisseur wants to find that idea. The emotions of both the artist and the connoisseur are thus guided by a principle; they are objectified and transformed, and become æsthetic enjoyment. An illustration will make this clearer. Suppose we look at the picture of a beautiful woman. The effect is immediate—a sensuous pleasure arising from the mellow colors and the attractiveness of features. This pleasure is almost instinctive. But if we stop there, the probability is that the beauty of the woman will arouse sensual desire. That is not æsthetic enjoyment, but purely sensual pleasure. If, however, feeling is referred to the idea which the artist wished to embody—*e. g.*, chastity, motherliness, aspiration, etc.—our feeling is transformed into artistic enjoyment, because it gives food to the imagination. The elementary feeling of sensuous pleasure has become purified and elevated into a noble and wholesome sentiment,

and we have thus been liberated from the thrall of the merely sensuous enjoyment. All art must have the faculty to arouse both this immediate pleasure and the mediate æsthetic sentiment. False art stops with the former. The necessity for this transformation lies in the fact that, like all elementary feelings, so the immediate pleasure arising from the observation of a beautiful object gets control over us, and we are not free. If we would enjoy æsthetically, the pleasure must be transformed into the purer and more elevated atmosphere of the ideal. For thus alone are we freed from the thrall of the immediately given, and are able to enjoy æsthetically; *i. e.*, as free human beings.

The purposes of art and religion are, then, the same, since both aim at liberating us from the sway of feeling.

They follow, moreover, the same method. This has already been indicated, since the elevation and purification of feelings can be accomplished only by their transformation and objectification. We have seen that man is not free when under the spell of a feeling. Is, then, the object of art and religion to kill or to suppress feeling? No; since man is dead without feeling. A man who is no longer capable of a deep and strong emotion is dead. He is *blasé*, he is cynical, he is an intellectual machine. Nothing can give him a keen and positive enjoyment; he is capable only of the negative satisfaction of spoiling other people's enjoyment. The purpose of art and religion cannot, consequently, be to kill or to suppress the emotions, but to transform and to control them. How? By directing them outward under the mediation of the intellect. Art does this by directing feeling to the sublime and beautiful in nature or in art proper; religion, by focusing feeling on the holy and perfect divine personality. This transformation of elementary feeling through art and religion must be treated separately, since it deals largely with the intellect; *i. e.*, with representation.

III.

By "representation" we mean a mental picture, an image, a percept, or a concept. Whenever we try to get some more or less definite idea we have a representation in one of these four forms. How do we come by a representation in religion?

Religion is, to say it once more, feeling in its essence. But if it were only feeling, we should have to admit that animals had religion. The latter alternative seems absurd, and feeling must, consequently, be combined with a rational element in order to become religious. In feeling the individual becomes aware only of the obscure and mysterious background of life. It is indeterminate, aimless, and directed only to the satisfaction of immediate needs. We know, of course, by what process man attains to representations in regard to objects which appeal to our senses. But religious ideas have no such visible objects, and only a mind which is sufficiently developed can form a representation of a divinity. This very fact excludes animals from having religion, since they are not able to reason. Feelings must, then, be transformed into something else, through the medium of the intellect. They have to become representation; they must receive a definite object. Since there is, however, no definite object in religion which can serve as a basis for representation—as, for instance, in that of a tree, animal, etc.—the task of forming a religious representation falls upon imagination—*i. e.*, the creative, constructive element in our mind. Since man can, moreover, construct only in his own image, the representation of the deity must necessarily bear the features of himself. He images the deity as a being similar to himself. He gives it personality. He cannot image the divine being as inferior to himself, since he regards himself as the highest form of living beings. If he deviates from the course of picturing the deity similar to himself, the deviation will be along the line of magnifying that divine power. He will give it the attributes of omnipotence, immortality, and, with the Greeks, eternal youth.

The objection must be met here that people on the level of savages have pictured the deity in the form of animals, of fetiches, and of other things below themselves in mental power. Man had and still has little constructive power on that level of culture. He simply felt that there was a power in some way superior to himself. He found that nature with its tremendous power—manifested in thunderstorms and hurricanes, in strong beasts and wild animals—was such a being. Since he could not image this power without a definite object, he attributed it to beings which he perceived to move like animals, or to call forth vegetation like the sun, to destroy like the

earthquake, etc. The animals, the stars, the fetich, were to him simply images of this destructive or benevolent, but always superior, power of nature. And nature appeared to him blind, uncanny, violent, arbitrary, just as he himself was. Polytheism is, consequently, the stage in man's development in which he pictures the deity in his own image.

When we turn to the Greeks, we find that the same truth holds. They pictured their deities after their own image. The gods are simply on a higher plane, endowed with all the good and bad qualities of the better Greeks. This fact is too well known to need any further explanation.

A purely spiritual conception of God was introduced by Christianity—a view anticipated in part in the Hebrew conception of Jehovah. And here a parting of the ways takes place. A purely intellectual conception of God is and must be impersonal, superpersonal, or whatever we may choose to call it. Such a view is the work of reason proper; its conception of God is that of an *absolute*, of a *principle*, of a *force*, or whatever names may be given to it. This is the conception of God in science. And reason true and simple cannot have any other view concerning God, because it cannot image a personal God who is omnipresent, yet personal; immanent in the universe, and still not absorbed by nature; unconscious in inorganic beings, yet self-conscious in man; concerned with the affairs of all the worlds, and still hearing and answering the prayer of a little child. A God of this kind cannot be conceived in any way, except in a more or less anthropomorphic form; and so the purely intellectual conception of science will, as a rule, have none of it. The terms "absolute," "principle," "force," etc., serve it better.

With such a conception of the divine, religion is impossible, only a religious tendency or attitude; because religious feelings cannot be focused and become definite without a clear representation. Science declines, however, to define the ultimate ground of existence in this manner, and leaves the feelings vague and fluctuating.

If man were a purely intellectual being, religion would never have outgrown the stage of pantheism. But he is also a willing and an emotional being. The objection will immediately be raised that neither the volitions nor the emotions have anything to do in a theoretical discussion, and, if admitted at all, are only of secondary

importance. I should like to reply that religion is not a purely theoretical affair, but a tremendously practical one; and that in practical matters the emotions are of fully as great importance as the intellect. It is outside of the province of this paper to enter into a lengthy discussion with the intellectualists, and so I simply give two quotations, one from a literary man, and one from a psychologist, who, by the way, is a voluntarist. John Burroughs says:

We are bound to give the reason and the understanding full sway in their own proper fields. In subduing and in utilizing this world, or adjusting ourselves to it, we have no guide but science. Yet science is not the main part of life, notwithstanding all the noise it is making in the world. Science is making a great noise in the world because it is doing a great work. Literature, art, religion, speculation, have had their day; that is, the highest achievements of which they are capable are undoubtedly of the past. But science is young; it is now probably only in the heat of its forenoon work. It is a little curious that man's knowing faculties, the first to be appealed unto, should be the latest in maturing; that he should worship so profoundly, admire so justly, act so wisely and heroically, while he yet knew so little accurately of the world in which he was placed. Does not this fact point to the conclusion that science is not the main part of life?⁴

Professor Harald Höffding says:

In feeling we have the innermost state of the conscious individual as determined by the influences received from without and by the activity exercised by the individual himself.⁵ . . . Everything which is really to have power over us must manifest itself as emotion or passion.⁶

But if feeling is to rise above instinct in religion; if, in other words, it is to be a motive power in a beneficent manner, it must become clear, definite, and determined; and for this purpose a clear and definite representation is required.

Such a representation demands a personal divine being. The interests of the intellect are purely theoretical, and these may be satisfied by a *principle*, *absolute*, or any similar conception of the ultimate ground of existence. The interest of the emotions is always practical—especially in religion—and that can be satisfied only with a representation of God as a person. The practical demand may be satisfied with a deified man or animal. The theoretical demand, however, is opposed to a representation of this kind. The result is

⁴*The Light of Day*, pp. 97, 98.

⁵*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 272.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 284.

a compromise. The mind represents God as a person. Personality is spirit in the form of character; its attributes are self-consciousness, self-activity, and freedom.

This representation of God as a person contains, just because it is a compromise, the germs of a conflict. If the mind lays stress on the theoretical interest, then the more scientific—*i. e.*, intellectual—conception of pantheism will exercise the greatest attraction, and present the most probable solution. If the mind lays stress on the practical interests of life, the more artistic—*i. e.*, emotional—conception of theism will present the fewest difficulties. The same individual may be, consequently, a pantheist as a thinking, and a theist as an emotional, being. And frequently we find a popular conception of God—as an anthropomorphic being—run parallel with the official theology which presents God as a purely spiritual conception.

The conflict between the demands of the intellect and that of the emotions leads, then, to the compromise of a spiritual personality. Such a personality cannot be imaged; an image of God as a person is, however, necessary if the emotions are to be satisfied. The question arises: How are we to get a worthy and dignified image of God and still leave his pure spirituality intact? The ancient religions perished because they were unable to meet these two demands. With the increasingly purer conception of God, images of stone or wood—or even of marble and of paint, as among the Greeks—were no longer considered adequate representations of the deity. The problem was not only of theoretical, but also of practical interest. Philosophy attempted to solve the former by conceiving God as pure *Idea*, especially in the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. But this conception was beyond the comprehension of the multitude, who knew just enough philosophy to discard all the popular representations of the gods as unworthy, but were not able to grasp the truth in the new conception of Plato. And thus Greek religion degenerated; it had no power or influence upon the lives of men. But the demand for a worthy representation of God was unquenchable. And the yearning, groping, and hoping for a religion of this kind explains the readiness with which many people accepted Christianity. For here the problem had been solved. God was conceived as a pure spirit,

but personal. As such he was, of course, not capable of being represented. The result was another compromise. God became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This conception left the pure spirituality of the Godhead intact, and it supplied at the same time a means to represent the divine being worthily in the God-man.

We have now briefly sketched the way in which the mind represents the divine being through the agency of the imagination and satisfies a demand of the emotions. The process has been that of a gradually increasing purification of the conception of God. As men had clearer conceptions of morality, they wanted a worthy representation of God as a moral being. Their love was, however, always an image of the loved one: crude and ignoble in the lower stages, prompted only by fear and reward; refined and unselfish in Christianity, prompted by a yearning after perfection and a longing for a father's love. But all through the process the more or less crude religious emotions were purified and clarified by the medium of the representation.

IV.

In a similar manner are the sensuous feelings transformed into æsthetic emotions through the medium of the intellect, *i. e.*, through imagination or emotional construction. A color of a certain shade and intensity makes a pleasant impression upon us; it is a purely sensuous pleasure. How does it become artistic enjoyment? When this color is seen in relation to other colors in the same object; when I perceive this relation to be one of difference, but when the differences are just sufficiently great to produce variety in a harmonious whole. Artistic enjoyment is, therefore, an emotional construction out of purely sensuous pleasure and the intellectual elements of unity and relation. The beautiful, whether in nature or in art, must represent an idea which gives unity to the parts; the idea must appeal to our emotions through the senses, and the two combined must give rise to a new construction in our imagination. The idea alone will not give rise to artistic enjoyment, since some ideas are derived from ugly objects; the sensuous pleasure alone will not produce it, since that is almost entirely physical; the two must combine in a new construction. The sensuous pleasure must give emotional warmth to it, and the idea must give it unity, harmony, and suggestiveness.

But these two elements must be present simultaneously if we are to have æsthetic pleasure; else the enjoyment is labored, like that of a joke which has to be explained. The idea and the sensuous pleasure must be the result of a single representation. The perfect combination of these two elements in a new construction is as difficult as that of a purely spiritual personality in religion. The result is a conflict in art as old as that in religion. Is the sensuous pleasure in art the principal thing, or is it the intellectual element? Are objects of art beautiful merely because they are true portraits of pumpkins, snakes, sea-urchins, etc., even though these things are ugly? Or are only those pictures, statues, etc., artistic, which represent a beautiful object plus an idea? It is not our purpose to enter into this contest, since volumes might be written about it. We only wished to indicate that the struggle between the intellectual and the emotional element is as old and severe in art as it is in religion.

V.

If both art and religion clarify and purify feeling by objectification, we should expect the highest possible effect where the two work in conjunction. This is, indeed, the case. The *Symposium* of Plato owes its perennial charm to the fact that the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are presented as the one permanent being over against the changeable and perishable, the bad, false, and ugly. Plato conceives the divine both as good and beautiful; he has both a religious and an artistic temperament. The superiority of the art of Angelo, Rafael, and Leonardo da Vinci is due to the presence both of religious and æsthetic elements in the temperaments of these men, which sought expression in one presentation. Sometimes the ability to objectify these religious-æsthetic emotions is inadequate, and we get then the rapture and the exultations of the mystic, which are often exceedingly effective just because they are suggestive rather than explicit. The great service which music has rendered to the cause of Christian religion is too well known to need more than mention. When a service is conducted without the assistance of the arts, as for instance in the strictly Puritan churches, the tendency is toward intellectualism—*i. e.*, toward dogmatism—and therefore toward rationalism; and the emotions, instead of being kept supple and

pliant, become hard and rigid. In other words, the elimination of the æsthetic element has the tendency to drive out the emotions from religion altogether. Where, on the other hand, the artistic element—*e. g.*, music—plays too prominent a part, religion tends to become purely emotional, volatile, and ineffective in building up a strong character. The best results are obtained when æsthetic elements are combined with those of religion, and both are purified and objectified through the medium of the intellect. The emotions are then kept supple and pliant; they prevent the mind from becoming too intellectual; and the intellect not only furnishes new material for the emotions, but clarifies and purifies them. In this way the mind is always kept on the alert; the imagination has sufficient material for new constructions; and the result is a well-balanced and happy mind.

VI.

Art and religion have, then, a similar effect on the feelings, and they often co-operate in this respect. What place belongs to each in education? Can art take the place of religion in the development of the emotions? From what has been said so far, it would seem as if this might be the case. But art and religion differ, nevertheless, so much in their effect upon feelings that they can never serve as substitutes for each other.

Art is, in the first place, for a few select spirits, while religion is democratic and for all people. The way mankind is at present constituted will make it impossible for the majority of men to be educated in the arts to such an extent that æsthetic enjoyment can replace the religious.

We may find fault with this fact, but the fact itself cannot be doubted. The number of *Schöngeister*—as the Germans appropriately call the people who worship art—is comparatively small, and will remain so for some centuries to come, simply because æsthetic enjoyment presupposes a special training which few people are able to obtain, and because a large number of men and women are not endowed with the faculty to enjoy art.

Suppose, however, that these two conditions were met—*i. e.*, that every human being had the ability and the opportunity to be educated in the arts—would religion then become superfluous? I believe

not. Art is impersonal, while religion is intensely personal. And certain moods of man can be assuaged and satisfied only by personal relations. The man who is depressed wants someone to cheer and comfort him; a friend may do this, but more frequently—as in the case of bereavement through death—he will require the comfort of religion, because God is both more willing to comfort and more powerful to help. And, again, the strength of the hold which religion has upon the affections of men may be seen from the fact that religion deals with questions of much greater and more permanent importance than the arts. Whether idealism or realism is to be the ruling principle in art may disturb the peace of a small number of people for a considerable length of time; but whether man is mortal or immortal is a question of the greatest importance for all men all the time.

Moreover, the enjoyment of art is generally a holiday affair. It is for the few hours when we are in a pleasant and peaceful mood. The whole attitude of our minds must be free from care and worry when we come before a picture, in order to enjoy it æsthetically. How small is, for instance, the number of people who have been edified by Millet's "Angelus" in comparison with those who have been uplifted by what that picture presents, *prayer!* How far must most of us go in order to hear good music, see fine pictures, or even to get proper books! How near and always ready is, on the other hand, the comforting and uplifting influence of prayer!

These differences indicate clearly that art cannot compare with religion in its influences upon the emotions. The difference is so great that art has generally been used as an auxiliary to religion; and in this position it is much more effective than when it stands alone.

I do not mean to disparage the wholesomeness of æsthetic enjoyment. I simply mean that, measured in terms of influence upon the life of man, art can never compete with religion. Æsthetic emotions are pleasurable enjoyment. They presuppose a mind that is already contented and cheerful. The æsthetic emotions are more contemplative, more self-satisfying, than those of religion; the contemplation of the beautiful produces pure pleasure which is ennobling and uplifting, but does not prompt man to action. Just as we have to be in a happy frame of mind when we approach the beautiful, so we

enjoy it in a purely personal way, the thought of God or of our neighbor hardly ever enters our mind. How different with the religious emotions of reverence, love, sympathy! They prompt to action by their very nature; they are social in their very essence, and need expression through action directed toward other human beings.

I think even these few remarks will suffice to show that art can never serve as a substitute for religion in the education of the emotions.

Has religion an equal chance with ethics in the education of the will, and with science in that of the intellect?

Secular ethics appeals to the will through the intellect. This is the Greek conception—*i. e.*, that man fails to do the right thing because of his ignorance of it. Secular ethics can never get away from this conception. It must, of course, be admitted that many sins are committed in sheer ignorance. But most evil deeds are done in weakness and in more or less open defiance of the rules of right. And here secular ethics shows its powerlessness in the influence over the will. "A religionless morality" has, whenever it has been tried, been found wanting. Why? Because the ethical precepts cannot be "driven home" so that the individual will feel impelled to act. The objection may be raised, of course, that in an ideal condition of society this ought to be and would be the case; that insight into right would produce corresponding action. True, but we are not as yet living in an ideal community. We must take men as they are, not as we should like them to be. And as men are constituted at present they undoubtedly need all the props in their morality which we can possibly give them.

Secular ethics has no props. It appeals either to enlightened self-interest or to the categorical imperative. In the former case the connection between what is perceived to be right and the corresponding action is made through a careful balancing of advantages and disadvantages resulting from conduct as a whole. In how many cases short-sighted policy decides for the more direct course of immediate advantage through immoral action is too well known to need further discussion. In the case of the categorical imperative of Kant we have a lofty flight into realms of abstract reasoning, but the application in the practical principles sounds rather like a sublimated utilitarianism; *e. g.*, "act on a maxim which thou canst will to be a

universal law." This is simply the philosophical form of the Golden Rule, which is not the highest expression of Christian ethics. If, on the other hand, the categorical imperative is taken in its rigorous form, and we are to consider only those actions as moral which we do against our inclinations, we get into a condition where life would be such a constant strain that everybody would wear himself out in a short time; and that for no purpose, since there is not necessarily a conflict between morality and happiness. It is true, of course, that many actions must be done against inclinations, but that ought to be so only at the time of the formation of good habits. The latter once formed, there should be at least a mild pleasure in doing a good act. If the action must always be done by means of a severe struggle, the inference is clear that the actor is still immoral in his feelings, and that the law he obeys is still largely external.

Christianity supplies a higher motive than utilitarianism, and obviates at the same time the rigor of the categorical imperative. It uses both of these motives. The command, "Thou shalt not," is as categorical as need be. The promises for obedience and the Golden Rule are utilitarian. But they are looked at only as the beginning of morality, and they are employed only as substitutes and schoolmasters for the Christian motive. What is that motive? It is love. Love takes possession of man in such a manner that there is little room for reflection, and the question of utilitarianism does not even have a chance to arise. Love likewise does of its own accord what the categorical imperative demands, and makes the latter superfluous. It has its roots in feeling, and has its own motive force in itself. For when the feelings are enlisted in a cause, action follows spontaneously. Moreover, it prompts to action even in those numerous cases where action may not be pleasant. Where the categorical imperative simply asserts its immutable law and requires obedience, no matter what the cost, love by looking at the loved one immediately suppresses individual preferences for the happiness of the other party. And since its own happiness consists in seeing the loved one happy, love requires no long and circuitous reasoning to the effect that only when we do act fairly by others will they act similarly toward us. Utilitarian motives are entirely foreign to true love. Lastly, love makes man happy. But only when we are happy can

we effectively assist others. The cheerfulness in giving—whether it be material things, advice, encouragement, etc.—is as valuable as the gift itself. The pessimist cannot be effective in assisting others, just because he lacks the cheerfulness and hopefulness which make the gift valuable to anyone who is not reckoned among the degenerates.

Love between husband and wife, parents and children, friends and comrades, undoubtedly has the power to act as a motive in this threefold capacity; viz., to produce spontaneously good actions, to overcome individual preferences, and to put man into the proper frame of mind to be willing to act morally. But love of this kind acts only within comparatively small circles, and cannot serve a general ethical principle. If it is to serve as such, it must be universalized. How can that be accomplished?

Christianity shows the way. It makes love a universal principle by declaring God to be love. It declares God to be a father, and thus to have a personal interest in every man. The fatherhood of God implies the brotherhood of man. The family relation is made universal, and the love and spontaneity for ethical conduct in the family is to become the motive force for men in their relation to all other men. The medium by which the unknown hosts of humanity enter into the affections of the individual is the intellect, and this process means essentially a refinement and a broadening of the emotions. By representing these people vividly we get a more or less clear picture of them; and by picturing them as members of the same family—as children of God—we are able to transfer a share of our love for our relatives, friends, and neighbors to the distant people scattered over the globe. We love them as far as people who have no direct or personal relations with us can be loved. The emotions are thus broadened. These people are, moreover, represented as having similar relations to God, and thus the brotherhood of man becomes a real force in our conduct to strangers. That this is not idle talk is witnessed amply by the motives of Christian missionaries who are impelled to undergo hardships of all kinds by no other motive than love for their more unfortunate brothers and sisters in distant lands. The emotions are thus constantly directed from the immediate to the mediate, from the near to the far, from the present to the pictured, and undergo in this process an increasing refinement.

The ethical problem solves itself more easily on the basis of the Christian religion than on that of secular ethics, and the latter cannot become a substitute for the former.

But religion has a competitor also in the intellectual realm in science and philosophy. And this competition is much more successful than that of art and ethics in the realm of feelings and of the will, respectively. By far the greatest share of the development of the intellect falls to the lot of science and philosophy, taken in the broadest sense. This fact cannot be disputed. And still, religion contributes essential elements even to the development of the intellect; elements which are by no means secondary, superfluous, and replaceable. To begin with, some of the greatest problems of philosophy—*e. g.*, immortality, the divine being, free-will—belong as much to religion as they do to philosophy, and have, indeed, been given to the latter by the former. Other more specifically theological problems—*e. g.*, the incarnation, the nature of sin, and the sonship of man—are questions requiring the greatest intellectual acumen for their solution. On the other hand, some of the specific problems of science and of philosophy—*e. g.*, the constitution of the physical universe and the theory of knowledge, respectively—are of the deepest concern to religion. It is not necessary to enter into this matter further, since intellectual and religious problems overlap constantly, because religion is, and necessarily must be, a *philosophy* when it becomes conscious of itself, *i. e.*, wishes to give a reason for the hope which is in it.

If the reasoning of this essay has been correct, we may draw two conclusions: (1) Religion contributes important elements to the education of man in regard to his whole mental nature; *i. e.*, of the feelings, the will, and the intellect. (2) Religion contributes, moreover, essential elements to the development of the human mind, which are peculiar to itself, and which cannot be supplied by any other agency. It will, therefore, always retain a place in the educational scheme of mankind.

But a warning must be added. Religion must be of the right kind, if it is to fill and retain this place. It must be well balanced; it must maintain a happy medium between intellectualism and emotionalism. If it inclines too much toward the former, it will become

a philosophy and produce that most contemptible of all conceits, of which some confessions of faith are examples—the type of mind which has fathomed all the depth of knowledge human and divine, and is, therefore, able to sit upon its exalted throne in order to pass judgment upon all who disagree. If, on the other hand, too much stress is laid on the emotional element, religion produces that abnormal state of mind which craves enjoyment of a peculiar kind—a continuous wallowing in sentimentality—and which by feeding upon itself finally lands man in the slough of despair. If, moreover, religion overemphasizes mere moral conduct, it tends to become external, to lose its vitality and enthusiasm, and must die. In order to act as an educational force, religion must appeal to the whole man, and thus contribute its share in his development toward the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.

THE ORAL SOURCES OF THE PATRIARCHAL NARRATIVES.

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IN the investigation of the patriarchal narratives the first problem that presents itself is that of the literary composition of the book of Genesis. Through the labors of critics for more than a century this problem may now be regarded as practically solved. Genesis is found to be a compilation out of three independent but parallel documents, known commonly as the Jehovist, the Elohist, and the Priestly Code.

No sooner is this conclusion reached, however, than another, more formidable question at once confronts us: Whence did J, E, and P derive the material that they have included in their histories? In their narratives of the exodus they occasionally inform us that they have made use of earlier written records; but in the book of Genesis no such citations are found, and no mention is made of writing as known to the patriarchs. It is possible that in Gen., chaps. 1-11, J has made use of an older document, and that in Gen., chap. 14, fragments of an ancient chronicle have been preserved; but, apart from this, there is no evidence that any one of the three main documents in Genesis is based upon written sources. Accordingly, it is clear that the authors of these histories must have depended for their information mainly upon oral tradition. That this was the fact is shown by numerous characteristics of their narratives.

The same stories are told of two or even three of the patriarchs. This shows the plasticity of oral tradition rather than the rigidity of literary transmission. In the majority of cases the stories are introduced in such a way as to show that they are popular explanations of the origin of certain holy places, objects, names, or customs, that have been gathered by the historian from the lips of his countrymen in various parts of the land. By the ancient Hebrews, as by other Semitic peoples, wells, trees, mountain-tops, tombs, altars, and monoliths were viewed with reverence. In early times they were

supposed to be the dwelling-places of spirits; but later, with more advanced religious conceptions, other explanations of their sanctity were demanded. To meet this need a large number of the anecdotes of the patriarchs were narrated.

The wells of Beer-lahai-roi, Beer-sheba, Esek, Sitnah, and Rehoboth;¹ the "terebinth of the oracle" at Shechem, which in Judg. 9:37 is called the "terebinth of the diviners," and in Deut. 11:30 is said to have stood beside a *gilgal* or sacred stone circle; the terebinth of Mamre, the tamarisk of Beer-sheba, and the terebinth of Bethel;² the mountain-top of Moriah;³ the tombs of Machpelah, Ephrath, Shechem, and Bethel;⁴ the altars of Shechem, Bethel, Hebron, and Beer-sheba;⁵ the *maçceboth*, or solitary upright stones, of Bethel, Shechem, Mizpah, and Ephrath⁶—are the themes of many narratives of Genesis that are designed to throw light upon their origin by connecting them with incidents in the lives of one or more of the patriarchs.

In the genesis of these narratives popular etymologies have played a large part. The names Beer-sheba,⁷ Beer-lahai-roi,⁸ Moriah,⁹ Zoar,¹⁰ Esek,¹¹ Sitnah,¹² Rehoboth,¹³ Bethel,¹⁴ Eder,¹⁵ Gilead,¹⁶ Mizpah,¹⁷ Mahanaim,¹⁸ Peniel,¹⁹ and Succoth²⁰ are explained in from one to three different ways, and thus give rise to as many different stories of the origin of these sanctuaries. Names of persons also furnish a basis for anecdotes by etymological interpretations of their supposed meanings. Abraham,²¹ Isaac,²² Ishmael,²³ Moab and

¹Gen. 16:14; 21:15-19; 21:30, 31; 26:26-33; 26:19-22.

²Gen. 12:6; 35:4; 13:18; 14:13; 18:1; 21:33; 35:8.

³Gen., chap. 22.

⁴Gen. 23:19; 25:9; 35:19; 50:13; 35:20; 35:8; Josh. 24:32.

⁵Gen. 12:7; 12:8; 13:4; 35:7; 13:18; 26:25.

⁶Gen. 28:10-22; 35:14; 31:45 ff.; 33:20; (emended text) 35:20.

⁷Gen. 21:31; 26:33; 21:15-17.

⁸Gen. 16:14.

¹³Gen. 26:22.

¹⁸Gen. 32:2; 32:7, 10.

⁹Gen. 22:14.

¹⁴Gen. 28:17; 28:22; 35:15.

¹⁹Gen. 32:30.

¹⁰Gen. 19:22.

¹⁵Gen. 35:21.

²⁰Gen. 33:17.

²¹Gen. 17:5.

¹¹Gen. 26:20.

¹⁶Gen. 31:48.

²²Gen. 17:17; 18:12; 21:6.

¹²Gen. 26:21.

¹⁷Gen. 31:46, 49.

²³Gen. 16:11; 17:20; 21:17.

Ammon,²⁴ Jacob,²⁵ Israel,²⁶ Edom,²⁷ Reuben,²⁸ Levi,²⁹ Simeon,³⁰ Dan,³¹ Naphtali,³² Gad,³³ Asher,³⁴ Issachar,³⁵ Zebulon,³⁶ Joseph,³⁷ Benjamin,³⁸ Perez and Zerah³⁹ are accounted for by two, and frequently by three, different stories. Popular beliefs, customs, and proverbs also form hooks on which the patriarchal traditions are hung,⁴⁰ and fragments of ancient songs find their explanation in the accompanying prose narratives.⁴¹

On the basis of these facts we are warranted in concluding that the material which J, E, and P have incorporated into their histories is derived almost exclusively from oral tradition. This being the case, we cannot avoid asking the further question: Whence did this tradition come? Was it an inheritance from antiquity, or was it a late fabrication? This problem has been ignored almost entirely by criticism. Attention has been absorbed so completely by the documentary analysis of Genesis that there has been no time for a thorough study of the oral sources; and yet it is clear that, until we know whence the traditions come and how they were transmitted, we are not in a position to affirm anything in regard to their historical character. Accordingly I propose in this article to make the problem of the origin of the oral traditions of the patriarchs the subject of a special investigation, which may serve, on the one hand, to give completeness to the literary analysis of Genesis, and, on the other hand, may furnish a basis for further research into the historical character of the book.

In the light of history there are four possible sources for the oral traditions of the patriarchs: they may have originated in the desert and have been brought into Canaan at the time of the conquest; they may have been developed by Israel during the period of its residence in Canaan; they may have been learned from the Babylonians, Egyptians, or some other foreign nation; or they may have

²⁴Gen. 19:30-38.

²⁹Gen. 29:34.

³⁴Gen. 30:13.

²⁵Gen. 25:26; 27:36.

³⁰Gen. 29:33.

³⁵Gen. 30:16, 18.

²⁶Gen. 32:28.

³¹Gen. 30:6.

³⁶Gen. 30:20a, 20b.

²⁷Gen. 25:30.

³²Gen. 30:8.

³⁷Gen. 30:23, 24.

²⁸Gen. 29:32.

³³Gen. 30:11.

³⁸Gen. 35:18a, 18b.

³⁹Gen. 38:28-30.

⁴⁰Gen. 30:14 f.; 30:37-43; 32:32; 22:14.

⁴¹Gen. 4:23 f.; 9:25-27; 25:23; 27:27-29, 39-40; chap 49.

been learned from the aboriginal inhabitants of Canaan among whom the Hebrews settled. Each of these possibilities demands a careful consideration.

I. TRADITIONS BROUGHT IN FROM THE ARABIAN DESERT.

Israel possessed an authentic tradition of the times of Moses that has come down to us in the fourfold narrative of the Hexateuch. If it could remember this period, there is no reason why it might not have remembered some incidents of its earlier nomadic life. Israel was a branch of the Aramæan race that migrated out of the Arabian desert, and it must have preserved some recollection of its affiliations with other tribes and of its early wanderings, wars, and alliances. If such traditions are found in the Hexateuch, they will show no connection with the land of Canaan, because they originated before the entrance into Canaan, and they will be cast in the primitive Semitic form of genealogies and family histories.

The Semites, as a result of their long sojourn in the desert, had a singularly strong sense of tribal solidarity. Where the Greeks and the Romans spoke of Achaioi, Iones, and Romani, regarding tribes as aggregates of individuals, the Hebrews, Arabs, and Canaanites spoke of Israel, Moab, Ammon, Midian, etc., in the singular, regarding tribes as unities in which the identity of individuals was lost. In like manner districts were personified as women. Jerusalem is habitually known as "Daughter Zion," Judah as "Daughter Judah." The land of Israel is personified by Hosea as the wife of Yahweh, and by Ezekiel the kingdoms of Judah and Israel are represented as sisters. The principle of personification being established, it was natural to narrate the history of a tribe under the form of a family history. If a tribe settled in a new region and mingled with the older inhabitants, this was described as a marriage of its eponym-ancestor to a wife of the same name as the region. If two tribes united, this also was described as a marriage, the stronger tribe that gave its name to the alliance being viewed as the husband, and the weaker tribe as the wife. If one tribe conquered another of alien blood and absorbed it without admitting it to political equality, this was described as the taking of a concubine instead of a legitimate wife. If one region was occupied successively by several tribes, this

was regarded as the taking of the same wife by several husbands. If a tribe lost some of its members or part of its territory through conquest, this was described as a taking away of its father's wife. If it split up into several divisions, these were regarded as children of the original tribe and brothers of one another. If one of these tribes usurped authority over the others, this was viewed as marriage with its father's wife. If a tribe lost its identity, this was described as death of its father or barrenness of its mother.

The book of Genesis contains a number of traditions of this sort. They are not localized in the land of Canaan, and therefore are not open to the suspicion of having originated after the conquest, or of having been learned from the Canaanites; and they are cast in precisely the same genealogical form that we have seen to be characteristic of primitive Semitic tribal traditions. When in Gen., chap. 10, we read that the sons of Ham were Cush (Nubia) and Mizraim (Egypt), and Put (east Africa ?) and Canaan; or that the sons of Shem were Elam, and Assyria, and Lydia, and Mesopotamia; we are evidently dealing, not with individuals, but with races. Such genealogies are the same as if we should say that John Bull begat Uncle Sam, and Uncle Sam begat New England, and New England begat Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. That these tables are not meant to refer to individuals is shown by the fact that the same names occur in different genealogical relations. Thus in Gen. 10:7 Sheba and Havilah are made sons of Cush, while in 10:28 f. they are made sons of Joktan, a descendant of Shem. Such a relation is possible only on the supposition that these were tribes whose members were associated partly with the Cushites and partly with the Joktanites.

If now in the tenth chapter of Genesis the names have a collective signification, it is possible that the same is true in the following chapters that deal with the history of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and their children. All these names were used collectively by the later Hebrews (*cf.* Mic. 7:20; Am. 7:9; 5:15; etc.), and in some at least of the patriarchal narratives it is clear that they are used collectively. Hagar, the concubine of Abraham, is certainly a personified group of tribes. Her name means "village" or "encampment." In 16:1 she is called Miçrith, "an Egyptian," but here with Winckler⁴² we should doubt-

⁴² *Allorientalische Forschungen*, Vol. I, pp. 29 f.

less read Muḡrith, "a north Arabian." In 21:14 we read that she "wandered in the desert of Beersheba," an unlikely occupation for a solitary woman, but natural for a group of Bedawin. Her "son" Ishmael is a well-known group of nomads that dwelt to the south and southeast of Palestine. What is said of him agrees precisely with the characteristics of this people as we meet it in later history: "He shall be a wild ass among men; his hand shall be against every man; and every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell to the east of all his brethren" (16:12); "He dwelt in the wilderness and became an archer, and he dwelt in the wilderness of Paran" (21:21). Obviously we are dealing here with a race rather than with an individual. The "sons" of Ishmael (25:12-18) are twelve, like the twelve "sons" of Israel and the twelve "sons" of Nahor (49:28; 22:20-24). Among them we find Nebaioth, Kedar, Dumah, etc.—all names of Arabian tribes that are frequently mentioned in the Assyrian inscriptions and in Old Testament history of the period of the kings.

Keturah means "incense," and her children are the incense-producing tribes of western and southern Arabia (25:1-6). Of these Midian is the nation with which Israel had to fight in the days of Moses and of Gideon. Sheba (Sabæa) is the land whose queen came to visit Solomon. Dedan is a tribe whose caravans are often mentioned by the prophets. In the case of the "sons" of Dedan the historian does not even take the trouble to personify, but remarks: "The sons of Dedan were the Asshurites, and the Letushites, and the Leummities." One of these children of Abraham through Keturah is the same Sheba that in Gen. 10:7 is classified as a son of Ham, and in Gen. 10:28 as a son of Joktan. The discrepancy is explicable only by the supposition that Sheba was a large tribe whose members stood in different political affiliations and therefore could be regarded as descendants of different ancestors.

The wives of Esau, according to 26:34; 28:9, were Judith, the daughter of Beeri the Hittite; Basemath, the daughter of Elon the Hittite; and Mahalath, the daughter of Ishmael, the sister of Nebaioth; but according to 36:2 his wives were Adah, the daughter of Elon the Hittite; Oholibamah, the daughter of Zibeon the Hivite; and Basemath, Ishmael's daughter, sister of Nebaioth. This tangle is explicable only when we assume that the "wives" of Esau were aboriginal

tribes of Mount Seir with which the Edomites mingled when they conquered the land. Such tribes could be classified both with the Hittites and with the Ishmaelites, and they could have double names like Jacob-Israel and Esau-Edom. The children of Esau in Gen., chap. 36, are easily recognized as tribes and districts of the land of Edom. Amalek, a well-known clan of the southern desert, appears in 36:12 as a grandson of Esau, whereas, according to Gen. 14:7, this people was already in existence in the time of Abraham.

The "sons" of Jacob form a group of twelve—a common arrangement in Bedawin confederacies. That they are tribes rather than individuals is shown by the fact that tradition varies as to the way in which the number twelve is to be reckoned. In reality there were thirteen "sons," and the number twelve was obtained only by dropping Levi, the priestly tribe, out of account, or by counting Ephraim and Manasseh as one under the name of Joseph.

It appears, accordingly, that a number of the traditions of Genesis have no connection with the land of Canaan, and that they are cast in the genealogical form which is characteristic of primitive Semitic tradition; it is probable, therefore, that they originated in the Arabian desert prior to Israel's migration into the land of Canaan. Such narratives are found in Gen. 11:10—13:4; 15:1—18:15; chaps. 20; 21; 22:20—24; 24:1—25:20; chap. 26; 27:46—28:9; 29:1—30:24; chaps. 42—47; 50:15—26. They all treat of Israel's origin, racial affiliations, and tribal experiences in the period prior to the conquest of Canaan.

II. TRADITIONS DEVELOPED BY ISRAEL IN THE LAND OF CANAAN.

Even a hasty scrutiny of the Book of Genesis is sufficient to show that many of its traditions date from a time after the conquest. In 36:31—39 there is a list of eight kings "that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the land of Israel." The first of these is Bela, son of Beor, who is identical with Balaam, son of Beor, the contemporary of Moses. The third, Husham, is probably a textual variant of Cushan of Judg. 3:8 ff. The fourth, Hadad, "smote Midian in the field of Moab," and therefore was apparently a contemporary of Gideon. The list as a whole brings us down at least as late as the reign of Saul.

The life of Abraham is largely a counterpart of the history of the people of Israel. Abraham is a stranger in Canaan, who has no natural claim to the land, but derives his title solely from the gift of Yahweh. He waits many years before the promise of a numerous posterity begins to realize itself. He does not take possession of his heritage at once, but lives in faith of a future ownership.

Isaac bears the same representative relation to Israel as does Abraham. He is a child of his father's old age, just as Israel is the last-born of a group of peoples. He comes near to losing his life in childhood, just as Israel runs the risk of extinction soon after its occupation of Canaan. He takes an Aramæan wife, just as Israel forms a union with Aramæan tribes. He loves peace, just as Israel cherishes the ideal of "dwelling each beneath his own vine and fig-tree with none to disturb." After his mother's death and before his own marriage he dwells, not with his father at Hebron, but at Beer-lahai-roi; a clear evidence that, at least in this tradition, the name is tribally understood.

The similarity of the characters and experiences of Jacob and Esau to those of the nations of Israel and Edom are so marked that they have claimed the attention of commentators from the earliest times. Esau is the first-born of twins; *i. e.*, Edom became a nation shortly before Israel (*cf.* Gen. 36:31 ff.); but Jacob obtained the birth-right; *i. e.*, Israel gained possession of the land of Canaan. Esau is a clever hunter, a man of the open mountain country (25:27). Of him it is said (27:39 f.):

Away from the fertile earth shall be thy dwelling,
And away from the dew of heaven from above;
And by thy sword shalt thou live.

Jacob, on the other hand, like Israel in its golden age, is a polished man, dwelling in houses, and familiar with the ways of civilization (25:27). Of him it is said (27:28 f.):

God give thee of the dew of heaven,
And of the fatness of the earth,
And plenty of corn and wine:
Let peoples serve thee,
And nations bow down to thee:
Be lord over thy brethren,
And let thy mother's sons bow down to thee.

Here the condition of Israel in the period of the kings is described, and knowledge is shown of its victories over Moab, Ammon, and Edom. In like manner the words of 25:23:

The one people shall be stronger than the other people,
And the elder shall serve the younger:

not merely state that nations rather than individuals are meant, but allude to the fact that under David the Edomites were conquered and for two hundred years remained tributary to Judah (1 Chron. 18:12). Of Esau, however, it is said (27:40):

Thou shalt serve thy brother;
But it shall come to pass, when thou shalt break loose,
That thou shalt shake his yoke from off thy neck.

This corresponds with the fact that in the reign of Joram the Edomites succeeded in establishing their independence (2 Kings 8:22).

In like manner the "sons" of Jacob are clearly the tribes of Israel, and all that is said about them refers to their conquest of Canaan and subsequent experiences in that land. The order of birth of the sons is the order in which the tribes obtained a foothold in Canaan. Reuben is the first-born (29:32; 49:3) because this tribe first occupied the region east of the Jordan (Numb., chap. 32). Simeon, Levi, and Judah come next because they were the first to push over into the land west of the Jordan (Judg. 1:3 ff.). Dan, Naphtali, Gad, and Asher were regarded, not as children of the wives of Jacob, but as children of his concubines, because they were Canaanitish tribes that were adopted on unequal terms into the Hebrew confederacy. The name *'A-sa-ru*, Asher, is found in inscriptions of the Egyptian kings Seti I. and Ramessu II. as the name of a people of Canaan one hundred years before the exodus, and Gad in the Mesha inscription is regarded as an aboriginal tribe of the land east of the Jordan. The originally alien character of these concubine-clans is evidenced also by the fact that in the time of Deborah three of them took the side of the Canaanites against Israel. Naphtali, the only one that remained loyal, received special praise (Judg. 5:18), because this conduct was unexpected.

There is evidence that at a very early period the tribe of Reuben was not limited to the region east of the Jordan, where we find it in the time of the Judges; but that it conquered territory west of the Jordan at the expense of the Bilhah tribes, Dan and Naphtali (Josh. 15:6;

18:17). This incident is poetically described in Gen. 49:4; 35:22, as a taking of his father's concubine by Reuben.

At the time of the exodus the tribes of Simeon and Levi were large and powerful. According to Judg. 1:1-7, Simeon accompanied Judah in its first invasion of the land west of the Jordan, and Levi also was doubtless engaged in this enterprise. These tribes fought with the Canaanites at Bezek (the modern Ibziq) near Shechem, in the region later occupied by Ephraim and Manasseh (Judg. 1:22); and since they were successful, they must originally have settled in this neighborhood. Subsequently, however, we find Judah fighting for a new home in the south, Simeon reduced to a mere appendage of Judah, and Levi scattered without lands among the other tribes, its members being glad to take up any occupation that is offered to them (Judg., chaps. 17-19). In the Song of Deborah no one of these tribes is mentioned—an evidence of the political insignificance to which they had sunk. It is clear that in the interval between their first entrance into Canaan and the time of Deborah some catastrophe overtook them. What this was we are not informed in Joshua or in Judges, but in Gen., chap. 34, we find the missing link of the history. According to this narrative, Dinah, the sister of Levi and Simeon, was violated by Shechem; that is, a minor Hebrew clan was forcibly annexed by the Canaanitish city of Shechem.⁴³ Thereupon the Canaanites proposed to establish *commercium* and *connubium* with the other Hebrew tribes in the neighborhood. The Hebrews ostensibly assented to the terms; but when a favorable opportunity came, "Simeon and Levi, Dinah's brethren, took each his sword and came upon the city (Shechem) unawares, and slew all the males."⁴⁴ As a result of this deed Jacob complained: "Ye have troubled me, to make me to stink among the inhabitants of the land, among the Canaanites and the Perizzites: and I being few in number, they will gather themselves together against me and smite me; and I shall be destroyed, I and my house." This is what actually happened. The Canaanites arose in their wrath, nearly annihilated Simeon and Levi, and drove Judah

⁴³Compare the mingling of Canaanites and Hebrews at Shechem, Judg., chap. 9.

⁴⁴Observe that Simeon and Levi alone are represented as slaying all the males in the city—a fact which shows that we are dealing here with tribes and not with individuals.

out of the northern portion of the land. By the Rachel tribes this calamity was regarded as a righteous retribution upon the treachery of the Leah tribes, and this verdict finds expression in Gen. 49:6, 7.

In consequence of the catastrophe at Shechem, Judah was compelled to seek a new home in the south of Canaan (Judg. 1:9-20). Here it led a precarious existence, in constant danger of being exterminated by the Canaanites. So unimportant was it politically that, as remarked before, it is not mentioned in the Song of Deborah. To this dark period, when the tribe was seeking to strengthen itself by alliances with the Canaanites, but was continually losing clans which were absorbed by its more powerful neighbors, belongs the narrative of Gen., chap. 38. "And it came to pass at that time that Judah separated himself from his brethren, and turned in to a certain Adullamite whose name was Hirah;" that is to say, the tribe of Judah, being driven out of the north, lost its connection with the other tribes of Israel and affiliated with the Canaanitish tribe of Hira. "And Judah saw there the daughter of a certain Canaanite whose name was Shua, and he took her;" that is, the tribe of Judah fused with a Canaanitish tribe in the neighborhood of Adullam. Three sons were born of the union, Er, Onan, and Shelah; that is: three clans arose out of the mixture of Judah with the aboriginal population. Of one of these sons it is said particularly that his mother bare him, not at Adullam, but at Chezib (=Achzib?), which indicates that, strengthened by its union with the Canaanites, Judah began to press westward. "And Judah took a wife for Er, his first-born, and her name was Tamar. And Er, Judah's first-born, was wicked in the sight of Yahweh, and Yahweh slew him." Tamar is the name of a well-known town in the south of the later territory of Judah (Ezek. 47:19; 48:28); this incident, therefore, can mean no more than that in the attempt to occupy the district of Tamar a clan of the tribe of Judah perished. Onan, Judah's second-born, then took Tamar to wife, and he died also; that is, a second Judean attempt to occupy Tamar was no more successful than the first. Judah was unwilling to give his third son; that is, attempts to conquer this region were for a time abandoned. Finally, however, Tamar won Judah himself, and became by him the mother of Perez and Zerah; that is, the annexation that could not be accomplished by force came about at

last by a peaceable mingling of the Judeans with their neighbors, and the hybrid population that thus arose was grouped in the two well-known clans of later history, Perez and Zerah.

Through this union with the aborigines, and through accessions of Kenezites and Kenites from the south, the tribe of Judah at last grew so strong that it overshadowed the more northern tribes, and under David came to hold the hegemony in Israel. These events are reflected in the Blessing of Jacob (49:8-10):

Judah, thee shall thy brethren praise
 Thy father's sons shall bow down before thee
 The scepter shall not depart from Judah,
 Nor the ruler's staff from between his feet,
 Until he to whom it belongs shall come.

Here knowledge is shown, not merely of the ascendancy which the tribe of Judah obtained over the other tribes in the time of David, but also of the loss of that ascendancy through the schism of the kingdom and the rise of the tribe of Ephraim to power.

In like manner it might be shown that all that is said about the sons of Jacob in the so-called Blessing of Jacob and in other stories of the book of Genesis, excepting those concerning Joseph, refers to incidents of tribal history after the conquest. It appears, accordingly, that a considerable portion of the narratives of the patriarchs is derived from a tradition that arose among the Hebrews after their entrance into Canaan. Under this head the following narratives may be enumerated: Gen. 25:21-34; 27:1-45; 30:25-31:55; 32:3-15; chap. 34; 35:21-36:43; chaps. 38, 48, 49.

III. TRADITIONS DERIVED FROM BABYLONIA.

It has long been recognized that the Hebrew traditions embodied in the first eleven chapters of Genesis display so many parallels with the Babylonian stories of the creation, the tree of life, the flood, the tower of Babel, etc., that they must be derived from Babylonian originals. The only question that is still disputed is the time when these traditions migrated into Canaan. They cannot have been learned by the Hebrews at the time of the exile, or even at the time of the Assyrian supremacy, for they are found in documents that were written earlier than either of these periods. They cannot have been brought

into Canaan at the time of the conquest, for there is no evidence that at so early a date the Hebrews came under Babylonian influence; besides, all these traditions have a local color, which shows that they were remodeled in the land of Canaan before they came into the hands of the Hebrews. The same traditions also were current in the Canaanitish sanctuaries of Phœnicia, and narratives of a similar character have been found at Tell-el-Amarna.⁴⁵ Accordingly, the only possible theory is that the Canaanites learned the Babylonian primeval traditions at the time of the Babylonian supremacy in the third millennium B. C., and that they passed them along to Israel when Babylon had lost her prestige and was no longer able to impart them directly. If this be the case, it is not impossible that some Babylonian elements may be found interwoven with the patriarchal traditions, but in the light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that the attempt to trace them entirely to Babylonian prototypes⁴⁶ is an impossibility.

IV. TRADITIONS LEARNED FROM THE CANAANITES.

It is highly probable that the Hebrews learned some of their traditions from the Canaanites who occupied the land before them. Israel of the days of David and Solomon was not a lineal descendant of Israel of the days of Moses, but was the product of a mingling of Hebrew clans with the aboriginal inhabitants of the land. The Canaanites were not exterminated, but, as the historians in Joshua and Judges repeatedly inform us, the children of this or that tribe were not able to drive them out, but they dwelt in the midst of Israel to this day.⁴⁷ In process of time, through conquest, treaty, or intermarriage, Canaanites and Hebrews were fused into one people, and dwelt in the same cities, as was the case at Shechem, for instance, in the time of Abimelech (Judg., chap. 9).

With the absorption of the older population came of necessity the appropriation of its civilization. For more than a thousand years, as we know from recent archæological discoveries, Canaan stood under Babylonian rule. Its people adopted the Babylonian language

⁴⁵*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Vol. VI, pp. 74 ff., 92 ff.

⁴⁶WINCKLER, *Geschichte Israels*, Vol. II, "Die Legende."

⁴⁷Josh. 13:13; 17:12 f.; Judg. 1:19, 21, 27-36.

for correspondence and also for business, as we now know from Mr Macalister's recent discovery at Gezer, and were deeply imbued with Babylonian learning. For five hundred years before the exodus Canaan stood under the influence of Egyptian civilization. The Amarna letters show us a rich and prosperous land whose people enjoyed a civilization as high as that of Israel in the best days of the kingdom. Into this civilization the nomadic hordes of the Hebrews could not come without being profoundly influenced. They occupied the cities built by the Canaanites, and cultivated their fields. Knowledge of agriculture brought inevitably a knowledge of the religious rites that attended planting and harvesting. The traditions that were current at local shrines and altars could not fail to become known to the Israelites as well as to the Canaanites. When the two peoples were finally fused into one, the Canaanites must have furnished their share of the traditions that became the joint stock of the new nation, and their heroes must have been regarded as ancestors of the new Israel.

That this borrowing of Canaanitish traditions actually occurred is proved by the Babylonian primeval narratives of the book of Genesis, which have come to the Hebrews *via* the Canaanites. If the Hebrews could learn their primeval traditions from the Canaanites, why might they not also learn some of their patriarchal traditions?⁴⁸

In proof of a Canaanitish as well as an old Hebrew origin of the patriarchal traditions the fact may be adduced that two distinct conceptions are held of nearly all the main features of the lives of the forefathers:

1. There are two ideas as to the time when they lived. According to one, the patriarchs formed part of the great Aramæan migration. All the documents of Genesis agree that Laban, the Aramæan, was a kinsman of Jacob, *i. e.*, of Israel.⁴⁹ Gen. 31:47 emphasizes the Aramæan origin of Laban by putting into his mouth the Aramaic words *jegar-sahadutha*, "the heap of witness." In Deut. 26:5 the Israelite, when he brings his offering of first-fruits, is bidden to say, "A wandering Aramæan was my father." In the genealogical tables of P, Aram and Eber (the assumed ancestor of the Hebrews) are

⁴⁸GUTHÉ, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, pp. 154 f.

⁴⁹E, Gen. 31:20; J, 29:10; P, 25:20.

both descendants of Shem. In the genealogies of J, Aram is a descendant of Eber through Nahor. In both cases the affinity of Hebrews and Aramæans is assumed.

Through recent archæological discoveries the date of the Aramæan migration out of Arabia may be determined with great exactness. In one of the Tell-el-Amarna letters⁵⁰ a Syrian prince complains to the Pharaoh that he is menaced by a people called the Ahlami. In regard to this people Tiglath-pileser I., king of Assyria (*ca.* 1000 B. C.), narrates: "I took my chariots and my warriors, and marched into the desert into the midst of the Aramæan Ahlami."⁵¹ Ramman-nirari I., king of Assyria, in an account of the exploits of his father Pudilu (*ca.* 1350 B. C.) couples the Suti with the Ahlami in such a way as to indicate that they were a nomadic people of the same Aramæan race. These Suti play a large rôle in the Amarna letters. Ashuruballit, king of Assyria, wrote to the Pharaoh Amenhotep IV.: "If I had sent your messengers away, the Suti would have sent bands to way-lay them; therefore I have retained them."⁵² Numerous letters complain of the efforts of these Suti to obtain a foothold in Syria, and beg the Pharaoh for help against them.⁵³ Kadashmanharbe, who reigned over Babylon shortly after this time, found the Suti so troublesome that he was obliged to undertake an expedition against them to break their power and to open up anew the trade-routes with Syria that they had blocked. Of him it is recorded: "The conquest of the thievish Suti from east to west he accomplished, so that their power was annihilated. Fortresses he established in Amurru (Syria), and wells he dug. In order to strengthen their defense he settled people in peace within them."⁵⁴ Kadashmanharbe's efforts, however, were powerless to hinder the advance of these nomads. At some time in the twelfth century they entered Babylonia, sacked Sippar, and established themselves there until they were dislodged centuries later by Nabuabaliddin.⁵⁵

⁵⁰WINCKLER, No. 291.

⁵¹*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Vol. I, pp. 32 f.

⁵²WINCKLER, *Amarna Letters*, No. 15.

⁵³*Ibid.*, Nos. 15, 52, 77, 100, 206, 216, 283.

⁵⁴*Chronicle P*, Col. I, ll. 7-9; WINCKLER, *Allorientalische Forschungen*, Vol. II, p. 115; Vol. III, p. 298.

⁵⁵*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Vol. III, p. 174.

In the same manner in which the Suti are associated with the Aramæan Ahlami, another people, known as the Habiri, is associated with the Suti. A certain north Syrian prince named Namyawaza writes to Amenhotep IV.: "Verily I and my soldiers and my chariots, together with my brethren and my Habiri⁵⁶ and my Suti, are at the disposal of the army, whenever my lord, the king, commands."⁵⁷ If Ahlami and Suti were Aramæans, the Habiri who fought with them must also have been Aramæans. These Habiri are the theme of a large number of the Amarna letters. From all parts of Syria and Palestine the lament comes up that the cities of the Pharaoh are falling into their hands, and that if he does not send reinforcements soon, they will gain possession of the whole land. As a matter of fact, they did speedily destroy the last vestige of Egyptian authority, and effected permanent settlements.

The name Habiri is the etymological equivalent of 'Ibri, "Hebrew," since in the Amarna letters *ḥ* is constantly represented by the Babylonian *h*. Habiri therefore, is 'Abiri, which could easily be syncopated into 'Ibri. That the Habiri were Hebrews in the narrower sense—that is, Israelites—is, however, improbable. The exodus of Israel cannot have taken place as early as the migration of the Habiri, and its conquest of Canaan does not correspond with their operations in the Amarna letters. On the other hand, it is likely that the Habiri were Hebrews in the wider sense; that is, that they belonged to the group of tribes which Israel regarded as related to itself through descent from a common ancestor Eber.

In the attacks of the Ahlami, Suti, and Habiri upon Syria and Palestine, as they are recorded in the Amarna letters and in Babylonian and Assyrian inscriptions of the same period, we see clearly the beginning of the great Aramæan migration, which in the succeeding centuries overflowed Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Assyria, and gave its language to these regions. Before 1400 B. C. we find no trace of Aramæans in either the Babylonian or the Assyrian monuments. The same is true of the Egyptian inscriptions. The first possible sign of Aramæan influence upon Egypt is the name Darmeseq

⁵⁶On the correctness of this reading of the ideogram SA-GAS see SCHRADER (WINCKLER), *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, pp. 196 f.

⁵⁷*Amarna Letters*, No. 144.

for Dameseq, "Damascus," in a list of Ramessu III.⁵⁸ Müller conjectures, with considerable probability, that the mistake of "Aram" for "Amor" in a text of the time of Ramessu II. indicates the presence of Aramæans in Syria as early as 1300 B. C. Before this time, however, there is nothing in the Egyptian monuments to indicate that they had yet left their home in the Arabian desert. Accordingly, when Hebrew tradition regards the patriarchs as Aramæan immigrants, it implies that they did not live before the fifteenth century B. C.

With this tradition another conception in the book of Genesis is in irreconcilable conflict, according to which the patriarchs belonged to the twenty-third century B. C. In Gen., chap. 14, Abraham is represented as a contemporary of Amraphel (Hammurabi), the sixth king of the first dynasty of Babylon (2239-2196 B. C.). The same conception is found when we compute the date of the patriarchs from the figures that are given in the Old Testament. Adding 430 years for the recorded lengths of the reigns of the kings of Judah from the building of the temple to the exile, 480 years (1 Kings 6:1) from the exodus to the building of the temple, 400 years (Gen. 15:13) for the sojourn in Egypt, 130 years (Gen. 47:9) to the birth of Jacob, 60 years (Gen. 25:26) to the birth of Isaac, 25 years (Gen. 21:5; 12:4) to Abraham's migration, we obtain a total of 1,525 years. Adding this to 586, the date of the exile, we obtain 2111 B. C. as the date of Abraham's migration, which, although it is not quite so early as the date demanded by the synchronism with Hammurabi, is nevertheless much too early for the Aramæan migration.

The same difficulty emerges when we study the proper names in Genesis. Several of these occur as tribal or geographical designations in Egyptian inscriptions of a date long prior to the Aramæan migration. Lot is doubtless the same as Lotan, one of the "sons" of Seir the Horite, according to Gen. 36:20; but this is the same as Ruten or Luten, which occurs in Egyptian texts as early as the twelfth dynasty. Jacob and Joseph are found apparently in the list of conquered places recorded in the annals of Thothmes III. (ca. 1515 B. C.). Y-'q-b-'a-ra is unquestionably the phonetic equivalent of Ya'qob-el, "Jacob-god," since Semitic *l* is regularly represented by Egyptian *r*. Y-ša-p-'a-ra is probably Yoseph-el, "Joseph-god," although in this case the

⁵⁸MUELLER, *Asien und Europa*, pp. 234 f.

difference between *š* and *s* renders the identification a little less certain.⁵⁹ Müller has shown, however, that this is not a sufficient reason for rejecting the equation.⁶⁰ From these names it appears that 200 years before the exodus and 100 years before the Aramæan migration Jacob and Joseph, the assumed ancestors of the Hebrews, were well known in the land of Canaan. It is clear, accordingly, that while one group of traditions points to an Aramæan origin of the patriarchs about 1400 B. C., another group of traditions assigns them to a much higher antiquity. How is this discrepancy to be explained?

A number of critics have denied the Aramæan origin of the Hebrews on the ground that in historic times Israel, Moab, Edom, etc., spoke Canaanitic and not Aramaic. Hebrew is the language of the glosses to the Amarna letters, and Isa. 19:18 speaks of it as "the language of Canaan." That Israel spoke a Canaanitic dialect is, however, no conclusive evidence that it belonged to the Canaanitic race, for it may easily have adopted this language after it entered Palestine. The inscriptions discovered at Zenjirli in northern Syria prove that ancient Aramaic was closer akin to Hebrew than is its classical descendant. If, as Winckler thinks,⁶¹ the Hebrews were the first wave of the Canaanitish migration pushed forward by the advancing Aramæans, it is hard to see how national tradition should so completely have forgotten this fact as to have made Canaan and Israel descendants of different sons of Noah. Wellhausen's suggestion⁶² that Israel claimed kinship with the Aramæans because the latter was the most powerful race in western Asia is improbable, since the Hebrews suffered too much at the hands of the Aramæans to have any desire to claim relationship with them. If they had set out to connect themselves genealogically with the strongest race that they could find, they would doubtless have chosen the Assyrians. The testimony of the documents of the Hexateuch is unanimous that Israel belonged to the Aramæan race, and this tradition is confirmed by the stories which represent the patriarchs as fetching their wives from Aram. If nomadic Israel formed unions with Aramæan tribes, it must itself have

⁵⁹MEYER, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, Vol. VI, p. 8; MÜLLER, *Asien und Europa*, p. 162; GROFF, *Revue égyptologique*, Vol. IV, pp. 95, 146.

⁶⁰*Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, December 15, 1899, col. 396.

⁶¹*Völker Vorderasiens*, p. 14.

⁶²*Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*, p. 8.

been Aramæan. Moreover, the first appearance of the Hebraic peoples coincides with the first appearance of the Aramæans. Neither Israel nor any of the nations most closely related to it are mentioned in the monuments before the thirteenth century. Israel is first named in the triumphal inscription of Merenptah, discovered by Petrie in 1896 at Thebes; and Edom is first named in a document of the same king.⁶³ The supposed mention of Moab in an inscription on the base of a statue of Ramessu II. rests upon a misreading. Accordingly, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the tradition which assigns the ancestors of Israel to the Aramæan race.

We are thrown back, therefore, upon the difficulty previously stated. How is it that the patriarchs can be regarded as Aramæans, and at the same time be assigned to a period long before the Aramæan migration? The only solution of this difficulty is the recognition that these diverse conceptions represent independent lines of tradition. The belief that the patriarchs were Aramæans is derived from an old Hebrew tradition that was brought in from the desert, while the belief that they lived in the third millennium B. C. is derived from a Canaanitish tradition that was indigenous in the land of Canaan.

2. There are two conceptions of the region in which the patriarchs dwelt. One places them in the desert, the other places them in the land of Canaan. In Gen. 20:1 Abraham resides in Gerar between Kadesh and Shur, and here runs the risk of having his wife taken from him. In Gen., chap. 26, Isaac resides in the same region and runs the same risk. In Gen., chap. 12, where the same story is related for the third time, but the scene is laid in Mitsraim (Egypt), we are doubtless to regard Mitsraim as a corruption of Mutsrim (northwest Arabia)⁶⁴ and to identify it with Gerar of the other narratives. Isaac also is represented as dwelling at Beer-lahai-roi in the southern desert (Gen. 24:62; 25:11) and at Beersheba on the southern boundary of Canaan. Both Jacob and Joseph die outside of the Promised Land. The wives of the patriarchs, Sarah, Hagar, Keturah, Rebekah, Leah, and Rachel, are all aliens. Their children also dwell outside of Canaan. The sons of Hagar are the clans of the eastern and southern desert, and those of Keturah are the tribes of

⁶³*Papyrus Anastasi*, VI, 4, 14.

⁶⁴See WINCKLER, *Allorientalische Forschungen*, Vol. I, p. 30.

southern and western Arabia. Esau dwells in the desert to the south. All this implies that in one strand of tradition the fathers of these tribes are regarded as dwelling outside of Canaan.

On the other hand, another strand of tradition locates the patriarchs in Canaan. Abraham's headquarters are at Hebron, and here he is buried (25:9). Isaac is never said to live in Canaan, but he is brought to Hebron to die and to be buried there (35:27-29). Jacob's headquarters are at Bethel. In regard to his burial-place there is a diversity of opinion. According to J (50:10, 11), it is at Goren-ha-Atad, or Abel-Mizraim, east of the Jordan; according to E (33:19; *cf.* Josh. 24:32), apparently it is at Shechem; according to P (50:12 f.) it is at Hebron. In all these cases, however, the traditions agree that Jacob is buried in the land of Canaan. Joseph is associated with Shechem, and here also he is said to be buried (Josh. 24:32).

The difficulty between these two conceptions was felt even by the compilers of Genesis, and they have devised a number of curious theories to remove it. The foreign origin of the wives of the forefathers they explain by journeys to Mesopotamia. The foreign residence of their children they explain by a sending away out of Canaan in order to make more room for Isaac and Jacob! Thus in 21:10 Sarah says of Hagar and Ishmael: "Cast out this bondwoman and her son, for the son of the bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac." Of Abraham's other children we read (25:6): "Unto the sons of the concubines, which Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts; and he sent them away from Isaac his son, while he yet lived, eastward, into the east country." Of Esau it is said (36:6): "Esau took his wives and his sons and his daughters, and all the souls of his house, and his cattle, and all his beasts, and all his possessions which he had gathered in the land of Canaan; and he went into a land away from his brother Jacob." Jacob's burial in Canaan is explained by the story that his body was brought up by his sons, and Joseph's burial at Shechem is explained by the still more astonishing story that his mummy was preserved for four hundred years in Egypt and was transported to Canaan by the children of Israel at the time of the exodus (Gen. 50:26; Josh. 24:32). Such stories explain nothing, but serve only to bring out more clearly the difficulty of the problem. The only way to account for this diversity

of traditions is by the theory that they were derived from different sources. The conception which locates the forefathers and their families in the desert is of old Hebrew origin, while the one that places them in Canaan is of Canaanitish origin.

3. There are two conceptions of the region from which the patriarchs migrated. According to J, it was Haran in Mesopotamia; according to P, possibly following E, it was Ur of the Chaldees in Babylonia (11:31). These two conceptions correspond with the two that we have noted already of the age to which the patriarchs are assigned. Haran was a chief center of the Aramæans, while Babylonia was connected with an earlier migration in the third millennium B.C.

In a contract-tablet of the reign of Ammisadugga, the tenth king of the first dynasty of Babylon (*ca.* 2108 B. C.), a region in the vicinity of Sippar is called Amurru, "The Amorite;" and in another tablet of the same period Amurru is identified with Mar-tu, which is the ideogram, or the ancient name, for Syria-Palestine.⁶⁵ From this identification it follows, first, that by the time of Ammisadugga Martu of the ancient inscriptions had become equivalent to Amurru, "the Amorite land;" and, second, that there were Amorites in Babylonia, who, after the analogy of their western kindred, could be designated as Martu. Further evidence that the Amoritic migration extended not merely to Syria and Palestine, but also to Babylonia, is found in a new type of proper names that suddenly makes its appearance in Babylonia at the time of the first dynasty. Among the kings of this dynasty and in contract-tablets dated in their reigns many names occur compounded with 'Abi, 'Ammi, Shumu, and the third person imperfect of the verb formed with *ya*, in precisely the manner in which the Canaanitish-Hebrew names are formed.⁶⁶ This is conclusive evidence that in the second half of the third millennium B. C. Babylonia was invaded by a race speaking a language closely akin to Canaanitic or Hebrew. That some clans of this race, after settling in the neighborhood of Ur in southern Babylonia, should migrate westward and join their kindred in Palestine is not at all improbable.

⁶⁵MEISSNER, *Beiträge zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht*, Nos. 42 and 43.

⁶⁶See the literature in my *Early History of Syria and Palestine* (New York: Scribner, 1901), pp. xxxi, 25.

The clans that so migrated, however, cannot have been Aramæans, as were the lineal ancestors of Israel, but must have belonged to the Amorites. It appears, therefore, that, while the tradition which makes the patriarchs come from Haran is probably of Israelitish origin, that which makes them come from Ur must be regarded as of Canaanitish origin.

4. The two names that are given to most of the patriarchs are evidence that the traditions concerning them have come from two sources. Abram bears also the name of Abraham. The names sound similar, but they have no etymological connection. *Ram* in Abram is derived from the verb "to be high," and this name means either "a father is high," or "Ram is a father." *Raham* in Abraham is a root unknown to Hebrew (Canaanite) whose meaning is uncertain. Jacob is identified with Israel; Esau, with Edom; Joseph never appears as a Hebrew tribe, but is always represented by Ephraim and Manasseh; and in like manner Lot is represented by Moab and Ammon.

The compilers of Genesis have explained these facts by the hypothesis that at some time in their lives the names of the patriarchs were changed, but this is manifestly only a device to escape the difficulty. The only natural explanation is the theory that the two sets of names represent independent traditions, one derived from the Canaanites, the other from Israel; and that the assignment of two names to one person is a result of a fusing of Canaanitish with Hebrew tradition.

In support of this view the fact may be noted that the names of one set are of Canaanitish formation, while those of the other set are of Aramæan formation. Abram is identical with Abi-ramu, an Amoritic name which occurs in a tablet of Apil-Sin, the fourth king of the first dynasty of Babylon (ca. 2277 B. C.).⁶⁷ Ya'qob (Jacob) is an abbreviation of Ya'qub-ilu, "Jacob-god," an Amoritic name found in a contract-tablet of the time of the first dynasty of Babylon. This same name occurs in Egypt in the same period under the form Ya'qebher (in Egyptian *r=l*) as the name of a Semitic (Amoritic) conqueror who about 2200 B. C. seated himself upon the throne of the Pharaohs;⁶⁸ and, as we have seen already, Y-'q-b'a-ra, the name of a district, or of a tribe, in the land of Canaan in the time of Thothmes

⁶⁷MEISSNER, *op. cit.*, No. 111, p. 91.

⁶⁸PETRIE, *History of Egypt*, Vol. I, p. xix.

III. (ca. 1515 B. C.), is the exact equivalent of Ya'qob-el, "Jacob-god." Joseph is probably identical with Yašup-ilu, an Amoritic name in a contract-tablet of the first dynasty of Babylon, and with a Canaanitish name Y-ša-p-'a-ra in the list of Thothmes III. Lot (Lotan) is a Canaanitish name that appears under the form Ruten (=Luten) in early Egyptian inscriptions, and Esau is probably the same as Usöos, a hero of the Phœnicians, mentioned by Philo of Byblus.⁶⁹ On the basis of these facts we are warranted in concluding that the patriarchal names Abram, Jacob, Joseph, Esau, and Lot are derived from Canaanitish tradition, and were learned by Israel after the conquest.

On the other hand, Abraham, Isaac, Israel, Ephraim, and Manasseh, Edom, Moab, and Ammon, which are identified with the names just enumerated, are never found in monuments before the fifteenth century B. C.; and are evidently derived from an Aramæan tradition that was brought into Canaan by the Israelites.

The combination of these two sets of names was a result of the fusing of Canaanites and Hebrews into one people. When this union was effected, it was only natural that the effort should be made to identify ancestors. The Hebrew immigrants claimed descent from Israel, and the Canaanitish aborigines, from Jacob; consequently Israel had to be identified with Jacob. Jacob was regarded as the older name, which was superseded by Israel, because the Canaanites were conquered by the Hebrews. The influence of religion in bringing about the union was expressed by the traditions that the change of name took place at the sanctuaries of Bethel and Peniel.⁷⁰

The Hebrew clans of Ephraim and Manasseh settled in the region occupied by the Canaanitish tribe of Joseph, the "son" of Jacob. In this case it was impossible to say that Joseph's name was changed into two new names; consequently Ephraim and Manasseh had to be regarded as "sons" of Joseph. By this combination the difficulty arose that two of the "sons" of Israel became grandsons of Jacob, who was identified with Israel. This difficulty was met by the story of Gen., chap. 48, that Israel adopted the sons of Joseph and placed them on the same footing as his own sons.

⁶⁹CHEYNE, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, col. 1333.

⁷⁰GUTHIE, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, pp. 161 ff.

Abraham was the assumed ancestor of a large group of Aramæan peoples, including not merely the Hebrew clans, but also the Ishmaelites and a number of other Arabian tribes. Abram was a local hero of the district of Hebron. Only a few of the peoples comprehended under the name of Abraham ever invaded Palestine; consequently the identification of Abraham with Abram cannot be explained by a mingling of populations, but must be due merely to similarity of sound.

In like manner Esau is identified with Edom, because the old Canaanitish district of Esau was conquered by Edom, an Aramæan people akin to Israel. Moab and Ammon become the sons of Lotan (Ruten), or Lot, because they occupied the territory formerly known by this name. Isaac is the only one of the patriarchs who is not given a second name, but he is connected with Beer-lahai-roi, a sanctuary outside of Canaan, or with Beersheba, a sanctuary in the extreme south. He represents the unity of Israel and Edom in the southern desert prior to their division into two nations. This united people effected no permanent conquest in Canaan, and therefore its name could not be said to take the place of an earlier Canaanitish designation. There was no patriarch of similar name in Canaan with whom he could be identified, as Abraham was with Abram; consequently he had to remain a solitary figure of Hebrew tradition without any Canaanitish counterpart. Inasmuch, however, as he was regarded as the son of Abraham and the father of Israel, he had to become also the son of Abram and the father of Jacob; and thus the patriarchal genealogy was molded into a self-consistent unity.

On the basis of the facts now enumerated we are warranted in concluding that the narratives of the patriarchs are derived from four main sources: first, the tradition which Israel brought into the land of Canaan; second, the tradition developed after the conquest; third, the tradition derived from Babylonia; and fourth, the tradition learned from the Canaanites. The importance of this conclusion is obvious. It gives the clue with which we may unravel the tangled and frequently self-contradictory mass of stories in the book of Genesis. Viewed as a homogeneous tradition, the narratives of the patriarchs are inexplicable; but viewed as a combination of four independent traditions, their interpretation becomes

possible; all that is necessary is to determine to which of the four strands any given incident belongs.

A further advantage of this discrimination is that it restores two lost sources of history. If some of the narratives of the patriarchs are derived from the traditions of Canaan, then we may obtain from them much needed information in regard to the history of Palestine prior to the Hebrew occupation. If another portion is derived from the experience of the Hebrews after the conquest, then we find in this a welcome supplement to the scanty records of Joshua and Judges. All that is lost to primitive tribal history is gained for the vastly more important history of Canaan before and after its invasion by Israel.

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE DIVINITY SCHOOL.

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A BROAD view of popular religious conditions and tendencies since the Reformation should convince any thoughtful man that the Association for Religious and Moral Education has been founded at the right psychological moment. Believers in the Reformation principle of the right of private judgment will pray that in practical administration the association may rise to a comprehensive grasp of the situation, and fulfil its high vocation in something more than a mechanical, limited, or perfunctory way.

The Reformation was a protest against authority in the church as applied in the papal system. It was an emancipation of the individual mind and conscience, and represents in the ecclesiastical sphere the political emancipation achieved by successive evolution and revolution in the growth of modern democracy. But just as the development of civil liberty makes ever clearer its instability without enlightenment, so the history of Protestantism is making ever clearer the principle that religious education is the indispensable complement of religious liberty. We must know the truth, and the truth will make us free.

The principle of the right of private judgment has been commonly interpreted as a simple revolt against authority of all kinds in religion. It was so interpreted by Romanists from the start, who did not fail to show that the alternative of authority is anarchy, and to point to the ever-multiplying sects of the Protestant world as symptomatic of its ultimate fate in religious and moral anarchy. There was truth in both the logic (granting its premises) and the diagnosis. Without popular enlightenment a free church is as certain to drift into religious and moral anarchy as an illiterate South American republic into political. If the ultimate appeal is to be to "private judgment," that judgment must at least be enlightened. Sectarianism, the curse of Protestant churches, was in reality a result of imperfect develop-

ment of that true principle of authority which is alone compatible with liberty, and yet is the indispensable bulwark against anarchy and chaos. Today we recognize a fundamental distinction between *governmental* authority, whose appeal is to fear, and what we may term *expert* authority, whose appeal is to the reason. The former corresponds to the governmental system of "the Gentiles, whose great ones lord it over them;" the latter, to that of the kingdom wherein service is the measure of greatness. The Reformation was not a revolt against authority as such, but against an authority based on official position rather than on service, and so it was compatible with the ultimate supremacy of the individual mind and conscience. The question of authority and its real source still remains indeed an unsettled one in the Protestant body, but almost from the beginning enlightenment was instinctively recognized as its chief ally, its only guardian from excesses. And this implies authority.

As in every department of special knowledge the ordinary man bows to the opinion of the specialist, as the child yields to the maturer opinion of the adult, the non-scientific to the scientist, while reserving the ultimate decision to himself; so in religion. The ultimate appeal, indeed, is to the individual conscience and judgment; but so long as "there are diversities of gifts" equality in administration is as chimerical in church as in state. The layman must have respect for the judgment of the expert in theological science, or he disregards an essential part of the evidence. Manifestly, expert authority of this type must be relative, not absolute. It must be freely chosen by the subject himself, and hence is perfectly compatible with the right of private judgment; it is even indispensable to prevent its degenerating into anarchy. It is therefore fundamentally different from official, or, as we have termed it, governmental, authority, which enforces its dicta under penalty, it may be social, ecclesiastical, or civil; of this world, or of the world to come.

In the post-Reformation epoch there was instinctive reaction against the flood of religious vagaries called into being by the revolt against authority, but without clear definition of the principle. Of course, there was an element, and a large one, to whom simple return to the past, open or disguised, seemed the only remedy. Governmental authority was the immediate resort of the high-churchman by nature,

as it has always been since the days of Ignatius's controversy with Gnostic heresy. On the other side arose, over against the state church of the Anglicans and on the continent, the demand of the democratic Puritan in England and America for an "educated ministry." The history of civil liberty presents an absolutely analogous phenomenon. Conservative minds, disgusted with the crude vagaries of *demos*, even in the Great Republic, lose faith in democracy, and clamor for paternalism and privilege. Every new outbreak of popular folly provokes from this quarter new murmurs at the rash adoption of manhood suffrage and equality of civil rights. And those of a more patient faith have but one alternative. It is not possible to deny that "you can fool some of the people all the time, and all the people some of the time." The one remedy of the consistent democrat is the enlightenment of the voter; and though it seem the longer and harder way, it is really the more hopeful, as well as juster. No one has ever succeeded in suggesting any other cure for the ills of democracy than education, whether in church or state. And education is authority appealing to the reason, as truly as coercion is authority appealing to fear. Nor did the post-Reformation epoch find a true solution. To substitute for this divinely guided, progressively enlightened individual reason an infallible book is as contrary to the fundamental principles of the great Reformers as to revert to an infallible hierarchy. The true seat of authority in earliest Reformation times was not an inerrant Scripture, but Scripture *interpreted by the Spirit of truth in the individual heart*.

More or less vaguely Protestantism has always felt, accordingly, its dependence for stable progress on education. The age which succeeded the Reformation was an age of councils and creeds, confessions and catechisms; but with an aim which could not but be at first vaguely and empirically conceived. Its ideal, over against the high-church principle which was soon to culminate in the doctrine of a single infallible mouthpiece on all questions of faith and practice, was substantially: Every man his own theologian. The practical difficulty of individual incapacity was partly ignored, partly counteracted by a system of catechetics. In church, Sunday school, public school, or home, the child was expected somehow or other to assimilate at least the essential elements of the orthodox Body of Divinity potentially present in Holy Scripture.

In our day this system has confessedly broken down. Children are not taught the catechism; they hear little about the doctrines of the faith which were household words in a former generation; to a large and increasing extent they show an appalling ignorance of the Bible. Thus simultaneously there is a giving way of the system of religious education which in former times served at least to hide the impracticability of the ideal, and a growing sense of the hopelessness of the attempt. Roman Catholic protest has driven the Bible out of the public school, and compels us to adopt the logical corollary of separation of church and state by secularizing the entire system of public education. Even before this the great endowed colleges, founded in colonial days with the training of an educated ministry as their principal function, had been practically secularized by mere force of public opinion, leaving the divinity school as a separate institution. England puts off as yet the evil day of disestablishment, but is even now in the throes of a reconstruction of her educational system, the outcome of which must inevitably be the secularization of the public school. France is undergoing a similar crisis. Parents meantime are certainly not supplying in the home the training thus refused by the state; nor will anyone who knows the inefficiency of the average Sunday school, or pastor's confirmation class, pretend that we have in home or church any adequate educational system for the training of this side of human nature, the religious and moral faculties.

There is a still more serious aspect of the present situation. We begin to see that the post-Reformation ideal is inherently impracticable. The time can never come, short of the millennium, when every man can be his own theologian. The farther theology advances, the more abstruse the questions of literary and historical criticism, of philosophy, and of sociology become, the more inevitable becomes the dependence of the layman—yes, even of the average clergyman—upon the expert and specialist. To arrest this process of specialization is to condemn theology to a hopeless and contemptible inferiority to the other sciences. Specialization is indispensable, and this involves expert authority. Even governmental authority finds its true function, under rigid limitation of the law of service, in the work of organization. The layman finds himself thrown back into depend-

ence on authority, though, as we have said, the authority of the expert is a fundamentally different thing from that of which Protestantism threw off the yoke. But while the question of the seat of authority in religion is still in debate—while the opinion still prevails that every Protestant layman is *ipso facto* an expert in theology, at least competent to pronounce judgment on the orthodoxy of the minister and teacher—it can scarcely be expected that much respect will be shown for this expert authority, however well attested. The complementary principles of education and authority have thus still to find their proper adjustment, and this situation constitutes the fundamental problem in the Protestant religious world.

And just as the Protestant ideal, as formerly cherished, is now seen to be impracticable, so also its method is now recognized by all educators as essentially faulty. We no longer identify instruction and education. We are not in danger of mistaking the mind which has memorized the catechism—or, for the matter of that, a whole body of divinity—for a well-trained mind in this department of thought. It is true our divinity schools have recently been accused of filling the notebooks of students, of cramming them with the system of some superannuated preacher, instead of training their faculties. But the very accusation served principally to bring out the great change in this respect. In at least all the more progressive institutions such a notion of theological education is obsolete. To what extent the difference between instruction and training has dawned upon religious teachers of less advanced grade is doubtful; but certain it is that the old conception is doomed. Just because men can no longer be satisfied with the swallowing of ready-made systems, but demand *education*, we have witnessed the decline, almost to extinction, of drill in creed and catechism. Unfortunately it remains without a substitute. Practically, then, as well as theoretically, the progressive religious world is deplorably lacking in well-defined principles.

And actual conditions in the religious life and thought of the people are what might be expected in view of this uncertainty. Certainly the salient feature of the age in the whole domain of religious life continues to be the still progressing decline of authority.¹ The

¹ See the article by PROFESSOR GEORGE P. FISHER, D.D., on "The Decline of Liturgical Authority," in the *North American Review*, 1882.

church of Rome itself, though heir to all the governmental genius of the Latin empire, its organization perfected by centuries of astute development, feels its grasp relaxing.² The European state church is slowly succumbing to the American free-church principle. Germany, too, has its increasing body of dissenters. Ecclesiastical substitutes for the old-time civil penalties against unorthodox opinion are rapidly and deservedly falling into contempt. Protestant bodies have, indeed, on occasion reverted, openly or disguisedly, to Romish principles, launching anathemas against the application, if not the principle, of private judgment. Often they have proved it possible to inflict decided social injury upon the dissenter, though at such heavy cost as to make the heresy trial a dubious weapon at best; without deterrent effect on the freethinker, an object of very real dread to the prosecutor. True, most women and children, and some men, can still be convinced that the exercise of reason to the detriment of traditional church opinion exposes to divine displeasure. Something may still be got out of the terrors of the world to come. But governmental authority is rapidly waning. In our hearts we are all ashamed of such appeals. Whatever be said in extenuation, we feel that dogma enforced under penalty, present or future, civil or spiritual, is an intervention of force in the domain of reason. Even the ignorant layman suspects that resort to threat is due to lack of argument. The high-church principle is but a survival of the dark ages; in spite of sporadic reaction, it cannot claim the future.

But the decline of governmental authority is very far from having been compensated, even under Protestantism, by expert authority in the person of the cleric. In many subjects which the preacher feels called upon to handle it is the pew-holder who is the expert; the relatively amateurish quality of the clergyman's thought is often painfully apparent; sometimes, alas, within what should be his own domain. Even when his opinion deserves respect it often fails to command it, because in theology everybody considers himself an expert. That is the popular interpretation of the right of private judgment. And the decline of clerical authority, illegitimate and

² One of the most notable symptoms of this relaxation, most pronounced of course in America, is the Catholic parochial school system, an instance of *fas docendi ab hostibus*, but on the whole a fruitless effort.

legitimate alike, has not been without its natural effects. Only a superficial self-complacency can view with equanimity the advance, *pari passu* with this decline of authority, of religious anarchy and hysteria on the one side, and of blank materialism or indifference on the other. Surely to the dispassionate view of the historian of the future the most striking characteristics of American religious life in our age will not be so much the enlightened character of popular religious thought as the number, the activity, the amazing sweep and spread of religious vagaries, from Mormonism through Spiritualism to the cult of Dowie and of Mrs. Eddy. Democracy seems to be availing itself of its at last untrammelled religious liberty to give a trying-on to any and every religious nostrum. Popular wit remarks of Dowie and his dupes: "The old-time Elijah was fed by the ravens, the modern by the gulls." Not one of the great world-religions—Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism—can boast an outward success, after the same lapse of time, which equals that of any one of our great American crazes. Either Joseph Smith or Mrs. Eddy easily distances Mohammed, or the Founder of Christianity himself, in wealth, influence, and number of adherents. And the susceptibility of Americans to this type of hysteria promises to be soon equaled, if not outdone, in the older countries, where the decay of religious authority has thus far been slower. England is already a close second, and Germany follows hard after.

These are specific symptoms of a religious and moral anarchy due to the decay and running out of the Reformation principle of the right of (unenlightened) private judgment. And the evils in question are neither slight, nor are they really compensated by attendant and supposedly consequent boons.

Granted that the followers of Joseph Smith have produced an orderly and prosperous community where once was the Great American Desert, are we to be congratulated on Mormonism? Shall we credit the blossoming of the wilderness to the Book of Mormon, or to the plain commonplace virtues of industry and thrift? In good sooth it is not always needful to burn the barn that we may enjoy roast pig. Granted again that the adherents of Dowie or of Mrs. Eddy have brought themselves in a multitude of cases out of mental and physical wretchedness into a state of cheerfulness and content.

This is in itself most welcome. It probably has great retroactive effect in what physicians call psychological healings. But these things are not dependent on the pseudo-philosophy of Mrs. Eddy. A few glasses of whisky will also make a morose and wretched man cheerful and contented while the effects are felt. Does the comparison seem unjust? We are not comparing the effects of alcohol with Mormonism, nor with Spiritualism, nor with so-called "Christian Science," which are not in themselves vices, but with the element of popular *fanaticism* which they exploit in common. It is a widespread condition of intellectual and moral crudity which has made possible these and a hundred other religious fads and crazes. No one wishes to deprive even the drunkard of his cheerfulness and contentment. On the contrary, we long to see him endowed with them permanently, and by better means. No one would diminish, nor even belittle in word, the happiness of mind and the improvement of body Mrs. Eddy's devotees so often claim to have found, and doubtless have, on the whole, promoted in the world. But there is not the smallest element of this which could not have been attained, as the very misnomer "Christian Science" (a *lucus a non lucendo*) proclaims, by simple attention to science and the gospel. The vaunted blessings should have been had from everyday Christianity, and *without* the pseudo-philosophy and the parody of religion. It was equally possible to have the "Christianity" and the "science" *without* the degradation of reason implied in the discrediting of the witness of the senses, *without* the actual miseries too often inflicted on the helpless, *without* the general blinding of the highest in man which comes by persistent living in a vain show. And these evils are not easily outweighed by any cheerfulness imposed through mere self-stultification. Credulity and superstition are less painful ills than the toothache; but he who gets rid of the toothache, taking in its stead the "impression," or "claim," of a toothache, and a blinder for the eyes of his mind, sells himself cheap, and takes his pay in fiat money.

But the prevalence of fads and nostrums is not the only symptom of a lack of religious education in the true sense of the word. An obstinate bigotry, blindly clinging to a creed outworn, may give evidence of wearisome indoctrination in all the traditional formulæ, but it is the reverse of a witness of education. The true authority has

as much of a part to play in displacing the obsolete as in conserving the wisdom of the past; and it is undeniable that much of what passes for orthodoxy and enlightened religious opinion is only an unconscious travesty of obsolete dogma. Bigotry and atheism play into each other's hands, while true scholarship is persistently and solemnly warned that even obsolete opinions must be guaranteed exemption from the corroding touch of criticism, lest piety perish with them from the earth. Religious education is in a parlous state when there begins to be an "advanced" thought which by tacit understanding is made the basis of discussion among the learned, but which it is considered "imprudent" to set before the laity. But how often nowadays do we hear ecclesiastical ordaining bodies commending the candidate who entertains religious views which he "would not bring into the pulpit." Debate on "The Ethics of Creed Subscription" has not yet said its final word, but that already uttered is significant.

The worst of our humiliation from the religious fads that accompany the decline of authority, and the bigotry which goes hand in hand with practical atheism, is that they belong to the category of "preventable diseases." Mormonism, with its caricature of the doctrines of revelation and inspiration, could have made no headway against a historical appreciation and interpretation of the Bible. Spiritualism would have had no chance against a sound psychology. A moderate acquaintance with church history would have shown that the majority of our current theosophies are but cruder forms of ancient error, the ghosts of dead heresies. An obsolete theory of inspiration still resting like an obsession on the popular mind, though without real authority in the church, is their vital element, and at the same time the chief obstacle to enlightenment. One and all, the religious cranks rend their triumphant way up and down our Bibles, allegorizing, distorting, misinterpreting at will, because Protestantism, as the people understand it, has decreed that the Bible is an infallible encyclopædia of all knowledge, and every man's notion of its meaning as good as any other's. And yet there is such a thing as a scientific exegesis and criticism. The Bible has a limited purpose and an actual historical sense, in most cases as certainly determinable by experts as the sense of the federal constitution.

The alternatives before us are authority, or anarchy. Unaccom-

panied by increasing enlightenment the emancipation of the individual mind and conscience must result unavoidably in just the growing evils of today. Without the authority of the past as embodied in expert knowledge, there is no ratchet to the wheel of progress, experience is limited to the memory of the individual, the church may suffer again the same diseases which should have won it immunity centuries ago. And enlightenment, as we have seen, cannot take the form that every man shall be an expert. As things are now, the average man is not competent to frame an opinion himself on debated questions of theology, and he has no respect for the competent opinion of his neighbor. Once more the history of political democracy affords the parallel; to the average layman the opinion of the theological expert—except, of course, when it corroborates his inherited dogma—has about the same value as the opinion of the expert scholar in social science and political economy to the average voter. He hears mentally the old cry of 1793: “*La république n’a pas besoin de savants.*”

Such is the difficult period in which we witness the formation of an Association for Religious and Moral Education. Will it be able to cope with the situation? At least the men who have joined in forming it are those of all others in America most competent to take a broad and comprehensive view of conditions as they are, and of dealing with them in a spirit of true statesmanship.

We may imagine it as one of the first steps of the new organization to take mental inventory of resources. The church has not, of course, a complete educational system. It relies partly on home training, partly on the pastor’s confirmation class, partly on the pulpit. But the efficiency of all these institutions is, to say the least, not on the increase. In the absence of a parochial school system the one great reliance for real educational work must be the divinity school, the institution which has now everywhere taken over the functions of the earlier collegiate school in training an educated ministry. Here is the one great resource available to meet the need, a foundation of the churches and for the church, institutions presumably adapted to, and holding themselves in readiness for, just this emergency. And the resources of the divinity school are, or should be, twofold. Besides its function as a training school for pastors and teachers, it has that

of shaping, molding, and directing theological opinion, whether orally, from the lecture platform, or by publication of books and articles. In these days of scientific specialization the theological professor is, as a rule, an expert who from the days of university study has devoted himself supremely to his specialty, not a superannuated preacher pensioned off in the class-room. If even in former days, when a man had to be a scientist at odd times, and on the most meager resources, New England could produce a genuine school of theological thought at the feet of Edwards, it is not too much to expect that today American divinity professors, surrounded by a wealth of libraries and with comparative concentration of energy in special lines, should be producers as well as transmitters of thought.

Without academic freedom this is, of course, impossible. If the mortmain of creeds is imposed, the great German universities will continue, as in the past, to produce all the great text-books of theology, and to lead the theological thought of the world. But the discrepancy is today already less striking than it has been. It can no longer be said that American theological thought is a *quantité négligeable*. Perhaps we have not much that deserves to rank as expert authority from an international standpoint; but we have already more than we know how to use. Commendable as are the efforts to promote summer schools and assemblies, university-extension lecture courses, and the like, the efforts to promote real co-operation between the parish minister and the theological professor even in his immediate vicinity, are as yet sporadic and spasmodic. Quite possibly such an expert would evince the trustworthiness of his authority rather by his refusal to indorse certain supposed axioms than by positive dicta. Still it is worth something to be told the uncertainty of supposed facts. The pity is that it is so far from being a common thing to see a theological professor invited to speak as such—not filling the pulpit as substitute preacher, but as an expert in his own specialty—in the pulpit or at the conference desk. And if he were invited, it would still remain to be seen whether his views did not meet the kind of contempt already spoken of as characterizing democracies.³

³ The Presbyterian church in America has (or rather had) three biblical scholars of really international reputation. Two of them it has driven out from the denomination, besides another biblical scholar of almost equal rank. The third taught for many years at Andover and is now teaching at Harvard. It does not appear that

Here, then, is a point of immediate and pressing need, an economic waste of large extent and far-reaching consequences. The one great educational institution at the command of the churches is run at only a fraction of its normal efficiency. Be it from distrust of "the new ideas," or from lack of the needful machinery, there is but little co-operation in this line between the churches and those who occupy the position of its trained experts and specialists. It certainly is not because of indolence or unwillingness on the part of the latter. Will the Association for Religious Education do something to cope with these conditions?

And it may well be questioned whether, even in its more commonly appreciated function of turning out candidates for the ministry, the divinity school is meeting the full requirement of the times. Certainly we have institutions enough. Consolidation, especially of sequestered institutions with such as are in direct relations with the greater universities, thus meeting the drift of seekers for theological training toward the university centers, so long ago foreseen by Bishop Westcott, would be the first economic step to commend itself to men accustomed to business management. Fewer institutions and better equipped, with larger attendance, in closer relation with the great universities, so as both themselves to command the respect of the intelligent community as real institutions of learning, holding an equal place in the sisterhood of the sciences, and also to keep their students in uninterrupted relation with the thought and life of the university—this should be the aim so far as regards the establishment of divinity schools. If the process of consolidation could be carried to the extent of grouping together in mutually independent affiliation with some great university a sisterhood of Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and other seminaries, so as to have separate instruction only in such departments of theological study as are distinctively viewed by the sect in question, another enormous waste of efficiency and influence would be corrected.

Many will also say that the scarcity of vacant pulpits as compared with the number of unemployed ministers indicates an oversupply the Presbyterian churches care to avail themselves of his scholarship, or are even aware of the fact that he is one of the foremost authorities of the world in many questions of theological science.

of ministerial timber. But of all professions and vocations it is truest of this that "there is room at the top." There was no demand for the prophets, nor for John the Baptist; there was no demand for the first preachers of the gospel. The supply created the demand. If there is room for a gospel in modern times, if men have religious and moral needs that are now unsupplied, there is a "call" distinct and urgent for men that have a gospel to convey. So much, however, the statistics do require us to admit, that the need of the churches is of quality before quantity. The question is: Are the methods and means now employed such as are fitted to send forth men of the required caliber and training into the ministry?

We have heard, and still do hear, the cry raised from time to time that the ministry is "overeducated," not in touch with the "people." In any true sense of the word "education" a man can no more be overeducated than he can be too well prepared for his work. If there is lack of lucidity, precision, intelligibility to the common people, in current preaching, it indicates a need for more education, not less. It is the master who can be simple, the tyro who is hazy and incomprehensible. If the preparation is one-sided, let it be altered; let there be a larger proportion of training in practical parish duties; but, in the name of common-sense, let us cease to hear complaints that a man is too well prepared for his task.

But what is the task of the minister of today? Unless the considerations urged at the beginning of this discussion are false and futile, it is something decidedly more and greater than organizing Sunday-school picnics and extending the glad hand at church sociables. More than ever before in the history of Protestantism we need an educated ministry, *experts* in biblical science and in the history and theory of religion. They must deserve, and must win because they deserve, that kind of authority which is the real and the only remedy against progressive religious anarchy.

And to this end there must be co-operation between the divinity school and the ecclesiastical ordaining body, just as in the supplying by the former of that special expert authority which is not expected of the average clergyman. The crying need of the hour is of quality in the ministry before quantity. Let us consider, then, whether the system of student aid really works in this direction, or perhaps the

opposite. As it is, we attempt to rival the federal government in supplying free education, free rooms, and even free board and pocket money, to candidates for the ministry; but *without* the federal government's provision for employment in well-paid service to age of the retirement, and then half-pay or a pension. May not this have certain unfortunate tendencies which fail to be felt only because of the generally high character of those who seek the ministry, and the constant watchfulness of the trustees of the scholarship funds? Let us soberly ask the question whether we are not doing all in our power to make the system emphasize quantity rather than quality by putting all the material incentives to the ministry at its beginning, education gratis, with support while in the divinity school, the relatively largest salary and readiest openings immediately after graduation, matched by increasing relative poverty as the burdens of life increase, and a "dead-line" at fifty. Is the man who is conscious of abilities that with patient industry will insure him ultimately a great career in law or medicine likely to be attracted by a system which works in this way?

Again, exclusion of the unfit is absolutely vital if the standard of quality is to be maintained. Ecclesiastical ordaining bodies have a right to expect that no candidate shall appear before them with the approval of a divinity faculty who is mentally unfit, whether through ignorance or incapacity, to win and hold the respect of an intelligent congregation. The fact that he is pious and a good fellow and edifyingly orthodox does not alter the fact of his deficiency in a vital particular of which his teachers, in the nature of the case, must be the best judges. Correspondingly, the divinity school has the right to expect that there will be no smuggling in of half-educated men by ministerial back doors on the part of licensing or ordaining bodies. It has also the right to expect a cessation at last of the disgraceful peddling of divinity degrees by American "universities," which has made us a laughing-stock in countries where a doctor of divinity is supposed to be a scholar of distinction. There will be little complaint of the scholars at the illiberality of ordaining bodies which reject candidates of intellect, vigor, and training because of alleged doctrinal unsoundness, if only an equal exclusiveness is shown toward candidates whose only qualifications for leadership are

orthodoxy combined with ignorance and mental dependence. A co-operation between church and school which results in the exclusion both of the mentally unqualified and the spiritually unconsecrated will have no ill result in restoring the true authority of the clergy.

There is, then, a great responsibility in our day for the divinity school. For the true well-being of the great body of the people few needs are more vital, few more imperatively demanded by the conditions of the age, than moral and religious sanity and sobriety. And for these there must be a general enlightenment which is not attainable without expert authority and leadership. But the supreme need is co-ordination of the resources already at command, co-operation toward a well-defined common goal between our churches and our institutions of religious education.

Gladly do we see millions poured out to raise the standard of medical practice throughout the country by the better equipment of the great medical schools. The reign of quackery, thriving on the ignorance and credulity of the poor, is scarcely threatened by the public school alone. A well-advertised nostrum, a patent pill or bitters, still extorts its tribute of millions from the scantiest purses. The real remedy is to place medical science on a footing where it vindicates itself. At the medical institutes of Harvard and Johns Hopkins Universities the gifts of millionaire philanthropists are wisely bestowed for the ultimate benefit of the poorest and most helpless. The case with religious and moral education is wholly parallel. God grant we may have like endowments to raise the standard of religious and moral education, if only that the ministry may become a bulwark against impositions practiced on the credulity of the defenseless.

The philanthropist who provides for the raising of the level of religious thought among his fellow-countrymen, insuring that religious liberty which yields to no superstition, because founded on enlightenment, will show himself no less far-sighted than those who give to medical research. But whether with little or with much, let theological education be adequate to the times. Let the seminaries make their curricula worthy of university men, and their diplomas a guarantee of real mental qualification. Let the churches

avail themselves of the resources of expert opinion at their command with confidence and not distrust. We shall have taken then at least one step toward restoring true religious authority, thus consolidating the conquests of the Reformation and establishing religious liberty on knowledge of the truth.

HODGSON'S "METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE" AS THE FOUNDATION OF THEOLOGY.¹

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THE conception of God is of vital importance to theology. Do we know God? What is the source of our knowledge? Is this source reason, or revelation, or both, forming together a unity of truth concerning God, man, and their relations? Our reply to these questions determines the character of our theology. There are four positions that may be taken. One despairs of knowing anything of this Supreme Being; another is over-confident, knowing even the secrets of Infinity, and is assured of the divine attributes in their variety and their relations; a middle course maintains that our knowledge is in so far correspondent with Reality, and consequently the truth, but at the same time it is granted that Reality is far more than we know; finally, there is that view which essentially follows Kant in his distinction between theoretical and practical reason, limiting knowledge to the theoretical. This negative theology has always been a feature of neo-Platonic thought, whether of the Alexandrian school or of St. Augustine who attempted to synthesize it with the Christian conception of the Absolute as a personal Will; Anselm did likewise, and Calvin is not so far removed from St. Augustine that we can recognize no resemblance between them. Kant attempted to fix for all time what can and what cannot be known of God. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* affirmed that knowledge was limited to sense-phenomena when *thought* by the Understanding, however much we might *think* of that which lies beyond the realm of sense and desire to know its existence and nature. Such a theory of knowledge becomes metaphysical in affirming that there is no knowledge of God possible, and reduces theology to the task of formulating the practical and constructing a systematic view of the content of faith with only a vague assurance of the trustworthiness of this view which cannot be regarded as knowledge.

Mr. Hodgson in the closing sections of his *Metaphysics of Experience* discusses "The Foundation of Theology," practically adapting, with some modifications, the Kantian theory just presented, showing that the foundation of theology is philosophical and, indeed, that the only tenable founda-

¹*The Metaphysics of Experience*. By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Vol. I, xv + 459 pages; Vol. II, 403 pages; Vol. III, 446 pages; Vol. IV, 503 pages.

tion for theology is that offered by *The Metaphysics of Experience*; while theology is limited to the systematization of the practical and is not to be regarded ultimately as knowledge, since it is only the conceptual representation of the content of faith. It is the purpose of this paper to develop somewhat in detail Mr. Hodgson's argument, partly because it forces to the front the question whether theology can claim to be knowledge of the Supreme Reality, or whether theology is only a pleasing mental exercise of little ultimate significance; partly because it calls special attention to the conception of God; and partly because there are many suggestions in this work of much importance to the theologian.

Let me at the outset acknowledge that *The Metaphysics of Experience* is a great work. My interpretation can be only the record of my view of the work, which is so comprehensive in its treatment of many problems that I can notice only a few of them. Emphasis may be laid upon features that are of less importance in the author's mind than others, for the understanding of the work is sometimes difficult. Nevertheless, he who has courage to wrestle with the problem of Reality should have a grateful hearing. For who has yet solved the problem? Who has left nothing to be said? May not, too, each man's thought and feeling on the subject be a factor in the problem? As Kant taught us, the disposition to metaphysics itself calls for explanation, and, if I mistake not, each man's personal view is likewise a factor, however insignificant, in the problem of Reality. Hence I do not write in a polemic spirit, but with deep appreciation of the author's effort to throw light upon the supreme problem. With these preliminary remarks, I desire to pass in review some of the more important arguments which, I think, bear upon the theme, "The Foundation of Theology." I shall first present the arguments to which I wish to call attention, reserving a few critical remarks for the closing words.

We agree with our author as to the problem of metaphysics and as to the manner of its solution. The problem is to exhibit the nature of Being or Reality which can be, for us as knowing, nothing other than the content of our conscious experience. Hence Being and Experience are one, and metaphysics is "the metaphysics of experience." That is, the reality we have access to is reality as known and when known, and the task of metaphysics is accomplished by an analysis and synthesis of the factors in the content of conscious experience (Vol. I, pp. 2-6). As to the critical examination of the faculty of knowledge prior to attempting the analysis of conscious experience for the construction of metaphysics, our author holds that it would be full of assumptions which make it impossible to form a metaphysics solely upon the basis of experience. Kant limited knowledge

to experience, and our author regards himself as continuing the work of Kant by confining the analysis to experience (Preface, p. xi), and maintains that he is truer to Kant's position than Kant himself by insisting that this analysis of conscious experience shall be undertaken without any assumptions. We shall not, therefore, speak of powers of knowledge, of a self that knows, and of the noumenal reality which it is hoped our powers of knowledge may reach.

On the contrary, what those powers are, and what the term "powers" means, will be disclosed, if at all, by the results of the very work which they are engaged in doing (I, 8). . . . Consciousness, therefore, as distinguished from its objects, is the thing to be interrogated. (Preface, p. xiv.) . . . Being of which we can and Being of which we cannot have positive and verifiable knowledge are explicanda; the answer to every question concerning them must be found, if at all, by interrogating consciousness; with this position, any *a priori* assumption whatever is inconsistent.

We may remark in passing that the author's position on this point is practically unassailable, but it is one easily abandoned for another which seems strong because of its assumptions. Do we not know a world of objects beyond us interacting with ourselves, and is not our knowledge a mediation between our real selves and these real objects? To say that cognitive states of consciousness bearing as their content Being are all, and that self and its objects are only phases of this conscious experience, is apparently to take the ground from beneath our feet. Yet, when asked if it is possible to transcend conscious experience in order to arrive at a truly real self and things, we have to admit that we cannot even for the purposes of metaphysics and theology. Questions concerning ultimate Reality can only be decided from the standpoint of conscious experience itself. Professor Ladd² objects that this view is too narrow on the ground that it is only a philosophized psychology, leaving out of view the practical life; but I think our author intends to embrace the entire man in conscious experience, the interrogation of which alone can decide the bearing of the practical life upon our knowledge of the nature of ultimate Reality.

Although I am not in this particular following our author, it is convenient to discuss the foundation of theology as presented by him in connection with the three problems of God, freedom, and immortality. It was Kant who in his *Critique of the Practical Reason* found it necessary to make these postulates in the interests of moral and religious faith. I am confident that we still have to determine the philosophical foundation of theology along these lines. The problem of freedom involves the discus-

²*Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 22 f.

sion of the nature of the *ego*, whether it be a reality or only a phase of the cosmic order; what its relation to the body may be; and what its special relations to its own states in cognition and in moral activity are. The problem of God involves a discussion of the Absolute Unity and its final conception, if we can conceive the Absolute at all, involving of course the question of divine Personality, and the relation to the world-order and to man. The problem of immortality raises the question of its possibility and the mode of conceiving such an existence.

First, the problem of freedom, involving a discussion of the reality and nature of the self. There are two possible views concerning the reality of the soul—the actualist's and the substantialist's. The actualist is one who maintains that only conscious states as such and in their totality constitute the soul or mind. The substantialist holds that the states of consciousness are the possessions and manifestations of a real agency or spirit. The actualist's view harmonizes more readily with that metaphysics which regards the soul as only a transient phase of the cosmic order, entirely determined by that order, whether the ultimate principle be spiritual, material, or unknown. The substantialist's view for some thinkers seems to harmonize more readily with the conceptions of creation by the divine Person and of freedom in cognitive, moral, and religious activity. Our author is an actualist and an empiricist in his view of the soul, opposing Kant in his *a priori* transcendentalism and all others who maintain a "pure" or "real" *ego*; nor does he lose an opportunity to score the substantialists, whose theory he crudely interprets to mean some sort of changeless entity or "pure being" that is hidden behind the states of consciousness, and in some mysterious way possesses and unifies those states. We turn now to the author's view of the self, both psychological and metaphysical; and first the psychological.

In order to trace the development of the self from the lowest form of conscious experience, the author supposes that, if we could by some means get at the content of a single instant of consciousness at the beginning, we should discover a consciousness neither of a self nor of an external world, but only of a single sensation, *e. g.*, a sound *C*. This sensation fades, becoming a representative factor *c* to unite with *D*, a new experience, in the perception *cD*. But there is no need of assuming an *ego* to react upon the sensation in perceiving; the sensation *D* and the retrospective state *c*, representing the former sensation *C*, unite of themselves in the perception *cD*. This union of one conscious state, be it sensation or perception, with the retrospective conscious state representative of a former sensational or perceptual experience, in a new unity, the present perception, is for our

author the main fact of our experience and the clue to his philosophy. Reflective perception as thus understood is simply a conscious state in which an object is presented involving also a preceding object formerly presented to the senses (I, 113). This union takes place without any subject to synthesize the sensational or perceptual state with the retrospective or reflective state. At this point our author criticizes English empiricism because it takes the atomistic view of consciousness and creates an artificial separation between conscious states that have the whole history of their life together (I, 129). The atomistic view of consciousness, this English empiricism, plays into the hands of Kantian transcendentalism, namely, by requiring some transcendental hypothesis to establish a nexus between its isolated atoms of perception (I, 131).

The implication, of course, is that, since the several conscious states link themselves together retrospectively, the hypothesis of a combining subject of the states with categories or ways of acting in the synthetic process is superfluous.³

Concerning the development of the consciousness of the self as subject arguments too numerous to recount in detail are presented. Suffice it to say that the conscious states transform themselves, finally, into an external world, a human body, and an *ego* distinguishing itself from, yet knowing, the world, possessing the body and being self-conscious. We might readily suppose that this transformation of the conscious states is the development of a "real" individual, but to assume this is to assume what Mr. Hodgson constantly repudiates. There are only conscious states which become in turn body, external world, and self in contrast to world and body, yet in peculiar but different relations to world and body. The author's own words may be of assistance.

Speaking concerning the lower stages of the process of development, we may say that a given conscious state—*e. g.*, the perception of anything—is both existence and knowing; the same state which is the thing is also the knowing; *i. e.*, another aspect of this conscious state which is the thing existing is also knowing the thing as existing:

Looking at the process from our own point of view as observers *ab extra*, and not as it would appear to its own subject or percipient at the time, we may say that the process-content of consciousness reflects in existing and exists in reflecting. As reflecting, it is a part of knowing; as existing, it is a part of Being. One and the same process-content of consciousness is at once knowledge and existence, though this distinction could not be consciously drawn or perceived by its subject at the time supposed, because at the time supposed he has no knowledge of himself as a subject or percipient. (I, 84.)

³On the whole subject see Vol. I, chaps. ii, iii.

But what, I would ask, is meant by a "subject or percipient at the time," since "it is the foregone conclusion that the conscious life is analyzable without remainder into ideas or presentations"?⁴ Admitting a subject in process of development to self-consciousness, we grant that a conscious state may be at once a cognition and a real thing, and it is out of such states by acts of a subject performing synthetic judgments that the world of reality is constructed—itsself for the individual a conscious world. I have made this statement, not for the sake of argument, but to bring out more clearly the difference between the actualist's conception of the self as an automaton—a series of states having only a nominal subject—and the substantialist's conception of a real active spiritual principle.

Continuing the exposition of the author's view, we are told that the percipient, of course not yet self-conscious, unable to recall the conscious processes through which he has passed, takes the perceived things—really modes of consciousness—as *bona fide* things and, particularly through sight and touch, knows them as an external world of real, individual, and independent things. The constant and central object of all these material things is his own body. Having taken both things and his own body—both being permanent groups of conscious states—as material realities, how does consciousness break loose from this material and become distinguished from the material body and the world of things? A child having seen a dog in a basket goes again to find the dog, now absent; the result is a consciousness of the anticipation and of the fact that things may not agree with their anticipated behavior. Hence there is a distinction between the thought of the things and the things themselves. Consciousness and the body as yet undistinguished are now the subject in contrast with the rest of the material world. In other words, Mr. Hodgson is skilfully showing what is sometimes called the bi-partition of consciousness into subject and object, both sides of the antithesis being conscious states. Another step in the argument is as follows: Things change, body changes accordingly, and consciousness or experience changes as well. These changes are observed by the percipient, who now interprets his experience as the action of things upon his body, which in turn causes his conscious experience to be different or to change. This would lead to the self-distinction of consciousness from the body as its seat and from things whereby the percipient is conscious of himself, of his body, and of the external world, forgetting, however, that each and all together are only different groups of conscious states located in or related to each other (I, 322-25; also I, 205-337).

I have already implied that Mr. Hodgson had no place for a "real"

⁴ANDREW SETH, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 95.

go as an active agent; hence consciousness is in no sense an activity; we as consciousness are a series of conscious states; as such, we are conscious automata, we do nothing. This conception of the self is in keeping with the summary way in which Mr. Hodgson disposes of the time-honored category of cause and effect. Having shown that the process of perception culminates in the abstraction of the perceived thing—really only a mode of consciousness—from its immediate relation to the percipient, forming with others the external, material world of things regarded as existing apart from the subject as individual and independent realities, the percipient forms the idea of any such being—this holds of perceived persons as well—considered in action as a cause and of a corresponding change in another being as effect (I, 325). Thus the conception of cause and effect is “common-sense” and unscientific, for which must be substituted that of “real condition and conditionate,” which is implicit in the “common-sense” view of the causal relation. Indeed, the common-sense form precedes and is the presupposition of the scientific, and remains standing side by side with it, as well in scientific as in non-scientific minds. (I, 326.)

It is necessary carefully to review this treatment of the causal relation, always one of the most difficult problems of metaphysics, whose solution determines the character of the speculative system, as it certainly does in the case of our author. That his treatment of the causal relation is intended to be even the fulcrum of his lever for upsetting many theories is evident from the following statement:

The great crucial and fundamental question which divides philosophers at the present day is the question whether agency belongs to and is exerted by consciousness, or by something which is not consciousness, though an object of it. This is not the same question as that which divides Idealists and Materialists. To me, those who contend for consciousness being the exarter of agency are *ipso facto* Idealists; but not all are Materialists who contend for the exarter of agency being something which is not consciousness. Still, whenever experience is taken as the basis and test of philosophy, matter is the only ground upon which the contention of the non-Idealistic school can be determined or brought to an issue, since matter is the only positively known object which can be held to be at once non-conscious and real. Hence the first question to arise in an experiential Metaphysic is that of the independent existence of Matter, which must be established, if at all, by analysis of that which we call our knowledge of it. This analysis involves, by showing the necessity for, the substitution of the conception of *Real Condition* for the Aristotelic and Scholastic conception of *Cause*; a substitution which will be found to work a cardinal change in our whole manner of regarding the universe, or whatever other name we may give to the total object-matter of philosophy. (Preface, xi, xii.)

Recalling, as was said above, that the percepts become objectified as a world of material, external things in relation to the one constant body with whose experiences the consciousness is identified and from which the consciousness is finally distinguished, we have material things whose changes are followed by changes in the body, and the changes of body are followed by changes of conscious experience. For common-sense, this means that external things (or persons) produce changes in our bodies, and our bodies in turn produce changes in consciousness. But, for reflection, there is no causal relation or agency; for reflection, things are percepts, body is percept or group of conscious states, and the changes of things and of body are likewise percepts following one upon another as condition and conditionate factors of consciousness; and, when consciousness is distinguished from the body with which it is at first blended, consciousness becomes always only the conditionate of body; *i. e.*, material things condition (not act upon) body, body conditions consciousness. It must be noted, too, that the conceptions of real condition and conditionate are only modes of understanding the course of nature—modes of the order of knowledge, which is the order of reflective perceptions, in contrast with the order of existence, which is the presentation or sense-perception order, *i. e.*, the course of nature as perceived—both orders being states of consciousness (I, 334-37).

Real conditions and conditionates do not as such exist in the course of nature but only facts or objects of perception which are conceived under these terms. What we gain by so conceiving them is a generalized knowledge—a knowledge of general facts or laws of nature from which other facts may be deduced or inferred. But the whole content of this conceived order, taken as a content, belongs to the order of knowledge as distinguished from the order of existence, or course of nature itself. It is a means of discovering and understanding the facts; but those facts only, and not the conceptions which embody the understanding of them, are the existents of the order of existence.

To attribute laws of nature or the character of being a condition to the course of nature itself (still more, to say that in nature there are *causes* and *effects*) is to make entities of generalities. (I, 382.)

Again, if the objects of nature are, for reflection, only states of consciousness, and condition and conditionate only concepts of the order of knowledge of these perceptual states, is there anything over and above the states of the individual consciousness, be it a "real" *ego*, other persons, or a material world, that is non-conscious? In reply, it is shown that our knowledge of the material world, acquired chiefly through tactual resistance and visual percepts, requires a further explanation than the analysis of conscious experience can afford. In short, since certain groups of visual and

tactual perceptions have a coherence and comparative permanence of their own, in contra-distinction from the permanence of our objective thoughts of those same groups of perceptions,

we are therefore compelled to have recourse to Matter, as the only real existent, positively known to us, which is also a real condition. In Matter, we must find the only positively known source of the Real conditioning in or belonging to the course of nature. . . . Why, for instance, should the immediate perceptions which form the complex, say of a paper-knife handle, occur in their actually perceived order? There is literally no answer to these questions in the immediate perceptions themselves. They force us, therefore, to the inference of some permanently acting real condition which, as an object of inference, is and must be a represented object in the first instance.

In short, we must by inference from the requirements of our perceptions think of Matter as existing "in some form or forms which would be actually both visible and tangible, if we had sensibilities sufficiently acute." Such is the attempt made to arrive at the certainty of the trans-subjective. (I, 392-402.)

Included within the domain of Matter is the physical nervous basis of consciousness, itself non-conscious, upon which as real condition consciousness in all its forms and phases depends as conditionate; "or, in other words, consciousness as an existent is the conditionate of really existing Matter" (I, 408-21). It is materialism in psychology. The higher processes of psychic life, such as thought even in its most refined judgments and constructions, and such as feelings, emotions, desires, volitions, etc., are also only the conscious conditionates of brain-processes which are the real conditions (III, 310, 311). This position is defended at length in the treatment of the foundation of logic and of ethics (III, 229-384; IV, 1-251).

The result supposed to be proved, it had best be stated at once, is the complete parallelism of the bodily and the mental—the denial, therefore, of any real causality to consciousness, which remains the inert accompaniment of a succession of physical changes over which it has no control. In a word, the result is the doctrine of human automatism . . . conscious automatism.⁵

These words of Professor Seth may be applied to Mr. Hodgson's theory, if we understand them to mean that all initiative agency belongs to the brain-processes, never to consciousness. The discussion of the will and its freedom is a good illustration of the theory. Volition is only the conscious phase of a nerve-process which is the real agency, itself a part of the cosmic process. Certain brain-cells known as automatic may be supposed to be the real agency in a volition as well as in the higher forms of conscious

⁵ANDREW SETH, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

activities, Indeed, man is in all his life a conscious automaton. For example, judgment involves discrimination, selective attention, and volition.

This choice [between alternatives discovered by analysis] must be made, and this assent given—both of them volitional acts if considered as two—or there is no judgment—no provisionally completed thought (III, 313). . . . Assertion means . . . the intra-cerebral conscious act of assenting to something as true (III, 316). [Indeed] we may speak of thought itself as an activity, provided always we bear in mind that the activity and its exercise really belong to the cerebral organs or organ, and not to their dependent concomitant, the mode of consciousness (III, 310, 311).

Nor is the origination of error an exception, since "it is the volitional element in thought which makes error and fallacy possible;" which means of course, that error is only a mode of consciousness, and thus a conditionate of brain-processes as real condition, which in turn are a part of the cosmic process (III, 335). The alternatives between which choice is made are in reality conflicting brain-processes whose conscious conditionates are the alternatives discovered by reflective analysis in thought and morals. As regards these alternatives,

what appears as the tendency of each to displace the other must consequently be ascribed to some conflict, or opposite behavior of some sort or other, on the part of the neuro-cerebral processes which support them, say an increase of energy in the one, accompanied by a withdrawal of energy from the other. (IV, 33.)

The final choice or decision between the alternatives is the conscious conditionate of the outcome of the conflicting brain-processes (IV, 35). This final nerve-adjustment in which the conflict of processes ceases is subordinated to the natural law of self-preservation which governs all the physiological processes which take place in living organisms (IV, 45).

It is, in fact, the neuro-cerebral process supporting moments of self-consciousness which are meant when we say that *we* give the greatest force to the most apparently reasonable action, or that *we* are the agents in acts of choice (IV, 53, 54). . . . If we want a definition of the will, it may now be supplied from a psychological source; we may define it as an exercise of nerve-energy accompanied by the sense of choosing between alternatives. (IV, 20.)

This is, in brief, the whole theory of volition both in intellectual and moral choice.

From the above standpoint, Mr. Hodgson proceeds to define and maintain the freedom of the will as the *sine qua non* of moral action and ethical science. One experiences some surprise to find the freedom of the will maintained upon such an apparently deterministic basis, but he grapples manfully with the problem of conceiving the universe as such a unity as

will render free moral action possible. I am confident, too, that Mr. Hodgson's theistic critic has some lessons to learn from him.

First of all the *de facto* order of nature excludes alternatives. This *de facto* course of nature we conceive as a sequence and coexistence of actions and events taking place between material things which are real conditions and conditionates of one another. The laws of nature are our conceptual expressions of the perceptual uniformities of the *de facto* course of nature. Laws of nature exist, therefore, only in our thought, not in the course of nature itself. Now, such being the course of nature and such being natural law,

has freedom any place among these conceptions under which we are compelled to bring the *de facto* order of real and physical existence, in order to understand it? Or, otherwise stated, are there any facts in that *de facto* order (which, it must be remembered, excludes alternative possibilities) which compel us to form the conception of freedom in order to characterize them? (IV, 124.)

We must answer this question, first, negatively, by asking what sort of freedom we are trying to conceive. We do not mean that whatever existences we are to regard as free are to be regarded as

free from the laws of nature inasmuch as they are parts of that *de facto* order of nature, the whole of which exhibits those *de facto* uniformities for which laws of nature are the name. Neither is it intended to declare them free from being acted on by extraneous forces. . . . It follows that in speaking of agents as free, it is intended to declare them free from compulsion or constraint by extraneous forces, and free for actions resulting from their own nature and constitution (IV, 125). . . . [Indeed] if freedom in volition is a real fact, it is itself an instance exemplifying laws of nature. (IV, 139.)

Since the agents are parts of the *de facto* order of nature, they have to be conceived

in connection and interaction with other parts of that order. Consequently it is only so far as it is free for acting in accordance with its own nature and constitution, and from compulsion or constraint by extraneous forces, that an agent or its action can truly be called free; while conversely it can and must be called free, so far as, or in the respects in which, it is capable of so acting.

A weathercock is free to turn in all directions of the plane in which it is, free within these limits to heed the change of wind; a seed, put into the ground in favorable, and protected from unfavorable, conditions, is free to develop its nature. So also

the cerebral organ of volition, in its action of deliberating and choosing . . . is free in exactly the same sense, allowing for its differences of kind. It is free for that action of part upon part which we call deliberating between, and thereby

changing the strength of motives, and deciding for that which, in consequence of that action, becomes the strongest; it is free from constraint preventing its action in this particular way. The physiological brain organism is free, so far as the interaction of its parts is not subjected to extraneous constraints; and its resulting action is free so far as it is determined by the internal action of its parts.

It determines itself according to its own nature. Thus

the fact of freedom is . . . deeply rooted in the *de facto* course of nature . . . and is as independent of the conception of alternative possibilities as that *de facto* order of events is itself conceived to be.

Hence we may adopt Hobbes's definition of freedom:

Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. (IV, 126-29.)

Recalling the statement that consciousness is always and only the conditionate of brain-processes as the real condition, conscious alternatives are only the conscious correlates of the interacting parts of the brain, and decision and voluntary choice are only the conscious correlates of the outcome of this interaction of the parts and the neuro-cerebral mechanism, and thus there is the consciousness of being free in the volition.

We have now arrived at the point at which it is necessary to introduce Mr. Hodgson's metaphysical view of the Unity of Being. While, as shown above, Matter in its particular phase as neural mechanism is the real condition of consciousness, Matter itself is not infinite, but is in turn the conditionate of an unknown realm of Real Conditions. On the other hand, consciousness may, indeed, so far as its *genesis* is concerned, be the mere conditionate of Matter, but this fact by no means accounts for its *nature*, which must be conceived from the standpoint of that unknown realm of real conditions—the unknown Power, which embraces Matter as its conditionate and also consciousness in its *nature*, but not in its *genesis*, which is always in connection with processes of the neural mechanism.

That this unknown Power cannot be defined is shown by the fact that it can be conceived neither as Matter nor as a universal consciousness; *i. e.*, while accepting materialism in psychology, philosophical materialism is denied, likewise idealism, whose primary tenet is that consciousness is the only real existent. There are evidences in the data of consciousness that Matter has had a beginning in time and may not be limited in space, and that it is only a conditionate of real conditions beyond and unlike itself—indeed, totally unknown (IV, 275, 304-8, 310, 311, 315, 370). Nor is idealism tenable whose

primary tenet is that consciousness (in some one or more of its forms) is the only real existent, the *causa sui et mundi*, generating out of itself whatever appears to be not-consciousness, as Matter, Force, Mind, for instance; any such appearance being therefore illusory. (IV, 371-73.)

The effect of idealism may perhaps be summed up in the phrase, there is no Being but Knowing, or Being and Knowing are one and the same (IV, 373). Chief among the arguments against idealism is that consciousness can never make or cause anything to exist, let alone being *causa sui* (IV 374). Or, again, how could consciousness as such an efficient agency account for the experience of Matter—its force, coherence, resistance and occupancy of space (IV, 383)? It being impossible to regard the individual consciousness as able to account for its experience of Matter—which would be solipsism—we may perhaps assume for this purpose a universal world-consciousness. But how can we think of such a universal consciousness as omniscient, embracing all the factors of individual consciousness in a unity of consciousness? How can we understand the relation of the universal to the individual consciousness? Since we cannot answer these questions, we must reject the hypothesis of a universal consciousness as untenable. Consequently, we may infer from the data of the individual consciousness some existence other than consciousness. We have seen that this existence cannot be Matter, although Matter includes the physical order as well as the brain mechanism which is the conditionate of the genesis of the individual consciousness; rather is Matter itself a conditionate; also, since this inferred existence cannot be any form of consciousness, it must be an unknown Power, embracing in itself the Seen and the Unseen. Although the results of our theoretical analysis of conscious experience are negative, since we reach the conception of the Unknown Power, yet these results have also a positive aspect, since we know that there is such a Power, and that it is in its nature unknown.

I have now completed the exposition of as much of the theoretical portion of Mr. Hodgson's work as bears most directly upon my theme, the foundation of theology, although it has been impossible to present the arguments chosen in detail. What has already been said forms the philosophical basis of theology—which, according to our author, is the only basis—as will soon be made evident. Thus far the example of Kant has been followed who, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, reached a negative and skeptical outcome concerning the knowledge of the existence of God as a Person. Mr. Hodgson also follows Kant's example in the *Critique of the Practical Reason*, which shows the necessity for the postulate of the personal God to satisfy the needs of moral and religious faith. Likewise Mr.

Hodgson insists upon the distinction between the conception of the Unknown Power of the theoretical reason and the conception of the infinite Personality of the practical life (IV, 222) which expresses the phenomena of conscience in a summary manner. All that can be said theoretically is that this Power is coextensive and coeternal with Existence in its entirety, whether revealed to man through the media of sense or not. It is, in other words, the Power or Agency which is the fact or object thought of by our conception of Real Conditioning, whether positively known to us or not, and therefore belonging, not only to the seen world, but also to that which is unseen and infinite beyond it. This is the object of that idea of Man's which is the speculative basis of his idea of God. The raising or completion of this speculative basis into that full idea is due to the moral ideas and feelings which are the creatures of conscience. (IV, 203-6.)

When thus completed, the conception of the unknown Power becomes the idea of an omniscient witness of our immanent acts of choice and is the idea in which religion, properly so called, has its origin. (IV, 346.)

Conscience itself, it may be stated, is that mode of consciousness in which there is a judgment of volitions according to the criterion of the anticipated harmony or discord which they tend to produce in the character of the agent, and actions which are voluntary are right or wrong accordingly (IV, 66-81). This is not eudæmonism, nor is it self-realization, unless the self be understood to be the self-character of the present, and the action willed that which is judged to express and harmonize the self, and in this harmony there is an accompanying happiness (IV, 79-81).

Again,

conscience is imperative in no other sense than that in which desires, motives, reasons, or judgments are imperative, which involve a perception of preferability. (IV, 87.)

That is, the contemplated act is viewed as preferable because of its evident harmony with the character and its anticipated tendency to preserve and promote this unity of the character—the self. The imperativeness of conscience may be, as concerns its degree of intensity, accounted for by the fact that the principle of self-preservation has caused the nervous mechanism at the basis of the conscious, volitional processes to become organized to certain courses of action so that

every act of disobedience, or even of evasion, is to some extent a disintegration of the cerebral system of the subject, destroying the *consensus* of its energies, a disintegration originating in its own action. (IV, 88.)

Another reason for the degree of intensity in connection with the judgments of conscience is metaphysical,

belonging to them as modes of knowing which have an infinite future as the object of their anticipation, and also are attended with peculiar emotional feelings, the existence of which is not explicable in any other way than by referring them to conscience as their source. (IV, 87.)

Corresponding with the varying degrees of imperativeness in connection with the judgments of conscience is the sense of transgressing an authority when the deed does not follow the dictates of conscience. This is a new kind of painful quality—it is remorse of conscience; as felt by the subject contemplating his wrong act, it is the sense of guilt. When the subject views his volitional act “as putting him out of harmony with the moral law apprehended as universally valid for all consciously active beings, it is *sin*” (IV, 193). This sense of sin is one of the data upon which the idea of God is founded. Corresponding terms describe the experience in view of a good volitional act; there is approval and a sense of harmony with the universal moral law. This, too, is a factor in the foundation of the idea of God.

Another step in the development of the idea of God is that in primitive times there can be no exact analysis of the phenomena of conscience. In due time, however, the inevitable law of human reason to explain all phases of conscious experience turns to these moral phenomena. The explanation will, of course, be at this stage of development anthropomorphic. At first the subject knows the body as the seat of consciousness—there is no sharp distinction between body and spirit. Natural objects are accordingly explained after the analogy of the self—they are selves, persons. At a later stage, when consciousness is distinguished from the body, by the help of dreams, etc., natural objects are viewed as ruled over by spirits, which are distinguished from, and not as before identified with, these objects. These ruling spirits will form a hierarchy, their respective ranks being determined by the magnitude and general impressiveness of the natural objects over which sovereignty is exercised. When the awakening human reason, unable to analyze the factors that are really in the phenomena of conscience, seeks to explain the imperativeness of the moral law, the sense of guilt, of remorse, and of sin in view of a wrong action, or of approval and peace in view of a good action, how easy it is to regard this most wonderful and impressive of human experiences as the direct manifestation—indeed, as the very voice—of God, who is then thought of as the ever-present personal witness of our inmost heart. Thus the conscience is the source of the idea of the supreme moral Person and Judge of all (IV, 203). Herein lies also the origin of religion.

In thus completing our Idea of God, by ascribing a moral nature and moral perfection to the Power which is the really conditioning agency of the universe, we do as a fact personify and deify that Power, just as our primitive ancestors personified and deified the particular existents or forces of Nature, including their own departed progenitors. (IV, 205 f., 1-227.)

The only conclusion possible is, of course, that the conception of God as a supreme moral Person is simply a comprehensive summary of the phenomena of conscience, not speculatively to be taken as real knowledge of this Power which sustains the universe. The positive knowledge that there is such an Unknown Power to which neither blame, nor praise, nor, least of all, moral goodness and self-consciousness with interest in human life can be attributed, is all that is speculatively tenable in the idea of God, and constitutes the only speculative basis of theology. The remainder of the idea of God is a convenient, but not ultimately significant, superstructure.

Consequently, and in one word, we no longer speculatively conceive of God as a Mind, creating and governing Matter, or creating and governing other minds. Not, however, because proof has failed that God is a Mind; but because proof has failed that Mind is a reality. . . . He is now conceived as the whole of that Power of real conditioning, of which the real conditioning of every human and individual consciousness is an infinitesimal portion and derivative. (IV, 208, 209.) . . . Faith in God stands to its possessor in the place of knowledge.

His religious ideas of God cannot be appealed to as containing speculative truth "in controversy with others who are either irreligious, or who clothe their religion in different ideas" (IV, 224).

We must not, however, understand Mr. Hodgson to teach that the conception of the Infinite as self-conscious moral Personality is entirely unfounded and illusory. It is rather inadequate; indeed, it is a harmless, but convenient and allowable, way of expressing our confidence in the requirements of conscience, if we only remind ourselves that this conception is not really Knowledge, and that the infinite Power escapes our theoretical Knowledge altogether.

Another important conception to which the practical reason leads us is that of a future life. Like Kant, Mr. Hodgson shows that this practical belief in another life is not knowledge; yet, on the other hand, it is not entirely without a speculative basis, and it is impossible to show that theoretically the conception of immortality is contradictory. Instead of being contradictory, and so impossible, there are facts which make another life probable. As this belief is an accompaniment of religious faith, in consequence of which theology must consider it, it must be treated in connection with the foundation of theology.

Since consciousness is the conditionate of Matter in the form of brain mechanism, which in turn is the conditionate of the Unknown, both forming a unity, it is conceivable that the unseen and unknown realm of conditions may be modified by the reaction of the nervous mechanism which is the condition of desires, emotions, and volitions. Hence we may say, speaking popularly, that our volitional acts modify the unknown world of real conditions, it being really the brain-processes at the basis of conscious volitions which effect this modification (IV, 318-25). As a correlate of this speculative possibility is the fact that conscience represents our volitional acts as making a difference with us in the indefinite future, which consequently suffers determination by what we do as moral beings both as regards what we shall be and experience and what kind of companions we shall have and what we ourselves shall be able to do. These are practical beliefs, growing out of the experience of conscience and inseparable from the effort to obey its dictates (IV, 339-48). Is a future life speculatively conceivable? Yes, upon the hypothesis of an unknown region of Matter which may be modified by the brain-activity at the basis of our desires, emotions, and volitions, so that we may say we are daily preparing ourselves a "spiritual" body to support our conscious life of the future when we have finished with the one we now have—a most interesting theory which I cannot now present more in detail. It will be observed, however, that, while a future life is postulated by the moral, it is also shown theoretically possible, and there is no contradiction which can nullify the significance of a belief in it (IV, 390-96).

A similar view is held concerning a divine revelation; it is conceivable, and there is no theoretical contradiction of it. The belief in a divine revelation is a phase of the practical life. Morality passes over into religion when, in sincere obedience to the dictates of conscience, the law of conscience is identified with the unknown Power that sustains the universe which is now viewed as a self-conscious moral Person. Given this religious faith, a revelation is conceivable and reasonable. Religion, then, does not rest on revelation, but revelation on religion. Moreover, a divine revelation is speculatively conceivable: since consciousness in all its phases is the conditionate of Matter in the form of cerebral mechanism, and since Matter is in turn the conditionate of the unknown Power, new and unique experiences may appear in the individual consciousness, which unique expression in the individual consciousness the practical reason regards as the revelation of the divine Person. Consequently, this revelation is, from the standpoint of the individual, his own insight into the experience of the moral and religious consciousness. The test of the validity and worth of the

revelation is, for example, the familiar saying, "The Bible finds me," *i. e.*, the revelation is recognized as giving expression to the heart's moral and religious needs and aspirations. Christ was founder of the Christian religion because he interpreted the human heart to itself; Christianity is the universal religion and revelation because it expresses and fulfils man's moral and religious needs (IV, 216-18, 399-418).

We are now prepared to show the province and problem of theology in its constructive aspect. Theology is strictly limited to the practical, deals only with the practical conceptions which men formulate to express their moral and religious beliefs concerning their relations to the divine Person, and is not at all to be regarded as speculatively true. This view differs from that commonly accepted, which really puts theology in the realm of philosophy as its most important and culminating feature, maintaining that there is an implicit harmony between revelation and natural theology, which afford each other a reciprocal support, and that both together form a trustworthy system of knowledge concerning the existence and nature of God and of his relations to man and the world (IV, 398-402).

Theology, according to Mr. Hodgson, as "the formulation and systematization of the convictions of Religion or of Faith," must be distinguished from that Religion or Faith. Since the conceptions used are of necessity taken from the prevalent philosophy of a given period, theology is not a fixed science and will change with the changing theoretical views. The abiding factor is the Religion, the Faith. Applying these principles to the Christian theology, there was first the faith, then the formulated expression. Christ led the disciples to faith in God as loving them, which evoked in them the effort to obey conscience and to do the will of God, who was conceived as both just and merciful. These were the essential redemptive teachings of Jesus, whose personality seized upon them so powerfully as to impress these beliefs deep into the hearts of the disciples and lift them up to a new life.

But the moment which robbed his disciples of their beloved Master roused them to sustained reflection. Where and what were the hopes which their belief in Him had inspired in them? That reflection was the beginning of a theology. (IV, 409.)

And the thing the disciples and believers generally have sought to do has been to express in systematic form the significance of their faith, using the terminology available and feeling the modifying influence of prevailing systems of thought. This is always an important and difficult task as the systematization must rest upon a philosophical basis, against which

no valid speculative objection can be raised. . . . It must be a theoretical statement of man's practical relation to the Universe, as believed by those only who are believers in the Religion of which it is the embodiment, and must besides be incontrovertible on speculative grounds. The Theology must be at once speculatively incontrovertible, and an intellectual embodiment of the practical Faith. (IV, 422, 423.)

Although Mr. Hodgson closes his work with valuable suggestions concerning the theology which today may hope for acceptance by all classes, we may pass them, as they do not bear directly upon our topic—the foundation of theology.

A critical estimate of Mr. Hodgson's conception of theology and its philosophical basis proposed by him is challenged by the requirement that the philosophical basis of theology shall be such that no valid speculative objection can be raised against it. The point of the criticisms which I am about to make is that he has not been true to the facts of conscious experience.

Take, for example, the use made of condition and conditionate in explaining the synthetic processes of the perceptive act. He grants that there is a synthesis of sensational and representative factors, but says that the cerebral mechanism as the synthesizing agency "is as much in harmony with the actual experience as if the blank were filled up by the action of an immaterial agency" (I, 449; II, 257). We may grant that brain and conscious processes are parallel, and that the conscious synthetic aspect of perception doubtless has a parallel brain state; but this is only stating the fact that two processes, nervous and conscious, occur together, and while parallelism is irrefutable, it does not explain the synthesizing processes of consciousness. Besides, to say that brain-mechanism is the real synthesizing agency is to reinstate the conception of the causal relation which has been rejected in favor of condition and conditionate. If we are not to accept brain-mechanism as the synthesizing agency, and with Mr. Hodgson reject the atomistic sensationalism of the English empirical school, whereby individual conscious states are in some way associated together forming the perception, what can this synthesizing agency be? There are two reasonable hypotheses either of them better than the proposed cerebral agency; namely, a finite spirit developing to full self-consciousness, or the Infinite Mind expressing itself in the developing cognitive processes of the finite consciousness. Who has ever really overthrown Kant's essential argument in the *Deduction of the Categories* against empiricism, that the particulars of sense, received successively, must be reproduced and synthesized according to the forms, categories, and principles of the subject that is finally to know the unitary

object in a unity of experience, and know its own self as identical in this experience? Kant said that, according to empiricism,

each representation would, in its present state, be a new one, and in no wise belonging to the act by which they are to be produced one after the other, and the manifold in it would never form a whole because deprived of that unity which consciousness alone can impart to it. [In short], that unity of consciousness would be impossible, if the mind, in the knowledge of the manifold, could not become conscious of the identity of function, by which it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge.⁶

Mr. Hodgson may object that this applies only to the "atomistic" empiricism, not to his own, and that the "mind" referred to is only the empirical *ego*-aspect of consciousness for which he himself has provided. We may, indeed, criticize Kant, but his essential meaning was an active, synthesizing agency—a mind—to fill up the blank which Mr. Hodgson thinks is adequately filled by the cerebral mechanism which he regards as the true agency in the synthesis, while the synthetic aspect of consciousness is only a passive conditionate of this brain-activity. In my judgment, we must assume a spiritual synthesizing principle, either a finite mind in process of development, or the infinite Mind expressing itself in the developing finite consciousness. T. H. Green, holding the latter view, maintained that perception can be understood only on the assumption of a synthesizing function which is more than the factors synthesized, and that this synthesizing agency can least of all be accounted for upon the basis of the cerebral mechanism, although this cerebral mechanism is operative in the process; for "every effort fails to trace a genesis of knowledge out of anything which is not in form and principle, knowledge itself."⁷ Besides, cerebral mechanism is a psychic conceptual construction, and to say that the functions of the *ego* are to be explained by one of its own constructions is certainly difficult to understand.

Similar remarks may be made concerning Mr. Hodgson's conception of the will and its freedom. The real agency in volitional acts, we have seen, is conceived to be the cerebral mechanism, which is a part of the natural order. This natural order excludes alternatives. Hence "freedom" is thought to apply to actions which result from the nature and constitution of the agency, in this case the cerebral mechanism, acting part on part, yet itself within the order of nature. We may grant the implied parallelism between the nervous and the conscious, with the observation that it only states a coincidence, but does not explain it; we may grant the application

⁶*Critique of Pure Reason*, MÜLLER'S translation, Vol. II, pp. 92-95.

⁷*Prolegomena to Ethics*, sec. 70.

of the term "free" to the actions of an agency which is the part of the Whole, but with the understanding that the Whole is spiritual rather than material or unknown; we grant that such "free" acts which express the nature and constitution of an agency are not rendered inconceivable by the conception of this agency as a factor in the all-embracing Whole. But the real question is: What is the agency that is conceived as "free" in its volitional acts? Is it the cerebral mechanism so ingeniously described by our author? It must be remembered that this mechanism is in the order of nature. Hence the question is whether the volitional processes of consciousness are explained by an agency standing within the order of nature, or whether these volitional processes require the hypothesis of a principle which is itself not in the order of nature? I am confident that we must assume such a spiritual principle, not in the natural order, be it either the finite soul or the infinite Mind manifesting itself in the human consciousness; for man in the processes of knowledge and in the formation of motives, in the words of Green,

exerts a free activity—an activity which is not in time, not a link in the chain of natural becoming, which has no antecedents other than itself, but is self-originated. There is no incompatibility between this doctrine and the admission that all the processes of brain and nerve and tissue, all the functions of life and sense, organic to this activity, . . . have a natural history. There would only be such an incompatibility, if these processes and functions actually constituted or made up the self-distinguishing man, the man capable of knowledge.⁸

Enough has been said to show that the agency which can properly be called "free" is not the cerebral mechanism, although, as our author says, it doubtless does express its nature and constitution in its actions and is so far free. Another and different agency, correlated it may be with the cerebral mechanism—the recognition of this correlation being only a statement of the fact, not an explanation—is required to account for the facts of conscious experience in the processes of knowledge and the formation of motives; to this agency, standing without the order of nature, the term "free in its actions" may be applied. Mr. Hodgson apparently feels the uncertainty of his position when he says that the cerebral process is always the condition of the *genesis*, never of the *nature* of the conscious conditionate which sustains some inconceivable relation to the unknown Power. I wish also to call particular attention to the substitution of "condition and conditionate" for "cause and effect," which are of especial importance at this point. In this substitution the author is not true to our experience which he proposes to analyze, for "condition and conditionate" are unknown

⁸*Op. cit.*, sec. 82.

terms unless they are translated into "cause and effect." It will be observed that by charges of anthropomorphism and the use of this unknown term, "condition and conditionate," he escapes the troublesome analysis of the causal relation which might show that the only assignable meaning of "cause and effect" is grounded in the expression of an intelligent will-agent which we know in our experience. To say that the cerebral mechanism is the real agency in our volitional acts is certainly to attribute to an unknown quantum what we have heretofore believed to be the most characteristic feature of spiritual life. We may go so far as to say that, if true, it has no meaning for us; how, then, can it be true? Whether this spiritual principle which we would assume is a finite reality or a manifestation of the infinite, and what the relations of the finite and the infinite spirits are, are different questions.

A similar reply may be made to Mr. Hodgson's conception that the ultimate Reality is neither Matter nor Mind, but an unknown Power. We must grant, of course, that the negative position cannot be refuted, for it is always possible to deny that knowledge of ultimate Reality is attainable. But to those who take the theory of knowledge seriously, believe knowledge to be possible, and desire to be faithful to actual experience, and to avoid in the analysis of that experience the use of unknown, and consequently meaningless, terms, I would suggest the following in place of a detailed argument in favor of the conception of the ultimate Reality as Mind: First, Mr. Hodgson supports his inference from the data of consciousness to an unknown Power by the use of the conceptions "condition and conditionate" as a substitution for the conception of causal agency, thereby avoiding the analysis of the causal experience of consciousness which would, in my opinion, lead him and us, if true to that experience, to infer a universal Will as the ground of all that is real. We know the real because we experience resistance; how shall we understand this resistance except after the analogy of the self in the experience which we have of our own will-activity? As it is a matter of inference on either of the two theories, which inference is the more satisfactory? Which is more faithful to the content of conscious experience? Secondly, knowledge, assumed to be possible, implies that the reality known is intelligible, and thus the expression of Mind for mind; as we know things in relation which are thus held together in the unity of our consciousness, so Reality which is known is somehow a unity of existences in relation which is conceivable only on the assumption of the supreme Mind of whose thought and will all existences are the manifestations. Thirdly, it is an error to say that inductive and deductive proof as applied in the sciences is of a worth superior to the proof for the existence

of God as Mind; instead, all reasoning, whether inductive or deductive, rests finally upon the trustworthiness of reality as rational; all law—natural, psychical, and intellectual—must be grounded in reality. What conception of ultimate Reality harmonizes so well with these necessities of our thought as the conception of the divine Mind? If we are to conceive this Mind at all, and at the same time be true to our conscious experience, this Mind will be for us, with Lotze, a Perfect Personality of whom our minds are only pale copies.⁹ Fourthly, Erdmann has told us that the special problem of modern philosophy—which, by the way, must be a philosophy expressing the essential meaning of Christianity—is to combine the world-problem of the ancients with the other-world problem of the Middle Ages in a new and higher unity;

no theories will meet the requirements of modern times, nor deserve the name of philosophy, except such as recognize both the here, or real, of antiquity, and the hereafter, or ideal, of the Middle Ages, and attempt to reconcile the two. Any system which left one of these sides out of account, or which did not admit that there was a point where the two coincided, would cease to be philosophical. . . . Henceforth, the path that philosophy follows is not to reach self by starting from the world or from God, but to start from self and find one's way back to a world and to God.¹⁰

Has not Mr. Hodgson, by denying a speculative knowledge of the true Reality "left one of these sides out of account"? If so, is his system a true philosophy of the modern period, since it fails fully to recognize the special problem of modern philosophy? To land us in an absolute negation concerning the Infinite is almost to revise Plotinus, ignores and does not solve the problem of modern thought.

Having considered some of the objections to the philosophical basis of theology proposed by our author, we shall now consider the proposed limitation of theology strictly to the practical sphere with the function of formulating and systematizing the content of moral and religious faith (IV, 402), with only a vague confidence that the construction has ultimate significance as the truth about the nature of the unknown Power in relation to ourselves. Perhaps the following would express the author's meaning: Theology is necessary; it is only an inadequate, although the best attainable, expression of a man's conception of the infinite Reality. So far as it goes, it may be true enough, but it falls deplorably short of knowledge. We may make the best theological system possible, still we are unprofitable servants—we fall so far short of the Reality that our theology is not true

⁹LOTZE, *Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 688.

¹⁰*History of Philosophy*, secs. 259, 260.

knowledge. However, a theology we must have; therefore, let us make it the best possible, although we have little or no claim for it as the true interpretation of "the unknown Power that sustains the universe." Theology is not then really useless; it is rather a beneficial intellectual exercise by means of which the heart's faith gets an expression and takes form, which in turn strengthens and maintains the faith. May not the place and function of theology be compared to that of poetry, whose imagery and grace inspire with lofty purposes, which express the soul as theology expresses the faith of religion? Every system of theology is representative of the period in which it is created, and prepares the faith which it expresses to become strong enough to seek at a later time another theological expression rendered necessary by the growth in the life of faith and by the social and intellectual changes that have taken place.

Mr. Hodgson is also apparently anxious to do what he can to bridge the chasm which he conceives to exist between the theoretical and the practical, between speculative knowledge and theology, as is evident from the following:

It is active and habitual obedience to conscience which inspires, and is impossible without inspiring, the confidence, that the power which we exert in so acting is identical in kind, and *continuous in fact*, with the inmost nature of the infinite and eternal Power which sustains the universe. It is true that we cannot think of this confidence without throwing the fact of it into conceptual form, and so forming a conception of the Power towards whom the confidence is felt. . . . The only knowledge on which it rests is a knowledge of our own confidence in the Eternal Power, which, in feeling that confidence, we feel as identical and continuous with ourselves. Expressed in conceptual form, the Eternal Power is a Person; but this conception is the creation of faith. (IV, 216, 217.)

The attributes of self-conscious knowledge, Purity, Justice, Mercy, Love, which the moral and religious consciousness ascribe to the eternal Power are, in the human shape in which alone we positively know them, but feeble adumbrations of what they are in Him, *i. e.*, in their true, but to us unimaginable, perfection (II, 227), although we have good grounds for inferring from practical reasoning the existence of such a universal, omniscient, moral consciousness (IV, 386).

The *vis medicatrix naturae* which physicians speak of, and the power sustaining conscience, which redeems from iniquity by means of penitence and reformation of life, are different operations of one and the same conditioning agency. (IV, 369.)

If this practical view of infinite Reality

be an illusion, it is at all events a necessary and uncontradicted one, and, moreover, one the genesis of which can be traced ultimately to the operation of the

very object whose nature it enables us to conceive, and the existence of which as a reality is speculatively and independently ascertained. (IV, 337.) The religious Faith of man, founded in his nature as a moral being, transcends the knowledge which his speculative intellect can procure, and anchors on the Eternal Reality beyond it. That this Faith is positively and speculatively legitimate and secure is among the truths which it is the humble but welcome duty of Philosophy to ascertain and establish. (IV, 434.)

It is very difficult to interpret Mr. Hodgson's conception of the exact worth of the practical and of its theological expression, but I think he intends to do what he can to mediate between the speculative and practical reason. The speculative reason, dealing with actual facts or existents leads us to the conception of the unknown Power; the practical fills this conception with content, the chief factor of which is self-conscious, moral Personality—a conception which cannot be received by the speculative reason as knowledge, but a conception which the speculative reason cannot show to involve a contradiction; it may, therefore, be cherished by the practical reason as the best attainable expression of the infinite Reality, although wholly inadequate. Theology, which formulates the contents of the practical is still within the practical, having indeed a measure of our confidence as representative of our relations to "the unknown Power that sustains the universe," but still cannot claim to be real knowledge of that Power. It may all be an illusion (IV, 337.)

We must grant that there are both advantages and truth in these conceptions of the place and function of theology. Among the advantages may be mentioned the fact that the theologian is freed from the troublesome speculative problems which arise when the constructed theology is assumed to be the truth concerning the existence and nature of God, man, and their relations. A teleology is "an empty dream;" a theodicy, "an insane imagination" (IV, 223, 424). Being thus freed, the theologian may construct his individual system, confident that he is giving expression to the content of his faith, which is in some vague way "*continuous in fact* with the Power which sustains the universe." Another constructing a different system, may have the same confidence, and each man's system is as good as the other, for each is to be "traced ultimately to the operation of the very object whose nature it enables us to conceive, and the existence of which is speculatively and independently ascertained." Into what a heritage of liberty theology thus enters! Calvinism and Ritschlianism stand side by side; both are in the practical sphere, are equally trustworthy, and may be equally illusive. Neither has a better claim than the other to be the absolute truth concerning the existence and nature of this unknown

Power in relation to ourselves. They serve their day and generation in expressing the content of moral and religious faith, as Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, and Browning's *Rabbi Ben Ezra* give expression in poetic form to another phase of man's life.

Such is my understanding of Mr. Hodgson's conception of the place and function of theology. Surely it has large advantage and much truth on its side; for theology certainly does have the office assigned it, and this office is not insignificant. The question is whether this is all the truth about theology. It is of supreme importance that the theologian decide what he is attempting in theology—a question which not all squarely face! Is he attempting to construct by a critical analysis of all data, both natural and revealed, a view of God and man and their relations which may be accepted as the truth—as corresponding with Reality; or is he simply endeavoring to give intellectual expression to the emotions and volitions which constitute his practical life, with no assurance that his construction is vital truth, at the most with only a vague confidence in it as the best intellectual expression of his faith of which he is capable? If I mistake not, the theologian is very prone to believe in his theology as the truth, although he may not have settled in his own mind just what his theology, if the truth, would involve; and, if our friend the theologian is right, Mr. Hodgson is wrong, although not entirely wrong, for the function assigned theology it undoubtedly has; he is wrong in the sense of too narrowly restricting the aim and scope of theology. For my part, I sympathize with that theologian who regards his theology as the ultimate truth. I must not, however, too hastily put aside Mr. Hodgson's view, which is similar to that of certain lines of theological thought today. Paulsen, for example, says that, in contrast with the former theological view which regarded dogma as the expression of theoretical truths which

can and must be scientifically demonstrated by means of exegetical and historical proofs or ontological and cosmological arguments or, which can and must be interpreted by abstruse speculation,

there is a new movement in Protestant theology for which

the dogma has the significance of a formula that does not bind the understanding as much as the will. It does not contain demonstrable predications of historical and natural reality, but articles of faith in values that are universally recognized, that satisfy the heart and determine the will.¹¹

The Ritschlian or neo-Kantian theology would do likewise. This conception of theology harmonizes fairly well with Mr. Hodgson's statement

¹¹PAULSEN, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 13.

that theology should be speculatively incontrovertible and "an intellectual embodiment of the practical Faith." Mr. Hodgson even goes beyond this neo-Kantian school in maintaining that the only basis of theology is philosophical, and that this basis must be such that no valid speculative objection can be made against it; with which I agree. I believe, however, that we must go farther; that, avoiding by ignoring the confusion that arises when we try to mark off the field of philosophy from that of theology and to distinguish or identify biblical theology, dogmatics, apologetics, systematic theology, and philosophy of religion as pleases our individual whim, the *aim* is to find the best possible expression of what we shall then believe in as the truth, after a careful analysis of subjective, historical, and speculative sources, concerning the existence and nature of God, man, and their relations. In this attempt I would make room for the fullest analysis of the individual experience, believing that these innermost experiences of heart and mind are as much a source of data for the synthetic view of the true Reality as the data of sense-perception. Lest the individual thinker, from the standpoint of his own experience solely, fall into mysticism and vagary, I would have him be kept sane by interpreting the social or race-experience in that unique expression of it found in the Scriptures, which will afford a wholesome correction and enlightenment to his own mind. I would have the individual experience, thus modified and enriched, founded upon and adjusted to a defensible speculative basis, forming with it a consistent whole of truth which shall be to this theologian the best and most reason-satisfying expression of his knowledge concerning God, man and their relations; indeed, concerning his own life and destiny.¹² It is the conviction that we have knowledge that alone can save theology from being a colorless expression of mere sentiment. Have we not had enough of this sickly theology which has no grip on Reality and claims none; whose highest aim is "not to bind the understanding," but to persuade the will? Let us recall those grand words of Erdmann, that the special problem of modern thought is "to start from self and find one's way back to a world and to God." This is no uncertain tone; recall his other words, which can, I think, be applied to theology as well as to philosophy: "Any system which left one of these sides [world or God] out of account, or which did not admit that there was a point where the two coincided, would cease to be philosophical;" and, I am confident, would cease to be a theology worthy of the name.

Again, shall we allow this separation of the theoretical and practical reason to pass unchallenged? Speculative thought in Fichte, Schelling,

¹²Cf. HARRIS, *The Self-Revelation of God*, chap. vii.

and Hegel did not; and, if I mistake not, this refusal to maintain the separation was nearer Kant's own meaning than some of the more recent speculations. What, I would ask, is the use of a philosophical basis of theology, which, according to Mr. Hodgson, theology must have, unless its truth forms some sort of positive foundation for the superstructure to keep theology from being just what he says it is, namely, a structure with little or no ultimate significance? Basis and superstructure must form a whole and give meaning and completeness to each other. A criticism from the standpoint of another basis would not be valid against a given theology, unless this other speculative basis could be shown to be the only defensible one.

Again, having undertaken the analysis and synthesis of the facts of conscious experience, the worth of the result depends upon the integrity and completeness of the facts. Why, then, shall we, according to Mr. Hodgson, separate one portion of the results of analysis and synthesis of the facts of conscious experience from another, and call one speculative knowledge, and the other merely the formulation of the content of the practical, and not knowledge? Moreover, on what ground does he choose one portion as significant of ultimate Reality and the other not? Both are subjective—for knowledge is subjective—and there is as much difficulty in getting from the subjective to the objective in the case of the speculative as in that of the practical. Indeed, we may go farther, and with Bosanquet, say that the objective reality is itself a construction of the individual whose correspondence with Reality rests upon an assumption.¹³ I maintain, therefore, that this separation between the theoretical and the practical, Kant and Mr. Hodgson notwithstanding, is inconsistent with the attempted analysis of the conscious experience which is a whole, and the result ought also to be a unity, or the cause for splitting the unity of conscious experience forthcoming. Whether we have a theology which both expresses our practical experience, including the significance of moral and religious faith, with a place for the sacred records of that experience on the part of a highly moral and religious people, and which also forms with a defensible philosophical basis a systematic view of God, man, and their relations, is not the question; the question is as to the status of theology, both as to its relation to its speculative basis and as to its trustworthiness as knowledge.

Again, we have also to ask what test is to be applied to the analysis and synthesis of the facts of conscious experience which shall determine whether our results are to be accepted as true or not? This test is, in

¹³BOSANQUET, *Essentials of Logic*, chaps. i, ii.

brief, that the systematic view formed by the synthesis must be free from contradiction and satisfy the reasoner by its tendency to harmonize the totality of his experience. This is little more than a statement of the governing principles of all reasoning, namely, the principles of identity or non-contradiction and sufficient reason. Setting out to analyze conscious experience as a whole, the synthesis of the factors of this conscious experience will itself be a whole, each part as trustworthy as another, although one be called speculative philosophy and the other practical theology.

Finally, as to a choice between Mr. Hodgson's conception of "the foundation of theology" and of theology itself, and any other conception of the same, the question is: Which is the more reason-satisfying? Which harmonizes better with our experience of life, world, and God? Note that it is a choice, not a compulsion. On the one hand, Mr. Hodgson has the advantage which comes from mere negation. He who does not commit himself to anything has nothing to defend. Mere negation concerning the Absolute is always safe and unassailable. On the other hand, the theologian who is confident that the speculative basis of his theology in unity with his theology are the truth about God, man, and their relations is easily thrown into a fright by a skeptical reference to his audacity in maintaining that he really knows the little he claims about God, his nature and purposes. Indeed, we must grant that the negative position is more becomingly humble. Still, there remains the never fully satisfied desire to know more of the all-wise God and Father whom to know is life eternal, and we simply cannot accept the doctrine that what we believe with all our hearts to be knowledge is not really the truth.

CRITICAL NOTE.

JEWS AND ANTISEMITES IN ANCIENT ALEXANDRIA.¹

FROM out the cemeteries and rubbish heaps of Egypt a new world has come into view—a long-concealed civilization. All branches of science are highly concerned in the preservation of these newly discovered treasures. Around these papyri there has grown up a special science, and a special journal is devoted to the daily increasing literature which concerns them.² In the domain of philology we need only mention the Mimiambics of Herondas, and the fragments of Hyperides and of Demosthenes. The jurist discovers numerous records of sales, manumissions, etc. The student of medicine finds remarkable prescriptions. More than all others, students of constitutional history and political science are profiting by these finds. Thanks to these numberless documents pertaining to taxes, we now know more concerning the system of taxation of the Ptolemies than we do about many systems of more recent times.³ Moreover, theology also, besides finds belonging to the Byzantine age, has discovered rich treasures of an earlier epoch. It is well known that Professor Deissmann, of Heidelberg, has undertaken to found a new system of New Testament lexicography on these freshly discovered monuments of the popular language, of which the writings of the New Testament form the single literary deposit hitherto known. He has already shown in his *Bibelstudien* the outlines of this new system, and has illustrated it with copious examples.⁴ I need only mention the discoveries for the text of the Bible, and more especially of the Apoc-

¹ This article was written in 1900, as an addition to SHAILER MATHEWS's excellent *History of New Testament Times in Palestine*, before the paper of AD. BAUER in *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, Vol. I (1901), pp. 29-47, and the new edition of SCHÜRER's standard work had appeared. In revising the author has been able to add some remarks on these recent utterances.

² *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, herausgegeben von U. WILCKEN (Leipzig: Teubner); Vol. I, 1901.

³ U. WILCKEN, *Griechische Ostraka aus Aegypten und Nubien*, 1899; C. WACHSMUTH, *Wirtschaftliche Zustände in Aegypten während der griechisch-römischen Periode*; CONRAD's *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie*, Vol. LXXIV (1900), pp. 771-809.

⁴ DEISSMANN, *Bibelstudien*, 1895; *Neue Bibelstudien*, 1897; *Die sprachliche Erforschung der griechischen Bibel*, 1898; article "Hellenistisches Griechisch," in HAUCK's *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie*, 3d ed., Vol. VII, pp. 627-39.

rypha, such as the Fayum Fragment, the Gospel and Apocalypse of Peter, and the Behnesa Logia.

In addition to these I desire to call attention to the fact that a few years ago two genuine copies of a famous *libellus*, the certificate of recantation of a Christian in time of persecution, unexpectedly came to light. One copy is preserved in a Berlin papyrus from Fayum and published by Krebs.⁵ Another copy from the collection of the Archduke Rainer is published by Wessely.⁶ Both are given by O. von Gebhardt in his *Acta Martyrum Selecta*, 1902, pp. 182, 183.

The first of these two documents, which is practically preserved entire, and which the second copy closely resembles in its essential points, may be translated as follows:

To those (persons) chosen (for the supervision) of the sacrifices in the village of Alexander's Island: from Aurelius Diogenes, the son of Satabus, of the village of Alexander's Island, seventy-two years old, with a scar on the right eyebrow. Just as I have always regularly sacrificed to the gods, so now in your presence in accordance with the (imperial) decree have I sacrificed and (drunk) and (tasted) of the offerings, and I beg you to attest the same.

May you ever prosper!

I, Aurelius Diogenes, have presented the (foregoing).

That Aurelius has performed sacrifice and . . . is attested.

In the first year of the emperor Cæsar Gaius Messius Quintus Traianus Decius Pius Felix Augustus, the second day of Ephiphi [June 26].

With a marvelous vividness the circumstances of the Decian persecution are here presented to our view. How colorless in comparison with this documentary testimony is the picture given us in the ancient literary sources, especially the *Church History* of Eusebius!⁷ This same quality is met with in the documents which we shall treat in detail in this paper.

Among the most important finds of the last few years are different papyrus fragments which illuminate in a peculiar manner the history of the Alexandrine Jews, and establish beyond doubt the conclusion that in ancient Alexandria—at that day the center of Greek culture and civilization, and at the same time the seat of the strongest Jewish colony in the empire—the conflict which has lasted through centuries between the Jews

⁵ "Ein libellus eines libellaticus v. Jahr 250 n. C., aus dem Fajjum," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Academie*, November, 1893, pp. 1007-14.

⁶ *Anzeiger der Wiener Akademie, philologisch-historische Classe*, 1894, No. 1, pp. 3-9.

⁷ C/. EUSEBIUS, *H. E.*, VI, 39 ff., and thereon A. HARNACK, *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1894, pp. 38 ff.; TH. MOMMSEN, *Römisches Strafrecht*, 1899, p. 568, n. 5.

and Antisemitism broke out, not only once, but repeatedly, in a fashion threatening the peace of the empire.

Something was already known on this matter from two writings of the Alexandrian philosopher and theologian Philo, in which he narrates the outrages inflicted by the Alexandrian mob on the Jews under the rule of Governor Flaccus in 35 A. D., and also his journey with the deputation sent because of this affair to the court of Emperor Caius Caligula. I pass over the problems in literary history which these two works present. Evidently they are parts only of one or two larger works, the one comprising, according to Eusebius,⁸ five books. Massebieau and Schürer⁹ have endeavored, each in his own way, to reconstruct their contents. From them we might, perhaps, have learned interesting particulars concerning the period of Sejanus's ministry. Still, that which is lost can not be restored through hypotheses, but only, perchance, through fortunate discoveries. It is more important for us to bring before our minds the personality of Philo—this man, thoroughly versed in the Platonic and Stoic philosophy, who writes in good classic Greek, and who has won for himself an honorable place in the history both of Greek philosophy and Greek literature, and who yet, if in his culture a Greek, was in his heart a Jew through and through. From the study of the Holy Scriptures of his nation he deduced by means of an allegorical exegesis both the ideas of the Platonists and the ethics of the Stoa. Although he expounded nearly the entire law in a symbolical way, he would yet by no means acknowledge the conclusion drawn by many of his contemporaries, viz., that one might release himself from the fulfilling of the law in its literal sense, from circumcision, from observance of the sabbath and of feasts, from forbidden foods, etc. This enlightened Judaism, which ceased to be Judaism at all, meets us in characteristic form in Philo's own nephew, Tiberius Alexander, the son of Alexander, the opulent chief farmer-of-the-taxes, who went through the entire Roman *cursus honorum*, was even for a time procurator of Judea, and during the last great Jewish uprising was one of the most influential advisers at the imperial headquarters—against his own people. Absolutely different was Philo, who, however much he stood beyond the pale of his people by reason of his culture, placed both himself and that culture unreservedly at the service of his nation, even in the hour of danger.

⁸ *H. E.*, II, 5.

⁹ L. MASSEBIEAU, "Le classement des œuvres de Philon," *Bibl. de l'école des hautes études*, 1889; E. SCHÜRER, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, Vol. III, pp. 525-30; L. COHN, "Einleitung und Chronologie der Schriften Philos," *Philologus*, Suppl. VII (1899), pp. 421 ff.

It was the year 38. Tiberius was dead; Caius, surnamed Caligula, began to reign, and at once invested his old friend, the Jewish prince Agrippa, with royal dignity in his native country of Palestine. This prince, equally worthless and immoral, had recently been obliged to suffer close confinement under the suspicious Tiberius. Shortly before, he had been happy to hold the place of market superintendent in Tiberias from his brother-in-law Herod. Now on his journey home he appeared with incredible pomp. The equipments of his body-guard gleamed with gold and silver. On the way he touched at Alexandria. Here people still remembered well how, not so long since, he had infested the great banking houses, begging in poverty. The contrast incited the fun-loving Alexandrians to a malicious satire. They dragged a poor, crazy fellow, Karabas by name, a character known to the whole city, into the theater, clothed him with royal insignia, and mocked in him the Jewish king.¹⁰

On Agrippa himself no further attack was made. But the anti-Jewish passion of the mob, now become violent, was directed against the wealthy Jews of Alexandria. Caligula's "imperial madness" and self-deification were well known. Therefore some sly rogue hit on the idea of employing this against the Jews. Also it might be hoped that by this means the bad impression which the insult to his friend Agrippa might possibly have made on the emperor could be removed. A proposition was made that in all the synagogues statues of the emperor should be set up to receive divine honors.

Flaccus, the governor of the city, who, according to Philo's own testimony, for six years under Tiberius had performed the duties of his office with entire justice and with the greatest prudence, not sure, under the new régime, of the imperial favor, and consequently of his post, permitted anything. Naturally the Jews refused to allow the statues of the emperor to be placed in their synagogues relying on their privileges which assured them the protection of their own form of worship untainted by such images. This refusal led to the seizure of their synagogues. Even private dwellings were broken open, completely plundered, and the inmates horribly tortured. For the horrors which then followed—the scourging of the eldest of the community before the people in the theater, the burnings, stonings, etc.—we have, it is true, only the *ex parte* testimony of Philo, who may have indulged in rhetorical exaggeration. But there is no good

¹⁰ The affair was a wanton jest conceived at the moment, and it had as little to do with the Roman license of the king of the Saturnalia as had the mocking of Jesus by the Roman soldiery. WENDLAND, "Jesus als Saturnalienkönig," *Hermes*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 175-79.

ground for denying that an outbreak of Antisemitic fanaticism in this populace, accustomed to horrors of every sort, might have produced such cruelties.¹¹

How much farther matters went we do not know. It is at least certain that Flaccus in the autumn of 38 was suddenly imprisoned and sent into exile. Also we know that the Jews exerted themselves both to pay homage to the emperor in other ways and to establish their loyalty to him. Already at the time of his accession to the throne they had decreed all manner of honors for him, so far as was possible within the bonds of their religious principles. But the decree of homage kept back by Flaccus came to the emperor's knowledge only later through Agrippa. Thus even now both parties were endeavoring to come into direct communication with the emperor. Accordingly, in the winter (probably 38-39; according to Schürer, not until that of 40), two deputations went to Rome, one headed by the Greek *littérateur* Apion, the other by Philo himself. The result was, as Josephus also informs us,¹² in the highest degree unfavorable to the Jews. While Apion had bribed a slave of the emperor's, Helikon, this method of procedure, the only one practicable at the court of Caligula, was completely unsuccessful in the case of the Jews. Therefore they suffered endless delay. After a short audience in the Campus Martius they were obliged to follow the imperial court to Puteoli; only to wait there in vain. Finally the emperor deigned to grant them the requested audience after he had returned to Rome. He received them while inspecting his new buildings in the gardens of Mæcenas and Lamia, walked noisily back and forth, hurrying and giving orders. The Jews had to follow him about constantly—a feat which at their age was by no means easy—only from time to time they were honored with a scornful question amid the plaudits of their opponents: "Are you the mad fellows who won't believe in my divinity?" and more of the same sort. Finally he dismissed them as "more foolish than criminal," thus exposing them still more to the persecuting zeal of their adversaries.

Here Philo's account leaves us, and thus ends all further accurate information. It might well be that the missing portion of Philo's work, if ever discovered, would give new particulars concerning the period immediately following.

In the meantime, however, an entirely new perspective has suddenly opened before us. A series of discoveries of papyri establishes beyond a

¹¹ Cf. also PHILO, *Adv. Flacc.*; MOMMSEN, *Römische Geschichte*, Vol. V, pp. 515 ff.; SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 495 ff.; MATHEWS, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

¹² Cf. JOSEPHUS, *Antiquities*, XVIII (257 ff.); SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 500 ff.

doubt that the events narrated by Philo are not a unique occurrence peculiar to the reign of a Caligula. The bitter hate of Greeks and Jews in Alexandria appears as a chronic evil, which, ever breaking forth afresh, produced entirely similar scenes, not alone under Caligula's successor Claudius (41-54), but even under Trajan (98-117) and Commodus (180-92).

We are concerned with the three following documents, preserved, unfortunately, in a very fragmentary condition.

I.

The first consists of two fragments, both from the same roll. The one, with two columns, is in Berlin,¹³ and has been edited and annotated by U. Wilcken.¹⁴ The other, now in the Museum at Gizeh, was found by Pierre Jouguet and was published by Th. Reinach.¹⁵ It describes a scene at the court of Claudius. In Wilcken's judgment, the writing belongs to the end of the second century, both on account of its paleographical character and since it is found on the reverse of a papyrus of the second century.¹⁶

I differ somewhat from Wilcken's filling out of the Berlin columns, since these were considered by him to be wider than is actually shown to be the case by the Gizeh fragments which are preserved in their entire width (twenty-eight to thirty-three letters).

I, 1. B. G. U. (II), 511. U. Wilcken. 19 + 14.5. Ca. 200 A. D.

	...] <u>ωρον Ταρκύνιος</u>	13
	...] <u>αρι ἀναστὰς</u>	10
	...] <u>ατον ὅλην τὴν</u>	11
	...] <u>ον ποιήσεις</u>	10
5	... ὕ] <u>πὲρ πατρίδος</u>	11
	...] <u>μεν ὑπερ</u>	7

1. Perhaps *νῆς* τὸ W. (486).

¹³ *Berliner griechische Urkunden* = B. G. U., 511.

¹⁴ "Alexandrinische Gesandtschaften vor Kaiser Claudius," *Hermes*, Vol. XXX (1895), pp. 485-98.

¹⁵ "L'empereur Claude et les antisémites Alexandrins," *Revue des études juives*, Vol. XXXI (1895), pp. 161-78.

¹⁶ Cf. further U. WILCKEN, *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, Vol. XVI (1896), pp. 1617-21; Vol. XVII (1897), p. 411; TH. REINACH, *Revue*, Vol. XXXII (1896), p. 160; Vol. XXXIV (1897), pp. 296-98; E. SCHÜRER, *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1896, 21, pp. 289 ff.; *Geschichte*³, Vol. I, pp. 67 ff.

	...] νίζετο δίκαιον ἦν	15
	...] δὲ Ἀου'ολας (sic) συνακλη-	16
	...] ἰν ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ	14
10	...] πετα . Διὸ ἐρωτῶ	12
	...] . τω τοῦτο τὸ ἅπαξ	13
	...] . τοῦ τηλικούτου	13
	...] οὐλὸν προσηκούσης	14
	...] εἰ μὴ οὗτοι παρε-	14
15	...] ἐν συμβουλείῳ	11
	...] ἐκάθισεν . Ἐκλήθησαν	17
	[οἱ τῶν Ἀλεξανδρέων (?) πρέσ] βεις καὶ μετετάξατο	(20 +) 17
	... εἰς αὐ] ριον ἀκούσαι αὐτῶν .	15
	[Ἔτους ιβ' (?) Κλαυδίου Καίσα] ρος Σεβαστοῦ	(20 +) 11
20	[Ἀυτοκράτορος (?) Παχῶν ε .	(12 +) 6

17. οἱ τῶν Ἀλεξανδρέων (?) πρέσ], Wilcken: These twenty letters are surely too many.

18. Perhaps ὁ Καῖσαρ εἰς τὸ αὐ] 14 + 15 = 29 letters.

19. Ἔτους τρισκαίδεκάτου (?) Κλαυδίου Καίσα], Wilcken (thirty-one letters). Supported principally by the fact that only this combination fills out the line. The number to be restored must remain uncertain, yet ε' (the tenth year = 50), is the earliest, and ιδ' (the fourteenth year = 54) the latest possible limit.

20. Γερμανικοῦ (?) Αὐτοκράτορος (?), Wilcken.

I, 2.

	Ἡμέρα [δε] ντ[έ] ρα Παχῶ[ν ι]	May 1 (53?)
	Ἀκούει Κλαυδῖος Καῖσα[ρ Σεβαστὸς Ἰσιδώρου (?)]	19 + 17 (27)
	γυμνασιάρχου πόλεως Ἀ[λεξανδρέων]	19 + 10
	κατὰ Ἀγρίππου βασιλέω[ς ἐν τοῖς Λουκουλ]-	19 + 13
5	λιανοῖς κήποις συνκα[λέσας συμβούλειον (?)]	18 + 16
	συνκλητικ[ῶ]ν εἰκο[σ]ι π[έντε]	18 +
	ὑπατικῶν δέκα ἐξ, πα[ρούσης Ἀγριππίνης μετὰ]	16 + 20 (28)
	τῶν ματρωνῶν . Εἰς . [. . .	14
	Ἰσ[τ]ιδώρου, Ἰσίδωρ[ο]ς ἐν . . . [. . .	18 (21)
10	κύριέ μου Καῖσαρ, τῶν . . . [. . .	17 (20)
	ἀκούσαί μου τὰ πονοῦν[τα] . . .	18
	ὁ, αὐτοκράτωρ, μερίζω σο[φ] . . .	19

2. [ρ Σεβαστὸς Γερμανικὸς Ἰσιδώρου, Wilcken (twenty-seven letters).

3. [λεξανδρέων λόγους ποιούμενον, Wilcken (twenty-six letters).

4. [ε τῆς Χαλκίδος (?) ἐν τοῖς Λουκουλ, Wilcken (twenty-five letters). The filling out Λουκουλ seems certain. But the first portion which gives to the βασιλέω a more definite location is without any foundation.

5. After συμβούλειον (βουλὴν would be too short a form) there is no need for further additions.

7. [ρούσης Ἀγριππίνης Σεβαστῆς μετὰ, Wilcken (twenty-eight letters). Possibly we should write it παρουσῶν Σεβαστῆς καὶ (seventeen letters), since the completion above (twenty letters) is somewhat wide.

	ἡμέραν συνεπένευ[σαι . . .	15
	καθήμενοι [π]άντες σ[. . .	16
15	εἰδότες, ὁποῖό[ι ἐσ]τιν ὁ [Ἀγρίππας(?) . . .	19 +
	Κλαύδιος Καῖ[σαρ	11
	κατὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ [φίλου(?) . . .	11
	μου δύο φίλ[ους(?) . . .	9
	Θέωνα ἐξηγη[τὴν . . .	10

I, 3. Gizeh, XXXI, 132.

 ε πρέσβεια [.] ἡ πατρίς.	
	Λά[μπων τῷ Ἰσιδῶρῳ· ἐγὼ μὲν ἔ]φειδον	28
	ἥδη τὸν θάνατ[ον Κλαύ]διος Καῖσαρ·	33
	πολ[λούς μου φίλους ἀπέκτ]εινας, Ἰσίδωρε	33
5	Ἰσίδωρος· βασιλέως ἤκουσα τοῦ τότε	29
	προσ[τάξαντος· καὶ σά, λέγε, τίνος θέλεις,	33
	κα[τηγορήσω. Κλαύ]διος Καῖσαρ· ἀσφαλῶς	31
	ἀνευ μουσικῆς εἶ, Ἰσίδωρε. Ἰσίδωρος·	29
	ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εἰμι δοῦλος οὐδὲ μουσικῆς	31
10	κεν[ός, ἀλλὰ διασήμου πάλεως [Ἀ]λεξαν-	29
	δρ[εῖ[α]ς] γυμνασίου· συ δε ἐξ. δωμα . .	(31)
	. . ιος . νδα βλητος· διὸ καὶ ἀπο	
	. . ειας ἐτ . . . τη . . . ως. Ἐφ[η] Λά[μπ]ων	
	τ[ῷ] Ἰσιδῶρῳ· τοίγαρ ἄλλο ἔχομεν εἰ παρα-	33
15	φρ[ονοῦντι] βασιλεῖ τόπον δεδέναι;	29
	Κ[λαύ]διος Καῖσαρ· οἷς προεκέλευσα	28
	τ[ὸν] θάνατον τοῦ Ἰσιδώρου καὶ Λάμπων- [ος	30

11, 12 συνεξ. λαμν [. .] ησιουδα [.] βλητος, Jouguet, in Wilcken, B. ph. W., 17, 411; = οὐ δὲ ἐκ Σαλώμης τῆς Ἰουδαίας W.

12. . . ης Ἰουδα[ι]. Jouguet, in Wilcken, B. ph. W., 16, 1619, 2.

14. 1. τί γάρ . . ἡ, Reinach-Schürer.

15. δεδέναι = διδόναι, Reinach = δεδωκέναι, Schürer, Wilcken, B. ph. W., 16, 1619, 2.

16. Instead of οἷς προεκ: Ὑσίδωρε ἐκέλευσα, Wilcken, B. ph. W., 16, 1629 (withdrawn, *ibid.*, 17, 411).

Of the beginning too little has been preserved to permit a translation to be given. At the end of the first column the document reads:

The deputies of the Alexandrians were called,
and (the emperor) promised to hear them tomorrow
(In the twelfth year) of Cæsar (Claudius)
Augustus (the emperor), on the 5th Pachon. [April 30.]

Thus close the minutes of the first day. Manifestly there had preceded a discussion in the Senate or in the imperial council, in which two

senators at least had spoken, Tarquinius and Aviolaus; names which astonish us in those times, and which appear learned reminiscences of old Etruscan history—Claudius wrote, as is well known, an Etruscan history in twenty books—but which nevertheless must be ascribed to contemporary senators. What these gentlemen had said can no longer be established with any accuracy; nor is it certain whether the discussion was only concerning the admission of the Alexandrian embassy, or whether possibly some other embassy, perhaps that of the Alexandrian Jews, had previously had an audience.

The minute continues in the second column:

Second day, 6th Pachon [May 1].

The emperor Claudius (Augustus) hears (Isidor) the gymnasiarch of the city of Alexandria who brings a complaint (?) against King Agrippa, in the gardens of Lucullus after a (council of state ?) had been called together, consisting of twenty-five senators (among them) sixteen of consular rank, in the presence of (Agrippina ? with) the matrons.

It does not appear doubtful to me that here before this brilliant assembly in the gardens of Lucullus the deputation of the Alexandrians, at whose head stood the gymnasiarch Isidor, had the audience which was granted to them the day before.¹⁷

What follows is again uncertain. Isidor advanced and evidently requested a hearing for his bill of complaint against Agrippa. The emperor, however, replied that he was now speaking against his (the emperor's) friend, just as he had already murdered two of his friends, one of them the exegete Theon—probably a high Egyptian official.

In the further proceedings preserved in the Gizeh fragment there appears along with Isidor an associate of the same sort, Lampon, encouraging him through reference to the fact that he (Lampon) had already looked death close in the face. In answer to the emperor's repeated reproach that he had already killed many of his friends,¹⁸ Isidor vindicates himself with the declaration that in so doing he had only executed the orders of the then reigning emperor, and proffers the present emperor the same service; truly a very awkward expression of unconditional loyalty, which the emperor

¹⁷ Schürer's doubt as to whether one condemned to death could serve as a member of a deputation arises from the mistaken supposition that the condemnation mentioned at the end of the Gizeh fragment occurred at an earlier date. It may well have resulted as a consequence of the commission of lèse majesté in the course of this very audience.

¹⁸ AD. BAUER, *op. cit.*, p. 33, referring to LeBlant understands *Amici Caesaris* as only loyal subjects. But the application to Agrippa and the exegete Theon which immediately precedes points in the opposite direction. In John 19:12 it is not an ordinary subject but the procurator that is so described.

repels with the rebuke: "Verily, thou art an uncultivated fellow, Isidor." He, however, takes this very ill: "I am neither a slave nor without culture, but the gymnasiarch of the celebrated city of Alexandria."¹⁹ Thou, however. . . ." (the following revilings are unfortunately no longer legible). Wilcken believes that there was here an offensive allusion to Claudius's relations with a Jewess Salome. In spite of Bauer's agreement, I consider this very doubtful.

At this point his companion Lampon puts in, as it were, a conciliatory word: "What else have we (done) than given place to (obeyed) a crazy emperor?"—a reference, as it appears, to the murderous service rendered to the predecessor of Claudius (Wilcken, Schürer); since the other meaning of the word as a rebuke—"What else have we (to do now) but to give place to a crazy emperor" (Reinach, Bauer), surely exhibits such an excess of freedom, when directed to the emperor in his very presence, that it can scarcely be credited, even from a Lampon. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the characterization of Gaius Caligula as a "crazy emperor" in the presence of his successor is not an unheard of thing; it is used in almost these terms in Claudius's decree, preserved by Josephus, in favor of the Alexandrian Jews, as follows: "on account of his great insanity and madness, he oppressed those who would not abandon their ancestral religion and address him as God."²⁰

If we accept the genuineness of these words, which, however, is not to be done without some doubt, we may suppose that Lampon in the above-mentioned sentence desired to refer directly to that imperial edict. Nevertheless this expression in the mouth of the Alexandrian was an impertinence; and, in fact, punishment followed instantly. The document continues: "to whom I have already given orders for the execution of Isidor and Lampon" Here the fragment breaks off, but it is plainly to be completed, "these shall carry out my orders." Later we find the execution of both mentioned as an accomplished fact.

This whole matter, scarcely intelligible in itself, first appears in its true light when we consider it in connection with the report of Philo, on the one hand, and the fragments to follow, on the other. So it becomes

¹⁹ Compare with the διασήμου πόλεως Ἀλεξανδρίας, Acts 21:39, Τάρσεως τῆς Κιλικίας, οὐκ ἀσήμου πόλεως πόλεως.

²⁰ JOSEPHUS, *Antiquities*, XIX, 5, 2 (278-85), 284, τοῦ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ παραφροσύνην οὐ μὴ παραβῆναι ἠθέλησε τὸ Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος τὴν πατρῶιον θρησκείαν καὶ θεὸν προσαγορεύειν αὐτὸν ταπεινώσαντος αὐτοῦ. The words διὰ τὴν Γαζον παραφροσύνην are repeated in 285. The two epistles, while they are under strong suspicion of being fabrications, may be genuine. Cf. RANKE, W. G., Vol. III, p. 97; MOMMSEN, R. G., Vol. V, p. 523.

manifest that the matter in question is a quarrel between the Antisemites and Jews of Alexandria. The latter are indeed not mentioned in these fragments. But of that more hereafter.

II.

The second document exists fortunately in two different texts.

a) The first is preserved in a papyrus written on both sides of the sheet, all in one piece, with three columns on each side. It is found among the treasures of the Louvre (Pap., 2376 *bis*, ol. 68); while an additional fragment with only one column is in the British Museum (*Fayum Papyri*, I). These three tattered remnants, concerning which Letronne had remarked, "rien à en tirer," were published by Brunet de Presle,²¹ and later, with very much better text, by U. Wilcken.²²

The London fragment, published meanwhile by F. G. Kenyon,²³ U. Wilcken has connected with the others.²⁴

In addition there is also—

b) A Berlin fragment, published by Krebs²⁵ and reviewed by U. Wilcken.²⁶ This latter (*b*), corresponding to about an eighth part of the former (*a*), is of essential service in the filling out of (*a*), just as (*a*) in turn first becomes entirely legible through (*b*). This mutual completion is shown below by the use of different styles of type. Its usefulness extends also beyond the part common to both documents; for through (*b*) the original width of the columns of (*a*) is established. This is not so large as Wilcken at first supposed.

The relation of these two texts is not, however, that of two copies of the same text. Rather are they two different recensions. Now one, now the other, shows important additions. Therefore they may be considered either as two different accounts of the same transaction, or as two independent extracts from the same minute.

²¹ *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale*, Vol. XVIII, 2 (1865), pp. 383 ff. (tab. XLVI).

²² "Ein Aktenstück zum jüdischen Kriege Trajans," *Hermes*, Vol. XXVII (1892), pp. 464–80; and TH. REINACH, "Juifs et Grecs devant un empereur romain," *Revue des études juives*, Vol. XXVII (1893), pp. 70–82; cf. also F. KREBS in the *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, 1895, No. 48, pp. 1524–26.

²³ *Catalogue of Greek Papyri in the British Museum*, 1893, p. 229.

²⁴ *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1894, p. 749.

²⁵ *B. C. U.*, p. 341.

²⁶ *Hermes*, Vol. XXX (1895), pp. 482–85. Cf. DEISSMANN, *Bibelstudien*, 1895, 62 ff.; VOGELSTEIN UND RIEGER, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, Vol. I (1896), pp. 17 ff.; SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 65 f.

II, a.

I, recto (Par. E).

[Πα]ύλος πε[ρ]ι τ[ο]ῦ βασιλέως ἐν . . .
 [...] οὗς προήγαγον καὶ ἐτο[ί]α . . .
 [...] οὐ ἀνηγ[ό]ρευσε, καὶ Θέω[ν]
 [π]ερὶ τούτ[ου] διάταγμα ἀνέγνω [του]
 5 [Α]ούπου ὡς προάγειν αὐ[τ]οὺς
 [ἐ]κέλευε χλευάζων τὸν [ἀ]πὸ
 [σ]κηνῆς καὶ ἐκ μείμου βασιλεία.
 [Ο]ύτως ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ
 [ἐ]σχενδίασεν εἰπὼν πρὸς
 10 [Π]αῦλον καὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρου[ς]
 [π]ά[ν]τα[ς], 'Ἐν ταῖς τ[ο]ι[αύταις] π[α]
 [ρα]τάξεσι[ς] τ[ε]ίνε[ται] ἐμοῦ ἡ
 ἐν τῷ Δακικῷ πολέμ[ω]ι
 [...] θυλεῖτ[αι] των π[ο] . . .
 15 [...] ὡν ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν . . .
 [...] ἀνδρας ἔ τὸν . . .
 [...] πόλεσι μόνοι . . .
 [...] ας τι ἔχειν . . .
 [...] σα αὐ[τ]οῦ . . .
 20 [...] καὶ κα[τὰ] . . .
 [...] . . .
 [...] π[ρ]ο[ς] . . .
 [...] ν[ο] . . .
 25 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 . . .
 30 . . .
 . . .

2. ετος? R.
 3. [ορεν] R.
 10. ἡμετέρου[ς] | ταῦτα ἐν R.
 12. γείνε[ται] ἐμοῦ . η R.
 13. . εν R.
 14. συ]θυλειτωτων π . . R. Ρεθαρσλεγκιώνων.
 15. . . ατος [τ]ων ἐκεῖ? α(ὐ)τὸν R.
 16. . . ρων R.

II, recto (Par. A).

[.] Καῖσαρ 'Ιουδαίοις· 'Ἐμαθον.'
 ['Ιουδαῖοι . . .] οὐτω θον . . αρχηι τῆς
 [.] καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἤρξεται
 [.] δλίγα καὶ πε[ρ]ι τοῦ 'Ανθίμου
 5 [.] δειχθῇ τῷ κυρίῳ ἐφ' οὗ
 [δδε ὁ πόλεμ]ος ἐκινήθη, ὅτι καὶ με-
 [τ'] αὐτοῦ? τῇ? ἀποδημίαν ταῦτα ἐγένετο
 [. . εἰς τὰς] κωστωδίας ἤρπασαν καὶ
 [ἀρπασθέν?]τας ἐτραυμάτισαν.'
 10 [Καῖσαρ· 'Περὶ τ]ῶν πάντων συνέγγων
 [τοῖς 'Αλεξ]ανδρείσι. 'Αλλ[λ]ὰ τοῖς ποιη-
 [σας] ταῦτα δ[ε] εἰ ἐ[π]ίρχεισ[θ]αι;
 ['Ιουδαῖοι] ανος θεων ἐμ
 [.] αὐτο[ῦ] κράτ[ω]ρ, χάρις σου
 15 [.] ρον[τ]α περὶ τοὺς
 [.] μᾶλ[λ]ον αὐτῶν
 [.] σ κε[]ς πιστευ-
 [.] ἡμεῖ[ς] περὶ ὧν ἐ
 [.] ειν .[. .] θόνων
 20 [.] αθοι ὀλι-
 [γ] δ[ε] ψέ.'
 [Καῖσαρ 'Αλεξ]ανδρεῖς
 [.] τοῖς
 [.] παρα] κριθεν
 25 [τες ἦσαν ἐξήκοντα 'Αλεξ]ανδρεῖς
 [τε καὶ τούτων] δοῦλοι, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 ['Αλεξανδρεῖς ἐξεβληθησα]ν, οἱ
 [δὲ δοῦλοι αὐτῶν ἐκεφαλίσθησαν]

 30

2. . . . ου τω θον ἡ ἀρχή(ι) τῆς. R.
 3. σταςεως? R.
 5. ἀπε·] δείχθη(ι) R. 10. Περὶ μὲν] ὡν R.
 6. <δδε R. 11. οὐκ 'ΑΛ. W.
 7. <τῇ R. 12. ἐπεξέρχεσθαι W.
 8. ὡς ἐκ τῆς R. 12. <ταῦτα R.
 8. ἐκ τῆς W. 22. 'Ελληνες? W.
 9. στρεβλωθέντας? W. 27. οὐ W. (Possibly) οἱ.

II, a.—Continued.

III, recto (Par. B).	
	ἡ τὸ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις [δεδομέ- ?]
	νον δάκρ[υ] προπεμψ[άτων . . .]
	ὥστε εἴ τινες ἐδ[ε] [ει ἐκβλη-]
	θῆναι ἀπὸ Ἀλεξανδρε[ίας τοὺς]
5	οὐδὲ ἦττον καὶ οὐ[χ ὑφ' ἡμῶν]
	ἀρπασθέντας ὡς [φασιν, ἀλλ' ?]
	ὑπὸ τούτων ἠρπάσ<θ>[ησαν]
	εἰς ἡμετέραν συκο[φαντίαν . . .]
	ὅσοι μὲν τελείως δια[σωθησὶ]
10	μενοὶ πρὸ[ς] τοὺς κυρ[ε]ῖς κατέ-]
	φ[υγο]ν αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐ[τῶν]
	παρεστάθησαν; 'Κα[ί]σαρ· 'Παρεστάθη ?]
	σαν.'
	[Ἰο]υδαῖοι· 'Κύριε ψευδον[ταὶ οἱ ταῦτα λέ]-
15	[γο]ντες οὐδ' ὅσοι ἦσαν ἀν[θρώποι] Ἰσασιν.']
	[Κα]ίσαρ Ἰουδαίοις· 'Φανε[.]
	άτους οὐ δύνασθε δέ[.] δ[-
	μ' εἰσιν Ἀλεξανδρεῖς [.]
	νες Ἀλεξανδρεῖς εὐχ[.]
20	πεποιηκέναι ἢ ἄλλου [.]
	ὁ ἐπαρχὸς μου ἐν αἷ [ἐγραψεν δια-]
	τάγματι δηλοῖ δυνα[.]
	μῶν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ το[ῦ]ς πρὸς . . .]
	ἀμαρτάνοντας δ[ο]ύ[λους] γενέσθαι]
25	εἰκός. Πάντας γὰρ κα[κ]οῦργους ? καὶ οἱ]
	Ἑλληνας καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς [ὕμῃς ? νομίζομεν ?]
	[τ]οὺς ἀχρεῖους δούλου[ς]]
	καὶ π[ε]ρὶ τῶν κα[.]
	[τα]ῦτα καὶ πόσοι ε. η[.]
30	[. . .]ς πεποιηκότες ἐκολ[άσθησαν]
	[δι]ότι [ἐ]κολάσθησαν [.]

1. δι τὸ W. 484.

7. ἠρπάγησαν W.

12. Παρεστάθησαν κα[ὶ] ἐκολάσθη W. παρεστάλησαν R.

15. ἀν[δρες] R.

16. φανε[ρὸν] ὅτι τοὺς αἰτῶ[ν]τάτους οὐ δύνασθε δε[ῖ]κνυσθαι . . .] Baucet.

22. δύνα[σθαι] R.

23. μοι R.

IV, recto (Lond.)

] Καίσαρ· 'καὶ οὐδ']
] ὡν Θείων ἀνέγν[ω]]
] μὲν Λούπου . [.]
] τα ὅπλα καὶ ἀνα[.]
5] . ποιᾶς ἐσχεν ἀφ.]
] ἀπα[ιτ]εῖ[ν] ὑμᾶς]
] ἐρχαν θε[λ]ετ . .]
] νομένους στρατι-]
] οριανοὺς καὶ η[. . .]
10	ἐρ[ω]τήσωσιν στινες]
] περὶ τοῦ ἀπὸ σκηνη[ς]]
] . ἀκριβὲς τε]
] καὶ Κλαυδιανοῦ]
] ντω]
]
]
]

illegible up to l. 31.

7. εν λετε Kenyon. Wilcken, G. G. A., 1894, 749.

II, a—Continued.

V, *verse* (Lond.).

] ν
]. εἰς
]. ε θησον
] γτο δυσι
 5]ς ω
] ὑποφε-
] ν και χειρο-
 ή] μέρας θ
 πε] μφθε [.]. ὑπὸ
 10 ε] ναντίας νε
] ου Καί[σ]αρος
 ἀν] θρώποις
] αλλα . . . ι και
] φέρονται
 15] αἰς καθ' ἡμῶν
] να κατε [.].
]. ω [.]

 20

 25

 30

VI, *verse* (Par. C).

[II] αὔλο[ς·] 'Ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ τάφος μοι
 μό[ρος] πεφροντίσθαι ὃν νο-
 μί[ζω] καταλαβεῖν. Ἐπὶ τοῦτον
 δὲ πορευόμενος οὐ δειλιά-
 5 σω σοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰπὲν.
 Οὕτως ἀκουσόν μου, Καῖσαρ, ὥς
 μεθ' ἡμέραν μηκέτι ὄντος.
 [Α] ντωνείνος· 'Κυρίε μου Καῖσαρ,
 μὰ τὴν σὴν τύχην ἀληθῶς
 10 λέ[γ]ει, ὥς μεθ' ἡμέραν μίαν
 μηκέτι ὦν. εἰ γὰρ τοσοῦτων
 ἐπι[σ]τωλῶν ἡμᾶς ὥς
 ἐπι[γ]όντων ἡμᾶς ὥς διέτα-
 ξαν ὁσίους Ἰουδα[ί]ους προσ-
 15 κατοκεῖν ο. ου πα[ρα]βόλως
 ἔσχον ἀναπ[εί]πτειν καὶ πο-
 λεμεῖν τὴν εὐπ[ερί]ωνυμο
 ν ἡμῶν πόλιν περὶ τούτων
 σου δίδιαν, ἐπιστολὴν ἐ-
 20 δέξω εἰς τὰς εὐερ[γ]εσίους
 σου χεῖρας, ἐξ ὧν φανερόν
 ἐστιν περὶ τῶν ἀ[ληθ]εστάτων
 σου λόγων. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι
 καὶ τοῦτο πεποιήκε κατὰ σοῦ
 25 μηδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν ἔ-
 χων τῶν πρὸς ἡμᾶς γε-
 γεννημένων γ[.]ων.
 [Κ] αἶσαρ· Παῦλος [.]
 θωι Ἀντων[ε]ιν . . .] εἰς
 30

12. ἐπι[σ]τωλῶν R.
 13. ἐπ[ε]ιγόντων R.
 14. ξαν < τοῖς ἀν > οσίους R.
 15. οἱ οὐ R.
 19. οὐδεμ[ί]αν ἐπισ[τ]ολὴν R.
 21. φ[α]νερόν R.
 22. ἀ[ρ]εστάτων R.
 24. πεποιήτ[α] κατὰ τ(?) οὐ R.
 27. γ[ραμμά]των R.
 28. [μὲν ? ἀφ]είσ[θ]ω(ι) Ἀντων[ε]ίνος δέ.

II, a—Continued.

VII, verso (Par. D + F).		VIII, verso (Par. E).	
	δεθῆι τῶι[.....].σιν		ταῦτα τ[
	ἡμᾶς τὸ [.....]ς κατὰ		πιγνούς [
	τὸ παρὸν [.....] θέντος		γ[εγ]εννη[
	αἱ σεβασ[.....].ις πρὸς		Ἄντων[
5	τοὺς δ.[.....]νον κο-	5	ἀναιρεθ[
	λάζιν κα[ὶ ἀγειν?] ὑπὸ ξύλον		μέλλωι [
	καὶ ὑπὸ κα[.....]όντα κάβα-		μεβλε[
	σιν εἰς .ν[.....] Ἰουδαίων		σως. Ἐ[
	τοῦτον φ[.....] αλλουτριου		τοῖς ορ[
10	προς αν[.....] πρεσβεία γε	10	διαταξ[
	γεγεννημ[ένον. . .] φανερός ἐστιν		ται εν[
	α[.] τατ[.....] . . . [.] ἀρξας κα		κλη δυ[
	θ[.....] σμα κατὰ	
	Ἰο[υδαίων]] των	
15	α[.....] εν στοι	15
	λ[.....] μφα.	
	τ[.....] ασης	
	κ[.....]	

20	20

25	25

30	30

II, b B. G. U. (I), 341.

[... πα]ύσασθαι σιω[π]ησαν[τ]
 [.....]των ἐνίστασο μ[..... ἐκ]
 [τῆς κωστῶ]δίας ἤρπασαν καὶ σ[τρεβλωθέντας? ἐτραυμάτισαν. Καὶ]-
 [σαρ· 'συν?]έγνω οὐκ 'Αλεξ[ανδρεῖσι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ποιήσασι?]
 5 [...]πολ[λ]άκις ἐπεξέρχεσθ[αι]
 Αὐτο[ι] κράτ[ω]ρ· 'Αλεξανδρεῖς οὐκ ..[.....]
]σον...[.....]κριθεντες ἦσαν ἐξ[έ]κοντα 'Αλεξανδρεῖς τε καὶ τούτων
 δο[ὺ]λοι καὶ οἱ μὲν 'Αλεξανδρεῖς [ἐξεβλήθησαν? οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι αὐτῶν]
 ἐκ]εφαλίσθησαν (sic) μηδενὸς τῶν .[.....]
 10]αντων αὐτῶν εἰ τὸ πᾶσιν [ἀνθρώποις δεδομένον? δάκρυ προ-]
 πεμ]ψαντων ὥστε, εἴ τινες εἶδει [ἐκβλήθηται ἀπὸ 'Αλεξανδρείας οὐ]-
 δε]ν δὲ ἦττον ὥς φασιν τοὺς ἀρπασ[θέντας καὶ οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἀλλ']
 ὑπὸ] τούτων ἤρπαττησαν εἰς ἡμερ[^{τε sic}α]ν συκοφαντία. "Ὅσοι μὲν τε-]
 λεω]ς δ[ι]ασωθησόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἰδι[ο]υς κατέφυγον, αἱ τοὶ εἰς αὐ]
 15]π[... π]αρεστάθησαν καὶ ἐκολάσθησ[α]ν
]ε.[...]οι περὶ π[.....]ος[.....]..[

4, 5. [ἀλλὰ τοῖς ποιήσασι ταῦτα γυν καὶ] πολλάκις ἐπεξέρχεσθ[αι] δεῖ... Bauer.

6. αὐτοκράτωρ, W. (vocative), cf. P. II. 14.

7. [...]ο παρ[α]κριθε W. 484, 2. with ἐξέκοντα, cf. P. I, 16.

This document takes us to an entirely different period. Very unfortunately, the ruling emperor is not mentioned, but with the greatest probability Wilcken considers him to be Trajan (cf. Schürer, Bauer); while, with less likelihood, Reinach supposed him first to be one of the Antonines, most probably Marcus Aurelius; later on Reinach changed his opinion and suggested Hadrian. Before him, it seems, are arrayed two deputations, one Jewish and the other Alexandrian, to which belong a certain Paulus and Antoninus, perhaps also one Theon, who, as it happens, produces and reads an edict of the Roman governor Lupus against the Jews, and also a similar one of a certain Claudianus. The matter under discussion is clearly a revolt of the Jews, which Wilcken has, with the highest penetration, connected with that well-known rebellion which, originating in Cyrene, later spread over all Egypt under Trajan in the year 115. In this rebellion a certain Andreas, surnamed Lukuas, made his appearance as king of the Jews, and at the head of the insurrectionary hordes is reported to have slaughtered several hundred thousand Egyptians. The Alexandrians took revenge for this by a fearful massacre of the Jews living in their city.²⁷

²⁷ Cf. EUSEBIUS, *H. E.*, IV, 2; SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 662 ff.

To this occasion we should refer both the mentioned edict of Lupus, who gave in derision the command to bring before him τὸν ἀπὸ σκηνῆς καὶ ἐκ μείμνου βασιλέα—i. e., the king of the stage and actors—and also the complaint of the Jews that the prisons had been broken into and they themselves dragged forth and maltreated. To a chiding remark of the emperor to the effect that such a thing took place while he was engaged in the Dacian war, the Jews affirmed that the whole thing came from sixty men, and that after the departure of the lord (reference is made either to the emperor's predecessor,²⁸ or perhaps to the governor²⁹) the matter had come to an outbreak. The emperor announces that he had pardoned the Alexandrians, but judgment must be entered against the ring-leaders. Hereupon the deputation of the Alexandrians (?) explained that sixty men had already been exiled and their slaves beheaded on account of this affair; much more reason was there for proceeding against the Jews, since they had contrived the whole affair themselves, to calumniate the Alexandrians. As the Jews are branding this statement as a lie, the emperor puts in a word for the Alexandrians, who had simply obeyed the order of his governor, as Theon had read it; the Jews were known to be ἀχρεῖοι δοῦλοι, "unprofitable servants" (cf. Matt. 25:30); moreover, it was admitted that those who had allowed themselves to commit violence in excess of the governor's orders had already suffered punishment. It is strong language that the emperor employs against the Jews, but that is easily intelligible if the trial took place after the emperor's military operations in the East, when a formidable rising of the Jews required to be rigorously stamped out. We should rather be surprised at the emperor's impartiality and justice; he dismissed the complaint of the Jews, but he did not entirely accede to the wishes of the opposing delegation who aimed at the rehabilitation of the exiles and at a complete defeat of the Jews. On this point their spokesman made a further and clearer statement. Paulus affirmed that he had now but one care remaining—to be buried in Alexandria (did he expect execution,³⁰ or was he already so old and weak that he was expecting his end?); so he would not fear to tell the emperor the truth. The emperor ought to listen to him as to one who would

²⁸ Reinach, who maintains this as an argument against Wilcken's date in the reign of Trajan.

²⁹ KREBS, in the *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, 1894, p. 1525; SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 66.

³⁰ This is the common idea; cf. SCHÜRER. Bauer supposes, on insufficient grounds, that in the interval the trial took a turn which led to the condemnation of Paulus. The haphazard mention of an earlier condemnation is quite out of the question.

be on earth but a day. Antoninus, his associate, seconded him: "By thy fortune, my lord the emperor, he speaks truly, as one who will be living but a day;" and he goes on to say that the emperor could not have received letters from Alexandria in which it was set forth that the Jews had been compelled to herd together in a quarter, a *ghetto*, in order that they might never again be able to take by surprise the city of Alexandria.³¹ The transaction ends with the dismissal of Paulus, while Antoninus is kept in custody. To what end?

By far the best preserved and clearest is a third document which is found among the Oxyrhynchus papyri. It is a leaf of papyrus, 15 cm. high and 44.7 cm. wide, whose front exhibits a copy of a contract from the archives of Oxyrhynchus, while on the back is seen our text in five columns, written in a hand belonging to about the end of the second century. It is edited by Grenfell and Hunt.³²

III.

I.

[π]ατρί μου καὶ [...]ε[.....] ὅτι
μήτε χρεῖαν[...]σ.[.....]αι
[...]σ...δεις[...]...[.....]. ὑπε
[.....]...αμε[.....]νος.[.]εν κἀ-
5 γὰρ κα[.....]ν[...]αὐτοῦ
γε ταῦτα λέγον[το]ς στρ[α]φεῖς καὶ
ιδὼν Ἡλιοδωρον εἶπεν· Ἡλιο-
δωρε, ἀπαγομένου μου οὐδὲν
λαλεῖς; Ἡλιοδωρος εἶπεν·
10 'καὶ τίιν ἐχομεν λαλῆσαι μὴ ἐχον-
[τ]ες τὸν ἀκούοντα; τρέχες, τέκνον,
τελευτα. κλέος σοί ἐστιν
ὑπὲρ τῆς γλυκντάτης σου πατρί-
δος τελευτῆσαι. μὴ ἀγωνία·

II.

καὶ [.....] καὶ [...]ας σε διώκω
ἐκ π.[.....] ανω.' Αὐτοκράτωρ με-
τεκ[α]λέσατο αὐτόν. Αὐτοκράτωρ εἶπεν·
'[τῷ]ν οὐκ οἶδας τίιν [λα]λεῖς;' Ἀππιανός·
5 'ἐπίσταμαι· Ἀπ[πι]ανός τυράννην·
Αὐτοκράτωρ', [οὐκ,] ἀλλὰ βασιλεῖ.' Ἀππι-
ανός· 'τοῦτο μὴ λέγε· τῷ γὰρ θεῷ
'Αντωνεῖνω [τ]ῷ π[ατ]ρί σου ἐπρεπε
αὐτοκρατορεῖν. ἄκουε· τὸ μὲν
10 πρῶτον ἢ[τ] φιλόσοφος, τὸ δεύτερον
ἀφιλάργυρος, τ[δ] τρίτον φιλάγαθος· σοὶ
τούτων τὰ ἐναντία ἐνκειται· τυραν-
νία ἀφιλοκαγαθία ἀπαιδία.' Καῖσαρ ἐ-
κέλευσεν αὐτὸν ἀπαχθῆναι. Ἀππι-
15 ανός ἀπαγομένος εἶπεν· 'καὶ τοῦτο

³¹ The suppression of the letters was an insult to the emperor's majesty, in seeking to predispose him against the Alexandrians.

³² No. XXXIII, *vo.*, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Vol. I (1898), pp. 62-68, Egypt Exploration Fund, Græco-Roman Branch. Cf. on this document TH. MOMMSEN, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Academie*, 1898, p. 498; AD. DEISSMANN, *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1896, pp. 602-6; VON WILAMOWITZ-MÖLLENDORF, *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1898, pp. 690 ff.; F. BLASS, *Literarisches Centralblatt*, 1898, p. 1076; O. CRUSIUS, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Beilage, p. 225; WEIL, *Revue des études grecques*, Vol. XI (1898), pp. 243 f.; TH. REINACH, *Revue des études juives*, Vol. XXXVII (1898), pp. 218-25; MITTEIS, *Hermes*, Vol. XXXIV (1899), pp. 88-91.

III.

ἡμεῖν χάρι[σ]αι, κύριε Καῖσαρ.
 Αὐτοκράτωρ· τί;· Ἀππιανός· κέλευ-
 σόν με ἐ[ῖ]ν[υ] τῇ εὐγενείᾳ μου ἀπα-
 χθῆναι.
 5 Ἀππιανὸς λαβὼν τὸ στροφεῖον
 ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλ[ῆ]ς ἔθηκεν καὶ τὸ
 φακάσ[ω]ν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόδας θείας ἀνε-
 βόησεν [μ]έσης Ῥώμης· συνδράμε-
 τε, Ῥωμ[α]ῖοι, θεωρήσατε ἓνα ἀπ' αἰῶ-
 10 νος ἀπαγόμεν[ον] γυμνασίᾳρχον καὶ
 πρε[σ]βευτὴν Ἀλεξανδρέων· ὁ ἡβό-
 [κατο]ς εὐθύς δραμῶν παρέθετο
 [τῷ] κυρίῳ λέγων· κύριε, κάθη, Ῥωμαῖ-
 15 οὖ γονγύζο[υσ]ι.
 Αὐτοκράτωρ· περὶ
 τίνας;· ὁ ὑπατος· περὶ τῆς ἀπάξεως

IV.

τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως· Αὐτοκράτωρ·
 μεταπεμφθῆτω· Ἀππιανὸς
 εἰσελθὼν εἶπεν· τίς ἤδη τὸν δεύ-
 τερόν μου ἄδην προσκυνοῦντα
 5 καὶ τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ τελευτήσαντας,
 Θέωνά τε καὶ Ἰσίδωρον καὶ Λάμ-
 πωνα, μετεκαλίστατο; ἄρα ἡ
 σύνκλητος ἡ σὺ ὁ λήσταρχος;
 Αὐτοκράτωρ· Ἀππιανέ, ἰώθα-
 10 μιν καὶ ἡμεῖς μαινομένους καὶ
 ἀπονενοημένους σωφρονίζειν·
 λαλεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐγὼ σε θέλω λα-
 λεῖν.
 Ἀππιανός· νῆ τὴν σὴν τύ-
 χην οὔτε μαίνομαι οὔτε ἀπονενό-
 15 ημαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑμαντοῦ εὐγε-

V.

νείας καὶ τῶν ἐ[μοί] προσηκόντων
 ἀπαγγέλλω· Αὐτ[οκράτωρ]· πῶς;
 Ἀππιανός· ὥς εὐγ[ε]νῆς καὶ γυμνασί-
 5 αρχος· Αὐτοκράτωρ· φῆς οὖν ὅτι ἡμεῖς
 ἀγενεῖς ἐσμεν;
 [Ἀππιανός· τοῦτο μὲν
 οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑμαντοῦ
 εὐγενείας καὶ τῶν ἐ[μοί] προσηκόν-
 των ἀπαγγέλλω· Αὐτοκράτωρ·
 νῦν οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι οὐκ ἀγενεῖς ἐσμεν;
 10 Ἀππιανός· τοῦτο μ[ὲν] εἰ ἀληθῶς οὐκ οἶ-
 δας, διδάξω σε. π[ρ]ῶτον μὲν Καῖσαρ ἔ-
 σωσε Κλεοπάτρ[αν]
 ἐκράτησεν βασι[λείας] καὶ ὡς λέγου
 σί τινες, ἐδάνει[σε]

II, 13 l. ἀπαχθ[ε]ν[ος]ία, Blom.

Of this text a full translation can be given. There is no question that it describes the examination of an Alexandrian Antisemite, Appian, who was condemned to death for lese-majesty by the emperor Commodus—not Marcus Aurelius, as the first editors supposed.

As he said this Appian turned, and when he saw Heliodor, he said: "Heliodor, sayest thou nothing while I am carried off?" *Heliodoros*³³ said: "And to whom shall we speak, since we have no one who hears us? Hasten, child, go! It is glorious for thee to die for thy most sweet native land. Do not despair, I will soon follow thee(?)"³⁴ The *emperor* had him summoned. The *emperor* spoke: "Now, dost thou not know to whom thou speakest?" *Appian*: "I know: Appian speaks to the tyrant." The *emperor*: "No, but to the emperor." *Appian*: "Say not so; for it befitted the god Antoninus, thy father, to have sole imperial sway. Harken: first, he was a philosopher; then, free from avarice; thirdly, a lover of justice. But thou hast qualities just the opposite of these—tyranny, hatred of justice, boorishness." The *emperor* gave orders to take him away. *Appian*, as he was led away, said: "Grant us at least this boon, O Cæsar." The *emperor*: "What?" *Appian*: "Command that I be taken away as becomes my rank." The *emperor*: "So be it" (*ἔχε, habeas*). *Appian* took his headband and placed it on his head, and after he had put his white shoes³⁵ on his feet he cried aloud in the midst of Rome: "Run hither, ye Romans, see one being put out of the world,³⁶ a gymnasiarch and deputy of the Alexandrians!" The *veteran* straightway ran and told the emperor: "Lord, while thou sittest here, the Romans are murmuring." The *emperor*: "Wherefore?" The *consul*: "Because of the arrest of the Alexandrian." The *emperor*: "Let him be brought back." *Appian*, on entering, said: "Who, then, has called me back, when I was greeting death for the second time, and those who died before me, *Theon*, *Isidor*, and *Lampon*? The senate, or thou, robber chief?" The *emperor*: "Appian, we are accustomed to bring to their senses even those who are crazed and mad. Thou speakest for so long a time as I am willing that thou should speak." *Appian*: "By thy fortune, I am neither crazy nor mad, but I demand my honor and privileges." The *emperor*: "In what way?" *Appian*: "As a man of good birth and a gymnasiarch." The *emperor*: "Dost thou mean that we are of base birth?" *Appian*: "About that I know nothing, but I stand for my honor and privileges." The *emperor*: "Now, knowest thou not that we are not of base birth?" *Appian*: "If thou really art ignorant of that, I will instruct thee: First Cæsar saved Cleopatra, then he seized the sovereignty, and as some say, he lent³⁷

We should be eager to learn the further disclosures which this gymnasiarch of Alexandria, as impudent as he was punctilious for his due honors, had to impart; but the papyrus ends abruptly.

³³ I think Grenfell is not right in identifying this Heliodorus with the prefect of Egypt, 193 A. D., Avidius Heliodorus.

³⁴ At the end of Folio I one line appears to be wanting, not five, as Bauer says, further, the first two lines of Folio II are not sufficiently preserved.

³⁵ Cf. on this peculiar dress of the gymnasiarch PLUTARCH, *Marcus Antonius*, 33.

³⁶ Reinach connects ἀπ' αὐτοῦ with γυμνασιάρχος, and translates: "un gymnasiarch perpétuel."

³⁷ Or "she seized . . . and she lent" (Reinach).

IV.

Finally mention should be made of a small fragment of the Berlin collection from Fayum, measuring 7×8.5 cm., which probably belongs with these others. Krebs, who has published it as *B. G. U*, 588, places it in the first century. It is too small and too poorly preserved to allow us to make much out of it. I content myself with printing the text.

IV.

...].σ.[.....].ας θέσω
 ...π]αρ' ὑμῶν φιλάτων με[?]
 ...]ν πορθοῦντες ὑμᾶς, οἱ γὰρ
 ...] καὶ ἔργον καὶ πάθος ἔχιν εμα-
 5 . με]ταφοράν τ' ἂν αὐτίκα τὰ πα
 ...].πο λιμένος ὁ ὑπ' ἀνθρώ-
 ...] παροξυνθεὶς εἰς τὴν ὑμε-
 ἀνθ]ρωπον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ δίκαιον
 ...]ν ἄλλ' οὐκέτι ἀπειλῆς λοι-
 10 ...'Αλεξ]ανδρεὺς Βασιλεὺς Ῥωμαίων

What, now, do these documents tell us? Notwithstanding the fact that they are spread over a period of one hundred and fifty years, relations plainly exist between them.

Let us begin with the individuals.

Isidor and Lampon, who appear first in I before Claudius, are persons by no means unknown to us; they are, there can scarcely be any doubt, the same two demagogues with whose fatal activity we have already become acquainted from the account of Philo, first before Flaccus against the Jews, then at Caligula's court against Flaccus. In Philo's report Lampon is gymnasiarch; in this one it is Isidor; and both again unite in hostility to the Jews. Is there, as Reinach thinks, any direct connection between this fact and the riot depicted by Philo and the two Alexandrian deputations? Lampon and Isidor might be considered as colleagues of that Apion who headed the Antisemite deputation to Caligula. The conjecture might be hazarded that this deputation, especially if it did not come to Rome in the winter of 38/39, but (as Schürer believes) in 40, remained in the city until after the change of rulers on January 24, 41. Then we must further understand³⁸ that they were treated with hostility under the new régime,

³⁸ In fact, Claudius soon after his accession to the throne, when the Jews of Alexandria appeared disposed to avenge themselves on the Alexandrians, showed himself in the highest degree complaisant toward them through his confirmation of all their privileges (JOSEPHUS, *Arch.*, XIX, 5, 2, 278).

several members were even condemned to death, so that only the experiment of a complaint against Agrippa appeared to be of avail for them—truly a hopeless endeavor, for Claudius owed his throne almost entirely to the energetic measures of this prince. It was impossible that he should so soon forget this service.

In truth, a number of different facts definitely oppose Reinach's combination. In the first place, not Apion, but Isidor and Lampon, appear here as the leaders; then, it is not Lampon, as in Philo, but Isidor, who is the gymnasiarch; during the stay of the delegation in Rome the change could not have taken place; at the very least a second embassy must be supposed. This, too, should not be placed at the very beginning of Claudius's reign, but somewhat later. The question is then raised: Which Agrippa is meant? Reinach and Schürer consider that it is Agrippa I. (37-44), who is well enough known to us through Philo as the patron of the Jewish community of Alexandria.³⁹ But I think Wilcken has produced decisive reasons for believing that more probably his son, Agrippa II.—since his father's death at the court of Claudius, and, after the year 50, king of Chalkis—is meant. This man, as well as his father, was the mediator for his people at the imperial court.⁴⁰ In this case the affair would have taken place, not in the first year of the reign of Claudius, but at some later time; not in 41, but between 50 and 54. Now, it was in 48 that the emperor seized the gardens of Lucullus, after Messalina had removed Valerius Atticus to get them.⁴¹ Reference is also made to Agrippina, from 49 Claudius's second wife, and not to her predecessor, Messalina, to the effect that she took a public part in affairs of state, the reception of deputations, etc.⁴² Moreover, it is specially told of her that Agrippa II. made use of her intercession with Claudius in the affair of Cumanus in the year 52. Therefore precisely this twelfth year may conjecturally be considered as the time of these events, although the years 10-14 must also be regarded as possible.⁴⁴

Accordingly, there exists no direct relation between Philo's deputation

³⁹ Cf. SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 505, 552; MATHEWS, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

⁴⁰ Cf. SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, p. 586; MATHEWS, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁴¹ Cf. TACITUS, *Ann.*, XI, 1 ff. REINACH, however, proposes to read *Ζερουλιανοῖς* instead of *Λουκουλιανοῖς*; cf. also SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 68.

⁴² Cf. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, Vol. I, p. 156; DIO, LX, 33.

⁴³ Cf. JOSEPHUS, *Ant.*, XX, 135, and thereon SCHÜRER, *loc. cit.*, p. 570.

⁴⁴ Wilcken's exact date, the 13th year (53), is the result of an incorrect supposition arising from his allowing too great a width to the columns in completing the imperfect papyrus.

to Caligula and this hearing before Claudius. Nevertheless an inner connection is not to be denied. The same Jew-baiters are the men who twice play the leading parts. Isidor and Lampon must have acquired a certain reputation among their followers as champions of Antisemitism in Alexandria. Clearly then, they are the same men whom the gymnasiarch Appian under Commodus calls his predecessors in martyrdom for the good cause of the Alexandrians. Through this reference we likewise learn that the sentence of death pronounced against them by Claudius was actually carried out.

As accompanying, or perhaps preceding, them, Appian mentions one Theon. This name, by the way, was exceedingly common in Alexandria. Curiously enough we find it used in all our documents. In I we have the exegete Theon, apparently referred to as one of the friends of Claudius murdered by Isidor in the service of Caligula; the other must surely be Flaccus. In II, Theon is a colleague of Paulus and Antoninus, and thus a member of the Antisemitic deputation. This is entirely consistent with the manner in which he is mentioned in the third document. But the fact that he is joined with Isidor and Lampon, and is even mentioned first, compels us, I believe, to admit another Theon of an earlier date. In that case it is not impossible that the same exegete Theon is referred to, in spite of the fact that, according to I, he rather appears as an opponent of Isidor. Isidor was so energetic a champion of Antisemitism, as well as so absolutely devoted a tool of Caligula's, that he broke with his associates as soon as they were inconvenient or became objects of suspicion to the emperor. No one from Philo's account will consider Flaccus as friendly to the Jews. Yet he fell a victim to Isidor. Such also was Theon's lot. It is but one of the many ironies of history that subsequently he and his slayer Isidor were classed together as martyrs to the cause of Antisemitism.

If in this interrelation of the third and first documents we may be permitted to discover the traces of a certain party tradition, we can on no account neglect the fact that gymnasiarchs regularly appear as leaders of the Antisemitic faction. We shall easily comprehend its significance if we endeavor to recall the place in national politics of the ancient gymnastic clubs. The gymnasium, rather than the school of philosophy, was the center of Greek public life. The influence of athletic training of the body reached a far wider circle and had a greater importance than the scientific training of the mind. In many Greek cities there were athletic societies for older men as well as for the youth, and participation in them was for citizens a matter, not only of honor, but of political duty.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ ZIERBARTH, *Das griechische Vereinswesen*. Athletics and gymnastics were Greek, not Roman; cf. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Sittengeschichte Roms*⁶, Vol. II, p. 485.

This was the side of Greek life that the Jews had positively no inclination for. In the books of the Maccabees it is set forth as the ἀκμή Ἑλληνισμοῦ, the culmination of the Seleucid attempt at Hellenizing, that the high-priest Jason established a gymnasium in the temple, and here the prominent young men of Jerusalem, even including young priests, carried on their physical exercises naked, among whom some, ashamed of the circumcision, endeavored to change this condition by means of a difficult operation.⁴⁶ In the gymnasium the Greek character exhibited the side in which it was most opposed to Judaism. It is only natural that, just as the Jews hated and abhorred it, the Greek youths of the gymnasium, on the other hand, and at their head the gymnasiarch, regarded hatred of the Jews as bound up with their sport. What such a gymnasiarch fancied himself to be we see in Appian. And, in truth, his influence, although his functions were more honorable and expensive than politically important, may have been very great. He always had at his orders large numbers of turbulent youths. And in Alexandria the right of might was always strong. Indeed, it is well known that even the later Christian bishops, as Dioscur, decided questions, not only of ecclesiastical politics, but even of dogma, by the fists of sturdy parabolanes and monks.

There seems to be no other connection between the different transactions recorded in our three documents than this long-continued hostility between the Jews and the intensely patriotic Greeks of the gymnasium. This hatred, founded in the very nature of things, continually burst out into flames. And, because of the great size of the Jewish colony in Alexandria, these conflicts were of such importance that the imperial privy council itself was repeatedly occupied with them. The so-called rebellion of Lukuas in Trajan's reign furnished the Roman empire plenty of trouble.

It is of considerable interest to observe what a different impression is made by the various emperors mentioned. While Caligula makes no concealment at all of his hate against the Jews, and takes unreservedly the part of the Antisemites, we see Claudius sharply opposed to the latter. This exactly corresponds with Josephus's account of the favor shown the Jews by Claudius. At the request of the allied kings, Agrippa and Herod, immediately upon his elevation to the throne he sent an edict, not only to Alexandria, but to all cities, colonies, and municipalities of the empire, and to the subject princes, in which he fully confirmed all the privileges of the Jews.⁴⁷ The same state of affairs is seen under Commodus. The Anti-

⁴⁶ 2 Macc. 4:13; JOSEPHUS, *Ant.*, XII, 241.

⁴⁷ JOSEPHUS, *Ant.*, XIX, 5, 2, 3 (279-92); SCHÜRER, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 502; Vol. III, pp. 31-74.

semites appear here as demagogues dangerous to the state, from whom any violence is to be expected, while the Jews are loyal subjects, so long as they are not disturbed. Even Trajan holds his protecting hand over them, despite the fact that throughout he is not graciously disposed toward them; nor surely in their great rebellion had he any occasion for manifesting kindly feelings. But it was a principle of the Roman government to protect the chartered rights of the Jews as far as possible. Moreover, even in the great Jewish war in the reign of Vespasian the Roman authority protected the privileges of the Jews, particularly in cities with a partial Jewish population, against the inflamed hatred of their Greek fellow-citizens. Antoninus even revoked, so far as it affected Jewish children, the universal prohibition of castration—and circumcision—proclaimed by his predecessor Hadrian.

There is something singular in these privileges of the Jewish nation, originating with the Diadochi, alike increased and confirmed by the changing masters of Rome—a Pompey, a Cæsar, an Antony, and an Augustus. Clearly there was a desire to use this nation, long since spread abroad beyond the narrow limits of its home country, as a bond of union in the great process of amalgamating nationalities. Yet these numerous rights granted them, particularly that of *isopoliteia*, besides numerous exemptions, were ever the occasion for new and vigorous strife. During Titus's residence in Antioch the Greeks had no more urgent request to make of him than that he would expel the Jews from the city, or at least that he would annul their prerogatives, conferred on them by Antiochus, and engraved on a bronze stele. Titus refused.

How did the Romans come to adopt this policy? Was it because of the ancient treaties of friendship once made with the Asmonean princes? Was it because of the great services once rendered by Antipater and Herodes to the then rulers of Rome, under the most wise policy which Cæsar and Augustus adopted? Was it even some sort of a tendency toward Judaism itself, such as is discovered on the part of many distinguished Romans of the imperial period?⁴⁸ With a governmental policy so thoroughly utilitarian as was that of the Romans, the grounds of this line of action must be sought in some practical benefit. It was the old maxim, *divide et impera*, which induced them to make the Jews a counterbalance to the unquiet

⁴⁸ The satirical flings of Horace on this subject are well known. Especially noteworthy is a passage in Suetonius, *Vita Augusti*, according to which this prince, so devoted to the old-established religion, and so scornful of all others, expressed to his grandson, Gaius, his approval of the fact that he had not paid his devotions in the temple at Jerusalem while on a journey in the Orient. Clearly to do so was the fashion of the day.

spirit of the Greek cities; while on their part the former, knowing that only by the strong arm of Rome were they protected from the wrath of their fellow-citizens, were generally the most loyal of subjects.

Now, however, the question arises: Does there exist, in addition to this inner relation between the events, an outer one between the reports? How shall these newly discovered documents be rated from the literary point of view? At the first glance they might be pronounced independent records (Reinach). But we must note that, according to Wilcken's account, the report of the hearing before Claudius (I.) exists only in an unofficial copy dating from the end of the second century, and is thus contemporaneous with the hearing before Commodus. A connection between these facts is plainly indicated. The report of the earlier time was copied, since it had again acquired real importance. But how was this copy secured? The rabbinic legend, that Marcus Aurelius, in gratitude for the cure of his daughter, had granted the Jews permission to rummage through the state archives, gives us no light at all. These documents were at that time preserved, not at Rome, but in Egypt itself, as is shown by the employment of Egyptian terms for the dates in I. They had been brought there from Rome previously, as Wilcken supposes, by the ambassadors themselves on their way back to Alexandria as part of their reports (*ἀπο μνηματισμοί*). Separate copies were made of the minutes of proceedings and given to the parties concerned, and even to others, and the archives, while not open to everyone, were nevertheless accessible.⁴⁰ Von Wilamowitz thinks of excerpts from the *Commentarii Caesaris* copied for the sake of local interest, resembling reprints of a local paper from the official gazette.

But are all these actually independent copies of reports? The form is by no means always exactly the same. Here we have something resembling a document, and there a piece of historical narrative. Therefore, Deissmann had put forth the conjecture, and P. Viereck agrees with him, that all the fragments which we have here are but parts of a single historical work—an account of the persecution of the Jews in Alexandria from a Jewish standpoint, after the fashion of the books of the Maccabees, with documents incorporated which are partly genuine, partly falsified, or at least highly colored. The view that we are concerned here, not with original documents, but with a literary production, which in its single "deeds" is sometimes mere rhetoric and untrustworthy, and sometimes strongly exaggerated at the very least, is accepted by Ad. Bauer. But—following Reinach—he considers them to be parts, not of a Jewish, but of

⁴⁰ Cf. MOMMSEN, *Römisches Strafrecht*, p. 520.

an Alexandrian presentation of the dispute—a heathen martyrology. I think neither of those views can be proved. On the contrary, the common conception that all three fragments belong to one literary work is contradicted by the fact that the second is preserved in a double form. Two different versions of a separately transmitted document are easily conceivable. But that both should have been incorporated into the same work, or that the work itself should have existed in two different revisions, belongs to the realm of improbabilities. I confess that I am not myself able to give a final solution. We must wait until these few fragments are enriched by new discoveries, when for the first time they may be understood in their true character.

One matter, however, I may touch on briefly in conclusion; *i. e.*, the significance of these discoveries for the history of early Christianity. The intense hatred of the Greeks against the Jews, of which we have perceived unmistakable proofs in the documents we have been discussing, we meet again in the history of the apostles. This hatred enraged the populace and officials of Philippi against Paul, the itinerant Jewish artisan and proselytizer (Acts, chap. 16). This hatred caused the irritated assembly in the theater at Ephesus, entirely irrespective of the actual matter at stake, to break out in fury at the mere sight of a Jewish speaker, and to shout for two hours: "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!" which meant nothing more than, "Down with the Jews!" (Acts, chap. 19). We may regard it as an instinctive reaction, due to these experiences, that nascent Christianity made all possible efforts to destroy the impression that it was only a Jewish sect. Conceived in the womb of Judaism, it yet had within itself a strength which carried it irresistibly beyond the narrow limits of this religion. Out of the messianic movement in Israel an independent world-religion quickly developed. This the Hellenists had already recognized, but it was Paul who so magnificently worked out this conception. But, in spite of this innate necessity for breaking with Judaism, possibly a clear outward separation would not have come about so speedily. The privileges of Judaism afforded a protection which the new religion did not possess—had not a combination of circumstances required such action. Paul, the powerful founder of the church of the gentile Christians, who was so far above this opposition between Jews and gentiles, and who loved his people more than did a Philo (see Rom. 9: 1; 10: 1), still, at the head of a delegation of gentile Christians, brought to Jerusalem a collection for the mother-church which involuntarily recalls the contribution for the temple sent by the whole dispersion to Jerusalem.

But immediately after his time such relations were completely broken off. The Christian ecclesia appears as a definitely Greek society in contrast with the Jewish synagogue, which is even called the "synagogue of Satan" (Rev. 2:9).⁵⁰ "We . . . those," is the sharp distinction drawn by the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, who applies all the promises of the Old Testament to the Christians, and all the curses to the Jews. In the words of Christ against the Pharisees, the author of the Didaché understands the expression "Ye hypocrites" to mean all Jews without distinction: "If ye fast, it shall not be to you as to the hypocrites: they fast Monday and Thursday, but ye shall fast Wednesday and Friday." In its most conspicuous form this innate distinction between Christians and Jews is finally found in the gospel of John, where the opponents of Jesus appear, not as separate factions of the Jewish nation, the Pharisees and scribes, but simply as "the Jews." This is the counterpart of the fact that the Jewish people, as such, had turned away from Christianity. The gospel was given to the Greeks. No internal conflict between gentile and Jewish Christians drove Christianity into this sharp opposition. It was partly the frequently experienced hostility of the Jewish synagogue, which hated and persecuted Christianity as a dangerous rival and also as an apostate sect. An even stronger motive, however, was the Greeks' hatred of the Jews. As the Jews, not without success, sought to direct to the Christians the *odium generis humani* which pressed heavily on them, so also these were inspired to appear as something completely different from Judaism. It is the same apologetic interest which endeavored to free the Roman governor Pilate from any share in the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus, and which exhibited the Jews as the murderers of Jesus, in a manner entirely false to history, such as found expression in the gospel of Peter.

ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ.

JENA, GERMANY.

⁵⁰ Cf. HARNACK, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums*, pp. 46 ff.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT

THE question how men are to be graded is a very hard one. The theater-goer sees in the star player of his day the most wonderful man of the century. A football enthusiast or a wheelman does not doubt that the whole world is moved in joy or in envy by the feat of the last winner. In the field of letters much the same one-sidedness may be seen. Is anyone then fair? Has anyone the true measure for greatness to which all must yield? No. I revere the memory of Ruskin, and I regard Tolstoi as the greatest man living, but I know that others have other heroes. Nevertheless the late Bishop Westcott seems to me to have been one of the greatest men of his day and in many ways an all-round man, even if he did not frequent the theater or win any golf prizes.

Arthur Westcott puts him before our eyes in a mosaic of his letters and of the words of friends knit together by the love of a son.¹ Some readers have thought that the intimate character of a few of these letters should have forbidden their public use. Westcott had to do with all kinds of people; so has his life. Two classes find fault with this openness. One has but little sympathy with the inner life revealed; this class is small and I feel no grief at their blame. The other is larger and has the feeling that in Westcott's private thoughts their own secret thoughts have been put into the pillory. I agree that the choice of letters for the public is hard, and I should scarcely have printed some of these. But this life is no pillory for critics. It is not to be looked at as a classic marble, giving Westcott in distant greatness. It is a book for the hundreds of people who loved him, and who tighten the grasp of their love on his memory when they find in its pages that he, too, had thoughts like theirs. My own feeling has been: "I hardly had a right to know that, but I like him all the better now that I do know it." It is one of the curious things in this world that men often find near ties of thought with friends that have passed away, and wish they could call them back for a moment and claim spiritual kinship on these lines that they had not touched before. But one cannot say everything one feels. The sympathetic bond that sometimes joins even passing strangers issues from the

¹ *Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott, D.D., D.C.L., Sometime Bishop of Durham.* By his Son, ARTHUR WESTCOTT. 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1903. With illustrations. 17+441; 11+449 pages. \$5.00, net.

mysterious certainty that each would under given circumstances feel, think, wish, and do the same thing.

Westcott was born January 12, 1825, in Birmingham, and died July 27, 1901, at Bishop Auckland, the seat of the bishop of Durham. After his schoolboy life at Birmingham and his university life at Cambridge, 1844-51, he lived at Harrow 1852-69, at Cambridge 1870-90 (adding his canon's residence at Peterborough for the years 1869-83, and at Westminster for the years 1883-90), and at Bishop Auckland 1890-1901.

The inward strength of his personality appears in his youth. He is sentimental, but not weak; he is devoted, but not blind; and he is determined, but not obstinate. He is the living proof of prayer being a source of good work—I do not say “good works.” His puritan turn of thought keeps the microscope constantly following, like the clock-set observatory, his daily path. Quietism and pietism are related, but it is the latter which leads him in his youth, day in and day out, to pass judgment on his every act, to say whether he had done right to be at a given meeting, and whether the meeting had been what it should be. His private words to his lady love—for example, his letter to her on the first Sunday in Lent, 1846 (Vol. I, pp. 61-63)—reveal a bent, which under other climes might have made St. Elizabeth's confessor Conrad of Marburg. He follows the dissection of thoughts even to their personal relation: “Would you value my affection less than truth?” He is ever on guard against pride. His successes—his numerous successes—threw him back upon his weakness, made him fear inability to meet what people expected from him. This is the background of the watchword “Remember” that recurs in these most private letters; it is that they are to remember to pray for each other; not a lover's rose, but a helpmate's hand. And this appeared in a case (II, 25) in which his eldest son had one evening seen him standing

for a long time the picture of dejection. I did not dare to speak; but going away next day, I wrote a simple line to ask if in any way I could share his trouble. The answer came back to me—“I am not troubled by such things as you might think; it is simply that there are times when I feel just overwhelmed by the kind things which are said, and the gratitude of men: it makes me quite afraid.”

That is the keynote of the spirit of the man. We do not find it recorded so often in the cullings from later letters; then there were other things to be quoted; but that is the man through and through.

This bent of self-watchfulness may have been partly the result of, or may have led to, his general watchfulness. There lay in his nature, and I think it is to be seen in the photographs in these volumes, an alertness out of the common. There was a quickness and a keenness, not sharpness, in

his glance that showed his sentinel nature. Many a man has such a nature without showing it in his eye. Westcott was on the alert and he looked it. His eye turned upon one in listening with the quick glance of a mouse or a bird. He threw himself at that point, and his comrade or companion felt that Westcott gave the most exact attention and would be sure to catch the sense of every word spoken, and perhaps to penetrate to the soul behind the words. I should really like to know whether he could say what kind of teeth, and eyes of what color, the people he met had. I do not think so. I think he looked into their eyes and down into their souls, and no more saw the outward eyes than he saw the crowns of their heads. One might call his eye a searchlight, were that not altogether too glaring to be mentioned in the same breath with him.

Measured by the recruiting sergeant and weighed on his scales, Westcott was small. I have the recollection that he gave the impression of smallness even to me, a very small person. But he gave just as surely the impression of restrained power—of power that he had under control and could use if he wished. He did not seem to be cowering down, sinking into nothingness, under his official robes, but to be holding himself there, to be in tension, to be full of what the Germans call *Spannkraft*; perhaps, we might say, of elasticity—the elasticity which is active, upheaving, bond-bursting. It will strike many men as absurd, but there was, after all, much that we attach to the notion of a soldier in Westcott's nature: alertness, calm views of things, self-restraint, irrepressible force. Add to *Spannkraft* and elasticity the word *élan*—the momentum not of a cannon ball, but of a gymnast full of life—and you have, I think, the soul-side of Westcott in his seemingly shrinking physical form.

It is a part of Westcott's clear view of the chessboard, of the battlefield, of life, when we find him at the end true to his beginning. Theologians in distant lands may have thought him the recluse that he himself half thought he was, and they may have pictured him as most particularly concerned for the niceties of grammar and text, for the hairsplitting distinctions of scholastic debate, and for the rights of ecclesiastical office. He did think grammar necessary, and he shows it when he (I, 430) mentions uncertainty about Latin quantities in the absence of a dictionary (although he writes: "I cannot express to you the positive dislike—I want a stronger term—with which I look on all details of spelling and breathing and form [I, 281]; and again: " 'Grammar' I simply hate" [I, 285])—and he could split a hair as well as most of the men who never do anything else, and could write Greek and Latin prose and poetry fluently—and he was always ready to stand up for official privileges when there was a point to be made.

That is all true, but his thought, his thoughts, his underlying trend of sympathy, was with life and not with letter; with human life, with the life of men, with the souls of men. He did not stop at the souls of the educated, of the "sympathetic few" of snobbish lisp. He aimed at the people. The man who (I, 49) was in the year 1847 (?) an ardent Sunday-school teacher declares in his diary (I, 50) in comparison with

Faraday's light experiments; but far, far more interesting is that brief account of the London poor and "ragged schools." What a prospect is there before us! I cannot tell how best to view it—how most efficiently to take part in the duties it unfolds.

That is the man who half a century later was sarcastically called "the pitmen's bishop" (II, 375). One day in the year 1883 I was walking with him through the Seven Dials, a part of London, perhaps scarcely better than much of the East End. We were speaking of something scientific, probably about textual criticism or about some point in dogmatics, of which he had then been professor for twelve years. On the narrow sidewalk we were dodging along, seeing at every step squalor and all manner of uncanny things. Something or other forced itself upon us more distinctly, and he said in substance: "But I cannot find the heart to busy myself with these questions when I see this life here. One must do something to make this better."

I said a moment ago that "Westcott probably saw into souls." It was in connection with social work, in his address at the founding of the Christian Social Union (II, 16), that he showed his power of putting his own soul into other men and moving them. The hearers could not tell what he had said, but they knew what he had done. He had taken hold of them and moved them to self-devotion. The impulse of his soul had become the impulse of theirs. Sometimes men belittle a deed of this kind as an act of "personal magnetism," and suppose thereby that they have rated the speaker down into the class of more mechanical and less intellectual action, that it was a trick of spiritual manipulation, a mental massage, a cajoling of innocents. Is it possible for a thinking man to rate the expression of soul and thought lower because it is wordless, or is more than the words? Do not point to the unintelligent, commentary-seeking "gift of tongues." That is different to my mind. That needed explanation; this needs no explanation. But let us return to the eminently "socially" tuned music of Westcott's life.

He was president of that Christian Social Union and made at its meetings noteworthy addresses; for example, on "The Organization of Industry," "Social Service," "The Christian Rule of Expenditure." Ever and

again through these gleanings from his life we see the thought of the poor burning indignation at their state, bewilderment as to method of relief, ready action when any chance offers itself. Now he bewails the forty children at one shop in St. George's, East London, buying a farthing's worth of pease for a day's meal (I, 54); now "the crowds of poor, ignorant, resourceless, perishing creatures around us" (I, 72); now the "frightful grievance of men and children . . . in the heart of our splendid cities" (I, 136); now "the poverty, wretchedness and vice of millions" and "the emptiness and idleness and luxury of those whose name is rich, though indeed poorest of the poor in all which constitutes true wealth" (I, 157). As early as 1846 he refers to the plan of a friend (I, 78) for a college for theology graduates, which should be in a large town and give them "two or three years in study and meditation, in visiting the poor and sick, in learning the feelings and habits, the wants and wishes, of the mass of the people." He says of it: "I do not know when I was more delighted with any idea." It is a foreshadowing, a subjective one, of the university settlement. Another project of the same kind, but at another point in the line, was—not a college for graduate theologians as above, nor a university settlement of single persons gathered in a house in a poor district—but a group of families living as a *coenobium* in the simplest way, with "an obligation to poverty, an obligation to study, and an obligation to devotion." It was discussed among the Westcotts, Horts, Bensons, and Wordsworths in the years 1868–70 (see Vol. I, pp. 263–67), and a paper on it by Westcott was to appear in the *Contemporary Review* in 1870, but I do not catch the title in the bibliography; perhaps it was not printed. The children looked for its speedy founding and fancied they knew where it was to be. The point of it for today is the emphasizing of Westcott's simple manner of life, and of the wish of these scholars really to do and endure, and not merely to write neat essays and make fine speeches. Westcott and the "Bishop of Truro" (who was bishop of Truro on June 10, 1882?) had two hours' conversation with General Booth, of the Salvation Army. Westcott writes: "What he said and looked was of the deepest interest. Much he had evidently not thought out." In 1896 Westcott went to Cambridge and proposed the main resolution at the enthusiastic meeting for establishing a "Cambridge House" in South London (II, 210). In July, 1898, he received in the castle at Bishop Auckland about thirty members of the Seaham Harbour Bottle-Workers' Institute, showing them around, having them take tea with him, and at their wish holding a brief service in the chapel with them. Vol. II, p. 109 refers to Westcott's great interest in the "co-operative" movement and gives a few words, from a speech, which connect his interest therein

as a boy with his active participation in furthering it as a bishop. By the way, it would have been interesting to know just when and where that "response to a vote of thanks" was made; perhaps the editor might at other points have dated and fixed the place of chance quotations.

Westcott's great deal in the realm of social action was on occasion of the coal strike, March 9 to June 3, 1891, with over eighty thousand workmen idle on the spot. Of course, the strike told wofully in all directions, affecting the shipping, the railways, the engineering trade, and business in general. The editor puts the loss in wages at \$5,500,000, and the general, not easily estimated, loss at \$15,000,000. Westcott wrote hither and thither, trying to catch up threads for a direct action (II, 115-19). On May 2 he addressed an open letter, published in the *Times*, to the rural dean of Bishop Auckland, Rev. E. Price, suggesting, "a board composed of three representatives of the owners and three representatives of the miners and three business men unconnected with this special industry," and on May 25 he wrote to the chairman of the "owners' association" and to the secretary of the "federation board" (of the workmen) suggesting the reopening of the pits upon two conditions and inviting the representatives of the two sides to come to him at Auckland and discuss details. The owners agreed to come, and the workmen placed their side of the case in a strong letter and agreed to come if the owners would. Westcott was in London on May 30, at the annual meeting of the International Arbitration Association, when he received a telegram that the federation board and the owners' wage committee were ready to come to Auckland the next day. Westcott caught an evening train to Durham, slept there, and went on to Bishop Auckland in the morning. The representatives of both sides lunched with him, and then he set forth three points: that they should try to forget the bitterness of the past few weeks and aim at settlement; that they should not only think of the moment, but of what the future would judge of the result; and that they should see in their work, not merely a solution of the present difficulty, but, "what was far more important, the establishment of real fellowship between capital and labour." After conferring together under Westcott's chairmanship, they "separated and considered the matter apart, the bishop passing to and fro between them." It finally came to the pass at which he had to seek from the owners a lessening of their demands (II, 124-26). It went very hard. Finally the owners' committee adopted a resolution yielding. When this was read to the men before the bishop, he said it was the happiest five minutes of his life. Thousands of workmen had waited for five hours outside the palace, and the good news was carried around like wildfire. One of the workmen describes the scene outside at length, tells

how the bishop drove off to catch the delayed special train, and how the federation board had "to undergo an ordeal of hand-shaking which would unnerve an American President." The dates are confused, or May 30 on p. 122 should be 31, for we learn on p. 129 that the conference was on June 1 and that work began again on June 3. Thus the scholar had proved himself the man of action in the thick of the fray in the most pressing difficulty of the life of today. Before leaving the social side of his work, it may be added that the great problem of the "unemployed" is one to which he gave no little thought (II, 192-96), and the resolutions of a conference held at Auckland, October 25 and 26, 1895, are well worth studying, especially in reference to the need of a central body to control and organize relief.

Westcott's publications are to be found in the bibliography (II, 441-48). It is estimated that 280,000 volumes of his works have been issued, without counting single sermons and short writings, of which alone the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge has circulated perhaps 31,000. His work upon the revision of the English Bible and his work upon the Greek New Testament with Dr. Hort (I, 389-404) are too well known to need further mention here; the quotations offered by his son throw vivid light on several weighty questions connected with the work in both lines; see also Vol. II, p. 84. His most excellent work on the history of the *Canon of the New Testament* came out in 1855; it passed through a number of editions, which to my regret I do not find in the bibliography. It was in reference to it that he once said to me, in substance: "When I do a thing, I do it as well as I can, and then I am done with it. I will not do it over again." A similar thing comes out in a letter to Dr. Hort, July 5, 1879, about their Greek New Testament:

My state is simply this, that I could not attempt to go into revision in detail. I should never again be able to do the work as well as I did when my mind was full of it. At the time I endeavoured to make the best judgment in my power, and I cannot revise. The whole thing once done must abide as a whole.

And he writes, August 26, 1899, in replying to a question about a German book: "It is not likely that I could reopen questions, which I have once studied as carefully as I could, with any profit." That is a matter of temperament and of habit. In general, such a limitation may add force to the investigations made and free the mind for new work. We can do no more than mention his masterpieces in various articles in Smith's *Bible Dictionary*, such as Canon, Herod, New Testament, Vulgate. His *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels* (1860), his *Bible in the Church* (1864), and his *History of the English Bible* (1868) show us what he was doing at Harrow besides watching over the boys. His Cambridge work, so far as not

included above, appears in his commentaries on John's gospel in 1882, on John's epistles in 1883, and on Hebrews in 1889. Once when I offered to serve him with literature for some commentary work, he replied that he had enough, and he added, in substance: "I feel every year more and more that the real work of the commentator must lie, not in searching out the thoughts of other men about the text, but in sinking himself into the text itself." Such commentaries as he wrote, so exact in spite of his horror of grammar, so full of research, and especially so full of thought and of heart, are very rare.

Everyone will characterize Westcott's theology according to his own standing amid the problems. That he seemed at one time to some men to be "unsafe" and "Germanizing" (I, 218) is not strange. Many Englishmen used to call anything in theology they did not like "German," and they could do it all the more readily because they neither could nor would read German. Westcott named Christianity "personal devotion to a person" (II, 358), showing at the end of his life the same personal devotion that we saw in him in his earliest manhood. Such a sentence admits, of course, of varied interpretation. It must be read in the light of Westcott's life. For a distinction turn to Canon Liddon in St. Paul's thrilling his hearers with his devotion "to the sacred heart of Jesus." I think that this phrase and this phase of devotion were totally foreign to Westcott's nature. His thoughts on creeds find a startling expression (I, 89), where he says: "Words seem to change so much in meaning, and creeds to change with them, that half the theology of the present day is based on mere ignorance and carelessness. He was then an undergraduate; at a still earlier period he wrote (I, 52): "I never read an account of a miracle but I seem instinctively to feel its improbability, and discover some want of evidence in the account of it;" compare then his four sermons of 1859 on the characteristics of the gospel miracles (I, 202), which "were somewhat severely handled by too orthodox critics" (I, 234-36). His view of the atonement given in a letter to his wife in 1855 (I, 231), after hearing the Hulsean lecturer thereon, is very interesting:

To me it is always most satisfactory to regard the Christian as in Christ—absolutely one with Him, and then he does what Christ has done: Christ's actions become his, and Christ's life and death in some sense his life and death.

In a letter to Hort in 1860 (I, 239, 240) he says most excellently of the atonement:

Have we the slightest hope to expect to gain an intelligible theory of the fact? Is it not enough to say that the death of our Blessed Lord was necessary for our redemption? and that we are saved by it? Is it not absurd to expect that we can conceive how it is necessary—since the necessity is divine?

The resurrection he touches upon in Vol. II, p. 240; see also Vol. I, p. 439, where he refers as well to the fall. In 1849 (I, 160, 161) he declares himself against creeds: "I object to them altogether, and not to any particular doctrines." In this connection it is well also to read what he says in 1880 (I, 436): "Every year makes me tremble more at the daring with which people speak of spiritual things."

Such a habit of thought must lead to a wide view of churchly boundaries, and Westcott had such a view, devoted as he was to his own church. His wife was originally a Methodist. He received a party of Baptist ministers at Auckland "to see the chapel and have tea." He invited the members of the North of England Primitive Methodist Preachers' Association to visit the castle (II, 191, 192). He hoped before long—this was in the year 1848 (I, 139)—"to see an order of men—in some degree like the 'local preachers'—who, while recognized religious 'helps,' may yet follow their several callings, and be an integral portion of the people." The following page (I, 141) passes from this union of clergy and laity to discuss the "unsociability" of the English church, and to urge the union of rich and poor and the assembling of the congregation during the week. In 1885 Westcott, then professor, did all he could to secure signatures for the Cambridge memorial on church reform, the text of which we find (I, 414, 415), and which aimed, among other things, especially at the "admission of laymen of all classes, who are *bona fide* churchmen, to a substantial share in the control of church affairs." The memorial was well received, but then was overshadowed by the debates on Irish home rule. The matter appears again in 1897 (II, 214), and in a speech quoted (II, 249) he says: "The self-government of the Established Church of Scotland justifies the extension of like power to the Church of England." Westcott was a member of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, which seems to have been chiefly of historical value; the editor quotes from someone that he took "a leading part in the work of research;" I can witness to it, for he said one day that the Museum did not contain certain German documents, and being certain of the contents of the Museum, I got permission to go into the stack and found them for him. He was full of the thought of reviving the church of England through and in her cathedrals; this was, I remember, a favorite theme with Lightfoot. Papers by him on "Cathedral Work" appeared in *Macmillan's Magazine* in January and February, 1870, pointing to the theory of cathedral life based on "*systematic devotion and corporate action*," and to the theory of cathedral work "regulated by the requirements of *theological study* and *religious education*" (I, 307; cf. 308-12); a clergy-house would help train candidates

for holy orders and offer a place for retirement (I take it [see p. 308] for the refreshment of tired clergymen); while some organization for religious inspection and church finance would be added. Bishop+Chapter+Clergy+Diocese would make "the social life once more complete." He did all he could to raise the level of theological attainments for the candidates for holy orders (I, 376-83), securing the establishment of a "preliminary examination" in the year 1871. Late in 1895, at Advent, some of his younger clergy wrote to him about home and foreign service, and asked him if he would be ready to keep a confidential list of men who were ready to do what he set them. It was a happy thought and struck a responsive chord in Westcott's heart (II, 198-201). His "private longing for a pope" (II, 158) was one of his humorous touches woven into a serious letter to the archbishop of Canterbury.

His interest in education was constant, even if in the earlier years at Harrow he seemed not to be very successful in the practice of it. University extension found staunch supporters in him and Lightfoot (I, 412-413), although it sounds strange to hear him say that "special training is not the work of a university." He opposed coeducation and degrees open alike to men and women (I, 413); he favored a special university for women (II, 235, 295, 140). His high appreciation of women finds utterance not only in his letters to his lady love and his wife, but also in his serious correspondence with women (for example, II, 69-90, 239-44).

A man of Westcott's stamp must have been a "friend" of rare degree. The three great friendships of his life were those with Hort, Lightfoot, and Benson. Of Hort he wrote (II, 137): "You know what Dr. Hort has been to me for more than forty years—far more than a brother, a constant strength and inspiration. His life has passed into many lives. Thus we cannot wholly lose him." These two last sentences are true of Westcott himself. His life, through his spoken and through his written work, has passed into the life of by far the greater number of English and of English-speaking theologians.

Westcott's handwriting was not good, and we find (II, 449, 450) fifty different readings that were made by different people of his signature in a letter to a friend. Several of his workmen correspondents complained of his writing, one declaring that he and a friend had spent hours over a letter and then been able to read only a part of it. He seems often to have had to write to friends to explain what he had written before; he tells (I, 85) a correspondent of six years standing that a doubtful word in a previous letter was "processes," and he says: "I remember well looking

at the offending word, but I decided that it was legible." Vol. II, before p. 13, stands a page of what his son considers his best writing. As early as 1846 he was in despair because his lady love read "M'Neile" as "Write," but he did not change his hand. Would that it were possible for good schools to teach writing well. Westcott might have been an exquisite writer; his delicate drawings in these volumes show his sense of form and his love of beauty. If I am not mistaken, handwriting is one of the last retreats of a vigorous personality. One is so very much alone with the bit of white paper. Time is rarely at command. And the pen is forced to express what the man else conceals. He refuses now to yield to the bit of regularity, calmness, form. I do not remember what Lord Palmerston's writing was like, but it would be hard to conceive of Westcott's keeping his ink pot across the room so as to force deliberation in writing.

Certain things in the accounts of Westcott's life have an interest for Americans as such. At the three-hundredth anniversary of the commemoration in Trinity College, Cambridge, on December 22, 1846, Westcott was but little satisfied with the speeches. His description includes a reference to Mr. Bancroft who then represented the United States at the court of St. James. I quote a few lines, so as to show that the critical view of things is general and not aimed at anyone person or nation.

The speeches very poor. Whewell peculiarly unfortunate (except in spirit). Bishop of London makes a singular misapplication of Scripture. Lord Hardwicke discusses naval architecture. Sedgwick is inaudible to me. The American minister full of screams and gesticulations. Macaulay has been anticipated by Jeremie. Lord Fitzwilliam and Vice-Chancellor neat. Lord Montague too long. (I, 45, 46.)

Americans are supposed to have a leaning toward the use of "expect" for "suppose," but a member of Westcott's family says to him (I, 313): "I expect you do not feel alone." In a like way "feel to" is attributed to Americans, but Westcott writes (I, 80): "I feel more and more to desire to view life;" (I, 81): "I felt less than ever to admire their selfish life;" (I, 367): "I feel to want sympathy." Americans who stickle for right pronunciation will be much distressed to hear that Westcott, in spite of all remonstrances, insisted upon pronouncing the *o* in progress long, like *o* in "go" (II, 327, 370).

In writing to Dr. Hort on June 27, 1881 (I, 402), he refers to Dr. Ezra Abbot of Harvard: "Dr. Abbot's letter is very generous. I send a varied replica. How can he have time to write so fully and carefully? He fills me with shame." And on August 15, 1881 (I, 340), he refers to Professor

Joseph Henry Thayer: "You missed Dr. Thayer. He called here for half an hour—a most bright, vigorous man." In a letter of September 15, 1886, to Archbishop Benson he writes: "I have been reading for the tenth time Emerson's Essays, and trying to see his world. I find it very hard—harder than to bring the world which I do see into a tendency towards harmony." In a letter to the *Times*, April 6, 1889 (II, 20), he quotes Emerson.

Should not (I, 228) *Neuss* be *Reuss*, and (I, 47) *Vansittart* be *Van Sittart*? As for Van Sittart, the editor yields elsewhere to the notions of men as to their own names, as, for instance, W. H. B. folkes (I, 195). The spelling Whittard (I, 8, ll. 2 and 4), is apparently a misprint.

It is regretted that in this as in other English books men of title, and in particular church dignitaries, are only named by their titles. What foreigner is able to say just who was the bishop of Chester in just the given year? At the moment many Englishmen know; after a few years many do not know, and are able to fix the person only by means of research. The title is well enough for official acts. In modern life, in modern Saxon literature, the man should be given. He himself (II, 69) speaks of a letter received addressed to Mr. B. F. *Dunelm*, which shows that the writer took his title for his name.

CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY.

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INTUITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PSALMS.

THE first thing which attracts the attention of the reader of this book¹ is the "revised text" from which the translation is made. To understand the grounds of the revision fully one must follow the peculiar development of Professor Cheyne's theories with regard to Jerahmeel and northern Arabia. Following certain suggestions of the Assyriologist Winckler, Cheyne makes every reference to Egypt apply to a region of northern Arabia, supposed to bear the same or a very similar name, Muṣr or Muṣri, and references to Assyria or Babylonia receive a similar treatment. This Muṣri was probably in vassalage to the larger empire of Meluḥḥa, which is frequently referred to in the Old Testament writings under the name of Asshur or Ashhur.

¹ *The Book of Psalms*. Translated from a revised text with notes and introduction. In place of a second edition of an earlier work (1888) by the same author. By T. K. CHEYNE. 2 vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1904. lxxx+336, 246 pages.

It is assumed in the present work that the deportation of the Jews which has left most traces on the later writings of the Old Testament was, not to Babylonia, but to that part of N. Arabia which was called by the Jews *Jerahmeel* or the *Negeb*. (Pp. xiv, xv.)

Such deportation was, according to Professor Cheyne, "no uncommon fate of the Israelite and Judahite population." Sections of the population experienced such deportation several times at the hands of northern Arabian kings, and Jerusalem itself was taken and the temple destroyed probably more than once. It is a highly plausible view that

there were also ancient Hebrew writings which referred to Assyrian deportations of Israelites and Judahites, and to a Babylonian deportation of Judahites. (P. xvi.)

But that was long before the days of the Psalms, and it is impossible that there should be any real references in the Psalms to such ancient history. The later redactors of the Psalms were aware that there had been such deportations and

manipulated the texts before them, so that they should seem to refer to Assyria or Babylon . . . but it is improbable that they had any evidence of this except tradition. (P. xvi.)

The Psalms, according to Professor Cheyne, came from so late a period that they can "present no distinctly Babylonian colouring." The calamity that they refer to must be a north Arabian oppression, and we may, therefore, assume at once that any reference to Babylonian oppression, to the Assyrians, or, going still farther back, to Egyptian bondage, is due to the archaistic fancy of redactors who, for somewhat recondite psychological reasons, have substituted in all cases for references to northern Arabian oppression allusions to Babylonia, Assyria, or Egypt.

Corresponding to this change of history we have a similar change of geography. The geographical references in the Psalms are to be connected with the region south of Judah, not with the region north of it, and all references to regions north of Judah must, therefore, be changed into references to the territory southward. Where Bethel is referred to, some sacred site in the Negeb is meant. The Lebanon cannot be the famous mountains of the Lebanon northward of Palestine, but must be something to the south, and, in lieu of anything better, the word Lebanon is changed into Gebalon, supposed to be some mountain or mountains southward, the exact location of which is unknown. The Negeb, for which is substituted the name *Jerahmeel*, becomes a flourishing and populous region quite unlike the steppe it now is, and which it is commonly supposed to have been in antiquity, on the ground of the references in the Hebrew scriptures. It

abounded in cities and important sites, which have, unfortunately, disappeared so completely from the face of the earth as to leave no traces behind.

To revise the text of the Psalms to fit the new history and the new geography, the main outlines of which have been sketched above, Professor Cheyne has not resorted to any known methods of text-criticism, such as comparison of the versions, study of meters, etc., but to pure intuition. I doubt if any text was ever so radically revised, and revised on such entirely subjective grounds of preconceived theory, as the text of the Psalms supposed to underlie this translation, but not actually presented to the eye in this volume. A couple of examples from the translation will suffice to show the character and extent of the revision. Let us take first the second stanza of the beautiful forty-second psalm. Here is the translation given by Cheyne in 1888, in that edition of the book of Psalms of which, according to the title-page, this present volume is to take the place:

My soul upon me is bowed down; therefore will I think upon thee
from the land of Jordan and of Hermonim, from the little mountain.
Flood calls unto flood at the sound of thy cataracts,
all thy breakers and billows have gone over me:
(Yet) will Jehovah by day give charge to his lovingkindness,
and in the night will his song be with me,
even a prayer unto the God of my life.
Let me say unto God my rock, "Why hast thou forgotten me?
why go I as a mourner amidst the oppression of the enemy?"
Like rottenness in my bones, my foes reproach me,
whilst all day long they say unto me, Where is thy God?
Why art thou bowed down, my soul, and why moaning upon me?
wait thou for Jehovah, for unto him I shall yet give thanks
as the saviour of my countenance and my God.

Here is the translation from Cheyne's "revised text":

Preserve me, [O Yahwè] my God, | from the tribes of the Arabians,
From the race of the Jerahmeelites | rescue thou me.
Rouse thee, O God of my succour; | why dost thou forget me,
While I walk tremblingly, | the Arabians pressing me hard?
They stir up wars continually | to consume thy guarded ones;
The mockeries of those that insult thee— | upon me have they passed.
As with arrows in my bones | the Misrites insult me,
While they say to me continually, | Where is thy God?
O Yahwè! command thy loving kindness, | and send forth thy faithfulness.
Why faintest thou, my soul? | why frettest thou within me?
Wait on for Yahwè, that he may cause me to see | the habitation of God.

Unless the reader were told that these two are translations of the same original, he would surely perceive no connection between them; and, even after one is told, it is a difficult task to establish such connection. Cheyne's translation of 1888 is substantially the translation given by all Hebrew scholars; that is to say, while the translations of different scholars differ in details, the general substance of all is the same. But as the text of this psalm is somewhat difficult, and therefore lends itself the more readily to emendations and suggestions, we will turn next to a psalm extremely simple in its character, the text of which offers practically no difficulties, while the meaning seems to lie upon its face. The twenty-ninth psalm is a description of a thunderstorm, in which the thunderclaps are represented by the familiar Jewish phrase for thunder, "the voice of Yahaweh." We will give first a translation which represents in sense the general consensus of scholars:

Give to Yahaweh, sons of God,
Give to Yahaweh glory and strength.
Give to Yahaweh his glorious name,
Worship Yahaweh in holy apparel.

Yahaweh's voice above the waters!
The God of glory thundereth,
Yahaweh above great waters.

Yahaweh's voice with might!
Yahaweh's voice with majesty!
Yahaweh's voice breaking cedars!

Yahaweh breaketh the cedars of Lebanon:
He maketh Lebanon skip like a calf,
And Sirion like a young wild ox.

Yahaweh's voice cleft flames of fire;
Yahaweh's voice shaketh the desert,
Yahaweh shaketh the desert of Kadesh.

Yahaweh's voice boweth hinds in travail,
It strippeth the forests.
In his palace all cry, Glory!

Yahaweh sat above the flood;
Yahaweh sitteth king forever.
Yahaweh give his people strength!
Yahaweh grant his people peace!

Here is Professor Cheyne's translation of the same in his present volume:

1. Ascribe unto Yahwè, O ye sons of Jerahmeel,
Ascribe unto Yahwè glory and strength:
Ascribe glory, O ye Ishmaelites, unto Yahwè,
Worship Yahwè, Rehoboth and Cush.

The voice of Yahwè + sounds + over the great waters,
[Yahwè,] the God of glory, thunders:
[His] voice Yahwè [utters] with power!
[His] voice Yahwè [utters] with majesty!

- The voice of Yahwè breaks the cedars,
10. Yahwè shatters the cedars of Gebalon (?);
He causes Gebalon to skip like a calf,
Sirion like a young wild ox.

The voice of Yahwè cleaves [the rocks,]
[The stones he cleaves with] fiery flashes;
The voice of Yahwè makes the wilderness to tremble,
The wilderness of Kadesh Yahwè makes to tremble.

The voice of Yahwè shakes the oaks to and fro,
[The trees of] the forests Yahwè strips:

.
.

20. [? Ye sons of Zion, exult in your king,]
Ye sons of Jerahmeel, chant hymns to his glory.
His seat Yahwè has taken to judge the world;
For ever will Yahwè hold his seat as king.

There is absolutely no ground in the text and no intelligible reason, as far as anyone but Professor Cheyne can see, for substituting for such familiar Hebrew phrases as "sons of God" or "the gods" "sons of Jerahmeel," or for manufacturing Ishmaelites, Rehoboth, and Cush out of perfectly plain Hebrew expressions. Similar arbitrary and utterly irrational text-changes are introduced in every psalm. In the one hundred and twenty-first psalm, for instance, one of the charming psalms of the Pilgrim Psalter, the simple and natural phrase, "the sun shall not smite thee by day neither the moon by night," is converted by Professor Cheyne into: "Cusham shall not smite thee by day nor Jerahmeel by night."

It was to be expected that the headings of the Psalms would be treated with small respect, and in fact they have undergone a most radical revision,

sometimes with comical results. There is a pretty general agreement that Pss. 120-34 constitute a Pilgrim Psalter, and that the headings of the individual psalms of this collection mean "song of ascents." These were the songs sung by those going up to the feast at Jerusalem. The common Hebrew word translated "ascents" is rejected by Professor Cheyne, apparently because it is an ordinary and readily intelligible word, and something else substituted, which he translates: "Marked. Of the Ishmaelites." Many of the headings of the earlier books are difficult to understand, and have given rise to much discussion and many emendations. These are fair game for Professor Cheyne's methods, but it cannot be said that he has anywhere produced what would seem to ordinary mortals intelligible results. Take, for instance, such a heading as this which he gives for the twentieth and twenty-first psalms: "Deposited. Marked: of 'Arab-ethan.'" What in common-sense does it mean? Of course, the heading "of David," which is so common, especially in the first book of Psalms, is rejected. It is somewhat surprising to find that the headings of the Korah and Asaph collections are allowed to remain moderately unchanged.

I have endeavored to present Professor Cheyne's views of Hebrew history and geography, and his treatment of the Psalter based upon those views, as fairly as possible, but it is really difficult to treat such a book seriously. It is like being in Wonderland. You see some things you know, but they are curiously distorted, and all about you are strange, fantastic creatures—Jerahmeels, Rehoboths, Cushams, and the like—mere whimsies of the author; rabbits speak; the forty-second rule is the first in the book; and finally you realize that the one by whose eyes you see it all can grow short or long at pleasure, by nibbling something he holds in his hand and which no one has but he. That the book has received serious treatment from me is due, not to its contents, but to the fact that Professor Cheyne did, at an earlier date, do admirable work, for which many middle-aged scholars of today are his grateful debtors. It is only the reputation of his past work which justifies a review of the present volume.

It may well be asked how it is possible that a man of such marked intellectual ability and remarkable scholarly attainments, who has done such good work in days gone by, has wandered so far from the paths of common-sense as to reject the natural meaning of simple Hebrew words and substitute in their stead such utterly preposterous imaginations. Casting away the plain, historical and geographical, allusions, of which the Psalms are full, he has invented events and a land of which we have no mention anywhere in the Bible, least of all in the Psalms. It would be interesting, as a psychological problem, to follow the curious developments of critical thought

which have brought Professor Cheyne to his present position. One of the things which influenced him greatly in reaching his present conclusions he sets forth in the introduction—a question “by our theologian-statesman, Gladstone”:

Is it conceivable, if the Psalms in general owed their origin to the time of the Captivity, that the composer of them should, in numerous and conspicuous cases, have dwelt so long and so often over the details of the Egyptian bondage, and should never but once and briefly have made reference, specific indeed but narrow, to the one recent catastrophe, choosing rather to go back to the centuries dimmed in comparison by the interval of a thousand years? (P. xvii.)

Now, Professor Cheyne had already reached the conclusion that the Psalms were throughout of very late origin. He had thrown away everything in the way of external tradition—the arrangement of the Psalms in collections, liturgical headings, and the various evidences of a slow growth extending over a long period of time, during which things once familiar had become altogether unintelligible. Instead of using these external helps to secure dates by which to trace the growth of the collections, he had rearranged the Psalms arbitrarily, according to his own conception of their meaning, putting together in one group psalms of the first and psalms of the last book. He had treated individual psalms practically as though the very latest emendation represented the time of the composition of the psalm. By these methods, reducing everything to a dead level, he had convinced himself that the whole Psalter was written in the late Persian or even in the Greek period. His tendency was to bring the Psalms down to an ever later date. It seemed to him that the religious conceptions and the phraseology of the Psalter compelled this ascription to a very late period. To satisfy the references which he thought he saw he imagined historical events in the Persian period, of which no record had come down; and then set himself, out of the allusions of the Psalter, to reconstruct the history of the Persian period. Following a method which has been far too freely used of late by Old Testament scholars, which began in a reaction against the hidebound conservatism of a former generation, that regarded the Massoretic Hebrew text as possessing in a greater or less degree infallibility, he began to emend difficult passages, and then passages which seemed to him inconsistent with the general sense, not on any known grounds of text-criticism, but according to his own fancy of what, under the conditions which he supposed to have existed, the psalmist might have said.

As Gladstone had pointed out, the text of the Psalms as it has come down to us is full of references to the Egyptian captivity, while there is little specific reference to the Babylonian exile. In point of fact, it is impos-

sible to appreciate the course of Hebrew history and understand the development of the religion of the Jews without reckoning with the Egyptian bondage. Whether it affected the whole people or a small section of the people only, the Egyptian bondage and the deliverance from that bondage made on Israel at the very commencement of its history an impression which was never effaced. Out of that deliverance and the events connected with it Israel came into being. It is alluded to, in one shape or another, in all the traditions of the people. It plays its part in the folklore tales of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the later prophetic literature is equally full of references to those events. By the time of the Babylonian exile the deliverance from Egyptian oppression had become a convention, an article of faith. Precisely as the old Scotch Covenanters narrated the events of their days in scriptural language, so, one may say, the Jews of later time sang of the conditions of their age in the phraseology of that more ancient experience. This once understood, references to the Babylonian captivity and the distressful conditions of the following period are plainly discernible in many psalms. But, if this reasoning is valid, we must also recognize that the Psalter had its roots in the period preceding the exile.

The proper answer to Gladstone's question is a recognition of the antiquity of the origins of the earlier collections of the Psalter, not the utter rejection of all the historical facts of which we have any knowledge whatsoever, and the invention of a new history and a new geography to fit the supposed references in a new text of the Psalms. Any rational discussion of the Psalms must recognize the slow growth and development of the Psalter. The independent collections must be treated for themselves, the headings of the Psalms must be utilized as external evidences passed down by tradition. I am inclined to think that the ultimate result of Psalter criticism will be, not to bring the whole Psalter down to a very late period, but to carry back its beginnings to an early period; that careful criticism will show how, from small beginnings, in independent collections, with many recastings and much conventionalizing of expressions, and yet withal a conservative retention of terms and references no longer intelligible, the Psalter took its final form, receiving its final recasting, perhaps, in the Maccabaeon period.

These volumes are provided with an index so slight and insufficient that it would probably have been better omitted altogether. Contrasting with the two pages of index, at the close of the second volume we have, after the unpleasant fashion of English publications, over sixty pages of advertisements. These advertisements, bound up with the volume, always remind

me of the stations on the underground railway in London, where I find great difficulty in seeing the insignificant sign giving the name of the station because of the overwhelming mass of large and conspicuous signs of advertising concerns.

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RECONCILIATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE.

THE process of adjustment between religious philosophy, Judaistic and Christian, and scientific philosophy has already covered a long period and is like to continue for many years. It has been fraught with much bitter controversy, and many are the misgivings as to the ultimate outcome. One may hear prophecies, on the one hand, of the extinction of religion and the triumph of science, and on the other hand, of the victorious revival of religious faith. The faint-hearted would stay the ark with anxious hands, as it seems to them to totter to its overthrow; others would drive unmindful of the stumbling oxen or the rocky road.

It is not difficult to discern the causes of the controversy. There lies behind it the assumption that the biblical writers were so inspired that whatever they said about the phenomena of nature must be used as true *in the sense prevailing at the time* in the discussions provoked by new discoveries. No attempt seems to have been made to ascertain in what sense these writers meant their statements. Their ideas oftentimes were as far from the current interpretation as that is from the present one.

The general consequence was that those whose business was the interpretation and advocacy of the Scriptures became advocates of the current explanation of natural phenomena, which they believed warranted by the Scriptures, and therefore opponents of the theories put forward by scientific men to include the newly observed phenomena of nature. Thereby religion obtained the reputation, wrongly enough, of being opposed to science. Even learned men, who should have known better, have adopted this unwarranted position, and have described, under such titles as "the conflict between religion and science," a conflict which they and their heedless followers created out of their own misconceptions.

Nor is the case much better when it is assumed that the conflict is one between theology and science, or even between ecclesiasticism and science. The accident that religious men were for a long time almost the only educated men brought them necessarily into the discussions. The conflict,

however, depended not so much upon their religious convictions, as upon the nature of their education, and the attitude of mind and mode of reasoning which it developed. That education which trains one to look upon the products of the human intellect, however noble and uplifted, not only as material to be appreciated and work to be emulated, but as truth to be believed, precedents to be followed, and limitations not to be overpassed, creates a mode of thinking which is diametrically opposed to that of science. Briefly, the education of the earlier periods may be characterized as that dependent on authority. It tended inevitably to produce minds willing to be limited by the thinking of the past and to follow precedent. When, therefore, the few who dared to reason independently propounded ideas contrary to current conceptions, a conflict between the two types was inevitable. Education was chiefly in the control of ecclesiastical organizations. The dominant education rested upon authority, and even appealed to the Scriptures as final authority in all matters which they touched. Upon the church, therefore, fell the odium of the conflict between the conservative and the radical, between authority and novelty.

Now, this type of education is by no means obsolete even today. In the earlier phases of a child's education he is inevitably, and not unwisely, trained to depend upon authority—the authority of the parent, of textbook, and of teacher. Unhappily many never go beyond this childish stage. Even the high school cannot dispense wholly with the method of authority, and many schools do not begin, even in the science courses themselves, to show pupils a more excellent way. Too often also the college fails to introduce the student to accurate observation and independent thinking. Far the strongest indictment against the mathematical-classical group of studies has been that they were so employed in education as to confirm the man in the childish dependence upon authority. Their traditional use and method had had this effect, and it was the rare teacher who broke away and used the classics, as they may be used, in the scientific spirit. That the normal effect of these methods is not universal may be inferred from the gradual rise of science and the increase in the number of its votaries.

As even yet much the greater number of even learned men have been trained to an overwhelming respect for authority, and as the less educated have had little or no opportunity for any other training, the conflict between authority and the scientific spirit continues to exist. But the center of the conflict has shifted somewhat. It is evident that the scientific method is rightly dominant, and it seems that authorities in religion and science *must* be "reconciled." One type of apologist seeks now to show that the allega-

tions of Scripture writers are consonant with the present conceptions of science. Shields's *Scientific Evidences of Revealed Religion* may be taken as an extreme type of an apologetic both futile and useless. The other endeavors to show how religious conceptions may be modified in the light of modern discoveries without loss to true religion.

For the people of any particular age or phase of development books of this sort are beyond doubt useful, if they correctly represent the two parties, Christianity and science. But it must never be forgotten that such efforts are foredoomed to failure if "reconciliation" is the object. The method of authority and the method of science are incompatible, and no wedlock, blessed though it be, will ever unite them. Science will move on and leave any "reconciliation" outgrown. Christianity is growing now, and ought to continue its development until it likewise invalidates the argument. Such books are therefore, in the very nature of things, ephemeral. Yet they may do a most useful even if transient service.

The work¹ by Professor Rice is surely one of the sanest and most helpful of its kind. In the first part our scientific progress is considered. In general, scientific progress is shown to be along three lines: the extension of the universe in space, the extension of the universe in time, and the unity of the universe. The author devotes attention with increasing fulness to each in turn. This portion of the work is indeed a history of the scientific discoveries which have affected religious belief. It constitutes more than two-thirds of the whole, and may be accepted as a clear, concise, readable, and generally accurate statement of the more important facts and theories of astronomy, geology, and biology. Here are discussed the antiquity of man, Genesis and geology, the evolution of the universe according to the nebular hypothesis, the evolution of the earth through geologic history, the evolution of living things and Darwin's contribution to our knowledge of it, with a final section on the theological bearings of evolution.

In the second part of the book one finds chapters on the personality of man and of God, law in nature (most commendable), providence, prayer, miracle, and revelation and the Bible. A brief third part considers the general status of "Christian evidences."

Two different sorts of people are likely to find fault with this book. One will be the Christian of a certain type; because it assumes as true many things about Christianity which he is unwilling to concede, and abandons many points of ancient doctrine which seem to him impregnable.

¹ *Christian Faith in an Age of Science*. By WILLIAM NORTH RICE. New York: Armstrong & Son, 1903. xii + 425 pages, 15 figures.

He does not feel the force of the difficulties that beset his scientific brethren, and he considers any yielding as compromise with an enemy who ought to be resisted with a "Get thee behind me, Satan; thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men." Such a man will say that the author asks simply an abandonment of historic Christianity and advocates a mongrel substitute of monistic philosophy, scientific rationalism, and pantheism—a religion Christian only by brevet.

The other critic will be the scientific man whose religious development has been dwarfed. He will point out some flaws even in the scientific portions; he will cavil at the discussions on providence, prayer, and miracle; will revile the author's evident faith as unfitting him for his task; and will demand rigid scientific proof of the fundamentals of Christianity as prerequisite to belief.

But the scientific man who seeks religious truth as he seeks truth in material fields will find here suggestions which may lead to fuller faith. Yet even he may feel constrained to withhold assent to some of Professor Rice's explanations, and, in default of adequate knowledge, many will prefer to suspend judgment entirely, only holding it sure that truth is in none of its parts at variance with itself. The Christian who has writhed before the unholy dilemma, "You must believe thus-and-so, or you are no Christian," will find from this book that even the most modern results of scientific study not only need not destroy faith, but may strengthen it. The theologian, if he reads with open mind, may get from it new ideas that will illuminate some philosophical recesses of doctrine. To all who want light on their faith we commend the book for thoughtful perusal and calm reflection.

But he who takes the book as a final word, be he who he may, will make a mistake which the author warns him against. It necessarily indicates only a line of thought for personal development, a *modus vivendi*, till we all attain unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a full-grown man, acquainted with the ways of God in the world.

Perhaps a passage of Professor Rice's own will be the best indication of the scope of his book.

We have traced the history of the great discoveries which have created the new intellectual atmosphere. The flat earth has rolled itself into a spheroid. The once steadfast earth spins in its orbit around a central sun. The heavenly bodies have stretched apart into measureless distances. The six thousand years of tradition have expanded into a duration immense if not eternal. Man himself, though his duration is but a moment in comparison with that of the universe,

claims an antiquity far beyond the traditional limit. The chaotic manifoldness of nature has given place to a threefold unity—a unity of substance, a unity of force, and a unity of process. All changes of matter, lifeless and living alike, are the expression of transformations of a stock of energy which suffers neither addition nor subtraction. From the nebula to man we find no break in the continuity of evolution. Meteors have clustered into suns and planets. The incandescent surface of the globe has wrinkled into continents and oceans. The simplest forms of life have developed in endless ramification into the varied species of plants and animals, till animal life has grown divine in man himself.

And we have recognized that these changes in our thought of the universe cannot but work corresponding changes in our thought of God and of his revelation to man. We have ceased to look to the Bible for a revelation of the plan and history of the universe, or to regard the Bible as inerrant. The "carpenter God" has vanished from a universe which we have come to regard as a growth and not as a building. The metaphysical dogma of the duality of essence in human nature has been rendered uncertain by the tendencies of biological science. Evolutionary anthropology must regard the fall of man as potential rather than actual. The tendencies of scientific thought have compelled us to reject as unhistoric some of the Biblical narratives of miracle, and to regard others as more or less doubtful.

Yet these changes of belief involve the abandonment of no essential doctrine of Christianity. A Heavenly Father, a risen Saviour, an inspired and inspiring Bible, an immortal hope, are still ours.

Such a book will surely be useful in its day, though neither those who reverence authority, nor those who doubt all things that they may know the more, are fully satisfied by it.

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THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT RESTATED.¹

HERE are two books with essentially one theme, though separated in time of publication by but little more than a year. The former is a serious, elaborate, and learned discussion of some 330 pages; the latter is a series of three lectures apologetic of the position taken in its predecessor and somewhat, though not offensively, polemical. Ultra-conservative readers will welcome both, though they will find nothing new in either.

The purpose of these two books is to re-establish and reinforce the doctrine of the strictly substitutionary and propitiatory death of Christ,

¹ *The Death of Christ: Its Place and Interpretation in the New Testament*, 1902. *The Atonement and the Modern Mind*, 1903. By JAMES DENNEY. New York: Armstrong & Son. 334 pages, \$1.50; 159 pages, \$1.

which the author thinks is frankly denied or entirely ignored in a considerable part of the preaching and the religious writing of the present day.

In his main book, after an introduction in which he maintains the unity of the New Testament, discusses certain "misused distinctions" such as historical and dogmatic, biblical and systematic, material and formal, and posits the death of Jesus on the cross as a subject which is treated by the New Testament writers as "of central and permanent importance to the Christian faith," the author proceeds to the proof of this proposition by an examination of the synoptic gospels, the earliest Christian preaching as illustrated in the first half of Acts and the first epistle of St. Peter, the epistles of St. Paul, the epistle to the Hebrews, and the Johannine writings, among which he includes the Apocalypse. The volume concludes with a *concio ad clerum* on "the importance of the death of Christ in preaching and in theology."

It is impossible in the space at my command to give a detailed review of Dr. Denney's exposition and argument; nor is it necessary. It will suffice to set forth his main contention. But some notice must be taken of his first chapter, for in that he lays the basis of his claim that the death of Jesus is "central and dominant" in the synoptic gospels and in the mind of Jesus himself.

It may be said at the outset—not by way of compliment, but in frank acknowledgment of the truth—that the author is learned and carries his learning easily; he is familiar with current theological thought on the continent as well as in Great Britain; he is clever and nimble in argument, though wanting at once in vision and in a certain robust sense for fact; he is courteous to opponents, albeit sometimes a bit mordant in sarcastic allusion or remark; and he is thoroughly religious—in the theological sense. But, though he occasionally uses warm language, there is no inherent heat and glow in his expression. He reaches, to his own satisfaction, certain tremendous conclusions; but he never quickens the pulse of his reader, perhaps because, though convinced, he is never quite convincing. Evidently he has strong conviction, but it is conviction of the head rather than of the heart, and his logic never takes fire.

The fundamental difficulty with Dr. Denney is that he is attempting to resuscitate a doctrine which is dead. His attempt is among the ablest as well as the most recent, but it fails. The reason for his failure is inherent in his thesis: he is maintaining that which is unreal or immoral, or both; and from it the ingenuous mind irresistibly revolts. Curiously he illustrates his own words, used in criticism of a remark of Schmiedel's:

It is difficult to believe that this sort of thing is written seriously: if courtesy compels us to acknowledge that it is, we can only draw the melancholy conclusion that it is possible for the human mind to be serious even when it has completely lost contact with reality. (P. 49.)

In discussing the testimony of the synoptics as to the "central and dominant" position of Jesus' death in the record, Dr. Denney devotes himself mainly to three critical moments—the baptism, the prediction uttered in the region of Cæsarea Philippi, that is, within six months of the end, and the institution of the Supper. He cites also the sayings about the children of the bride-chamber fasting when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and about Jonah being "three days and three nights in the whale's belly." But these may be put aside as of little force in supporting his contention. The second and third instances are pertinent, as showing that Jesus rightly estimated the probable result of the hostility which was ripening against him among the Pharisees. But it is not easy to treat seriously Dr. Denney's handling of the report of Jesus' baptism. The evangelist says: "A voice came from heaven, Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in Thee I am well pleased." These words, according to our author, did not awaken in Jesus a sense of his messiahship, but spoke to and expressed a sense of messiahship already clearly developed. He says:

The Messianic consciousness in Jesus from the very beginning was one with the consciousness of the Servant of the Lord. The King, to whom Jehovah says, Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee (Psalm 2:7) is at the same time (in the mind of Jesus) that mysterious Servant of Jehovah—"my beloved in whom I am well pleased"—whose tragic yet glorious destiny is adumbrated in the second Isaiah (42:1 ff.). It is not necessary to inquire how Jesus could combine beforehand two lines of anticipation which at the first glance seem so inconsistent with each other; the point is, that on the evidence before us, which seems to the writer as indisputable as anything in the Gospels, He did combine them, and therefore cannot have started on his ministry with the cloudless hopes which are sometimes ascribed to him.

One needs a good deal of patience and charity to treat such writing as this seriously. It is not only unhistorical and uncritical, but it is fanciful in the extreme. The same may be said of the assumption that probably Jesus told the stories of his baptism and temptation often, giving more or less fully, with brief allusions to Old Testament words or fuller citation of them, such hints of His experience as His hearers could appreciate. (P. 14, note.)

As a matter of fact, nothing is more striking in the gospel stories than the high reserve of Jesus about his interior and deeper experiences. There is no trace of intimate confidences concerning himself. Dr. Denney even goes

so far as to find in the baptism of Jesus an explicit, dramatic fulfilment of Isaiah's words, "He was numbered with the transgressors!" After this we are not surprised when a similar drastic treatment draws out of the words about the children of the bride-chamber fasting when the bridegroom shall be no longer with them a distinct and conscious forecast by Jesus of his own death.

The exegetical and hermeneutical treatment of the Pauline, Johannine, and other writings which Dr. Denney reviews may be examined by the reader at his leisure, but there is nothing in it so fantastic as the preceding. It sets forth the author's belief that the whole significance of Jesus' appearance on the earth and life among men is concentrated in his death on the cross. That fact gives everything else its value. There is but one gospel, and that gospel is the substitutionary and propitiatory death of Jesus.

God has really done something in Christ on which the salvation of the world depends, and . . . it is a Christian duty to be intolerant of everything which ignores, denies, or explains it away. (P. 110.)

That "something done in Christ" has previously been defined thus:

Christ took on him the consequences of our sins—He made our responsibilities, as sin had fixed them, His own. (P. 98.)

For Dr. Denney

the whole secret of Christianity is contained in Christ's death, and in the believing abandonment of the soul to that death in faith. . . . The propitiatory death of Christ, as an all-transcending demonstration of love evokes in sinful souls a response which is *the whole of Christianity*.^{*} (P. 178.)

The "all-transcending demonstration of love" is wholly in Jesus, who takes the sinner's place in a peculiar death; and the old difficulty of conceiving divine forgiveness as real, when it is conditioned on a practical exhaustion of penalty, reappears. The grace of God is rather the grace of Jesus, and God remains the inexorable judge who revokes the sentence of condemnation because the law has been vindicated, or at least the divine ethical demand satisfied, and not because he is a compassionate Father graciously bestowing pardon on the penitent.

It is not often that one finds today so frank an acceptance of the idea that the relation to God of the sinner saved by grace is a forensic relation. Dr. Denney says:

The forensic theory of atonement, as it is called, is not unrelated to the ethico-mystical; it is not parallel to it; it is not a mistaken *ad hominem* or rather *ad Phariseum* mode of thought which ought to be displaced by the other; it has the essential eternal truth in it by which *and by which alone* the experiences are

* The italics are the author's.

generated in which the strength of the other is supposed to lie. (P. 184.) Mystical union [with Christ] owes its very being to that atonement outside of us, that finished work of Christ, which some would use it to discredit. (P. 185.)

The author's entire conception of God's relation to the world, in the process of salvation, is provincial to the last degree. He has no gospel for men of every race and time. Though he says that

there is nothing in the world so universally intelligible as the Cross; . . . the atoning death of Christ, as a revelation of God, is a thing in itself so intelligible, so correspondent to a universal need, so direct and universal in its appeal, that it must be the basis of a universal religion (p. 118);

yet in his theory the cross is unintelligible to anyone save the metaphysical theologian. Faith and motive to righteousness depend absolutely on a metaphysical notion of Christ's death, and salvation depends on an understanding of Christ's state of mind while undergoing the experience of dying—a state of mind which has never been disclosed save in a few obscure ejaculations on the cross. Says Dr. Denney:

No one is really saved from sin until he has in relation to it that mind which Christ had when He bore our sins in His own body on the tree. (P. 308.)

Faith is not a confident, restful, obedient trust in God, such as Jesus inculcated and exemplified; it is acceptance of an occult theory of atonement. Indeed, Dr. Denney even declares, "It is the Atonement which regenerates."

The simplicity of Jesus' gospel is gone, and in place of it is a theory of moral relations between personalities (there can be moral relations only between personalities, of course) which cuts the roots of morality. The process of salvation is fundamentally materialistic and magical.

The Christ who is the object of faith is the Christ whose death is the Atonement, and the faith which takes hold of Christ as He is held out in the gospel *conducts*, if we may use such a figure, *the virtue of the Atonement into the heart.*³ (Pp. 291 f.)

It is not surprising now that the author can say:

We are always establishing for ourselves, or letting others impose upon us, customs—whether intellectual, as creeds, or ethical, as conventional ways of being charitable or of worshipping God—which, though good in themselves, tend to corrupt the world just because they are customs: in other words, we are always tacitly denying that the death of Christ does full justice to law in every sense of the term, and that for those who believe in it law exists henceforth only in the divine glory of the Atonement, and in the life which it inspires. (P. 192.)

He frankly makes Christ inaccessible to the ingenuous youth who seeks to imitate him until he has apprehended him as a substitute for himself in

³ The italics here are mine.

a mysterious transaction in which Christ assumes, in an expiatory way, the full responsibility for his sins.

He may think at first [this "amiable and aspiring youth" who "is trying to imitate Jesus"] that he can identify himself with the Son of God at any point over the whole area of his life, but he discovers experimentally that this is not so. He finds out in a way surer than any logical demonstration that Christ is in the last resort as inaccessible to him as the God to whom he would draw near by imitating Christ, and that the only hope he has of getting to God in this way depends upon Christ's making Himself one with him in that responsibility for sin which separates him from the Father. His one point of contact with Christ, when his whole situation is seriously taken, is Christ's character as a propitiation for sin. (Pp. 300 f.)

The meaning of the author's main contention is fairly plain to one who is familiar with theological literature and modes of thought; but to the reader not thus prepared it must be obscure. Yet, like many others who have written on this theme, Dr. Denney is curiously elusive and unsatisfactory to the trained mind. He is not evasive so much as he is unable to state exactly what is accomplished by Christ in his substitutionary death. He says, it is true, that Christ takes the full responsibility of the sinner's sin. But what does this mean? How can moral responsibility be shifted from the guilty to the guiltless without destroying morality itself? The whole argument is only another statement of the old device for morally getting something for nothing, for acquiring righteousness without meeting the requirements which are absolutely essential to righteousness. It drags us again to the demoralizing conclusion that God achieves morality in man by a process which is immoral and fundamentally impossible outside the sophistries of theology.

The second book adds nothing of importance to the first. In a somewhat more polemical vein the author presents a preliminary definition of the subject, and then discusses "Sin and the Divine Reaction against It" and "Christ and Man in the Atonement."

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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PHILOSOPHY.

TO THOSE who knew Herbert Spencer only through that great system of philosophy which he has given to the world this account of his life and personality¹ will be a welcome acquisition, especially as it is written by

¹ *An Autobiography*. In two volumes; illustrated. New York: Appleton & Co., 1904. 655 and 603 pages.

his own hand and published by those who for so many years have stood in honorable business relations with the distinguished thinker.

Physically, Mr. Spencer's life was one long losing battle with nervous disease, and the last dozen years of it were spent in retirement and invalidism. Intellectually, he was strikingly independent and constructive in his thinking; fitted, by heredity and early training, for accurate observation and wide generalizing. Morally, he inherited from his Huguenot and Wesleyan ancestors a strong disposition to disregard all merely conventional or arbitrary authority—a disposition which he very happily describes by the phrase "constitutional nonconformity." Religiously, he lived and died outside the pale of the "current orthodoxy," because it never seemed possible to him that the Supreme Being should stand in that close personal relation to human life required by the creeds of the churches. Nevertheless, as life advanced, he regarded these creeds with increasing tolerance, and even with positive approval, as necessary and salutary factors in man's evolution toward the highest religious status. He even declares that the sphere occupied by them "can never be an unfilled sphere."

It must be admitted that Mr. Spencer carries his "constitutional nonconformity" to such length at times that he almost seems to disagree for the pure love of disagreement. He has no patience with Plato, whose *Dialogues* seem to him indefinite in thought, and dramatically inferior to the conversations of our third-rate novelists. To read the *Iliad* through would be "a dreadful task." Ruskin speaks and writes "multitudinous absurdities." Turner is not a great painter, nor is Wagner a great musician. As for Carlyle, he "either could not or would not think coherently." Carlyle, indeed, is a pet aversion, to whom Spencer devotes some five pages of denunciation, which for vigor and explicitness would do credit to the Chelsea sage himself.

It must also be admitted that Mr. Spencer sometimes criticises and condemns the position of an opponent without either fairly stating or carefully examining that position. For example, he refers to the "assumption, held in common by the Quakers and most other Christians, that the declared will of God is the only possible standard of morals." Again, he charges ethical writers, as well as ordinary people, with teaching "without qualification" the doctrine that virtue always brings good consequences, and vice evil consequences. Students of philosophy have long been familiar with his criticism of Kant, and are perhaps not altogether unprepared for his confession, now made, that he never read more than the first few pages of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*. In his criticism of Kant he takes occasion to point out that reason's function, as a critic of external percep-

tion, is not to deny the genuineness of its dicta, but to "reinterpret them in such a way as to make them consistent." Having never read Kant, of course he could not be expected to know that this is precisely what the critical philosophy has done for our common notion of space.

In spite of the remarkable versatility of his genius, Mr. Spencer may be described as a man of one idea; and that idea is evolution. One of the most valuable features of this *Autobiography* is the manner in which it sets forth, "in the order of their genesis," the evolutionary ideas of which the author has been so distinguished an exponent. He calls the book a natural history of himself; and it is of the greatest interest to follow up the process of the unfolding of the fundamental ideas that constitute the basis and point of departure for his system, into all the ramifications of that system, as it was evolved during the author's active life; so that the "advance toward a complete conception of evolution" is shown to have been "itself a process of evolution."

In a series of twelve letters to the *Nonconformist*, published when Spencer was twenty-two years of age, there are adumbrations of the general drift of all his subsequent thinking. The omnipresence of law and order, in nature organic and inorganic, in man, in mind, and in society; the specific relation in which everything stands to its environment; the wants that have to be supplied, the instincts that have to be gratified, and the organs and instruments appropriate to this end; the decadence of unused organs and faculties; and the tendency everywhere toward equilibrium, toward self-adjustment, individual and social—all this is foreshadowed in the letters, and out of the letters grew *Social Statics*, Mr. Spencer's first book; while out of *Social Statics* grew the entire synthetic philosophy.

From the moment when it obtained possession of his mind, the conception of evolution absolutely dominated everything in Spencer's thought. The entire synthetic philosophy is an outgrowth of the root-principle of development by the operation of natural forces; and these forces are all at bottom only different forms of one single force, which "can in no case be either increased or decreased, but only transformed" (Vol. II, p. 15). All that has ever occurred, all that is now going on, and all that ever will be or take place in the universe, is to be explained in terms of the operation of that great force which is the one original, eternal, and opaque fact. All phenomena, whether astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, or sociologic; all forms of being, of thought, and of will; all ideas, customs, and beliefs, of whatever sort; as well as all progress, all stagnation, and all decay, are to be explained in the same way, namely, as expressions of this one great force, which, in itself incomprehensible, takes

on the two forms of matter and motion, and by the constant distribution and redistribution of these, produces all the things that are, and all the events that happen, from the molecule to the Milky Way, from the motion of an insect's pinion to the swing of Neptune in his mighty orbit, and from the crudest superstitions of fetichism to the sublimest conceptions of the Christian faith.

To give even a summary of so imposing a system as the synthetic philosophy is scarcely possible within the present limits; and, fortunately, it is scarcely necessary. The manner in which the author employs the conception of an original and inscrutable force, unceasingly expressing itself in a distribution of matter and motion, to account for all phenomena in the inorganic, organic, and superorganic realms; the conceptions of the instability of the homogeneous, and the unceasing concomitant processes of differentiation and integration, bringing about the transformation from "indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent heterogeneity;" the conception of equilibration as the final result of the transformations which an evolving aggregate undergoes; the conception of a perpetual alternation between evolution and dissolution—the alternations completing themselves in short periods in the case of small aggregates, while in large aggregates they may require periods immeasurable by human thought—that which persists throughout all these ceaseless changes, being an unknown and unknowable Power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time; all these conceptions are more or less familiar to the present generation. The system, it must be confessed, is fascinating on account of the stupendous breadth of its outlook and the simplicity at which it aims. The generalizing instinct is strong in our race; and every age has witnessed attempts to explain the entire universe by means of some single, all-inclusive principle; attempts to mount some Pisgah peak from which the whole land might be viewed. And we need not be surprised if the vast extent of the territory and the startling heterogeneity of the phenomena presented should sometimes give us pause, and raise doubts in many minds as to the feasibility of the attempts.

The system, it may be added, is attractive because of the many evidences that it contains a large measure of truth. That the processes of differentiation and integration, with the accompanying elimination of that which is worse adapted to the conditions in which it is placed, and the survival of that which is better adapted to those conditions, are going on continually, both in the material and in the mental realm, is a statement supported now by a vast and constantly accumulating weight of evidence. Whether by the same principle we shall be able to explain, not only the

development that takes place *within* each realm of the real, but also the relation in which the several realms (the biological, the psychological, and the ethical, for example) stand to one another, is another question. It is also quite another question, even granting that this can be done, and the whole stupendous structure articulated in detail, whether that would end the matter, and leave nothing more to be said.

Criticism of the synthetic philosophy might be general, as touching the cardinal principle underlying it; or it might be special, as touching the applicability of that principle to the various departments of investigation in detail. Following the former plan, we might ask whether the "instability of the homogeneous," which lies at the very root of the whole system, is not an impossibility in thought and in fact; we might ask how that which is perfectly homogeneous can ever *begin to depart from* that condition of homogeneity. Following the latter plan, we might point out that in the *First Principles*, the apparent conclusiveness of the arguments by which ultimate realities are shown to be unknowable, rests upon the assumption that the process of knowing a thing requires always the picturing of that thing in the imagination. Let any reader of the *First Principles* observe how constantly Mr. Spencer employs the terms "knowledge," "conception," "mental picture," and "image," as perfectly interchangeable; and then let him ask himself whether the entire argument is not a *petitio principii*. The question might legitimately be raised whether a treatment of man's moral nature which is avowedly nothing more than a natural history of the manner in which man is by slow degrees approaching a state in which he will spontaneously do the things which are conducive to the utterance of life, can be called ethics in the true sense. It may be seriously questioned whether the unique peculiarities of the moral judgment and the categorical imperative can be accounted for by saying that "experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continuous transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition." It may be pointed out that no explanation is given as to *how* a "nervous modification" can *become* a "faculty of moral intuition," even though unlimited aeons be allowed for the transformation. We might, with Green, raise the question how a creature who is simply a product of natural forces could ever undertake to give an account of those forces, as explaining himself, or could ever consider himself under a moral obligation to conform to their laws. We might make the fullest allowance for Mr. Spencer's invaluable services to the science of education, and yet make serious objection to that doctrine

of moral discipline whose avowed object is to do the very thing that ought never to be done in the case, namely, to eliminate the personality of the parent and teacher, and substitute therefor "the impersonal agency of nature." We might call attention, as Mr. Frederick Harrison has done, to the inconsistency between that negative conception of the Supreme Being with which Mr. Spencer sets out, and that positive conception of him which he reaches before the conclusion of the *First Principles*; and we might ask whether his declaration that God is "at least personal" does not reopen the whole question as to the worth and validity of the current religious creeds.

But as all parts of the synthetic philosophy proceed from a single fundamental principle, so all criticisms of this system are at bottom one criticism. If Mr. Spencer's central thesis is complete and adequate in every respect, well and good; there is nothing more to be said. But if it is insufficient, its insufficiency will be shown in its failure to account for some of the undisputed facts.

Mr. Spencer, as he himself repeatedly asserts, has yielded himself without reserve to the notion of causality. The one great original inscrutable *force* is the sole and sufficient *ultimate* explanation of the universe. We believe that he has rendered great and distinguished service to science and philosophy by his thoroughgoing elaboration of the principle of cause; and we are not disposed seriously to quarrel with him, even when he undertakes to apply that principle in realms where others have hesitated to apply it. And yet it is certainly worth while to point out that the *exhaustive application of a principle* is not the same as an *exhaustive enumeration of principles*. To treat the world from the principle of causation is to treat it from a certain aspect or point of view. To show the validity of that principle in all the realms of the real is only to show that, *in that aspect, or from that point of view*, the universe is a manifestation of the constant and necessary relatedness of cause and effect. But, in so doing, the validity of other points of view is not precluded. Grant as fully as you please the omnipresence of force and law, and it still remains a perfectly legitimate conception that these are only the means by which, and the way in which, there is being continuously wrought out and realized that dominant *purpose* and *idea* which constitutes the higher fact and the sublimer reality of the universe.

Mr. Spencer describes himself as prone to yield himself without reserve to the tyranny of an idea which has once taken possession of his mind. He has certainly yielded himself to the tyranny of naturalism. So complete is the subjugation that he seems quite unable to conceive the existence

of any other viewpoint. If the world is throughout *caused*, then for him there can be nowhere any *purpose* in it. He assumes without inquiry the complete incompatibility of cause and purpose in the same universe; just as he assumes without inquiry the complete incompatibility of the subjectivity and objectivity of space and time, as constituents of the world we know.

Had he been a little less impatient with all idealism, and a little more disposed to give the matter patient consideration, he might perhaps have seen that space and time not only *may be*, but *must be*, both subjective and objective at the same time. And had he been a little less impatient with all theology, and a little more disposed to metaphysical thinking, he might have seen that cause and purpose, force and idea, are but two aspects of the same whole, and that neither can be spared from our thinking without an impoverishment of our universe.

And then perhaps, having seen this great truth, Mr. Spencer would have been disposed to reconsider an ethical doctrine which, as it stands, fails utterly to explain why man should ever conceive a higher or better state, and lay upon his own conscience the solemn obligation of striving to attain unto it. He would reconsider a sociology which, talking constantly of "progress," leaves that important word entirely devoid of those teleological implications which alone can give it intelligible significance. And he would reconsider a philosophy of religion which, in so far as it remains consistent with itself, removes God so far from the reach of man, and so denudes him of all knowable qualities, as to leave the religious nature (which Spencer declares to be as genuine as any other faculty of man's being) without any proper conceivable "environment"—that is to say, without any proper object upon which it may bestow itself in faith and love and service, and from which it may receive that sustenance without which, according to Spencer's own doctrine, it must fall into a condition of atrophy, and finally disappear.

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HENRY WARD BEECHER.

In this volume,¹ Dr. Lyman Abbott, out of the riches of a lifelong personal acquaintance with Mr. Beecher, presents the public with an interpretation, an "appreciation," and a defense of his great master and friend.

Such a volume is perhaps specially needed just at this time. Mr.

¹ *Henry Ward Beecher*. By LYMAN ABBOTT. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1903. xl + 458 pages. \$1.75, net.

Beecher died under a cloud that had scarcely been lifted. His denominational associates to a large degree feared he had been guilty of the things with which he was charged, and let him drop from even casual mention. Others, not so immediately concerned, did not forget him or cease to speak of him and his great services. They did not so much fear because, possibly, they had not so much loved. But time is bringing, if it has not quite brought, a defense to Mr. Beecher's memory which is producing a great change. It is growing increasingly clear that he was sinned against; and the greatness of his services to religion and public life may now receive a new consideration, and his influence a new extension.

The review of his life which this book brings us shows two things with great clearness: how fully he was an exponent—so much so as to be in fact the typical exponent—of the spirit of that Congregationalism in which he was born, and which he served with the exception of the few years of his western ministry; and how, by virtue of it, he was the greatest prophet of his time. The modern Congregationalist, who reads Dr. Abbott's book and dips here and there again into Beecher's sermons, lectures, or political addresses, is struck with the modern air which pervades them, thirty or more years old though they may be, and recognizes it as the very air which he is himself breathing today. Congregationalism is essentially free, democratic, and practical. There were Congregationalists who in various ways resisted the natural outflow of one or more of these secret fountains of its power; but Mr. Beecher promoted their most liberal forthputting. The fathers of Congregationalism were not scholastics, and even their great theologians were always aiming at immediate practical effects. Beecher was often opposed for his lack of theology, scholarship, and what not; but, as Dr. Abbott shows, it was not lack of theology which characterized Mr. Beecher, but the subordination of theological form to direct effect for good. He had scholarship, but no pedantry. He had the courage, too, which belongs to the freedom of Congregationalism. Hence his modernness. He welcomed evolution, when others were depreciating it because they feared it. In his sermon upon "The Unity of Man" he granted everything to evolution which it could then (1872) ask, but insisted, whatever man's origin, upon the manifest *fact* of his unity in spiritual powers and needs. And then he said:

I look upon science as God's elect, not yet knowing her own mission. *I believe she is destined to regenerate religion herself.* I believe that science is speaking to us, and that we are to derive from it a nobler conception of God. . . . Therefore I say "All hail!" to the men who search and look after God's footprints. But while I say this, I cannot afford to say to any modern deductions:

"Take my faith, and I will give up the God of my fathers and the faith of my youth." There is nothing which I find in science that can take the place of that faith which I learned in my earlier years, and which I have lived on all my life long.

It took more than twenty years for leading evangelical theologians to come to that position, so much was Mr. Beecher ahead of his times; but that was the true attitude of Congregationalism, as it has now recognized.

Perhaps this anticipatory modernness of Mr. Beecher is nowhere better brought out than in his sermon, of the same year, upon the disclosures of municipal corruption in the days of Tweed in New York. That sermon is engaged in enforcing the idea, by some thought so new, and to many yet below the eastern horizon of their intellectual world, of the solidarity of men, and of the share of responsibility of every member of a community for the crimes that may be done in it:

It is a partnership. There is some of your blood and some of mine in every one of those thieving rascals. We are their fathers. . . . We breed felons when we permit, or in minor matters set on foot, those causes which issue in the production of laxness in public or commercial life. . . . *You* must cure it. A part of the cure lies in your heart; a part of it in your family; a part of it in the common schools; etc.

It was characteristic of Beecher to preach upon such themes. He counted "nothing human foreign to him" or to his pulpit. Dr. Abbott does well, therefore, to emphasize what many did not know at the time, or have since forgotten, that public topics did not constitute the burden and bulk of his ministry. His great object was the conversion of men. He did not even lay the chief emphasis upon edifying men, as many a preacher has who has thought himself eminently evangelical. The unconverted man, the outsider, was chief in Beecher's mind, and the great majority of his sermons were directed to gaining the attention of this class and furnishing them with the motives which should lead to repentance and salvation. If he was not conventional in this, and if he seemed often to go far afield to bring the motives of the gospel to bear upon men, it was doubtless because he saw, or thought he saw, peculiar difficulties in men's way needing removal in just that method.

So, in his reformatory work, his interpreter has done us a great service in bringing out so clearly the sane, conservative, broad, and wise elements of Mr. Beecher's methods and work. We were in danger of forgetting these, as some were so shocked by the unusual about Mr. Beecher that they could never perceive them. He auctioneered a slave off in his church to secure the funds for her purchase and liberation. This was sensational,

and to many so confounding that they thought Mr. Beecher a fanatic and extremist. But decidedly as he used his great opportunity in the *Independent*, of which he was an editor, he advocated nothing harsh or rash. He did not expect or encourage war. But he would not support the Fugitive Slave Law. "Obedience to laws, even though they sin against me; disobedience to every law that commands me to sin," was his principle. He maintained a spirit of Christian kindness toward slaveholder as well as toward slave. And it would have been his choice if the whole work of uprooting and destroying slavery had been left to the slower but irresistible influences of Christianity upon public sentiment. This was not the spirit of excess, but the wisdom of an exceptionally great and pure mind.

To the public at large Beecher's greatest single service will be thought, no doubt, to be his defense of America before the English nation in 1863. There is something so picturesque about the whole campaign, the power of the man comes out so clearly, his pluck is so admirable, and the contagion of his enthusiasm is so great, that no American—and, for that matter, no Englishman—can read the story without feeling not only astonishment at the feat, but gratitude to the man. Whether the ruling classes would have let England drift into acknowledgment of the Confederacy after Vicksburg and Gettysburg or not, Beecher won the great working classes, and made such an acknowledgment forever impossible. Considered as oratorical efforts, Dr. Abbott is not extreme when he claims for these addresses a place beside those of Demosthenes, Cicero, Fox, and Burke. For forensic success they are unsurpassed in the history of oratory.

But Mr. Beecher was a minister of the gospel; and, whatever his influence elsewhere may have been, the most important question which can be asked about him is: What was his influence within the legitimate sphere of his chosen calling? And here, next to his practical success as a winner of souls, his success as a leader in theological thinking comes under necessary examination. It is probable that he had more direct influence in modeling the thought of the country at large than any professor of theology who could be mentioned. What was the character of that influence, and how likely is it to endure?

The answer to these questions seems now tolerably clear. Mr. Beecher rendered little or no service to scientific, systematic theology. He did not design to. He selected the doctrines which he wished to emphasize, because they were fundamental for conviction, conversion, for development of faith, for dominant love of Christ, for character. Thus he looked at the whole problem of theology from a different angle from that occupied by the scientific theologian. But all the more for that, he vivified what

he did teach. The results of this are evident in Dr. Abbott. Most of those things which he thinks he received from Mr. Beecher he had probably heard in his veriest youth in his New England home, for they were the commonplaces of New England theology, and Beecher had absorbed them from his father in Litchfield and Boston, long before he studied them with him in Cincinnati. But they were dead, inoperative, misconstrued, and overlaid in the mind of the eager youth who took his place one day in Plymouth Church and got a new and dazzling vision of the great love of God. Beecher had made them live. And this he did for thousands of others all over the land.

The earliest teaching of Mr. Beecher seems to have been just the New School theology of New England in the main. In the main—for doubtless he differed at this or that unimportant point. By and by he got interested in evolution, and both he and Dr. Abbott have attempted to state theology in terms of evolution. Neither of those efforts seems to have any great promise of permanence. They do not understand evolution altogether. Who does, as yet? They are interesting, and no doubt of distinct value as efforts. But no one, not even their authors probably, expected that they would achieve permanence as authoritative statements of truth. Yet their value has been very great, and if they had had no other value whatever, the value of the fact that their authors were not afraid of evolution, while still standing, to their own apprehension, within the fellowship of the Christian church and the circle of evangelical theology, was and is immeasurably great.

It was in connection with criticisms made upon Mr. Beecher for his sermons upon evolution that he determined in 1882 to withdraw from the New York and Brooklyn Association of Congregational Ministers. He made at the time an elaborate statement of his theological position. At its close the association voted unanimously, among other things, that "his full and proffered exposition of doctrinal views that he has made at this meeting indicates the propriety of his continued membership in this or any other Congregational association." A review at this date of the statement confirms this judgment. It was not "systematic," as many count system; it did not accord with Calvinism of any variety at every point; but it was, substantially theistic, Trinitarian, kenotic in its Christology, and cordially accepted providence, prayer, miracles, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, inspiration (quoting freely from the Westminster Confession), atonement, and future punishment (though not affirming its endlessness). In fact, by some Congregationalists at the present day it would be called conservative. But throughout it illustrated what has been already said, that Beecher's

theological interest was with the doctrines that immediately and powerfully affect men, with the practical rather than the scholastic, and that his power was in making simple and fundamental doctrines live and effect revolutionary changes in men's souls. In all this he was pre-eminently the child of that New England theology of which his father, Lyman Beecher, had been one of the leading exponents and defenders.

The true greatness of Beecher was therefore the greatness of a great personality; and his true work in the world, that of bringing to bear personal power for the moving of men toward righteousness and toward God. In this respect he did a work equalled by none of his contemporaries in this country, and remotely approached by but few. When so much has been said, has it not been said that he gained and maintained a place among the greatest men of our nation and our time?

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THE TALMUD AND CHRISTIANITY.¹

THE extension of the historico-religious method to the study of the New Testament has made it necessary that the ideas and aspirations of the contemporary Judaism should be very closely scrutinized. And the New Testament itself, with its Jewish coloring, tempered though it is by a strong and avowed polemic against official Judaism, not only suggests, but demands, this investigation in the interests of its own understanding and interpretation. Responding to this demand, recent years have witnessed the appearance of many works dealing with the history of the Jewish religion in New Testament times. And one of the most striking characteristics of this movement is that the sources of information with regard to contemporary Judaism have been found largely in the apocalyptic Jewish literature which has been preserved chiefly in the Christian church among the apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books. This has been done intentionally, and with the avowed conviction that it is from the literature of the people, the uncultivated masses, that one can gain the most vivid conception of the real force of a religion and of religious ideas.² Proceeding on

¹*Talmud und Theologie*. Ein Vortrag von PAUL FIEBIG. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. viii + 30 pages.

Introduction to the Talmud. By M. MIELZINER. Second revised edition. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1903. 297 pages. \$2, net.

Christianity in Talmud and Midrash. By R. TRAVERS HERFORD. London: Williams & Norgate, 1903. xvi + 449 pages.

²See article by BOUSSET, "Die Religionsgeschichte und das Neue Testament," *Theologische Rundschau*, July, 1904, p. 271.

this principle, the recent works of Baldensperger, Bousset, Charles, Schürer, and Volz, while not ignoring the Talmud and Midrash, have devoted a large share of their attention to the apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books, so far as they can be shown to be of Jewish origin.

That a new and extremely rich field for investigation has been opened up cannot be denied, nor can it be questioned that, so far as the interpretation of Christianity is concerned, this extra-canonical literature is of more value than is the orthodox official Jewish literature. For it is in these apocryphal books that we find mirrored more clearly than in the Talmud or Midrash the thoughts, the longings, the hopes, and the fears of the great body of the people to whom Christ turned with his preaching when the official classes rejected him and his message. But it is only natural that Jewish scholars especially should protest against dignifying these popular heterogeneous and often incongruous ideas with the name of Judaism or Jewish religion, and should insist that, next to the Old Testament, the Talmud, the Midrashim, and the other writings of the recognized leaders of Jewish thought should be regarded as the primary, if not the only, sources for the formulation of a religion of Judaism in the New Testament or any other period.

Expression to this protest was given most forcibly, and with too much of race rancor to be truly scientific, in the little book by Felix Perles entitled *Bousset's Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter kritisch untersucht*. With all its bitterness, however, the book brings into the foreground this fundamental difference of opinion as to the real sources for a history of the religion of Judaism, as Bousset himself has recognized in his reply to Perles.³ Mr. C. G. Montefiore⁴ has also complained of the tendency of Christian scholars to ignore the work of Jewish scholars on what he asserts is their own distinctive field, and declares, on the authority of so great a rabbinic scholar as Schechter, that the apocalyptic writings "contributed very little toward the formation of Jewish thought. The rabbis were either wholly ignorant of their very existence, or stigmatized them as silly or fabulous, and thus allowed them no permanent influence upon Judaism." Such Christian scholars as Dalman and Strack would probably agree, in part at least, with the views of Perles and Montefiore. It seems a reasonable conclusion that both opinions have their justification, and that neither of them is entirely correct. A representation of the religion of Judaism which deals only incidentally with the character and teaching of the great Jewish rabbis, whatever may be its worth in furnish-

³*Volksfrömmigkeit und Schriftgelehrtentum*, 1903.

⁴"Jewish Scholarship and Christian Silence," *Hibbert Journal*, 1903, pp. 335-46.

ing the background for Christianity, cannot claim to do full scientific justice to one of the most important religious developments that the world has ever seen. And, on the other hand, the ideas which have been preserved in the apocalyptic literature, and which were undoubtedly current in the minds of the common people, the ordinary laymen who knew not the law, must be given due consideration, if we are to form a correct conception of the extent and the intensity of that religious life out of the midst of which Christianity was brought into being.

The enormous difficulties in the way of the mastery of the religious ideas of official Judaism may, it is true, be urged as an excuse for the neglect of this subject by the ordinary Christian scholar, and Jewish scholars, as Mr. Montefiore admits, have not done what they might to make the treasures of rabbinic Judaism accessible to general scholarship. But, notwithstanding the difficulties, it would seem desirable that some few at least of the Christian scholars of Europe and America should attempt to make themselves at home in this great field, and that the contributions of competent Jewish scholars in this department of thought, which is so peculiarly their own, should be welcomed and accorded due consideration. This is the burden of the lecture by Fiebig, one of the works which form the special occasion of this article. Within the short space of thirty pages Mr. Fiebig has managed to compress a good deal of interesting information with regard to the extent and character of the Jewish rabbinic literature, with illustrations of the light thrown on New Testament narratives and doctrines from the teaching of the Talmud, and suggestions as to the best way of making the thought of the Talmud available for the history of religion, and especially for the history of the origin of Christianity.

Our second book furnishes for the English-reading student an admirable introduction to the great body of the rabbinic writings. In its present form it is the second edition of a work whose first edition appeared in 1894. It seems to have been written especially for the use of Jewish students, but its comprehensive character and its freedom from the polemic spirit make it an excellent work to put in the hands of a Christian student as well. A brief outline of its contents may be useful. The author gives in successive chapters a brief survey of the Mishna; of works kindred to the Mishna; the authorities and expounders of the Mishna; the Gemara; commentaries, epitomes, editions, translation of the Talmud; the legal hermeneutics of the Talmud, with the explanation and illustration of the numerous rules for the artificial interpretation; an outline of the talmudic terminology and methodology; and lastly, and all too briefly, a series of notes on the ethics of the Talmud. Two valuable indexes and a key to the abbreviations used in the Talmud complete the volume.

Our third book deals with another phase of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, namely, the attitude of the rabbinic writings as the literature of official Judaism to Christianity and especially to its founder. The field is not a new one. The pamphlets of Heinrich Laible, *Jesus Christus im Thalmud*, and of Professor Dalman, *Was sagt der Thalmud über Jesum?* (English, *Christ in the Talmud*, by A. W. Streane, 1893) went over the same ground as that covered by the work before us, in so far as it deals with the statements of the Talmud with regard to Jesus. But the wider scope of the present work in treating of the utterances of the Jewish literature with regard to Christianity gives it an independent value. It also furnishes an interesting and thoroughly sympathetic outline of the rabbinic religious and ethical system, and describes how the rabbis reared their vast structure on the basis of the Old Testament or more closely defined, upon the basis of the Pentateuch, with its substance in the Sh^{ma}, by their method of tradition and artificial interpretation. The author sets Judaism as a system of life and thought, with perhaps too sharp a definition as a system of religion of works or orthopraxy with liberty of faith, over against historical Christianity as a religion of faith or orthodoxy with liberty of works.

An appendix brings the original texts of the passages which are translated and commented upon in the body of the work. In addition to their value as sources, they are of value in that they give the reader who may be acquainted only with classical Hebrew an inkling of the difficulties which confront the student of the Talmud as he attempts to translate the strange Aramaic and new-Hebrew sentences, and to attach some intelligible interpretation to them.

When we consider the struggle between Christianity and Judaism to which the New Testament bears witness, perhaps the predominant thought in the mind of one who looks over these references is one of surprise that the Talmud contains so little evidence of that struggle. Our Lord himself is referred to chiefly in veiled language, but there is unmistakable evidence that official Judaism sanctioned and circulated, if it did not originate, the familiar stories concerning his birth out of wedlock and the impurity of his mother. The hatred for Jesus is shown by the declaration that he was a sinner who led the multitude into sin, and by the assertion that he had no part in the world to come. The Talmud bears witness to his miraculous powers, to the fact that he gathered disciples about him, and to his execution; though there is a strange lack of harmony in the statements as to the time, place, and manner of his death; but it adds nothing with regard to his life and work which is not contained in the gospel narratives.

In the second part of his book Mr. Herford is upon ground that has not been so thoroughly worked before in English. In his discussion of the talmudic references to Minim and Minuth, heretics and heresy, he seems to us to show conclusively that the common opinion that the reference is to Christians and Christianity is the correct one. In this he refutes the arguments of Friedländer, who in his work, *Der Vorchristliche jüdische Gnosticismus*, sought to prove that the Minim were Gnostics of the Ophite sect. Occasionally, on the testimony of Mr. Herford, the term may denote other heretics, but usually the reference is to Jewish Christians, and probably to Jewish Christians who held a Christology similar to that of the epistle to the Hebrews (pp. 380, 381).

The view that the Minim were Jewish Christians is not only in harmony with the fact that the hostility to the Minim was most marked about the beginning of the second century, and then gradually decreased until the relations between them and the rabbis were almost friendly, but it also throws light upon the diminishing significance of the distinctively Jewish element in the early church. When Christianity ceased to be a Jewish sect and became avowedly gentile, it was no longer a matter of concern to rabbinical Judaism.

In closing, it may not be amiss to echo the sentiments of our authors and to hope that the day may not be far distant when the means for a correct estimate of this religious system which is so closely related historically to Christianity may become more generally available. Even if no important information is to be derived from talmudic sources as to the origin and early history of Christianity, yet, in the interests of science and of the extension of the kingdom of God, it may well be urged that justice be done the Jewish religion.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EARLY CHURCH.

THE literature on the subject of the origin of the Christian ministry has been recently increased by two additions—*The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries*,¹ by Professor Lindsay, principal of Glasgow College of the United Free Church of Scotland; and *The Church and its Organization in Primitive and Catholic Times*,² by Rev. Walter Lowrie.

¹ New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904. 402 pages. \$3.50, net.

² New York: Armstrong, 1903. 398 pages. \$2.

Dr. Lindsay's work covers the first three centuries. After treating, in his first two chapters, of the New Testament conception of the church, its various meetings in apostolic times for edification, for the eucharist, and for business, he discusses the higher general ministry of apostles, prophets, and teachers in his third chapter; and then turns in his two next chapters to the question of the relation of bishops and presbyters, and the development of the episcopate to the time of Ignatius. "The Fall of the Prophetic Ministry and the Conservative Revolt" is the title of the sixth chapter, which is devoted to the situation in the second century, the Montanist movement, and the worship and government as described in the canons of Hippolytus. In the seventh chapter he takes up the work and influence of Cyprian, and in his last chapter gives a most interesting and valuable discussion of the Roman state religion and its effects on the organization of the church. His book is a profitable one to browse over for the whole ante-Nicene period. Ample learning, conscientious and conservative scholarship, and a deep interest in his theme make its reading attractive to the general student of the history of the time. Nor is his work of a partisan character, although he does not allow us to forget that he represents the Scotch Free Church; and perhaps he may go too far when he finds a close resemblance between its ministry and that of the early church. He makes it plain that he has no overfondness for bishops, nor does he show any affection for Cyprian, as he deals some trenchant blows at Benson's life of the bishop of Carthage.

Of Mr. Lowrie's book it is more difficult to speak. It is controversial, and calculated to provoke opposition. Its subtitle, "An Interpretation of Rudolph Sohm's *Kirchenrecht*," is justified throughout, for, in addition to his defense of Sohm's theory, he incorporates much of Sohm's work in his text and notes. The first hundred pages are devoted to a general treatment of the history of opinion about ecclesiastical organization, especially in the age of the Reformation. In a section on "Denominational Controversy" he gives an amusing account of the discussions on church government in the Westminster Assembly, but without recognizing the deeper issues which were at stake. He concludes the introductory part of his book with a résumé of the modern theories of church organization. His second and third chapters are devoted to a study of the apostolic age, in accordance with Sohm's theory that it had no legal order, but was directly under the guidance of the Spirit: "a legal constitution is opposed to the nature of the church." The theory of Sohm is in substance the position of the Quakers. The following passage is a representative one:

Sohm, while he sees in the legalizing of Christian institutions a radical departure from primitive ideals, which he attributes to want of faith in the guidance of the Spirit, recognizes at the same time that the character of legalized (Catholic) Christianity was conditioned essentially by the primitive conception of the nature of the church. The legal constitution of the church must assume monarchical form; because from the beginning the church was ruled by Christ's spirit, by Christ's word, *through* the men whom he had charismatically endowed to speak in his stead. That is to say, the officers of the church are the representatives of Christ (God), not the representatives of the congregation. Thus also, ecclesiastical law—if law there be—can only be regarded as an authority *jure divino*, because no other law is of force in the church but God's law. (P. 12.)

It is this thesis, with its corollaries, somewhat difficult to grasp, which Mr. Lowrie applies and seeks to test and confirm, in the latter part of his book, where he deals with the origin of the Christian ministry. As both Dr. Lindsay's and Mr. Lowrie's books have this in common, that they deal with the question of the relations between presbyters and bishops, and how it came about that the guidance of the community fell into the hands of the bishop, which have been the points at issue in the modern discussion, these points are taken here for a brief review.

Dr. Lindsay may be said in general to follow Professor Loofs and Professor Schmiedel in their dissent from the Hatch-Harnack theory, reverting in the main to Lightfoot's position, that the terms "bishop" and "presbyter" are synonymous, or, in other words, that "presbyters" were "church officials chosen and appointed as such in the church of the first century," and identical with "bishops." "Presbyter" is the name of the office, and *episcopus* tells us that the function of oversight was exercised by the "presbyter." This was also the testimony of Jerome, that in the course of time one of these coequal presbyters was placed over the others, and assumed the title of *episcopus*. This came to pass in the age of Ignatius, 110-17 A. D., when we first have the threefold form of ministry—bishops, presbyters, and deacons—substantially as it continued henceforth to exist in the Catholic church. The change consisted in this, that the college of presbyters without a president became one with a president, who was generally designated as "bishop." Dr. Lindsay thinks that the change came about gradually, without provoking any great opposition, and was everywhere, or almost everywhere accepted; but that when we come to ask for the causes which produced the change, or the paths along which the change manifested itself, the answer must be conjectural; or, which is the same thing, we must admit our ignorance.

The documentary sources of information are wanting. In this opinion

—that we do not know how the threefold ministry arose—Loofs and Schmiedel also concur. The probability founded on the natural order of things suggests that when the college or council of presbyters appointed any member of their order to the duty of an *episcopus*, and he succeeded in doing it well, he would naturally be continued in his position, and the tendency would be to make it permanent. He would also appear at once to those without or within the fold as a most important personage. Still further, he would come to represent the unity of the church, its property would be invested in his name, he would stand forth among the other presbyters as the *episcopus par excellence*, and, gathering up in his hands the various activities in the community, would gradually become the permanent head of the board of presbyters. In this way is to be explained how Hegesippus by the middle of the second century was able to make out his lists of bishops going back to the time of apostles. Dr. Lindsay also admits the force of the contribution made by Sohm, that the celebration of the eucharist was connected with the development of the *episcopus*. The board of presbyters can be easily conceived as presiding at a meeting for “exhortation”—the homiletical service; but not at a meeting for “thanksgiving” when the Lord’s Supper was kept. Here it would be necessary that one should preside. It may have been that the presbyters presided in turn, but the president (*πρωεστὴς*) of Justin Martyr, in whose Apology we have the first clear account of the observance of the Lord’s Supper, is manifestly the anticipation of the later bishop. At first he would be under the disciplinary authority of the presbyters;³ but if such presbyter-bishop had the prophetic gift, or were specially versed in the word and doctrine, at a time when the church was distracted with heresies, it is easy to see how precedence would grow into permanent authority. What was true of any one Christian community might be predicated of all; and although ways and methods may have differed, yet the common result was rapidly reached. But Dr. Lindsay regards the change as a great and radical one, by which the single *episcopus* rose to authority; as radical as the change in the sixteenth century, when, in the Reformed churches, he was reduced to the position of pastor and the oversight was vested in councils of graded authority. There was no apostolic sanction for the rise of the bishop to monarchical authority, or even for his distinct existence from the presbytery. It was the power of the Christian people in the congregations which sanctioned the change, and the same power was exerted in equally legitimate fashion, when, in the Reformed churches, what seemed fit in the second century was rejected as unfitting in the sixteenth century.

³ Cf. *Sources of the Apostolical Canons*.

The evidence that presbyters held an official position in the church in the first century, may be briefly summarized. (1) In 1 Peter 5:1, 2 the presbyters are told to "shepherd the flock of God which is among you;" and "to shepherd" (*ποιμαίνειν*) is, in the ancient ecclesiastical terminology, a word expressing the relation of an office-bearer. (2) In Acts 20:17, Paul tells the presbyters whom he summoned to Miletus to "shepherd the church of God," which is also called a "flock" (*ποιμνιον*); over which flock the Holy Ghost had made them overseers (*ἐπισκόπους*). And again in the Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (I, xlv, 4-6) the office-bearers are called presbyters, and the nature of their work is spoken of as oversight (*ἐπισκοπή*);

It will be no light sin for us if we have thrust out of the oversight those who have offered the gifts unblamably and holily. Blessed are those presbyters who have gone before, . . . for they have no fear lest anyone should remove them from their appointed place.

Such is the evidence for the contention that presbyters were office-bearers in the church of the first century, and that their function was oversight or episcopacy.

The proof for the identity of presbyters and bishops is thus arranged by Dr. Lindsay:

(1) Acts 20:17; St. Paul sent for *the* elders of Ephesus, and in his address to them said that the "Holy Spirit had made them bishops;" (2) in 1 Peter 5:1, 2, elders are told to act as pastors and as bishops (*πρεσβύτεροι . . . ποιμαίνετε . . . ἐπισκοποῦντες*); (3) in 1 Clement it is made clear that at Rome presbyters or elders and bishops are the same officials; (4) in 1 Timothy a description of bishops is given (3:1-7), then follows what is required of deacons (3:8-13); in 5:17-19 the former ministers are alluded to as presbyters; (5) in Titus 1:5-7 we find that "thou shouldest set in order the things that were wanting and appoint elders in every city . . . for the bishop must be;" (6) in the Peshito Syriac version of the New Testament *ἐπίσκοπος* is usually translated by kashisho—elder or presbyter; (7) the opinion of the ancient church, founding on these passages, and voiced by Jerome, unhesitatingly declared that in the apostolic age elders and bishops were the same; and this idea may almost be said to have prevailed throughout the Middle Ages down to the Council of Trent.

The evidence which Dr. Lindsay here gives as proof for the identity of presbyters and bishops may be conclusive, while yet it does not exclude the conception of the bishop as still having some special function to which he may have been delegated by the presbyters or in some other way. This was the contention of Dr. Hatch. Or, to adopt the language of Hooker, the significance of whose words has not been diminished by modern investigation:

Things themselves are always ancients than their names; therefore that thing, which the restrained use of the word doth import, is likewise ancients than the restraint of the word is.

It is important to discriminate between these two points and lines of proof, (1) that presbyters were an official class, and (2) that presbyters and bishops were identical. In regard to the first of these points, it is easy for one to share in the confidence with which Dr. Lindsay quotes the testimony of Loofs⁴ to the effect that he is so convinced that the presbyters of 1 Peter 5:1 are office-bearers that, if the argument needed it, he would prefer to believe that the νεώτεροι mentioned in the fifth verse are deacons. It is only the play upon the words for rhetorical effect which leads the writer of 1 Peter, as also other writers, to contrast πρεσβύτεροι with νεώτεροι. But when Professor Loofs goes farther and declares that to take ἐπίσκοπος as the name of an office-bearer, and not the descriptive term of the function of an office-bearer, is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of many modern attempts in the investigation of primitive ecclesiastical organization, he then seems to go too far. At any rate, he must reckon with Mr. Lowrie, to whose exposition we now turn, where this first false step, according to Dr. Lindsay and Professor Loofs, is made the foundation-stone of a theory; "presbyter" becomes a title merely of honor, while "bishop" is the name of an office-bearer. Dr. Lindsay and others, especially Lightfoot, follow an inductive method; Sohm pursues the deductive, advancing a hypothesis, and seeking to bring allusions to organization into harmony with it. This hypothesis is worked out by Mr. Lowrie in chap. 4, entitled "The Eucharistic Assembly—Its Significance for Church Order and Organization." To Dr. Hatch belongs the credit for the first suggestion of this theory, but he confined himself to one aspect of the eucharist, the *offerings*, whose care and distribution were intrusted to the bishop. Professor Harnack carried the theory farther taking advantage of the then recently discovered *Didache*, where the bishop is presented in the vacant place of the prophet, presiding at the eucharistic feast. Mr. Lowrie gives expansion to this point in an interesting discussion, maintaining the thesis of Sohm with great energy and suggestiveness: "It was in connection with the eucharist and the eucharistic assembly that a legal conception of the congregation and of the ministry was first formulated." A very brief outline of the argument for this hypothesis is as follows:

In the earliest time the eucharist was kept in conjunction with the agapé, all the disciples gathering around a common table. Both gentile and Jewish usage required a president for the feast, for obviously the functions

⁴ *Studien und Kritiken*, 1900, p. 638.

of breaking bread and the eucharistic prayer must be performed by one person. But this does not imply that the right to preside belonged exclusively to any one class of officers. The common priesthood of all believers implies that each one is "inherently capable" of these functions—an idea still current in the time of Tertullian. Despite this qualification which would seem to lead in another direction, Mr. Lowrie goes on to affirm that "whoever presided at the eucharist was *ipso facto* regarded as an officer." A distinction must be drawn here between "minor assemblies," equivalent to the "house churches" in a town, and the "principal assembly" of the whole local community of Christians. It is the principal assembly (whose existence is here assumed as in the nature of the case), that is significant for the development of church organization; the minor eucharistic assemblies explain the plurality of bishops, which was a feature of early organization.

It being assumed, then, that there could not be rotation in such an office, the question would arise in the assembly, "who is most worthy to sit in the seat of Christ?" for again it is assumed that "he who presides was recognized as sitting in Christ's seat." (For this assumption, however, there is no evidence until the time of Ignatius, 110-17 A. D.) In the apostolic age, as it was Paul who broke the bread at Troas, so it must have been James at Jerusalem; and, again, the position of leadership held by Timothy and Titus "surely implies presidency in the eucharistic assembly." While the Charismatic ministry still existed, it was the prophets (as in the *Didache*) who offered the eucharistic prayer; but when they were no longer to be had, the members of the congregation appointed the fittest of their number to this dignity, and the choice would naturally be made among the older men (*πρεσβύτεροι*). (The question might here arise whether the rule of the *Didache* was everywhere followed; or whether the presbyters might not elsewhere have appointed one of their number. Presbyters are not mentioned in the *Didache*.) Assuming further, as Mr. Lowrie does, the genuineness of the Pastorals (A. D. ca. 64), we have in them the enumeration of the attributes of that one of the presbyters appointed to this dignity of a bishop. As it was natural that the bishop should be taken from among the older men, so it was natural that the deacons—the ministers of the eucharist—should be chosen from the younger men. The requirement that the bishop should be "apt to teach," which has been taken by others to imply that at the time when the Pastorals were written this demand was first made upon the bishop (Wernle), is here regarded as going naturally with the office. As to the presbyters, their position cannot be very clearly defined, and the right view regarding them "has been prejudiced by age-long misrepresentation." They had no formal office, but were a vaguely

defined class, distinguished for their age or larger experience. The bishops were selected from this class; and hence the confusion that has so long prevailed about these two names.

It is a circumstance which is thought to call for reflection in this connection that "feasts are commonly and quite naturally the occasion of marking rank and precedence." Despite our Lord's rebuke of ambition for the "chief place at feasts,"

we have to suppose that, in accordance with prevailing custom, the presbyters or elders would occupy the chief places on either side of the president at the head of the eucharistic table. . . . And vague as the distinction was, it was probably the most formal that the presbyters enjoyed.

A twofold change took place in the second century, the time of which cannot be definitely fixed; (1) when the eucharist was separated from the *agapé*, and (2) when it was united with the *general* service of instruction and worship. According to the earlier usage, the principal "assembly" for homiletic purposes might comprise nearly all the Christians in a town or city, while the eucharist must be celebrated in small groups in several private houses, because it is assumed that all sat down at table. It is this which may explain the plurality of bishops. Many considerations may have united in bringing about the union of the two assemblies, completed by the time of Justin Martyr—a result which was momentous for organization, for liturgical worship as well as for church architecture. The union of the two services, the homiletic and the eucharistic, gave a new touch of formality and order; the position of the bishop became more exalted, because he now presided at the table, with presbyters on either side. Since it was no longer possible for the congregation to sit at the table, the feast assumed a symbolic character, and the beginning was also made of the separation between clergy and laity.

It is possible, as Mr. Lowrie remarks, that the early form of church buildings may support this theory; that the private house where the eucharist was first kept may have perpetuated itself in the so-called basilica of the age of Constantine; that the private house, and not the basilica, may have been the model or type of the Christian church. There is much to be said for this theory of church buildings, and, one church recently discovered does exist in Rome belonging to the sixth century—*Sta. Maria Antiqua*—which was simply a private house altered into a church. But church buildings did not come till the third century, and of the few which are then reported to exist we have no details regarding structure. The first definite statement is found in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii, 7), where the comparison which gives symbolic significance is not the house, but the ship:

And first, let the building be long, with its head to the east, with its vestries on both sides at the east end, and so it will be like a ship. In the middle let the bishop's throne be placed, and on each side of him let the presbyters sit down; and let the deacons stand near at hand, in close and small girt garments, for they are like the mariners and managers of the ship.

The mosaic in the apse of the Church of Sta. Pudenziana in Rome is a possible survival, three centuries and more later than the time of Ignatius, of the idea which he advocated—Christ in heaven with the apostles on either side; while the bishop on his seat below, surrounded by his presbyters, may suggest the comparison or the harmony of the heavenly and earthly hierarchies. But the bishop in the fourth century—the time of the mosaic—was regarded as the successor of the apostles, and not of Christ; and the symbolism is not necessarily of a nature to throw light on the point at issue.

The view of Sohm, interpreted and reinforced by Mr. Lowrie, is full of suggestiveness. It must be admitted that the development of the episcopate was connected with the eucharist. But the theory in its detailed form makes too many assumptions, as we have seen, for which the evidence is not forthcoming. We know little or nothing of any "principal assembly" in the apostolic age, nor of the relation of the house churches to it; in regard to the keeping of the eucharist there is silence in the New Testament writings apart from the description of Paul; it is not until the time of Justin Martyr (*ca.* 150) that we have a clear account; for the date of the *Didache* cannot be fixed. Under these circumstances, any hypothesis is to be welcomed which will throw light and be self-realizing. But not only does this hypothesis fail us at the critical points, but it also creates other difficulties which it does not solve. Mr. Lowrie maintains that the theory of the original identity of bishops and presbyters leaves "the development of the single episcopate an insoluble mystery," while the idea that the presbyters were thrust down from their higher rank to a lower one he pronounces "a monstrously unhistorical assumption." But, on the other hand, he has a problem to solve; he admits that in regard to the "origin of the single episcopate we are left largely to conjecture." How plural episcopacy passed over into moniscopacy is no more easily determined by his view of the connection of the bishop with the eucharist, than according to the other theory is the rise of the bishop out of the college of presbyters. In regard to the latter, Dr. Lindsay, Professor Loofs, and Professor Schmiedel confess that they do not know. Mr. Lowrie offers some suggestions as to how the practical difficulties may have been met of eliminating the several bishops from the field; as, for example, in Rome, where, according to his

theory, there were many bishops corresponding to the numerous places of assembly, and each bishop had his presbyters and deacons. He thinks that "a practical obstacle such as this could never have been surmounted except in the face of an imminent danger, and under the stress of a necessity which all recognized as imperative." But Dr. Lindsay would probably hold the same opinion regarding the rise of the bishop to monarchical authority over the presbyters. But also Mr. Lowrie frankly confesses: "I do not pretend to explain *how* the extra bishops were got rid of." And, indeed, history is silent on the subject.

We turn from this exposition of Sohm's hypothesis to its verification in the sources. Hatch, according to Mr. Lowrie, deserves the negative credit of having demolished the view which regarded bishops and presbyters as identical, but he was wrong in finding three sets of officers in the New Testament—presbyters, bishops, and deacons.

Sohm's solution is that there were but two sorts of officers (apart from the charismatic ministry of apostles, prophets, and teachers), and these were bishops and deacons. . . . The episcopal organization was not among the earliest institutions of Christianity, but nevertheless it originated in apostolic times. It was already established at Philippi about the year 60.⁵

The presbyters in the first century "were not officers, but merely a class in the community"—the "elder" disciples, the "honorable," from whose number the bishop was chosen, and among whom he ranked when it was dignity rather than office that was in question. The presbyter as such was not elected nor appointed, but enjoyed his informal position of leadership by common and informal consent: when an elder is (said to be) appointed, there is nothing else he can be appointed to but the episcopate—"the appointed elder is *ipso facto* a bishop" (p. 347).

In other words, in the New Testament and in Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians, the name "presbyter" is untechnical, while "bishop" and "deacon" are technical. Therefore in 1 Peter 5:1, 2, 5, the presbyters who are enjoined to "feed the flock" are not official persons, even though the young are exhorted to obey them, but are simply the older members of the community, and they exercise oversight because that is the duty of *all* elders (p. 357). In the case of the elders of the church at Jerusalem, so often mentioned,⁶ or the elders of the epistle of James (5:14) the same rule applies—they are not office-bearers. But, on the other hand, whenever the word "appointed" is used in connection with presbyters, we are to understand bishops. Thus Acts 14:23, "when they had *ordained* them elders in every city," carries a distinct reference to the bishop. So also in

⁵ Phil. 1:1.

⁶ Acts 11:30; 15:2, 6, 22, 23; 16:4; 21:18.

the case of the elders of the church at Ephesus⁷ bishops are to be understood, as in the passage, "the Holy Ghost hath *appointed* you bishops." It is possible, however, that there may be an allusion in Acts 11:30 to bishops, because here it is said a contribution for the poor was sent to the *elders*, the administration of church property being a function of the bishop's office. In other cases mentioned in Acts it may be that bishops were included among the elders, and the same may hold true of the elders mentioned in the epistle of James. But on this point, as Mr. Lowrie remarks, "a sure conclusion is hardly to be reached;" and it is difficult to see why the same remark may not apply to the statement which follows, that the Acts "expressly characterizes the appointed presbyters as bishops." In the pastoral epistles, when the word "presbyter" is used, it must be taken to mean an unofficial person of high dignity, except in Titus 1:5, where to *ordain* "presbyters" in every city means to make "bishops." And again in the Epistle of Clement (chap. 1), "ye walked after the ordinances of God, submitting to your rulers (*ἡγουμένους*) and rendering to the presbyters (*πρεσβυτέρους*) the honor which is their due," the rulers are bishops and the presbyters are the *elder men*. In all the allusions of Clement to presbyters we must understand an unofficial class, except in one passage (chap. 54) where it reads, "let the flock of Christ be at peace with the *appointed*" elders, and here it must be bishops that are meant.

As we contrast this interpretation of references in the New Testament and in Clement with that given above by Dr. Lindsay (with whom agree Dr. Hort in his *Christian Ecclesia* and later Professor Schmiedel in *Encyclopædia Biblica*), it seems artificial and arbitrary, till we are led to doubt the statement of Mr. Lowrie that the theory of Jerome has been demolished, or that Sohm's hypothesis becomes more convincing when applied to the situation described in the New Testament. It would be easier to agree with Wernle that overseers and elders indicate the same persons, that the colleges of presbyters without a head are a stage in the transition from the earlier ministry of the apostolic age to the age of Ignatius when the claim of the "monarchical" bishop, as he is commonly called, was for the first time boldly asserted.

It was Hatch's thesis that the office of bishop was an administrative one dealing primarily with ecclesiastical affairs rather than with teaching. Sohm is contending against Hatch for the spiritual quality of the bishop's office; and Mr. Lowrie remarks (p. 366) that the "antithesis between teaching and administration is a modern one which did not exist at all for the early church." But there is an important passage in the Acts of the

⁷ Acts 20:17, 28.

Apostles which, if we assume the historicity of the book, is a *locus classicus*, pointing to the distinction between teaching and administration. In the very earliest years of the church, and before Paul was yet converted, the twelve called the multitude of the disciples unto them, and said, It is not reason that *we should leave the word of God and serve tables*. Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men full of the Holy Ghost and of wisdom whom *we may appoint over this business*. But *we will give ourselves continually to prayer and to the ministry of the word*.⁸

This passage has received scant attention at the hands of recent students of the origin of the ecclesiastical organization, beyond the general agreement that it is not deacons who are here alluded to. Some have regarded it as an abortive attempt at organization, which was never followed up. Dr. Lindsay, agreeing with Ritschl, holds that the appointment of presbyters is to be understood; and there is something to be said for this theory. But there may be some truth in the ancient comment of Chrysostom,⁹ that "it was neither deacons nor presbyters who were then appointed." If it were neither deacons nor presbyters, then it may have been bishops, who rose by degrees from this inferior position (for so it is distinctly put—the administrative service of tables, as compared with the higher ministry of the Word) till they came to have servants to aid them, that is, the deacons; who became at a later stage identical with the presbyters, holding the presbyterial office and rank, and yet always with a distinct administrative function, till at last they rose to the place of president of the college of presbyters, and then the function of administrative oversight was granted the highest place of honor—the monarchical bishop of the Catholic church stands revealed. In some such general way as this it may be possible to explain the rise of the episcopate. As a hypothesis it does justice to Hatch's view, with its modifications by Harnack; it receives a contribution in its support from Sohm's view; it recognizes the presbyters as officials for which the evidence is too strong to be set aside; it justifies the conception of a *college* of presbyters, first without a head and then with one; and it is in harmony with the later development of the episcopal office in the Catholic church, where the administrative feature of episcopacy is predominant. It gains renewed support in the age of the Reformation, when the attempt was made to give again to the Word of God the precedence over the service of tables. In this development of the bishop to the time of Ignatius, and in the later growth and expansion of the office, it was a redeeming feature that the office came to be regarded as charismatic, or requiring special gifts of the Spirit, as it claimed for itself apostolic authority, and sub-

⁸ Acts 6:2-4.

⁹ *Hom. in Acta Apost.*, xiv.

jected to itself not only the presbyterate, but also teaching and prophecy. But in calling it charismatic, it is meant that it was suited to the needs of the age, that the times were calling for the bishop with the centralization of authority as the one predominant need of the church. Both Mr. Lowrie and Dr. Lindsay, with many other workers in the same field, admit that the change was attended with no violent protest or marks of revolution. That may be true with some exceptions,¹⁰ and yet when the development reached the point where it displaced prophetic utterance and authority, there came a protest in Montanism which was heard and felt throughout the church, and lingered even in the age of Cyprian.

A word should be said about the presbyters. Both Hatch and Harnack, and also Sohm, may have erred in limiting the functions of what we must hold to have been an office. It may have been in connection with the service for instruction, which was distinct from that of the eucharist, that they presided and taught and ministered the Word of God, as well as discharged the functions of moral oversight (11 Clem., 17). If we only knew, as Loofs has suggested, who trained the catechumens and prepared them for baptism it would throw light upon the question at issue. The fact that the homiletical service was so prominent in the early church and that it was gradually superseded by the eucharistic, which at last finally supplanted it, as in the Middle Ages, is a circumstance to be kept in mind in tracing the growth of the organization.

But after all has been said, there remain difficulties which, if not insuperable, have not yet been overcome, in the effort to interpret the hints contained in the New Testament and in the later writers of the sub-apostolic age—difficulties that hinder a common agreement or even a common understanding. Dr. Lindsay affirms, and Mr. Lowrie also, that the dates when the books of the New Testament were written, are a negligible element in the inquiry; for whenever they were written, they bear witness to the existing condition of the organization. It may be that Réville in his elaborate and valuable discussion has placed too much emphasis upon this point, but he is right in his attempt to fix the date of a document as a preliminary to any conclusion. Certainly it makes a difference whether we regard the Pastorals as genuine and as reflecting accurate information regarding the situation in the year 64, or the Acts as written by Luke not far from the same time, with accurate information about the church's order. Both Dr. Lindsay and Mr. Lowrie so regard them. But if they were written, as Jülicher claims, a generation or more later; if the Pastorals were a text-book by some unknown author, brought up to date by interpolations, as

¹⁰ 3 John, vs. 9.

late as well on in the second century; or if the writer of the Acts were not Luke, but some anonymous author attempting to describe the situation some forty years before he wrote, then the elaborate criticism and inference and adjustment, by Dr. Lindsay or by Sohm, of passages, which need to be brought into harmony, may be of little significance in determining the actual facts. And the same remark holds true of 1 Peter and James, and even of the synoptics, Matthew and Luke, if they also may have been influenced by later Catholic usage. Thus the famous passage, Matt. 16:18, upon which Dr. Lindsay dwells as significant for the use of "church," and which Mr. Lowrie makes the central point in his lecture on Jesus' "use of the word 'church,'" must first be vindicated against a growing doubt as to its genuineness. Réville regards it as an interpolation. Harnack thinks it doubtful. The passage is not cited by Irenæus when he is putting up his strong argument for the Roman church where, if he had known of it, it seems as if he would surely have used it. Such are some of the difficulties which make it impossible at present finally to determine many of the questions involved in the attempt to reproduce an exact picture of the organization of the early church.

But there is another, and perhaps even greater, obstacle—the presuppositions which are laid down for the purpose of controlling the inquiry. Thus Dr. Gore devotes a chapter in his *Church and the Ministry* to demonstrating the necessity of a certain principle of apostolic succession as essential in the nature of the case, and, having found it in writings of the latter part of the second century, assumes it to have been operating from the first. Sohm also has his presuppositions which reverse those of Bishop Gore, and in these he is followed by Schmiedel: "Anything in the nature of a constitution which could be described as legal formality is essentially foreign to the nature of religion;" or, in the words of Sohm: "No such thing ought ever to have existed, for religion consists in a relation of the devout heart to God." While some take it for granted that Christ intended to establish a church, Sohm, on the contrary, says: "It would be a great mistake to suppose that Jesus himself founded a religious community." With Gore the question of the origin of the ministry is of primary importance as involving the principle of authority; but Schmiedel thinks that, so far as the essence of religion is concerned, it is unquestionably only secondary in importance.

Sohm has a peculiar theory, which his interpreter, Mr. Lowrie, has expounded at length in his chapters entitled "The Idea of Church Organization" and "The Significance of Order and Custom." To put it briefly, Sohm maintains that there was no "law" in the apostolic age; but that

"custom" was the rule by which the church lived. "The authority of custom is not necessarily a legal authority." "Force is implied in the very idea of law; whereas the nature of the church abhors compulsion." By the light of this theory, Mr. Lowrie is guided in giving a summary of the history of ecclesiastical organization. But the theory is a subtle one, tenuous, difficult to grasp, and elusive. To the ordinary mind "custom" is but unwritten law, which *may* carry a tyrannical compulsion, while under law there *may* be freedom. Sohm maintains that church "law" began with Ignatius, when also the Catholic church began to be. But in the ordinary use of language, law did not come until there was some recognized authority, such as a synod, provincial or œcumenical, which legislated for the whole church. What Ignatius did was to attempt a change of custom, and he succeeded. In this connection some interesting remarks may be found in Tertullian's treatise on the *Veiling of Virgins*, where he maintains that "custom" has its origin in ignorance or simplicity. "Our Lord Christ has surnamed himself Truth, not Custom." The work of the Holy Spirit is to stimulate development:

What is the Paraclete's administrative² office but this—the direction of discipline, the revelation of the Scriptures, the re-formation of the intellect, the advancement toward the better things. . . . Those who have received Christ set truth before custom.

Tertullian in this treatise was advocating, as a Montanist, resistance to the growing "custom," as he conceived it, which Ignatius had been the first to introduce. The Holy Spirit "is the only prelate, because he alone succeeds Christ." Even Jerome was still under the impression that the order of the church in his time was but a matter of custom: "Ac sola consuetudine presbyteris episcopi presunt." These remarks are quoted as illustrating the ordinary use of language on the subject in the ancient church.

Mr. Lowrie in his preface laments "the neglect of Sohm's work," attributing it to the significant fact "of the *narrow* acquaintance of English-speaking scholars with German theological literature." It may or may not be so. The probability is that Sohm's theories are not exactly what the Anglo-Saxon type of mind is inclined to receive, however they may be welcomed in Germany. Had it been otherwise, both England and America would have proved more fertile soil. As it is, a little work of Sohm's *Kirchengeschichte im Grundriss*, translated into English (1895), is widely known, and in the absence of some such manual, written from a different point of view, but with equal charm of style and equipment of learning and scholarship, it holds an undisputed place. But in this work we have the same presuppositions as in his *Kirchenrecht*. There must be many who

will challenge such statements as these: "The natural man is a born enemy of Christianity;" "The natural man is a born Catholic;" "Church law has arisen from this overpowering desire of the natural man for a legally constituted, *catholicized* church;" with the coming of Ignatius and the monarchical bishop "the church has changed, not merely her constitution, but her faith." All this is the very essence of Martin Luther, from whose spell no German can escape; but it is not the genius of the Anglican or Reformed churches.

Is it not time to study the history of the rise of the "Catholic" church from a more objective point of view, and apart from ecclesiastical or national or other presuppositions? It was Baur who started the issue in its modern form; who thought the Catholic church arose when in the course of the second century the Jewish and Pauline types of Christianity were reconciled. Renan followed in the main upon this track. Ritschl saw the rise of the Catholic church in the influence of Greek thought upon Christian ideas, which it molded into dogmas. Sohm finds the great departure which constitutes the Catholic church in Ignatius and the episcopate, in the change from a charismatic custom to ecclesiastical law. But is the Catholic church anything else in reality than the primitive apostolic church, recognizing its call to universal expansion and adapting itself thereto? The term "catholic" is one of the great inspiring watchwords of the world, the ancient reservoir of faith and hope; like the modern word "humanitarian," or many others that could be mentioned, incapable of exact definition, and for that reason all the more potent. It is of the very essence of Christianity, or of the religion of Jesus, that it must assimilate every agency in every time and country which will enable it to conquer the world for the kingdom of God and his righteousness. And to this end the organization may be vital, no less than religious experience.

ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN.

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RECENT STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY.

WE have in these 1,015 pages the fourth part of Professor Hauck's history of the church in Germany,¹ or the eighth book in his series. It deals with the fascinating era of the Hohenstaufens, under the subtitle of "The Papal Dominion in the German Church and its Contests," from 1122 to 1250. It opens with a lengthy discussion of the external ecclesiastical conditions at the beginning of the twelfth century, studying with care the

¹*Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands*. Von ALBERT HAUCK. Vierter Teil, "Die Hohenstaufenzeit." Erste und zweite (Doppel-)Auflage. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 416 pages. M. 8.

various dioceses and monastic institutions. The author passes on to an elaborate investigation of the special types of piety which characterized the age. He then analyzes the forces which diminished the imperial prerogative and papal control, which brought on the reaction under Frederick I. The new monastic orders are reviewed with care and at length. Passing from these more external aspects of the Hohenstaufen church, the author plunges into the theological rubric, points out the new theological method characteristic of this age from Rupert von Deutz to Albert the Great, and shows the conservative attitude then natural to the German church. He has a strong chapter on the relation of the church to culture, and a résumé of the final efforts to bring the most remote German lands under Christian sway and to reach the Slavonic neighbors. The section of his history in hand closes with an elaborate account of the contest of Celestine III. and Innocent III. for the supremacy in church and state, and the reaction under Frederick II., bringing to the front the discordant religious elements which made certain sooner or later the Reformation movement. The appendices give a complete list of the ecclesiastical divisions of Germany into archbishoprics and bishoprics, as well as all monastic institutions. The bibliography is full, both as to sources and literature, and the index is refreshingly complete.

An elaborate monograph ² on the history of the idea of the sacrificial mass has been written by a devout Roman Catholic. With a wealth of learning and a deep spirituality it reviews the whole subject from the earlier ritual of the Hebrews down to the present day, and brings in a verdict for the Tridentine formula. The work opens with an introductory study of the idea of the messianic sacrifice as seen in the Old and New Testaments, filling the 141 pages of Book I. Book II goes more fully into the views of the ante-Nicene, Nicene, and post-Nicene fathers, tabulating the positions taken by each writer, showing the gradual growth of the formal idea of the Lord's Supper as a sacrifice. The various liturgies are examined, East and West. About two hundred pages are given to the views of the churchmen of the Middle Ages, special emphasis being laid upon the scholastics, whose idealistic philosophy led naturally to the view of the bloodless sacrifice afterward formulated with greatest care at Trent. After a brief but courteous handling of the denial by the Reformers of the sacrificial character of the eucharist, the author reviews the discussions of Catholic writers before the Council of Trent, giving nearly the whole of the fifth and sixth

²*Die Geschichte des Messopfer-Begriffs; oder, Der alte Glaube und die neuen Theorien über das Wesen des unblutigen Opfers.* Von FRANZ SER. RENZ. I. Band, "Altertum und Mittelalter;" II. Band, "Neuzeitliche Kirche." Freising: Datterer & Co., 1902. 816, iv + 526 pages. M. 10.

books to the debates at and since Trent by the various Catholic schools of thought. His conclusion is seen in the following sentence:

The essence of the eucharistic sacrificial act is therefore to be thus defined: Under the formal essence of the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament we are to understand the objective and subjective celebration of the sacramental communion by means of the real body and blood of Jesus Christ appearing in the form of bread and wine.

In a monograph of 621 pages³ we have a fine sample of the extreme Protestant contention in the recent phase of the *Culturkampf*. The author in this second attack upon the Ultramontane position lays down in the first section what he takes to be the biblical or New Testament scheme of morals, working out a complete outline of ethics, which he forthwith uses as the norm by which he calls to judgment the whole Jesuitical and papal code. He launches at once on the casuistical debates of the sixteenth and following centuries, examining in detail the theory of "probabilism." Over one hundred pages are devoted to the exposition of the theologico-ethical scheme of Alfons Maria von Liguori. A minute analysis of the ethics of the Roman Catholic forms of worship follows. The theory of sin, and the relations of the individual to God, to neighbors, and to the state, are given separate chapters. Marriage occupies over one hundred pages of the volume. In the third book the author undertakes to give a critical estimate of the scheme as a whole and to bring it to the test of the scriptural norm. His conclusion is that the papacy in regard to its ethical theory, as in all other particulars, is "a monstrous falsehood."

Little more than mere mention can be made of a handful of valuable reprints and studies from Paris, the titles and contents of which are enumerated below.

H. W. HULBERT.

BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
Bangor, Me.

³*Das Papstthum in seiner social-kulturellen Wirksamkeit.* VON GRAF VON HÖNSBROECH. Zweiter Band, "Die ultramontane Moral." Vierte unveränderte Auflage. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1902. M. 12.

⁴*La charité aux premiers siècles du christianisme.* PAR ANDRÉ BAUDRILLART. Paris: Bloud, 1903. 63 pages. Fr. 0.62.

Frère Élie de Cortone: Étude biographique. PAR ED. LEMPP. Paris: Fischbacher, 1901. 220 pages.

Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté de 1682-1789. Publiés par LÉON MENTION. Tome I. Paris: Picard, 1893, 1903. 183 pages. 1, "La régle les libertés de l'Église gallicane;" 2, "L'affaire des Françaises;" 3, "L'Édit de 1695 sur la juridiction ecclésiastique;" 4, "L'affaire des 'Maximes des Saints;'" 5, "Le Jansénisme en 1705;" 6, "La bulle 'Unigénitus;'" 7, "Le Parlement, les Jansénistes et le clergé (1720-1755);" 8, "Le clergé et le fisc, les biens de main-morte—l'Édit de 1749;" 9, "La suppression des Jésuites."

MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

PROFESSOR WERNLE is already known as the leading representative of the new school of historical exegesis which is creating something very similar to a new era in the study of the gospels and the apostolic literature. In his present pamphlet¹ he gives a succinct, but exceedingly luminous, discussion of the expectation concerning the conception of the kingdom of God as found in the New Testament. This he discovers to be fundamentally eschatological. He also discovers that in the case of Jesus and Paul, as well as in some of the other New Testament characters, this eschatological belief was supplemented by another to the effect that, while the kingdom had not yet come in its precise sense, it was in a sense already present in that its power was present. This power was to be seen in the works of Jesus and in those of the early church, especially in that there could be seen to be a beginning of the conquest of Satan. Professor Wernle also holds that the church was regarded as the embodiment of this kingdom of power. Few genuinely historical students will question that he is right in his main positions. There is perhaps a ground for question as to whether there has ever been exegetically established in Paul's thought a distinction between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of God, but no ground for doubting that Jesus believed the kingdom of God to be in some sense present.

Professor Sanday tells us in his preface that his latest book² is written partly for the purpose of lightening his forthcoming *Life of Christ* of a certain amount of topographical material, and also because he believes that he has something to contribute to the topography of the New Testament from the point of view of criticism. The book justifies his first motive, but the second does not appear to be quite so fully justified as one might have hoped.

As a discussion of topography the volume has the merit of Professor Sanday's lucidity of style and sanity of judgment, and above all of his recognition of the unwisdom of being too sure of one's conclusions in matters of identification. At the same time there is practically nothing new on its pages. Especially in this connection should one notice the discussion of Bethesda and of the trial of Jesus. In the former case Dr. Sanday does not believe the problem of identification has been solved. In the latter case he holds, with Kreyenbühl, that the trial was at Herod's palace near

¹*Die Reichgotteshoffnung in den ältesten christlichen Dokumenten und bei Jesus.* Von PAUL WERNLE. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1903. 58 pages. M. 1.20.

²*Sacred Sites of the Gospels.* By W. SANDAY. With the assistance of PAUL WATERHOUSE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903. 126 pages; lv plates. 13s. 6d.

what is now known as the Jaffa Gate. He also holds that the Cœnaculum is the site of the Lord's supper, and that, on the whole, the balance of probability favors the traditional site of Golgotha and the Holy Sepulcher. His discussion of the site of Capernaum is perhaps the best piece of work in the book, and results in the rather cautious favoring of Kahn Minyeh.

Dr. Sanday shows a wide acquaintance with the recent literature, but surprises one by the consideration he pays Ramsay's amorphous *Education of Christ*. It is refreshing, however, to find him puncturing the supreme self-complacency of the Macmillan *Guide to Palestine*.

The few days which Dr. Sanday spent in Palestine did not suffice to give more than a superficial impression of ruins and places. He says, for example: "There is in Palestine no Pompeii to take one back at one step into the very heart of the past." If Dr. Sanday had gone east of the Jordan and had seen Jerash and Umkeis, it is hardly possible to think he would have made such an unqualified statement. If he had climbed the hill above Kahn Minyeh, he would have seen that there are veritable ruins there. If he had followed the water courses between the Hot Springs at El Tabijha, he would perhaps have received other impressions than those he records.

The plates are half-tone reproductions of the stock photographs of Palestine. The book is in reality a summary of literature and of conclusions based upon literature.

The significance of a new edition of the Book of Jubilees³ lies both in its being an English translation of a carefully edited and complete text, and also in Professor Charles's statement that he has completely changed his opinion as to the time of its composition expressed in his *Commentary on the Book of Jubilees*. He now holds that the book was written by a pharisaic supporter of the Maccabean dynasty who was probably also a priest; that is to say, somewhere between 135 and 96 B. C. From this point of view it appears to him that the difficulties in the interpretation of the book very largely disappear.

Any student of Jubilees must recognize the advantages which such a change of date gives, and yet it is very difficult to feel that the evidence given by the editor is thoroughly convincing. Professor Charles is always inclined to exaggerate the importance of a new impression, and in the present instance this characteristic must be allowed for. From the statement that Levi is called "the priest of the Most High God" Professor Charles

³*The Book of Jubilees*; or, *The Little Genesis*. Translated from the editor's Ethiopic text. By R. H. CHARLES. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black; New York: imported by Macmillan, 1902. xci + 275 pages. \$5.25.

argues that the book must have been written in Maccabean times. According to Jewish tradition, he argues, Hyrcanus was the first man that came to use this title, and therefore the book was written not earlier than 135 B. C. He further argues that it was written before the break of Hyrcanus with the Pharisees, 96 B. C., because, although pharisaic, its author approved of the Maccabean pontificate. It is difficult to see in the book any very distinct data for either one of these positions. There are many difficulties, it is true, which lie in giving it a later date, and it may be probable that it was written in the Maccabean period; but Professor Charles has not placed this beyond doubt. On the whole, however, we are inclined to think that it will be better to accept the earlier date, especially in the light of 31:14-20, when compared with the Psalms of Solomon 17:5, 6, 8, the Assumption of Moses 6:1, and the apocalyptic history of 23:12-31.

The value of Jubilees in its bearing upon the messianic element in the New Testament is small, but great in its information concerning the development of angelology, demonology, and rabbinical interpretation in general. Professor Charles has brought out these facts admirably in his note, and his work will prove indispensable to the serious student of the Jewish thought which was contemporary with the beginnings of Christianity.

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RECENT BOOKS ON EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE.

APOLLONIUS OF ROME,¹ a Christian, it would seem, of senatorial rank, attained the martyr's crown under the emperor Commodus. His Acts have been handed down to us in two versions: an Armenian, discovered in 1874, preserved in the Mechitarite monastery in Venice, and an English translation of which was published by F. C. Conybeare in the *Guardian* in 1893; and a Greek manuscript in the Paris National Library, published by the Bollandists in 1895 (*Bollandianis*, Tom. XIV). Max, prince of Saxony, gives us in his volume the Greek text, with a German version, and a Latin translation of the Armenian text, which latter he considers the older in form, though neither text is original. Each has probably worked over the common source to some extent, with a view to its use in the church service. The account of the trial of Apollonius presents difficulties, from the point of view of Roman law, which led Mommsen to reject

¹ *Der heilige Märtyrer Apollonius von Rom: eine historisch-kritische Studie.* Von MAX, Prinz von Sachsen, Herzog zu Sachsen. Mainz: Kirchheim, 1903. vii + 88 pages.

it. The author tries to clear up these difficulties—I think, unsuccessfully. Yet, by comparison with the Fathers, he proves beyond a doubt that the whole atmosphere of the work is genuinely a second-century one. Aside from the liturgical interest which all martyrology possesses, the work, by its account of Apollonius's long defense before the prefect, is of value chiefly to students of second-century apologetics. The author thinks the work points to a lost Apology by Apollonius.

We have three new *Hefte* of Lietzmann's "Kleine Texte für theologische Vorlesungen und Übungen." The first is of great liturgical interest. It gives us the three oldest martyrologies.² First we have two short calendars, one a *Depositio Episcoporum*, the other a *Depositio Martirum*, from two late copies of older manuscripts, the original, according to the title, being by Filocalus, caligraphist to Pope Damasus, written in 354 A. D. The manuscript contained, besides these, a zodiacal calendar, lists of imperial consecrations and of consuls, Easter dates, lists of *praejecti urbis* (254-354), and a list of Roman bishops from Peter to Liberius. As this list of bishops became the basis for the *Liber Pontificalis*, this martyrology underlies the great martyrology of Pseudo-Jerome. Next we have a martyrology of Carthage, published in 1682 by Mabillon from a now lost Cluny manuscript, possibly original. This contains chiefly African saints. Its date is later than 505 A. D. Finally there are a German translation of the oldest calendar of the Eastern Church, from a Syrian manuscript in the British Museum; a codex written 411/12 at Edessa, and containing also the Clementine *Recognitions*; Titus of Bostra against the Manichees; and several works by Eusebius—all in Syriac. The document undoubtedly rests on a Greek original, often parallel to Pseudo-Jerome.

The fragments³ of the "Gospel of Peter" and the "Apocalypse of Peter" found in an eighth-(?) century parchment, which also contained two fragments of Enoch, discovered in a grave at Akhmīm, and now in the museum at Gizeh, as also fragments of *Kerygma Petri*,⁴ collected in Clement Alexandrinus's *Stromata*, are edited by Erich Klostermann. The gospel fragment gives an account of the crucifixion and resurrection. It is evidently Gnostic. The apocalypse is a vision of the future state, curiously worked out of the transfiguration of our Lord, it would seem.

Origen's Tenth Homily⁴ on Jeremiah, the Greek text published by

² *Die drei ältesten Martyrologien*. Von HANS LIETZMANN. Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1903. 16 pages. M. o.40.

³ *Apocrypha*. I: *Reste des Petrusangeliums, der Petrusapokalypse und des Kerygma Petri*. Von ERICH KLOSTERMANN. Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1903. M. o.30.

⁴ *Ausgewählte Predigten*. I: *Origenes Homilie X über den Propheten Jeremias*. Von ERICH KLOSTERMANN. Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1903. M. o.30.

Klostermann side by side with the Latin of Jerome, is a valuable study in Origen's sermon-composition and Jerome's methods of translation. There are also new emendations of the text.

The question of the authenticity of the *Cohortatio ad Graecos*, ascribed to Justin Martyr, is taken up again by Dr. Wilhelm Widmann.⁵ This work is divided into an introduction, discussing the history of the problem, and three chapters, devoted respectively to the contents of the work, especially the theological; to its literary form and vocabulary; and to answering various theories. Widmann finds tradition, at least as far back as Eusebius, uniformly ascribing the book to Justin. By elaborate comparisons he establishes the resemblance of its content and style to those of Justin's works. Undoubtedly there is relation to Julius Africanus, but the *Cohortatio* is the earlier. This is interesting. Within a year we have also had a discussion of the *Cohortatio* by Willy Gaul, who, while not ascribing it to Justin, places it almost in Justin's time. Thus the tide of criticism of this work seems to be setting back toward its genuineness.

Nathanael Bonwetsch, who as far back as in 1891 presented the works of Methodius, with remarks on their authenticity and transmission, now gives us a very careful and interesting work on the theology of Methodius of Olympus.⁶ The author first reviews the contents of each of the extant works of Methodius; then he discusses the dogmatic aspect of the writings, under the usual dogmatic heads—doctrine of God, world and man, sin, atonement, etc.; next he takes up the ethical aspect of Methodius's works, especially the relation of his teachings to those of Origen; finally, in a very interesting chapter, he deals with the place of Scripture, philosophy, and church tradition in Methodius. Methodius's canon evidently included the apocrypha of the Old Testament (Hellenistic canon) and our canonical New Testament books except Second Peter. He also recognized an apocalypse besides John's—perhaps *Apocalypsis Petri* (so Zahn *et al.*). His exegesis, especially of the Old Testament, is Origen's "spiritual" interpretation, *i. e.*, avowedly allegorical. Plato and the Stoa are the philosophical elements in Methodius, his ethics betraying especially Stoic influence. Methodius's theology grows out of the teaching tradition of the church. He, like all other men, stands on the shoulders of his predeces-

⁵ *Die Echtheit der Mahnrede Justins d. M. an die Heiden*. Von WILHELM WIDMANN. ["Forschungen zur christlichen Litteratur- und Dogmengeschichte," III, 1.] Mainz: Kirchheim, 1902. 164 pages.

⁶ *Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympus*. Von NATHANAEL BONWETSCH. ["Abhandlungen der kirchlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philologisch-historische Klasse," N. F., VII, 1.] Berlin: Weidmann, 1903. iv + 171 pages. M. 12.

sors. Yet tradition has not yet attained the post-Nicene formality. This work on Methodius will prove of great value for the history of dogma, bringing out, as it does, the orthodox trinitarian thought, so far as it had developed before Nicea, and showing us the advanced monastic ethics at the end of the third century. Moreover, the relation of Methodius to Origen and his combat with Origenist errors are very interesting for the history of the Origenist controversy, in which subsequently Methodius was appealed to as authority against Origen.

In a new volume of "Texte und Untersuchungen" Harnack discusses the pseudo-cyprianic treatise *De Singularitate Clericorum*, fragments of the *Hypotyposes* of Theognostos, and the forged epistles of Bishop Theonas. *De Singularitate*, after an introduction on the previous study of the work, is treated in eight chapters, in which, from an examination of the manuscript transmission, it is shown that the treatise was anonymous and not ascribed to Cyprian until the twelfth century. Morin in 1891 ascribed the work to the Donatist Macrobius. Harnack undertakes to prove this authorship. By a careful analysis of the treatise, its purpose, style, and vocabulary, he first makes the authorship of a Donatist bishop most probable; then he fixes the time as that of Macrobius; and finally he shows how exactly Macrobius suits the evidence. The date would then be about 375 A. D. The chief interest of this treatise, if we are indeed thus to assign it to the middle of the fourth century, flows from its very large number of Bible citations, throwing important light on the state of the Latin Bible of that time. In an appendix Harnack gives a list of these citations, which he discusses at some length.

In 1902 Diekamp (in *Theologische Quartalschrift*, No. 4, pp. 481-94) published an interesting discovery of a genuine fragment of Theognostos, teacher in Origen's school at Alexandria. Harnack gives a thorough discussion of Theognostos's teaching, followed by fragments excerpted from later authors. Theognostos was a thoroughgoing Origenist, and this paper is valuable for students of the Origenist controversies.

After two centuries of accredited genuineness, positive proof has at last been furnished that the epistle of Bishop Theonas is a forgery. Harnack carefully discusses this proof in the light of its manner of using Scripture, its ethical and religious conceptions, the false traces of date, and the true material for dating, language, etc. Mommsen in a letter to Harnack

¹ *Der pseudocyprianische Traktat, De Singularitate Clericorum, ein Werk des donatistischen Bischofs Macrobius in Rom. Die Hypotyposes des Theognost. Der gefälschte Brief des Bischofs Theonas an den Oberkammerherrn Lucian.* Von ADOLF HARNACK. ["Texte und Untersuchungen," N. F., IX, 3.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1903. 117 pages.

showed that the ideas of court officialdom in this epistle are drawn, not from the court of Aurelian, but from that of Louis XIV.(!), while the Latin is that of the Renaissance and even contains Gallicisms. The epistle was evidently composed by a Jansenist, perhaps the oratorian Vignier, in the seventeenth century, to whom other forgeries are traceable.

George Karo and Hans Lietzmann have published a catalogue of Greek *catenae*.⁸ There are indices of the codices used and of the authors of *catenae* or comments. The catalogue is arranged according to the books of the Bible as they are found in the manuscripts. Under each are printed the list of commentators mentioned in each codex and a description of the codices. The book, which is the product of immense labor, will be useful chiefly for students of the manuscripts themselves.

FREDERICK S. ARNOLD.

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⁸ *Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus*. Von GEORGIUS KARO UND JOHANNES LIETZMANN. [Aus den *Nachrichten der k. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philologisch-historische Klasse*, 1902.] Nos. 1, 3, 5. 620 pages.

INDEX.

I. AUTHORS AND SUBJECTS.

ALLEN, ALEXANDER V. G., Review of: Lindsay, The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries	799
Lowrie The Church and Its Organization in Primitive Times	799
Ancient Alexandria, Jews and Anti-Semites in	728
ANTHONY, ALFRED WILLIAMS, Review of: Abbott, From Letter to Spirit	411
Bollinger, Markus, der Bearbeiter des Matthäus-Evangeliums	411
Bornhäuser, Wollte Jesus die Heidenmission?	410
Dewing, An Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy	405
Griffinhoofe, The Unwritten Sayings of Christ	407
Grimm, Die Ethik Jesu	410
Heuver, The Teachings of Jesus concerning Wealth	400
Randolph, The Virgin-Birth of Our Lord	408
Sanday <i>et al.</i> , Criticism of the New Testament	406
Stewart, The Temptation of Jesus	408
Stone, An Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy	405
Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles	592
Apostles, The Apocryphal Acts of the	592
Apostolic Churches, Speaking of Women in the	360
Archæology and the Old Testament	562
ARNOLD, FREDERICK S., Review of: Bonwetsch, Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympos	821
Harnack, Der pseudocyprianische Traktat	822
Karo and Lietzmann, Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus	823
Klostermann, Apocrypha; Ausgewählte Predigten	820
Lietzmann, Die drei ältesten Martyrologien	820
Max, Der heilige Märtyrer Apollonius von Rom	810
Widmann, Die Echtheit der Mahnrede Justins d. M. an die Heiden	821
<i>Art, Religion, and the Emotions</i> , Rudolph M. Binder	636
Babylon and the Bible, More Literature on	144
Babylonia, The Legal Code of	256
BACON, BENJAMIN WISNER, The Problem of Religious Education	683
Review of: Drummond, An Inquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel	615
Stanton, The Gospels as Historical Documents	615
BADHAM, F. P., The Martyrdom of John the Apostle	539
BAPTISM, Two Recent Deliverances Concerning the Act of	350
BARNES, CHARLES R., Review of Rice, Christian Faith in an Age of Science	777
BATTEN, SAMUEL ZANE, The Logic of Evolution	470
BETTERIDGE, W. R., Review of: Frieberg, Talmud und Theologie	795
Herford, Christianity in Talmud and Midrash	795
Mielziner, Introduction to the Talmud	795
Biblical Criticism, The Present Status of	85
BIGGS, CHARLES L., Review of Recent Literature on Church History	198
BINDER, RUDOLPH M., <i>Art, Religion, and the Emotions</i>	636
BISHOP, SAMUEL H., A Point of View for the Study of Religion	267
Book of Cerne, The	559
Book of Numbers, New Works on the	575
Books of Kings, The	99
BIGGS, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, A Plea for the Higher Study of Theology	433
BROWN, FRANCIS, Review of Burney; Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Kings	99

BURRAGE, HENRY S., Review of Lambert, <i>The Sacraments in the New Testament</i>	350
Rogers, Baptist and Christian Archæology	350
Cerne, <i>The Book of</i>	559
Christianity, Vindication of	320
Christian Origins and Gospel Criticism	615
Church History, Literature on	198
Channing and the Religion of New England	78
Code of Babylonia	256
Code of Hammurabi	601
COE, GEORGE ALBERT, <i>The Philosophy of the Movement in Religious Education</i>	225
CONE, ORELLO, Review of Feine, <i>Der Römerbriefe: Eine exegetische Studie</i>	555
<i>Critical Notes</i>	66, 302, 536, 539, 728
DENIO, F. B., Review of: Baentsch, <i>Handkommentar zum Alten Testament: Numeri</i>	575
Gray, <i>A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers</i>	575
Holzinger, <i>Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament: Numeri</i>	575
<i>Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the New Testament, The</i> , William H. Walker	452
DEWAR, WILLIAM, <i>What is a Miracle?</i>	240
Divinity of Christ, Inquiries concerning the	10
Divinity School, <i>The Problem of Religious Education and the</i>	683
DOBSCHÜTZ, ERNST VON, <i>Jews and Anti-Semites in Ancient Alexandria</i>	728
Doctrine of Sin	588
Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the New Testament, <i>The Development of the</i>	452
Early Christian Church, <i>The</i>	164
Eastern Christendom	92
England, Religious Forecast in	625
Epistle to the Romans. To Whom Was It Addressed?	555
Epistles to the Thessalonians, Recent Works on the	609
Ethics and Philosophy, Literature on	395
Eusebius—Church Father, Historian, and Apologist	582
Evolution, <i>The Logic of</i>	470
<i>Faith and Mysticism</i> , Eugene W. Lyman	502
FOSTER, FRANK HUGH, Review of Abbott, <i>Life of Henry Ward Beecher</i>	790
FOSTER, GEORGE B., Review of Recent Literature on Systematic Theology	412
FRAME, JAMES EVERETT, Review of: Wohlenberg, <i>Der erste und zweite Thessalonicherbriefe ausgelegt</i>	610
Wrede, <i>Die Echtheit des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefs</i>	610
GILBERT, GEORGE HOLLEY, Review of: Haussleiter, <i>Zwei apostolische Zeugen für das Johannes-Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zu Lösung der Johanneischen Frage</i>	600
Lincke, <i>Jesus in Kapernaum: Ein Versuch zur Erklärung des Markus-Evangeliums</i>	597
MacConnell, Christ	600
Poulin and Loutil, <i>Les évangiles et la critique</i>	599
Schmidt, <i>Die Geschichte Jesu</i>	597
Wellhausen, <i>Das Evangelium Marci</i>	596
God in Human Evolution, <i>The Place of</i>	302
GOODSPEED, CALVIN, Review of Lidgett, <i>The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life</i>	152
GOODSPEED, EDGAR JOHNSON, <i>The Madrid Manuscript of Laodiceans</i>	536
GOODSPEED, GEORGE STEPHEN, Review of Recent Literature on the Old Testament	180
Gospel Criticism and Christian Origins	615
Gospels, Jesus and the	596
Gospels, Recent Criticism of the	123

GREGORY, CASPAR RENÉ, Review of: Weiss, Die Religion des Neuen Testaments	95
Westcott, Life of Westcott	755
HALE, EDWARD EVERETT, Review of Chadwick, William Ellery Channing	78
<i>Hellenism and Hebraism</i> , John E. McFadyen	30
HENDERSON, CHARLES RICHMOND, Review of; Coleman, Social Ethics: An Introduction to the Nature and Ethics of the State	426
Dalhoff, Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit	428
Edwards, God and Music	425
Golder, History of the Deaconess Movement in the Christian Church	428
Lee, Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy	429
Lucius, Zur äussern und innern Mission	428
Mark, The Teacher and the Child	426
Schäfer, Leitfaden der Inneren Mission	427
Spalding, Religion, Agnosticism, and Education	425
Wurster und Heurig, Was jedermann heute von der Inneren Mission wissen muss	427
HODGES, GEORGE, Review of The Book of Cerne	559
<i>Hodgson's "Metaphysics of Experience" as the Foundation of Theology</i> , James Ten Broeke	609
HULBERT, ERI B., Review of Recent Literature on Church History	198
HULBERT, HENRY W., Review of: Baudrillart, La charité aux premiers siècles du christianisme	816
Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands	814
Hönsbroeck, Das Papstthum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit	816
Lempp, Frère Élie de Cortone	816
Mention, Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté de 1682-1789	816
Renz, Die Geschichte des Messopfer-Begriffs	815
Immortality	139
INNES, ALEXANDER TAYLOR, The Religious Forecast in England	625
<i>Inquiries concerning the Divinity of Christ</i> , Frank C. Porter	10
Is God Knowable?	372
Is God Universal Father?	152
Israel, The Latest History of	382
Islam, Recent Literature on	429
Jesus and the Gospels	596
JEWETT, J. R., Review of: Hartmann, Mesreb der weisse Narr und fromme Ketzer	431
Hirschfeld, New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qoran	431
MacDonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory	429
Vaux, Gazali	430
<i>Jews and Anti-Semites in Ancient Alexandria</i> , Ernst von Dobschütz	728
Job, The Problem of the Poem of	66
John Calvin	331
JOHNS, C. H. W., Review of: Sayce, The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia	172
Schrader, Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament	172
JOHNSON, FRANKLIN, Review of: Recent Literature on Church History	198
Zscharnack, Der Dienst der Frau in den ersten Jahrhunderten der christlichen Kirche	360
John the Apostle, The Martyrdom of	539
JONES, ARTHUR, Review of: Adams, Primer on Teaching	221
Bushnell, The Spirit in Man	218
Cairns, Principal Cairns	221
Hall, The Use of the Holy Scriptures in the Public Worship of the Church	220

Lanier, The Kinship of God and Man	220
Martineau, National Duties and Other Sermons and Addresses	218
Meyer, Hints for Lay Preachers	219
Morgan, The Crises of the Christ	222
Stoddard, The Life and Letters of Charles Butler	222
Strong, Authority in the Church	221
Torrey, Revival Addresses	219
Judaism in the Days of Jesus	313
Judaism of New Testament Times, Literature on the	570
KELSO, JAMES A., Review of: Smith, Old Testament History	382
KENYON, F. G., Review of Gregory, Textkritik des Neuen Testamentes	364
Kings, The Books of	99
KNIGHT, GEORGE T., The New Science in Relation to Theism	48
KONIG, EDUARD, The Problem of the Poem of Job	66
KRÜGER, G., Review of Egli and Finsler, Corpus Reformatorum; Vol. LXXXVIII; Huldreich Zwingli's sämtliche Werke	393
Laodiceans, The Madrid Manuscript of	536
Legal Code of Babylonia, The, A. H. Sayce	256
LITTMANN, ENNO, Review of: Cooke, A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions	337
Lidzbarski, Handbuch der nordsemitischen Epigraphik	337
Logic of Evolution, The, Samuel Zane Batten	470
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O., Review of: Bolliger, Die Willensfreiheit	402
Couchard, Benoit de Spinoza	404
Duprat, Morals: A Treatise on the Psycho-Sociological Bases of Ethics	399
Fite, An Introductory Study of Ethics	398
Hudson, Rousseau and Naturalism in Thought and Life	403
Laberthonnière, Essais de philosophie religieuse	395
Montgomery, The Place of Values	396
Ott, David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology	403
Palmer, The Nature of Goodness	401
Profeit, The Creation of Matter	397
Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy	404
Lyman Beecher Lectureships, Recent Volume of	343
LYMAN, EUGENE W., Faith and Mysticism	502
McCONNELL, S. D., Review of: Abbott, The Other Room	139
Weir, Human Destiny in the Light of Revelation	139
McFADYEN, JOHN EDGAR, Hellenism and Hebraism	30
MACLENNAN, SIMON FRASER, Review of Knox, The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion	320
Madrid Manuscript of Laodiceans, The, Edgar Johnson Goodspeed	536
MARGOLIS, MAX L., Review of Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter	313
Martineau, The Man and the Thinker	107
Martyrdom of John the Apostle, The, F. P. Badham	539
MATHEWS, SHAILER, Review of: Charles, The Book of Jubilees	818
Sanday, Sacred Sites of the Gospels	817
Wernle, Die Reichgotteshoffnung in den ältesten christlichen Dokumenten und bei Jesu	817
MENZIES, ALLAN, Review of Weiss, Das älteste Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zum Verständniss des Markus-Evangeliums und der ältesten evangelischen Ueberlieferung	123
Metaphysics of Experience as the Foundation of Theology	699
Minister for the Times, The	117
Miracle, What is a?	240
MITCHELL, EDWIN KNOX, Review of: Beth, Die orientalische Christenheit der Mittelmeerländer	93
Grass, Geschichte der Dogmatik	94
Rausch, Kirche und Kirchen im Lichte griechischer Forschung	92

MOFFATT, JAMES, Review of Shaw, The Pauline Epistles	306
MONCRIEF, JOHN W., Review of: Doumergue, Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps	331
Recent Literature on Church History	198
MOXOM, PHILIP S., Review of: Denney, The Atonement and the Modern Mind	779
The Death of Christ	779
New England, Channing and the Religion of	78
<i>New Science in Relation to Theism</i> , The, George T. Knight	48
New Testament, Literature on the	405
New Testament, Syriac Version of the	162
New Testament, The Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the	452
New Testament, The Religion of the	94
<i>New Theory as to the Use of the Divine Names in the Pentateuch</i> , A, Henry A. Redpath	286
New Works on the Book of Numbers	575
North-Semitic Epigraphy and its Contributions to Semitic Study	337
NOURSE, EDWARD E., Review of: Baldensperger, Die messianischapokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums	571
Volz, Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba	571
Numbers, New Works on the Book of	575
Old Testament and Archæology	562
Old Testament, Recent Literature on the	180
<i>Oral Sources of the Patriarchal Narratives</i> , The, Lewis Bayles Paton	658
Paris, Religious Situation in	1
PATON, LEWIS B., The Oral Sources of the Patriarchal Narratives	658
Patriarchal Narratives, The Oral Sources of the	658
PATTISON, T. HARWOOD, Review of Wilson, Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology	117
PATTON, C. S., The Place of God in Human Evolution	302
Paul's Epistle, A New Book on	306
Pentateuch, A New Theory as to the Use of the Divine Names in the	286
<i>Persian Dualism</i> , Henry Goodwin Smith	487
PETERS, JOHN P., Review of Cheyne, The Book of Psalms	767
Philosophy and Ethics, Recent Literature in	395
<i>Philosophy of the Movement for Religious Education</i> , The, George A. Coe	225
<i>Place of God in Human Evolution</i> , The, C. S. Patton	302
PLATNER, J. W., Review of Schmidt, Die alten Petrussekten im Zusammenhang der apokryphen Apostellitteratur nebst einem neuentdeckten Fragment	592
<i>Plea for the Higher Study of Theology</i> , A, Charles Augustus Briggs	433
<i>Point of View for the Study of Religion</i> , A, Samuel H. Bishop	267
PORTER, FRANK CHAMBERLIN, Inquiries concerning the Divinity of Christ	10
Practical Theology, Literature on	218
Present Status of Biblical Criticism	85
PRICE, ORLO J., Review of Drummond, The Life and Letters of James Martineau	107
PRICE, IRA MAURICE, Review of: Budde, Das Alte Testament und die Ausgrabungen	148
Delitzsch, Babel and Bible	144
Giesebrecht, Friede für Babel und Bibel	146
Gunkel, Israel und Babylonien	151
Harnack's Letter to the <i>Preussische Jahrbücher</i> on the German Emperor's Criticism of Professor Delitzsch's Lectures on <i>Babel und Bibel</i>	170
Heyn, Zum Streit um Babel und Bibel	169
Hilprecht, Die Ausgrabungen der Universität zu Pennsylvania im Babel Tempel zu Nippur	150
Hübener, Das zertrümmerte Babel, das unfehlbare Gotteswort, und die ewige Gottesstadt	145
Keil, Zur Babel und Bibelfrage	147
Knieschke, Bibel und Babel, El und Bel	146
König, Babyloniens Kultur und die Weltgeschichte	145

Löhr, Babel und die biblische Urgeschichte	148
Recent Literature on the Old Testament	180
PRINCE, J. DYNELEY, Review of Harper, The Code of Hammurabi	601
<i>Problem of Religious Education and the Divinity School, The</i> , Benjamin Wisner	
Bacon	683
<i>Problem of the Poem of Job, The</i> , Edward König	66
Recent Criticism of the Gospels	123
REDPATH, HENRY A., A New Theory as to the Use of the Divine Names in the Pentateuch	286
Review of Gwilliam, Place of the Peshitto Version in the Apparatus Criticus of the Greek New Testament	161
Religion, A Point of View for the Study of	267
Religion in Conduct	425
Religion of New England, Channing and the	78
Religion of the New Testament	94
Religion, Point of View for the Study of	267
Religions of Israel and its Neighbors	172
Religious Education, The Philosophy of the Movement for	225
Religious Education, The Problem of	683
<i>Religious Forecast in England, The</i> , A. Taylor Inness	625
<i>Religious Situation in Paris, The</i> , A. G. B.	1
RICHARDSON, ERNEST CUSHING, Review of: Gifford, Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae praeparationis libri xv	582
Schwartz, Eusebius' Werke: Die Kirchengeschichte	582
ROBINSON, GEORGE L., Review of Pinches, The Old Testament in the Light of the Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia	562
Romans, To Whom Was the Epistle Addressed?	555
SAYCE, A. H., The Legal Code of Babylonia	256
Science and the Faith	357
Semitic Study, North-Semitic Epigraphy and its Contributions to	337
Sin, The Doctrine of	588
SMITH, GERALD BIRNEY, Review of Recent Literature on Systematic Theology	412
SMITH, HENRY GOODWIN, Persian Dualism	487
SMITH, JOHN M. P., Review of Recent Literature on the Old Testament	180
Smith, Old Testament History	391
Speaking of Women in the Apostolic Churches	360
STEVENS, GEORGE BARKER, Review of: Bousset, Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter	317
Syriac Version of the New Testament	162
Systematic Theology, Literature on	412
TEN BROEKE, JAMES, Hodgson's "Metaphysics of Experience" as the Foundation of Theology	699
Review of: Bowne, Theism, Comprising the Deems Lectures for 1902	372
Flint, Agnosticism	372
Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin	588
The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin	588
TERRY, MILTON S., Review of Gordon, Ultimate Conceptions of Faith	343
Textual Criticism, A Great Work in	364
Theism, The New Science in Relation to	48
Theology, A Plea for the Higher Study of	433
Theology, Metaphysics of Experience as the Foundation of	699
Thessalonians, Recent Works on the Epistles to the	609
To Whom Was the Epistle to the Romans Addressed?	555
TRACY, Review of Spencer, Autobiography of Herbert Spencer	784
VEDDER, HENRY C., Review of Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten	164
Vindication of Christianity	320

WALKER, WILLIAM H., The Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ in the New Testament	452
WENLEY, R. M., Review of: Capron, The Conflict of Truth	357
Mallock, Religion as a Credible Doctrine: A Study of the Fundamental Difficulty	359
What is a Miracle? William Dewar	240
WILLETT, HERBERT L., Review of Recent Literature on the Old Testament	180
Yale Lectures on Preaching	343
ZENOS, ANDREW C., Review of: Carpenter, The Bible in the Nineteenth Century	85
McFadyen, Old Testament Criticism and the Christian Church	85
ZWINGLI, The Works of	393

II. RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

Abbott, From Letter to Spirit	411
Life of Henry Ward Beecher	790
The Other Room	139
Adams, Primer on Teaching	221
Auchincloss, The Only Key to Daniel's Prophecies	187
Baentsch, Handkommentar zum Alten Testament: Numeri	575
Baldensperger, Die messianisch-apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judenthums	571
Barry, The Papal Monarchy	203
Baudrillart, La charité aux premiers siècles du christianisme	816
Baum und Geyer, Kirchengeschichte für das evangelische Haus	200
Baumann, Der Aufbau der Amosreden	186
Baumgarten, Predigten aus der Gegenwart	424
Beardslee, Outlines of an Introduction to the Old Testament	180
Bell, Lives and Legends of the Evangelists, Apostles, and Other Early Saints	200
Bensow, Die Lehre von der Kenose	421
Beth, Die orientalische Christenheit der Mittelmeerländer	93
Blake, Joseph and Moses, the Founders of Israel	182
Bolliger, Die Willensfreiheit	402
Markus, der Bearbeiter des Matthäus-Evangeliums	411
Bonwetsch, Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympos	821
Bornhäuser, Wollte Jesus die Heidenmission?	410
Boussett, Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter	315
Bowker, Of Religion	417
Bowme, Theism	372
British Museum, A Guide to the Early Christian and Byzantine Antiquities	199
Budde, Das Alte Testament und die Ausgrabungen	148
Die Schätzung des Königtums im Alten Testament	183
Budge, A History of Egypt, from the End of the Neolithic Period to the Death of Cleopatra VII	184
Burney, Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Kings	100
Bushnell, The Spirit in Man; Sermons and Selections	218
Cabrol, Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie	198
Cairns, Principal Cairns	221
Capes, The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries	207
Capron, The Conflict of Truth	357
Caro, Die Beziehungen Heinrichs VI. zur römischen Kurie während der Jahre 1190 bis 1197	224
Carpenter, The Bible in the Nineteenth Century	86
Carson, Reunion Essays	209
Chadwick, William Ellery Channing: Minister of Religion	78
Charles, The Book of Jubilees	818

<i>Cheyne</i> , Critica Biblica; or, Critical Notes on the Text of the Old Testament Writings. Part I, Isaiah and Jeremiah; Part II, Ezekiel and Minor Prophets; Part III, First and Second Samuel	- - - - -	190
The Book of Psalms	- - - - -	767
<i>Coleman</i> , Social Ethics	- - - - -	426
<i>Conder</i> , The First Bible	- - - - -	195
<i>Cook</i> , Biblical Quotations in Old English Prose Writers	- - - - -	195
<i>Cooke</i> , A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions	- - - - -	337
<i>Couchoud</i> , Benoit de Spinoza	- - - - -	404
<i>Cremer</i> , A Reply to Harnack on the Essence of Christianity	- - - - -	416
<i>Dalhoff</i> , Die christliche Liebesthätigkeit	- - - - -	428
<i>Dalman</i> , Palästiner Diwan als Beitrag zur Volkskunde Palästinas	- - - - -	197
<i>Davies</i> , Heinrich Ewald, Orientalist and Theologian, 1803-1903	- - - - -	194
<i>Deane</i> , St. Anselm	- - - - -	432
<i>Delitzsch</i> , Babel and Bible	- - - - -	144
<i>Denney</i> , The Atonement and the Modern Mind	- - - - -	779
The Death of Christ	- - - - -	779
<i>Detmer</i> , Johann von Leiden	- - - - -	205
<i>Dewey</i> , An Introduction to the History of Modern Philosophy	- - - - -	405
<i>Dietrich</i> , Die nestorianische Tauf liturgie ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter Verwertung der neusten handschriftlichen Funde historisch-kritisch erforscht	- - - - -	202
Isodadh's Stellung in der Auslegungsgeschichte des Alten Testaments an seinen Commentaren zu Hosea, Joel, Jona, Sacharja 9-14 und einigen angehängten Psalmen	- - - - -	181
<i>Douglass</i> , Spiritual Evolution, or Regeneration	- - - - -	224
<i>Doumergue</i> , Jean Calvin: Les hommes et les choses de son temps	- - - - -	331
<i>Drummond</i> , An Inquiry into the Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel	- - - - -	615
<i>Drummond and Upton</i> , The Life and Letters of James Martineau	- - - - -	107
<i>Duprat</i> , Morals: A Treatise on the Psycho-Sociological Bases of Ethics	- - - - -	399
<i>Edwards</i> , God and Music	- - - - -	425
<i>Egli und Finsler</i> , Corpus Reformatorum: Huldreich Zwingli's sämtliche Werke	- - - - -	393
<i>Erb</i> , Die Sicherstellung des Monotheismus durch die Gesetzgebung in dem vorerilischen Juda	- - - - -	190
<i>Feine</i> , Der Römerbrief: Eine exegetische Studie	- - - - -	555
Die Erneuerung des paulinischen Christentums durch Luther	- - - - -	423
<i>Fieberg</i> , Talmud und Theologie	- - - - -	795
<i>Fisher</i> , An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity	- - - - -	424
<i>Fite</i> , An Introductory Study of Ethics	- - - - -	398
<i>Fitzgerald</i> , The Roots of Methodism	- - - - -	212
<i>Flint</i> , Agnosticism	- - - - -	372
<i>Foakes-Jackson</i> , Christian Difficulties in the Second and Twentieth Centuries	- - - - -	423
The Biblical History of the Hebrews	- - - - -	181
<i>Foster, George B.</i> , Literature in Systematic Theology	- - - - -	412
<i>Gairdner</i> , The English Church in the Sixteenth Century from the Accession of Henry VIII. to the Death of Mary	- - - - -	208
<i>Giesebrecht</i> , Friede für Babel und Bibel	- - - - -	146
<i>Gifford</i> , Eusebii Pamphili Evangelicae præparationis libri XV	- - - - -	582
<i>Gilbert</i> , Side-Lights on Immortality	- - - - -	423
<i>Golder</i> , History of the Deaconess Movement in the Christian Church	- - - - -	428
<i>Gordon</i> , Ultimate Conceptions of Faith	- - - - -	343
<i>Grass</i> , Geschichte der Dogmatik in russischer Darstellung	- - - - -	94
<i>Graves</i> , Handbook of Christian Doctrine	- - - - -	432
<i>Gray</i> , The International Critical Commentary: A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers	- - - - -	575
<i>Gregory</i> , Textkritik des Neuen Testaments	- - - - -	364
<i>Griffiths</i> , The Unwritten Sayings of Christ	- - - - -	407
<i>Grimm</i> , Die Ethik Jesu	- - - - -	410

<i>Gunkel</i> , Genesis übersetzt und erklärt	- - - - -	186
Israel und Babylonien: Der Einfluss Babyloniens auf die israelitische Religion	- - - - -	151
<i>Gwilliam</i> , Place of the Peshitto Version in the Apparatus Criticus of the Greek New Testament	- - - - -	162
<i>Hall</i> , The Use of the Holy Scripture in the Public Worship of the Church	- - - - -	220
<i>Haring</i> , Das christliche Leben	- - - - -	415
<i>Harnack</i> , Augustins Konfessionen: Ein Vortrag	- - - - -	224
Das Mönchthum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte	- - - - -	224
Der pseudocyprianische Traktat	- - - - -	822
Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten	- - - - -	164
Reden und Aufsätze	- - - - -	424
<i>Harnack's</i> Letter to the <i>Preussische Jahrbücher</i> on the German Emperor's Criticism of Professor Delitzsch's Lectures on <i>Babel und Bibel</i>	- - - - -	150
<i>Harper</i> , The Code of Hammurabi	- - - - -	601
<i>Hartmann</i> , Mesreb der weise Narr und fromme Ketzer	- - - - -	431
<i>Hashagen</i> , Longinus über das Erhabene	- - - - -	432
<i>Hauck</i> , Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands	- - - - -	814
<i>Hausleiter</i> , Zwei apostolische Zeugen für das Johannes-Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zur Lösung der Johanneischen Frage	- - - - -	600
<i>Hedges</i> , Father Marquette: His Place of Burial at St. Ignace, Mich	- - - - -	217
<i>Herford</i> , Christianity in Talmud and Midrash	- - - - -	795
<i>Herrmann</i> , Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott	- - - - -	413
<i>Hewer</i> , The Teachings of Jesus Concerning Wealth	- - - - -	409
<i>Heyn</i> , Zum Streit um Babel und Bibel	- - - - -	149
<i>Hilprecht</i> , Die Ausgrabungen der Universität zu Pennsylvania im Bel Tempel zu Nippur	- - - - -	150
<i>Hirschfeld</i> , New Researches into the Composition and Exegesis of the Qoran	- - - - -	431
<i>Holden</i> , Justification by Faith and Sacred Trusts in Harmony and Correlation	- - - - -	224
<i>Hölscher</i> , Die Geschichte der Reformation in Goslar; nach dem Berichte der Akten im städtischen Archive dargestellt	- - - - -	205
<i>Holzappel</i> , St. Dominicus und der Rosenkranz	- - - - -	224
<i>Holsinger</i> , Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament; Lieferung 19, Numeri	- - - - -	575
<i>Hönsbroech</i> , Das Papstthum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit	- - - - -	816
<i>Horsch</i> , A Short History of Christianity	- - - - -	200
<i>Houtin</i> , La question biblique chez les Catholiques de France au XIXe siècle	- - - - -	196
<i>Hübener</i> , Das zertrümmerte Babel, das unfehlbare Gotteswort, und die ewige Gottesstadt	- - - - -	145
<i>Hudson</i> , Rousseau and Naturalism in Thought and Life	- - - - -	403
<i>Hummelauer</i> , Cursus Scripturae Sacrae: Commentarius in Librum Josue	- - - - -	186
<i>Hunnius</i> , Natur und Character Jahwes nach den vordeuteronomischen Quellen der Bücher Genesis-Könige	- - - - -	189
<i>Hunt</i> , The English Church from its Foundation to the Norman Conquest	- - - - -	207
<i>Hutton</i> , The Influence of Christianity upon National Character as Illustrated by the Lives and Legends of the English Saints	- - - - -	208
<i>Jeremias</i> , Moses and Hammurabi	- - - - -	192
John Wesley's Journal	- - - - -	212
John Wesley the Methodist	- - - - -	212
<i>Karo und Lietzmann</i> , Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus	- - - - -	823
<i>Keil</i> , Zur Babel- und Bibelfrage	- - - - -	147
<i>Klostermann</i> , Apocrypha	- - - - -	820
Ausgewählte Predigten	- - - - -	820
<i>Kniebe</i> , Der Schriftenstreit über die Reformation des Kurfürsten Johann Sigismund von Brandenburg seit 1613	- - - - -	224
<i>Knieschke</i> , Bibel und Babel, El und Bel	- - - - -	146
<i>Knox</i> , The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion	- - - - -	320
<i>Koenig</i> , De la sincérité dans l'enseignement de l'histoire sainte de l'Ancien Testament aux enfants	- - - - -	196

<i>Kolb</i> , Die Anfänge des Pietismus und Separatismus in Württemberg	- - -	206
<i>Kolde</i> , Das bayerische Religionsedikt vom 10. Januar 1803, und die Anfänge der protestantischen Landeskirche in Bayern	- - -	206
<i>König</i> , Babyloniens Kultur und die Weltgeschichte	- - -	145
<i>Kropatscheck</i> , Das Schriftprinzip der lutherischen Kirche	- - -	419
<i>Laberthonnière</i> , Essais de philosophie religieuse	- - -	395
<i>Lambert</i> , The Sacraments in the New Testament	- - -	350
<i>Lanier</i> , Kinship of God and Man	- - -	220
<i>Lee</i> , Constructive and Preventive Philanthropy	- - -	429
<i>Lempp</i> , Frère Elie de Cortone	- - -	816
<i>Lepsius</i> , Adolf Harnack's Wesen des Christentums	- - -	416
<i>Lidgett</i> , The Fatherhood of God in Christian Truth and Life	- - -	152
<i>Lietzmann</i> , Die drei ältesten Martyrologien	- - -	820
<i>Lincke</i> , Jesus in Kapernaum	- - -	597
<i>Lindsay</i> , The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries	- - -	799
<i>Lobstein</i> , The Virgin Birth	- - -	419
<i>Löhr</i> , Babel und die biblische Urgeschichte	- - -	148
<i>Lowrie</i> , The Church and its Organization in Primitive Times	- - -	799
<i>Lucius</i> , Zur äussern und innern Mission	- - -	428
<i>Luther</i> , Christian Liberty	- - -	224
<i>MacDonald</i> , Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitu- tional Theory	- - -	429
<i>Mallock</i> , Religion as a Credible Doctrine	- - -	359
<i>Mark</i> , The Teacher and the Child	- - -	426
<i>Marti</i> , Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament: Numeri	- - -	575
<i>Martineau</i> , National Duties and Other Sermons and Addresses	- - -	218
<i>Max</i> , Der heilige Märtyrer Apollonius von Rom	- - -	819
<i>McConnell</i> , Christ	- - -	600
<i>McFadyen</i> , Old Testament Criticism and the Christian Church	- - -	86
<i>McGill et al.</i> , A Short History of American Presbyterianism	- - -	214
<i>Meade</i> , Stories from the Old, Old Bible	- - -	196
<i>Meinhold</i> , Studien zur israelitischen Religionsgeschichte. Band I, Der heilige Rest; Teil I, Elias, Amos, Hosea, Jesaja	- - -	188
<i>Mention</i> , Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté de 1682-1789	- - -	816
<i>Meyer</i> , Hints for Lay Preachers	- - -	219
<i>Mielziner</i> , Introduction to the Talmud	- - -	795
<i>Moeller</i> , Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte	- - -	200
<i>Möller</i> , Die Entwicklung der alttestamentlichen Gottesidee in vorerilicher Zeit	- - -	188
<i>Montgomery</i> , The Place of Values	- - -	396
<i>Morgan</i> , The Crises of the Christ	- - -	222
<i>Mortimer</i> , The Creeds	- - -	414
<i>Naumann</i> , Ist lebhaftes religiöses Empfinden ein Zeichen geistiger Krankheit oder Gesundheit?	- - -	432
<i>Nowack</i> , Handkommentar zum Alten Testament: Numeri	- - -	575
<i>Nueslen</i> , Methodismus in Amerika	- - -	214
<i>Orr</i> , David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology	- - -	403
<i>Palmer</i> , The Nature of Goodness	- - -	401
<i>Parker</i> , The Heart of John Wesley's Journal	- - -	211
<i>Pfleiderer</i> , Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschicht- licher Beleuchtung	- - -	421
<i>Phillips</i> , What Baptists Stand For; and, Gleanings in the Field of Baptist His- tory	- - -	216
<i>Pick</i> , Assyrisches und Talmudisches: Kulturgeschichtliche und lexikalische Notizen	- - -	193
<i>Pierre</i> , Deux conférences sur le miracle	- - -	418
<i>Pike</i> , Wesley and His Preachers; Their Conquest of Britain	- - -	212

<i>Pinches</i> , The Old Testament in the Light of the Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia	562
<i>Pireyre</i> , Pourquoi ne peut-on pas se faire protestant ?	432
<i>Poulin</i> , Sainte Clotilde	216
<i>Poulin et Loutil</i> , Les évangiles et la critique	599
<i>Projet</i> , The Creator of Matter	397
<i>Rade</i> , Die Leitsätze der ersten und der zweiten Auflage von Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre nebeneinandergestellt	432
<i>Randolph</i> , The Virgin-Birth of our Lord	408
<i>Rau</i> , Harnack, Goethe, D. Strauss und L. Feuerbach über das Wesen des Christentums	417
<i>Rausch</i> , Kirche und Kirchen im Lichte griechischer Forschung	92
<i>Renz</i> , Die Geschichte des Messopfer-Begriffs	815
<i>Rice</i> , Christian Faith in an Age of Science	777
<i>Rütschl</i> , Wissenschaftliche Ethik und moralische Gesetzgebung	415
<i>Robson</i> , Jeremiah the Prophet	187
<i>Rogers</i> , Baptism and Christian Archaeology	350
<i>Rothstein</i> , Die Genealogie des Königs Jojachin und seiner Nachkommen in geschichtlicher Beleuchtung	183
<i>Reitsch</i> , Die nachevangelischen Geschehnisse der bethanischen Geschwister und die Lazarus-Reliquien zu Andlau	-199
<i>Sabatier</i> , La doctrine de l'expiation et son évolution historique	422
<i>Sampey</i> , Syllabus for Old Testament Study	180
<i>Sanday</i> , Sacred Sites of the Gospel	817
<i>Sanday et al.</i> , Criticism of the New Testament	406
<i>Sayce</i> , The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia	172
<i>Schack-Schackenburg</i> , Aegyptologische Studien	182
<i>Schäfer</i> , Leitfaden der Inneren Mission	425
<i>Schmidt, Carl</i> , Die alten Petrusakten im Zusammenhang der apokryphen Apostellitteratur nebst einem neuentdeckten Fragment	597
<i>Schmidt, Paul W.</i> , Die Geschichte Jesu	597
<i>Schrader</i> , Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament, II	172
<i>Schwartz</i> , Eusebius' Werke; zweiter Band: Die Kirchengeschichte	582
<i>Seeberg</i> , Vorstudien zur Dogmatik	412
<i>Sehling</i> , Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts	204
<i>Seitz</i> , Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation (1519): Aus bisher unbenutzten Quellen	204
<i>Shaw</i> , The Pauline Epistles	306
<i>Shaw-Caldecott</i> , The Linear Measures of Babylonia about 2500 B. C.	193
<i>Smith, H. P.</i> , Old Testament History	382
<i>Smith, N.</i> , Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy	404
<i>Sollau</i> , Hat Jesus Wunder getan ?	418
<i>Spalding</i> , Religion, Agnosticism, and Education	425
<i>Spencer</i> , Autobiography of Herbert Spencer	784
<i>Stanton</i> , The Gospels as Historical Documents; Part I, The Early Use of the Gospels	615
<i>Steinberg</i> , Studien zur Geschichte der Juden in der Schweiz während des Mittelalters	224
<i>Stephens</i> , The English Church from the Norman Conquest to the Close of the Thirteenth Century	207
<i>Steuernagel</i> , Hebräische Grammatik mit Paradigmen, Litteratur, Uebungstücken und Wörterverzeichnis	185
<i>Stewart</i> , The Temptation of Jesus	408
<i>Stoddard</i> , The Life and Letters of Charles Butler	222
<i>Strack</i> , Die Sprüche Jesus', des Sohnes Sirach's	185
<i>Strong</i> , Authority in the Church	221
<i>Sutherland</i> , Methodism in Canada: Its Work and Its Story	213

<i>Tennant</i> , The Origin and Propagation of Sin - - - - -	588
The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin - - - - -	588
The Book of Cerne - - - - -	560
<i>Thimme</i> , Luther's Stellung zur heiligen Schrift - - - - -	420
<i>Thompson</i> , The Presbyterians - - - - -	214
<i>Thümmel</i> , Die Versagung der kirchlichen Bestattungsfeier, ihre geschichtliche Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Bedeutung - - - - -	201
<i>Torrey</i> , Revival Addresses - - - - -	219
<i>Vaux</i> , Gazali - - - - -	430
<i>Vedder</i> , The Baptists - - - - -	215
<i>Vols</i> , Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba - - - - -	571
<i>Von Kugelen</i> , Die Gefangenschaftsbriege des Johann Hus - - - - -	224
<i>Von Lüpke</i> , Tat und Wahrheit - - - - -	412
<i>Voysey</i> , Religion for All Mankind - - - - -	224
<i>Wagner</i> , Der Christ und die Welt nach Clemens von Alexandrien - - - - -	423
<i>Watkinson</i> , The Journal of John Wesley - - - - -	211
<i>Weidner</i> , Ecclesiology; or, The Doctrine of the Church - - - - -	423
Studies in the Book; Old Testament; First Series, Exodus - - - - -	197
<i>Weir</i> , Human Destiny in the Light of Revelation - - - - -	193
<i>Weiss</i> , B., Die Religion des Neuen Testaments - - - - -	95
<i>Weiss</i> , J., Das älteste Evangelium: Ein Beitrag zum Verständniss des Markus- Evangeliums und der ältesten evangelischen Ueberlieferung - - - - -	125
<i>Wellhausen</i> , Das Evangelium Marci - - - - -	596
<i>Wernle</i> , Die Reichsgotteshoffnung in dem ältesten christlichen Dokumenten und bei Jesu - - - - -	756
<i>Westcott</i> , Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott - - - - -	756
<i>Whitton</i> , Miracles and Supernatural Religion - - - - -	417
<i>Widmann</i> , Die Echtheit der Mahnrede Justins d. M. an die Heiden - - - - -	821
<i>Wiernikowski</i> , Das Buch Hiob - - - - -	194
<i>Wilkin</i> , Control in Evolution - - - - -	413
<i>Wilson</i> , Six Lectures on Pastoral Theology - - - - -	117
<i>Winckler</i> , Abraham als Babylonier; Joseph als Aegypter - - - - -	181
Die Gesetze Hammurabis, Königs von Babylon um 2250 v. Chr. - - - - -	192
Keilinschriftliches Textbuch zum Alten Testament - - - - -	184
<i>Withrow</i> , Makers of Methodism - - - - -	212
<i>Wohlenberg</i> , Der erste und zweite Thessalonicherbrief ausgelegt - - - - -	610
<i>Workman</i> , The Dawn of the Reformation; Vol. II, The Age of Hus - - - - -	203
<i>Wrede</i> , Die Echtheit des zweiten Thessalonicherbriefes - - - - -	610
<i>Wurster und Heunig</i> , Was jedermann heute von der Inneren Mission wissen muss - - - - -	427
<i>Zapletal</i> , Der Schöpfungsbericht der Genesis, mit Berücksichtigung der neusten Entdeckungen und Forschungen - - - - -	191
<i>Zscharnack</i> , Der Dienst der Frau in den ersten Jahrhunderten der christlichen Kirche - - - - -	360

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
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Vol. VIII

OCTOBER, 1904

No. 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE RELIGIOUS FORECAST IN ENGLAND	- - - - -	625-635
By A. TAYLOR INNES, M.A., Edinburgh, Scotland.		
ART, RELIGION, AND THE EMOTIONS	- - - - -	636-657
By REV. RUDOLPH M. BINDER, PH.D., New York city.		
THE ORAL SOURCES OF THE PATRIARCHAL NARRATIVES	- - - - -	658-682
By PROFESSOR LEWIS BAYLES PATON, PH.D., Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Conn.		
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE DIVINITY SCHOOL	- - - - -	683-698
By PROFESSOR BENJAMIN WISNER BACON, D.D., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.		
HODGSON'S "METAPHYSICS OF EXPERIENCE" AS THE FOUNDATION OF THEOLOGY	- - - - -	699-727
By PROFESSOR JAMES TEN BROEKE, PH.D., McMaster University, Toronto, Can.		
CRITICAL NOTE:		
JEWS AND ANTISEMITES IN ANCIENT ALEXANDRIA	- - - - -	728-755
By PROFESSOR ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ, PH.D., University of Jena, Germany.		
RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE:		
BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT. By PROFESSOR C. R. GREGORY, PH.D., TH.D., Leipzig, Germany	- - - - -	756
INTUITIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE PSALMS. By REV. JOHN P. PETERS, D.D., New York city	- - - - -	767
RECONCILIATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY AND SCIENCE. By PROFESSOR CHARLES R. BARNES, PH.D., the University of Chicago	- - - - -	775
THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT RESTATED. By REV. PHILIP S. Moxom, D.D., Springfield, Mass	- - - - -	779
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A PHILOSOPHER. By PROFESSOR FREDERICK TRACY, B.A., PH.D., University of Toronto, Toronto, Can.	- - - - -	784
HENRY WARD BEECHER. By REV. FRANK HUGH FOSTER, D.D., Olivet, Mich.	- - - - -	790
THE TALMUD AND CHRISTIANITY. By PROFESSOR WALTER R. BETTERIDGE, PH.D., Rochester Theological Seminary, Rochester, N. Y.	- - - - -	795

(Continued on the following page.)

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE—Continued.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EARLY CHURCH. By PROFESSOR ALEXANDER V. G. ALLEN, D.D., Episcopal Divinity House, Cambridge, Mass. - - - -	799
RECENT LITERATURE IN CHURCH HISTORY. By PROFESSOR HENRY W. HULBERT, D.D., Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me. - - - -	814
MATERIALS FOR THE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By PROFESSOR SHAILER MATHEWS, D.D., the University of Chicago - - - - -	000
RECENT BOOKS ON EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE. By REV. FREDERICK S. ARNOLD, PH.D., Poughkeepsie, N. Y. - - - - -	000

BOOKS REVIEWED IN THIS NUMBER:

<i>Abbott</i> , Life of Henry Ward Beecher - - - - -	790
<i>Baudrillart</i> , La charité aux premiers siècles du christianisme - - - - -	816
<i>Bonwetsch</i> , Die Theologie des Methodius von Olympus - - - - -	821
<i>Charles</i> , The Book of Jubilees - - - - -	818
<i>Cheyne</i> , The Book of Psalms - - - - -	767
<i>Denney</i> , The Atonement and the Modern Mind - - - - -	779
The Death of Christ - - - - -	779
<i>Fieberg</i> , Talmud und Theologie - - - - -	795
<i>Harnack</i> , Der pseudocyprianische Traktat - - - - -	822
<i>Hauck</i> , Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands - - - - -	814
<i>Herford</i> , Christianity in Talmud and Midrash - - - - -	795
<i>Hönsbroech</i> , Das Papstthum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit - - - - -	816
<i>Karo und Lietzmann</i> , Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus - - - - -	823
<i>Klostermann</i> , Apocrypha - - - - -	820
Ausgewählte Predigten - - - - -	820
<i>Lempp</i> , Frère Elie de Cortone - - - - -	816
<i>Lietzmann</i> , Die drei ältesten Martyrologien - - - - -	820
<i>Lindsay</i> , The Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries - - - - -	799
<i>Lewrie</i> , The Church and Its Organization in Primitive Times - - - - -	799
<i>Max</i> , Der heilige Märtyrer Apollonius von Rom - - - - -	819
<i>Mention</i> , Documents relatifs aux rapports du clergé avec la royauté de 1682-1789 - - - - -	816
<i>Mielziner</i> , Introduction to the Talmud - - - - -	797
<i>Renz</i> , Die Geschichte des Messopfer-Begriffs - - - - -	815
<i>Rica</i> , Christian Faith in an Age of Science - - - - -	775
<i>Sanday</i> , Sacred Sites of the Gospels - - - - -	817
<i>Spencer</i> , Autobiography of Herbert Spencer - - - - -	784
<i>Wernle</i> , Die Reichsgotteshoffnung in dem ältesten christlichen Dokumenten und bei Jesu - - - - -	817
<i>Westcott</i> , Life and Letters of Brooke Foss Westcott - - - - -	756
<i>Widman</i> , Die Echtheit der Mahnrede Justins d. M. an die Heiden - - - - -	821

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
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
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
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
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
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
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